CN110830247B - Blind vulnerability detection method and device for gated detector in quantum key distribution system - Google Patents
Blind vulnerability detection method and device for gated detector in quantum key distribution system Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method and a device for detecting blindness-causing loopholes of a gated detector in a quantum key distribution system. The invention realizes the relatively thorough detection of the blind hole of the gate control detector for the first time by simulating the general form of the blind attack, namely the pulse light blind attack, and provides guarantee for the improvement of the actual safety of the quantum key distribution system.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a general detection method and a general detection device for a blinding vulnerability of a gate-controlled photodetector (SPD) in a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system, and belongs to the technical field of quantum secret communication.
Background
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems have proven to be information theoretically secure. However, there are some deviations from the ideal model in the actual engineering implementation of a QKD system, and these vulnerabilities give an attacker the opportunity to eavesdrop on the keys, threatening the security of the actual QKD system. One well-known leak is the blinding leak of gated photodetectors (SPDs). Because a large resistor connected in series with an Avalanche Photo Diode (APD) exists in the internal structure of the SPD, when an attacker irradiates the APD with strong light, the bias voltage at two ends of the APD is too low due to the generated large current, and then the APD enters a linear mode. When the APD is in the linear mode, an attacker uses a certain well-constructed interception and forwarding method and intercepts the post-processing process to obtain information transmitted by both communication parties. In 2010, Lyderson et al experimentally verified the effectiveness of this attack using blinding vulnerabilities.
Researchers have proposed various remedies for this vulnerability. One of the more well-known schemes is a scheme for monitoring photocurrent, and the scheme achieves better effects. Currently, a large number of commercial QKD systems on the market employ a scheme of photocurrent detection to monitor attackers' attacks against blinding vulnerabilities. However, on one hand, the effectiveness of the photocurrent monitoring scheme is not theoretically proven, and on the other hand, the current engineering implementation of photocurrent monitoring in a large number of commercial QKD systems only aims at the special form of continuous light-induced blind attack, and whether the photocurrent monitoring scheme is effective for the pulse light-induced blind attack which is more general and more difficult to detect is not considered. In summary, a general detection scheme for blinding vulnerability of gated SPDs is necessary.
Disclosure of Invention
The purpose of the invention is as follows: in order to overcome the defects in the prior art, the invention provides a method and a device for detecting blindness caused by a gated detector in a quantum key distribution system, which are used for simulating the behavior of pulsed light blindness caused attack so as to detect the blindness caused by SPD.
The technical scheme is as follows: in order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the technical scheme that:
the utility model provides a gate control detector causes blind vulnerability detection device among quantum key distribution system, including causing blind pulse light generation module, triggering pulse light generation module, quantum signal intercepting module, classical signal intercepting module, clock synchronization module, wherein:
the clock synchronization module is used for synchronizing the gate signals of the gated detector, the blind pulse light generation module and the excitation signals of the trigger pulse light generation module, so that the relative time relation among the gate signals, the blind pulse light and the trigger pulse light is controllable, and all the blind pulse light and the trigger pulse light are ensured to be respectively emitted out of the gate signals and into the gate signals.
And the blind pulse light generation module is used for generating a plurality of groups of blind pulses to be emitted out of the gate signal of the gate control detector, and the distance between each group of blind pulses, the pulse intensity and the number of pulses contained in each group can be adjusted, so that each group of blind pulses is theoretically enough for temporarily blinding the gate control detector, and meanwhile, the blind time is obtained. If each group of blind pulse is enough to temporarily blind the gated detector in theory and the gated detector cannot find the blind attack by adjusting the intensity, the group-to-group distance and the number of pulses in the group of blind pulses of the blind pulse light generation module, it is determined that the blind hole of the gated detector may exist.
The device comprises a triggering pulse light generation module, a triggering pulse light generation module and a control module, wherein the triggering pulse light generation module generates a triggering pulse light, the pulse intensity can be adjusted, and the triggering pulse light generation module is used for assisting in judging whether the blinding pulse light causes the blinding of the gated detector within a certain time and judging whether the gated detector can be controlled with a success rate of 100% within the blinding time.
