CN114697006B - Detection method and device for resisting seed light attack - Google Patents
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
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Abstract
The invention provides a detection method and device for resisting seed light attack with higher precision. The time synchronization between the detection device and the QKD device is realized by utilizing the synchronization signal of the QKD device, and pulse light is used as an analog signal for seed light attack, so that lower seed light power can be allowed, single photon detection and high-precision time resolution measurement can be carried out on a time window of the attacked quantum light signal, thereby effectively eliminating noise floor caused by limited connector isolation and greatly improving detection precision.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of quantum secret communication, and particularly provides a detection method and device for resisting seed light attack.
Background
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is the first quantum information technology to be put into practical use. At present, the technology is mature gradually, and the commercial application is expanding gradually. The quantum key distribution device has the main function of providing a symmetric key distribution mode with information theory safety. The safety key distributed by the QKD is utilized, and the safety of communication can be effectively ensured by combining the encryption mode of cryptography.
The theoretical safety of QKD has been theoretically demonstrated. However, in a real QKD device, there may be some deviation from the theoretical description due to the physical characteristics of the device, providing the potential for an eavesdropper to obtain key information. This type of attack method is called quantum hacking. Practical QKD devices need to design corresponding safeguards against these attacks. Aiming at a light source end, the prior art provides a novel attack means called seed light attack. How to detect whether a QKD device can resist such attacks is a challenge.
The Chinese patent application with publication number of CN 110830108A discloses an anti-attack detection method and device of a laser transmitter of a quantum secret communication system, as shown in figure 1, wherein anti-attack detection equipment comprises a connector, a seed light preparation module and a result analysis module, and a waveform diagram of laser and polarization state and wavelength information are obtained by comparing a waveform diagram I with a waveform diagram II. If the pulse width, the pulse light energy and the pulse generation time of the two waveform diagrams are larger than a preset threshold value I, the average count number of each detector is larger than a preset threshold value II after being detected, and the light wavelength of emitted light is larger than a preset threshold value III, the existence of seed light injection control holes of the laser transmitter of the transmitting party is judged, namely the laser transmitter is controlled by the injection light of an attacker, and if the output light has no obvious difference in the aspects, the laser transmitter has no holes.
However, in the existing detection method, the seed light source adopts a continuous light source, which brings high measurement noise, so that the detection accuracy is not high. The connector generally uses a circulator or a beam splitter, etc., the isolation is limited, for example, 60dB, and the background of the input signal has a great influence on the detection precision. The power of the seed light source should be generally greater than 0dBm, the noise floor after 60dB isolation is about-60 dBm, and the power is more than an order of magnitude higher than that of the quantum signal which is generally lower than-70 dBm.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problem, the invention provides a detection method and a detection device for resisting the attack of seed light, which have higher precision. The time synchronization between the detection device and the QKD device is realized by utilizing the synchronization signal of the QKD device, and pulse light is used as an analog signal for seed light attack, so that lower seed light power can be allowed, single photon detection and high-precision time resolution measurement can be carried out on a time window of the attacked quantum light signal, thereby effectively eliminating noise floor caused by limited connector isolation and greatly improving detection precision.
Specifically, a first aspect of the present invention relates to a detection device for resisting a seed light attack, which comprises a pulse seed light source module, a connector module, a single photon detection module and a control module;
the pulse seed light source module is arranged for outputting a pulse seed light signal;
the connector module is configured to allow quantum optical signals output by a QKD device under test to reach the single-photon detection module, and to allow the pulsed seed optical signals to be injected into the QKD device under test;
the single photon detection module is used for single photon detection so as to obtain detection count data;
the control module comprises a time synchronization unit and an analysis judging unit;
the time synchronization unit is configured to achieve time synchronization between the QKD device under test and the detection apparatus using a synchronization signal of the QKD device under test;
the analysis and judgment unit is configured to judge whether the QKD device under test is capable of resisting a seed light attack, based on the detection count data of a quantum light signal emitted by the QKD device under test under an attack condition.
