CN107682379A - Safe information transmission device, transmission method and storage method based on homomorphic cryptography - Google Patents
Safe information transmission device, transmission method and storage method based on homomorphic cryptography Download PDFInfo
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- CN107682379A CN107682379A CN201711180072.9A CN201711180072A CN107682379A CN 107682379 A CN107682379 A CN 107682379A CN 201711180072 A CN201711180072 A CN 201711180072A CN 107682379 A CN107682379 A CN 107682379A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/008—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving homomorphic encryption
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- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of information secure transmission method based on homomorphic cryptography, including following steps：The first step：By servicing user service provider is sent to data encryption to be processed, and by obtained ciphertext；Second step：The method that use direction service provider submits data processing is serviced, is represented with function f ()；3rd step：Service provider is handled encryption data in function f () with lower, and the result after processing is sent into service user；4th step：Calculating is decrypted after receiving the data of service provider return in service user, finally gives desired result.The present invention is realized while handling encryption data, will not reveal any privacy content of user's initial data, has ensured the transmission safety and storage safety of data；Outside world is prevented, provides false command.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of safe information transmission and storage method based on homomorphic cryptography, belong to based on homomorphic cryptography
Communication interaction security fields, more particularly to the field such as car networking, encryption, information exchange.
Background technology
T-BOX car-mounted terminals are the important components for interconnecting automobile mounted system in the present age.As automotive electronics and intelligent network join
The rapid development of technology, T-BOX is just towards the direction evolution of intelligent net connectionization.It is mainly responsible for the ECU of vehicle storing letter
Breath uploads to TSP, realizes interconnecting for in-vehicle information and TSP, navigation, news and weather etc. can also be provided for passenger inside the vehicle
Information entertainment service.Increasing for T-BOX functions means that in-car and the information transfer in the external world are more frequent so that information security wind
Danger greatly increases.
T-BOX during TSP (service provider) communication interaction with often worrying its data safety the problem of.Data safety can divide
For two parts:The safety of data storage and the safety of data transfer.It is to use password to solve one of core technology of data safety
Technology.The homomorphic encryption scheme place different from legacy encryption scheme is that it is concerned with data processing safety.Homomorphic cryptography
Provide a kind of function of being handled encryption data, that is to say, that data owner can allow other people can be to encryption
Data are handled, but processing procedure will not reveal any privacy content of user's initial data, simultaneously as key returns use
Family possesses in itself, and therefore, operation can be decrypted to the ciphertext after processing in user, after decryption obtained by clear data just
It is to the result after corresponding processing in plain text.
The life of following people and automobile relation are more and more closer, and in-car ECU will store increasing personal information, more
More hackers will attempt to attack, once success, it is meant that the leakage of a large amount of personal informations, or even the person of car owner can be threatened
Safety.In order to study T-BOX information security issue, the present invention is analyzed for the security threat that T-BOX faces, and is proposed
Corresponding solution.
The content of the invention
The technical problems to be solved by the invention are the shortcomings that overcoming prior art, there is provided a kind of security pole confidentiality
Strong information transfer and storage method.
In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides a kind of information secure transmission method based on homomorphic cryptography, its
It is characterised by including following steps：
The first step：By servicing user service provider is sent to data encryption to be processed, and by obtained ciphertext；
Second step：The method that use direction service provider submits data processing is serviced, is represented with function f ()；
3rd step：Service provider is handled encryption data in function f () with lower, and the result after processing is sent out
Give service user；
4th step：Calculating is decrypted after receiving the data of service provider return in service user, finally gives expectation
Result.
Preferably, in the first step, the data ciphering method uses RSA cryptographic algorithms；Service user provides one group
Random number, using the public key encryption of service provider, and the result front that random number R 1 is added to rsa encryption is sent to service
Provider；Service provider is decrypted with the private key of oneself, after being proved to be successful, is verified again with same method.
Preferably, in the first step, the data ciphering method uses HMAC md5 encryption algorithms；Service user provides
One group of random number R 1, and random number is passed through into HMAC md5 encryptions, the MAC value after encryption is added to after random number R 1 and issues clothes
Be engaged in provider；After service provider is proved to be successful, verified again with same method.
Further, the function of the HMAC md5 encryptions is：Wherein H represents MD5 computing, and K represents authentication password, m
The message of input is represented, opad represents that the 0x36 of circulation, ipad represent the 0x5C of circulation.
