CN107832917B - Identification method of weak cascade, key cascade and controllable cascade of cascade reservoir group based on Bayesian risk network - Google Patents

Identification method of weak cascade, key cascade and controllable cascade of cascade reservoir group based on Bayesian risk network Download PDF

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CN107832917B
CN107832917B CN201710953817.4A CN201710953817A CN107832917B CN 107832917 B CN107832917 B CN 107832917B CN 201710953817 A CN201710953817 A CN 201710953817A CN 107832917 B CN107832917 B CN 107832917B
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张元泽
陈群
刘浩吾
王仁坤
李永红
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Sichuan University
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Abstract

The invention discloses a method for identifying weak steps, key steps and control steps of a step reservoir group based on a Bayesian risk network, relates to the field of hydraulic and hydroelectric engineering, and solves the problem of how to identify the risks of the step reservoir group in the aspect of risk prevention and control of the step reservoir group. Based on the Bayes risk network model of the cascade reservoir group, a recognition method of weak cascade, key cascade and control cascade of the cascade reservoir group is provided, and theory and method support is provided for applying the Bayes risk network model of the cascade reservoir group to cascade reservoir group risk recognition, evaluation and prevention and control. The method is simple and clear, has strong operability, and has important application prospect in risk identification, evaluation, prevention and control of the cascade reservoir group.