Further, the connector module has a first port, a second port, and a third port, and is configured such that an optical signal input via the first port is output by the second port, and an optical signal input via the third port is output by the first port; the method comprises the steps of,
the first port, the second port and the third port of the connector module are respectively connected with the QKD device under test, the single photon detection module and the pulse seed light source module.
Optionally, the connector module comprises a circulator, a beam splitter or a coupler.
Further, the single photon detection module may include a single photon detector and a TDC; the single photon detector is used for single photon detection and generates a detection signal; the TDC is configured to perform a time measurement on the probe signal to generate the probe count data.
Preferably, the single photon detector is a gated single photon detector.
Further, the time synchronization unit is configured to: controlling the pulse seed light source module not to emit light, controlling the tested QKD equipment to send delay scanning light, and obtaining a first delay amount when the detection counting rate is highest based on the detection counting data; and based on the synchronization signal of the measured QKD device and the first amount of delay, achieving time synchronization between the pulsed seed light source module and/or the single-photon detection module and the measured QKD device.
Further, the analysis judgment unit is configured to: and controlling the pulse seed light source module to output the pulse seed light signal so as to carry out seed light attack on the QKD equipment to be detected, controlling the QKD equipment to output the quantum light signal, and judging whether the QKD equipment to be detected can resist the seed light attack or not according to the detection count data.
Still further, the analysis judgment unit is configured to: and obtaining the increment of the detection count of the quantum optical signal under the attack condition according to the detection count data, and judging that the detected QKD equipment cannot resist the seed optical attack when the increment exceeds a preset threshold value.
Further, the control module further comprises a background measurement unit arranged to: and controlling the pulse seed light source module to emit light, controlling the tested QKD equipment to emit no light, and obtaining background count according to the detection count data.
Further, the detection device may further include an optical path control module, where the optical path control module is disposed between the connector module and the single photon detection module, and is used to control on-off of an optical path between the connector module and the single photon detection module. Wherein the optical path control module is arranged to allow only the quantum optical signal under attack conditions to reach the single photon detection module.
Optionally, the optical path control module is an optical switch, an intensity modulator, an acousto-optic modulator, an electro-absorption modulator or other devices for realizing optical path on-off or providing substantial loss modulation.
The second aspect of the present invention relates to a detection method for resisting a seed light attack, which includes a synchronization step and an attack detection step;
the synchronization step is for achieving time synchronization between the QKD device under test and the detection apparatus, wherein: the detection device is used for carrying out seed light attack on the detected QKD equipment by utilizing pulse seed light and carrying out single photon detection on a quantum light signal output by the detected QKD equipment so as to obtain detection count;
the attack detection step is used for obtaining the detection count of the quantum optical signals output by the QKD device under the attack condition and judging whether the QKD device under the detection count can resist the seed optical attack or not according to the detection count.
Further, the detection method may further comprise a background measurement step for obtaining a background detection count of the detection device.
Further, the attack detection step may further include a step of controlling on-off of an optical path to allow only the quantum optical signal output by the QKD device under attack to obtain a detection count.
Preferably, the detection method can be implemented by using the detection device for resisting the attack of the seed light.
Drawings
The following describes the embodiments of the present invention in further detail with reference to the drawings.
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings that are required in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly described, it being obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and that other drawings may be obtained according to these drawings without inventive effort for a person skilled in the art.
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a prior art attack-resistant detection device for a laser transmitter of a quantum secret communication system;
FIGS. 2-3 illustrate one embodiment of a detection apparatus for combating seed light attacks in accordance with the present invention; fig. 4-5 show further embodiments of a detection device according to the invention that is resistant to a seed light attack.
Detailed Description
Hereinafter, exemplary embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. The following examples are provided by way of illustration to fully convey the spirit of the invention to those skilled in the art to which the invention pertains. Thus, the present invention is not limited to the embodiments disclosed herein.
