EP0029894A2 - System zur sicheren Kennwortverifikation - Google Patents

System zur sicheren Kennwortverifikation Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0029894A2
EP0029894A2 EP80106085A EP80106085A EP0029894A2 EP 0029894 A2 EP0029894 A2 EP 0029894A2 EP 80106085 A EP80106085 A EP 80106085A EP 80106085 A EP80106085 A EP 80106085A EP 0029894 A2 EP0029894 A2 EP 0029894A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
card
key
terminal
encryption
keyboard
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP80106085A
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English (en)
French (fr)
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EP0029894A3 (en
EP0029894B1 (de
Inventor
Paul Edward Stuckert
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
International Business Machines Corp
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International Business Machines Corp
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Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by International Business Machines Corp filed Critical International Business Machines Corp
Publication of EP0029894A2 publication Critical patent/EP0029894A2/de
Publication of EP0029894A3 publication Critical patent/EP0029894A3/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0029894B1 publication Critical patent/EP0029894B1/de
Expired legal-status Critical Current

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
    • G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
    • G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/0873—Details of the card reader
    • G07F7/088—Details of the card reader the card reader being part of the point of sale [POS] terminal or electronic cash register [ECR] itself
    • G07F7/0886—Details of the card reader the card reader being part of the point of sale [POS] terminal or electronic cash register [ECR] itself the card reader being portable for interacting with a POS or ECR in realizing a payment transaction
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1025—Identification of user by a PIN code