Description

Identification method of weak cascade, key cascade and controllable cascade of cascade reservoir group based on Bayesian risk network
Technical Field
The invention relates to a recognition method of weak steps, key steps and control steps of a step reservoir group based on a Bayesian risk network, which is used for risk analysis, evaluation and control in the field of hydraulic and hydroelectric engineering.
Background
The small number of cascade reservoir groups in the drainage basin is more than ten and more than ten, and the risk resistance of the cascade reservoir groups is different along with the difference of dam types, dam heights, reservoir capacities and the forming forms of the cascade reservoirs; the risks are continuously transmitted, transferred and amplified from upstream to downstream along with the evolution of flood among the cascade reservoir groups, the path is clear, and the time difference of the transmission time among the cascades is obvious;
based on the characteristics, in order to avoid large-scale cascade collapse, the risk prevention and control of the cascade reservoir group should adopt a sectional mode to cut off or transfer the risk in a small range. The risk prevention and control of the cascade reservoir group are mainly characterized in that prevention, prevention and control are combined, and the key of prevention is to improve the self risk resistance and find out weak cascade and reinforcing short plates in the cascade reservoir group; the key of the 'control' lies in the interception and transfer of risks, key steps and control steps in the step reservoir group are to be found out for key design and management, and if necessary, an over-standard and over-conventional method is adopted to improve the safety margin, and the risks of the step reservoir group are intercepted in sections and controlled in a grading way;
the key of the step reservoir group risk prevention and control is to scientifically and reasonably segment the step reservoir group, and the scientific and reasonable segmentation needs to scientifically and reasonably classify the step reservoir, so that the steps in the step reservoir group are divided into four types, namely general steps, weak steps, key steps and control steps, and the key steps are taken as boundary steps of a risk control section;
after a certain step reservoir in the step reservoir group breaks (dam failure), the posterior probability of the dam break of each step reservoir in the downstream can be deduced according to the Bayesian risk network of the step reservoir group. The method comprises the steps of defining a step with the highest dam failure probability in a step reservoir group as a weak step by taking the probability of dam break of a step reservoir as a measurement index; defining the step which causes the largest accident probability change of the dam of the downstream adjacent step reservoir in a certain section (usually 4-5 steps) of the step reservoir group as a key step; dividing the cascade reservoir group into a plurality of risk control sections by taking the key cascade as a boundary cascade, sequentially comparing the key cascades of 2-3 adjacent risk control sections from upstream, and defining the cascade with the largest effective reservoir capacity as a control cascade; the steps except for the weak steps, the key steps and the control steps in the step reservoir group are called as general steps;
generally, in a step reservoir group, a weak step is often a risk triggering step, a critical step is often a step which plays a local risk blocking role in a certain section, a control step is a step which plays a role in blocking risks in a wider area, and obviously the control step is necessarily the critical step (for example, in fig. 1, S5, Si +3 are control steps CS1 and CS2, respectively). In the watershed risk prevention and control, the key steps are taken as steps of step reservoir group risk prevention and control sections (such as S5, S9, Si +3 and Sn in the figure 1), and the control steps are taken as steps of step reservoir group risk truncation division (such as CS1 and CS2 in the figure 1);
therefore, the key of the risk prevention and control of the cascade reservoir group is to find weak cascade, key cascade and control cascade in the cascade reservoir group;
under the support of a national key basic research and development plan (973 plan) 'determination of risk level of cascade reservoir group and risk design theory (2013 CB 036403-03)', a targeted research is carried out by a subject group, and on the basis of the practice of carrying out a large amount of risk analysis and evaluation on the cascade reservoir group by using a Bayesian risk network, an identification method of weak cascade, key cascade and controllable cascade of the cascade reservoir group is provided.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to solve the technical problem of how to identify weak steps, key steps and control steps in a cascade reservoir group based on a Bayesian risk network of the cascade reservoir group;
the technical scheme adopted by the invention for solving the technical problems is as follows: firstly, dividing a cascade reservoir group into a plurality of sections by taking 4-5 steps as one section from upstream; secondly, sequentially assuming that each step breaks from the upstream to each section, and calculating the variable quantity of the probability of the dam breaking of the reservoir of the adjacent step at the downstream caused by the dam breaking; thirdly, finding out the cascade reservoir with the maximum probability variation of dam break of the downstream adjacent cascade caused by dam break of each section, namely the key cascade reservoir; secondly, dividing the step reservoir group into a plurality of risk control sections again by taking the key steps as boundary steps; then, starting from the upstream of the cascade reservoir group, taking every 2-3 adjacent risk control sections as risk control levels, and comparing key gradients in the risk control levels, wherein the gradient with the largest effective reservoir capacity is a controlled gradient; finally, aiming at each risk control section, comparing the accident probability of each step of reservoir
Figure 861874DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
The step with the highest accident probability is a weak step of the risk control section, and the steps except the weak step and the key step are general steps;
the identification method and the flow of the weak cascade, the key cascade and the controlled cascade of the cascade reservoir group are as follows:
A. the method comprises the following steps of firstly, dividing a cascade reservoir group into a plurality of sections by taking 4-5 steps as one section from upstream;
B. and secondly, sequentially assuming that each step breaks from the upstream to each section, and calculating the variable quantity of the probability that the dam break of the reservoir of the adjacent step at the downstream causes the dam break of the reservoir of the adjacent step at the upstream, wherein the formula is calculated:
Figure 530753DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
(1)
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure 461800DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
the change rate of the dam break probability of the downstream power station is shown when the ith power station breaks the dam; siIndicating the dam break event of the i-th step reservoir;
Figure 216129DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
the method comprises the steps that the probability that the (i + 1) th-level power station breaks a dam is shown when the ith-level power station does not break the dam;
Figure 953141DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
the method comprises the steps of representing the probability of dam break of the (i + 1) th-level power station when the ith-level power station breaks;
C. step three, finding out a cascade reservoir with the maximum probability variation of dam break of the downstream adjacent cascade caused by dam break of each section, namely the key cascade reservoir;
Scr=E (Cmax)= E (max{Ci}) (2)
in the formula, ScrRepresenting a key step reservoir; e (-) is a mapping function, here points to the step of the reservoir with the largest dam break probability variation;
D. fourthly, dividing the cascade reservoir group into a plurality of risk control sections again by taking the key cascade as a boundary cascade;
E. fifthly, starting from the upstream of the cascade reservoir group, taking every 2-3 adjacent risk control sections as risk control levels, comparing the key cascade of each risk control level, and taking the cascade with the largest effective reservoir capacity as a control cascade;
F. sixthly, comparing the accident probability of each step reservoir in the step reservoir group aiming at each section
Figure 678125DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
The step with the largest accident probability is the weak step of the section, and the expression is shown as follows:
Figure 107970DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
(3)
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure 349595DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
indicating a weak step reservoir;
Figure 624719DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
the accident probability of the ith step reservoir is obtained; e (-) is a mapping function, here pointing to the step of the reservoir where the probability of failure is greatest;
the invention has the beneficial effects that: the classification of the cascade reservoir group and the identification of weak cascade, key cascade and control cascade provide decision basis for the risk prevention, control and management of the cascade reservoir group, and have good application prospect.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the cascade reservoir group risk control segment (1) and classification (2) of the present invention;
labeled as: (1) the method comprises the steps of (1) representing risk segmentation of the step reservoir group, (2) representing risk classification of the step reservoir group, (3) representing key steps in the step reservoir group, and (4) representing control steps in the step reservoir group. Si represents the ith step reservoir; pi represents the probability of failure of the ith reservoir (also
Figure 268190DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
) (ii) a CSi represents the ith seat control step;li represents the i-th step reservoir group; li denotes the i-th step reservoir group.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The method comprises the following main steps:
A. the first step, starting from the upstream, dividing a cascade reservoir group into a plurality of sections (1) by taking 4-5 steps as one section;
B. secondly, sequentially assuming that each step reservoir Si breaks from the upstream to each section, and calculating the variable quantity of the probability that the dam break of the reservoir adjacent to the downstream causes the dam break of the reservoir adjacent to the downstream;
C. thirdly, finding out a cascade reservoir with the maximum probability variation of dam break of the downstream adjacent cascade caused by dam break of each section, namely the key cascade reservoir (3);
D. fourthly, dividing the cascade reservoir group into a plurality of risk control sections (1) again by taking the key cascade as a boundary cascade;
E. fifthly, starting from the upstream of the cascade reservoir group, taking every 2-3 adjacent risk control sections as a risk control stage (2), comparing key cascades (3) in the risk control stages (2), and taking the cascade with the largest effective storage capacity as a control cascade (4);
F. sixthly, comparing the dam break probability Pi (of each step reservoir) in the step reservoir group aiming at each section (1)
Figure 603356DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
) The step with the highest probability of failure is the weak step of the section.
Example (b):
the method is successfully applied to risk identification of a certain section of the cascade reservoir group in the great river crossing basin, can well identify weak cascade, key cascade and controllability cascade in the cascade reservoir group, and provides decision basis for risk prevention and control of the cascade reservoir group.

