CN114697006A - Detection method and device for seed light attack resistance - Google Patents
Detection method and device for seed light attack resistance Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN114697006A CN114697006A CN202011609589.7A CN202011609589A CN114697006A CN 114697006 A CN114697006 A CN 114697006A CN 202011609589 A CN202011609589 A CN 202011609589A CN 114697006 A CN114697006 A CN 114697006A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- detection
- seed light
- attack
- qkd
- module
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 196
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 15
- 230000003287 optical effect Effects 0.000 claims description 63
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 claims description 23
- 238000010521 absorption reaction Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000001360 synchronised effect Effects 0.000 abstract description 7
- 238000002955 isolation Methods 0.000 abstract description 5
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000002347 injection Methods 0.000 description 2
- 239000007924 injection Substances 0.000 description 2
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000010287 polarization Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000002360 preparation method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000000523 sample Substances 0.000 description 1
- 239000000243 solution Substances 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/002—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Electromagnetism (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Photometry And Measurement Of Optical Pulse Characteristics (AREA)
- Optical Communication System (AREA)
Abstract
The invention provides a detection method and a detection device for resisting seed light attack with higher precision. The time synchronization between the detection device and the QKD equipment is realized by utilizing the synchronous signal of the QKD equipment, and the pulsed light is used as the analog signal of seed light attack, so that the lower seed light power can be allowed, and single-photon detection and high-precision time resolution measurement can be carried out on the time window of the attacked quantum light signal, thereby effectively eliminating background noise caused by limited isolation of the connector and greatly improving the detection precision.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of quantum secret communication, and particularly provides a detection method and device for resisting seed light attack.
Background
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is the quantum information technology that was first put into practical use. At present, the technology is mature gradually, and the commercial application is gradually expanded. The main function of the quantum key distribution device is to provide a symmetric key distribution mode with information theory security. The safety key distributed by the QKD is utilized, and the safety of communication can be effectively guaranteed by combining with the cryptographic encryption mode.
The theoretical safety of QKD has been theoretically demonstrated. However, in a real QKD device, there may be some deviation in the physical characteristics of the device from the theoretical description, providing the possibility for an eavesdropper to obtain key information. This type of attack is known as quantum hacking. Practical QKD devices need to design corresponding safeguards against these attacks. Aiming at the light source end, the prior art provides a novel attack means, which is called seed light attack. How to detect whether the QKD device can resist such attacks is an urgent problem to be solved.
Chinese patent application publication No. CN 110830108A discloses an anti-attack detection method and device for a laser transmitter of a quantum secure communication system, as shown in fig. 1, wherein the anti-attack detection device includes a connector, a seed light preparation module, and a result analysis module, and obtains a waveform diagram of laser and polarization state and wavelength information by comparing a waveform diagram one with a waveform diagram two. If the pulse width, the pulse light energy and the pulse generation time of the two oscillograms are larger than a first preset threshold value, the average counting number of each detector is larger than a second preset threshold value after being detected, and the wavelength of the emitted light is larger than a third preset threshold value, the laser emitter of the emitting party is judged to have a seed light injection control leak, namely, the seed light injection control leak can be controlled by the injected light of an attacker, and if the output light has no obvious difference in the aspects, the laser emitter has no leak.
However, in the existing detection method, the seed light source adopts a continuous light source, which brings high measurement noise and causes low detection accuracy. The connector generally uses a circulator or a beam splitter, etc., the isolation is relatively limited, for example, 60dB, and the background of the input signal has a great influence on the detection accuracy. The power of the seed light source is usually larger than 0dBm, the background noise after 60dB isolation is about-60 dBm, and the background noise is higher by more than one order of magnitude compared with the power of quantum signals which are usually lower than-70 dBm.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problem, the invention provides a detection method and a detection device with higher precision and seed light attack resistance. The time synchronization between the detection device and the QKD equipment is realized by utilizing the synchronous signal of the QKD equipment, and the pulsed light is used as the analog signal of seed light attack, so that the lower seed light power can be allowed, and single-photon detection and high-precision time resolution measurement can be carried out on the time window of the attacked quantum light signal, thereby effectively eliminating background noise caused by limited isolation of the connector and greatly improving the detection precision.