Further, the HMAC md5 encryptions include following steps：
A), key is filled：If key length is less than block length, end mends 0, its HMAC is sought if block length is longer than
Value, instead of key；
B key and ipad XORs after), filling, obtain a block length identical bit with one-way hash function
Sequence, it is designated as ipadkey；
C), beginning that ipadkey sequences are attached to message is combined, and calculates their MD5 values；
D), by A) in fill after key and opad XORs, obtain one and block length identical bit sequence, be designated as
opadkey；
E), by C) hashed value that draws is placed on behind opadkey, as input calculates its MD5 values, and planning commission is finally
MD5 values.
The invention further relates to a kind of secure information storage method based on homomorphic cryptography, it is characterised in that including following
Step：
1)、KeyGen(1k)：Input security parameter k, choose Big prime p and q, calculate N andChoose small integer e；Profit
Calculated and met with extended EuclideanUnique integral d；Select the homomorphism hash function of safetyThe private key of user is sk=d, and public key is pk=(N, e)；
2)、SigGen(sk,F)：If the data of user's storage are F={ m1,m2,…,mn, user is that data F chooses at random
IdentifierAnd to each data block miCalculate signature sigmai, signature set φ={ σ1,σ2,…,σn}；RASL bottom
Node layer is the signature sigma arranged in orderi, i.e. x (vi)=σi；Service the start node cryptographic Hash M that user calculates RSALc(Mc
For open variable), and { F, φ } and RASL are sent to after service provider and deleted；
3)Challenge：Service the user set I=that c element of random selection forms from set { 1,2 ..., n }
{S1,S2,…,Sc, wherein S1≤S2≤…≤Sc；To i ∈ I, user selects random value vi∈Zp, and by challenge message chal=
{(i,vi)}i∈I, send to service provider；
4)GenProof(F,chal,φ)：Receive challenge information chal={ (i, vi)}i∈IAfterwards, service provider is raw first
Into the signature { σ of corresponding data blocki}i∈IAnd its proof information { Π (i) } in RASLi∈I, wherein Π (i)=(A1,A2,…,
An), Ai=(li,qi,di,gi), 1≤i≤n, then select random number r ∈ Zp, calculate Y, μ '；μ=μ '+r are made, generate evidence
5)VerifyProof(pk,chal,P)：Checking is divided into the progress of two steps, and after receiving receipt P, service user is first
Using proving information { П (i) }i∈ITo σiValue and its index value i verified.
Further, in 5) step, its verification method is：Service user and choose initial value λ0=0, ρ0=0, γ0=
0,ε0After=0, to j ∈ I, λ is calculatedj=lj,ρj=ρj-1+qj,δj=dj；
If δj=rgt, then rj=h (λj,ρj,γj-1,gj),εj=εj-1；
If δj=dwn, then rj=h (λj,ρj,gj,γj-1), εj=εj-1+qj；
After cycle calculations, if rk ≠Mc, then verify not by returning to reject；If rk=Mc, then it is verified,
Return to accept.
If above-mentioned be verified, service user calculatesAnd verify equationIf being proved to be successful, service user's output result TRUE, it is on the contrary then
Output result FALSE.
The invention further relates to a kind of safe information transmission device based on homomorphic cryptography, it is characterised in that including：Information is sent out
Module is sent, encryption information and information processing method are sent for servicing use direction service provider；Information receiving module, it is used for
After service provider receives the encryption file that sends of service user and information processing method and encryption file is handled
Retransmit to service user；Message processing module, the information sent for reception processing information sending module are simultaneously forwarded to letter
Cease receiving module；Communication module, passed for the information between information sending module, information receiving module and message processing module
Defeated communication.
The beneficial effects of the invention are as follows：The present invention is realized while handling encryption data, will not reveal use
Any privacy content of family initial data, the transmission safety and storage safety of data are ensured.Using RSA cryptographic algorithms or HMAC
For md5 encryption algorithm to carrying out two-way authentication between T-BOX and TSP, guarantee communicating pair is all real, prevents outside world,
Provide false command.The homomorphic encryption scheme place different from legacy encryption scheme is that it is concerned with data processing safety.
Homomorphic cryptography provides a kind of function of being handled encryption data, that is to say, that data owner can allow other people can
Encryption data is handled, but processing procedure will not reveal any privacy content of user's initial data, simultaneously as close
Key returns user to possess in itself, and therefore, operation can be decrypted to the ciphertext after processing in user, the clear data of gained after decryption
Exactly to the result after corresponding processing in plain text.Safety storage based on homomorphic cryptography characteristic, can not only resist opponent and attack
Hit, moreover it is possible to do not reveal the privacy of user in verification process.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is homomorphic cryptography schematic flow sheet.
