CN111898164A - Data integrity auditing method supporting tag block chain storage and query - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a data integrity auditing method supporting tag block chain storage and query, which comprises the following steps: the method comprises the steps that a client-side divides a data file into blocks and generates data labels, the data labels are stored on a cloud server, and the data labels are stored on a block chain platform in a T-Merkle tree structure; an auditor sends a sampling audit inquiry to the cloud server and the block chain platform; the block chain platform executes a query algorithm to obtain a data tag, calculates ciphertext tag evidence and returns the ciphertext tag evidence to an auditor, and the cloud server calculates ciphertext data evidence and returns the ciphertext data evidence to the auditor; the auditor directly verifies the integrity of the data without decryption by the two-wire pair nature. The invention uses a block chain platform to store a data label, provides a corresponding block chain storage structure and an inquiry method, and designs a bilinear pairing verification method based on a ZSS short signature, thereby improving the expandability of the system and the safety and the high efficiency of data integrity audit.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a data integrity auditing method supporting tag block chain storage and query, and belongs to the field of information security.
Background
Cloud storage is an important service of cloud computing, allowing data owners to host their data in cloud servers and provide data access to users over a network. By means of virtualization, distributed storage and other technologies, the cloud storage integrates storage devices of different manufacturers, different structures and different positions in a network to form a storage resource pool. Users rent storage resources to cloud storage as a low-cost and high-expandability infrastructure service to cloud service providers according to their own demands in a pay-as-needed manner, and the services are receiving more and more attention from individuals and enterprises.
With the rapid development of cloud storage, mass data is more easily attacked when being stored on a cloud server in a centralized manner, so that the cloud storage faces more complex security threats than the traditional storage. Meanwhile, after the data owner stores the data in the cloud, the physical control on the data is lost, so that the safety of the data depends on a cloud service provider, and data leakage and loss events prove that the cloud service provider cannot be completely trusted. Therefore, although cloud storage brings many advantages and convenience, it cannot guarantee the integrity of data uploaded by the client.
In recent years, researchers have proposed a centralized third party public auditing scheme to verify cloud data integrity. But has the defects that: 1) it is unreasonable to assume that third party audits are fully trusted. 2) Auditors may not perform audit tasks as contracted due to their own capability limitations. Due to the characteristics of decentralization, transparency, non-falsification, safety and the like, the appearance of the block chain technology brings a new method for solving the problems, but the block chain technology faces the problems of poor storage expandability, low query efficiency and the like. The invention discloses a novel block chain-based data integrity auditing technology, which has very important significance for solving the data integrity problem in cloud storage and promoting the wide application of the cloud storage.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects of the prior art, the invention aims to provide a data integrity auditing method supporting tag block chain storage and query, and aims to solve the problems of bottleneck, poor block chain expansibility, low query efficiency and the like of centralized auditing in the prior art, and the problems can cause the wide application of cloud storage to be limited if not solved.
The technical scheme of the invention is a data integrity auditing method supporting tag block chain storage and query, which comprises the following steps:
(1) initializing and setting security parameters, generating public parameters, and generating a public key and a private key for data signature by a client;
(2) the client divides the file into blocks by using a data slicing technology, generates data labels for the data blocks by using a ZSS short signature technology, stores the data blocks on a cloud server, and stores the data labels on a block chain platform;
(3) an auditor performs sampling audit, and randomly selects a partial data block subset for verification;
(4) after receiving the audit request, the block chain platform acquires a data tag by using a query algorithm, calculates a ciphertext tag evidence and returns the ciphertext tag evidence to an auditor; after receiving the audit request, the cloud server executes the calculation of the ciphertext data evidence and returns the ciphertext data evidence to the auditor;
(5) the auditor verifies that the data evidence and the tag evidence match without decryption based on the two-line pair nature, and if a match indicates that the data is complete.
