CN106845280A - A kind of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method and system - Google Patents
A kind of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method and system Download PDFInfo
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- CN106845280A CN106845280A CN201710150247.5A CN201710150247A CN106845280A CN 106845280 A CN106845280 A CN 106845280A CN 201710150247 A CN201710150247 A CN 201710150247A CN 106845280 A CN106845280 A CN 106845280A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6209—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a single file or object, e.g. in a secure envelope, encrypted and accessed using a key, or with access control rules appended to the object itself
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
- G06F21/645—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures using a third party
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
Abstract
The embodiment of the invention discloses a kind of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method and system,Duty-circle is improved by the data storage block message on node,Certification path length is shortened using local authority's root node,Reduce auditing by third party end and user terminal computing cost,And the property held that auditing by third party end need to only be returned by cloud storage service device end proves that the cryptographic Hash of interior joint is calculated local authority's root node cryptographic Hash,Then it sign with key and obtain local authority's root node signature,Just the local authority's root node signature that can be returned with cloud storage service device end is compared and is verified,And unique root node need not be calculated and signed for integrity verification,Greatly improve auditing by third party end and user terminal integrality audit efficiency,And maintain the freshness of nodal information by setting up version identifier in node.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to data integrity validation field, more particularly to a kind of audit of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity
Method and system.
Background technology
Cloud has efficient computing capability and huge storage capacity, and being that data owner's saving is substantial amounts of is locally stored sky
Between and data management burden, but cloud and non-fully credible, especially in public cloud and mixed cloud, cloud may delete part visit capacity
Few data save cloud storage space.Therefore, data owner DO is needed by cloud data integrity audit technique requirement cloud
Integrity certification is provided to oneself, it was demonstrated that cloud data are complete.There are three entity difference in cloud data integrity auditing system
It is data owner DO, cloud storage service provider CSP and auditing by third party person TPA.In integrality audit process, first by
In data owner's DO computing capabilitys it is limited and can not keep it is always on thus authorize completely believable auditing by third party person TPA it is complete
Into audit work is acted on behalf of, authorized auditing by third party person TPA operation challenge informations obtain challenging solicited message to generating algorithm.
The challenge solicited message operation evidence generating algorithm that cloud storage service provider CSP receives auditing by third party person TPA transmissions is obtained
The property held is proved.The property held that auditing by third party person TPA receives cloud storage service provider CSP returns proves that operation integrality is examined
Calculating method, audit determines that i.e. cloud data are complete, otherwise prove that data are damaged by then showing that the property held proves positive.But
It is when the increasing number of data from the sample survey block or the property held prove huge, the amount of calculation of the person TPA that causes auditing by third party, communication is negative
Load and network bandwidth consumption will significantly increase.In addition, in order to improve the security of cloud data, auditing by third party person TPA is deposited with cloud
Storage service provider CSP needs periodically frequently interaction.Thus reduce the computing cost of auditing by third party person TPA and, improve
Data owner DO audit efficiencies, the integrality aspect of guarantee data have practical significance.
It is low to there is Duty-circle in the authentication data structure that existing cloud data integrity audit program is used, certification path
The long amount of calculation for causing integrality auditing system, communication burden and network bandwidth consumption will significantly increase, and then influence the 3rd
Square audit person TPA and data owner's DO integrality audit efficiency problems.
Therefore it provides a kind of method and system that efficiently can enter to rack data integrity audit are those skilled in the art
The technical issues that need to address.
The content of the invention
A kind of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method and system are the embodiment of the invention provides, has been realized
Whole property audit function, effectively improves Duty-circle, shortens certification path length, reduces calculating and the communication overhead of system
And with audit efficiency higher.