Specifically, a first aspect of the present invention relates to a seed light attack resistant detection apparatus, which includes a pulse seed light source module, a connector module, a single photon detection module and a control module;
the pulse seed light source module is arranged for outputting a pulse seed light signal;
the connector module is configured to allow quantum optical signals output by a QKD device under test to reach the single-photon detection module and to allow the pulsed seed optical signals to be injected into the QKD device under test;
the single photon detection module is arranged for single photon detection to obtain detection count data;
the control module comprises a time synchronization unit and an analysis and judgment unit;
the time synchronization unit is used for realizing time synchronization between the QKD device to be tested and the detection device by utilizing the synchronization signal of the QKD device to be tested;
the analysis and judgment unit is used for judging whether the QKD equipment to be tested can resist seed light attack or not according to the detection counting data of the quantum light signals sent by the QKD equipment to be tested under the attack condition.
Further, the connector module has a first port, a second port and a third port, and is configured such that an optical signal input through the first port is output by the second port and an optical signal input through the third port is output by the first port; and the number of the first and second groups,
the first port, the second port and the third port of the connector module are respectively connected with the QKD device to be tested, the single-photon detection module and the pulse seed light source module.
Optionally, the connector module comprises a circulator, a splitter or a coupler.
Further, the single photon detection module may include a single photon detector and a TDC; the single-photon detector is arranged for single-photon detection and generating a detection signal; the TDC is configured to perform a time measurement on the detection signal, generating the detection count data.
Preferably, the single-photon detector is a gate-controlled single-photon detector.
Further, the time synchronization unit is configured to: controlling the pulse seed light source module not to emit light, controlling the tested QKD equipment to send delay scanning light, and obtaining a first delay amount when the detection counting rate is highest based on the detection counting data; and realizing time synchronization between the pulse seed light source module and/or the single-photon detection module and the QKD device to be tested based on the synchronization signal of the QKD device to be tested and the first delay amount.
Further, the analysis determination unit is configured to: and controlling the pulse seed light source module to output the pulse seed light signal so as to carry out seed light attack on the tested QKD equipment, controlling the tested QKD equipment to output the quantum light signal, and judging whether the tested QKD equipment can resist the seed light attack according to the detection counting data.
Still further, the analysis determination unit is configured to: and obtaining the increment of the detection count of the quantum optical signal under the attack condition according to the detection count data, and judging that the QKD equipment to be detected can not resist seed light attack when the increment exceeds a preset threshold value.
Further, the control module further comprises a background measurement unit configured to: and controlling the pulse seed light source module to emit light, controlling the QKD equipment to be detected not to emit light, and obtaining background count according to the detection count data.
Furthermore, the detection device can also comprise a light path control module, wherein the light path control module is arranged between the connector module and the single photon detection module and is used for controlling the on-off of a light path between the connector module and the single photon detection module. Wherein the optical path control module is configured to allow only the quantum optical signal under an attack condition to reach the single photon detection module.
Optionally, the optical path control module is an optical switch, an intensity modulator, an acousto-optic modulator, an electro-absorption modulator, or other devices for switching an optical path or providing large loss modulation.
The second aspect of the invention relates to a detection method for resisting seed light attack, which comprises a synchronization step and an attack detection step;
the synchronization step is used for realizing time synchronization between the QKD device to be detected and the detection device, wherein: the detection device is used for carrying out seed light attack on the QKD equipment to be detected by using pulse seed light and carrying out single-photon detection on a quantum optical signal output by the QKD equipment to be detected so as to obtain detection count;
and the attack detection step is used for acquiring the detection count of the quantum optical signal output by the tested QKD equipment under the attack condition and judging whether the tested QKD equipment can resist seed light attack or not according to the detection count.
Further, the detection method may further comprise a background measurement step for obtaining a background detection count of said detection device.
