CN112165472B - Internet of things data security sharing method based on privacy protection - Google Patents

Internet of things data security sharing method based on privacy protection Download PDF

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CN112165472B
CN112165472B CN202011001418.6A CN202011001418A CN112165472B CN 112165472 B CN112165472 B CN 112165472B CN 202011001418 A CN202011001418 A CN 202011001418A CN 112165472 B CN112165472 B CN 112165472B
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attribute
information
ciphertext
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CN112165472A (en
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王锐芳
李勇
李永娇
赵坤园
朱亮
李健勇
袁俊岭
甘勇
张启坤
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Zhengzhou University of Light Industry
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
    • H04L63/0421—Anonymous communication, i.e. the party's identifiers are hidden from the other party or parties, e.g. using an anonymizer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • H04L67/1001—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network for accessing one among a plurality of replicated servers
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • H04L67/1097—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network for distributed storage of data in networks, e.g. transport arrangements for network file system [NFS], storage area networks [SAN] or network attached storage [NAS]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees

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Abstract

The invention provides an Internet of things data security sharing method based on privacy protection, which comprises the following steps: initializing protocol parameters in an information sharing network domain; registering a terminal member; the terminal member acquires the attribute authority parameters of the terminal member, calculates an encryption key according to the Chinese remainder theorem, encrypts the shared information resources and stores the encrypted information resources in a linked database; calculating intermediate parameters required by the stored information resources, generating index information of the shared ciphertext and encapsulating the index information in a block, and so on, wherein each terminal member stores the related information of the ciphertext in the block to generate a block chain; access and sharing of ciphertext. According to the invention, identity and attribute parameter matching double authentication is adopted to prevent collusion attack and protect personal privacy, an attribute matching access control strategy is combined with a block chain technology to ensure the safety of shared resource information, the storage burden is reduced, the information resource sharing in the industrial Internet of things is more flexible, efficient and practical, and the method has important field research significance and commercial application value.

Description

Internet of things data security sharing method based on privacy protection
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of information security, in particular to a privacy protection-based industrial Internet of things data security sharing method.
Background
The rapid development and continuous innovation of the computer technology and the Internet of things improve the efficiency of information storage and real-time exchange. Modern industrial systems require the application of industrial internet of things systems to realize higher-level data sharing, which necessitates data interaction between different internet of things systems in the form of an open network. However, such a highly open network is vulnerable to illegal attacks, which may cause various data to be damaged or lost, and may seriously affect the normal operation of the industrial system. Privacy protection and data security are security problems needing to be guaranteed for resource sharing, access control is one of the fundamental technologies for data information protection, and data can be guaranteed to be accessed only by users with corresponding permissions. And information resources are obtained and decrypted through attribute parameter matching, so that fine-grained, safe and flexible access to shared data is guaranteed.
The important foundation and core of industrial internet of things technology remains the internet. Through the integration of various wired networks, wireless networks and the Internet, in the industrial Internet of things, in order to ensure the confidentiality and the leakage resistance of shared information and the personal privacy of information sharers among mobile terminals, shared resources are encrypted and then uploaded to a downlink database of a block chain, the downlink storage addresses and index information of the shared resources are stored in the block chain, a data visitor determines and downloads ciphertext resources according to the index information in the blocks, and then a decryption key is calculated to decrypt the ciphertext. Because the access to the internet of things is not limited by time and regions, the encryption of the shared resource information in the network environment is an important guarantee for the safety of information resources.
In order to prevent an illegal terminal from joining in inter-domain data sharing, a terminal member needs to perform identity authentication in the process of information resource sharing. The traditional identity authentication method is easy to expose personal identity information in the identity authentication process, and the identity authentication with hidden attributes is adopted, so that the personal privacy can be well protected. At present, research aiming at an industrial internet of things data security sharing method based on privacy protection does not appear yet. A series of challenging problems need to be solved, and the work of setting an access control strategy, identity authentication, personal privacy protection and the like in the information sharing process is unprecedented.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the technical problems that personal identity information is easy to expose and sensitive data cannot be flexibly protected in the identity authentication process of the existing information resource sharing method, the invention provides the privacy protection-based Internet of things data security sharing method.
In order to achieve the purpose, the technical scheme of the invention is realized as follows: a method for safely sharing data of an Internet of things based on privacy protection comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: initialization of protocol parameters in an information sharing network domain: the CA and each terminal member generate respective public/private key pairs;
step two: registration of terminal members:
A) the authentication center CA selects network attribute parameters which are in one-to-one correspondence with the network attributes in the network attribute set, simultaneously generates attribute serial numbers which are in correspondence with the ordered network attribute set, and broadcasts the network attributes in the network attribute set, the corresponding network attribute parameters and the attribute serial numbers to all terminal members in the domain;
B) each terminal member calculates intermediate parameters required by terminal member registration by using the attributes in the respective ordered attribute set, and then sends the intermediate parameters to a Certificate Authority (CA);
C) after receiving the message sent by each terminal member, the CA verifies the identity of each terminal member, if the verification is passed, the CA selects a series of random numbers, calculates the attribute authority parameters and the signature, and sends the attribute authority parameters, the signature and the public key to each registered terminal member;
D) after each terminal member receives the message sent by the authentication center CA, the terminal member calculates the attribute authority parameters and intermediate parameters required by the registration of the terminal member, the terminal member verifies the identity of the authentication center CA and the correctness of the attribute authority parameters, if the verification is passed, each terminal member obtains the attribute authority parameters corresponding to the attributes, and the registration of each terminal member is successful;
E) the certification center CA sends the public key, the attribute authority parameter, the attribute serial number and the corresponding network attribute parameter to each terminal member and stores the public key, the attribute authority parameter, the attribute serial number and the corresponding network attribute parameter in a block of each terminal member;
step three: information resource encryption storage:
F) the terminal member acquires the attribute authority parameters of the terminal member, calculates an encryption key by using the attribute serial number and the corresponding network attribute parameters according to the Chinese remainder theorem, encrypts the shared information resource into a ciphertext and stores the ciphertext in a linked database of the block chain;
G) the terminal members calculate intermediate parameters required by information resource storage according to the IP address sequencing, generate index information of a shared ciphertext, send the intermediate parameters required by the ciphertext, a public key, the IP address of the next terminal member and the attribute authority parameters acquired from the authentication center CA to the next terminal member, and package the information, the storage address of the ciphertext and a timestamp in a block;
H) after the next terminal member acquires the message sent by the last terminal member, the IP address and the attribute authority parameters are compared, if the message is correct, the terminal member writes a new block, calculates the intermediate parameters required by the stored ciphertext, generates the index information of the shared ciphertext, sends the intermediate parameters required by the stored resource, the public key, the IP address of the next terminal member and the attribute authority parameters acquired from the authentication center CA to the next terminal member, and encapsulates the information, the stored address of the ciphertext and the timestamp in a block; by analogy, each terminal member stores the relevant information of the ciphertext in the block to generate a block chain so that other terminal members can access the ciphertext;
step four: ciphertext access and sharing:
I) each terminal member determines a ciphertext which the terminal member wants to access according to the index information of the ciphertext resource in the block chain, then sends a public key, an attribute authority parameter and a signature of the terminal member to the terminal member with the ciphertext resource, and the terminal member with the ciphertext resource verifies the identity of the terminal member and returns a storage address to the terminal member; the terminal member downloads the ciphertext information from the linked database according to the storage address, selects the corresponding attribute authority parameters and the network attribute parameters according to the attribute serial number in the terminal member block with the ciphertext resource, calculates a decryption key according to the Chinese remainder theorem, and decrypts the ciphertext information to obtain the shared ciphertext.
The index information comprises the category, brief description, keywords and attribute serial numbers required by encryption of the ciphertext resources.
The method for generating the respective public/private key pair by the authentication center CA and each terminal member in the first step comprises the following steps:
(1) the CA randomly selects a master key, and calculates a public/private key pair by using a generator of the addition group: the authentication center CA randomly selects a positive integer
Figure BDA0002694460350000031
As a system private key, and calculates a public key PK A ＝SK A g 1 The authentication center CA will (SK) A ,PK A ) As a public/private key pair of the system; wherein, g 1 Is an addition group G 1 The generation element of (a) is generated,
Figure BDA0002694460350000032
representing integers of order qSet q is an addition group G 1 Prime order of;
(2) each terminal member u in the domain i Randomly selecting a public key, and calculating a private key of the public key by using a generator of an addition group: each terminal member u i Selecting a random positive integer
Figure BDA0002694460350000033
Computing terminal member u i Private key of
Figure BDA0002694460350000034
And public key
Figure BDA0002694460350000035
Wherein i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, n is the number of terminal members in the domain,
Figure BDA0002694460350000036
is terminal member u i The identification of (2) is stored in the memory,
Figure BDA0002694460350000037
is a hash function, {0,1} * Representing a set of numeric strings of arbitrary length consisting of binary 0 and 1.