Fig. 2 is homomorphic cryptography application model.
Fig. 3 is that cloud storage verifies model.
Fig. 4 is T-BOX and TSP mutual authentication flow charts.
Embodiment
Embodiment 1
Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawing 1-4 in the embodiment of the present invention, the technical scheme in the embodiment of the present invention is carried out it is clear,
It is fully described by.
Firstth, two-way authentication
In order to ensure that T-BOX and TSP can use RSA cryptographic algorithms or HMAC md5 encryption algorithms with mutual authentication.
Assuming that T-BOX is sender, TSP is that recipient, wherein R1 and R2 represent that T-BOX and TSP issues mutual one group of random number, letter
Number f (R1), f (R2) represent to act on R1 and R2 cryptographic algorithm respectively.
Rsa encryption certification：T-BOX provides one group of random number, is added to using TSP public key encryption, and by random number R 1
The result front of rsa encryption is sent to TSP.TSP is decrypted with the private key of oneself, after being proved to be successful, is tested again with same method
Card.
HMAC md5 encryption certifications：T-BOX provides one group of random number R 1, and random number is passed through into HMAC md5 encryptions, will
MAC value after encryption issues TSP after being added to random number R 1.After TSP is proved to be successful, verified again with same method.HMAC
MD5 principle is：Wherein H represents MD5 computing, and K is represented
Authentication password, the message of m expression inputs, the 0x36 of opad expression circulations, the 0x5C that ipad expressions circulate, idiographic flow are as follows：
(a) key is filled.If key length is less than block length, end mends 0, its HMAC is sought if block length is longer than
Value, instead of key.
(b) key and ipad XORs after filling, obtain a block length identical bit with one-way hash function
Sequence, it is designated as ipadkey.
(c) beginning that ipadkey sequences are attached to message is combined, and calculates their MD5 values.
(d) by the key after being filled in (a) and opad XORs, one and block length identical bit sequence is obtained, is remembered
For opadkey.
(e) hashed value for drawing (c) is placed on behind opadkey, as input calculate its MD5 values, planning commission finally
MD5 values.
Secondth, homomorphic cryptography
Following four step is included with the process of homomorphic cryptography processing data in T-BOX and TSP：
The first step：By T-BOX to data encryption to be processed, and obtained ciphertext is sent to TSP；
Second step：The method that T-BOX submits data processing to TSP, represented with function f ()；
3rd step：TSP is handled encryption data in function f () with lower, is then sent to the result after processing
T-BOX receives；
4th step：Calculating is decrypted after receiving the data of TSP returns in T-BOX, finally gives desired result.Obviously,
In above process, T-BOX data exist in the form of ciphertext always in transmitting procedure, and opponent and TSP decrypt without corresponding
In the case of key, user data is safe.Simultaneously because the special nature of homomorphic cryptography, TSP can be to wanting according to T-BOX
Ask and data are effectively treated, therefore T-BOX demands can be realized using homomorphic cryptography, while can also protect that T-BOX's is hidden
It is private.
3rd, safety storage
KeyGen(1k)：Input security parameter k, choose Big prime p and q, calculate N=pq and
Small integer e is chosen, is metAndCalculated and met using extended EuclideanUnique integral d,Select the homomorphism hash function of safetyT-
BOX private key is sk=d, and public key is pk=(N, e).
SigGen(sk,F)：If the data of T-BOX storages are F={ m1,m2,…,mn, T-BOX is that data F chooses at random
IdentifierAnd to each data block miCalculate signature sigmai=(H (name | | i) H (mi))d, signature set φ={ σ1,
σ2,…,σn}.RASL bottom layer node is the signature sigma arranged in orderi, i.e. x (vi)=σi.Client calculates RSAL start node
Cryptographic Hash Mc(McFor open variable), and { F, φ } and RASL are sent to after TSP and deleted.
Challenge：The T-BOX set I={ S that c element of random selection forms from set { 1,2 ..., n }1,
S2,…,Sc, wherein S1≤S2≤…≤Sc.To i ∈ I, T-BOX selection random values vi∈Zp, and by challenge message chal=
{(i,vi)}i∈I, send to TSP.