Further, the attack detection step may further include a step of controlling on/off of an optical path to allow only quantum optical signals output by the QKD device under the attack condition to obtain a detection count.
Preferably, the detection method can be implemented by using the detection device for resisting seed light attack.
Drawings
The following describes embodiments of the present invention in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without creative efforts.
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an attack-resistant detection apparatus for a laser transmitter of a quantum secure communication system according to the prior art;
FIGS. 2-3 illustrate one embodiment of a seed light attack resistant detection device according to the present invention; fig. 4-5 show further embodiments of the detection device according to the invention against seed light attacks.
Detailed Description
Hereinafter, exemplary embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. The following examples are provided by way of illustration in order to fully convey the spirit of the invention to those skilled in the art to which the invention pertains. Accordingly, the present invention is not limited to the embodiments disclosed herein.
The invention provides a detection device and a detection method for carrying out attack detection on a QKD device to be detected so as to judge whether the QKD device can resist seed light attack. On the basis of realizing time synchronization between the QKD device to be detected and the detection device by using a synchronization signal of the QKD device to be detected, the pulse light signal is used as seed light to carry out seed light attack, and whether the QKD device to be detected can resist the seed light attack or not is judged based on single-photon detection counting (or change) of the quantum light signal emitted by the QKD device to be detected under the attack condition.
Fig. 2-3 show an embodiment of a detection device according to the invention against seed light attack.
As shown in fig. 2-3, the seed light attack resistant detection device may include a pulsed seed light source module, a connector module, a single photon detection module, and a control module.
The pulse seed light source module is used for outputting a pulse seed light signal so as to simulate seed light attack.
As an example, the pulsed seed light source module may be any light source module capable of providing a pulsed laser signal.
The connector module is used for realizing optical connection between the QKD device to be tested and the single-photon detection module and optical connection between the pulse seed light source module and the QKD device to be tested. For example, the connector module may have a first port, a second port, and a third port, and an optical signal input by the first port will be output by the second port, and an optical signal input by the third port will be output by the first port.
In the embodiment shown in fig. 2, the first port, the second port, and the third port of the connector module may be respectively connected to the QKD device under test, the single-photon detection module, and the pulsed seed light source module. Therefore, the quantum optical signal output by the QKD device under test can reach the single-photon detection module for single-photon detection by means of the connector module, and the pulse seed optical signal output by the pulse seed light source module is injected into the QKD device under test to implement seed light attack.
As examples, the connector module may include a circulator, a splitter, or a coupler.
The single photon detection module is used for carrying out single photon detection on the received optical signals so as to obtain detection counting data.
As an example, the single photon detection module may include a single photon detector and a high precision TDC (time to digital converter), as shown in fig. 2.
In the single photon detection module, a single photon detector performs single photon detection on an optical signal (e.g., a quantum optical signal) to generate a detection signal.
The TDC performs time measurement on the detection signals to generate detection count data, i.e., obtains the distribution of the detection counts over time.
The control module is used for realizing time synchronization between the QKD equipment to be detected and the detection device based on the synchronous signal of the QKD equipment to be detected and judging whether the QKD equipment to be detected can resist seed light attack or not based on single-photon detection counting of the quantum light signal emitted by the QKD equipment to be detected under the attack condition.
As shown in fig. 2, the control module may include a time synchronization unit and an analysis determination unit.
The time synchronization unit is used for realizing the time synchronization between the QKD device under test and the detection device based on the synchronization signal of the QKD device under test.
As an example, the time synchronization unit may control the pulse seed light source module not to emit light, control the measured QKD device to send the delay scanning light, and obtain the delay amount when the detected count rate is highest based on the detected count data output by the single-photon detection module, so that a synchronization signal (as shown in fig. 2) or a delay amount (as shown in fig. 3, each module in the detection apparatus may implement time synchronization based on the synchronization signal of the measured QKD device and the obtained delay amount) can be sent to the pulse seed light source module and the single-photon detection module (e.g., the single-photon detector and the TDC) in the detection apparatus according to the synchronization signal of the measured QKD device and the obtained delay amount, so as to implement time synchronization between the detection apparatus and the measured QKD device. For example, a synchronization signal or a delay amount may be sent to the pulsed seed light source module to adjust its light emission delay based on the synchronization signal and the delay amount of the QKD device under test, so as to achieve time synchronization between the pulsed seed light source module and the QKD device under test.