In the invention, a detection device and a method for detecting attack on a detected QKD device to judge whether the detected QKD device can resist seed light attack are provided. On the basis of realizing time synchronization between the QKD device to be tested and the detection device by using the synchronous signal of the QKD device to be tested, the pulse optical signal is used as seed light to perform seed light attack, and whether the QKD device to be tested can resist the seed light attack is judged based on single photon detection count (or change) of the quantum optical signal sent by the QKD device to be tested under the attack condition.
Fig. 2-3 show an embodiment of a detection device according to the invention that is resistant to a seed light attack.
As shown in fig. 2-3, the detection device for resisting the attack of the seed light may include a pulse seed light source module, a connector module, a single photon detection module, and a control module.
The pulse seed light source module is used for outputting a pulse seed light signal so as to simulate seed light attack.
As an example, the pulsed seed light source module may be any light source module capable of providing a pulsed laser signal.
The connector module is used for realizing optical connection between the tested QKD device and the single photon detection module and optical connection between the pulse seed light source module and the tested QKD device. For example, the connector module may have a first port, a second port, and a third port, and an optical signal input by the first port will be output by the second port, and an optical signal input by the third port will be output by the first port.
In the embodiment shown in fig. 2, the first, second and third ports of the connector module can be connected to a QKD device under test, a single-photon detection module and a pulsed seed light source module, respectively. Therefore, the quantum optical signal output by the tested QKD device can reach the single-photon detection module by means of the connector module to carry out single-photon detection, and the pulse seed optical signal output by the pulse seed light source module is injected into the tested QKD device to implement seed optical attack.
As examples, the connector module may include a circulator, a beam splitter, or a coupler.
The single photon detection module is used for carrying out single photon detection on the received optical signals so as to obtain detection count data.
As an example, as shown in fig. 2, the single photon detection module may include a single photon detector and a high-precision TDC (time-to-digital converter).
In a single photon detection module, a single photon detector performs single photon detection on an optical signal (e.g., a quantum optical signal) to generate a detection signal.
The TDC performs time measurement on the probe signal to generate probe count data, i.e., obtain a distribution of probe counts over time.
The control module is used for realizing time synchronization between the detected QKD equipment and the detection device based on the synchronous signal of the detected QKD equipment and judging whether the detected QKD equipment can resist the seed light attack based on the single photon detection count of the quantum light signal emitted by the detected QKD equipment under the attack condition.
As shown in fig. 2, the control module may include a time synchronization unit and an analysis judgment unit.
The time synchronization unit is used for realizing time synchronization between the detected QKD equipment and the detection device based on the synchronization signal of the detected QKD equipment.
As an example, the time synchronization unit may control the pulse seed light source module to emit no light, control the measured QKD apparatus to emit delayed scanning light, and obtain the delay amount when the detection count rate is highest based on the detection count data output by the single photon detection module, so that the pulse seed light source module, the single photon detection module (e.g., the single photon detector and the TDC) in the detection apparatus may transmit a synchronization signal (as shown in fig. 2) or a delay amount (as shown in fig. 3) according to the synchronization signal of the measured QKD apparatus and the obtained delay amount, and each module in the detection apparatus may implement time synchronization according to the obtained delay amount based on the synchronization signal of the measured QKD apparatus, so as to implement time synchronization between the detection apparatus and the measured QKD apparatus. For example, a synchronization signal or amount of delay can be sent to the pulsed seed light source module to adjust its light emission delay based on the synchronization signal and amount of delay of the QKD device under test, thereby achieving time synchronization between the pulsed seed light source module and the QKD device under test.
By maintaining time synchronization between the QKD device under test and the detection apparatus, it is enabled to seed the QKD device under test with a pulsed seed optical signal, allowing lower seed optical power, lower noise floor than would be possible with continuous optical seed optical signal, while also allowing single photon detection and acquisition of detection counts (distribution) of the quantum optical signal more accurately in time under the attack conditions, providing a more accurate anti-attack detection effect.