The method for registering the terminal member in the second step comprises the following steps:
A) the CA selects a group of positive integers p of pairwise reciprocity elements 1 ,p 2 ,....,p R The certification center CA sets the ordered network attribute set Attr as { a ═ a 1 ,A 2 ,...,A ν ,...,A R And an attribute order number S corresponding to the set of network attributes 1 ,S 2 ,...,S ν ,...,S R And positive integer p 1 ,p 2 ,....,p ν ,....p R Composition message { (A) 1 ,S 1 ,p 1 ),(A 2 ,S 2 ,p 2 ),...,(A R ,S R ,p R ) Broadcasting to all terminal members in the domain; wherein, the network attribute A ν ＜A ν+1 ，1≤ν≤R，R∈N * Representing the number of network attributes, N * Denotes a positive integer, S ν The representation corresponds to the network attribute A ν Attribute sequence number of p ν The representation corresponds to an attribute A ν An attribute parameter;
B) terminal member u i Using its ordered set of attributes
Figure BDA00026944603500000310
Attribute element in (2) calculates intermediate variables
Figure BDA0002694460350000038
And
Figure BDA0002694460350000039
terminal member u i To transmit information
Figure BDA0002694460350000041
Sending the information to a certification center CA; wherein i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n,
Figure BDA0002694460350000042
and o i Representing intermediate variables, attribute sets, required for registration of terminal members
Figure BDA0002694460350000043
r i ∈N * And attribute
Figure BDA0002694460350000044
r i Is terminal member u i Number of attributes of (a) i,k Is a terminal member u i The (k) th attribute of (2),
Figure BDA0002694460350000045
indicating terminal member u i The identity of (2) is identified,
Figure BDA0002694460350000046
representing terminal member u i The public key of (2); PK A Representing the public key of the certificate authority CA,
Figure BDA0002694460350000047
representing terminals intoPerson u i A random positive integer of the public key and the private key is calculated,
Figure BDA0002694460350000048
is a hash function, | | is a concatenation symbol;
C) CA receiving terminal member u of authentication center i Message sent
Figure BDA0002694460350000049
Thereafter, the certificate authority CA calculates intermediate variables
Figure BDA00026944603500000410
And passes the verification
Figure BDA00026944603500000411
Whether to authenticate terminal member u in standing i If the equality holds, the certificate authority CA selects the identity corresponding to each attribute a i,k Random number of
Figure BDA00026944603500000412
1≤k≤r i Then, the intermediate variable χ is calculated i，k ＝ι i，k θ i，k And
Figure BDA00026944603500000418
authentication center CA will information
Figure BDA00026944603500000419
Sent to registered terminal member u i (ii) a If the equality is not satisfied, the authentication center CA will use the terminal member u i Removing the domains; wherein k represents a terminal member u i The kth attribute of (1), χ i,k Is a terminal member u i Of the k-th property parameter, δ i Is terminal member u i Registering required intermediate parameters;
D) terminal member u i Receiving the information sent by the authentication center CA
Figure BDA00026944603500000414
After that, the air conditioner is started to work,terminal member u i Computing attribute rights parameters
Figure BDA00026944603500000415
And intermediate variables
Figure BDA00026944603500000416
Terminal member u i By verifying equation e (δ) i ,g 1 )＝e(Φ i ,PK A ) Whether the identity and the attribute a of the authentication center CA are established or not i,k Corresponding attribute authority parameter T i,k If the equation holds, the terminal member u i Obtain each attribute a thereof i,k Corresponding attribute authority parameter, terminal member u i The registration is successful; if the equality is not true, terminal member u i The registration fails; wherein,
Figure BDA00026944603500000420
attribute authority parameter, phi, representing terminal member i Representing an intermediate variable required for verifying the identity of the authentication center CA; e (-) is a computable bilinear mapping function;
E) authentication center CA will information
Figure BDA00026944603500000417
Send to terminal member u i And stored to terminal member u i On the block of (a).
Said verification equation
Figure BDA0002694460350000051
The method comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002694460350000052
the verification equation e (δ) i ,g 1 )＝e(Φ i ,PK A ) The method comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002694460350000053
the method for encrypting the shared information resource into a ciphertext and storing the ciphertext in the downlink database of the block chain in the step F) comprises the following steps:
1) each having an ordered set of attributes
Figure BDA0002694460350000054
Terminal member u i When sharing its information resource, terminal member u i According to attribute serial number corresponding to its attribute
Figure BDA0002694460350000055
Obtaining corresponding network attribute parameters
Figure BDA00026944603500000515
Computing equation by using own attribute authority parameters
Figure BDA0002694460350000057
Calculating a unique solution according to the Chinese remainder theorem
Figure BDA0002694460350000058
Wherein,
Figure BDA0002694460350000059
(ii) a Group key
Figure BDA00026944603500000510
Figure BDA00026944603500000510
1≤υ≤r i ，P、p υ And y υ Intermediate variables required for key calculation; mod represents a remainder function;
2) each terminal member u i Calculating group key group key Then, for the information to be shared
Figure BDA00026944603500000511
And (3) encryption: terminal member u i Computing an encrypted ciphertext
Figure BDA00026944603500000512
Encrypting information m; terminal member u i Sharing the encrypted ciphertext c i,m Upload to the down-link database and forward the ciphertext c i,m Is stored at the address
Figure BDA00026944603500000513
Returning to the linked database in the block for storage; wherein,
Figure BDA00026944603500000514
is a plaintext space.
The method for storing the index information of the ciphertext shared in the steps G) and H) comprises the following steps:
1) in the domain, each terminal member u participating in resource sharing i Broadcasting its IP address and public key;
2) after the terminal members in the domain receive the messages broadcast by other members, each terminal member sorts according to the size of the IP address, and each terminal member stores the public keys and the IP addresses of the former terminal member and the latter terminal member; ordered set ordered according to the size of the IP address as
Figure BDA0002694460350000061
n is the number of terminal members in the domain,
Figure BDA0002694460350000062
indicating terminal member u i Of public key, IP i Indicating terminal member u i The IP address of (2);
3) terminal member u i According to information shared by Certificate Authority (CA)
Figure BDA0002694460350000063
Computing signatures
Figure BDA0002694460350000064
Terminal member u i Information shared to it
Figure BDA0002694460350000065
Categorizing acquisition of categories of shared resources
Figure BDA0002694460350000066
Giving a short overview of shared resources
Figure BDA0002694460350000067
Extracting keywords of shared information
Figure BDA0002694460350000068
Attribute serial number corresponding to attribute used when encrypting information m
Figure BDA0002694460350000069
Generating index information of the shared resource information
Figure BDA00026944603500000610
Terminal member u i Obtaining the storage address of the shared information m in the down-link database
Figure BDA00026944603500000611
Terminal member u i Sending messages
Figure BDA00026944603500000612
Giving IP address as IP i+1 Terminal member u i+1 (ii) a Terminal member u i Recording time information time i And will transmit the message
Figure BDA00026944603500000613
Packaging into a block; therein, Sig i Is terminal member u i Time, signature of i Denoted as time stamp;
Figure BDA00026944603500000614
respectively representing attribute serial numbers corresponding to the attributes used in encryption;
4) terminal member u i+1 Receiving terminal member u i Transmitted information
Figure BDA00026944603500000615
Then, terminal member u i+1 The IP address of the user and the terminal member u i Comparing IP addresses in the blocks of (1), and comparing information
Figure BDA00026944603500000627
If the attribute authority parameters are the same as those stored in the block by the authentication center CA, if the IP address and the information are the same
Figure BDA00026944603500000616
Are all the same, terminal member u i+1 Writing a new tile, terminal member u i+1 Computing
Figure BDA00026944603500000617
And passing the verification equation
Figure BDA00026944603500000618
Verifying terminal member u i If the equality holds, terminal member u i+1 Determining that the message was sent by the previous member, terminal member u i+1 According to information shared by Certificate Authority (CA)
Figure BDA00026944603500000619
Computing signatures
Figure BDA00026944603500000620
Terminal member u i+1 Information shared to it
Figure BDA00026944603500000621
Categorizing acquisition of categories of shared resources
Figure BDA00026944603500000622
Giving a short overview of shared resources
Figure BDA00026944603500000623
Extracting keywords of shared resources
Figure BDA00026944603500000624
Attribute serial number corresponding to attribute used when encrypting the shared information m
Figure BDA00026944603500000625
Thereby generating index information of the shared resource information
Figure BDA00026944603500000626
Obtaining storage address of shared resource in down-link database
Figure BDA0002694460350000071
Terminal member u i+1 Sending messages
Figure BDA0002694460350000072
Giving IP address as IP i+2 Terminal member u i+2 (ii) a Terminal member u i+1 Recording time information time i+1 And will message
Figure BDA0002694460350000073
Packaging into a block; if the equality is not true, terminal member u i+1 Determining that the message was not sent by a previous terminal member, ignoring the message, and kicking the terminal member sending the message out of the network domain; therein, Sig i+1 Is terminal member u i+1 Time, signature of i+1 Denoted as time stamp;
5) each terminal member u i The index information and identity information of the shared information are encapsulated in their respective tiles and linked into a chain of tiles.
Said verification equation
Figure BDA0002694460350000074
The method comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002694460350000075
the method for accessing and sharing the resources in the fourth step comprises the following steps:
(1) each terminal member u in the domain j Determining the information to be accessed according to the index information in the block chain, and determining the terminal member u j Terminal member u of owner viewing the information i Index information in the block is used for obtaining corresponding attribute serial number
Figure BDA0002694460350000076
And sends information according to the attribute sequence number
Figure BDA0002694460350000077
To the owner u i Wherein, the signature
Figure BDA0002694460350000078
Terminal member u i Calculating intermediate variables
Figure BDA0002694460350000079
Terminal member u i By verifying the equation
Figure BDA00026944603500000710
Whether the verification terminal member u is established or not j The identity of (a); if the equation holds, terminal member u i The linked database address of the shared resource
Figure BDA00026944603500000711
Returned to terminal member u j (ii) a If the equality is not satisfied, then the terminal member u is represented j The identity is in a problem and the resource cannot be accessed; wherein j is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, i is less than or equal to j, i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, u i Terminal member, mu, representing the owner of the resource information i Intermediate variables required for resource access, H 2 (. -) represents a hash function; r is j Is terminal member u j The number of the attributes of (a) is,
Figure BDA00026944603500000712
representing terminal member u j The private key of (a);
(2) terminal member u j According to owner u k Shared resource of (2) a linked database address
Figure BDA00026944603500000713
Downloading information c of corresponding cipher text k,m Then according to the obtained attribute serial number
Figure BDA00026944603500000714
Selecting corresponding attribute authority parameters and network attribute parameters, and calculating decryption key according to Chinese remainder theorem
Figure BDA0002694460350000081
According to the decryption key x j And decrypting the ciphertext c k,m Calculating to obtain plaintext, i.e. shared resource
Figure BDA0002694460350000082
Said verification equation
Figure BDA0002694460350000083
The method comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002694460350000084
compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects: terminal members in the domain perform identity authentication through an identity authentication technology with hidden attributes before performing information resource sharing; after the identity of each terminal member is confirmed, attribute authority parameters corresponding to the attribute of each terminal member are calculated, an encryption key is calculated according to the Chinese remainder theorem, then shared data resources are encrypted and uploaded to a down-link database, the storage address of the ciphertext resource is returned to an on-link block for storage, and meanwhile, index information and personal identity information of the shared resources are stored in the on-link block, so that the safety and leakage resistance of the information resources can be guaranteed, the storage burden of the block chain can be reduced, and users can conveniently search the data resources. The terminal members in the domain of the invention adopt a symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt the shared information, the members who need to access the information and have attribute parameter matching can download the data resource according to the down-link storage address, and the attribute serial number in the index information selects the corresponding attribute authority parameter and the network attribute parameter to calculate the decryption key for decryption and viewing; the identity authentication technology with hidden attributes is adopted to realize the effects of personal privacy protection and identity authentication in the identity authentication process of resource information sharing, and the traceability that data information cannot be falsified and illegal attacks is guaranteed by utilizing the advantages of the block chain technology, and meanwhile, the problem of large communication traffic and calculation amount is avoided. When accessing the resources of the data, the shared resources can be decrypted only by passing identity authentication and successfully matching the attribute authority parameters, so that collusion attack of illegal terminals is avoided. According to the invention, a ciphertext attribute authentication technology is adopted to protect personal privacy, an attribute matching access control strategy is applied, and a block chain technology is combined to ensure the safety of shared resource information and the transparency of data storage, and a data resource storage mode combining block chain on-index storage and chain off-database storage is adopted to reduce the storage burden, so that the calculation and communication in the information sharing process are lighter; the safety of shared data and illegal attack tracing are guaranteed by utilizing the characteristics of non-tampering and traceability of the block chain technology; when accessing information resources, the identity and attribute parameter matching double authentication is adopted to prevent collusion attack, so that the information resource sharing in the industrial Internet of things is more flexible, efficient and practical, and the method has important field research significance and commercial application value.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without creative efforts.