By keeping time synchronization between the QKD equipment to be detected and the detection device, the pulse seed optical signal can be used for carrying out seed optical attack on the QKD equipment to be detected, lower seed optical power is allowed, lower background noise can be realized compared with the attack by adopting continuous optical seed optical signal, and meanwhile, the single photon detection and the acquisition detection counting (distribution) of the quantum optical signal can be more accurately carried out on the quantum optical signal in time under the attack condition, so that the more accurate anti-attack detection effect is provided.
The analysis and judgment unit is used for judging whether the QKD equipment to be detected can resist seed light attack or not based on single-photon detection counting (or change thereof) of quantum light signals emitted by the QKD equipment to be detected under attack conditions under the condition that the QKD equipment to be detected and the detection device are time-synchronized.
As an example, the analysis and determination unit may control the pulse seed light source module and the measured QKD device to emit light, calculate an increment of the detection count under an attack condition based on detection count data output by the single-photon detection module for detecting the quantum light signal, and determine whether the measured QKD device can resist seed light attack according to the increment. For example, it may be determined that the QKD device under test cannot resist seed light attack when the increase in the probe count exceeds a preset threshold, otherwise it may be determined that the QKD device under test can resist seed light attack.
Preferably, the control module may further comprise a background measurement unit for acquiring a background detection count of the detection device.
As an example, the background measurement unit may control the pulse seed light source module to emit light, control the QKD device under test not to emit light, and obtain the background count of the detection apparatus according to the detection count data output by the single-photon detection module.
In a preferred example, the single photon detector may be a gated type single photon detector. Accordingly, the time synchronization unit can provide the single-photon detector with the synchronization signal or the delay amount based on the synchronization signal of the measured QKD device and the obtained delay amount, so as to realize the time synchronization between the measured QKD device and the single-photon detector. By means of the method, the gated single-photon detector can perform single-photon detection only in the quantum light signal arrival period, so that the background signal from the pulse seed light source module falls outside the gating of the single-photon detector, and noise is effectively reduced.
Those skilled in the art will readily appreciate that when a free-running single photon detector is used in the single photon detection module, there is no need for time synchronization between the QKD device under test and the single photon detector, where noise due to the background signal of the pulsed seed light source module is present.
Fig. 4 and 5 show a further embodiment of the seed light attack resistance detection device according to the present invention, which is further provided with a light path control module on the basis of the devices shown in fig. 2 and 3. Hereinafter, for the sake of brevity, only the differences from the embodiment shown in fig. 2 and 3 will be described, and the same will not be described again.
Similarly, fig. 4 shows that the time synchronization unit directly provides the synchronization signal to the respective modules of the detection apparatus to achieve time synchronization on the respective modules; fig. 5 shows that the time synchronization unit provides the delay amount to each module of the detection apparatus, so that each module can realize time synchronization according to the acquired delay amount based on the synchronization signal provided by the QKD device under test.
As shown in fig. 4 and 5, the optical path control module may be disposed between the connector module and the single photon detection module, and is configured to control on/off of an optical path between the connector module and the single photon detection module.
In this embodiment, the time synchronization unit of the control module may provide the synchronization signal or the delay amount to the optical path control module based on the synchronization signal of the QKD device under test and the obtained delay amount.
The optical path control module can perform on-off control on the optical path based on the synchronous signal, so that only the quantum optical signal output by the detected QKD equipment can enter the single-photon detection module through the optical path control module under the attack condition (namely, when the pulse seed optical signal is injected into the detected QKD equipment), and the optical path is in an off state at other time, so that other optical signals such as noise are prevented from entering the single-photon detection module, the influence of background noise is further reduced, and the detection precision is improved.