A kind of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method is the embodiment of the invention provides, including：
User terminal carries out piecemeal operation to subscriber data file and obtains n data after generation client public key, private key for user
Block, data block set is generated according to the data block, and the data block is carried out to be calculated data block cryptographic Hash, by pre-
Put formula carries out signature calculation to the private key for user, the data block cryptographic Hash, the data block, obtains data block signature collection
Close, preset local authority's root node cryptographic Hash sign further according to the private key for user obtains preset local authority's root node
Signature；
The user terminal builds the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of y-bend, and by the data block set, institute
State data block signature set and preset local authority's root node signature is sent to cloud storage service device end；
Auditing by third party end set (1,2 ..., n) in c element composition data block of random sampling challenge subset, by choosing
War information challenges subset generation challenge information to set to generating algorithm according to the data block, and by the challenge information to collection
Close and send to the cloud storage service device end；
The cloud storage service device end is according to being preset in the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of the y-bend
Certification path information obtains secondary path information aggregate, by evidence generating algorithm according to the secondary path information aggregate, institute
Challenge information is stated to set, preset local authority's root node signature, the data block set and data block signature collection
Symphysis is sent to the auditing by third party end property the held evidence into the property held evidence, wherein, the certification path letter
Breath is corresponding to set with the challenge information；
The auditing by third party end gets the secondary path information aggregate and the institute that the property the held evidence is included
Challenge information is stated to gathering corresponding data block cryptographic Hash, preset local authority's root node signature, to the secondary path
Information aggregate and the challenge information carry out being calculated first local authority's root node to the corresponding data block cryptographic Hash of set
Cryptographic Hash, and according to private key for user authority's root node cryptographic Hash local to described first sign and obtain the first local power
Wigan node signature, described first local authority's root node signature is compared with preset local authority's root node signature
Operation；
The auditing by third party end is compared after operation passes through described, according to the client public key, the challenge information pair
Set, the property the held evidence carry out verification operation, if being verified, confirm that cloud data are complete, if checking does not pass through, really
Recognize cloud data to be damaged.
Preferably, the user terminal carries out piecemeal operation after generation client public key, private key for user to subscriber data file
N data block is obtained, data block set is generated according to the data block, and the data block is carried out to be calculated data block Kazakhstan
Uncommon value, signature calculation is carried out by preset formula to the private key for user, the data block cryptographic Hash, the data block, is obtained
Data block signature set, preset local authority's root node cryptographic Hash sign further according to the private key for user obtains preset office
Also include before portion authority root node signature：
The user terminal generates the client public key and the private key for user by public private key pair generating algorithm.
Preferably, the cloud storage service device end is according to being preset in the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data knot of the y-bend
Certification path information in structure obtains secondary path information aggregate, by evidence generating algorithm according to the secondary path information collection
Conjunction, the challenge information are to set, preset local authority's root node signature, the data block set and the data block label
The name set generation property held evidence, and the property the held evidence is sent to the auditing by third party end, wherein, the certification road
Footpath information is corresponding to set with the challenge information to be specifically included：
The cloud storage service device end is according to being preset in the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of the y-bend
Certification path information obtains secondary path information aggregate, and according to the challenge information to gathering to the data block set, institute
State data block signature set carry out respectively signature polymerization be calculated the first numerical value, second value, according to first numerical value, institute
Second value, the secondary path information aggregate, preset local authority's root node signature and the challenge information are stated to collection
The corresponding data block cryptographic Hash generation property held evidence is closed, and the property the held evidence is sent to the auditing by third party end,
Wherein, the certification path information is corresponding to set with the challenge information.
Preferably, the data block size is 32K.
Preferably, the preset formula is：
In formula, Φ is data block signature set；σiIt is i-th data block signature；h(mi) it is i-th data block cryptographic Hash；
miIt is i-th data block；U is random number；α is private key for user.
Preferably, the embodiment of the present invention additionally provides a kind of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing system, including：
User terminal, auditing by third party end and cloud storage service device end；
The user terminal, the auditing by third party end and the cloud storage service device end communicate to connect between any two；
The user terminal is used for after generation client public key, private key for user, carries out piecemeal to subscriber data file and operates
To n data block, data block set is generated according to the data block, and the data block is carried out to be calculated data block Hash
Value, signature calculation is carried out by preset formula to the private key for user, the data block cryptographic Hash, the data block, is counted
According to block signature set, preset local authority's root node cryptographic Hash sign further according to the private key for user obtains preset part
Authoritative root node signature；
The user terminal is additionally operable to build the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of y-bend, and by the set of data blocks
Close, the data block signature set and preset local authority's root node signature are sent to cloud storage service device end；
The auditing by third party end be used for set (1,2 ..., n) in the challenge of c element composition data block of random sampling it is sub
Collection, challenges subset and generates challenge information to set, and chosen described to generating algorithm by challenge information according to the data block
War information is sent to the cloud storage service device end to set；
The cloud storage service device end is used for basis and is preset in the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of the y-bend
In certification path information obtain secondary path information aggregate, by evidence generating algorithm according to the secondary path information collection
Conjunction, the challenge information are to set, preset local authority's root node signature, the data block set and the data block label
The name set generation property held evidence, and the property the held evidence is sent to the auditing by third party end, wherein, the certification road
Footpath information is corresponding to set with the challenge information；
The auditing by third party end is additionally operable to get the secondary path information collection that the property the held evidence is included
Close the corresponding data block cryptographic Hash of set, preset local authority's root node are signed with the challenge information, to described auxiliary
Help routing information set and the challenge information carries out being calculated the first local authority to the corresponding data block cryptographic Hash of set
Root node cryptographic Hash, and described first local authority's root node cryptographic Hash sign obtaining first according to the private key for user
Local authority's root node signature, by described first local authority's root node signature and preset local authority's root node sign into
Row compares operation；
The auditing by third party end is additionally operable to compare after operation passes through described, according to the client public key, the challenge
Information carries out verification operation to set, the property the held evidence, if being verified, confirms that cloud data are complete, if checking is obstructed
Cross, then confirm that cloud data are damaged.
Preferably, the user terminal is additionally operable to generate the client public key and the user by public private key pair generating algorithm
Private key.
Preferably, the cloud storage service device end is additionally operable to basis and is preset in the orderly Merkel's Hash authentication tree of the y-bend
Certification path information in data structure obtains secondary path information aggregate, and according to the challenge information to gathering to the number
Signature polymerization is carried out respectively according to set of blocks, the data block signature set and is calculated the first numerical value, second value, according to described
First numerical value, the second value, the secondary path information aggregate, preset local authority's root node are signed and described
Challenge information is sent to described the property the held evidence to gathering the corresponding data block cryptographic Hash generation property held evidence
Tripartite's audit end, wherein, the certification path information is corresponding to set with the challenge information.
Preferably, the data block size is 32K.
Preferably, the preset formula is：
In formula, Φ is data block signature set；σiIt is i-th data block signature；h(mi) it is i-th data block cryptographic Hash；
miIt is i-th data block；U is random number；α is private key for user.
As can be seen from the above technical solutions, the embodiment of the present invention has advantages below：
A kind of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method and system are the embodiment of the invention provides, with following
Advantage：(1) data storage block message improves Duty-circle on node；(2) certification road is shortened using local authority's root node
Electrical path length, reduces auditing by third party end and client computing cost；(3) auditing by third party end only need to be by cloud storage service device end
The property held for returning proves that the cryptographic Hash of interior joint is calculated local authority's root node cryptographic Hash, and it is carried out with key then
Signature obtains local authority's root node signature, and the local authority's root node signature that just can be returned with cloud storage service device end is compared
Pair and checking, and unique root node need not be calculated and signed for integrity verification, greatly improve auditing by third party
End and user terminal integrality audit efficiency；(4) freshness of nodal information is maintained by setting up version identifier in node, so that
A kind of orderly Merkel's Hash tree BO-MHT authentication data structures of new y-bend are devised, cloud storage service provider is resisted
The Replay Attack and forgery attack of CSP, it is ensured that the real-time and security of cloud data integrity audit, and in the data property held
Prove to realize a kind of new cloud data integrity audit program using BO-MHT structure designs under PDP models.
Brief description of the drawings
In order to illustrate more clearly about the embodiment of the present invention or technical scheme of the prior art, below will be to embodiment or existing
The accompanying drawing to be used needed for having technology description is briefly described, it should be apparent that, drawings in the following description are only this
Some embodiments of invention, for those of ordinary skill in the art, without having to pay creative labor, may be used also
Other accompanying drawings are obtained with according to these accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 is that a kind of flow of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method provided in an embodiment of the present invention is illustrated
Figure；
Fig. 2 is a kind of another flow of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method provided in an embodiment of the present invention
Schematic diagram；
Fig. 3 is a kind of structural representation of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing system provided in an embodiment of the present invention
Figure；
Fig. 4 (a) and Fig. 4 (b) is a kind of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing party provided in an embodiment of the present invention
The application examples schematic diagram of method.
Specific embodiment
A kind of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method and system are the embodiment of the invention provides, has been realized
Whole property audit function, effectively improves Duty-circle, shortens certification path length, reduces calculating and the communication overhead of system
And with audit efficiency higher.
To enable that goal of the invention of the invention, feature, advantage are more obvious and understandable, below in conjunction with the present invention
Accompanying drawing in embodiment, is clearly and completely described, it is clear that disclosed below to the technical scheme in the embodiment of the present invention
Embodiment be only a part of embodiment of the invention, and not all embodiment.Based on the embodiment in the present invention, this area
All other embodiment that those of ordinary skill is obtained under the premise of creative work is not made, belongs to protection of the present invention
Scope.
Refer to Fig. 1, the one of a kind of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method provided in an embodiment of the present invention
Individual embodiment, including：
101st, user terminal carries out piecemeal operation to subscriber data file and obtains n after generation client public key, private key for user
Data block, data block set is generated according to data block, and data block is carried out to be calculated data block cryptographic Hash, by preset public affairs
Formula carries out signature calculation to private key for user, data block cryptographic Hash, data block, obtains data block signature set, private further according to user
Key to preset local authority's root node cryptographic Hash sign and obtains preset local authority's root node signature；
102nd, user terminal builds the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of y-bend, and by data block set, data block
Signature set and preset local authority's root node signature are sent to cloud storage service device end；
103rd, auditing by third party end set (1,2 ..., n) in c element composition data block of random sampling challenge subset, it is logical
Cross challenge information and subset generation challenge information is challenged to set according to data block to generating algorithm, and challenge information is sent out set
Deliver to cloud storage service device end；
104th, cloud storage service device end is according to the certification being preset in the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of y-bend
Routing information obtains secondary path information aggregate, by evidence generating algorithm according to secondary path information aggregate, challenge information pair
Set, preset local authority's root node signature, data block set and the data block signature set generation property held evidence, and will hold
Property evidence is sent to auditing by third party end, wherein, certification path information is corresponding to set with challenge information；
105th, auditing by third party end gets the secondary path information aggregate and challenge information pair that the property held evidence is included
Gather corresponding data block cryptographic Hash, preset local authority's root node signature, to secondary path information aggregate and challenge information pair
Gathering corresponding data block cryptographic Hash be calculated first local authority's root node cryptographic Hash, and according to private key for user to the
One local authority's root node cryptographic Hash sign and obtains first local authority's root node signature, by first local authority's root node
Signature is compared operation with preset local authority's root node signature；
106th, auditing by third party end is comparing after operation passes through, according to client public key, challenge information to gathering, the property held card
According to verification operation is carried out, if being verified, confirm that cloud data are complete, if checking does not pass through, confirm that cloud data are damaged.
The agreement of the embodiment of the present invention all carries out encryption and decryption using bit arithmetic to transmission information, agreement is reached ultralight amount
Level standard, shortens authenticated time；Meanwhile, the shared key information at label and read write line end is made full use of, encryption and decryption data is reduced
Information is introduced and storage, reduction label cost；And dynamically updated and the label irreversible mechanism of Status flag bits by random number,
The security of guarantee agreement.The characteristics of realizing high efficiency, low cost, the high safety of label ownership transfer.
Refer to Fig. 2, a kind of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method provided in an embodiment of the present invention it is another
One embodiment, including：
201st, user terminal generates client public key and private key for user by public private key pair generating algorithm；
202nd, user terminal carries out piecemeal operation to subscriber data file and obtains n after generation client public key, private key for user
Data block, data block set is generated according to data block, and data block is carried out to be calculated data block cryptographic Hash, by preset public affairs
Formula carries out signature calculation to private key for user, data block cryptographic Hash, data block, obtains data block signature set, private further according to user
Key to preset local authority's root node cryptographic Hash sign and obtains preset local authority's root node signature；
203rd, user terminal builds the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of y-bend, and by data block set, data block
Signature set and preset local authority's root node signature are sent to cloud storage service device end；
204th, auditing by third party end set (1,2 ..., n) in c element composition data block of random sampling challenge subset, it is logical
Cross challenge information and subset generation challenge information is challenged to set according to data block to generating algorithm, and challenge information is sent out set
Deliver to cloud storage service device end；
205th, cloud storage service device end is according to the certification being preset in the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of y-bend
Routing information obtains secondary path information aggregate, and according to challenge information to gathering to data set of blocks, data block signature set
Signature polymerization is carried out respectively and is calculated the first numerical value, second value, according to the first numerical value, second value, secondary path information
Set, preset local authority's root node signature and challenge information generate the property held evidence to the corresponding data block cryptographic Hash of set,
And send to auditing by third party end the property held evidence, wherein, certification path information is corresponding to set with challenge information；
206th, auditing by third party end gets the secondary path information aggregate and challenge information pair that the property held evidence is included
Gather corresponding data block cryptographic Hash, preset local authority's root node signature, to secondary path information aggregate and challenge information pair
Gathering corresponding data block cryptographic Hash be calculated first local authority's root node cryptographic Hash, and according to private key for user to the
One local authority's root node cryptographic Hash sign and obtains first local authority's root node signature, by first local authority's root node
Signature is compared operation with preset local authority's root node signature；
207th, auditing by third party end is comparing after operation passes through, according to client public key, challenge information to gathering, the property held card
According to verification operation is carried out, if being verified, confirm that cloud data are complete, if checking does not pass through, confirm that cloud data are damaged.
Further, data block size is 32K.
Further, preset formula is：
In formula, Φ is data block signature set；σiIt is i-th data block signature；h(mi) it is i-th data block cryptographic Hash；
miIt is i-th data block；U is random number；α is private key for user.
The above is the detailed description carried out to a kind of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method, for ease of reason
Solution, will be said with a concrete application scene to a kind of application of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method below
Bright, application examples includes：
The application example symbol is illustrated as shown in Table 1：
Table one
| Symbol | Explanation |
| DO | Data owner |
| TPA | Auditing by third party person |
| CSP | Cloud storage service provider |
| BO-MHT | The orderly Merkel's Hash tree of y-bend |
| The cryptographic Hash of data block | |
| Local authority's root node | |
| Local authority's root node cryptographic Hash | |
| C | Authentication data structure |
| Γ | Agency's audit agreement |
| B | Local authority's root node mark； |
| It is version number's mark | |
| OP | Dynamic operation bit-identify |
The application example process is as follows：
(1) data owner DO operation public private key pair generating algorithms KeyGen (1k)→(sk,pk)：DO selects two at random
NumberWith u ∈ G1, k=gαThe public key for calculating then system is k, and private key is α.Wherein,For mould p module 0,1 ...,
p-1}；G1For rank is the multiplication loop group of p；G is G1The generation unit of group.
(2) data owner DO obtains set of data blocks F=(m to file F fixed size 32K piecemeals1,m2,...,mn) calculate
Obtain the cryptographic Hash h (m of data blocki)。
(3) data owner DO service datas block signature algorithm SigGen (F, sk) → (Φ, Sigsk(h(R)),C,Γ)。
Data owner DO is each data block miSignedData block signature set is obtained, further according to described
Private key for user preset local authority's root node cryptographic Hash sign obtain preset local authority's root node signature Φ=
{σi}1≤i≤n。
(4) data owner DO builds the orderly Merkel's Hash tree BO-MHT authentication data structure Cs of y-bend.
(5) stage is challenged：Authorized auditing by third party person TPA proxy data owners DO operation challenge informations are to generation
Algorithm ChalGen (1υ)→chal.Auditing by third party person TPA by way of random sampling from the set of data block index (1,
2..., n) in c element composition data block of random sampling challenge subset I=(Q1,Q2,...,Qc) and Q1≤i≤Qc.For i ∈
I, auditing by third party person TPA randomly choose nonnegative integerGeneration challenge information is to set chal=(i, λi),s1≤i≤
sc, chal is periodically sent then to cloud storage service provider CSP and completes checking request task.
(6) acknowledgment phase：Cloud storage service provider CSP receives the chal operation evidences that auditing by third party person TPA sends
Generating algorithm ProGen (F, Φ, chal) → Pro.Cloud storage service provider CSP respectively to data block corresponding to i in chal and
Data block signature polymerization is calculated μ and σ, then obtains secondary path information aggregate according to certification path information pathFinally return to the property held evidence Give auditing by third party person
TPA.Wherein,
Audit phase：Auditing by third party person TPA receives the property the held proof Pro fortune that cloud storage service provider CSP is returned
Row integrality audit algorithmAuditing by third party person TPA elder generations
CheckingBy secondary path information Ω in cloud storage service provider CSP returns ProiAnd data block
Cryptographic Hash h (mi) it is calculated all local authority root node cryptographic Hash f (R*), checking e (Sigα(f ()), g)=e (f
(.),gα), and if only if all of f (R*) be verified, checking is then proceeded to,
Whether set up.If setting up BL=1 proves that cloud data are complete, otherwise BL=0 proves that cloud data are damaged.
Specifically, shown in protocol procedures such as Fig. 4 (a) and Fig. 4 (b).
It is understood that data owner in the application example is foregoing user terminal, auditing by third party person is foregoing the
Tripartite's audit end, cloud storage service provider is foregoing cloud storage service end.
Refer to Fig. 3, a kind of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing system provided in an embodiment of the present invention, bag
Include：User terminal, auditing by third party end and cloud storage service device end；
User terminal, auditing by third party end and cloud storage service device end communicate to connect between any two；
User terminal is used for after generation client public key, private key for user, piecemeal operation is carried out to subscriber data file and obtains n
Data block, data block set is generated according to data block, and data block is carried out to be calculated data block cryptographic Hash, by preset public affairs
Formula carries out signature calculation to private key for user, data block cryptographic Hash, data block, obtains data block signature set, private further according to user
Key to preset local authority's root node cryptographic Hash sign and obtains preset local authority's root node signature；
User terminal is additionally operable to build the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of y-bend, and by data block set, data
Block signature set and preset local authority's root node signature are sent to cloud storage service device end；
Auditing by third party end be used for set (1,2 ..., n) in c element composition data block of random sampling challenge subset, it is logical
Cross challenge information and subset generation challenge information is challenged to set according to data block to generating algorithm, and challenge information is sent out set
Deliver to cloud storage service device end；
Cloud storage service device end is used for according to the certification being preset in the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of y-bend
Routing information obtains secondary path information aggregate, by evidence generating algorithm according to secondary path information aggregate, challenge information pair
Set, preset local authority's root node signature, data block set and the data block signature set generation property held evidence, and will hold
Property evidence is sent to auditing by third party end, wherein, certification path information is corresponding to set with challenge information；
Auditing by third party end is additionally operable to get secondary path information aggregate and challenge information that the property held evidence is included
To gathering corresponding data block cryptographic Hash, preset local authority's root node signature, to secondary path information aggregate and challenge information
Carry out being calculated first local authority's root node cryptographic Hash to gathering corresponding data block cryptographic Hash, and according to private key for user pair
First local authority's root node cryptographic Hash sign and obtains first local authority's root node signature, by the first local authority Gen Jie
Point signature is compared operation with preset local authority's root node signature；
Auditing by third party end is additionally operable to comparing after operation passes through, according to client public key, challenge information to gathering, the property held
Evidence carries out verification operation, if being verified, confirms that cloud data are complete, if checking does not pass through, confirms that cloud data are damaged.
Further, user terminal is additionally operable to generate client public key and private key for user by public private key pair generating algorithm.