The analysis and judgment unit is used for judging whether the measured QKD equipment can resist the seed light attack or not based on the single photon detection count (or the change) of the quantum light signal emitted by the measured QKD equipment under the attack condition under the condition that the measured QKD equipment and the detection device are in time synchronization.
As an example, the analysis and judgment unit may control the pulse seed light source module and the QKD device to emit light, calculate and obtain an increment of the detection count under the attack condition based on the detection count data of the detection output of the single photon detection module for the quantum light signal, and judge whether the QKD device to be tested can resist the seed light attack according to the increment. For example, it may be determined that the measured QKD device is not resistant to a seed light attack when the increase in the probe count exceeds a preset threshold, or else it is determined that the measured QKD device is resistant to a seed light attack.
Preferably, the control module may further comprise a background measurement unit for obtaining a background detection count of the detection device.
As an example, the background measurement unit may control the pulsed seed light source module to emit light, control the QKD device under test to emit no light, and obtain the background count of the detection device according to the detection count data output by the single photon detection module.
In a preferred example, a single photon detector may be employed as a gated single photon detector. Accordingly, the time synchronization unit may provide a synchronization signal or a delay amount to the single photon detector based on the synchronization signal of the QKD device under test and the obtained delay amount to achieve time synchronization between the QKD device under test and the single photon detector. In this way, the gated single photon detector can detect single photons only during the arrival of the quantum light signal, so that the background signal from the pulse seed light source module falls outside the gating of the single photon detector, and noise is effectively reduced.
Those skilled in the art will readily appreciate that when a free-running single photon detector is used in the single photon detection module, there is no need to time synchronize between the QKD device under test and the single photon detector, where noise due to the background signal of the pulsed seed light source module is present.
Fig. 4 and 5 show a further embodiment of a detection device according to the invention against a seed light attack, which is further provided with an optical path control module on the basis of the device shown in fig. 2 and 3. In the following, only the differences from the embodiments shown in fig. 2 and 3 will be described for the sake of brevity, and the same points will not be repeated.
Similarly, fig. 4 shows that the synchronization signals are provided by the time synchronization unit directly to the respective modules of the detection device to achieve time synchronization on the respective modules; fig. 5 shows that the delay amounts are provided by the time synchronization unit to the respective modules of the detection apparatus so that the respective modules can achieve time synchronization according to the obtained delay amounts based on the synchronization signals provided by the QKD device under test.
As shown in fig. 4 and 5, an optical path control module may be disposed between the connector module and the single photon detection module for controlling the on-off of an optical path therebetween.
In this embodiment, the time synchronization unit of the control module can provide a synchronization signal or an amount of delay to the optical path control module based on the synchronization signal of the QKD device under test and the amount of delay obtained.
The optical path control module can perform on-off control on the optical path based on the synchronous signal, so that only the quantum optical signal output by the detected QKD device under the attack condition (namely, when the pulse seed optical signal is injected into the detected QKD device) can enter the single photon detection module through the optical path control module, and the optical path is in an off state at other times so as to prevent other optical signals such as noise from entering the single photon detection module, thereby further reducing the influence of noise floor and improving the detection precision.
In the present invention, the "off state" may be a state in which the optical path is physically broken, or a state in which a great optical loss is provided. Thus, the optical path control module may be an optical switch, an intensity modulator, an acousto-optic modulator, an electro-absorption modulator, or other device that has optical path on-off or provides substantial loss modulation.
In order to better understand the working principle of the detection device of the present invention, the detection method of the present invention for preventing attack of seed light will be further described with reference to fig. 2 to 5.
The method for detecting the resistance to the seed light attack according to the present invention may include a synchronization step and an attack detection step.
The synchronization step is used to achieve time synchronization between the QKD device under test and the detection apparatus.
