CN103731259A - Method and system for safe downloading of TMK - Google Patents

Method and system for safe downloading of TMK Download PDF

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Publication number
CN103731259A
CN103731259A CN201310740642.0A CN201310740642A CN103731259A CN 103731259 A CN103731259 A CN 103731259A CN 201310740642 A CN201310740642 A CN 201310740642A CN 103731259 A CN103731259 A CN 103731259A
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key
random number
terminal
ciphertext
kms
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CN103731259B (en
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苏文龙
孟陆强
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Fujian Landi Commercial Equipment Co Ltd
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Fujian Landi Commercial Equipment Co Ltd
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Priority claimed from CN2013100843972A external-priority patent/CN103237004A/en
Priority claimed from CN2013100846735A external-priority patent/CN103220271A/en
Priority claimed from CN2013100846716A external-priority patent/CN103220270A/en
Priority claimed from CN2013100846538A external-priority patent/CN103237005A/en
Application filed by Fujian Landi Commercial Equipment Co Ltd filed Critical Fujian Landi Commercial Equipment Co Ltd
Priority to CN201310740642.0A priority Critical patent/CN103731259B/en
Priority to PCT/CN2014/073215 priority patent/WO2014139406A1/en
Publication of CN103731259A publication Critical patent/CN103731259A/en
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
    • G06Q20/20—Point-of-sale [POS] network systems
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Cash Registers Or Receiving Machines (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
  • Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
  • Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a method and system for safe downloading of a TMK. The method comprises the steps that a TK is generated through a payment terminal; after the TK is encrypted in a transferred mode by a distributor key management system, the TK is transmitted to the payment terminal; the TK which is encrypted in the transferred mode is collected by an operation terminal and transmitted to a KMS; identity authentication is conducted on the KMS and a payment system; after authentication is passed, the TMK is transmitted to the payment terminal by the KMS through the operation terminal. The method has the advantages that TK uploading and TMK downloading are both conducted through the operation terminal, the TMK downloading process directly follows the TK uploading process, and therefore the TMK downloading time efficiency is greatly improved.

Description

A kind of terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading and system
Technical field
The present invention relates to E-Payment field, relate in particular to a kind of terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading and system.
Background technology
(BANK Card) is more and more universal as the means of payment for bank card, common bank card paying system comprises point of sales terminal (Point Of Sale, POS), POS receives single system (POSP), code keypad (PIN PAD) and hardware encipher machine (Hardware and Security Module, HSM).Wherein POS terminal can be accepted bank card information, has communication function, and the instruction of accepting teller completes financial transaction information and the equipment of exchange for information about; POS receives single system POS terminal is managed concentratedly, comprises parameter downloads, and key is downloaded, and accepts, processes or forward the transaction request of POS terminal, and to POS terminal loopback transaction results information, is the system of centralized management and trading processing; Code keypad (PIN PAD) is that the relevant key of various financial transactions is carried out to safe storage protection, and the safety means that PIN are encrypted to protection; Hardware encipher machine (HSM) is to the peripheral hardware equipment that is encrypted of transmission data, for correctness and the storage key of encryption and decryption, checking message and the document source of PIN.Personal identification code (Personal Identification Number, PIN), personal identification number, is the data message of identifying holder's identity legitimacy in on-line transaction, in cyber-net system, any link does not allow to occur in mode expressly; Terminal master key (Terminal Master Key, TMK), during POS terminal works, the master key that working key is encrypted, encrypting storing is in system database; POS terminal is widely used in bank card and pays occasion, such as manufacturer's shopping, hotel's lodging etc., is a kind of indispensable modernization means of payment, has incorporated the various occasions of people's life.Bank card; debit card particularly; generally all by holder, be provided with PIN; in carrying out payment process; POS terminal is except above sending the data such as magnetic track information of bank card; also want holder to input the checking holder's of PINGong issuing bank identity legitimacy, guarantee bank card safety of payment, protection holder's property safety.In order to prevent that PIN from revealing or being cracked; requirement is from terminal to issuing bank in whole information interactive process; whole process is carried out safety encipher protection to PIN; do not allow any link in computer network system; PIN occurs in mode expressly, so the POS terminal of the PIN of acceptance input at present all requires to be equipped with key management system.