Definitions

  • the present invention addresses what is sometimes referred to as the "card-person pairing problem".
  • This problem exists whenever a person presents any sort of card or token, such as a credit card, debit card, identification card, etc. to another entity such as a retailer, bank, access control station, computer access terminal, etc., as evidence of the right or privilege of the person presenting said card to enter into some sort of privileged relationship relative to said entity such as credit, goods, services, facility access, etc.
  • the question which must be satisfactorily answered is, "Is the person presenting the card or token the person who is entitled to have same?".
  • the problem to be solved is one of adequately identifying the person, based on information contained in the card. From this information the entity seeking to verify the identity of the person must determine that said identity is correct.
  • recognition means such as "voiceprint”, or "fingerprint”. These are recognition and identification schemes wherein a person's fingerprint or voiceprint is compared against a previously taken fingerprint or voiceprint which is stored either on a credit card-like device carried by the person or stored in a central system memory, depending upon the complexity of the comparison and other factors which will be well understood by those skilled in the art.
  • the present invention presents a system in which the valid possession of a personal identification card is established when the person provides a key which is identical to a key which is electronically stored in the card.
  • the card itself is similar to that described in U.S. Patent No. 3,806,874 of Kurt Ehrat, entitled "Identification System for Individuals".
  • An essential feature of such a card is that it be so constructed that it is virtually impossible for anyone to either alter the circuitry in the card or to in any way either detect or alter the informational content of said card and circuitry other than in a manner which is intended by the design of the card.
  • CARD The credit card-like device or token
  • a CARD The credit card-like device or token
  • Such a CARD could be utilized at a bank's cash issuing terminal, a teller operated terminal, a point of sale terminal in a department store, or an identification terminal located at a physical facility.
  • U/I Terminal The terminals to which such a CARD is to be presented will be referred to hereinafter as a Utilization/Identification Terminal or "U/I Terminal". Regardless of the ultimate utilization of the terminal, for the purpose of the present invention, identification of the person is the function with which the present invention is concerned.
  • the person holding the CARD enter a memorized number via a keyboard into the identification system.
  • This number is then utilized as an encryption key as will be understood from the following description. While the number is, in essence, a personal identification number or PIN, in view of the use of the number in the present system, it will be referred to herein as the asserted key.
  • This asserted key is in contrast with a true key permanently stored in the CARD.
  • the asserted key is memorized and must be entered by the person into the U/I Terminal.
  • the key stored in the CARD will be referred to subsequently as the true key.
  • the asserted key and the true key will be specifically called "the key K A " and "the key K T " respectively.
  • a personal portable terminal device is utilized by the person to interface between the CARD and U/I Terminal.
  • the personal portable terminal device performs both an interface function between the CARD and the U/I Terminal and also provides a keyboard for entering the key K A into the system.
  • the term "XATR" will be utilized to refer to such terminal.
  • the CARD is first placed in a XATR which is then placed in a data exchange relationship with a U/I Terminal such as a Point of Sale Terminal (POST), or the like, at the facility where the person wishes to establish his identity.
  • a U/I Terminal such as a Point of Sale Terminal (POST), or the like
  • POST Point of Sale Terminal
  • the XATR is provided with a keyboard which allows the person to enter his memorized key K into the system with minimum exposure to unauthorized copying or retention.
  • a XATR is disclosed in detail in copending application Serial No. 866,197 of the present inventor entitled, "Personal Portable Terminal for Financial Transactions" filed December 30, 1977.
  • an identification system including a unqiue CARD containing data storage and computational capabilities built into same.
  • the card is further characterized by the fact that neither the circuitry nor any data stored therein be susceptible to alteration or unauthorized access subsequent to the manufacture or issuance thereof.
  • Embedded in the CARD are a plurality of storage registers, a random word generator and at least one key-controlled block-cipher encryption device.
  • the bank or other entity issuing the CARD causes the person's true key K T to be stored within the CARD. The person memorizes this key for subsequent entry into a U/I Terminal, or a XATR as the key K A .
  • a random word is produced by the system, which random word is simultaneously encrypted under the key, KT, and the key, K A , entered at a keyboard by the person.
  • the results of the encryptions of this random word are subsequently compared to determine if the two keys are the same. If they are, the person presenting the card is considered to be properly identified.
  • the true key, K T permanently stored within the CARD is never available outside of the CARD, i.e., only the random word encrypted under K T is available outside of the CARD.
  • the keyboard entered key, K A is not available to the U/I Terminal, only the random word encrypted under said key is.
  • a personal identification system which includes the combination of a CARD which is issued to a person and a U/I Terminal.
  • the CARD is so constructed that access to secure data stored therein is impossible. Any alteration of the functional operation of the circuitry contained therein subsequent to manufacture or issuance is also prevented.
  • the CARD contains at least a secure storage means for a key K T unique to the person, means for generat- i n g or obtaining a random word to be encrypted under said key, K T , a key-controlled block-cipher encryption device, and means for transferring the encrypted random word to a U/I Terminal for subsequent comparison.
  • the U/I Terminal provided at the utilization entity includes the following functional components:
  • the operation of the present system includes the generation of a random word either in the CARD, the U/I Terminal, or by a combination of the two, and then separate encryptions of this random word under the two keys, K T and K A .
  • the key, K T is stored in a secure storage location in the CARD and the key, K A , is entered by the person at a keyboard which may be located in the U/I Terminal.
  • the two encryptions occur in identical encryption devices, the first being located in the CARD and the other in the U/I Terminal. If both keys are the same, the encrypted random words will be identical.
  • the XATR in the present system provides a keyboard which is under the control of the person entering an asserted key K A .
  • the XATR also serves as a communication, data, and control interface between the CARD and U/I Terminal.
  • the circuit configuration of the CARD is modified so that the encryption of the random word under both the true key K T stored in the CARD and under the key K are both performed within the CARD.
  • the two versions of the encrypted random word are both transferred to the U/I Terminal and to a comparison circuit located, therein, wherein an affirmative comparison indicates that the proper asserted key K A has been entered by the person.
  • the person gains greater security because his asserted key K A never passes into the U/I Terminal.
  • the utilization entity in order for the utilization entity to have adequate protection it should be understood that it is of greatest importance that the CARD carried by the individual be unalterable in data content, circuit function or data paths.
  • the system would be compromised.
  • means are provided for disabling the CARD in the event of an attempted unauthorized use should the card be lost or stolen.