FIG. 1 is a schematic flow chart of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a diagram illustrating specific information transmission for resource information sharing according to embodiment 1 of the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of data storage for resource information sharing according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be obtained by a person skilled in the art without inventive effort based on the embodiments of the present invention, are within the scope of the present invention.
Aiming at the problems of confidentiality, integrity and leakage resistance of data resources when information is safely shared among mobile terminals in a network under the complex environment of industrial Internet of things communication; meanwhile, in the internet of things, a mobile terminal can access the internet of things at any time and any place to cause the problems of complexity, randomness and the like of communication environment personnel. Firstly, a CA in a domain randomly selects a main encryption key and calculates a corresponding public/private key pair, each terminal member in the domain randomly selects a public key, and then calculates a private key of the terminal member by using a generating element of an addition group; secondly, the authentication center CA selects corresponding prime numbers as network attribute parameters according to the number of the attributes in the intra-domain network attribute set, generates corresponding attribute serial numbers, and broadcasts the information to each terminal member in the domain; each terminal member calculates an intermediate variable required by the registration of the terminal member by using the attribute of the terminal member and sends the intermediate variable to an authentication center CA in the domain, the authentication center CA verifies the identity of each terminal member and then calculates a corresponding attribute parameter, the authentication center CA sends the intermediate parameter, the attribute parameter and a public key required by the registration of the terminal to each terminal member, each terminal member calculates an attribute authority parameter corresponding to the attribute of the terminal member after receiving the message, then verifies the identity of the authentication center CA and the correctness of the attribute authority parameter, and if the verification is passed, the registration of each terminal is completed. And the certification center CA in the domain sends the public key, the attribute parameters, the corresponding attribute serial number and the corresponding network attribute parameters to each terminal member and stores the public key, the attribute parameters, the corresponding attribute serial number and the corresponding network attribute parameters in a block. And then, the terminal member calculates an encryption key according to the Chinese remainder theorem by using the corresponding attribute authority parameter and the corresponding network attribute parameter, encrypts shared resource information by using the encryption key to generate an encryption ciphertext, uploads the ciphertext to a downlink database of the block chain, and stores a downlink storage address of the shared resource in the uplink block. The terminal members classify the ciphertext resources, combine the category, the general description, the keywords and the serial numbers of the attributes required by encryption of the ciphertext resources into index information to be stored in the blocks on the chain of the terminal members, and store the identity information of the terminal members in the blocks to generate block chains; finally, the terminal members determine the ciphertext which the terminal members want to access according to the index information in the block, and after the ciphertext which the terminal members want to access is determined, the terminal members sign and send the related parameter information to all the terminal members of the resource; all the terminal members of the resource verify the identity of the access terminal member, and if the identity passes the verification, the storage address of the shared resource is sent to the access terminal member; after the access terminal member downloads the corresponding ciphertext according to the ciphertext storage address, the access terminal member selects the corresponding attribute authority parameter and the network attribute parameter according to the attribute serial number, calculates the corresponding decryption key according to the Chinese remainder theorem, and then performs decryption operation on the ciphertext.
1. Theoretical basic knowledge and associated definitions to which the invention relates
1.1 bilinear mapping problem
Definition 1. bilinear mapping: let G 1 Is an additive group with a generator g 1 I.e. G 1 ＝<g1>，G 2 Is a multiplicative cyclic group. Addition group G 1 And multiplication cyclic group G 2 Having a common large prime order q,
Figure BDA0002694460350000101
is a safety parameter, and adds group G 1 And multiplication cyclic group G 2 The discrete logarithm of (1) is difficult, adding group G 1 And multiplication cyclic group G 2 Is a pair of bilinear groups, e is a computable bilinear map, and e: G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 It has the following properties:
properties 2. non-degradability: there is a generator ω, ρ ∈ G 1 So that e (ω, ρ) ≠ 1.
Property 3. calculability: there are efficient algorithms for generating the elements ω, ρ∈G 1 E (ω, ρ) can be calculated.
Inference 1. for all generative elements ρ 1 ,ρ 2 ,ω∈G 1 With e (ρ) 1 +ρ 2 ,ω)＝e(ρ 1 ,ω)e(ρ 2 ,ω)。
1.2 computational complexity problem
Definition 1 Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): for the equation Y aQ, where the generator Y, Q e G 1 Parameter of
Figure BDA0002694460350000102
If the parameter a and the generator Q are known, the generator Y can be easily calculated. However, given the generator Q and the generator Y, the probability of calculating the parameter a is negligible in polynomial time.
Definition 2.Diffie-Hellman inverse problem operation (ICDH): giving g 1 ,ag 1 And abg 1 For the parameters
Figure BDA0002694460350000103
Calculating (ab/a) g 1 。
1.3 theorem of Chinese remainder
Giving a series of positive integers p of pairwise reciprocity 1 ,p 2 ,...,p n I.e. gcd (p) i ,p j ) 1(i ≠ j); wherein p ═ p 1 p 2 ...p n ＝p i D i ，D i ＝p 1 p 2 ...p i-1 p i+1 ...p n Calculating the equation
Figure BDA0002694460350000104
To derive a unique solution
Figure BDA0002694460350000105
Wherein, y i ·D i mod p i 1, i 1,2, n, gcd () represents a function that verifies whether positive integers are prime, p i 、l i 、y i The intermediate variables required for the key calculation, mod represents the remainder function and x represents the key.
Example 1
Under the condition of complex data sharing, an intra-domain authentication center CA needs to perform identity authentication on a terminal member sharing data information, but when providing identity information, the identity information is easy to leak or be stolen. For safety, when information is shared and authenticated by multiple parties, personal identity privacy needs to be protected. During information sharing, confidentiality, integrity and leakage resistance of communication information are guaranteed, and members meeting an access policy are required to share the information. In view of the application background, the invention provides a privacy protection-based industrial internet of things data security sharing method, as shown in fig. 1, comprising the following steps: firstly, initializing parameters of terminal members participating in information resource sharing, and respectively generating respective public/private key pairs; registering terminal members in the domain, performing hidden attribute identity authentication on the terminal members in the domain before information encryption storage and information resource access, calculating corresponding attribute authority parameters according to respective attribute sets of the terminal members, and sending public keys, attribute parameters, attribute serial numbers and network attribute parameters of the terminal members to the terminal members and storing the public keys, the attribute parameters, the attribute serial numbers and the network attribute parameters in blocks of the terminal members by an authentication center CA; thirdly, information encryption storage, each terminal member selects corresponding attribute authority parameters and network attribute parameters according to the own attribute, then calculates an encryption key by using the Chinese remainder theorem, encrypts the data information shared by the terminal members by using the encryption key, uploads the encrypted ciphertext to a down-link database of a block chain, returns the storage address of the encrypted ciphertext to an on-link block, generates index information consisting of the category, brief description, keywords and serial numbers of the attribute used for encryption of the shared ciphertext, stores the index information in the block, uploads the identity information of each terminal member to each block, generates a block chain, and the structure of the block is shown in FIG. 3; determining shared resources which each terminal member wants to access according to the index information in the block chain, then sending the identity information of each terminal member to the terminal member having the resources which each terminal member wants to access, verifying the identity of the access terminal by the terminal member having the data resources, sending the storage address of the shared resources to the access terminal after the authentication is passed, downloading the ciphertext by the terminal member according to the storage address of the ciphertext, selecting corresponding attribute authority parameters and network attribute parameters according to the attribute serial number in the index information, and then calculating a decryption key according to the Chinese remainder theorem to decrypt the ciphertext so as to obtain the shared resources. A model diagram of the entire system is shown in fig. 2. The method comprises the following specific steps:
the method comprises the following steps: information sharing network initialization protocol parameters: and generating a public/private key pair of the authentication center CA and each terminal member.
Suppose that the information sharing network comprises an authentication center CA and n terminal members, wherein the authentication center CA is used for generating system parameters and a system master key, and the authentication center CA is also used for verifying the identity of a terminal member entity so as to track the identity of an anonymous terminal member in a block chain. U ═ U ═ for a set of n terminal members 1 ,u 2 ,...,u n Denotes that the identities of the respective n terminal members are set
Figure BDA0002694460350000111
And (4) showing. The authentication center CA defines a network attribute sequence ATTR ═ a arranged in a specified order 1 |A 2 |...|A R The corresponding network attribute set is Attr ═ a 1 ,A 2 ,...,A j ,...,A R H and network attribute a j ＜A j+1 ,j＜R，R∈N * Representing the number of network attributes, N * Representing a positive integer.
