CN112118092A - Quantum key distribution and reception system defense method aiming at dead time attack - Google Patents
Quantum key distribution and reception system defense method aiming at dead time attack Download PDFInfo
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- CN112118092A CN112118092A CN201910535129.5A CN201910535129A CN112118092A CN 112118092 A CN112118092 A CN 112118092A CN 201910535129 A CN201910535129 A CN 201910535129A CN 112118092 A CN112118092 A CN 112118092A
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- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
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Abstract
The invention relates to a quantum key distribution and reception system defense method aiming at dead time attack, which comprises an effective detection step, a detection invalidation step and a detection recovery step. In the effective detection step, the detector channel outputs detection signals outwards and marks time cycle serial numbers to the detection signals; and entering a detection invalid step after the detection signal is output in the valid detection step and is marked with a cycle number A. In the detection invalidation step, all the detector channels are made to enter a dead time state from a time period after the period number a and last for a time Td, and the detection invalidation step further includes an exit judgment process for judging whether to enter the detection recovery step. In the detection recovery step, all the detector channels are simultaneously recovered to an effective detection state so as to perform the effective detection step. Therefore, the problem of dead time window overlapping caused by independently setting dead time for the detector can be avoided, and the overlapping proportion is reduced to improve the code rate.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a quantum communication technology, in particular to a quantum key distribution and reception system defense method aiming at dead time attack.
Background
QKD (quantum key distribution) systems are composed of several internal components. To achieve QKD security requirements, the components of a QKD system must meet certain performance parameters. The manufacturing principle of the single photon detector causes the detector to have characteristics which can have the potential of being attacked. For example, the operating characteristics of single photon detectors have dead time (i.e., the minimum invalid detection time interval between two adjacent valid detections of the detector) to suppress the back pulse (i.e., the erroneous count of secondary detection events triggered by the previous photon detection event). If the system does not properly process the dead time, the system may cause attack hidden trouble, such as being influenced by the dead time attack.
Fig. 1 shows a schematic diagram of a dead time attack using the dead time effect of a probe. As shown in the figure, the detector works in a working mode of "when a certain detector in a plurality of detectors has a detection pulse, only the detector is in a dead time, and not all the detectors enter the dead time". Then, the detection result in this dead time is not completely random for the attacker, and the attacker has a certain probability to know the detection information. The attack does not need to intercept quantum states, and only needs to inject a strong pulse before the signal pulse (and the time interval of the signal pulse is less than the dead time), the strong light enables other detectors except the required detector to respond, so that the other detectors cannot detect in the effective window position due to the dead time, and then all key information can be obtained from the response result of the detector without the dead time. Taking BB84 polarization encoding as an example, if the polarization modulation of strong pulse light randomly selected by an attacker is | - >, and the receiving end passively selects a measurement basis vector, then detectors detecting | H >, | V >, and | - >, in the system are in dead time with high probability, and an eavesdropper controls the response of the detector at the receiving end accordingly. And only the detector for detecting | + >, if the receiving end detects, the attacker can judge the detection result of the receiving end to be | + >, with high accuracy.
Various defense schemes have been proposed in the prior art against dead time attacks.
For example, in one defense scheme of the prior art, the receiving end may analyze the detection events outside the detection window, but the attacker may partially attack or scatter the attack time positions to simulate noise to mask its attack behavior. However, this solution has limited defense effects and cannot completely defend against attacks.
In another defense scheme of the prior art, the receiving end can also adopt a mode of detecting the state of the detector, and the detection efficiency can be ensured to be at a normal level through the bias voltage of the detector. This requires the detector itself to have this monitoring function, placing additional circuit requirements on the detector.
The prior art also proposes a defense scheme in which a dead time attack is resisted by requiring that the probe count events employed to generate the key come from a portion that satisfies the condition that all probes are in a valid probe state (valid probes, i.e., probes that are not in a dead time). However, the dead times employed by current semiconductor material based detectors, such as InGaAs or Si detectors, are typically in the order of hundreds of nanoseconds to tens of microseconds, i.e., on the order of 100ns-10us, to suppress subsequent pulses. When the detector works in a working mode that one detector in the plurality of detectors has detection pulses, only the detector is in dead time, but not all the detectors enter the dead time, the defense scheme has the advantages that when the channel attenuation is small, the detection dead time is long, and the number of the detectors is large, independent dead time windows of the plurality of detectors are overlapped with each other and the overlapping proportion is serious, so that the probability of detection counting events meeting the condition obtained by screening the scheme is relatively small, most of the detection counting events do not meet the requirement of the condition, and the counting is wasted greatly, so that the rate of the finished code is reduced seriously.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems in the prior art, the invention provides a quantum key distribution and reception system defense method aiming at dead time attack, which comprises an effective detection step, a detection invalidation step and a detection recovery step.