Further, the step (1) specifically includes: initializing and setting a safety parameter lambda, and generating a cyclic addition group G with the order of a prime number q1And G2And there is a bilinear mapping e G1×G1→G2(ii) a The client randomly selects sk to be belonged to ZpAs private key, ZpRepresents [0, p-1 ]]And calculating pk skP as the public key, where P is G1A generator of (2); wherein the bilinear mapping relationship has the following properties: 1) for any P, Q ∈ G1There is an efficient algorithm to compute e (P, Q); 2) e (P, P) ≠ 1; 3) for any P, Q, R ∈ G1And a, b ∈ ZpComprises the following steps: e (aP, bQ) ═ e (P, Q)ab，e(P+R,Q)＝e(P,Q)·e(R,Q)。
Further, the step (2) specifically includes:
(2a) the client divides the data file into n blocks F ═ m1,m2,…,mnAnd for each oneData block miComputing data tag
Get Tag set T ═ { Tag ═ Tag1,Tag2,…,TagnIn which H is1Is a cryptographic hash function;
(2b) the client stores the data blocks on the cloud server, uploads the data labels to the block chain platform, and stores the data labels in the label block chain in a T-Merkle tree mode, and each block node comprises k data labels and corresponding indexes vj＝{Minj,Maxj,1,Tag1,2,Tag2,…,k,Tagk,H(vj) In which MinjAnd MaxjIs the minimum and maximum index values of the current node storage label, node hash value H (v)j) And H is a cryptographic hash function.
Further, the step (3) specifically includes: an auditor with a public key and file identification randomly selects a data block subset and a corresponding random value to generate a challenge set Charl ═ i, ui}i∈IWherein I ═ s1,s2,…,scC denotes the number of data blocks challenged, scIs the data block index [1, n]Subset of (1), uiAnd if the value is a random value, the auditor sends the challenge set Charl to the cloud server and the block chain platform.
Further, the step (4) specifically includes:
(4a) the cloud server calculates and encrypts data evidence after receiving the challenge set
Sending the DP to an auditor, wherein e represents a bilinear mapping relation;
(4b) after the block chain platform receives the inquiry set, the inquired label is searched by using an inquiry algorithm, and label evidence is calculated and encrypted
And sends the TP to the auditor.
Further, the step (5) specifically includes:
(5a) after receiving the data evidence and the label evidence, the auditor calculates by using the client public key pk and the challenge set Charl
(5b) The auditor verifies the correctness of the evidence according to the equation TP & e (R, P), and if the equation is established, the data stored on the cloud server is complete.
Further, in the step (2), the tag block chain is stored in a T-Merkle tree manner, which has the following characteristics: a) the data tags are stored in each tree node, not just in leaf nodes, and each node stores a plurality of data tags; b) attaching a tag index to the data tag to support fast retrieval; c) adding the maximum value and the minimum value of the index into the current block at the head of the block; each T-Merkle tree node comprises the minimum value, the maximum value, the index and the label set of the index of the current node and the hash value of the current node, the hash value of the current node is obtained by the hash value of the current node and the hash of the child nodes, and the calculation method comprises the following steps:
h(vj) Is the hash value h (v) of the current nodej)＝h(h(tag1)||h(tag2)||…||h(tagk) H is a cryptographic hash function, | | represents a string linking operation, rchild and lchild represent right and left child nodes, respectively, and when generating the T-Merkle tree, the T tree is first constructed using the data tag, and then the hash value of each node is calculated from the leaf node to the root node, thereby generating the T-Merkle tree.
Further, when the queried tag is retrieved by using the query algorithm in step (4b), when the tag with index ind is retrieved, firstly comparing with the index range of the head of the latest block, and if the tag is not in the current block, retrieving the previous block; if so, a fast lookup algorithm is performed in the current block.
Has the advantages that: in the embodiment of the invention, the data tag is generated by adopting a short signature technology, and the T-Merkle tree structure storage block is designed, so that the storage space is saved, the block chain storage expandability is improved, the block chain query algorithm is provided, and the retrieval speed is improved. The cloud server and blockchain platform encrypt the data evidence and the tag evidence using bilinear pairwise properties. The ZSS signature verification method based on bilinear pairings is designed, and an auditor can directly verify correct correctness on the premise of not needing decryption. The data privacy can be protected, the operation of bilinear pairings is effectively reduced, and the auditing efficiency is improved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a block node storage structure of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a diagram of a tag block chain storage architecture in accordance with the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a block diagram of a modified tag block chain of the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a flow chart of system initialization in the present invention;
fig. 6 is a flow chart of integrity audit in the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.
In an embodiment of the invention, the data is stored on a cloud server and the data tags are stored on a blockchain platform. If the data is directly stored on the blockchain, the system is limited by the capacity of the blockchain, so that the system cannot be widely applied. The data label is generated by adopting a short signature technology and is stored by adopting a T-Merkle structure. The ZSS short signature technology uses general hash functions (such as MD5 or SHA-1) without specially constructed hash functions, and adopts less bilinear pair operations to improve the signature generation efficiency (F.Zhang, R.Safavi-Naini, and W.Susilo, "An influence signature scheme from bilinear pairing and its applications," in Proc. int. Workshop Public Key Cryptogrn. Berlin, Germany: Springer,2004, pp. 277-290). FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the present invention, which for convenience of description, takes a client as an auditor. In fact, the auditor may be a client, a cloud server, a blockchain platform, or other third party authority.
