CN110505052B - Cloud data public verification method for protecting data privacy - Google Patents
Cloud data public verification method for protecting data privacy Download PDFInfo
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- CN110505052B CN110505052B CN201910800821.6A CN201910800821A CN110505052B CN 110505052 B CN110505052 B CN 110505052B CN 201910800821 A CN201910800821 A CN 201910800821A CN 110505052 B CN110505052 B CN 110505052B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
- H04L67/1097—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network for distributed storage of data in networks, e.g. transport arrangements for network file system [NFS], storage area networks [SAN] or network attached storage [NAS]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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Abstract
The invention belongs to the information security technology and discloses a cloud data public verification method for protecting data privacy. The method is suitable for any scene that a third party verifier with a public key verifies the integrity of the data, under the circumstance, the method does not leak the cloud data to the third party verifier, and meanwhile, the verifier can verify the integrity of the cloud data only with less calculation and communication expenses, so that the performance of a verification system is improved.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to an information security technology, in particular to a cloud data public verification method for protecting data privacy.
Background
With the rapid increase of data volume, the cloud storage service is more and more popular, and the problem of checking the integrity of cloud outsourced data is more prominent in the situation. Integrity verification of cloud data is one of important technologies of cloud storage applications, and data can be guaranteed not to be damaged. The storage certification is an effective solution for verifying outsourcing data integrity, and comprises a system establishment algorithm Setup, a label generation algorithm TagGen, an auditing algorithm Audit, an evidence generation algorithm Prove and a verification algorithm Verify. The storage certification is that the complete data file is divided into a plurality of blocks, corresponding labels are calculated for each block of data, and finally, the data and the labels are outsourced to the cloud server. Because the tags have homomorphic linear properties and can be aggregated into one authentication tag on any linear combination of data blocks, the cloud server can prove the integrity of the outsourced data with less cost. Specifically, to verify the integrity of the outsourced data, the verifier may issue a random verification challenge to the cloud server, which then returns the linear combination of data blocks and the corresponding authentication tag as a corresponding proof. If the proof is valid, then the outsourced data is interpreted as complete. Otherwise, the outsourced data is corrupted.
At present, all existing methods for detecting the integrity of public verification cloud data need relatively complex operation, so that the calculation amount is large. The invention designs a detection method for computing and effectively and publicly verifying the integrity of cloud data by utilizing a Hash tree technology, and meanwhile, the method can ensure that a verifier cannot obtain the content of the cloud data, thereby realizing the privacy protection of the data.
Before presenting the summary of the invention, some technical background and cryptographic knowledge to which the invention relates are introduced:
1. the hash tree used in the present invention refers to a tree storing hash values. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the hash tree is a binary tree, each node of the hash tree is a hash value of a child node, and the leaf nodes are hash values of corresponding messages. The hash tree is essentially a recursive definition, and specifically, all leaf nodes in the tree are hash values of data blocks, and the values of non-leaf nodes are combined by the hash values of all child nodes, and then a method of combining first and then hashing is continuously adopted to generate new values of non-leaf nodes. And iterating until the hash value of the root node is obtained.
2. The security of the present invention is based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem (Discrete LogalithProblem). Briefly, discrete pairsThe number problem refers to that given prime number p, cyclic group G with order p and one generator G and random element u on it, output
So that u = g x . In general, the discrete logarithm problem is very difficult.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to: the invention aims to provide an effective cloud data public verification method for protecting data privacy, which ensures the integrity of data stored on a cloud server and does not reveal the content of cloud data to a verifier.
The technical scheme is as follows: the invention discloses a cloud data public verification method for protecting data privacy, which comprises the following steps:
(1) The system establishes an algorithm (Setup), inputs a security parameter lambda, generates a public and private key pair (pk, sk) of the user, and discloses a system public parameter pp.
(2) And (3) a label generation algorithm (TagGen) inputs a system public parameter pp, a user private key sk and a file F, and a user outputs a file label T and a label evidence E.
(3) And (4) an Audit algorithm (Audit) inputs a system public parameter pp and a label evidence E, and the verifier outputs an Audit request Lambda for the file.
(4) And an evidence generation algorithm (Prove), inputting a system public parameter pp, an audit request Λ, a file F and a file label T, and outputting an evidence P by the cloud server.
(5) And (4) a verification algorithm (Verify), inputting a system public parameter pp, an audit request Λ, evidence P and a file F, verifying the validity of the evidence by a verifier, and returning to 1 if the evidence is valid, or returning to 0 if the evidence is not valid.