In the effective detection step, a detector channel outputs detection signals outwards, and time cycle serial numbers are marked on the detection signals;
when the detection signal is output in the effective detection step and the detection signal is marked with a cycle number A, entering the detection invalidation step;
in the detection invalidation step, all the detector channels are put into a dead time state from a time period after the period number A and are kept for a time Td; wherein the duration Td has an initial preset value Td _ Def, and the detecting invalidation step further comprises an exit judgment process for judging whether to enter the detecting recovery step; and the number of the first and second electrodes,
in the detection recovery step, all the detector channels are simultaneously recovered to an effective detection state so as to perform the effective detection step.
Furthermore, the effective detection step further includes the steps of performing time synchronization processing on the detection signal and marking the time cycle sequence number after performing time-to-digital conversion on the detection signal output by the detector channel.
Further, in the detecting nulling step, no avalanche gating signal is provided to the detector channel such that the detector channel does not generate the detection signal. Or alternatively, in the detection disabling step, an avalanche gating signal is continuously provided to the detector channel and the detection signal output by the detector channel is discarded.
Further, in the exit judgment process, it is judged whether or not there is an output of the detection signal in any one of the detector channels before the end of the duration Td in the detection disabling step;
performing the detection recovery step at the end of the duration Td if there is no output of the detection signal;
if the detection signal is output, judging whether a difference dT between a time point corresponding to the detection signal and the end point of the duration Td is greater than a preset second time Td0_ U;
discarding the detection signal output corresponding to the time point if the difference dT is greater than the second time Td0_ U, while performing the detection recovery step at the end of the duration Td;
if the difference dT is less than the second time Td0_ U, discarding the detection signal output corresponding to the time point and extending the duration Td by a time Td0_ A; and
when the duration Td is extended, the exit determination process is repeatedly performed until the extended duration Td is ended until the duration Td is not extended any more and the detection recovery step is performed at the end of the duration Td.
Preferably, said second time Td0_ U is greater than the detector intrinsic minimum dead time Td 0; and/or the extension time Td0_ A is greater than (Td0_ U-dT).
Preferably, the extension time Td0_ a is equal to Td0_ U.
Preferably, the number of detector channels is 4.
Preferably, the detector channels comprise detector channels for detecting H/V/P/N states.
Further, the detection signal may include a detection count pulse generated by the detector channel in response to the received light pulse, a noise dark count pulse and a back pulse of the detector channel.
Drawings
FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of dead time attack using the dead time effect of a probe;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram illustrating the quantum key distribution receiving system defense method against dead time attacks according to the present invention;
fig. 3 illustrates two exemplary schemes for implementing a probe invalid state.
Detailed Description
Hereinafter, exemplary embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. The following examples are provided by way of illustration in order to fully convey the spirit of the invention to those skilled in the art to which the invention pertains. Accordingly, the present invention is not limited to the embodiments disclosed herein.
Fig. 2 shows a schematic diagram of the quantum key distribution receiving system defense method against dead time attack according to the present invention.
According to the invention, the quantum key distribution and reception system defense method aiming at the dead time attack can comprise an effective detection step, wherein the detector channel outputs detection signals outwards, and the detection signals output by the detector channel are marked with time information. Here, the detection signal output by the detector channel may include, but is not limited to, a detection count pulse generated in response to the received light pulse, a noise dark count pulse and a post pulse of the detector channel.
In one example, after the detection signals of the multiple detector channels are acquired through time-to-digital conversion, the detection signals are subjected to time synchronization processing to mark corresponding cycle numbers thereof, so that the detection signals with the same cycle number can be placed in the same cycle number.
In a time period corresponding to a certain period number a, the detector channel outputs a detection signal (for example, the detector channel for H state outputs a detection signal, i.e., a detection count pulse, in response to the received light pulse) and marks time information on the detection signal, and then the detection invalidation step is performed. In the detection invalidation step, all detector channels (e.g., detector channels for H state/V state/P state/N state, respectively) are brought into the dead time state (i.e., into the invalidation detection state) beginning at a time period after the period number a and lasting for a time Td. In the present invention, the initial preset value of Td is the first time Td _ Def.
FIG. 3 illustrates two exemplary schemes for implementing a probe invalid state: the first scheme is that the avalanche gating signal is not provided to the detector, so that the detector does not output a detection signal outwards; the second solution is to provide avalanche gating signals to the detector continuously, but in this state (i.e. within time Td) the detection signals resulting from the corresponding avalanche gating signals will be discarded as invalid detection data. In fig. 3, Ts is a time period, which is the inverse of the system frequency.
The step of detecting invalidation further comprises exiting the judging process. In the exit determination process, it is first determined whether or not detection signals are output in all the detector channels before the end of the time Td.
If no detection signal is output, the dead time state is exited at the end of time Td, i.e., the detection invalidation step ends. At this time, the duration Td of the detection invalid state is its initial preset value Td _ Def, as shown in "(a case" in fig. 2, for example.
If a detection signal is output in the detector channel at a certain time point T1, it is determined whether a difference dT between the time point T1 and the duration Td is greater than a preset second time Td0_ U. Here, the second time Td0_ U may be set to be greater than the minimum dead time Td0 inherent to the detector.
The minimum dead time Td0 inherent to the detector is determined by the detector hardware circuitry. As an example, Td0 may be 8 ns.
