CN111898164B - Data integrity auditing method supporting label block chain storage and query - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a data integrity auditing method supporting label block chain storage and inquiry, which comprises the following steps: the client side blocks the data file and generates a data tag, the data is stored on the cloud server, and the data tag is stored on the blockchain platform in a T-Merkle tree structure; the auditor sends a sampling audit inquiry to the cloud server and the blockchain platform; the block chain platform executes a query algorithm to acquire a data tag, calculates ciphertext tag evidence and returns the ciphertext tag evidence to the auditor, and meanwhile, the cloud server calculates ciphertext data evidence and returns the ciphertext data evidence to the auditor; the auditor directly verifies the integrity of the data by the bilinear nature without decryption. The invention uses a block chain platform to store data labels, proposes a corresponding block chain storage structure and a query method, designs a bilinear pair verification method based on ZSS short signature, and improves the expandability of the system and the security and the high efficiency of data integrity audit.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a data integrity auditing method supporting label block chain storage and inquiry, belonging to the field of information security.
Background
Cloud storage is an important service of cloud computing, allowing data owners to host their data in cloud servers and provide data access to users over networks. By means of virtualization, distributed storage and other technologies, cloud storage integrates storage devices of different manufacturers, different structures and different positions in a network to construct a storage resource pool. Users rent storage resource cloud storage to cloud service providers as a low-cost, high-scalability infrastructure service in a pay-per-demand manner according to their own needs, and are receiving increasing attention from individuals and businesses.
With the rapid development of cloud storage, massive data is more easily attacked when being stored on a cloud server, so that the cloud storage faces more complex security threat than traditional storage. Meanwhile, after the data owner stores the data in the cloud, physical control of the data is lost, so that the security of the data is highly dependent on the cloud service provider, and the cloud service provider cannot be completely trusted due to data leakage and loss events. It follows that cloud storage, while providing many advantages and benefits, does not guarantee the integrity of the data uploaded by the client.
In recent years, researchers have proposed a centralized third party public audit scheme to verify cloud data integrity. But has the defects that: 1) It is not reasonable to assume that the third party audit is completely trusted. 2) Auditors may not perform audit tasks according to contracts due to their own capacity limitations. Due to the characteristics of decentralization, transparency, non-tampering, security and the like, the appearance of the blockchain technology is a new method for solving the problems, but the problems of poor expandability of blockchain storage, low query efficiency and the like are faced. The new data integrity audit technology based on the blockchain is very important and significant for solving the data integrity problem in cloud storage and promoting the wide application of the cloud storage.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects of the prior art, the invention aims to provide a data integrity auditing method supporting tag blockchain storage and query, which aims to solve the problems of bottleneck, poor blockchain expandability, low query efficiency and the like of centralized audit in the prior art, and the problems, if not solved, can lead to the limitation of wide application of cloud storage.
The technical scheme of the invention is a data integrity auditing method supporting label block chain storage and inquiry, which comprises the following steps:
(1) Initializing and setting security parameters, generating public parameters, and generating a public key and a private key for data signing by a client;
(2) The client side blocks the file by utilizing a data slicing technology, generates a data tag for the data block by utilizing a ZSS short signature technology, stores the data block on a cloud server, and stores the data tag on a blockchain platform;
(3) The auditor executes sampling audit and randomly selects part of data block subsets for verification;
(4) After receiving the audit request, the blockchain platform acquires a data tag by using a query algorithm, calculates ciphertext tag evidence and returns the ciphertext tag evidence to an auditor; after receiving the audit request, the cloud server executes the calculation of the evidence of the ciphertext data and returns the evidence to the auditor;
(5) The auditor verifies whether the data evidence and the label evidence are matched on the premise that decryption is not needed according to the double pair property, and if the matching indicates that the data is complete.