As an example, in the synchronization step, a delayed scanning light may be sent by the QKD device under test and a delayed scanning process performed to obtain a delay amount that maximizes the detection count output by the single-photon detection module in the detection apparatus.
Thus, the synchronization signal or amount of delay can be provided to the detection means based on the synchronization signal of the QKD device under test and the amount of delay obtained to achieve time synchronization between the detection means and the QKD device under test. For example, the light emission delay of the pulse seed light source module can be adjusted by means of a synchronization signal or a delay amount to enable the pulse seed light source module to be in time synchronization with the QKD device to be tested, namely, the attack time of the pulse seed light signal is synchronous with the time when the quantum light signal is emitted by the QKD device to be tested; alternatively, the optical path control module and the single photon detection module are time synchronized with the QKD device under test.
And on the basis of time synchronization of the detected QKD equipment and the detection device, executing an attack detection step, wherein the attack detection step is used for measuring single photon detection count of quantum optical signals sent by the detected QKD equipment under an attack condition and judging whether the detected QKD equipment can resist seed optical attack or not based on the single photon detection count. For example, the determination may be made based on whether the increase in the single photon detection count exceeds a preset threshold, i.e., when the increase exceeds the preset threshold, it is determined that the QKD device under test is unable to resist the seed light attack, otherwise it is able to resist the seed light attack.
As an example, in the attack detection step, both the pulse seed light source and the QKD device under test may be controlled to emit light, obtaining a single photon detection count of the quantum optical signal; and judging whether the detected QKD device can resist the attack of the seed light according to the variation amount (such as whether the increment exceeds a preset threshold value) of the single photon detection count.
Further, the detection method according to the present invention may further comprise a background measurement step for acquiring a background single photon detection count and a count distribution (i.e., a background noise) of the detection device on the basis of time synchronization.
As an example, in the background measurement step, the pulse seed light source module may be controlled to emit light, while the QKD device under test is controlled not to emit light, so as to obtain the detection count data output by the single photon detection module, so as to calculate and obtain the background single photon detection count and count distribution.
Preferably, in the attack detection step, the method further includes a step of controlling on-off of an optical path entering the single photon detection module based on the synchronization signal of the QKD device under test and the obtained delay amount, so as to allow only the quantum optical signal output by the QKD device under test under attack to enter the single photon detection module.
Based on the above, it can be understood that the invention can effectively reduce the power of the seed light by establishing time synchronization between the QKD device to be tested and the detection device resistant to the seed light attack and using the pulse seed light as the analog signal of the seed light attack, thereby reducing the detection noise caused by the seed light; meanwhile, through single photon detectors (particularly gating single photon detectors) and high-precision time resolution measurement, noise floor caused by limited connector isolation can be effectively eliminated, and detection precision is greatly improved.
While the invention has been described in connection with the specific embodiments illustrated in the drawings, it will be readily appreciated by those skilled in the art that the above embodiments are merely illustrative of the principles of the invention, which are not intended to limit the scope of the invention, and various combinations, modifications and equivalents of the above embodiments may be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention.
Claims (16)
1. The detection device for resisting the seed light attack comprises a pulse seed light source module, a connector module, a single photon detection module and a control module;
the pulse seed light source module is arranged for outputting a pulse seed light signal;
the connector module is configured to allow quantum optical signals output by a QKD device under test to reach the single-photon detection module, and to allow the pulsed seed optical signals to be injected into the QKD device under test;
the single photon detection module is used for single photon detection so as to obtain detection count data;
the control module comprises a time synchronization unit and an analysis judging unit;
the time synchronization unit is configured to achieve time synchronization between the QKD device under test and the detection apparatus using a synchronization signal of the QKD device under test;
the analysis and judgment unit is configured to judge whether the QKD device under test is capable of resisting a seed light attack, based on the detection count data of a quantum light signal emitted by the QKD device under test under an attack condition.