The embodiment of the invention is realized in such a way that the data integrity auditing method supporting the storage and query of the tag block chain comprises the following steps:
(1) a system initialization stage: and generating a private key and a public key, partitioning data, calculating a data tag, uploading the data to a cloud server for storage, and uploading the data tag to a block chain platform for storage.
(2) And (3) integrity auditing stage: and the cloud server and the block chain platform respectively generate data evidence and label evidence and return the data evidence and the label evidence to the auditor, and the auditor verifies whether the data evidence and the label evidence are matched.
Specifically, the system initialization phase in step (1) includes the following steps:
(a) the input is a safety parameter lambda, and the output is a cyclic addition group G1And G2And there is a bilinear mapping e G1×G1→G2(ii) a The client randomly selects sk to be belonged to ZpAs a private key, and calculating p as skP as a public key, the client randomly selects sk e ZpAs private key, ZpRepresents [0, p-1 ]]And calculating pk skP as the public key, where P is G1A generator of (2); wherein the bilinear mapping relationship has the following properties: 1) for any P, Q ∈ G1There is an efficient algorithm to compute e (P, Q);
2) e (P, P) ≠ 1; 3) for any P, Q, R ∈ G1And a, b ∈ ZpComprises the following steps: e (aP, bQ) ═ e (P, Q)ab，e(P+R,Q)＝e(P,Q)·e(R,Q)。
(b) The client divides the data file into n blocks F ═ m1,m2,,mnAnd for each data block miCalculation data markLabel (Bao)
Get Tag set T ═ { Tag ═ Tag1,Tag2,…,TagnIn which H is1Is a cryptographic hash function;
(c) the client stores the data blocks on the cloud server, uploads the data labels to the block chain platform, and forms a label chain in a T-Merkle tree mode. Each block node contains k data tags and a corresponding index vj＝{Minj,Maxj,1,Tag1,2,Tag2,…,k,Tagk,H(vj) In which the node has the value H (v)j) And calculating the hash of the current node and the child nodes.
Specifically, the integrity auditing stage in the step (2) comprises the following steps:
(a) an auditor with a public key and file identification randomly selects a data block subset and a corresponding random value generation challenge set Charl ═ { i, u ═i}i∈IWherein I ═ s1,s2,…,scIs the data block index [1, n ]]Subset of (1), uiIs a random value. And sending the challenge set Charl to the cloud server and the block chain platform by the auditor.
(b) Computing data evidence after the cloud server receives the challenge set
And the DP is sent to the auditor. After the block chain platform receives the inquiry set, the inquired label is searched by using an inquiry algorithm, and the label evidence is calculated
And TP is sent to the auditor.
(c) After receiving the data evidence and the label evidence, the auditor calculates by using the public key of the customer service end and the challenge set Charl
The auditor verifies that the evidence TP is DP · e (R, P), if the equation is established, the cloud server is storedIs complete.
Specifically, the data integrity auditing method for supporting tag block chain storage and query comprises the following steps:
(a) short signature techniques for computing data tags;
(b) a T-Merkle tree structure for storing tag blocks;
(c) a query algorithm based on the T-Merkle tree is used for rapidly retrieving the labels;
(d) a tag evidence generation algorithm for calculating ciphertext tag evidence;
(e) the data evidence generating algorithm is used for calculating ciphertext data evidence;
(f) and the verification algorithm based on the ZSS short signature technology is used for verifying whether the ciphertext data evidence and the ciphertext label evidence are matched so as to determine whether the data on the cloud server is complete.
The invention comprises the following parts: the method comprises the steps of a tag block chain storage structure, a block fast query technology and a ZSS verification technology based on bilinear pairings.
The existing blocks store block data by using a Merkle tree, the blocks are all stored in leaf nodes, the storage utilization is low, and when the blocks are searched, the whole block chain needs to be traversed. In order to save storage overhead and improve query efficiency, the invention improves the Merkle tree structure from 3 aspects: 1) data tags are stored in each tree node, not just in leaf nodes, and each node stores multiple tags. 2) A tag index is attached to the data tag to support fast retrieval. 3) The block header is added to the current block containing the maximum and minimum values of the index. The T-Merkle tree combines the features of the T-tree and the Merkle tree. Each T-Merkle tree node contains the minimum value, the maximum value, the index and the label set of the current node index and the hash value of the current node. The node structure is depicted in fig. 2. The hash value of the current node is obtained by calculating the hash value of the current node and the hash value of the child node.
The calculation method is as follows:
h(vj) Is the hash value h (v) of the current nodej)＝h(h(tag1)||h(tag2)||…||h(tagk) H) is a hash function, | | | represents a string chaining operation. When generating a T-Merkle tree, the T-tree is first constructed using the data tags, and then the hash value for each node is calculated from the leaf nodes to the root node. As shown in the T-Merkle tree structure of FIG. 3, assume that the tag indices range from 1 to 14, with each node storing two tags. To verify { Tag5,Tag6That requires side information Ω<H(c),H(b),h(Tag3),h(Tag4),h(Tag7),h(Tag8)>. The verifier calculates h (a) h (Tag)5)||h(Tag6)||H(c)||h(Tag5)||h(Tag6) And then calculates a hash value H' (root) of the root node as H (H (Tag))5)||h(Tag6) | h (a) | h (b)). It is verified whether the calculated H' (root) and the stored H (root) values are consistent. It is thus demonstrated that the T-Merkle tree retains the authentication properties of Merkle.
The block chain fast query technique supports fast binary search. The index range embedded in the current zone block at the block head. When the index is an ind label, firstly comparing the index range with the index range of the head of the latest block, and if the index range is not in the current block, searching the previous block; if so, a binary search is performed in the current block. The tag block chain structure is shown in FIG. 4. The query algorithm is as follows:
the ZSS verification technology based on bilinear pairings solves the problem of data privacy protection in the auditing process. During the integrity audit process, the auditor may obtain data privacy in some way. For plaintext data, an auditor may obtain the original data block from the received data evidence. For encrypted data, the auditor may obtain the key through other means to be able to decrypt the data. Such auditing schemes may pose new security threats to the owner's data. Therefore, the auditing method needs to support privacy protection, i.e. the auditor cannot obtain the data content. The system adopts an interactive auditing method, as shown in figures 5 and 6. When the cloud server and the block chain platform calculate the evidence, the bilinear pairwise encryption evidence is used, and an auditor directly verifies the correctness of the data evidence and the label evidence by using the operation property of the bilinear pairwise encryption evidence under the condition that decryption is not needed. The correctness of the expression TP ═ DP · e (R, P) was verified as follows:
the invention adopts sampling audit to reduce communication overhead and improve audit efficiency. Assuming that the number of data blocks is n, the number of damaged or lost data blocks is d, the challenge set size is c, and the probability P of detecting that a data block X is damaged or lost is PXThe calculation method is as follows:
it can be found that, no matter how large a file is, when the damage rate is 1%, the detection probability of 95% can be reached by only inquiring 300 blocks of data.
Claims (8)
1. A data integrity auditing method supporting tag block chain storage and query is characterized by comprising the following steps:
(1) initializing and setting security parameters, generating public parameters, and generating a public key and a private key for data signature by a client;
(2) the client divides the file into blocks by using a data slicing technology, generates data labels for the data blocks by using a ZSS short signature technology, stores the data blocks on a cloud server, and stores the data labels on a block chain platform;
(3) an auditor performs sampling audit, and randomly selects a partial data block subset for verification;
(4) after receiving the audit request, the block chain platform acquires a data tag by using a query algorithm, calculates a ciphertext tag evidence and returns the ciphertext tag evidence to an auditor; after receiving the audit request, the cloud server executes calculation of ciphertext data evidence and returns the ciphertext data evidence to an auditor;
(5) the auditor verifies that the data evidence and the tag evidence match without decryption based on the two-line pair nature, and if a match indicates that the data is complete.
2. The data integrity auditing method supporting tag blockchain storage and query according to claim 1, wherein the step (1) specifically includes: initializing and setting a safety parameter lambda, and generating a cyclic addition group G with the order of a prime number q1And G2And there is a bilinear mapping e G1×G1→G2(ii) a The client randomly selects sk to be belonged to ZpAs private key, ZpRepresents [0, p-1 ]]And calculating pk skP as the public key, where P is G1A generator of (2); wherein the bilinear mapping relationship has the following properties: 1) for any P, Q ∈ G1There is an efficient algorithm to compute e (P, Q); 2) e (P, P) ≠ 1; 3) for any P, Q, R ∈ G1And a, b ∈ ZpComprises the following steps: e (aP, bQ) ═ e (P, Q)ab，e(P+R,Q)＝e(P,Q)·e(R,Q)。
3. The data integrity auditing method in support of tag blockchain storage and querying according to claim 2, characterized by: the step (2) specifically comprises:
(2a) the client divides the data file into n blocks F ═ m1,m2,...,mnAnd for each data block miComputing data tag
Get Tag set T ═ { Tag ═ Tag1,Tag2,...,TagnIn which H is1Is a cryptographic hash function;
(2b) the client stores the data blocks on the cloud server, uploads the data labels to the block chain platform, and stores the data labels in the label block chain in a T-Merkle tree mode, and each block node comprises k data labels and corresponding indexes vj＝{Minj,Maxj,1,Tag1,2,Tag2,…,k,Tagk,H(vj) In which MinjAnd MaxjThe minimum value and the maximum value of the index of the storage label of the current node, and the node hash value H (v)j) And H is a cryptographic hash function.
4. The data integrity auditing method in support of tag blockchain storage and querying according to claim 3, characterized by: the step (3) specifically comprises: an auditor with a public key and file identification randomly selects a data block subset and a corresponding random value generation challenge set Charl ═ { i, u ═i}i∈IWherein I ═ s1,s2,…,scC denotes the number of data blocks challenged, scIs the data block index [1, n]Subset of (1), uiAnd if the value is a random value, the auditor sends the challenge set Charl to the cloud server and the block chain platform.
5. The data integrity auditing method in support of tag blockchain storage and querying according to claim 4, characterized by: the step (4) specifically comprises:
(4a) the cloud server calculates and encrypts data evidence after receiving the challenge set
Sending the DP to an auditor, wherein e represents a bilinear mapping relation;
(4b) after the block chain platform receives the inquiry set, the inquired label is searched by using an inquiry algorithm, and label evidence is calculated and encrypted
And sends the TP to the auditor.
6. The data integrity auditing method supporting tag blockchain storage and query according to claim 5, wherein step (5) specifically includes:
(5a) after receiving the data evidence and the label evidence, the auditor calculates by using the client public key pk and the challenge set Charl
(5b) The auditor verifies the correctness of the evidence according to the equation TP & e (R, P), and if the equation is established, the data stored on the cloud server is complete.
7. The data integrity auditing method in support of tag blockchain storage and querying according to claim 3, characterized by: in the step (2), the tag block chain is stored in a T-Merkle tree mode, and the mode has the following characteristics: a) the data tags are stored in each tree node, not just in leaf nodes, and each node stores a plurality of data tags; b) attaching a tag index to the data tag to support fast retrieval; c) adding the maximum value and minimum value range fields containing indexes into the current block at the head of the block; each T-Merkle tree node comprises the minimum value, the maximum value, the index and the label set of the index of the current node and the hash value of the current node, the hash value of the current node is obtained by the hash value of the current node and the hash of the child nodes, and the calculation method comprises the following steps:
h(vj) Is the hash value h (v) of the current nodej)＝h(h(tag1)||h(tag2)||…||h(tagk) H is a cryptographic hash function, | | | represents a string chaining operation, rchild and lchild represent the right child and left child nodes, respectively. When generating a T-Merkle tree, the T tree is first constructed using data tags, and then each node is computed from a leaf node to a root nodeThe hash value of the point, thereby generating a T-Merkle tree.
8. The data integrity auditing method in support of tag blockchain storage and querying according to claim 5, characterized by: when the queried label is searched by using a query algorithm in the step (4b), when the label with index ind is searched, firstly comparing the searched label with the index range of the head of the latest block, and if the searched label is not in the current block, searching the previous block; if so, a fast lookup algorithm is performed in the current block.
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| CN113312574A (en) * | 2021-05-21 | 2021-08-27 | 太原科技大学 | Cloud data integrity auditing method based on block chain |
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| CN115604038A (en) * | 2022-12-14 | 2023-01-13 | 山东省计算中心(国家超级计算济南中心)（Cn） | Cloud storage data auditing system and method based on block chain and edge computing |
| WO2023020429A1 (en) * | 2021-08-20 | 2023-02-23 | 清华大学 | Data auditing method and apparatus, and storage medium |
| CN115987979A (en) * | 2022-11-15 | 2023-04-18 | 重庆邮电大学 | Data integrity auditing method based on block trust election mechanism in edge calculation |
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