Claims (2)

1. The identification method of the weak cascade, the key cascade and the controlled cascade of the cascade reservoir group based on the Bayesian risk network is characterized in that: dividing step reservoirs in the step reservoir group into four types of general steps, weak steps, key steps and control steps;
(1) the general, weak, critical, and control rungs are defined as: taking the probability of dam break of the cascade reservoir as a measurement index, and defining the step with the highest probability as a weak step, wherein the dam break of a certain section of the cascade reservoir group represents that a dam fails; defining a step with the largest dam break probability change of a downstream adjacent step reservoir in a certain section of the step reservoir group as a key step, wherein the section is 4-5 steps; dividing the cascade reservoir group into a plurality of risk control sections by taking the key cascade as a boundary cascade, sequentially comparing the key cascades of 2-3 adjacent risk control sections from upstream, and defining the cascade with the largest effective reservoir capacity as a control cascade; the steps except for the weak steps, the key steps and the control steps in the step reservoir group are called as general steps;
(2) according to the definition, the method and the process for identifying the weak cascade, the key cascade and the controllable cascade of the cascade reservoir group based on the Bayesian risk network are as follows:
A. the method comprises the following steps of firstly, dividing a cascade reservoir group into a plurality of sections by taking 4-5 steps as one section from upstream;
B. secondly, assuming that each step breaks from the upstream to each section, calculating the variable quantity of the probability that the dam break causes the dam break of the reservoir of the adjacent step at the downstream, and calculating the formula as shown in formula (1):
Figure 263394DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
(1)
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure 118217DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
the change rate of the dam break probability of the downstream power station is shown when the ith power station breaks the dam; si represents the dam break event of the i-th step reservoir;
Figure 897954DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
the method comprises the steps that the probability that the (i + 1) th-level power station breaks a dam is shown when the ith-level power station does not break the dam;
Figure 293164DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
the method comprises the steps of representing the probability of dam break of the (i + 1) th-level power station when the ith-level power station breaks;
C. and thirdly, finding out the cascade reservoir with the maximum probability variation of dam break of the downstream adjacent cascade caused by dam break of each section, namely the key reservoir:
Scr=E (Cmax)= E (max{Ci}) (2)
in the formula, ScrRepresenting a key step reservoir; e (-) is a mapping function, and points to the step reservoir with the largest dam break probability variation;
D. fourthly, dividing the cascade reservoir group into a plurality of risk control sections again by taking the key cascade as a boundary cascade;
E. fifthly, comparing key steps of every 2-3 adjacent risk control sections from the upstream of the step reservoir group, wherein the step with the largest effective storage capacity is a control step;
F. sixthly, comparing the accident probability Pfi of each step reservoir in the step reservoir group aiming at each section, wherein the step with the highest accident probability is the weak step of the section, and the expression is shown as formula (3):
Figure 45219DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
(3)
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
indicating a weak step reservoir;
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
the accident probability of the ith step reservoir is obtained; e (-) is a mapping function where a failure is pointed toThe step of the reservoir with the highest probability.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method for identifying weak, key and control rungs of the cascade reservoir group and the calculation of the probability in the process are performed according to a Bayesian risk network of the cascade reservoir group.
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