Figure BDA0002694460350000112
1≤r i R is less than or equal to terminal member u in network i The order of the ordered attribute set, the attribute sequence corresponding to the order of the ordered attribute set
Figure BDA0002694460350000113
r∈N * And attribute a i,r-1 ＜a i,r ，r i Indicating terminal member u i R of i And null indicates that the attribute value is null.
If the terminal member wants to store the shared resource on the blockchain, or the terminal member wants to access the resource on the blockchain, the terminal member must be a legal authenticated member and have corresponding access right.
The method for generating respective public/private key pairs by the authentication center CA in the information sharing network domain and each terminal member in the network comprises the following steps:
the certificate authority CA within the domain runs the key generation algorithm KeyGen (1) λ ) Obtaining public and private key pair (SK) A ,PK A ) Wherein the authentication center CA randomly selects a positive integer
Figure BDA0002694460350000121
As a system private key, and calculates a public key PK A ＝SK A g 1 (ii) a Authentication center CA will (SK) A ,PK A ) As a public/private key pair of the system. Each terminal member u in the domain i Selecting a random positive integer from E U
Figure BDA0002694460350000122
Computing
Figure BDA0002694460350000123
Is terminal member u i The private key of (1). Calculate its public key
Figure BDA0002694460350000124
The system parameter is params ═ (PK) A ,q,G 1 ,G 2 ,g 1 ,e,H 1 ,H 2 ) (ii) a Wherein, g 1 Is an addition group G 1 The generation element of (a) is generated,
Figure BDA0002694460350000125
representing a set of integers of order q, q being an addition group G 1 KeyGen () represents a key generation algorithm, and λ represents an intermediate variable required for key calculation; i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, n is the number of terminal members in the domain, and U is { U ═ 1 ,u 2 ,...,u n Is a set of n terminal members,
Figure BDA0002694460350000126
is a terminal member u i The private key of (a) is used,
Figure BDA0002694460350000127
is a terminal member u i The public key of (a) is stored,
Figure BDA0002694460350000128
is a terminal member u i The identity of (2) is identified,
Figure BDA0002694460350000129
are two hash functions, {0,1} * Representing a set of numeric strings of arbitrary length consisting of binary 0 s and 1 s.
Step two: and registering the terminal member.
In order to prevent unauthorized terminal members from participating in information resource sharing, only terminal members with authority are allowed to participate in information encryption storage and information resource access. The invention adopts the identity authentication mode of hidden attribute, and the identity authentication is carried out on the terminal members in the domain before information uploading and information access, thereby avoiding the participation of other unauthorized users. Each terminal member interacts with the authentication center CA to generate an attribute authority parameter corresponding to each attribute. And finally, the authentication center CA sends the public key, the attribute authority parameter, the network attribute parameter and the attribute serial number of the authentication center CA to each block and stores the public key, the attribute authority parameter, the network attribute parameter and the attribute serial number in the blocks on the chain.
The invention realizes the safe sharing of intra-domain information, has the function of traditional identity authentication, can protect the personal privacy problem, matches and accesses according to the attribute authority parameters, and terminal members with different attribute authority parameters access data with different sensitivity degrees, thereby avoiding the leakage of sensitive information. The specific implementation method for registering the terminal member comprises the following steps:
(1) the CA selects a group of positive integers p of pairwise reciprocity elements 1 ,p 2 ,....,p R I.e. gcd (p) ν ,p α ) R, ν ≠ α,1, 2, · v ≠ α; the authentication center CA combines the network attribute set and the attribute sequence number corresponding to the network attribute set and the positive integer into a message { (A) 1 ,S 1 ,p 1 ),(A 2 ,S 2 ,p 2 ),...,(A R ,S R ,p R ) Broadcasting to all terminal members in the network domain; wherein, A ν (1. ltoreq. v. ltoreq.R) represents a network attribute, and the network attribute A α ＜A α+1 ，α＜R，R∈N * Representing the number of network attributes, N * Denotes a positive integer, S ν The representation corresponds to the network attribute A ν Attribute sequence number of p ν The representation corresponds to an attribute A ν An attribute parameter;
(2) owning property set
Figure BDA0002694460350000131
Terminal member u i Computing intermediate variables using attribute elements in attribute sets
Figure BDA0002694460350000132
And
Figure BDA0002694460350000133
then terminal member u i To transmit information
Figure BDA0002694460350000134
Sending the information to a certification center CA; wherein i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n,
Figure BDA0002694460350000135
and o i Representing intermediate variables, attribute sets, required for registration of a terminal member
Figure BDA0002694460350000136
r∈N * And attribute a i,r-1 ＜a i,r ，r i Is terminal member u i The number of the attributes of (a) is,
Figure BDA0002694460350000137
indicating terminal member u i The ID of (a) is stored in the memory,
Figure BDA0002694460350000138
indicating terminal member u i The public key of (2); PK A Representing the public key of the certificate authority CA,
Figure BDA0002694460350000139
representation of terminal Member u i Positive integers required for calculating the public key and the private key,
Figure BDA00026944603500001310
is a hash function and represents a concatenation symbol.
(3) Receiving terminal member u by authentication center CA i Transmitted message
Figure BDA00026944603500001311
Thereafter, the certificate authority CA calculates intermediate variables
Figure BDA00026944603500001312
And according to the formula
Figure BDA00026944603500001313
Whether to authenticate terminal member u in standing i If the equality holds, the certificate authority CA selects the identity corresponding to each attribute a i,k Random number of
Figure BDA00026944603500001314
1≤k≤r i Then calculating the intermediate variable χ i，k ＝ι i，k θ i，k And
Figure BDA00026944603500001316
authentication center CA sends information
Figure BDA00026944603500001317
Sent to registered terminal member u i . If the verification is not passed, the authentication center CA rejects the terminal member from the domain of the information sharing network. Wherein k represents a terminal member u i The kth attribute of (1), χ i,k Is a terminal member u i Of the kth property parameter, δ i Is terminal member u i Intermediate parameters required for registration. Note that: for two different terminal members u i And u l (i ≠ l) two attributes a corresponding to each other i,j And a l,k If j is k, then the random number iota i,j ＝ι l,k 。
Wherein the equation
Figure BDA00026944603500001318
The proving method comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA00026944603500001319
。
(4) terminal member u i Receiving the information sent by the authentication center CA
Figure BDA00026944603500001320
Then, terminal member u i Computing attribute rights parameters
Figure BDA00026944603500001321
And intermediate variables
Figure BDA0002694460350000141
Then, terminal member u i By verifying equation e (δ) i ,g 1 )＝e(Φ i ,PK A ) Whether the identity and the attribute a of the authentication center CA are established or not i,k Corresponding attribute authority parameter T i,k If the verification is passed, the terminal member u i Obtain each attribute a thereof i,k Corresponding attribute authority parameter, terminal member u i The registration is successful; if the verification fails, the terminal member is indicated to fail to register; wherein,
Figure BDA0002694460350000142
attribute authority parameters representing terminal members, which are terminal member mu i Intermediate variable, Φ, required for registration i Representing an intermediate variable, PK, required for verifying the identity of a certificate authority CA A Representing the public key of the certificate authority CA, e (-) is a computable bilinear mapping function formula. Wherein equation e (δ) i ,g 1 )＝e(Φ i ,PK A ) The proving method comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002694460350000143
(5) finally, the authentication center CA sends the information
Figure BDA0002694460350000144
Send to terminal member u i And stored to terminal member u i On the block of (a).
Step three: and (4) encrypting and storing the information resource.
Terminal members in the domain calculate an encryption key by using the Chinese remainder theorem, encrypt shared resource information and upload the encrypted resource information to a downlink database, and then store a storage address in an uplink block; and simultaneously, generating index information of the shared ciphertext and the identity information of each terminal member, uploading the index information and the identity information to respective blocks, and generating a block chain. The index information comprises the category of the ciphertext, brief description of the ciphertext, keywords and a serial number corresponding to an attribute parameter used during encryption of the ciphertext. The process is as follows:
(1) the method for encrypting and storing the shared resources under the link comprises the following steps:
1) each owning attribute set
Figure BDA0002694460350000145
Terminal member u i When sharing the data resource, firstly, according to the attribute sequence number corresponding to the attribute of the user
Figure BDA0002694460350000146
Obtaining corresponding network attribute parameters
Figure BDA0002694460350000147
Then, the self attribute authority parameters are used for calculation
Figure BDA0002694460350000148
According to the Chinese remainder theorem, a unique solution can be calculated
Figure BDA0002694460350000149
Wherein,
Figure BDA00026944603500001410
Figure BDA00026944603500001411
the shared information is encrypted and decrypted as a group key, so that the information sharing safety among terminal members in a network domain is ensured. Wherein, k is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, k is not equal to i, group key And x i Presentation key, P, p υ And y υ Intermediate variables required for key calculation; mod represents the remainder function.
2) Each terminal member u i Calculating the secret key x i Then, for the information he wants to share
Figure BDA0002694460350000151
Encryption: terminal member u i By calculation of
Figure BDA0002694460350000152
The resource m is encrypted. Then, terminal member u i Ciphertext resource c to be shared i,m Uploading to the on-chain database and transmitting the cipher text resource c i,m Of (2) a memory address
Figure BDA0002694460350000153
Returning to the chain storage in the blocks; wherein,
Figure BDA0002694460350000154
as a plaintext space, c i,m Is an encrypted ciphertext.