Further, the step (1) specifically includes: initializing and setting a safety parameter lambda to generate a cyclic addition group G with the order of prime number q 1 And G 2 And there is bilinear mapping e: G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the Client randomly selects sk e Z p Z as private key p Represents [0, p-1 ]]And calculates pk= skP as a public key, where P is G 1 Is a generator of (1); wherein the bilinear mapping has the following properties: 1) For arbitrary P, Q ε G 1 There is an efficient algorithm to calculate e (P, Q); 2) e (P, P) noteq1; 3) For any P, Q, R.epsilon.G 1 And a, b.epsilon.Z p The method comprises the following steps: e (aP, bQ) =e (P, Q) ab ，e(P+R,Q)＝e(P,Q)·e(R,Q)。
Further, the step (2) specifically includes:
(2a) The client divides the data file into n blocks f= { m 1 ,m 2 ,…,m n And for each data block m i Calculation data tagGet Tag set t= { Tag 1 ,Tag 2 ,…,Tag n }, wherein H 1 Is a cryptographic hash function;
(2b) The client stores the data blocks on a cloud server, uploads the data labels to a blockchain platform, and stores the data blocks in a label blockchain in a T-Merkle tree mode, wherein each blocknode comprises k data labels and corresponding indexes v j ＝{Min j ,Max j ,1,Tag 1 ,2,Tag 2 ,…,k,Tag k ,H(v j ) }, where Min j And Max j Refers to the minimum and maximum values of the index of the current node store tag, the node hash value H (v j ) H is a cryptographic hash function calculated from hashes of the current node and the child node.
Further, the step (3) specifically includes: an auditor with public key and file identification randomly selects a data block subset and a corresponding random value to generate a challenge set Chall= { i, u i } i∈I Wherein i= { s 1 ,s 2 ,…,s c And c represents the number of data blocks to be challenged, s c Is the data block index 1, n]Is a subset of u i Is a random value, and the auditor sends a challenge set Chall to the cloud server and the blockchain platform.
Further, the step (4) specifically includes:
(4a) The cloud server calculates and encrypts data evidence after receiving the challenge setSending the DP to an auditor, wherein e represents a bilinear mapping relation;
(4b) After the block chain platform receives the inquiry set, the inquired label is searched by utilizing an inquiry algorithm, and the label evidence is calculated and encryptedAnd sends the TP to the auditor.
Further, the step (5) specifically includes:
(5a) After receiving the data evidence and the tag evidence, the auditor calculates by using the client public key pk and the challenge set Chall
(5b) The auditor verifies the correctness of the evidence according to the equation tp=dp·e (R, P), and if the equation is true, it is explained that the data stored on the cloud server is complete.
Further, in the step (2), the data is stored in the tag blockchain in a T-Merkle tree manner, and the method has the following characteristics: a) The data labels are stored in each tree node, not just in leaf nodes, and each node stores a plurality of data labels; b) Attaching a tag index to the data tag to support quick retrieval; c) Adding the block header into the current block to comprise the maximum value and the minimum value of the index; each T-Merkle tree node comprises a minimum value, a maximum value, an index and tag set of the index of the current node and a hash value of the current node, wherein the hash value of the current node is obtained by the hash calculation of the hash value of the current node and the hash value of the child node, and the calculation method comprises the following steps:
h(v j ) Is the hash value h (v j )＝h(h(tag 1 )||h(tag 2 )||…||h(tag k ) H is a cryptographic hash function, || represents a string linking operation, rchild and lchild represent right and left child nodes, respectively, and when generating a T-Merkle tree, the T-tree is first constructed using data labels, and then a hash value of each node is calculated from leaf nodes to root nodes, thereby generating the T-Merkle tree.
Further, when searching the challenged tag by using the query algorithm in the step (4 b), when searching the tag with index ind, firstly comparing with the index range of the head of the latest block, and if not in the current block, searching the previous block; if in the current block, a fast find algorithm is performed in the current block.
The beneficial effects are that: in the embodiment of the invention, a short signature technology is adopted to generate the data tag, the T-Merkle tree structure storage block is designed, the storage space is saved, the storage expandability of the block chain is improved, a block chain query algorithm is provided, and the retrieval speed is improved. The cloud server and blockchain platform encrypt data evidence and tag evidence using bilinear pair properties. The ZSS signature verification method based on bilinear pairs is designed, and an auditor can directly verify the correctness of the correctness on the premise of no decryption. The method not only can protect the data privacy, but also can effectively reduce the operation of bilinear pairs and improve the auditing efficiency.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a block node storage block diagram of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a block chain memory block diagram of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a diagram of a tag blockchain architecture modified in accordance with the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a system initialization flow chart in accordance with the present invention;
fig. 6 is a flow chart of an integrity audit in accordance with the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in further detail with reference to the drawings and examples, in order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are for purposes of illustration only and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention.