In the present invention, the "off state" may be a state in which the optical path is physically broken, or a state in which a great optical loss is provided. Thus, the optical path control module may be an optical switch, intensity modulator, acousto-optic modulator, electro-absorption modulator, or other device that switches the optical path or provides large loss modulation.
In order to better understand the working principle of the detection device of the present invention, the detection method against seed light attack of the present invention will be further described below with reference to fig. 2 to 5.
The detection method for resisting seed light attack according to the invention can comprise a synchronization step and an attack detection step.
The synchronization step is used for realizing time synchronization between the QKD device to be detected and the detection device.
As an example, in the synchronization step, a time-delay scanning light may be sent by the QKD device under test and a time-delay scanning process may be performed to obtain a time-delay amount that maximizes the detection count output by the single-photon detection module in the detection apparatus.
Therefore, the detection device can be provided with the synchronous signal or the delay amount based on the synchronous signal of the QKD device under test and the obtained delay amount, so as to realize the time synchronization between the detection device and the QKD device under test. For example, the light-emitting delay of the pulse seed light source module can be adjusted by means of a synchronization signal or a delay amount, so that the light-emitting delay is time-synchronized with the QKD device to be tested, that is, the attack action time of the pulse seed light signal is time-synchronized with the quantum light signal emitted by the QKD device to be tested; or the light path control module and the single photon detection module are synchronized with the time of the QKD equipment to be detected.
And on the basis of time synchronization of the detected QKD equipment and the detection device, executing an attack detection step, wherein the attack detection step is used for measuring single-photon detection counting of quantum optical signals emitted by the detected QKD equipment under an attack condition, and judging whether the detected QKD equipment can resist seed light attack or not based on the single-photon detection counting. For example, the determination may be performed according to whether the increment of the single photon detection count exceeds a preset threshold, that is, it is determined that the measured QKD device cannot resist seed light attack when the increment exceeds the preset threshold, otherwise, the seed light attack may be resisted.
As an example, in the attack detection step, the pulse seed light source and the QKD device under test may both be controlled to emit light, and a single photon detection count of the quantum optical signal is obtained; and judging whether the QKD equipment to be tested can resist seed light attack or not according to the variation (such as whether the increment exceeds a preset threshold value or not) of the single-photon detection counting.
Further, the detection method according to the present invention may further include a background measurement step for acquiring a background single photon detection count and a count distribution (i.e., a background noise) of the detection device on a time-synchronized basis.
As an example, in the background measurement step, the pulse seed light source module may be controlled to emit light, and the QKD device under test may be controlled not to emit light, and the detection count data output by the single-photon detection module may be acquired to calculate the background single-photon detection count and the count distribution.
Preferably, in the attack detection step, the method further includes a step of controlling on/off of an optical path entering the single-photon detection module based on a synchronization signal of the measured QKD device and the obtained delay amount, so as to allow only a quantum optical signal output by the measured QKD device under the attack condition to enter the single-photon detection module.
Based on the above, it can be understood that the invention establishes time synchronization between the measured QKD device and the detection apparatus for seed light attack resistance, and uses the pulse seed light as the analog signal of seed light attack, so as to effectively reduce the power of the seed light, thereby reducing the detection noise caused by the seed light; meanwhile, through the single-photon detector (especially the gate-controlled single-photon detector) and high-precision time resolution measurement, background noise caused by limited isolation of the connector can be effectively eliminated, and the detection precision is greatly improved.
Although the present invention has been described in connection with the embodiments illustrated in the accompanying drawings, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that the embodiments described above are merely exemplary for illustrating the principles of the present invention and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and that various combinations, modifications and equivalents of the above-described embodiments may be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.