(2) The method for storing the index information of the shared resources on the chain comprises the following steps:
1) in the network domain, each terminal u participating in resource sharing i Broadcast his IP address and public key;
2) after the terminal members in the domain receive the messages broadcast by other members, each member is sorted according to the size of the IP address. Each member then maintains the public keys and IP addresses of its previous and subsequent members. Assume a sequence set of
Figure BDA0002694460350000155
3) Terminal member u i According to information shared by Certificate Authority (CA)
Figure BDA0002694460350000156
Computing signatures
Figure BDA0002694460350000157
Then, terminal member u i Encrypted information shared thereto
Figure BDA0002694460350000158
Categorizing acquisition of categories of shared resources
Figure BDA0002694460350000159
Then a brief overview of the shared resources is given
Figure BDA00026944603500001510
Description of the invention
Figure BDA00026944603500001511
The method is mainly used for searching the resources by the resource accessor. At the same time, extracting keywords of shared resources
Figure BDA00026944603500001512
Attribute sequence number corresponding to attribute used when encrypting the shared resource
Figure BDA00026944603500001513
Thereby generating index information of the shared resource information
Figure BDA00026944603500001514
Finally, the storage address of the down-link database of the shared resource is obtained
Figure BDA00026944603500001515
Then, terminal member u i Sending messages
Figure BDA00026944603500001516
Giving IP address as IP i+1 Terminal member u i+1 . Finally, terminal member u i Recording time information time i And will transmit the message
Figure BDA00026944603500001517
Packaging into a block; therein, Sig i Is terminal member u i Time, signature of i Denoted as time stamps.
Figure BDA00026944603500001522
Respectively representing the attribute serial number corresponding to each attribute used in encryption.
4) Terminal member u i+1 Receiving terminal member u i Transmitted information
Figure BDA00026944603500001518
Then, terminal member u i+1 The IP address of the user and the terminal member u i IP address comparison in blocks and comparing information
Figure BDA00026944603500001519
If the IP address and the information are the same as those stored in the block by the certification center CA
Figure BDA00026944603500001520
Are all equal, terminal member u i+1 A new block is written. Terminal member u i+1 Calculating out
Figure BDA00026944603500001523
And according to the equation
Figure BDA00026944603500001521
Verifying terminal member u i If the equality holds, terminal member u i+1 It may be determined that the message was sent by a previous member; terminal member u i+1 According to information shared by certification centers CA
Figure BDA0002694460350000161
Computing
Figure BDA0002694460350000162
Then, terminal member u i+1 Resource shared to it
Figure BDA0002694460350000163
Categorizing acquisition of categories of shared resources
Figure BDA0002694460350000164
Then a brief overview of the shared resources is given
Figure BDA0002694460350000165
At the same time, extracting keywords of shared resources
Figure BDA0002694460350000166
Attribute sequence number corresponding to attribute used when encrypting the shared resource
Figure BDA00026944603500001617
Thereby generating index information of the shared resource information
Figure BDA0002694460350000167
Finally, the storage address of the down-link database of the shared resource is obtained
Figure BDA0002694460350000168
Then, terminal member u i+1 Sending messages
Figure BDA0002694460350000169
Giving IP address as IP i+2 Terminal member u i+2 . Finally, terminal member u i+1 Recording time information time i+1 And will transmit the message
Figure BDA00026944603500001610
Packaging into a block; therein, Sig i+1 Is terminal member u i+1 Time, signature of i+1 Denoted as time stamps.
Equation of
Figure BDA00026944603500001611
The proving method comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA00026944603500001612
5) according to the above calculation process, each end member encapsulates the index information and identity information of the shared resource in their respective tiles and links them into a chain of tiles.
Step four: resource access and sharing
The terminal members in the domain determine ciphertext resources to be accessed according to the index information in the block, then send the identity information of the terminal members to the terminal members with shared ciphertext resources to be accessed, the terminal members with the access resources verify the identity of the access terminal, after the verification is passed, the terminal members with the access resources return the storage address of the ciphertext resources to the access terminal, the access terminal downloads the ciphertext resources according to the address, then selects corresponding parameters according to the index information and calculates a decryption key by using the Chinese remainder theorem, the ciphertext resources are decrypted to access and view, and the process is as follows:
(1) each terminal member u in the network domain j Determining the data resource to be accessed according to the index information in the block chain, and the terminal member u j View the data resource owner u i Index information in the block to obtain corresponding attribute serial number
Figure BDA00026944603500001613
And sends information according to the attribute sequence number
Figure BDA00026944603500001614
To the owner u i Wherein, the signature
Figure BDA00026944603500001615
Owner u i Computing
Figure BDA00026944603500001616
Then owner u k By verifying the equation
Figure BDA0002694460350000171
Whether a verification terminal member u is established j The identity of (c). If the verification passes, the owner u k The linked database address of the shared resource
Figure BDA0002694460350000172
Returned to terminal member u j . Wherein j is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, i is not equal to j, i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, mu k Intermediate variables required for resource access, H 2 (. -) represents a hash function; r is j Is a terminal member u j The number of the attributes of (a) is,
Figure BDA0002694460350000173
indicating terminal member u j The private key of (1).
Equation of
Figure BDA0002694460350000174
The proving method comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002694460350000175
(2) terminal member u j According to owner u k Shared resource of (2)
Figure BDA0002694460350000176
Downloading corresponding cipher text information c k,m Then according to the obtained attribute serial number
Figure BDA0002694460350000177
Selecting corresponding attribute authority parameters and network attribute parameters, and calculating decryption key according to Chinese remainder theorem
Figure BDA0002694460350000178
According to the decryption key x j And decrypting ciphertext c k,m Calculating to obtain plaintext, i.e. shared resource
Figure BDA0002694460350000179
Example 2
Fig. 1 shows a specific embodiment for explaining the contents and implementation methods of the present invention. In this embodiment, for convenience of illustration, the number of terminal members participating in information resource sharing is at most 10, and the entity set of the terminal members is expressed as
Figure BDA00026944603500001710
The set of corresponding entity terminal membership is represented as
Figure BDA00026944603500001711
The authentication center CA defines the attribute set of all terminal members as Attr ═ a 1 ,A 2 ,A 3 U terminal member i (1. ltoreq. i. ltoreq.10) as attr i ＝{a i,1 ,a i,2 ,a i,3 U terminal member υ (1 is more than or equal to upsilon is less than or equal to 10, upsilon is not equal to i) is attr υ ＝{a υ,1 ,a υ,2 }. The details introduced in this example are not intended to limit the scope of the claims but to assist in understanding the manner of practicing the invention. Those skilled in the art will understand that: various modifications, changes or substitutions to the preferred embodiment steps are possible without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention and its appended claims. Therefore, the present invention should not be limited to the disclosure of the preferred embodiments and the accompanying drawings.
The method comprises the following steps: initialization
It is assumed that the information sharing network includes an authentication center CA and 10 terminal members, and the authentication center CA is used for generating system parameters and a system master key. The certification authority CA is also used to verify the identity of the terminal entity to track the identity of the anonymous terminal member in the blockchain. Set of 10 terminal members U ═ U 1 ,u 2 ,...,u 10 Denotes that the identities of the respective 10 terminal members are grouped together
Figure BDA0002694460350000181
And (4) showing. The authentication center CA defines a network attribute sequence ATTR ═ a arranged in a specified order 1 |A 2 |A 3 The corresponding network attribute set is Attr ═ a 1 ,A 2 ,A 3 And A is j ＜A j+1 (j＜3)，R∈N * Indicating the number of network attributes. attr i ＝{a i,1 ,a i,2 ,a i,3 Is terminal member u in the network i Corresponding to the network attribute set arrangement order attr i ＝a i,1 |a i,2 |a i,3 ，
Figure BDA0002694460350000182
r∈N * And attribute a i,r-1 ＜a i,r And r represents a terminal member u i The r-th attribute of (1). (N) * Represents a positive integer)
If a terminal member wants to store the shared resource on the blockchain or the terminal wants to access the resource on the blockchain, the terminal member must be a legal authenticated member and have a corresponding access right.
The method for generating respective public/private key pairs by the authentication center CA in the information sharing network domain and each terminal member in the network comprises the following steps:
the certificate authority CA within the domain runs the key generation algorithm KeyGen (1) λ ) Obtaining public and private key pair (SK) A ,PK A ) Wherein, in the process,
Figure BDA0002694460350000183
as a system private key, and calculates a public key PK A ＝SK A g 1 (ii) a Each terminal member u in the domain i Selecting a random positive integer from e U (i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 10)
Figure BDA0002694460350000184
Computing
Figure BDA0002694460350000185
Is terminal member u i The private key of (1). Then calculates its public key
Figure BDA0002694460350000186
The system parameter is params ═ (PK) A ,q,G 1 ,G 2 ,g 1 ,e,H 1 ,H 2 ) (ii) a Wherein, g 1 Is an addition group G 1 The generation element of (a) is generated,
Figure BDA0002694460350000187
representing a set of integers of order q, q being an addition group G 1 Prime order of; i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 10, 10 is the number of terminal members in the domain,
Figure BDA0002694460350000188
is a terminal member u i The private key of (a) is used,
Figure BDA0002694460350000189
is a terminal member u i The public key of (a) is stored,
Figure BDA00026944603500001810
is a terminal member u i The identity of (2) is identified,
Figure BDA00026944603500001811
are two hash functions.
Suppose G 1 Is an addition group, G 2 Is a multiplication loop group, calculating an addition group G 1 And multiplication cyclic group G 2 The discrete logarithm problem of (g) is difficult to solve 1 ∈G 1 Is an addition group G 1 A generator of (1), an addition group G 1 And multiplication cyclic group G 2 With the same prime order q, there is a bilinear mapping function e G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 。
Figure BDA00026944603500001812
Are two hash functions.
The certificate authority CA within the domain runs the key generation algorithm KeyGen (1) λ ) Obtain public and private key pair(SK A ,PK A ) Wherein
Figure BDA00026944603500001813
as a system private key, and calculates a public key PK A ＝SK A g 1 (ii) a Each terminal member u in the domain i Selecting a random positive integer from e U (i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 10)
Figure BDA00026944603500001814
Computing
Figure BDA00026944603500001815
Is terminal member u i The private key of (1). Then calculates its public key
Figure BDA0002694460350000191
The system parameter is params ═ PK A ,q,G 1 ,G 2 ,g 1 ,e,H 1 ,H 2 ) (ii) a Wherein i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 10.