And the quantum signal intercepting module is used for intercepting the photons sent by the legal sender, measuring a quantum signal, encoding the detection result and forwarding the detection result to the legal receiver as a pseudo-state signal.
And the classical signal interception module is used for intercepting the post-processing information of a legal sender and a legal receiver in the quantum key distribution system, comparing whether the bases selected by the two parties in each round of communication are the same, extracting the effective part of the detection result stored in the step F) according to the same result so as to obtain the key negotiated by the two parties, and if the correct key is successfully stolen, judging that the quantum key distribution system can be attacked in a false state and stealing information. If the following conditions are met, the quantum key distribution system is judged to be attacked by a pseudo state and a key is stolen: for any round of communication, if the measurement basis of the quantum signal interception module is the same as the codes and measurement bases selected by the legal sender and the legal receiver, the result measured by the quantum signal interception module in the round of communication is the same as the code information and detection result selected by the legal sender and the legal receiver. Otherwise the legitimate receiver does not measure any information.
Preferably: the method for judging whether the gating detector can be controlled with 100% success rate in the blinding time comprises the following steps:
and adjusting the trigger pulse light generation module according to an excitation signal of the trigger light pulse, so that one trigger light pulse generated by the trigger light pulse generation module is at a single photon level, and the trigger light pulse is shot in a gate signal of a certain gate control detector in the blinding time. It is observed whether the triggering light pulse causes a count of the occurrences of the gated detector at the corresponding time. And adjusting the trigger pulse light generation module according to the excitation signal of the trigger light pulse, and striking the trigger light pulse generated by the trigger light pulse generation module into the gate signal of a certain gated detector in the blinding time. At this time, the intensity of the trigger light pulse is adjusted, and the energy of the trigger light pulse is recorded as E1 by observing the intensity of the output signal of the gated detector so that the trigger light pulse triggers the gated detector to count at the corresponding time with a probability of 100%. Similarly, the energy of the trigger light pulse that caused the counting at this time with a probability of 0% was recorded as E2, and E1 and E2 were recorded at all times throughout the blinding time. The recorded E1, E2 are used to calibrate the time at which the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with 100% success rate. In the blinding time, the standard for calibrating the time that the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with a 100% success rate is as follows: less than twice the resulting E1 was recorded over the time as E2. If the time that the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with a 100% success rate exists, the existence of blind holes caused by the gated detector is judged, and the gated detector can be controlled by the attacker with the 100% success rate. Otherwise, judging that the blind hole caused by the gating detector exists and the gating detector can only be controlled by the probability of an attacker.
A method for detecting blindness caused by a gated detector in a quantum key distribution system simulates the behavior of pulsed light blindness attack, so as to detect the blindness caused by SPD, and comprises the following steps:
and step A), the clock synchronization module sends an excitation signal of a gate signal to the gate control detector, sends an excitation signal of the blind pulse light to the blind pulse light generation module, and sends an excitation signal of the trigger pulse light to the trigger pulse light generation module.
And B), invading and interrupting the quantum channels of a legal sender and a legal receiver in the quantum key distribution system.
And C), adjusting the blind pulse light generating module according to the excitation signal of the blind pulse light, so that the generated blind pulse is emitted out of the gate signal of the gate control detector. According to parameters of the gated detector, the intensity, the group-to-group distance and the number of pulses in a group of blind pulses generated by the blind pulse light generation module are adjusted, so that each group of blind pulses is theoretically enough for temporarily blinding the gated detector, and meanwhile, the blind time is obtained. This is because the avalanche photodiode in the SPD has some degree of amplification effect on the incident blinding light in the linear mode; on the other hand, the generated strong photo current will stay in the circuit for a short time, i.e. a period of time for blinding is generated after each set of blinding pulses.
And D), adjusting the trigger pulse light generation module according to the excitation signal of the trigger light pulse to enable one trigger light pulse generated by the trigger light pulse generation module to be at a single photon level, and enabling the trigger light pulse to be shot into a gate signal of a certain gate control detector in the blinding time. While observing whether the triggering light pulse causes a count of the gated detector at the corresponding time. And if the generated weak trigger pulse does not generate a count within due blinding time, judging that the blinding hole of the gated detector exists, and continuing to execute the process of the step E). Otherwise, ending the detection.
And E), adjusting the trigger pulse light generation module according to the excitation signal of the trigger light pulse, and striking the trigger light pulse generated by the trigger light pulse generation module into the gate signal of a certain gate control detector in the blinding time. At this time, the intensity of the trigger light pulse is adjusted, and the energy of the trigger light pulse is recorded as E1 by observing the intensity of the output signal of the gated detector so that the trigger light pulse triggers the gated detector to count at the corresponding time with a probability of 100%. Similarly, the energy of the trigger light pulse that caused the counting at this time with a probability of 0% was recorded as E2, and E1 and E2 were recorded at all times throughout the blinding time. The recorded E1, E2 are used to calibrate the time at which the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with 100% success rate.
In the blinding time, the standard for calibrating the time that the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with a 100% success rate is as follows: less than twice the resulting E1 was recorded over the time as E2. If the time that the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with a 100% success rate exists, the existence of blind holes caused by the gated detector is judged, and the gated detector can be controlled by the attacker with the 100% success rate. Otherwise, judging that the blind hole caused by the gating detector exists and the gating detector can only be controlled by the probability of an attacker.
And F), randomly selecting a measurement base by the quantum signal intercepting module, intercepting the photons sent by the legal sender, and storing the detection result.
And G), adjusting the trigger pulse light generation module within the time that the calibrated gating detector can be controlled by an attacker with a success rate of 100%, encoding the detection result into an E1 pulse with the intensity larger than the current time and an E2 pulse with the intensity smaller than twice the current time according to the measured basis of the detection result, and sending the pulse to a legal receiver as a pseudo-state signal. The dummy state signal is not transmitted for the rest of the time.
If the sent pseudo-state signal is not identified (namely, any alarm device is not triggered or any corresponding reaction is not made), and when the base for coding the pseudo-state signal is consistent with the measurement base selected by the legal receiver, the legal receiver triggers a correct gate control detector and acquires the same information as the pseudo-state signal, and when the base is inconsistent, the legal receiver does not trigger any gate control detector, the quantum key distribution system is judged to be attacked by the pseudo-state.
And step H), a classical signal intercepting module intercepts the post-processing information of a legal sender and a legal receiver in a classical channel, compares whether the bases selected by the two parties in each round of communication are the same, extracts the effective part of the detection result stored in the step F) according to the same result so as to obtain a key negotiated by the two parties, and judges that the quantum key distribution system can be attacked in a false state and steals information if the correct key is successfully stolen.
If the following conditions are met, the quantum key distribution system is judged to be attacked by a pseudo state and a key is stolen: for any round of communication, if the measurement basis of the quantum signal interception module is the same as the codes and measurement bases selected by the legal sender and the legal receiver, the result measured by the quantum signal interception module in the round of communication is the same as the code information and detection result selected by the legal sender and the legal receiver. Otherwise the legitimate receiver does not measure any information.
Preferably: in the step C, if each group of blind pulses is theoretically enough to temporarily cause the blind gated detector by adjusting the intensity, the group-to-group distance and the number of pulses in the group of blind pulses of the blind pulsed light generation module, and the gated detector cannot find the existence of blind attacks (namely, no alarm or other corresponding measures appear), judging that blind holes of the gated detector possibly exist, and continuing to execute the step D) process, otherwise, ending the detection.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
the invention realizes the relatively thorough detection of the SPD blinding vulnerability for the first time through simulating the general form of the blinding attack, namely the pulsed light blinding attack, provides guarantee for the improvement of the actual safety of the QKD system, and has important significance for promoting the reliability research of the QKD system.
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FIG. 1 is a diagram of an apparatus for detecting blind effect and calibrating 100% success rate control time in an embodiment.
Fig. 2 is a diagram of an apparatus for developing a pseudo attack in an embodiment.
Detailed Description
The present invention is further illustrated by the following description in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and the specific embodiments, it is to be understood that these examples are given solely for the purpose of illustration and are not intended as a definition of the limits of the invention, since various equivalent modifications will occur to those skilled in the art upon reading the present invention and fall within the limits of the appended claims.
The utility model provides a gate control detector blind vulnerability detection device among quantum key distribution system, as shown in fig. 1, 2, including sending blind pulse light generation module, triggering pulse light generation module, quantum signal intercepting module, classical signal intercepting module, clock synchronization module, wherein:
the clock synchronization module is used for synchronizing the gate signals of the gated detector, the blind pulse light generation module and the excitation signals of the trigger pulse light generation module, so that the relative time relation among the gate signals, the blind pulse light and the trigger pulse light is controllable, and all the blind pulse light and the trigger pulse light are ensured to be respectively emitted out of the gate signals and into the gate signals.
And the blind pulse light generation module is used for generating a plurality of groups of blind pulses to be emitted outside the gate signal of the gate control detector, and the distance between each group of blind pulses, the pulse intensity and the number of pulses contained in each group can be adjusted at will, so that each group of blind pulses is theoretically enough for temporarily blinding the gate control detector, and meanwhile, the blind time is obtained. If each group of blind pulse is enough to temporarily blind the gated detector in theory and the gated detector cannot find the blind attack by adjusting the intensity, the group-to-group distance and the number of pulses in the group of blind pulses of the blind pulse light generation module, it is determined that the blind hole of the gated detector may exist.
The device comprises a triggering pulse light generation module, a triggering pulse light generation module and a control module, wherein the triggering pulse light generation module generates a triggering pulse light, the pulse intensity can be adjusted, and the triggering pulse light generation module is used for assisting in judging whether the blinding pulse light causes the blinding of the gated detector within a certain time and judging whether the gated detector can be controlled with a success rate of 100% within the blinding time. And adjusting the trigger pulse light generation module according to an excitation signal of the trigger light pulse, so that one trigger light pulse generated by the trigger light pulse generation module is at a single photon level, and the trigger light pulse is shot in a gate signal of a certain gate control detector in the blinding time. It is observed whether the triggering light pulse causes a count of the occurrences of the gated detector at the corresponding time. And adjusting the trigger pulse light generation module according to the excitation signal of the trigger light pulse, and striking the trigger light pulse generated by the trigger light pulse generation module into the gate signal of a certain gated detector in the blinding time. At this time, the intensity of the trigger light pulse is adjusted, and the energy of the trigger light pulse is recorded as E1 by observing the intensity of the output signal of the gated detector so that the trigger light pulse triggers the gated detector to count at the corresponding time with a probability of 100%. Similarly, the energy of the trigger light pulse that caused the counting at this time with a probability of 0% was recorded as E2, and E1 and E2 were recorded at all times throughout the blinding time. The recorded E1, E2 are used to calibrate the time at which the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with 100% success rate. In the blinding time, the standard for calibrating the time that the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with a 100% success rate is as follows: less than twice the resulting E1 was recorded over the time as E2. If the time that the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with a 100% success rate exists, the existence of blind holes caused by the gated detector is judged, and the gated detector can be controlled by the attacker with the 100% success rate. Otherwise, judging that the blind hole caused by the gating detector exists and the gating detector can only be controlled by the probability of an attacker.
And the quantum signal intercepting module is used for intercepting the photons sent by the legal sender, measuring a quantum signal, encoding the detection result and forwarding the detection result to the legal receiver as a pseudo-state signal.
And the classical signal interception module is used for intercepting the post-processing information of a legal sender and a legal receiver in the quantum key distribution system, comparing whether the bases selected by the two parties in each round of communication are the same, extracting the effective part of the detection result stored in the step F) according to the same result so as to obtain the key negotiated by the two parties, and if the correct key is successfully stolen, judging that the quantum key distribution system can be attacked in a false state and stealing information. If the following conditions are met, the quantum key distribution system is judged to be attacked by a pseudo state and a key is stolen: for any round of communication, if the measurement basis of the quantum signal interception module is the same as the codes and measurement bases selected by the legal sender and the legal receiver, the result measured by the quantum signal interception module in the round of communication is the same as the code information and detection result selected by the legal sender and the legal receiver. Otherwise the legitimate receiver does not measure any information.
The following case further illustrates the legitimate sender Alice, the legitimate receiver Bob and the inspector:
a method for detecting blindness caused by a gated detector in a quantum key distribution system simulates the behavior of pulsed light blindness caused attack as shown in figures 1 and 2, so as to detect the blindness caused by SPD, and comprises the following steps:
and step A), an inspector sends an excitation signal of a gate signal to a gating detector through a clock synchronization module, sends an excitation signal of blind pulse light to a blind pulse light generation module, and sends an excitation signal of trigger pulse light to a trigger pulse light generation module, so that the time relationship of the three modules is adjustable.
The modules are connected according to fig. 1. The inspector adjusts any pulse light generating module so that the generated blind pulse hits outside the gate signal of the SPD. According to parameters of the SPDs, the intensity, the group-to-group distance and the number of pulses in a group of blind pulses generated by any pulse light generation module are adjusted, so that each group of blind pulses is theoretically enough to temporarily blind the SPDs for a period of time. If Bob fails to find the existence of the blinding attack (namely no alarm or other corresponding measures appear), the SPD blinding vulnerability of the QKD system is judged to exist.
And step B), the intrusion of a detector is detected and the quantum channels of a legal sender Alice and a legal receiver Bob in the quantum key distribution system are interrupted.
And step C), the inspector adjusts the blind pulse light generating module according to the excitation signal of the blind pulse light, so that the generated blind pulse is emitted out of the gate signal of the gate control detector. According to parameters of the gated detector, the intensity, the group-to-group distance and the number of pulses in a group of blind pulses generated by the blind pulse light generation module are adjusted, so that each group of blind pulses is theoretically enough for temporarily blinding the gated detector, and meanwhile, the blind time is obtained. This is because the avalanche photodiode in the SPD has some degree of amplification effect on the incident blinding light in the linear mode; on the other hand, the generated strong photo current will stay in the circuit for a short time, i.e. a period of time for blinding is generated after each set of blinding pulses. If each group of blind pulse is theoretically enough to temporarily blind the gated detector by adjusting the intensity, the group-to-group distance and the number of pulses in the group of blind pulses of the blind pulse light generation module, and the gated detector cannot find the existence of blind attacks (namely, no alarm or other corresponding measures appear), judging that blind holes of the gated detector possibly exist, and continuing to execute the process of the step D), otherwise, ending the detection.
And D) in order to verify that the SPD is blinded in certain time, an inspector adjusts the trigger pulse light generation module according to an excitation signal of the trigger light pulse so that one trigger light pulse generated by the trigger light pulse generation module is at a single photon level and the trigger light pulse is shot in a gate signal of a certain gated detector in the blinding time. While observing whether the triggering light pulse causes a count of the gated detector at the corresponding time. And if the generated weak trigger pulse does not generate a count within due blinding time, judging that the blinding hole of the gated detector exists, and continuing to execute the process of the step E). Otherwise, ending the detection.
And step E), in order to calibrate the time that the SPD can be controlled by an attacker with a success rate of 100%, the inspector adjusts the trigger pulse light generation module according to the excitation signal of the trigger light pulse, and the trigger light pulse generated by the trigger light pulse generation module is applied to the gate signal of a certain gate control detector in the blinding time again. At this time, the intensity of the trigger light pulse is adjusted, and the energy of the trigger light pulse is recorded as E1 by observing the intensity of the output signal of the gated detector so that the trigger light pulse triggers the gated detector to count at the corresponding time with a probability of 100%. Similarly, the energy of the trigger light pulse that caused the counting at this time with a probability of 0% was recorded as E2, and E1 and E2 were recorded at all times throughout the blinding time. The recorded E1, E2 are used to calibrate the time at which the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with 100% success rate. The time that an SPD can be controlled by an attacker with a 100% success rate is calibrated with the criterion that E1 is less than twice E2. If the SPD can exist in the time controlled by the attacker with the success rate of 100%, the blind hole caused by the SPD exists, and the SPD can be controlled by the attacker with the success rate of 100%. Otherwise, the SPD is judged to have the blind vulnerability and can only be controlled by the attacker in a probabilistic way. Therefore, in the blinding time, the time that the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with a 100% success rate is calibrated as follows: less than twice the resulting E1 was recorded over the time as E2. If the time that the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with a 100% success rate exists, the existence of blind holes caused by the gated detector is judged, and the gated detector can be controlled by the attacker with the 100% success rate. Otherwise, judging that the blind hole caused by the gating detector exists and the gating detector can only be controlled by the probability of an attacker.
And F), connecting the modules by an inspector according to the figure 2, randomly selecting a measurement base by the inspector through the quantum signal interception module, intercepting photons sent by Alice of a legal sender, and storing a detection result.
And G), the inspector adjusts the trigger pulse light generation module within the time that the calibrated gating detector can be controlled by an attacker with a 100% success rate, encodes the detection result into a pulse with the intensity being larger than E1 of the current time and smaller than E2 of the current time according to the measured base of the detection result, and sends the pulse as a pseudo-state signal to a legal receiver Bob. The dummy state signal is not transmitted for the rest of the time. If the sent pseudo-state signal is not identified (namely, any alarm device is not triggered or any corresponding reaction is not made), and when the base for coding the pseudo-state signal is consistent with the measurement base selected by the legal receiver, the legal receiver triggers a correct gate control detector and acquires the same information as the pseudo-state signal, and when the base is inconsistent, the legal receiver does not trigger any gate control detector, the quantum key distribution system is judged to be attacked by the pseudo-state. That is, if the false state signal does not trigger the alarm device of the legal receiver Bob; and when the base of the code is consistent with the measurement base selected by the legal receiver, the legal receiver Bob triggers the correct SPD and acquires the information which is the same as the pseudo-state signal, and when the base is inconsistent, any SPD of the legal receiver Bob does not trigger, the QKD system is judged to be attacked by the pseudo-state.
And step H), an inspector intercepts post-processing information of a legal sender Alice and a legal receiver Bob in a classical channel by using a classical signal interception module, selects the condition that the coding base of the legal sender Alice, the measurement base of a quantum signal interception module and the measuring machine of the legal receiver Bob are consistent in all communications, compares whether the bases selected by the two parties in each round of communications are the same, extracts the effective part of the detection result stored in the step F) according to the same result, thereby acquiring a secret key negotiated by the two parties, and judges that the quantum secret key distribution system can be attacked in a false state and steals information if the correct secret key is successfully stolen.
If the following conditions are met, the quantum key distribution system is judged to be attacked by a pseudo state and a key is stolen: for any round of communication, if the measurement basis of the quantum signal interception module is the same as the codes and measurement bases selected by the legal sender and the legal receiver, the result measured by the quantum signal interception module in the round of communication is the same as the code information and detection result selected by the legal sender and the legal receiver. Otherwise the legitimate receiver does not measure any information.
The above description is only of the preferred embodiments of the present invention, and it should be noted that: it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications and adaptations can be made without departing from the principles of the invention and these are intended to be within the scope of the invention.
Claims (6)
1. A gate control detector blind hole detection device in a quantum key distribution system is characterized in that: including sending blind pulse light generation module, triggering pulse light generation module, quantum signal intercepting module, classical signal intercepting module, clock synchronization module, wherein:
the clock synchronization module is used for synchronizing the gate signals of the gate control detector, the blind pulse light generation module and the excitation signals of the trigger pulse light generation module, so that the relative time relationship among the gate signals, the blind pulse light and the trigger pulse light can be controlled, and all the blind pulse light and the trigger pulse light are ensured to be shot outside the gate signals and in the gate signals;
the blind pulse light generation module is used for generating a plurality of groups of blind pulses to be emitted out of a gate signal of the gate control detector, and the distance between groups of the blind pulses, the pulse intensity and the number of pulses contained in each group can be adjusted, so that each group of blind pulses is theoretically enough for temporarily blinding the gate control detector, and meanwhile, the blind time is obtained; if each group of blind pulse is enough to temporarily blind the gated detector in theory and the gated detector cannot find the blind attack by adjusting the strength, the group-to-group distance and the number of pulses in the group of blind pulses of the blind pulse light generation module, judging that the blind hole of the gated detector may exist;
the device comprises a triggering pulse light generating module, a control module and a control module, wherein the triggering pulse light generating module generates a triggering pulse light, the pulse intensity can be adjusted, and the triggering pulse light is used for assisting in judging whether the blinding pulse light causes the blinding of the gated detector within a certain time and judging whether the gated detector can be controlled with a success rate of 100% within the blinding time;
the quantum signal intercepting module is used for intercepting photons sent by a legal sender, measuring a quantum signal, encoding a detection result and forwarding the detection result to a legal receiver as a pseudo-state signal;
the classical signal intercepting module is used for intercepting the post-processing information of a legal sender and a legal receiver in the quantum key distribution system, comparing whether the bases selected by the two parties in each round of communication are the same or not, and extracting the effective part of the detection result stored according to the same result so as to obtain the key negotiated by the two parties; and if the correct key is successfully stolen, judging that the quantum key distribution system can be attacked by a pseudo state and stealing information.
2. The device for detecting blind holes caused by the gated detector in the quantum key distribution system according to claim 1, wherein: the method for judging whether the gating detector can be controlled with 100% success rate in the blinding time comprises the following steps:
adjusting a trigger pulse light generation module according to an excitation signal of a trigger light pulse to enable one trigger light pulse generated by the trigger light pulse generation module to be at a single photon level, wherein the trigger light pulse is shot in a gate signal of a certain gate control detector in the blinding time; observing whether the triggering light pulse causes the gated detector to count at the corresponding time; adjusting a trigger pulse light generation module according to an excitation signal of the trigger light pulse, and striking the trigger light pulse generated by the trigger light pulse generation module into a gate signal of a certain gate control detector in the blinding time; at the moment, the intensity of the trigger light pulse is adjusted, the gated detector is triggered to count at the corresponding time with the probability of 100% by observing certain intensity of the output signal of the gated detector, and the energy of the trigger light pulse is recorded as E1; similarly, recording the energy of the trigger light pulse which causes counting at the time with the probability of 0 percent as E2, and recording E1 and E2 at all times in the whole blinding time according to the method; the recorded E1 and E2 are used for calibrating the time that the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with a success rate of 100 percent; in the blinding time, the standard for calibrating the time that the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with a 100% success rate is as follows: less than twice as much E1 was recorded over the time as E2; if the time that the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with a 100% success rate exists, judging that blind holes caused by the gated detector exist and the gated detector can be controlled by the attacker with a 100% success rate; otherwise, judging that the blind hole caused by the gating detector exists and the gating detector can only be controlled by the probability of an attacker.
3. The device for detecting blind holes caused by the gated detector in the quantum key distribution system according to claim 1, wherein: if the following conditions are met, the quantum key distribution system is judged to be attacked by a pseudo state and a key is stolen: for any round of communication, if the measuring basis of the quantum signal intercepting module is the same as the codes and measuring basis selected by the legal sender and the legal receiver, the result measured by the quantum signal intercepting module in the round of communication is the same as the code information and detection result selected by the legal sender and the legal receiver; otherwise the legitimate receiver does not measure any information.
4. A method for detecting blindness caused by a gated detector in a quantum key distribution system is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step A), the clock synchronization module sends an excitation signal of a gate signal to the gate control detector, sends an excitation signal of blind pulse light to the blind pulse light generation module, and sends an excitation signal of trigger light pulse to the trigger light pulse generation module;
b), quantum channels of a legal sender and a legal receiver in the quantum key distribution system are invaded and interrupted;
step C), adjusting the blind pulse light generating module according to the excitation signal of the blind pulse light to enable the generated blind pulse to be shot out of the gate signal of the gate control detector; according to parameters of the gated detector, adjusting the intensity, the group-to-group distance and the number of pulses in a group of blind pulses generated by the blind pulse light generation module, so that each group of blind pulses is theoretically enough for temporarily blinding the gated detector, and simultaneously acquiring blinding time;
step D), adjusting a trigger pulse light generation module according to an excitation signal of the trigger light pulse to enable one trigger light pulse generated by the trigger light pulse generation module to be at a single photon level, wherein the trigger light pulse is shot into a gate signal of a certain gate control detector in the blinding time; observing whether the triggering light pulse causes the gated detector to count at the corresponding time;
step E), adjusting the trigger pulse light generation module according to the excitation signal of the trigger light pulse, and striking the trigger light pulse generated by the trigger light pulse generation module into the gate signal of a certain gate control detector in the blinding time; at the moment, the intensity of the trigger light pulse is adjusted, the gated detector is triggered to count at the corresponding time with the probability of 100% by observing certain intensity of the output signal of the gated detector, and the energy of the trigger light pulse is recorded as E1; similarly, recording the energy of the trigger light pulse which causes counting at the time with the probability of 0 percent as E2, and recording E1 and E2 at all times in the whole blinding time according to the method; the recorded E1 and E2 are used for calibrating the time that the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with a success rate of 100 percent;
in the blinding time, the standard for calibrating the time that the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with a 100% success rate is as follows: less than twice as much E1 was recorded over the time as E2; if the time that the gated detector can be controlled by an attacker with a 100% success rate exists, judging that blind holes caused by the gated detector exist and the gated detector can be controlled by the attacker with a 100% success rate; otherwise, judging that the blind hole caused by the gating detector exists and the gating detector can only be controlled by the probability of an attacker;
step F), the quantum signal intercepting module randomly selects a measuring base, intercepts photons sent by a legal sender and stores a detection result;
step G), in the time that the calibrated gating detector can be controlled by an attacker with a success rate of 100%, the triggering pulse light generation module is adjusted, the detection result is coded into an E1 pulse with the intensity larger than the current time and an E2 pulse with the intensity smaller than twice the current time according to the measured basis of the detection result, and the pulse is used as a pseudo-state signal to be sent to a legal receiver; not sending the pseudo-state signal in the rest time;
in the step G), if the sent pseudo-state signal is not identified, and when the basis for coding the pseudo-state signal is consistent with the measurement basis selected by the legal receiver, the legal receiver triggers a correct gate control detector and acquires the same information as the pseudo-state signal, and when the basis is inconsistent, the legal receiver does not trigger any gate control detector, the quantum key distribution system is judged to be attacked by the pseudo-state;
step H), a classical signal intercepting module intercepts post-processing information of a legal sender and a legal receiver in a classical channel, compares whether the bases selected by the two parties in each round of communication are the same, and extracts the effective part of the detection result stored in the step F) according to the same result so as to obtain a key negotiated by the two parties; and if the correct key is successfully stolen, judging that the quantum key distribution system can be attacked by a pseudo state and stealing information.
5. The method for detecting blindness caused by a gated detector in a quantum key distribution system according to claim 4, wherein the method comprises the following steps: in the step C, if each group of blind pulses is theoretically enough to temporarily cause the blind gated detector by adjusting the intensity, the group-to-group distance and the number of pulses in the group of blind pulses of the blind pulsed light generation module, and the gated detector cannot find the blind attacks, namely, no alarm or other corresponding measures are taken, it is determined that blind holes of the gated detector may exist, the process of the step D) is continuously executed, and otherwise, the detection is finished.
6. The method for detecting blindness caused by a gated detector in a quantum key distribution system according to claim 5, wherein the method comprises the following steps: and H), if the following conditions are met, judging that the quantum key distribution system can be attacked by a pseudo state and stealing a key: for any round of communication, if the measuring basis of the quantum signal intercepting module is the same as the codes and measuring basis selected by the legal sender and the legal receiver, the result measured by the quantum signal intercepting module in the round of communication is the same as the code information and detection result selected by the legal sender and the legal receiver; otherwise the legitimate receiver does not measure any information.
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