2. The detection apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the connector module has a first port, a second port, and a third port, and is configured such that an optical signal input via the first port is output by the second port, and an optical signal input via the third port is output by the first port; the method comprises the steps of,
the first port, the second port and the third port of the connector module are respectively connected with the QKD device under test, the single photon detection module and the pulse seed light source module.
3. The detection apparatus of claim 2, wherein the connector module comprises a circulator, a beam splitter, or a coupler.
4. The detection apparatus of claim 1, wherein the single photon detection module comprises a single photon detector and a TDC;
the single photon detector is used for single photon detection and generates a detection signal;
the TDC is configured to perform a time measurement on the probe signal to generate the probe count data.
5. The detection apparatus of claim 4, wherein the single photon detector is a gated single photon detector.
6. The detection apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the time synchronization unit is configured to:
controlling the pulse seed light source module not to emit light, controlling the tested QKD equipment to send delay scanning light, and obtaining a first delay amount when the detection counting rate is highest based on the detection counting data; the method comprises the steps of,
based on the synchronization signal of the QKD device under test and the first amount of delay, time synchronization between the pulsed seed light source module and/or the single-photon detection module and the QKD device under test is achieved.
7. The detection apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the analysis judgment unit is configured to: and controlling the pulse seed light source module to output the pulse seed light signal so as to carry out seed light attack on the QKD equipment to be detected, controlling the QKD equipment to output the quantum light signal, and judging whether the QKD equipment to be detected can resist the seed light attack or not according to the detection count data.
8. The detection apparatus according to claim 7, wherein the analysis judgment unit is further configured to: and obtaining the increment of the detection count of the quantum optical signal under the attack condition according to the detection count data, and judging that the detected QKD equipment cannot resist the seed optical attack when the increment exceeds a preset threshold value.
9. The detection apparatus of claim 1, wherein the control module further comprises a background measurement unit configured to: and controlling the pulse seed light source module to emit light, controlling the tested QKD equipment to emit no light, and obtaining background count according to the detection count data.
10. The detection device of claim 1, further comprising an optical path control module, wherein the optical path control module is arranged between the connector module and the single photon detection module and is used for controlling the optical path between the connector module and the single photon detection module to be switched on and switched off.
11. The detection apparatus as claimed in claim 10, wherein the optical path control module is arranged to allow only the quantum optical signal under attack conditions to reach the single photon detection module.
12. The detection apparatus according to claim 10, wherein the optical path control module is an optical switch, an intensity modulator, an acousto-optic modulator, an electro-absorption modulator, or other device for switching an optical path or providing substantial loss modulation.
13. A detection method for resisting the attack of seed light comprises a synchronization step and an attack detection step;
the synchronization step is for achieving time synchronization between the QKD device under test and the detection apparatus, wherein: the detection device is used for carrying out seed light attack on the detected QKD equipment by utilizing pulse seed light and carrying out single photon detection on a quantum light signal output by the detected QKD equipment so as to obtain detection count;
the attack detection step is used for obtaining the detection count of the quantum optical signals output by the QKD device under the attack condition and judging whether the QKD device under the detection count can resist the seed optical attack or not according to the detection count.
14. The detection method of claim 13, further comprising a background measurement step for obtaining a background detection count of the detection device.
15. The detection method of claim 13, wherein the attack detection step further comprises the step of controlling the on-off of the optical path to allow only the quantum optical signal output by the QKD device under attack to obtain a probe count.
16. The detection method according to claim 13, which is implemented with a detection device as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 12 that is resistant to a seed light attack.
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| CN110830247A (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2020-02-21 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Blind vulnerability detection method and device for gated detector in quantum key distribution system |
| CN110830108A (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2020-02-21 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Anti-attack detection method and device for laser transmitter of quantum secret communication system |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN110830247A (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2020-02-21 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Blind vulnerability detection method and device for gated detector in quantum key distribution system |
| CN110830108A (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2020-02-21 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Anti-attack detection method and device for laser transmitter of quantum secret communication system |
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