If dT is greater than Td0_ U, the probe signal output at time point T1 is discarded while exiting the dead time state at the end of duration Td. At this time, the duration Td of the detection invalid state is still the initial preset value Td _ Def, as shown in "(b) case1 case" in fig. 2, for example.
If dT is less than Td0_ U, discarding the probe signal outputted at the time point T1 and extending the duration of the probe disabling step by Td0_ A, i.e., updating the duration Td to Td _ Def + Td0_ A; meanwhile, the above-described exit determination process is repeatedly performed until the updated duration Td is ended, until the duration Td is no longer extended, and the dead time state is exited at the end of the duration Td, as shown in, for example, the "(b) case2 case" in fig. 2.
It is easily understood by those skilled in the art that if the duration Td is extended by N times in the detection invalidation step, the duration Td of the system in the dead time state is Td _ Def + N Td0_ a in this detection invalidation step.
In the present invention, the extension time Td0_ A may be set to be greater than (Td0_ U-dT). As an example, Td0_ a may be set to Td0_ U.
After the probe nullification step is completed, a probe recovery step is performed in which all probe channels are simultaneously restored to a valid probe state.
And finally, entering an effective detection step again to perform effective detection on the detector channel and entering an effective detection state.
In one example of the invention, the number of detector channels may be 4. Preferably, the detector channels may comprise detector channels for detecting one of the H/V/P/N states, respectively.
Compared with the prior art, in the quantum key distribution receiving system defense method aiming at the dead time attack, when a certain detector channel outputs detection signals outwards, other detector channels are also made to enter the dead time state while the detector channel enters the dead time state, and all the detector channels are made to enter the detection state again at the same time after the dead time is over. Therefore, the problem of dead time window overlapping caused by independently setting dead time for the detector, particularly dead time extension caused by partial overlapping can be avoided, and the overlapping proportion is reduced as much as possible to improve the code rate.
Although the present invention has been described in connection with the embodiments illustrated in the accompanying drawings, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that the embodiments described above are merely exemplary for illustrating the principles of the present invention and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and that various combinations, modifications and equivalents of the above-described embodiments may be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. A quantum key distribution receiving system defense method aiming at dead time attack comprises an effective detection step, a detection invalidation step and a detection recovery step, wherein:
in the effective detection step, a detector channel outputs detection signals outwards, and time cycle serial numbers are marked on the detection signals;
when the detection signal is output in the effective detection step and the detection signal is marked with a time cycle number A, entering the detection invalidation step;
in the detection invalidation step, all the detector channels are enabled to enter a dead time state from a time period after the time period number A and are kept for a time Td; wherein the duration Td has an initial preset value Td _ Def, and the detecting invalidation step further comprises an exit judgment process for judging whether to enter the detecting recovery step; and the number of the first and second electrodes,
in the detection recovery step, all the detector channels are simultaneously recovered to an effective detection state so as to perform the effective detection step.
2. The defense method of claim 1, wherein the active detection step further includes the step of time-synchronizing the detection signals and marking the time period number a after time-to-digital converting the detection signals output by the detector channels.
3. The defence method of claim 1, wherein, in the detection disabling step, no avalanche gating signal is provided to the detector channel.
4. The defence method of claim 1, wherein, in the detection disabling step, avalanche gating signals are continuously provided to the detector channels and the detection signals output by the detector channels are discarded.
5. The defense method according to claim 1, wherein in the exit judgment process, it is judged whether or not there is an output of the detection signal in any one of the detector channels before the end of the duration Td in the detection disabling step;
performing the detection recovery step at the end of the duration Td if there is no output of the detection signal;
if the detection signal is output, judging whether a difference dT between a time point corresponding to the detection signal and the end point of the duration Td is greater than a preset second time Td0_ U;
discarding the detection signal output corresponding to the time point if the difference dT is greater than the second time Td0_ U, while performing the detection recovery step at the end of the duration Td;
if the difference dT is less than the second time Td0_ U, discarding the detection signal output corresponding to the time point and extending the duration Td by a time Td0_ A; and
when the duration Td is extended, the exit determination process is repeatedly performed until the extended duration Td is ended until the duration Td is not extended any more and the detection recovery step is performed at the end of the duration Td.
6. The defence method of claim 5, wherein the second time Td0_ U is greater than a minimum dead time Td0 inherent to the detector; and/or the extension time Td0_ A is greater than (Td0_ U-dT).
7. The defence method of claim 5 or 6, wherein the extension time Td0_ a is equal to Td0_ U.
8. The defence method of claim 1, wherein the number of probe channels is 4.
9. The defense method of claim 1, wherein the probe channels include probe channels for detecting one of the H/V/P/N states, respectively.
10. The defense method of claim 1, wherein the detection signals include detection count pulses generated by the detector channel in response to received light pulses, noise dark count pulses and post pulses of the detector channel.
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| US20160337032A1 (en) * | 2015-05-12 | 2016-11-17 | Id Quantique Sa | Apparatus and Method for Providing Eavesdropping Detection of an Optical Fiber Communication |
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