Has the beneficial effects that: compared with the prior art, the invention has the advantages that:
the invention provides a privacy-protecting cloud data public verification method based on the discrete logarithm problem, which only relates to simple algebraic operation and a common hash function in a finite field, does not need bilinear pairwise operation, has high operation efficiency, and does not reveal cloud data contents to a third-party verifier.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the main steps of the present invention;
Detailed Description
The present invention is further illustrated by the following examples and the accompanying drawings.
As shown in fig. 1, the cloud data public verification method for protecting data privacy according to the present invention includes the following steps:
(1) The system establishes an algorithm (Setup), inputs a security parameter lambda, generates a private key SK of a user by the system, and discloses a system public parameter PP.
(2) And (3) a label generation algorithm (TagGen), inputting a system public parameter PP, a user private key SK and a file F, and outputting a file label T and a label evidence E by a user.
(3) And an auditing algorithm (Audit) inputs a system common parameter PP and a label evidence E, and the verifier outputs an auditing request Lambda for the file.
(4) And an evidence generation algorithm (Prove), inputting a system public parameter PP, an audit request Lambda, a file F and a file label T, and outputting an evidence P by the cloud server.
(5) Verification algorithm (Verify). Inputting a system public parameter PP, an audit request Λ, an evidence P and a file F, and verifying the validity of the evidence by a verifier. If the evidence is valid, 1 is output, otherwise 0 is output.
The specific implementation process of the step (1) is as follows:
1. the security parameter λ is entered and the prime number p = Θ (2) is selected λ ) Cyclic group G of order p and its generator G, function
A secure signature scheme (Sig, ver), which may employ SM2 signature or DSS standard signature algorithms, a random signed public-private key pair (spk, ssk) and a random number x,
2. computing public key X = g x And
output System public parameters PP = (p, g, f, spk, X, Y) j ) And the user private key SK = (ssk, x, y) j ) Where j is equal to [1, s ]]The same applies below.
The specific implementation process of the step (2) is as follows:
1. inputting system common parameters PP = (p, g, f, spk, X, Y) j ) User private key SK = (ssk, x, y) j ) And file F, first the user randomly selects the file identifier
2. Dividing the file F into n blocks, and equally dividing each block into s fans, namely F = { m = { (m) ij } i∈[1,n],j∈[1,s] 。
3. Calculating the label of each block, wherein the label sigma of the ith data i . Specifically, calculate
(mod p) and
4. and calculating the hash value of each label as a leaf node of the hash tree. The leaf nodes generate father node hash values of the leaf nodes in a mode of first combination and then hash, and the root node R of the hash tree is generated by analogy.
5. Signature (id, R) using the private key ssk, i.e. S = Sig ssk (id, R). Output tag T = (id, σ) 1 ,…,σ n ) And according to E = (id, S).
6. And (F, T, S) and E are respectively sent to the cloud server and the verifier, and the local copy is deleted.
The specific implementation process of the step (3) is as follows:
1. inputting the common parameters PP and label evidence E of the system, and firstly verifying the system by a verifier [1, n ]]Randomly selecting a plurality of integers as the sequence numbers of the challenge data blocks, without loss of generality, and marking as I = { (I, v) i ) Selecting random weight for each serial number
2. Sending an audit request Λ = (id, I).
The specific implementation process of the step (4) is as follows:
1. after receiving an audit request Λ = (id, I) of a verifier, the cloud server finds a corresponding file F and a corresponding tag T, and randomly selects the file F and the tag T
2. Computing
And (i, σ) i ) Auxiliary path Ω of i Wherein the auxiliary path omega i Is satisfied that the data can be represented by (i, σ) i ) And Ω i A minimum set of nodes for the root node is constructed.
3. Let the evidence P = (ω) j ,μ j ,{(i,σ i ),Ω i } i∈I ) And returning to the verifier.
The specific implementation process of the step (5) is as follows:
1. inputting system public parameter PP, audit request Λ, proof P and according to E, verifier first utilizes { (i, σ) } i ),Ω i } i∈I The root node R' of the hash tree is computed.
2. Verification Ver spk (S, (id, R')) =1 holds. If yes, calculating v = ∑ Σ i∈I i·v i And then verify
If yes, returning to 1; otherwise, 0 is returned.
Protocol analysis
1. Accuracy of measurement
First, if all participants in the present invention are honest, then the algorithm Ver spk (S, (id, R)) =1 is necessarily true. In addition, the following is also true:
therefore, the verification equation in the algorithm Verify holds.