Claims (16)
1. A seed light attack resistant detection device comprises a pulse seed light source module, a connector module, a single photon detection module and a control module;
the pulse seed light source module is arranged for outputting a pulse seed light signal;
the connector module is configured to allow quantum optical signals output by a QKD device under test to reach the single-photon detection module and to allow the pulsed seed optical signals to be injected into the QKD device under test;
the single photon detection module is arranged for single photon detection to obtain detection count data;
the control module comprises a time synchronization unit and an analysis and judgment unit;
the time synchronization unit is used for realizing time synchronization between the QKD device to be tested and the detection device by utilizing the synchronization signal of the QKD device to be tested;
the analysis and judgment unit is used for judging whether the QKD equipment to be tested can resist seed light attack or not according to the detection counting data of the quantum light signals sent by the QKD equipment to be tested under the attack condition.
2. The detection apparatus of claim 1, wherein the connector module has a first port, a second port, and a third port, and is configured such that an optical signal input through the first port is output by the second port and an optical signal input through the third port is output by the first port; and the number of the first and second groups,
the first port, the second port and the third port of the connector module are respectively connected with the QKD device to be tested, the single-photon detection module and the pulse seed light source module.
3. The detection apparatus of claim 2, wherein the connector module comprises a circulator, a splitter, or a coupler.
4. The detection apparatus of claim 1, wherein the single photon detection module comprises a single photon detector and a TDC;
the single-photon detector is arranged for single-photon detection and generating a detection signal;
the TDC is configured to perform a time measurement on the detection signal, and generate the detection count data.
5. The detector of claim 4 in which said single photon detector is a gated single photon detector.
6. The detection apparatus of claim 1, wherein the time synchronization unit is configured to:
controlling the pulse seed light source module not to emit light, controlling the tested QKD equipment to send delay scanning light, and obtaining a first delay amount when the detection counting rate is highest based on the detection counting data; and the number of the first and second groups,
and realizing time synchronization between the pulse seed light source module and/or the single-photon detection module and the QKD device to be detected based on the synchronization signal of the QKD device to be detected and the first delay amount.
7. The detection apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the analysis determination unit is configured to: and controlling the pulse seed light source module to output the pulse seed light signal so as to carry out seed light attack on the tested QKD equipment, controlling the tested QKD equipment to output the quantum light signal, and judging whether the tested QKD equipment can resist the seed light attack according to the detection counting data.
8. The detection apparatus of claim 7, wherein the analysis determination unit is further configured to: and obtaining the increment of the detection count of the quantum optical signal under the attack condition according to the detection count data, and judging that the QKD equipment to be detected can not resist seed light attack when the increment exceeds a preset threshold value.
9. The detection apparatus of claim 1, wherein the control module further comprises a background measurement unit configured to: and controlling the pulse seed light source module to emit light, controlling the QKD equipment to be detected not to emit light, and obtaining background count according to the detection count data.
10. The detecting device according to claim 1, further comprising a light path control module disposed between said connector module and said single photon detecting module for controlling the on/off of the light path therebetween.
11. The detection apparatus of claim 10 wherein the optical path control module is arranged to allow only the quantum optical signals under attack conditions to reach the single photon detection module.
12. The detection apparatus according to claim 10, wherein the optical path control module is an optical switch, an intensity modulator, an acousto-optic modulator, an electro-absorption modulator, or other devices for switching an optical path or providing large loss modulation.
13. A detection method for resisting seed light attack comprises a synchronization step and an attack detection step;
the synchronization step is used for realizing time synchronization between the QKD device to be detected and the detection device, wherein: the detection device is used for carrying out seed light attack on the QKD equipment to be detected by using pulse seed light and carrying out single-photon detection on a quantum optical signal output by the QKD equipment to be detected so as to obtain detection count;
and the attack detection step is used for acquiring the detection count of the quantum optical signal output by the tested QKD equipment under the attack condition and judging whether the tested QKD equipment can resist seed light attack or not according to the detection count.
14. The detection method of claim 13, further comprising a background measurement step for acquiring a background detection count of the detection device.
15. The detection method according to claim 13, wherein the attack detection step further comprises the step of controlling the on/off of the optical path to allow only the quantum optical signal output by the QKD device under test under an attack condition to obtain a detection count.