GenProof(F,chal,φ)：Receive challenge information chal={ (i, vi)}i∈IAfterwards, TSP firstly generates corresponding number
According to the signature { σ of blocki}i∈IAnd its proof information { П (i) } in RASLi∈I, wherein П (i)=(A1,A2,…,An), Ai=
(li,qi,di,gi), 1≤i≤n, then select random number r ∈ Zp, calculate Y=H (r), μ '=∑i∈Ivimi；μ=μ '+r are made, it is raw
Into evidence
VerifyProof(pk,chal,P)：Checking is divided into the progress of two steps, and after receiving receipt P, T-BOX is first with proof
Information { П (i) }i∈ITo σiValue and its index value i verified.Specific verification method is as follows：
T-BOX chooses initial value λ0=0, ρ0=0, γ0=0, ε0After=0, to j ∈ I, λ is calculatedj=lj,ρj=ρj-1+
qj,δj=dj；If δj=rgt, then rj=h (λj,ρj,γj-1,gj),εj=εj-1；If δj=dwn, then rj=h (λj,ρj,gj,
γj-1), εj=εj-1+qj；
After cycle calculations, if rk ≠Mc, then verify not by returning to reject；If rk=Mc, then it is verified,
Return to accept.It is above-mentioned be proved to be successful after, T-BOX calculateAnd verify equationIf being proved to be successful, T-BOX output results TRUE, on the contrary then output knot
Fruit FALSE.
In addition, the application also relates to a kind of safe information transmission device based on homomorphic cryptography, including information sends mould
Block, encryption information and information processing method are sent for servicing use direction service provider；Information receiving module, for servicing
Provider receives the encryption file that sends of service user and information processing method and sent out again after handling encryption file
Deliver to service user；Message processing module, the information sent for reception processing information sending module are simultaneously forwarded to information and connect
Receive module；Communication module, lead to for the information transfer between information sending module, information receiving module and message processing module
News.
(1) ensured using RSA cryptographic algorithms or HMAC md5 encryptions algorithm carrying out two-way authentication between T-BOX and TSP
Communicating pair is all real, prevents outside world, provides false command.
(2) the homomorphic encryption scheme place different from legacy encryption scheme is, it is concerned with data processing safety.Together
State encryption provides a kind of function of being handled encryption data, that is to say, that data owner can allow other people right
Encryption data is handled, but processing procedure will not reveal any privacy content of user's initial data, simultaneously as key
User is returned to possess in itself, therefore, operation can be decrypted to the ciphertext after processing in user, and the clear data obtained by after decryption is just
It is to the result after corresponding processing in plain text well.
(3) the safety storage based on homomorphic cryptography characteristic, can not only resist opponent's attack, moreover it is possible in verification process not
Reveal T-BOX privacy.
In addition to the implementation, the present invention can also have other embodiment.It is all to use equivalent substitution or equivalent transformation shape
Into technical scheme, all fall within the protection domains of application claims.
Claims (9)
1. the information secure transmission method based on homomorphic cryptography, it is characterised in that including following steps：
The first step：By servicing user service provider is sent to data encryption to be processed, and by obtained ciphertext；
Second step：The method that use direction service provider submits data processing is serviced, is represented with function f ()；
3rd step：Service provider is handled encryption data in function f () with lower, and the result after processing is sent to
Service user；
4th step：Calculating is decrypted after receiving the data of service provider return in service user, finally gives desired knot
Fruit.
2. the information secure transmission method according to claim 1 based on homomorphic cryptography, it is characterised in that：In the first step
In, the data ciphering method uses RSA cryptographic algorithms；Service user provides one group of random number, utilizes service provider's
Public key encryption, and the result front that random number R 1 is added to rsa encryption is sent to service provider；Service provider uses oneself
Private key decryption, after being proved to be successful, verified again with same method.
3. the information secure transmission method according to claim 2 based on homomorphic cryptography, it is characterised in that：In the first step
In, the data ciphering method uses HMAC md5 encryption algorithms；Service user provides one group of random number R 1, and by random number
By HMAC md5 encryptions, service provider is issued after the MAC value after encryption is added into random number R 1；Service provider verifies
After success, verified again with same method.
4. the information secure transmission method according to claim 3 based on homomorphic cryptography, it is characterised in that：The HMAC
The function of md5 encryption is：Wherein H represents MD5 computing,
K represents authentication password, and m represents the message of input, and opad represents that the 0x36 of circulation, ipad represent the 0x5C of circulation.
5. the information secure transmission method according to claim 4 based on homomorphic cryptography, it is characterised in that：The HMAC
Md5 encryption includes following steps：
A), key is filled：If key length is less than block length, end mends 0, its HMAC value is sought if block length is longer than,
Instead of key；
B key and ipad XORs after), filling, obtain a block length identical bit sequence with one-way hash function,
It is designated as ipadkey；
C), beginning that ipadkey sequences are attached to message is combined, and calculates their MD5 values；
D), by A) in fill after key and opad XORs, obtain one and block length identical bit sequence, be designated as
opadkey；
E), by C) hashed value that draws is placed on behind opadkey, calculate its MD5 values, the final MD5 values of planning commission as input.
6. a kind of secure information storage method based on homomorphic cryptography, it is characterised in that including following steps：
1)、KeyGen(1k)：Input security parameter k, choose Big prime p and q, calculate N andChoose small integer e；Utilize expansion
Open up Euclidean algorithm and calculate and meetUnique integral d；Select the homomorphism hash function of safetyThe private key of user is sk=d, and public key is pk=(N, e)；
2)、SigGen(sk,F)：If the data of user's storage are F={ m1,m2,…,mn, user is that data F chooses random identification
SymbolAnd to each data block miCalculate signature sigmai, signature set φ={ σ1,σ2,…,σn}；RASL bottom section
Point is the signature sigma arranged in orderi, i.e. x (vi)=σi；Service the start node cryptographic Hash M that user calculates RSALc(McFor public affairs
Open variable), and { F, φ } and RASL are sent to after service provider and deleted；
3)Challenge：Service the user set I={ S that c element of random selection forms from set { 1,2 ..., n }1,
S2,…,Sc, wherein S1≤S2≤…≤Sc；To i ∈ I, user selects random value vi∈Zp, and by challenge message chal=(i,
vi)}i∈I, send to service provider；
4)GenProof(F,chal,φ)：Receive challenge information chal={ (i, vi)}i∈IAfterwards, service provider firstly generates pair
Answer the signature { σ of data blocki}i∈IAnd its proof information { Π (i) } in RASLi∈I, wherein Π (i)=(A1,A2,…,An),
Ai=(li,qi,di,gi), 1≤i≤n, then select random number r ∈ Zp, calculate Y, μ '；μ=μ '+r are made, generate evidence
5)VerifyProof(pk,chal,P)：Checking be divided into two steps progress, after receiving receipt P, service user first with
Prove information { Π (i) }i∈ITo σiValue and its index value i verified.
7. the secure information storage method based on homomorphic cryptography according to power requires 6, it is characterised in that：In 5) step,
Its verification method is：Service user and choose initial value λ0=0, ρ0=0, γ0=0, ε0After=0, to j ∈ I, λ is calculatedj=
lj,ρj=ρj-1+qj,δj=dj；
If δj=rgt, then rj=h (λj,ρj,γj-1,gj),εj=εj-1；
If δj=dwn, then rj=h (λj,ρj,gj,γj-1), εj=εj-1+qj；
After cycle calculations, if rk≠Mc, then verify not by returning to reject；If rk=Mc, then it is verified, returns
accept。
8. the secure information storage method based on homomorphic cryptography according to power requires 7, it is characterised in that：If above-mentioned checking is led to
Cross, service user calculatesAnd verify equationIf
It is proved to be successful, then services user's output result TRUE, on the contrary then output result FALSE.
A kind of 9. safe information transmission device based on homomorphic cryptography, it is characterised in that including：
Information sending module, encryption information and information processing method are sent for servicing use direction service provider；
Information receiving module, the encryption file and information processing method sent for service provider reception service user is simultaneously
Retransmited after handling encryption file to service user；
Message processing module, the information sent for reception processing information sending module are simultaneously forwarded to information receiving module；
Communication module, for the information transfer communication between information sending module, information receiving module and message processing module.
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| CN110991655A (en) * | 2019-12-17 | 2020-04-10 | 支付宝(杭州)信息技术有限公司 | Method and device for processing model data by combining multiple parties |
| CN111092715A (en) * | 2019-12-27 | 2020-05-01 | 山东师范大学 | Network appointment information safety processing method, system and equipment |
| CN113821810A (en) * | 2021-08-26 | 2021-12-21 | 上海赢科信息技术有限公司 | Data processing method and system, storage medium and electronic device |
| CN114448624A (en) * | 2022-01-27 | 2022-05-06 | 华南师范大学 | Transparent Internet of things secure transmission method and device based on white-box cryptographic service |
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