Step two: terminal member registration
(1) The CA selects a positive integer p of two-two mutualins 1 ,p 2 ,p 3 The authentication center CA uses the network attribute set and the corresponding attribute serial number and the positive integer { (A) 1 ,S 1 ,p 1 ),(A 2 ,S 2 ,p 2 ),(A 3 ,S 3 ,p 3 ) Broadcasting to all terminal members in the network domain; wherein A is j (1. ltoreq. j. ltoreq.3) represents a network attribute, the network attribute A j ＜A j+1 ，j＜3，S j The representation corresponds to an attribute A j Attribute sequence number of p j The representation corresponds to an attribute A j The attribute parameter of (2).
(2) Possess attribute set attr i ＝{a i,1 ,a i,2 ,a i,3 Terminal member u of i Computing using attribute elements in an attribute set
Figure BDA0002694460350000192
And
Figure BDA0002694460350000193
then terminal member u i Information is transmitted
Figure BDA00026944603500001913
Sending the information to a certification center CA; wherein i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 10, theta i，1 θ i，2 θ i，3 And o i Representing intermediate variables, attribute sets, required for registration of a terminal member
Figure BDA0002694460350000196
And attribute a i,1 ＜a i,2 ＜a i,3 ，
Figure BDA0002694460350000197
Indicating terminal member u i The ID of (a) is stored in the memory,
Figure BDA0002694460350000198
representing terminal member u i The public key of (2).
(3) Receiving terminal member u by authentication center CA i Transmitted message
Figure BDA0002694460350000199
Then, the authentication center CA calculates
Figure BDA00026944603500001910
And passes the verification equation
Figure BDA00026944603500001911
Whether the verification terminal member u is established or not i If the verification is passed, the certificate authority CA selects the identity corresponding to each attribute a i,k Random number of
Figure BDA00026944603500001912
(1. ltoreq. k. ltoreq.3), and then calculating χ i，k ＝ι i，k θ i，k And delta i ＝SK A (ι i,1 a i,1 +ι i,2 a i,2 +ι i,3 a i,3 )g 1 (Note: for two different terminals member u i And u l (i ≠ l) two attributes a corresponding to each other i,j And a l,k If j is k, iota i,j ＝ι l,k ). The authentication center CA then sends the information { PK A ,δ i ,(χ i,1 ,χ i,2 ,χ i,3 ) Sending it to registered terminal member u i . If the verification is not passed, the authentication center CA rejects the member from the network domain; wherein, χ i,k Is the attribute parameter of the terminal member, k is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 3, delta i Is an intermediate parameter required by the registration of the terminal member; wherein, verifying
Figure BDA0002694460350000201
The proving method comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002694460350000202
(4) terminal member u i Receiving the information { PK) sent by the certification center CA A ,δ i ,(χ i,1 ,χ i,2 ,χ i,3 ) After that, terminal member u i (1. ltoreq. i.ltoreq.10) calculation
Figure BDA0002694460350000203
And phi i ＝(T i,1 +T i,2 +T i,3 ). Terminal member u i By verifying equation e (delta) i ,g 1 )＝e(Φ i ,PK A ) Whether the identity and the attribute a of the authentication center CA are established or not i,k (k is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 3) corresponding attribute authority parameter T i,k If the verification is passed, the terminal member u i Obtain each attribute a thereof i,k (k is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 3), and each terminal is successfully registered; if the verification fails, the terminal member is indicated to fail to register; wherein, T i,1 ,T i,2 ,T i,3 Attribute Authority parameter, μ, representing the terminal Member i Registering required intermediate variables for the terminal members; PK A A public key representing a certificate authority CA, e (-) being a computable bilinear mapping function formula; wherein equation e (δ) i ,g 1 )＝e(Φ i ,PK A ) Is proved by：
Figure BDA0002694460350000204
(5) Finally, the authentication center CA sends the information
Figure BDA0002694460350000205
Send to terminal member u i And store to u i On the block of (a).
Step three, resource encryption storage
Terminal members in the domain calculate an encryption key by using the Chinese remainder theorem, encrypt shared resource information and upload the encrypted shared resource information to a downlink database, and store a storage address into an uplink block; meanwhile, the index information (including the category of the ciphertext, brief description of the ciphertext, keywords and serial numbers corresponding to the attribute parameters used in ciphertext encryption) for generating the shared ciphertext and the identity information of each terminal member are uploaded to respective blocks to generate a block chain. The specific process is as follows:
(1) the method for encrypting the shared resources and storing the shared resources under the link comprises the following steps:
1) each owning attribute set { a } i,1 ,a i,2 ,a i,3 U terminal member i (i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 10), when sharing the data resource, firstly, according to the attribute serial number { S corresponding to the own attribute 1 ,S 2 ,S 3 Get the corresponding network attribute parameter { p } 1 ,p 2 ,p 3 And then calculating by using the attribute authority parameters of the users
Figure BDA0002694460350000211
A unique solution can be calculated according to the Chinese remainder theorem
Figure BDA0002694460350000212
Wherein,
Figure BDA0002694460350000213
Figure BDA0002694460350000214
the shared information is encrypted and decrypted as a group key, so that the information sharing safety between terminals in a network domain is ensured. Wherein i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 10, group key ，x i Representing a secret key, P, P υ ，y υ Intermediate variables required for key calculation.
2) Each terminal member u i After calculating the key, the information to be shared
Figure BDA0002694460350000215
Encryption: terminal member u i By calculation of
Figure BDA0002694460350000216
Resource m is encrypted. Then, terminal member u i Ciphertext resource c to be shared i,m Uploading to an on-chain database. Then, the memory address of the cipher text resource is used
Figure BDA0002694460350000217
Returning to the chain storage in the blocks; wherein,
Figure BDA0002694460350000218
as a plaintext space, c i,m Is an encrypted ciphertext.
(2) The method for storing the index information chain of the shared resource comprises the following steps:
1) in the network domain, each terminal u participating in resource sharing i (1 ≦ i ≦ 10) broadcasting his IP address and public key;
2) after the members in the domain receive the messages broadcast by other members, each member is sorted according to the size of the IP address. Each member then stores the public keys and IP addresses of its previous and next members. We assume the order set to be
Figure BDA0002694460350000219
3) Terminal member u i According to information shared by certification centers CA
Figure BDA00026944603500002110
Computing
Figure BDA00026944603500002111
Then u i Resource shared to it
Figure BDA00026944603500002112
Categorizing acquisition of categories of shared resources
Figure BDA00026944603500002113
Then a brief overview of the shared resources is given
Figure BDA00026944603500002114
(mainly for resource visitors to find resources). At the same time, extracting keywords of shared resources
Figure BDA00026944603500002115
An attribute sequence number (S) corresponding to an attribute used when encrypting the shared resource 1,m ,S 2,m ,S 3,m ) Thereby generating index information of the shared resource information
Figure BDA00026944603500002116
Finally, the storage address of the shared resource in the down-link database is obtained
Figure BDA00026944603500002117
Then, terminal member u i Sending messages
Figure BDA00026944603500002118
Giving IP address as IP i+1 Terminal member u i+1 . Finally, terminal member u i Recording time information time i And will transmit the message
Figure BDA00026944603500002216
Packaging into a block; wherein Sig i Is terminal member u i Time, signature of i Denoted as time stamps.
4) Terminal member u i+1 Receiving terminal member u i Transmitted information
Figure BDA0002694460350000222
Then, terminal member u i+1 The IP address of the user and the terminal member u i IP address comparison in blocks and comparison of information (χ) i,1 ,χ i,2 ,χ i,3 ) If the IP address and information (χ) are the same as those stored in the block by CA i,1 ,χ i,2 ,χ i,3 ) Are all equal, terminal member u i+1 A new block is written. Terminal member u i+1 Calculating mu i ＝H 2 (χ i,1 ||χ i,2 ||χ i,3 ) And according to the equation
Figure BDA0002694460350000223
Verification of u i If the equality holds, terminal member u i+1 It may be determined that the message was sent by the previous member; terminal member u i+1 According to information shared by CA
Figure BDA0002694460350000224
Computing
Figure BDA0002694460350000225
Then, terminal member u i+1 Resource shared to it
Figure BDA0002694460350000226
Categorizing acquisition of categories of shared resources
Figure BDA0002694460350000227
Then a brief overview of the shared resources is given
Figure BDA0002694460350000228
(mainly for resource visitors to find resources). At the same time, extracting keywords of shared resources
Figure BDA0002694460350000229
An attribute sequence number (S) corresponding to an attribute used when encrypting the shared resource 1,m ,S 2,m ,S 3,m ) Thereby generating index information of the shared resource information
Figure BDA00026944603500002210
Finally, the storage address of the shared resource in the down-link database is obtained
Figure BDA00026944603500002211
Then, terminal member u i+1 Sending messages
Figure BDA00026944603500002212
Giving IP address as IP i+2 Terminal member u i+2 . Finally, terminal member u i+1 Recording time information time i+1 And will transmit the message
Figure BDA00026944603500002213
Packaging into a block; therein, Sig i+1 Is terminal member u i+1 Time, signature of i+1 Denoted as time stamp; wherein,
Figure BDA00026944603500002214
the proving method comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA00026944603500002215
5) according to the above calculation process, each terminal member encapsulates the index information and identity information of the shared resource in their respective blocks and links them into block chains;
resource access and sharing
The terminal members in the domain determine the data resources to be accessed according to the index information in the block, then send the identity information of the terminal members to the terminal members with the shared resources to be accessed, the terminal members with the accessed resources verify the identity of the access terminal, after the verification is passed, the terminal members with the accessed resources return the storage address of the resources to the access terminal, the access terminal downloads the resource ciphertext according to the address, then selects the corresponding parameters according to the index information, calculates the decryption key by using the Chinese remainder theorem, decrypts the ciphertext for access and viewing, and the process is as follows:
(1) each terminal member u in the network domain j (j is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 10, i is not equal to j) determining the data resource which is required to be accessed according to the index information in the block chain, and u is not equal to j j View the data resource owner u k Index information in the block, obtaining corresponding attribute serial number (S) 1,m ,S 2,m ,S 3,m ) And sends information according to the attribute sequence number
Figure BDA00026944603500002310
Feeding u k (k is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 10, k is not equal to j), wherein,
Figure BDA0002694460350000232
u k calculating mu k ＝H 2 (χ j,1 ||χ j,2 ||χ j,3 ) Then u is k By the equation
Figure BDA0002694460350000233
Verification of u j The identity of (c). If the verification passes, u k The linked database address of the shared resource
Figure BDA0002694460350000234
Is returned to u j . Wherein j is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 10, mu k Intermediate variables required for resource access, H 2 (. -) represents a hash function; wherein the equation
Figure BDA0002694460350000235
The proving method comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002694460350000236
(2) terminal member u j According to terminal member u k Shared resource of (2)
Figure BDA0002694460350000237
Downloading corresponding cipher text information c k,m Then according to the obtained attribute serial number (S) 1,m ,S 2,m ,S 3,m ) Selecting corresponding attribute authority parameters and network attribute parameters, and calculating decryption key according to Chinese remainder theorem
Figure BDA0002694460350000238
Decipher the ciphertext c k,m Calculating to obtain a plaintext
Figure BDA0002694460350000239
The authentication center and the terminal members in the information sharing network domain generate respective public/private key pairs; terminal members in the domain interact with the authentication center CA to perform attribute authentication to obtain attribute authority parameters and other related attribute parameters, and registration is completed; after verifying the identity of each terminal member, the CA sends the public key of the CA, the public key of each terminal member, the attribute parameters, the network attribute parameters and the attribute serial number to each terminal member, and each terminal member stores the information in respective block; the terminal member selects corresponding parameters to calculate an encryption key according to the Chinese remainder theorem and encrypts shared resource information into a ciphertext, stores the ciphertext in a linked database of a block chain, and stores a storage address of the shared ciphertext in a linked block; storing the category of the shared ciphertext resource, the general description information, the key words, index information such as serial numbers corresponding to attribute parameters used in ciphertext encryption and the like and a down-link storage address, namely identity information of each terminal member in each block to generate a block chain; the terminal member determines the data resource to be accessed according to the index information in the block chain, then sends the identity information of the terminal member to the terminal member with the shared resource to be accessed, the terminal member with the accessed resource verifies the identity of the access terminal, after the verification is passed, the terminal member with the accessed resource returns the down-link storage address of the resource to the access terminal, the access terminal downloads the resource ciphertext according to the storage address, then selects the corresponding attribute parameter according to the index information and calculates the decryption key by using the Chinese remainder theorem, decrypts the ciphertext to check the resource information, and thereby obtains the shared resource information.