The key code system of POS terminal is divided into secondary: terminal master key (TMK) and working key (WK).Wherein TMK is encrypted protection to WK.Every POS terminal has unique TMK, must have safeguard protection, and assurance can only also participate in calculating by write device, can not read; TMK is a very crucial root key, if TMK is intercepted, working key is just cracked than being easier to, by serious threat bank card safety of payment.So can secure download TMK to POS terminal, become the key of whole POS terminal security.
In order to guarantee the downloading in POS terminal of terminal master key TMK safety, the safe machine room that the download of terminal master key TMK must be controlled at the administrative center of acquirer carries out, and therefore essentially will concentrate POS terminal by artificial, and download terminal master key TMK.Thereby bring maintenance centre's machine room workload large; After equipment dispatches from the factory, need to be transported to administrative center's safe machine room download key and just can be deployed to trade company, cost of transportation rises; In order to concentrate lower dress key, need a large amount of staff and operating time, the problem such as maintenance cost is large, maintenance period is long.
Summary of the invention
For solving the problems of the technologies described above, the technical scheme that the present invention adopts is: a kind of terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading, comprises step: S1, payment terminal produce transmission security key TK and generating transmission key ciphertext; S2, payment terminal upload transfers key ciphertext and download master key TMK; Wherein step S1 comprises: S11, vendor key management system are called the first hardware encipher machine, KMS system call the second hardware encipher machine, respectively at the first hardware encipher machine and the second hardware encipher Ji Zhongjiang supplier authority component and the synthetic Protective Key PK of KMS System Privileges component and MAC key MAK, and described Protective Key PK and MAC key MAK are stored in respectively in the first hardware encipher machine and the second hardware encipher machine in the lump; S12, vendor key management system are called the first hardware encipher machine and are produced public private key pair Pu_hsm, Pr_hsm, and PKI Pu_hsm is sent to payment terminal; S13, payment terminal are called code keypad generating transmission key TK, and described TK comprises traffic encryption key TEK and certified transmission key A UK; S14, payment terminal are called the code keypad Pu_hsm that uses public-key and are encrypted TK, generate the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu, and the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to vendor key management system; S15, vendor key management system are called the first hardware encipher machine and are used private key Pr_hsm to decipher the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu acquisition transmission security key TK; S16, vendor key management system are called the first hardware encipher machine and are used Protective Key PK encrypted transmission cipher key T K and use MAC key MAK to calculate MAC value, generate the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk, and the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk is sent to payment terminal; Wherein step S2 comprises: S21, operating terminal gather the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk of payment terminal; Between S22, operating terminal and KMS system, by CA center, carry out authentication, authentication sends to KMS system by the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk after passing through; S23, KMS system call the second hardware encipher machine use MAC key MAK to the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk verification MAC legitimacy inquiring, if verification is passed through, use Protective Key PK to decipher the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk and obtain transmission security key TK and be stored in described the second hardware encipher machine; After S24, KMS system acquisition transmission security key TK, calling the second hardware encipher machine uses authenticate key AUK and payment terminal to carry out two-way authentication; If S25 authentication is passed through, KMS system call the second hardware encipher machine uses traffic encryption key TEK to encrypt terminal master key TMK and generates master key ciphertext Ctmk and master key ciphertext Ctmk is sent to payment terminal; S26, payment terminal are called code keypad and are used traffic encryption key TEK deciphering master key ciphertext Ctmk obtain terminal master key TMK and terminal master key TMK is stored in code keypad.