In an embodiment of the invention, the data is stored on a cloud server and the data tag is stored on a blockchain platform. If the data is stored directly on the blockchain, it is limited by blockchain capacity, resulting in a system that is not widely applicable. The data label is generated by adopting a short signature technology and is stored by adopting a T-Merkle structure. The ZSS short signature technique uses a general hash function (such as MD5 or SHA-1) without a specially constructed hash function, and improves signature generation efficiency with fewer bilinear pairings (F.Zhang, R.Safavi-Naini, and W.Susilo, "An efficient signature scheme from bilinear pairings and its applications," in Proc. Int. Workshop Public Key Cryptor. Berlin, germany: springer,2004, pp. 277-290). FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the present invention, wherein clients are considered auditors for convenience of description. In fact, the auditor may be a client, cloud server, blockchain platform, or other third party authority.
The embodiment of the invention is realized in such a way that the data integrity auditing method supporting the storage and the inquiry of the tag blockchain comprises the following steps:
(1) System initialization phase: generating a private key and a public key, partitioning data, calculating a data tag, uploading the data to a cloud server for storage, and uploading the data tag to a blockchain platform for storage.
(2) Integrity audit phase: the auditor generates a challenge set and sends the challenge set to the cloud server and the blockchain platform, the cloud server and the blockchain platform respectively generate data evidence and tag evidence and return the data evidence and the tag evidence to the auditor, and the auditor verifies whether the data evidence and the tag evidence are matched.
Specifically, the system initialization stage in step (1) includes the following steps:
(a) The input is a safety parameter lambda and the output is a cyclic addition group G 1 And G 2 And there is bilinear mapping e: G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the Client randomly selects sk e Z p As private key and calculating p= skP as public key, the client randomly selects sk e Z p Z as private key p Represents [0, p-1 ]]And calculates pk= skP as a public key, where P is G 1 Is a generator of (1); wherein the bilinear mapping has the following properties: 1) For arbitrary P, Q ε G 1 There is an efficient algorithm to calculate e (P, Q);
2) e (P, P) noteq1; 3) For any P, Q, R.epsilon.G 1 And a, b.epsilon.Z p The method comprises the following steps: e (aP, bQ) =e (P, Q) ab ，e(P+R,Q)＝e(P,Q)·e(R,Q)。
(b) The client divides the data file into n blocks f= { m 1 ,m 2 ,,m n And for each data block m i Calculation data tagGet Tag set t= { Tag 1 ,Tag 2 ,…,Tag n }, wherein H 1 Is a cryptographic hash function;
(c) The client stores the data blocks on a cloud server, uploads the data labels to a blockchain platform and forms a label chain in a T-Merkle tree mode. Each block node contains k data labels and corresponding index v j ＝{Min j ,Max j ,1,Tag 1 ,2,Tag 2 ,…,k,Tag k ,H(v j ) -wherein the node hash value H (v j ) Is obtained by hash calculation of the current node and the child node.
Specifically, the integrity audit phase in step (2) includes the steps of:
(a) Auditors with public keys and file identifications randomly select a subset of data blocks and corresponding random values to generate a challenge set Chall= { i, u i } i∈I Wherein i= { s 1 ,s 2 ,…,s c And c is the data block index 1, n]Is a subset of u i Is a random value. The auditor sends the challenge set Chall to the cloud server and the blockchain platform.
(b) Computing data evidence after cloud server receives challenge setAnd the DP is sent to the auditor. After the block chain platform receives the inquiry set, the inquired label is searched by utilizing an inquiry algorithm, and label evidence is calculatedAnd TP is sent to the auditor.
(c) After receiving the data evidence and the tag evidence, the auditor calculates by using the customer service side public key and the challenge set ChallAuditor verifies evidence tp=dp·e (R, P), if the equation is true, indicating that the data stored on the cloud server is completeA kind of electronic device.
Specifically, a data integrity audit method supporting tag blockchain storage and querying, the technique comprises the following parts:
(a) A short signature technique for calculating a data tag;
(b) The T-Merkle tree structure is used for storing the tag blocks;
(c) A query algorithm based on a T-Merkle tree is used for quickly searching labels;
(d) The tag evidence generation algorithm is used for calculating ciphertext tag evidence;
(e) The data evidence generation algorithm is used for calculating ciphertext data evidence;
(f) And the verification algorithm based on the ZSS short signature technology is used for verifying whether the ciphertext data evidence and the ciphertext label evidence are matched or not so as to ensure whether the data on the cloud server are complete or not.
The invention comprises the following parts: tag blockchain storage structures, blockfast query techniques, and dual linear pair based ZSS verification techniques.