The invention is based on hidden attribute authentication and block chain technology theory, and is provided on the premise of taking decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem as a safety hypothesis, the identity authentication technology adopting hidden attribute realizes personal privacy protection in the identity authentication process of resource information sharing, and the block chain technology is adopted to store data, thereby not only ensuring the safety of data information, but also evenly distributing calculation and communication expenses on each node, adopting identity and attribute authority parameter matching joint authentication, avoiding collusion attack of terminal members without authority, and ensuring the safety and flexibility of information resource safety sharing. The invention realizes identity authentication of each terminal member in the industrial Internet of things, encrypts and uploads information resources to the downlink database, and then downloads, decrypts and checks the resource information to be accessed according to the index information ciphertext storage address and the calculation parameter in the block, so as to realize safety and flexibility of information resource sharing.
The above description is only for the purpose of illustrating the preferred embodiments of the present invention and is not to be construed as limiting the invention, and any modifications, equivalents, improvements and the like that fall within the spirit and principle of the present invention are intended to be included therein.

Claims (10)

1. A method for safely sharing data of an Internet of things based on privacy protection is characterized by comprising the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: initialization of protocol parameters in an information sharing network domain: the CA and each terminal member generate respective public/private key pairs;
step two: registration of terminal members:
A) the authentication center CA selects network attribute parameters which are in one-to-one correspondence with the network attributes in the network attribute set, simultaneously generates attribute serial numbers which are in correspondence with the ordered network attribute set, and broadcasts the network attributes in the network attribute set, the corresponding network attribute parameters and the attribute serial numbers to all terminal members in the domain;
B) each terminal member calculates intermediate parameters required by terminal member registration by using respective attributes in the ordered attribute set, and then sends the intermediate parameters to the authentication center CA;
C) after receiving the message sent by each terminal member, the CA verifies the identity of each terminal member, if the verification is passed, the CA selects a series of random numbers, calculates the attribute authority parameters and the signature, and sends the attribute authority parameters, the signature and the public key to each registered terminal member;
D) after each terminal member receives the message sent by the authentication center CA, the terminal member calculates the attribute authority parameters and intermediate parameters required by the registration of the terminal member, the terminal member verifies the identity of the authentication center CA and the correctness of the attribute authority parameters, if the verification is passed, each terminal member obtains the attribute authority parameters corresponding to the attributes, and the registration of each terminal member is successful;
E) the CA sends the public key, the attribute authority parameter, the attribute serial number and the corresponding network attribute parameter to each terminal member and stores the public key, the attribute authority parameter, the attribute serial number and the corresponding network attribute parameter in a block of each terminal member;
step three: information resource encryption storage:
F) the terminal member acquires the attribute authority parameters of the terminal member, calculates an encryption key by using the attribute serial number and the corresponding network attribute parameters according to the Chinese remainder theorem, encrypts the shared information resource into a ciphertext and stores the ciphertext in a linked database of the block chain;
G) the terminal members calculate intermediate parameters required by the stored information resources according to the IP address sequencing, generate index information of a shared ciphertext, send the intermediate parameters required by the stored ciphertext, a public key, the IP address of the next terminal member and the attribute authority parameters acquired from the authentication center CA to the next terminal member, and package the information, the storage address of the ciphertext and a timestamp in a block;
H) after the next terminal member acquires the message sent by the last terminal member, the IP address and the attribute authority parameters are compared, if the message is correct, the terminal member writes a new block, calculates the intermediate parameters required by the stored ciphertext, generates the index information of the shared ciphertext, sends the intermediate parameters required by the stored resource, the public key, the IP address of the next terminal member and the attribute authority parameters acquired from the authentication center CA to the next terminal member, and encapsulates the information, the stored address of the ciphertext and the timestamp in a block; in this way, each terminal member stores the relevant information of the ciphertext in the block to generate a block chain so that other terminal members can access the ciphertext conveniently;
step four: ciphertext access and sharing:
I) each terminal member determines a ciphertext which the terminal member wants to access according to the index information of the ciphertext resource in the block chain, then sends a public key, an attribute authority parameter and a signature of the terminal member to the terminal member possessing the ciphertext resource, and the terminal member possessing the ciphertext resource verifies the identity of the terminal member and returns a storage address to the terminal member; the terminal member downloads the ciphertext information from the linked database according to the storage address, selects the corresponding attribute authority parameters and the network attribute parameters according to the attribute serial number in the terminal member block with the ciphertext resource, calculates a decryption key according to the Chinese remainder theorem, and decrypts the ciphertext information to obtain the shared ciphertext.
2. The Internet of things data security sharing method based on privacy protection as claimed in claim 1, wherein the index information includes category, brief description, keyword of cipher text resource and attribute serial number required for encryption.
3. The Internet of things data security sharing method based on privacy protection as claimed in claim 1 or 2, wherein in the first step, the method for the authentication center CA and each terminal member to generate respective public/private key pairs is as follows:
(1) the CA randomly selects a master key, and calculates a public/private key pair by using a generator of the addition group: the authentication center CA randomly selects a positive integer
Figure FDA0003775498460000021
As a system private key and computing a public key PK A ＝SK A g 1 The authentication center CA will (SK) A ,PK A ) As a public/private key pair of the system; wherein, g 1 Is an addition group G 1 The generation element(s) of (a),
Figure FDA0003775498460000022
representing a set of integers of order q, q being an addition group G 1 Prime order of (2);
(2) each terminal member u in the domain i Randomly selecting a public key, and calculating a private key of the public key by using a generator of an addition group: each terminal member u i Selecting a random positive integer
Figure FDA0003775498460000023
Computing terminal member u i Private key of
Figure FDA0003775498460000024
And public key
Figure FDA0003775498460000025
Wherein i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, n is the number of terminal members in the domain,
Figure FDA0003775498460000026
is a terminal member u i Identification of (H) 1 :
Figure FDA0003775498460000027
Is a hash function, {0,1} * Representing a set of numeric strings of arbitrary length consisting of binary 0 and 1.