Another technical scheme provided by the invention is:
A terminal master key TMK secure download system, comprises the first hardware encipher machine, the second hardware encipher machine, vendor key management system, payment terminal, CA center, operating terminal and KMS system; Described vendor key management system comprises arranging key A module, PKI generation module, turns encrypting module, payment terminal comprises TK generation module, two-way authentication A module, TMK receiver module, operating terminal comprises TK acquisition module, the upper transmission module of TK, ca authentication A module, and KMS system comprises arranging key B module, TK receiver module, ca authentication B module, two-way authentication B module, TMK sending module; Arranging key A module and arranging key B module are used for calling the first hardware encipher machine and the second hardware encipher machine, respectively at the first hardware encipher machine and the second hardware encipher Ji Zhongjiang supplier authority component and the synthetic Protective Key PK of KMS System Privileges component and MAC key MAK, and described Protective Key PK and MAC key MAK are stored in respectively in the first hardware encipher machine and the second hardware encipher machine in the lump; PKI generation module is used for calling the first hardware encipher machine and produces public private key pair Pu_hsm, Pr_hsm, and PKI Pu_hsm is sent to payment terminal; TK generation module is used for calling code keypad generating transmission key TK, and described TK comprises traffic encryption key TEK and certified transmission key A UK; TK generation module is also encrypted TK for calling the code keypad Pu_hsm that uses public-key, and generates the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu, and the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to vendor key management system; Turning encrypting module uses private key Pr_hsm to decipher the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu acquisition transmission security key TK for calling the first hardware encipher machine; Turn encrypting module and also for calling the first hardware encipher machine, use Protective Key PK encrypted transmission cipher key T K and use MAC key MAK to calculate MAC value, generate the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk, and the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk is sent to payment terminal; TK acquisition module is for gathering the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk of payment terminal; Ca authentication A module and ca authentication B module are for carrying out authentication by CA center between operating terminal and KMS system; The upper transmission module of TK, for after passing through when authentication, sends to KMS system by the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk; TK receiver module is used MAC key MAK to the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk verification MAC legitimacy inquiring for calling the second hardware encipher machine, also, for when verification is passed through, use Protective Key PK to decipher the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk and obtain transmission security key TK and be stored in described the second hardware encipher machine; Two-way authentication A module and two-way authentication B module are for obtaining after transmission security key TK when KMS system, and the second hardware encipher machine that calls uses authenticate key AUK and payment terminal to carry out two-way authentication; TMK sending module is for after passing through when the authentication of KMS system and payment terminal, and the second hardware encipher machine that calls uses traffic encryption key TEK encryption terminal master key TMK generation master key ciphertext Ctmk and master key ciphertext Ctmk is sent to payment terminal; TMK receiver module is used for calling code keypad and uses traffic encryption key TEK deciphering master key ciphertext Ctmk obtain terminal master key TMK and terminal master key TMK is stored in to code keypad.
Beneficial effect of the present invention is: the present invention is by payment terminal upload transfers cipher key T K, by transmission security key, TMK is encrypted to transmission, realize payment terminal remote download terminal master key TMK, wherein, TK comprises traffic encryption key TEK and certified transmission key A UK, payment terminal and KMS system are first carried out bidirectional identity authentication through authenticate key AUK, and authentication is encrypted terminal master key TMK by the asymmetric traffic encryption key TEK of rear use and transmitted, and have improved the transmission of TMK and have downloaded safety.Further, described master key TMK download and transmission security key TK upload in the lump and carry out, and all by operating terminal, are undertaken, and have therefore greatly improved the time efficiency that TMK downloads.Simultaneously in payment terminal, dispatch from the factory before throwing in to trade company and just can unify to carry out master key TMK download by operating terminal, owing to carrying out authentication by CA center between operating terminal and KMS system, and TMK concentrates and downloads, therefore greatly reduce master key TMK and downloaded risk, and trade company takes payment terminal and just can directly use, greatly facilitate the use of trade company.Further; described vendor key management system and KMS system store respectively Protective Key PK and MAC key MAK; the transmission security key TK that payment terminal produces uploads after being encrypted by the Protective Key PK of vendor key management system and MAC key MAK; therefore operating terminal is without TK is turned to encryption further; greatly simplify the encryption in TK upload procedure, under the prerequisite that guarantees TK safe transmission, improved the time efficiency that TK uploads.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is the structured flowchart of a kind of terminal master key TMK secure download system in an embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 2 is the structured flowchart of two-way authentication A module in Fig. 1;
Fig. 3 is the structured flowchart of two-way authentication B module in Fig. 1;
Fig. 4 is the method flow diagram of a kind of terminal master key TMK of an embodiment of the present invention method for safely downloading;
Fig. 5 is the concrete steps flow chart of the step S1 in Fig. 4;
Fig. 6 is the concrete steps flow chart of the step S2 in Fig. 4.