  • Circuitry is provided within the CARD to electronically disable the CARD in the event of one or more unsuccessful comparison operations. The number of comparison failures necessary to cause disabling of the CARD would be predetermined by the system designers. In this way a number of legitimate mistakes by a person entering his key K A would be permitted.
  • FIGS. 1, 2 and 3 only the significant functional units of the system are disclosed. These are the significant storage registers and functional elements such as the encryption blocks, random word generators, and the comparison and catenation circuits.
  • the gates for transmitting data between registers or between registers and functional units and their operation are considered obvious to a digital circuit designer.
  • the sequential controls could comprise a system clock including a number of interconnected single shot circuits or a small microprocessor having an associated microprogrammed memory for effecting the various sequential operations required.
  • control of the functional units within the CARD could either be accomplished by a microprocessor or a system clock physically located within the CARD wherein the operation is initiated by a single control pulse from the U/I Terminal or alternatively all of the control functions could be performed by a microprocessor located within the U/I Terminal and transmitted to the CARD via the interface between the Card and the Terminal.
  • the XATR device functions primarily as a communication path for both data and control information.
  • the required key length for the FIPS 'Data Encryption Standard' is 56 binary bits.
  • Such a binary key is derived from a decimal keyboard entry by decimal to binary conversion employing conversion algorithms well-known in the art.
  • a 'compare' in block 217 of the terminal would indicate that the person holding the CARD was a properly identified person.
  • a 'no compare' would indicate that an unauthorized person was attempting to use the CARD or that the person's memorized key K A was improperly entered.
  • communication between the CARD and the U/I Terminal could be by a number of means well-known in the art. These include direct connection, as indicated, inductive coupling, or the like. It is also assumed that the circuitry within the CARD would be powered inductively from a power source in the U/I Terminal, rendering the CARD less bulky. Similarly, the control sequences could be performed by either a series of sequential single shot circuits or by a small microprocessor and control store therefor which could be located either within the CARD or in the U/I Terminal and connected to the CARD via appropriate control lines as will be well-understood by those skilled in the art.
  • the person first places his CARD on or in a U/I Terminal, which in the embodi- m ent of FIG. 1 is a retailer's Point of Sale Terminal (POST). Communication between the CARD and the U/I Terminal is established. First, the person enters his key K A via the keyboard 201 in the U/I Terminal. At this point all activity by the person ceases.
  • POST Point of Sale Terminal
  • the U/I Terminal through an appropriate signal, designated by the arrow P . I . (perform identification), initiates a program stored within the CARD to perform the following operations to establish the validity of the key K A entered by the person via the keyboard 201.
  • the CARD delivers the contents of key storage register 1045, which is the true key K T to the key input of the encryption device 115
  • the U/I Terminal delivers the keyboard entered key K A from the keyboard 201, as the asserted key input to the encryption device 215 (identical to 115).
  • the CARD delivers a random word from the Random Word Generator 107 to one input of exclusive OR circuit 116 located on the CARD and to one input of the exclusive OR circuit 216 located in the U/I Terminal
  • Random Word Generator 207 delivers random word RW2 simultaneously as the second input to exclusive OR circuit 116 in the card and to exclusive OR circuit 216 in the U/I Terminal.
  • the two exclusive OR circuits 116 and 216 located on the CARD and in the U/I Terminal respectively, deliver the same composite random word to their respective encryption devices 115 and 215, as the data input.
  • the two encryption operations are performed substantially simultaneously and the output of the encryption device 115 is stored in register 108 as the true encrypted random word (ERWT).
  • the output from encryption device 215 is stored in register 208 as the asserted encrypted random word (ERWA).
  • the two compare units simultaneously reach 'valid' or 'invalid' decisions based on ERWT and ERWA. If a 'valid' decision is reached, the person has entered the proper key K A at the keyboard and he is properly identified for whatever transaction he wished to consummate at the U/I Terminal.
  • compare unit 117 The function of compare unit 117 is to activate disabling circuitry of the type shown in FIG. 3 which will be described later. It will be noted, however, that this is not a requirement of the most basic system.
  • the output of encryption device 115 could be simultaneously transferred into compare unit 117 and 217 respectively, and the output of encryption device 215 could be simultaneously transferred to compare unit 217 and 117. Both of these alternate embodiments require that the CARD be absolutely unalterable to prevent the person fraudulently retransmitting ERWA back to the U/I Terminal and thus force a compare in compare unit 217. This subject will be discussed later with respect to the embodiment of FIG. 2.
  • registers 108, 109 and 208, 209 could be dispensed with and the two encrypted random words ERWT and ERWA forwarded directly to the compare circuit 217, other changes could be made in the system without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention.
  • Another possible alteration would be to dispense with the generation of the two random words RWl and RW2 and replace same with a single random word generator within the CARD or U/I Terminal which word is delivered to both encryption devices 115 and 215.
  • FIG. 2 an alternative embodiment of the invention is disclosed wherein the person has a personal portable transaction device, or XATR, at his disposal which has means for interfacing with the CARD and with the U/I Terminal.
  • the line A-A' again refers to the interface between the U/I Terminal and the XATR and CARD combination, i.e., the person and the Retailer.
  • the XATR is indicated by the outer dashed line to the left of the interface line A-A' and the CARD and its circuitry are indicated.
  • the XATR provides a keyboard 101 for entering the key K A which is totally within the control of the person presenting the CARD.
  • the XA T R provides the communication or interface function between the CARD located therein and the U/I Terminal.
  • the operations performed by the encryption circuitry, etc., in the embodiment of FIG. 2 are essentially the same as those of FIG. 1.
  • the principal exception to this is that the distribution of functions between the CARD and U/I Terminal is different.
  • the key K which is entered via the keyboard 101, never passes into the Terminal. Consequently, the second encryption device, shown in FIG. 2 as 114B, is located in the CARD. Again, the circuitry within the CARD may not be altered in any way by the person to whom said CARD is issued.
  • the operation of the system is as follows. With the CARD in position in the XATR and the XATR appropriately connected to the U/I Terminal, a transaction initiation button is actuated. The person enters the key K into the keyboard 101 of the XATR. K A is communicated to the encryption device 114B as the key input. Simultaneously, the key K T stored in register 1045 is gated as the key input to the encryption device 114A.
  • the data input to the two encryption units 114A and 114B both located on the CARD is generated by the Random Word Generator 106. Since both encryption devices are located on the CARD it is not necessary and serves no useful security function to have two random word generators as in the embodiment of FIG. 1.
  • the outputs from the two encryption devices 114A and 114B are delivered to registers 108 in the CARD and 208 in the U/I Terminal as the true encrypted random word (ERWT) and asserted encrypted random word (ERWA), respectively.
  • FIG. 2 prevents what would be a relatively simple alteration of the XATR by a person owning same and wishing to defraud the retailer.
  • the person could cause the output from register 208 to be delivered directly to register 209.