16. The detection method according to claim 13, which is implemented by using the detection device against seed light attack according to any one of claims 1 to 12.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202011609589.7A CN114697006B (en) | 2020-12-30 | 2020-12-30 | Detection method and device for resisting seed light attack |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202011609589.7A CN114697006B (en) | 2020-12-30 | 2020-12-30 | Detection method and device for resisting seed light attack |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN114697006A true CN114697006A (en) | 2022-07-01 |
| CN114697006B CN114697006B (en) | 2024-04-09 |
Family
ID=82132808
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202011609589.7A Active CN114697006B (en) | 2020-12-30 | 2020-12-30 | Detection method and device for resisting seed light attack |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN114697006B (en) |
Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110830247A (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2020-02-21 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Blind vulnerability detection method and device for gated detector in quantum key distribution system |
| CN110830108A (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2020-02-21 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Anti-attack detection method and device for laser transmitter of quantum secret communication system |
-
2020
- 2020-12-30 CN CN202011609589.7A patent/CN114697006B/en active Active
Patent Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110830247A (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2020-02-21 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Blind vulnerability detection method and device for gated detector in quantum key distribution system |
| CN110830108A (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2020-02-21 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Anti-attack detection method and device for laser transmitter of quantum secret communication system |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN114697006B (en) | 2024-04-09 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| KR101767232B1 (en) | Apparatus and method for the detection of attacks taking control of the single photon detectors of a quantum cryptography apparatus by randomly changing their efficiency | |
| CN206364813U (en) | A kind of measuring apparatus unrelated quantum key distribution system of PP structures | |
| CN108075886B (en) | Automatic time sequence adjustment method and device for quantum key distribution system | |
| CN110120835B (en) | External gate control single photon detection optical time domain reflection measurement method | |
| CN106603161A (en) | QKD system sending terminal based on phase modulation light source, receiving terminal, QKD system and method thereof | |
| CN106656491B (en) | The compensation method of half-wave voltage of phase modulator in a kind of quantum key dispatching system | |
| CN110830108B (en) | Anti-attack detection method and device for laser transmitter of quantum secret communication system | |
| EP3716252B1 (en) | Blinding attack detecting device and method | |
| GB2520208A (en) | A system and method for intensity monitoring | |
| CN111342953A (en) | Demonstration system for quantum channel eavesdropping attack of quantum key distribution equipment | |
| RU2783977C1 (en) | Method for detecting a detector blinding attack in quantum cryptography systems with polarisation encoding | |
| CN108446099B (en) | Source-independent high-dimensional time-coded quantum random number generator | |
| CA3149737A1 (en) | Method and system for quantum key distribution | |
| CN209930270U (en) | Quantum communication system based on single photon communication technology | |
| Zhang et al. | Polarization-insensitive quantum key distribution using planar lightwave circuit chips | |
| CN114697009B (en) | Device, method and attack end for detecting light source locking loopholes of phase encoding QKD (quantum key distribution) equipment | |
| Lovic et al. | Quantified effects of the laser-seeding attack in quantum key distribution | |
| CN114765532A (en) | Device and method for detecting light source injection locking loophole of polarization coding QKD (quantum key distribution) equipment and attack end | |
| CN114697006B (en) | Detection method and device for resisting seed light attack | |
| CN110726483B (en) | Device and method for resisting avalanche transition region attack | |
| Liang et al. | Security analysis on some experimental quantum key distribution systems with imperfect optical and electrical devices | |
| CN114205074B (en) | QKD equipment dead time attack resistance detection device | |
| Martins et al. | Code length limit in phase-sensitive OTDR using ultralong (> 1M bits) pulse sequences due to fading induced by fiber optical path drifts | |
| CN116614230B (en) | Pseudo-state attack demonstration system for introducing detection efficiency mismatch loopholes | |
| Gokul et al. | Experimental Demonstration of Coexistence of Classical and Quantum Communication in Quantum Key Distribution Link |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant |