CN113411183B - Synchronous correction vulnerability detection method and device in quantum key distribution system - Google Patents
Synchronous correction vulnerability detection method and device in quantum key distribution system Download PDFInfo
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- CN113411183B CN113411183B CN202110598319.9A CN202110598319A CN113411183B CN 113411183 B CN113411183 B CN 113411183B CN 202110598319 A CN202110598319 A CN 202110598319A CN 113411183 B CN113411183 B CN 113411183B
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
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- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
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Abstract
The invention discloses a synchronous correction leak detection method and a device in a quantum key distribution system, which comprises a wavelength division multiplexing module, a signal light delay module, a polarization detection module and a classical information interception module, wherein the polarization used by signal light in the synchronous correction process is detected, so that whether an excitation signal is sent to the signal light delay module or not is selected according to the polarization information to implement the delay of the signal light, whether the current signal light transmission is delayed or not is selected according to the received excitation signal, the processed signal light is sent to a receiving end, the base selection information published by the transmitting end and the receiving end is intercepted in a key distribution stage, a detector can be combined with the polarization information of the delay selected by the detector in the synchronous correction process to simulate the attack to realize the inference of partial keys, the invention realizes the detection of the leak by simulating the attack aiming at the synchronous correction leak, and the actual safety of the quantum key distribution system is guaranteed.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a universal detection method and a universal detection device for vulnerabilities existing in a synchronous correction process in a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system, and belongs to the technical field of quantum secret communication.
Background
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems have proven to be information theoretically secure. However, there are some deviations from the ideal model in the actual engineering implementation of a QKD system, and these vulnerabilities give an attacker the opportunity to eavesdrop on the keys, threatening the security of the actual QKD system. The implementation of the calibration preparation phase before the QKD system runs key distribution is some engineering design beyond the QKD theoretical protocol, so an attacker can be unprotected from QKD security proof against attacks in this phase. Specifically, there is a synchronization correction process in the commercial QKD system preparation phase. In the process, Bob calibrates the matching relation of Alice-side signal light and Bob-side corresponding detection events in time by using the time interval information of the synchronous light and signal light trigger counting emitted by Alice. Since the system independently performs synchronous modification on each detector in a time-sharing manner, an attacker can artificially delay the time label of a response event by applying delay to the synchronous modification of the partial detectors, and then deduces a partial key by intercepting information on a public classical channel in a key distribution stage of the QKD system, so that information stealing can be realized. Because the attack based on the synchronous correction vulnerability belongs to the foremost discovery of the safety research of the QKD actual equipment, a general commercial QKD system is not designed to realize a corresponding targeted defense scheme, and the system is in the threat brought by the vulnerability. In summary, it is necessary to design a detection scheme for synchronization correction vulnerability.
Disclosure of Invention
The purpose of the invention is as follows: in order to overcome the defects in the prior art, the invention provides a method and a device for detecting a synchronous correction vulnerability in a quantum key distribution system, which are used for simulating the behavior of synchronous correction attack so as to detect whether the vulnerability exists in a QKD system.
The technical scheme is as follows: in order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the technical scheme that:
the utility model provides a synchronous correction leak detection device among quantum key distribution system, includes wavelength division multiplexing module, signal light delay module, polarization detection module, classical information intercepting module, wherein:
the wavelength division multiplexing module is used for spatially separating the light emitted by the emitting end according to different wavelengths to obtain synchronous light and signal light, and the synchronous light is sent to the receiving end. The signal light is respectively sent to the signal light delay module and the polarization detection module.
The polarization detection module is used for detecting the polarization used by the signal light in the synchronous correction process, so that whether the excitation signal is sent to the signal light delay module or not is selected according to the polarization information to implement the delay of the signal light.
The signal light delay module is used for selecting whether to delay the current signal light transmission according to the received excitation signal and sending the processed signal light to the receiving end.
The classical information interception module is used for intercepting the base selection information published by the transmitting terminal and the receiving terminal in the key distribution stage.
Preferably: the polarization selected by the polarization detection module is changed to one or more of H, V, P, N depending on the needs of the attacker.
Preferably: the length of time of the delay applied in the signal light delay module is adjusted by the attacker as desired.
Preferably: and deducing a partial key according to the base selection information stolen by the classic information interception module and the polarization information selected by the simulated attack of a detector in the synchronous correction process of the polarization detection module.
A synchronous correction vulnerability detection method in a quantum key distribution system comprises the following steps:
and step A), before the QKD system enters a calibration preparation stage, all modules of the detection device required by synchronous correction attack are accessed into the optical path and the classical channel. In the synchronous correction process, the polarization detection module is adjusted according to an attack method simulated by an inspector to select signal light with specific polarization and apply delayed excitation signals. The signal light delay module applies a delay with a delay time t to the signal light according to the excitation signal. An attack that adds delay to V, P, N three polarization signal lights is detected.
And step B), the QKD system enters a key distribution stage, the signal light delay module is adjusted to close the delay applied to the transmission of the specific polarization signal light, and the signal light is prevented from reaching a receiving end in the actual time from t to 2 t. If the QKD system triggers any alarms due to signal light being suppressed, then a leak is determined to be absent. During the time t from the beginning of the key distribution phase, the detection response events of V, P, N three detectors are discarded during the synchronization correction process, and the response events of the three detectors during the actual time t to 2t are labeled with the system time from 0 to t. Since virtually any signal light is blocked from time t to 2t, the receiver-side detector's effective response event for QKD system 0 to t is only likely to occur due to the detection of a photon by the H-polarization detector.
And step C), monitoring the base selection information disclosed by the transmitting terminal and the receiving terminal in a classical information interception module. The inspector obtains a bit string by recording the instants in time of the QKD system t at which the probe counts are asserted on the classical channel as corresponding bits from the H-probe response. If the QKD system does not produce a valid count greater than the predetermined count threshold for the time t of the QKD system, the inspector resumes the inspection.
And D), continuing the key distribution stage for a preset time, so that the transmitting end and the receiving end obtain the bit strings with the length larger than the preset length threshold value to carry out error rate detection. Since the inspector has artificially delayed the time-stamp of the partial probe response event during the synchronization correction process, there will be inherent errors in the QKD system after system time t. And if the error rate detected by the system is kept below the error rate of normal operation of the system, and an alarm is not triggered, continuing the next step, otherwise, judging that the synchronous correction loophole does not exist.
And E), comparing the bit string obtained by the simulated attack in the initial system t time with the bit strings prepared by the transmitting terminal and the receiving terminal in corresponding time by the inspector, and judging that the synchronous correction vulnerability exists if the simulated attack is found to successfully obtain all the bits prepared by the transmitting terminal and the receiving terminal in the time. If the bit string stolen by the inspector is not identical to the bit strings of the transmitting end and the receiving end but the correlation degree is larger than the correlation threshold value due to errors of the physical devices, the existence of a synchronous correction vulnerability is still judged. And if the information stolen by the simulated attack does not have correlation with the bit strings of the transmitting end and the receiving end or the correlation degree is lower than a correlation threshold value, judging that the synchronous correction vulnerability does not exist.
Preferably: the polarization detection module selects specific polarization signal light through a polarization beam splitter, a half-wave plate or a quarter-wave plate.
Preferably: the delayed feedback control signal is applied and output by the single photon detector.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
the invention realizes the detection of the synchronous correction loophole for the first time by simulating the attack aiming at the synchronous correction loophole, provides guarantee for the actual safety of the QKD system and has important significance for promoting the reliability research of the QKD system.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a diagram of an apparatus for detecting a synchronization correction hole in an embodiment.
Fig. 2 is a flowchart of detecting a synchronization correction vulnerability.
Detailed Description
The present invention is further illustrated by the following description in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and the specific embodiments, it is to be understood that these examples are given solely for the purpose of illustration and are not intended as a definition of the limits of the invention, since various equivalent modifications will occur to those skilled in the art upon reading the present invention and fall within the limits of the appended claims.
The utility model provides a synchronous correction leak detection device among quantum key distribution system, as shown in fig. 1, includes wavelength division multiplexing module, signal light delay module, polarization detection module, classical information intercepting module, wherein:
and the wavelength division multiplexing module is used for spatially separating two lights emitted by Alice according to different wavelengths of the synchronous light and the signal light to obtain synchronous light and signal light, and the synchronous light is sent to Bob. The signal light is respectively sent to the signal light delay module and the polarization detection module.
The polarization detection module is used for detecting the polarization used by the signal light in the synchronous correction process, so that whether the excitation signal is sent to the signal light delay module or not is selected according to the polarization information to implement the delay of the signal light. The selected polarization may be arbitrarily changed to any one or more of H, V, P, N depending on the needs of the attacker.
And the signal light delay module is used for selecting whether to delay the current signal light transmission according to the received excitation signal and sending the processed signal light to Bob. The length of time of the applied delay can be adjusted at will by the attacker as required.
The classical information interception module is used for intercepting the base selection information published by Alice and Bob in the key distribution phase. Based on the information, the attacker can combine polarization information of the delay selected by the attacker in the synchronous correction process to realize the inference of the partial key.
The following case further illustrates the legitimate sender Alice, the legitimate receiver Bob and the inspector:
a synchronous correction vulnerability detection method in a quantum key distribution system is disclosed, as shown in figure 2, and realizes vulnerability detection by simulating attack behaviors aiming at vulnerabilities existing in a synchronous correction process, wherein the method mainly comprises the following steps:
and step A), before the QKD system enters a calibration preparation stage, all modules of the detection device required by synchronous correction attack are accessed into the optical path and the classical channel. In the synchronous correction process, the polarization detection module is adjusted according to an attack method simulated by an inspector to select signal light with specific polarization and apply delayed excitation signals. The signal light delay module applies a delay with a delay time t to the signal light according to the excitation signal. The selection device for the specific polarization signal light can be constructed by a combination of linear optical elements including but not limited to a polarization beam splitter, a half-wave plate, a quarter-wave plate and the like, and a feedback control signal for applying delay can be output by the single photon detector. The signal light delay module can be realized by an optical switch and a plurality of output channels which are connected with the optical switch and have different lengths. Here, we denote the applied delay time by the symbol t. We illustrate an attack that adds delay to V, P, N signal light of three polarizations, and an attack strategy that detects delay for signal light of other polarizations can be obtained by analogy with equal effect.
And step B), the QKD system enters a key distribution stage, the signal light delay module is adjusted to close the delay applied to the transmission of the specific polarization signal light, and the signal light is prevented from reaching Bob in the actual time from t to 2 t. If the QKD system triggers any alarms due to signal light being suppressed, then a leak is determined to be absent. During the time t from the beginning of the key distribution phase, the detection response events of V, P, N three detectors are discarded during the synchronization correction process, and the response events of the three detectors during the actual time t to 2t are labeled with the system time from 0 to t. Since virtually any signal light is blocked from time t to 2t, the Bob detector's effective response event for QKD system 0 to t can only occur due to the detection of a photon by the H-polarization detector.
And step C), monitoring the base selection information disclosed by Alice and Bob in a classical information interception module. The inspector obtains a bit string by recording the instants in time of the QKD system t at which the probe counts are asserted on the classical channel as corresponding bits from the H-probe response. If the QKD system does not produce a valid count greater than the predetermined count threshold for the time t of the QKD system, the inspector resumes the inspection.
And D), continuing the key distribution stage for a preset time, so that Alice and Bob obtain the bit strings with the length larger than the preset length threshold value to carry out error rate detection. Since the inspector has artificially delayed the time-stamp of the partial probe response event during the synchronization correction process, there will be inherent errors in the QKD system after system time t. And if the error rate detected by the system is kept below the error rate of normal operation of the system, and an alarm is not triggered, continuing the next step, otherwise, judging that the synchronous correction loophole does not exist.
And E), comparing the bit string obtained by the simulated attack within the time t of the initial system with the bit strings prepared by Alice and Bob within the corresponding time by the inspector, and judging that the synchronous correction vulnerability exists if the simulated attack is found to successfully obtain all the bits prepared by Alice and Bob within the time. If the bit string stolen by the inspector is not identical to the bit strings of Alice and Bob but the correlation degree is larger than the correlation threshold value due to the error of the physical device, the existence of the synchronous correction vulnerability is still judged. And if the information stolen by the simulation attack does not have correlation with the bit strings of Alice and Bob or the correlation degree is lower than a correlation threshold value, judging that the synchronous correction vulnerability does not exist.
The invention realizes the detection of the vulnerability by simulating the attack aiming at the synchronous correction vulnerability and provides guarantee for the actual safety of the quantum key distribution system.
The above description is only of the preferred embodiments of the present invention, and it should be noted that: it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications and adaptations can be made without departing from the principles of the invention and these are intended to be within the scope of the invention.
Claims (7)
1. The utility model provides a synchronous correction leak detection device among quantum key distribution system which characterized in that, includes wavelength division multiplexing module, signal light delay module, polarization detection module, classical information intercepting module, wherein:
the wavelength division multiplexing module is used for spatially separating the light emitted by the emitting end according to different wavelengths to obtain synchronous light and signal light, and the synchronous light is sent to the receiving end; the signal light is respectively sent to a signal light delay module and a polarization detection module;
the polarization detection module is used for detecting the polarization used by the signal light in the synchronous correction process, so that whether an excitation signal is sent to the signal light delay module or not is selected according to the polarization information to implement the delay of the signal light;
the signal light delay module is used for selecting whether to delay the current signal light transmission according to the received excitation signal and sending the processed signal light to the receiving end;
the classical information interception module is used for intercepting the base selection information published by the transmitting terminal and the receiving terminal in the key distribution stage.
2. The apparatus for synchronously correcting vulnerability in quantum key distribution system according to claim 1, wherein: the polarization selected by the polarization detection module is changed to one or more of H, V, P, N depending on the needs of the attacker.
3. The apparatus for synchronously correcting vulnerability in quantum key distribution system according to claim 2, wherein: the length of time of the delay applied in the signal light delay module is adjusted by the attacker as desired.
4. The apparatus for synchronously correcting vulnerability in quantum key distribution system according to claim 3, wherein: and deducing a partial key according to the base selection information stolen by the classic information interception module and the polarization information selected by the simulated attack of a detector in the synchronous correction process of the polarization detection module.
5. The detection method of the synchronous correction vulnerability detection apparatus in the quantum key distribution system based on claim 1 is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step A), before the QKD system enters a calibration preparation stage, all modules of a detection device required by synchronous correction attack are accessed into a light path and a classical channel; in the synchronous correction process, adjusting a polarization detection module according to an attack method simulated by an inspector to select signal light with specific polarization to apply a delayed excitation signal; the signal light delay module applies delay with delay time t to the signal light according to the excitation signal; detecting an attack that adds delay to V, P, N three polarization signal lights;
step B), the QKD system enters a key distribution stage, the signal light delay module is adjusted to close the delay applied to the transmission of the specific polarization signal light, and the signal light is prevented from reaching a receiving end in the actual time from t to 2 t; if the QKD system triggers any alarm due to the signal light being suppressed, it is determined that a leak does not exist; during the time t from the beginning of the key distribution phase, V, P, N the response events of the three detectors are discarded during the synchronous correction, and the response events of the three detectors in the actual time t to 2t are labeled with the system time from 0 to t; because any signal light is blocked in the time from t to 2t in practice, the effective response event of the detector at the receiving end in the time from 0 to t of the QKD system can only be generated due to the detection of photons by the H polarization detector;
step C), monitoring base selection information disclosed by a transmitting terminal and a receiving terminal in a classical information interception module; recording the time when detection counting is declared on the classical channel in the QKD system t time as corresponding bits obtained by the response of an H detector by an inspector to obtain a bit string; if the QKD system does not produce a valid count greater than the predetermined count threshold within the QKD system t time, the inspector resumes the inspection;
step D), the key distribution stage continues to continue for a preset time, so that the transmitting end and the receiving end obtain bit strings with the length larger than a preset length threshold value to carry out error rate detection; because the inspector has artificially delayed the time labels of partial detector response events during the synchronous correction process, there will be inherent errors in the QKD system after the system time t; if the error rate detected by the system is kept below the error rate of normal operation of the system, and an alarm is not triggered, continuing the next step, otherwise, judging that the synchronous correction loophole does not exist;
step E), the inspector compares the bit string obtained by the simulated attack within the time t of the initial system with the bit strings prepared by the transmitting terminal and the receiving terminal within the corresponding time, and if the simulated attack is found to successfully obtain all the bits prepared by the transmitting terminal and the receiving terminal within the time, the existence of the synchronous correction loophole is judged; if the bit string stolen by the inspector is not identical to the bit strings of the transmitting end and the receiving end but the correlation degree is larger than the correlation threshold value due to the error of the physical device, the existence of the synchronous correction vulnerability is still judged; and if the information stolen by the simulated attack does not have correlation with the bit strings of the transmitting end and the receiving end or the correlation degree is lower than a correlation threshold value, judging that the synchronous correction vulnerability does not exist.
6. The detection method according to claim 5, characterized in that: the polarization detection module selects specific polarization signal light through a polarization beam splitter, a half-wave plate or a quarter-wave plate.
7. The detection method according to claim 6, characterized in that: the delayed feedback control signal is applied to be output by the single photon detector.
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