  • the compare circuit 217 would always give a successful comparison regardless ot what key K A the person entered at the keyboard 101.
  • the contents of registers 208 and 209 are compared in unit 217 and if successful the identification of the person is assumed correct and if unsuccessful either a mistake has been made, i.e., the wrong key entered, or the person is an imposter.
  • the numeral 1045 refers to the register for storing the true key, KT.
  • register 108 stores the true encrypted random word and register 208 stores the asserted encrypted random word.
  • FIG. 3 a system similar to FIG. 2 is disclosed utilizing again an XATR as an interface unit between the CARD and the U/I Terminal.
  • FIG. 3 there are three additional enhancements to the basic system of the FIG. 2. It will be noted that the circuitry in FIG. 3 below the line D/D' is the same as in FIG. 2.
  • the first enhancement of FIG. 3 is the use of a special counter having a "disable CARD” output which will electronically “destroy” or “disable” a CARD which should no longer be used. Its operation will be apparent from the subsequent description of the figure.
  • the second feature described is the division of the key into high order and low order bits so that the key K A which must be memorized by the person may be considerably shortened.
  • the third feature involves the use of a special index (M) which may be selectively entered by the individual into a register in the CARD. This index is an offset whereby the key entered at the keyboard may be periodically changed without necessitating any change of the permanently stored key K T .
  • a block 125 is provided labeled Counter Protection having one output line labeled 'Disable CARD'.
  • Two input lines are provided. The first is labeled "Increment” which emanates from register 104 where a quantity KL is stored. This line produces a pulse each time register 104 is accessed. The second input from the compare block 117 marked “Reset” resets this counter to zero. This prevents someone finding or stealing a card, placing it in a XATR, and trying different keys K A until the correct one is found.
  • the counter protection circuit would be set at some predetermined count value.
  • This count value or threshold would allow a reasonable number of honest mistakes on the part of the person entering his key K A .
  • the register 104 is accessed and a pulse produced. Subsequently, with every successful compare between the registers 108 and 109 a pulse would be produced by 117 and the counter would be reset to zero. However, if a predetermined number of consecutive accesses of 104 should occur without a successful comparison by 117 a 'disable CARD' means 128 would be activated by the output from the Counter Protection block which would cause some "invalid" condition to occur in the CARD. This could take on a number of different forms such as, disabling the storage area for K T so it would not be available to the system.
  • a special register could be provided which would be readable by the U/I Terminal indicating an invalid CARD wherein said register would always be read before any identification procedure began.
  • Other ways in which the CARD could be disabled include setting a latch which burns a fusible link, removing power from the card or interrupting data flow from the CARD. This protection prevents an unauthorized holder of the CARD from presenting the CARD with different keys K A until the correct one is found.
  • the second feature of the circuitry shown in FIG. 3 is the division of the asserted key K A so that a smaller number of digits must be memorized by the person.
  • the blocks labeled 111, 102 and 103 should be ignored for the following explanation, it being assumed that the keyboard input goes directly to the catenation circuit 122 as the low order bits K A L.
  • the true key K T is divided into two parts, the low order bits K T L being stored in register 104 and the high order bits K T H being stored in register 105.
  • a low order portion of the key K T becomes one input to the catenation circuit 120 and the high order portion from register 105 becomes the second input to the catenation circuit 120.
  • the catenation circuit functions to order these two groups of bits into their proper sequence, i.e., into a single key having the appropriate bits in the high and low order positions.
  • Catenation circuit 122 works in exactly the same way as 120, and forms the full asserted key K A which is provided as the key input to the encryption device 114B.
  • K T H is utilized to make up both the full true key K T and the full asserted key K A .
  • security is provided and the size of the key which must be remembered and entered correctly via the keyboard 101 is reduced.
  • a quantity M may be entered at any time by the individual and stored in register 103 via the dashed line from keyboard 101. Subsequently the asserted key which is entered via 101 referred to herein as K E is entered directly into register 102 in the normal fashion. Addition of the two quantities in registers 102 and 103 in the adder circuit 111 produces the partial asserted key K A L.
  • both M and K E are N bit data words which when added together produce the N bit key K A L. This may be represented by the formula:
  • This feature allows the person to periodically alter his asserted key K E to enhance security.
  • the presently disclosed invention has applicability for any situation where personal identification is of importance. It would have particular utility in the retail sales field where the retailer is obviously concerned that the individual seeking credit and having an apparently valid credit card is actually the person entitled to said credit card and thus to credit. Another significant area of potential commercial utilization of the invention is in the financial field and more particularly cash issuing terminals either manned or unmanned wherein a person presents the bank ) CARD and, upon proper identification, cash is issued to the individual.
  • the system also has potential utilization in the facility access field wherein an individual is either seeking entry into a physical facility such as a plant or to a computer or to computer files via a terminal where it is important that the individual be properly identified prior to the granting of the desired access.
  • the function of the CARD is not limited to personal identification transactions, but may well be extended to maintain records of particular business transactions. Thus, subsequent bookkeeping and electronic funds transfer operations utilizing transaction data recorded on the card are possible.
  • the CARD would be presented to a banking institution where the transaction data would be transferred to the person's account. In those cases where the transaction data was not previously forwarded to the bank by the U/I Terminal device, the CARD entered data would serve as the sole bookkeeping data input. Conversely, when the transaction data was previously forwarded to the bank the transaction data from the CARD could serve as a check to protect the person and warn him of any unauthorized use of his account or mistakes by the retailer.
  • the presently disclosed system has the advantage of giving the person significant protection as well as providing security for the particular entity having control of the Utilization/ Identification Terminal whether it be a point of sale terminal, a computer terminal, a cash issuing terminal or some sort of facility access terminal.
  • identification system disclosed herein could be combined with other personal identification systems for various high security applications. These might include signature verification systems, fingerprint recognition systems, voiceprint recognition systems and the like.
  • the herein disclosed identification system provides a high degree of security for both the person holding the CARD and the entity which ultimately accepts said identification at a suitable U/I Terminal.
  • the system maintains security without recourse to a Host computer which might be subject to breakdown, communication outages, etc., and thus is capable of off-host operation without sacrificing reliability.
EP80106085A 1979-12-03 1980-10-07 System zur sicheren Kennwortverifikation Expired EP0029894B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US99797 1979-12-03
US06/099,797 US4295039A (en) 1979-12-03 1979-12-03 Method and apparatus for achieving secure password verification