4. The Internet of things data security sharing method based on privacy protection as claimed in claim 3, wherein the method for registering the terminal member in the second step is as follows:
A) the CA selects a group of positive integers p of pairwise reciprocity elements 1 ,p 2 ,....,p R The certification center CA sets the ordered network attribute set Attr as { a ═ a 1 ,A 2 ,...,A ν ,...,A R And an attribute order number S corresponding to the set of network attributes 1 ,S 2 ,...,S ν ,...,S R And positive integer p 1 ,p 2 ,....,p ν ,....p R Composition message { (A) 1 ,S 1 ,p 1 ),(A 2 ,S 2 ,p 2 ),...,(A R ,S R ,p R ) Broadcasting to all terminal members in the domain; wherein, the network attribute A ν ＜A ν+1 ，1≤ν≤R，R∈N * Representing the number of network attributes, N * Denotes a positive integer, S ν The representation corresponds to the network attribute A ν Attribute sequence number of p ν The representation corresponds to an attribute A ν An attribute parameter;
B) terminal member u i Using its ordered set of attributes
Figure FDA0003775498460000031
The attribute element in (1) calculates an intermediate variable
Figure FDA0003775498460000032
And
Figure FDA0003775498460000033
terminal member u i To transmit information
Figure FDA0003775498460000034
Sending the information to a certification center CA; wherein i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n,
Figure FDA0003775498460000035
and o i Representing intermediate variables, attribute sets, required for registration of a terminal member
Figure FDA0003775498460000036
r i ∈N * And attribute
Figure FDA0003775498460000037
r i Is terminal member u i Number of attributes of (a) i,k Is a terminal member u i The (k) th attribute of (2),
Figure FDA0003775498460000038
indicating terminal member u i The identity of (2) is identified,
Figure FDA0003775498460000039
indicating terminal member u i The public key of (2); PK A Representing the public key of the certificate authority CA,
Figure FDA00037754984600000310
indicating terminal member u i Calculating random positive integers, H, of public and private keys 2 :
Figure FDA00037754984600000311
Is a hash function, | | is a concatenation symbol;
C) CA receiving terminal member u of authentication center i Transmitted message
Figure FDA00037754984600000312
Thereafter, the certificate authority CA calculates intermediate variables
Figure FDA00037754984600000313
And passes the verification
Figure FDA00037754984600000314
Whether to authenticate terminal member u in standing i If the equality is established, the certificate authority CA selects the identity corresponding to each attribute a i,k Random number of
Figure FDA00037754984600000315
Then calculating the intermediate variables
Figure FDA00037754984600000323
And
Figure FDA00037754984600000316
authentication center CA will information
Figure FDA00037754984600000317
Sent to registered terminal member u i (ii) a If the equality is not satisfied, the authentication center CA will use the terminal member u i Eliminating the region; wherein k represents a terminal member u i The kth attribute of (1), χ i,k Is a terminal member u i Of the kth property parameter, δ i Is terminal member u i Registering required intermediate parameters;
D) terminal member u i Receiving the information sent by the authentication center CA
Figure FDA00037754984600000318
Then, terminal member u i Computing attribute rights parameters
Figure FDA00037754984600000319
And intermediate variables
Figure FDA00037754984600000320
Terminal member u i By verifying equation e (δ) i ,g 1 )＝e(Φ i ,PK A ) Whether the identity and the attribute a of the authentication center CA are established or not i,k Corresponding attribute authority parameter T i,k If the equation holds, the terminal member u i Obtain each attribute a thereof i,k Corresponding attribute authority parameter, terminal member u i The registration is successful; if the equality is not true, terminal member u i The registration fails; wherein,
Figure FDA00037754984600000321
attribute authority parameter, phi, representing terminal member i Representing intermediate variables required to verify the identity of a certificate authority CA(ii) a e (-) is a computable bilinear mapping function;
E) authentication center CA will information
Figure FDA00037754984600000322
Send to terminal member u i And stored to terminal member u i On the block of (a).
5. The Internet of things data security sharing method based on privacy protection as claimed in claim 4, wherein the verification equation
Figure FDA0003775498460000041
The method comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0003775498460000042
the verification equation e (δ) i ,g 1 )＝e(Φ i ,PK A ) The method comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0003775498460000043
6. the Internet of things data security sharing method based on privacy protection as claimed in claim 4, wherein the method for encrypting the information resource shared in step three, namely F), into the ciphertext and storing the ciphertext in the downlink database of the blockchain comprises the following steps:
1) each having an ordered set of attributes
Figure FDA0003775498460000044
Terminal member u i When sharing its information resource, terminal member u i According to attribute serial number corresponding to its attribute
Figure FDA0003775498460000045
Obtaining corresponding network attribute parameters
Figure FDA0003775498460000046
Computing equation by using own attribute authority parameters
Figure FDA0003775498460000047
Calculating a unique solution according to the Chinese remainder theorem
Figure FDA0003775498460000048
Wherein,
Figure FDA0003775498460000049
(ii) a Group key
Figure FDA00037754984600000410
1≤υ≤r i ，P、p υ And y υ Intermediate variables required for key calculation; mod represents a remainder function;
2) each terminal member u i Calculating group key group key Then, for the information to be shared
Figure FDA00037754984600000411
And (3) encryption: terminal member u i Computing an encrypted ciphertext
Figure FDA00037754984600000412
Encrypting information m; terminal member u i Sharing the encrypted ciphertext c i,m Upload to the down-link database and forward the ciphertext c i,m Of (2) a memory address
Figure FDA00037754984600000413
Returning to the down-link database in the block for storage; wherein,
Figure FDA00037754984600000414
is a plaintext space.
7. The Internet of things data security sharing method based on privacy protection as claimed in claim 6, wherein the method for storing the index information of the ciphertext shared in the steps G) and H) is as follows:
1) in the domain, each terminal member u participating in resource sharing i Broadcasting its IP address and public key;
2) after the terminal members in the domain receive the messages broadcast by other members, each terminal member sorts according to the size of the IP address, and each terminal member stores the public keys and the IP addresses of the former terminal member and the latter terminal member; ordered set ordered according to the size of the IP address as
Figure FDA0003775498460000051
n is the number of terminal members in the domain,
Figure FDA0003775498460000052
indicating terminal member u i Of public key, IP i Indicating terminal member u i The IP address of (2);
3) terminal member u i According to information shared by certification centers CA
Figure FDA0003775498460000053
Computing signatures
Figure FDA0003775498460000054
Terminal member u i Information shared to it
Figure FDA0003775498460000055
Categorizing acquisition of categories of shared resources
Figure FDA0003775498460000056
Giving a short overview of shared resources
Figure FDA0003775498460000057
Extracting keywords of shared information
Figure FDA0003775498460000058
Attribute serial number corresponding to attribute used when encrypting information m
Figure FDA0003775498460000059
Generating index information of the shared resource information
Figure FDA00037754984600000510
Terminal member u i Obtaining the storage address of the shared information m in the down-link database
Figure FDA00037754984600000511
Terminal member u i Sending messages
Figure FDA00037754984600000512
Giving IP address as IP i+1 Terminal member u i+1 (ii) a Terminal member u i Recording time information time i And will transmit the message
Figure FDA00037754984600000513
Packaging into a block; therein, Sig i Is terminal member u i Time, signature of i Denoted as time stamp;
Figure FDA00037754984600000514
respectively representing attribute serial numbers corresponding to the attributes used in encryption;
4) terminal member u i+1 Receiving terminal member u i Transmitted information
Figure FDA00037754984600000515
Then, terminal member u i+1 The IP address of the user and the terminal member u i Comparing IP addresses in blocks of (2), and comparing information
Figure FDA00037754984600000516
If the attribute authority parameters are the same as those stored in the block by the authentication center CA, if the IP address and the information are the same
Figure FDA00037754984600000517
Are all the same, terminal member u i+1 Writing a new tile, terminal member u i+1 Computing
Figure FDA00037754984600000518
And passes the verification equation
Figure FDA00037754984600000519
Verifying terminal member u i If the equality holds, terminal member u i+1 Determining that the message was sent by the previous member, terminal member u i+1 According to information shared by certification centers CA
Figure FDA00037754984600000520
Computing signatures
Figure FDA00037754984600000521
Terminal member u i+1 Information shared to it
Figure FDA00037754984600000522
Categorizing acquisition of categories of shared resources
Figure FDA00037754984600000523
Giving a short overview of shared resources
Figure FDA00037754984600000524
Extracting keywords of shared resources
Figure FDA00037754984600000525
Attribute serial number corresponding to attribute used when encrypting the shared information m
Figure FDA00037754984600000526
Thereby generating an index of the shared resource informationInformation
Figure FDA0003775498460000061
Obtaining the storage address of the shared resource in the down-link database
Figure FDA0003775498460000062
Terminal member u i+1 Sending messages
Figure FDA0003775498460000063
Giving IP address as IP i+2 Terminal member u i+2 (ii) a Terminal member u i+1 Recording time information time i+1 And will transmit the message
Figure FDA0003775498460000064
Packaging into a block; if the equality is not true, terminal member u i+1 Determining that the message was not sent by a previous terminal member, ignoring the message, and kicking the terminal member sending the message out of the network domain; therein, Sig i+1 Is terminal member u i+1 Time, signature of i+1 Denoted as time stamp;
5) each terminal member u i The index information and identity information of the shared information are encapsulated in their respective tiles and linked into a chain of tiles.
8. The Internet of things data security sharing method based on privacy protection as claimed in claim 7, wherein the verification equation
Figure FDA0003775498460000065
The method comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0003775498460000066
9. the Internet of things data security sharing method based on privacy protection as claimed in claim 7, wherein the resource access and sharing method in the fourth step is as follows:
(1) each terminal member u in the domain j Determining the information to be accessed according to the index information in the block chain, and determining the terminal member u j Terminal member u of owner viewing the information i Index information in the block to obtain corresponding attribute serial number
Figure FDA0003775498460000067
And sends information according to the attribute sequence number
Figure FDA0003775498460000068
To the owner u i Wherein, signing
Figure FDA0003775498460000069
Terminal member u i Calculating intermediate variables
Figure FDA00037754984600000610
Terminal member u i By verifying the equation
Figure FDA00037754984600000611
Whether a verification terminal member u is established j The identity of (a); if the equation holds, terminal member u i The linked database address of the shared resource
Figure FDA00037754984600000612
Returned to terminal member u j (ii) a If the equality is not satisfied, then the terminal member u is represented j The identity is in a problem and the resource cannot be accessed; wherein j is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, i is not equal to j, i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, u i Terminal member, mu, representing the owner of the resource information i Intermediate variables required for resource access, H 2 (. represents a hash function; r is j Is a terminal member u j The number of the attributes of (a) is,
Figure FDA00037754984600000613
indicating terminal member u j OfA key;
(2) terminal member u j According to owner u k Shared resource of (2)
Figure FDA0003775498460000071
Downloading information c of corresponding cipher text k,m Then according to the obtained attribute serial number
Figure FDA0003775498460000072
Selecting corresponding attribute authority parameters and network attribute parameters, and calculating decryption key according to Chinese remainder theorem
Figure FDA0003775498460000073
According to the decryption key x j And decrypting ciphertext c k,m Calculating to obtain plaintext, i.e. shared resource
Figure FDA0003775498460000074
10. The privacy protection-based secure sharing method of data of the internet of things according to claim 9, wherein the verification equation is
Figure FDA0003775498460000075
The method comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0003775498460000076
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