Main element symbol description:
10: payment terminal; 20: operating terminal; 30:KMS system; 40: vendor key management system; 50:CA center; 60: the first hardware encipher machines; 70: the second hardware encipher machines; 101:TK generation module; 102:TMK receiver module; 103: two-way authentication A module; The upper transmission module of 201:TK; 202:TK acquisition module; 203:CA authentication A module; 301: arranging key B module; 302:TK receiver module; 303:CA authentication B module; 304: two-way authentication B module; 305:TMK sending module; 401: arranging key A module; 402: turn encrypting module; 403: PKI generation module; 501: certificate preset module;
Embodiment
By describing technology contents of the present invention, structural feature in detail, being realized object and effect, below in conjunction with execution mode and coordinate accompanying drawing to be explained in detail.
First, the abbreviation the present invention relates to and Key Term are defined and are illustrated:
HSM_VENDOR: supplier's hardware encipher machine;
The abbreviation of AUK:Authentication Key, authentication authorization and accounting key, for the two-way authentication between PINPAD and key management system KMS;
CA center: so-called CA(Certificate Authority) center, it is to adopt PKI(Public Key Infrastructure) public key infrastructure technology, network ID authentication service is provided specially, be responsible for signing and issuing and managing digital certificate, and third party's trust authority with authoritative and fairness, its effect is just as the company of issue certificates in our actual life, as passport is handled mechanism;
The abbreviation of HSM:High Security Machine, high safety means are hardware encipher machine in this system;
KMS system: Key Management System, key management system, for office terminal master key TMK;
The abbreviation of MAK:Mac Key, MAC computation key, consults to determine 24 byte symmetric keys with client, for the MAC value of TK between MTMS system and KMS system, calculates;
MTMS: full name Material Tracking Management System, Tracing Material management system is mainly used when plant produced;
The abbreviation of PIK:Pin Key, Pin encryption key, is a kind of of working key;
PINPAD: code keypad;
The abbreviation of PK:Protect Key, Protective Key, consults to determine with client, 24 byte symmetric keys.Encrypted transmission for TK between MTMS/TCS and KMS;
The abbreviation of POS:Point Of Sale, i.e. point-of-sale terminal
SNpinpad: the sequence number of code keypad, when PINPAD is built-in, SNpos is consistent with POS terminal serial number;
The sequence number of SN:POS terminal;
The abbreviation of TEK:Transmission Encrypt Key, i.e. traffic encryption key, 24 byte symmetric keys, for the encrypted transmission of TMK between PINPAD and key management system KMS;
The abbreviation of TK:Transmission Key, i.e. transmission security key.Transmission security key is comprised of traffic encryption key TEK and two-way authentication key A UK;
The abbreviation of TMS:Terminal Management System, i.e. terminal management system, for completing the functions such as the management of POS end message, software and parameter configuration, remote download, the management of terminal running state information, remote diagnosis;
The abbreviation of TMK:Terminal Master Key, i.e. terminal master key, for POS terminal with pay the encrypted transmission of receiving working key between single system;
Safe house: have higher security level other, for the room of service device, this room needs just can enter after authentication.
Intellective IC card: be CPU card, integrated circuit in card comprises central processor CPU, programmable read only memory EEPROM, random access memory ram and is solidificated in the card internal operating system COS (Chip Operating System) in read only memory ROM, and in card, data are divided into outside and read and inter-process part.
Symmetric key: the both sides that transmit and receive data must use identical key to being expressly encrypted and decrypt operation.Symmetric key encryption algorithm mainly comprises: DES, 3DES, IDEA, FEAL, BLOWFISH etc.