The existing blocks store block data by using Merkle trees, the blocks are stored in leaf nodes, the storage utilization is low, and the whole block chain needs to be traversed when the blocks are searched. In order to save the storage overhead and improve the query efficiency, the invention improves the Merkle tree structure from 3 aspects: 1) The data labels are stored in each tree node, not just in leaf nodes, and each node stores multiple labels. 2) A tag index is appended to the data tag to support fast retrieval. 3) The block header joins the current block containing the maximum and minimum values of the index. The T-Merkle tree combines the features of the T-tree and the Merkle tree. Each T-Merkle tree node contains the minimum value of the index of the current node, the maximum value, the index and tag set, and the hash value of the current node. The node structure is described as in fig. 2. The hash value of the current node is calculated by the hash value of the current node and the hash of the child node.
The calculation method comprises the following steps:
h(v j ) Is the hash value h (v j )＝h(h(tag 1 )||h(tag 2 )||…||h(tag k ) H is a hash function, || represents a string chaining operation. When generating a T-Merkle tree, the T tree is first constructed using data labels, and then the hash value of each node is calculated from the leaf node to the root node. The T-Merkle tree structure shown in FIG. 3, assuming a tag index from 1 to 14, stores two tags per node. To verify { Tag ] 5 ,Tag 6 Auxiliary information Ω=is required }<H(c),H(b),h(Tag 3 ),h(Tag 4 ),h(Tag 7 ),h(Tag 8 )>. The verifier calculates H (a) =h (H (Tag 5 )||h(Tag 6 )||H(c)||h(Tag 5 )||h(Tag 6 ) Then calculate the hash value H' (root) =h (H (Tag) 5 )||h(Tag 6 ) I H (a) i H (b)). Verifying whether the calculated H' (root) and the stored H (root) value agree. It was demonstrated that the T-Merkle tree retains the authentication properties of Merkle.
The blockchain fast query technique supports fast binary searches. The index range embedded in the current block at the block head. When the index is ind, firstly comparing with the index range of the head of the latest block, and if the index is not in the current block, searching the previous block; if in the current block, a binary search is performed in the current block. The label block chain structure is shown in fig. 4. The query algorithm is as follows:
the ZSS verification technology based on bilinear pairs solves the problem of data privacy protection in the auditing process. During the integrity audit process, the auditor may obtain data privacy through some means. For the purpose of statement Wen Shuju, the reviewer may obtain the original data chunk from the received data evidence. For encrypted data, the auditor may obtain the key through other means to be able to decrypt the data. Such an audit scheme may pose new security threats to the owner's data. Thus, the auditing method needs to support privacy protection, i.e., the auditor cannot obtain the data content. The system employs an interactive auditing method, as shown in fig. 5 and 6. When the cloud server and the blockchain platform calculate evidences, the bilinear pair encryption evidences are utilized, and auditors directly verify the correctness of the data evidences and the label evidences by utilizing the bilinear pair operation property under the condition that decryption is not needed. The correctness of the verification expression tp=dp·e (R, P) is demonstrated as follows:
the invention adopts sampling audit to reduce communication overhead and improve audit efficiency. Assuming that the number of data blocks is n, the number of corrupted or lost data blocks is d, the challenge set size is c, and the probability P that a block X data block is corrupted or lost is detected X The calculation method is as follows:
it can be found that no matter how large the file is, when the corruption rate is 1%, a detection probability of 95% can be achieved by merely challenging 300 pieces of data.
Claims (5)
1. A data integrity audit method supporting tag blockchain storage and querying, comprising the steps of:
(1) Initializing and setting security parameters, generating public parameters, and generating a public key and a private key for data signing by a client;
the step (1) specifically comprises: initializing and setting a safety parameter lambda to generate a cyclic addition group G with the order of prime number q 1 And G 2 And there is bilinear mapping e: G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the Client randomly selects sk e Z p Z as private key p Represents [0, p-1 ]]And calculates pk= skP as a public key, where P is G 1 Is a generator of (1); wherein the bilinear mapping has the following properties: 1) For arbitrary P, Q ε G 1 There is an efficient algorithm to calculate e (P, Q); 2) e (P, P) noteq1; 3) For any P, Q, R.epsilon.G 1 And a, b.epsilon.Z p The method comprises the following steps: e (aP, bQ) =e (P, Q) ab ，e(P+R,Q)＝e(P,Q)·e(R,Q)；
(2) The client side blocks the file by utilizing a data slicing technology, generates a data tag for the data block by utilizing a ZSS short signature technology, stores the data block on a cloud server, and stores the data tag on a blockchain platform;
the step (2) specifically comprises:
(2a) The client divides the data file into n blocks f= { m 1 ,m 2 ,...,m n And for each data block m i Calculation data tagGet Tag set t= { Tag 1 ,Tag 2 ,...,Tag n }, wherein H 1 Is a cryptographic hash function;
(2b) The client stores the data blocks on a cloud server, uploads the data labels to a blockchain platform, and stores the data blocks in a label blockchain in a T-Merkle tree mode, wherein each blocknode comprises k data labels and corresponding indexes v j ＝{Min j ,Max j ,1,Tag 1 ,2,Tag 2 ,…,k,Tag k ,H(v j ) }, where Min j And Max j Refers to the minimum and maximum values of the index of the current node store tag, the node hash value H (v j ) The hash calculation of the current node and the child node is carried out, and H is a cryptographic hash function;
in the step (2), the data is stored in a tag blockchain in a T-Merkle tree mode, and the mode has the following characteristics: a) The data labels are stored in each tree node, not just in leaf nodes, and each node stores a plurality of data labels; b) Attaching a tag index to the data tag to support quick retrieval; c) The block header is added to the current block and contains the maximum value and minimum value range fields of the index; each T-Merkle tree node comprises a minimum value, a maximum value, an index and tag set of the index of the current node and a hash value of the current node, wherein the hash value of the current node is obtained by the hash calculation of the hash value of the current node and the hash value of the child node, and the calculation method comprises the following steps:
h(v j ) Is the hash value h (v j )＝h(h(tag 1 )||h(tag 2 )||…||h(tag k ) H is a cryptographic hash function, ||represents a string linking operation, rchild and lchild represent right and left child nodes respectively, and when a T-Merkle tree is generated, a T tree is firstly constructed by utilizing a data tag, and then a hash value of each node is calculated from a leaf node to a root node, so that the T-Merkle tree is generated;
(3) The auditor executes sampling audit and randomly selects part of data block subsets for verification;
(4) After receiving the audit request, the blockchain platform acquires a data tag by using a query algorithm, calculates ciphertext tag evidence and returns the ciphertext tag evidence to an auditor; after receiving the audit request, the cloud server executes calculation of ciphertext data evidence and returns the calculation result to the auditor;
(5) And the auditor verifies whether the data evidence and the label evidence are matched on the premise of not needing decryption according to the bilinear pairing property, and if the matching indicates that the data is complete.
2. The data integrity audit method supporting tag blockchain storage and querying as in claim 1, wherein: the step (3) specifically comprises: auditors with public keys and file identifications randomly select a subset of data blocks and corresponding random values to generate a challenge set Chall= { i, u i } i∈I Wherein i= { s 1 ,s 2 ,…,s c And c represents the number of data blocks to be challenged, s c Is a number ofAccording to block index [1, n ]]Is a subset of u i Is a random value, and the auditor sends a challenge set Chall to the cloud server and the blockchain platform.
3. A data integrity audit method supporting tag blockchain storage and querying as in claim 2, wherein: the step (4) specifically comprises:
(4a) The cloud server calculates and encrypts data evidence after receiving the challenge setSending the DP to an auditor, wherein e represents a bilinear mapping relation;
(4b) After the block chain platform receives the inquiry set, the inquired label is searched by utilizing an inquiry algorithm, and the label evidence is calculated and encryptedAnd sends the TP to the auditor.
4. The data integrity audit method supporting tag blockchain storage and querying of claim 3, wherein step (5) specifically comprises:
(5a) After receiving the data evidence and the tag evidence, the auditor calculates by using the client public key pk and the challenge set Chall
(5b) The auditor verifies the correctness of the evidence according to the equation tp=dp·e (R, P), and if the equation is true, it is explained that the data stored on the cloud server is complete.
5. A data integrity audit method supporting tag blockchain storage and querying as in claim 3, wherein: when searching the challenged tag by using the query algorithm in the step (4 b), when searching the tag with index ind, firstly comparing with the index range of the head of the latest block, and if not in the current block, searching the last block; if in the current block, a fast find algorithm is performed in the current block.
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| CN113312574A (en) * | 2021-05-21 | 2021-08-27 | 太原科技大学 | Cloud data integrity auditing method based on block chain |
| WO2023020429A1 (en) * | 2021-08-20 | 2023-02-23 | 清华大学 | Data auditing method and apparatus, and storage medium |
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| CN116776386B (en) * | 2023-07-05 | 2023-11-17 | 深圳钰丰信息技术有限公司 | Cloud service data information security management method and system |
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