Further, cloud storage service device end is additionally operable to basis and is preset in the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data knot of y-bend
Certification path information in structure obtains secondary path information aggregate, and according to challenge information to gathering to data set of blocks, data
Block signature set carries out signature polymerization and is calculated the first numerical value, second value respectively, according to the first numerical value, second value, auxiliary
Routing information set, preset local authority's root node signature and challenge information are helped to the corresponding data block cryptographic Hash generation of set
The property held evidence, and the property held evidence is sent to auditing by third party end, wherein, certification path information is with challenge information to set
Correspondence.
Further, data block size is 32K.
Further, preset formula is：
In formula, Φ is data block signature set；σiIt is i-th data block signature；h(mi) it is i-th data block cryptographic Hash；
miIt is i-th data block；U is random number；α is private key for user.
The above, the above embodiments are merely illustrative of the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than its limitations；Although with reference to preceding
Embodiment is stated to be described in detail the present invention, it will be understood by those within the art that：It still can be to preceding
State the technical scheme described in each embodiment to modify, or equivalent is carried out to which part technical characteristic；And these
Modification is replaced, and does not make the spirit and scope of the essence disengaging various embodiments of the present invention technical scheme of appropriate technical solution.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method, it is characterised in that including：
User terminal carries out piecemeal operation to subscriber data file and obtains n data block after generation client public key, private key for user,
Data block set is generated according to the data block, and the data block is carried out to be calculated data block cryptographic Hash, by preset
Formula carries out signature calculation to the private key for user, the data block cryptographic Hash, the data block, obtains data block signature collection
Close, preset local authority's root node cryptographic Hash sign further according to the private key for user obtains preset local authority's root node
Signature；
The user terminal builds the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of y-bend, and by the data block set, the number
Sent to cloud storage service device end according to block signature set and preset local authority's root node signature；
Auditing by third party end set (1,2 ..., n) in c element composition data block of random sampling challenge subset, by challenge letter
Breath challenges subset generation challenge information to set to generating algorithm according to the data block, and the challenge information is sent out set
Deliver to the cloud storage service device end；
The cloud storage service device end is according to the certification being preset in the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of the y-bend
Routing information obtains secondary path information aggregate, by evidence generating algorithm according to the secondary path information aggregate, described choose
War information is to set, preset local authority's root node signature, the data block set and data block signature set life
Into the property held evidence, and the property the held evidence is sent to the auditing by third party end, wherein, the certification path information with
The challenge information is to set correspondence；
The auditing by third party end gets the secondary path information aggregate that the property the held evidence included and described chooses
War information is signed to gathering corresponding data block cryptographic Hash, preset local authority's root node, to the secondary path information
Set carries out being calculated the first local authoritative root node Hash with the challenge information to the corresponding data block cryptographic Hash of set
Value, and according to private key for user authority's root node cryptographic Hash local to described first sign and obtain first local authority's root
Node is signed, and described first local authority's root node signature is compared into behaviour with preset local authority's root node signature
Make；
The auditing by third party end is compared after operation passes through described, according to the client public key, the challenge information to set,
The property the held evidence carries out verification operation, if being verified, confirms that cloud data are complete, if checking does not pass through, confirms cloud
Data are damaged.
2. Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that the user
End carries out piecemeal operation to subscriber data file and obtains n data block, according to described after generation client public key, private key for user
Data block generates data block set, and the data block is carried out to be calculated data block cryptographic Hash, by preset formula to institute
Stating private key for user, the data block cryptographic Hash, the data block carries out signature calculation, obtains data block signature set, further according to
The private key for user to preset local authority's root node cryptographic Hash sign before obtaining preset local authority's root node signature
Also include：
The user terminal generates the client public key and the private key for user by public private key pair generating algorithm.
3. Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method according to claim 2, it is characterised in that the cloud is deposited
Storage server end is obtained according to the certification path information being preset in the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of the y-bend
Secondary path information aggregate, by evidence generating algorithm according to the secondary path information aggregate, the challenge information to set,
Preset local authority's root node signature, the data block set and the data block signature set generation property held evidence,
And send to the auditing by third party end property the held evidence, wherein, the certification path information and the challenge information
Set correspondence is specifically included：
The cloud storage service device end is according to the certification being preset in the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of the y-bend
Routing information obtains secondary path information aggregate, and according to the challenge information to gathering to the data block set, the number
Carry out signature polymerization respectively according to block signature set and be calculated the first numerical value, second value, according to first numerical value, described the
Two numerical value, the secondary path information aggregate, preset local authority's root node signature and the challenge information are right to gathering
The data block cryptographic Hash generation property the held evidence answered, and the property the held evidence is sent to the auditing by third party end, wherein,
The certification path information is corresponding to set with the challenge information.
4. Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that the data
Block size is 32K.
5. Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that described preset
Formula is：
In formula, Φ is data block signature set；σiIt is i-th data block signature；h(mi) it is i-th data block cryptographic Hash；miFor
I-th data block；U is random number；α is private key for user.
6. a kind of Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing system, it is characterised in that including：User terminal, auditing by third party
End and cloud storage service device end；
The user terminal, the auditing by third party end and the cloud storage service device end communicate to connect between any two；
The user terminal is used for after generation client public key, private key for user, piecemeal operation is carried out to subscriber data file and obtains n
Data block, data block set is generated according to the data block, and the data block is carried out to be calculated data block cryptographic Hash, is led to
Cross preset formula carries out signature calculation to the private key for user, the data block cryptographic Hash, the data block, obtains data block label
Name set, preset local authority's root node cryptographic Hash sign further according to the private key for user obtains preset local authority's root
Node is signed；
The user terminal be additionally operable to build the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of y-bend, and by the data block set,
The data block signature set and preset local authority's root node signature are sent to cloud storage service device end；
The auditing by third party end be used for set (1,2 ..., n) in c element composition data block of random sampling challenge subset, it is logical
Cross challenge information and subset generation challenge information is challenged to set according to the data block to generating algorithm, and by the challenge information
Set is sent to the cloud storage service device end；
The cloud storage service device end is used for basis and is preset in the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of the y-bend
Certification path information obtains secondary path information aggregate, by evidence generating algorithm according to the secondary path information aggregate, institute
Challenge information is stated to set, preset local authority's root node signature, the data block set and data block signature collection
Symphysis is sent to the auditing by third party end property the held evidence into the property held evidence, wherein, the certification path letter
Breath is corresponding to set with the challenge information；
The auditing by third party end be additionally operable to get the secondary path information aggregate that the property the held evidence included and
The challenge information is signed to gathering corresponding data block cryptographic Hash, preset local authority's root node, to the auxiliary route
Footpath information aggregate and the challenge information carry out being calculated the first local authority Gen Jie to the corresponding data block cryptographic Hash of set
Point cryptographic Hash, and according to private key for user authority's root node cryptographic Hash local to described first sign that to obtain first local
Authoritative root node signature, described first local authority's root node signature is compared with preset local authority's root node signature
Relatively operate；
The auditing by third party end is additionally operable to compare after operation passes through described, according to the client public key, the challenge information
Verification operation is carried out to set, the property the held evidence, if being verified, confirms that cloud data are complete, if checking does not pass through,
Confirm that cloud data are damaged.
7. Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing system according to claim 6, it is characterised in that the user
End is additionally operable to generate the client public key and the private key for user by public private key pair generating algorithm.
8. Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing system according to claim 7, it is characterised in that the cloud is deposited
Storage server end is additionally operable to according to the certification path letter being preset in the orderly Merkel's Hash tree authentication data structure of the y-bend
Breath obtains secondary path information aggregate, and according to the challenge information to gathering to the data block set, the data block label
Name set carries out signature polymerization and is calculated the first numerical value, second value respectively, according to first numerical value, second number
Value, the secondary path information aggregate, preset local authority's root node signature are corresponding to set with the challenge information
Data block cryptographic Hash generates the property held evidence, and the property the held evidence is sent to the auditing by third party end, wherein, it is described
Certification path information is corresponding to set with the challenge information.
9. Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing system according to claim 6, it is characterised in that the data
Block size is 32K.
10. Merkle Hash trees cloud data integrity auditing system according to claim 6, it is characterised in that described pre-
Putting formula is：
In formula, Φ is data block signature set；σiIt is i-th data block signature；h(mi) it is i-th data block cryptographic Hash；miFor
I-th data block；U is random number；α is private key for user.
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