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0029894A2 true EP0029894A2 (de) 1981-06-10
EP0029894A3 EP0029894A3 (en) 1981-07-15
EP0029894B1 EP0029894B1 (de) 1985-01-09

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Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP80106085A Expired EP0029894B1 (de) 1979-12-03 1980-10-07 System zur sicheren Kennwortverifikation

Country Status (6)

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US (1) US4295039A (de)
EP (1) EP0029894B1 (de)
JP (1) JPS5911950B2 (de)
CA (1) CA1129028A (de)
DE (1) DE3069942D1 (de)
IT (1) IT1150969B (de)

Cited By (25)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2496294A1 (fr) * 1980-12-15 1982-06-18 Thomson Csf Dispositif protege d'authentification des utilisateurs d'un terminal de transmission de messages et systeme de transactions comportant de tels dispositifs
FR2497617A1 (fr) * 1981-01-07 1982-07-09 Transac Develop Transactions A Procede et dispositif de securite pour communication tripartie de donnees confidentielles
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Publication number Publication date
JPS5680769A (en) 1981-07-02
DE3069942D1 (en) 1985-02-21
CA1129028A (en) 1982-08-03
EP0029894A3 (en) 1981-07-15
EP0029894B1 (de) 1985-01-09
JPS5911950B2 (ja) 1984-03-19
IT8025313A0 (it) 1980-10-14
IT1150969B (it) 1986-12-17
US4295039A (en) 1981-10-13

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