2. Safety feature
The present invention solves the problem of data leakage, assuming that the verifier is malicious, since μ = r · f (ω) + Σ i∈ I v i ·m i And r is randomly selected, so that a malicious verifier cannot calculate the data block, and the method cannot reveal cloud data contents to a third-party verifier, thereby protecting the privacy of the cloud data.
3. Efficiency analysis
The scheme only relates to simple algebraic operation and a common hash function in a finite field, so the method has high operation efficiency and good application value, and meanwhile, the signature of the root node can use standard signature algorithms such as an SM2 signature algorithm, a DSS (direct sequence) and the like, and the safety and the efficiency are good.
Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that changes, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made in these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, the scope of which is defined in the appended claims and their equivalents.
Claims (1)
1. A cloud data public verification method for protecting data privacy comprises the following steps:
1) A system establishment algorithm (Setup), a security parameter lambda is input, a system generates a private key SK of a user, and a system public parameter PP is disclosed, and the specific implementation process is as follows:
A. the security parameter λ is entered and the prime number p = Θ (2) is selected λ ) Cyclic group G of order p and its generator G, function
A secure signature scheme (Sig, ver) using SM2 or DSS standard signature algorithms, randomly signing public and private key pairs (spk, ssk) and random numbers
B. Computing public key X = g x And
output System public parameters PP = (p, g, f, spk, X, Y) j ) And the user private key SK = (ssk, x, y) j ) Wherein j ∈ [1,s ]]The same applies below;
2) The label generation algorithm inputs system public parameters PP, a user private key SK and a file F, a user outputs a file label T and a label evidence E, and the specific implementation process is as follows:
A. inputting system common parameters PP = (p, g, f, spk, X, Y) j ) User private key SK = (ssk, x, y) j ) And file F, first the user randomly selects the file identifier
B. Dividing the file F into n blocks, and equally dividing each block into s fans, namely F = { m = { (m) ij } i∈[1,n],j∈[1,s] ；
C. Calculating the label of each block, wherein the label sigma of the ith data i In particular, calculating
And
D. calculating the hash value of each label as a leaf node of the hash tree, generating the parent node hash value of the leaf node by combining the leaf nodes firstly and then hashing the leaf nodes, and generating the root node R of the hash tree by analogy;
E. signature (id, R) using the private key ssk, i.e. S = Sig ssk (id, R), output tag T = (id, σ) 1 ,…,σ n ) HebiaoA proof of sign E = (id, S);
F. respectively sending the (F, T, S) and the (E) to a cloud server and a verifier, and deleting the local copy;
3) The method comprises the following steps that an Audit algorithm (Audit) is input into a system public parameter PP and a tag evidence E, and a verifier outputs an Audit request Lambda for a file, and specifically comprises the following steps:
A. inputting system common parameters PP and label evidence E, and verifying the system common parameters PP and label evidence E by a verifier [1, n ]]Randomly selecting a plurality of integers as challenge data block sequence numbers, and marking the integers as I = { (I, v) i ) And selecting random weight for each challenge data block sequence number
B. Sending an audit request Λ = (id, I);
4) An evidence generating algorithm (cave), inputting a system public parameter PP, an audit request Lambda, a file F and a file label T, outputting an evidence P by a cloud server, and specifically implementing the following processes:
A. after receiving an audit request Λ = (id, I) of a verifier, the cloud server finds the corresponding file F and the corresponding label T, and randomly selects the file F and the label T
B. Computing
μ j ＝r j ·f(ω j )+∑ i∈I v i ·m ij And (i, σ) i ) Auxiliary path Ω of i Wherein the auxiliary path omega i Is satisfied that the data can be represented by (i, σ) i ) And Ω i Constructing a minimum node set of root nodes;
C. let the evidence P = (ω) j ,μ j ,{(i,σ i ),Ω i } i∈I ) Returning to the verifier;
5) A verification algorithm (Verify), inputting a system public parameter PP, an audit request Lambda, an evidence P and a file F, verifying the validity of the evidence by a verifier, if the evidence is valid, outputting 1, otherwise, outputting 0, and the specific implementation process is as follows:
A. inputting system public parameters PP, an audit request lambda, a proof P and a label evidence E, and firstly utilizing { (i, sigma) } by a verifier i ),Ω i } i∈I Calculating a root node R' of the hash tree;
B. verification Ver spk (S, (id, R')) =1, if true, calculate v = ∑ Σ i∈I i·v i And then verify
If yes, returning to 1; otherwise, 0 is returned.
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