Unsymmetrical key: rivest, shamir, adelman needs two keys: public-key cryptography (private key Public key) and private cipher key (PKI Private key).Public-key cryptography and private cipher key are a pair of, if data are encrypted with public-key cryptography, only have with corresponding private cipher key and could decipher; If data are encrypted with private cipher key, only have so with corresponding public-key cryptography and could decipher.Because what encryption and decryption were used is two different keys, so this algorithm is called rivest, shamir, adelman.The basic process that rivest, shamir, adelman is realized confidential information exchange is: Party A generates a pair of secret keys handle wherein is open as Public key to other side; After using this key to be encrypted confidential information, the Party B who obtains this Public key sends to again Party A; Another private key that Party A preserves with oneself is again decrypted the information after encrypting.Party A sends to Party B after can using Party B's PKI to be encrypted confidential information again; Party B is decrypted the information after encrypting with the private spoon of oneself again.Main algorithm has RSA, Elgamal, knapsack algorithm, Rabin, D-H, ECC(elliptic curve encryption algorithm).
RSA: a kind of asymmetric key algorithm.RSA public key encryption algorithm is by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamirh and Len Adleman, in (Massachusetts Institute Technology), to be developed for 1977.RSA is named the name from they three of exploitation.RSA is the most influential public key encryption algorithm at present, and it can resist up to the present known all cryptographic attacks, by ISO, is recommended as public key data encryption standard.RSA Algorithm is true based on a foolproof number theory: two large prime numbers are multiplied each other very easy.RSA Algorithm be first can be simultaneously for encrypting the algorithm with digital signature, also easy to understand and operation.RSA is studied public key algorithm the most widely, from proposing three ten years till now, has experienced the test of various attack, for people accept, generally believes it is one of current classic PKI scheme gradually.
TDES Triple-DES:DES is a kind of symmetric encipherment algorithm, and key is 8 bytes.TDES is the cryptographic algorithm based on DES, and its key is 16 bytes or 24 bytes.TDES/3DES is the abbreviated expression (being triple DES) of English TripleDES, and DES is that English Data Encryption Standard(counts encryption standard) abbreviated expression.DES is a kind of symmetric key encryption algorithm, i.e. the data encryption key cryptographic algorithm identical with decruption key.DESYou IBM Corporation develops and discloses at 20 century 70s, and for U.S. government adopts, Bing Bei NBS and ANSI (ANSI) are admitted subsequently.TDES/3DES is a kind of pattern of des encryption algorithm, and it uses the key of 3 64 to carry out three encryptions to data.It is a safer distortion of DES.
For solving the technical problem existing in background technology, the present invention adopts a kind of new master key download scenarios, by POS terminal, produce at random TK(Transmission Key, transmission security key), TK after producing is stored in the code keypad of POS terminal, and TK is sent to KMS(Key Management System by transmission means required under various application scenarioss, key management system, for office terminal master key TMK).
When POS terminal to apply download terminal master key TMK, KMS system is used TK to encrypt terminal master key TMK, and the terminal master key ciphertext after encrypting is sent to POS terminal, POS terminal is decrypted master key ciphertext with TK after receiving, obtain terminal master key TMK, and terminal master key TMK is kept in code keypad.
So, by TK, encrypt terminal master key TMK, make TMK can carry out remote transmission, facilitate the secure download of TMK.
Above-mentionedly by POS terminal, gather and to be sent to bank's end after transmission security key TK TMK is encrypted, then by the method that POS terminal remote is downloaded the TMK after TK encrypts, can realize the remote download of TMK.But, above-mentioned TMK method for down loading TMK downloads to upload to separate with TK and carries out, generally that POS terminal produces and upload TK when manufacturer, after being issued to each trade company at POS terminal, carry out again TMK download, therefore the download of TMK is scattered carrying out, time efficiency is low, the workload of KMS system is large, and POS terminal renders to and carry out TMK after each trade company again to download uncertain factor more, and the download risk of TMK is higher.Therefore need a kind of time efficiency higher, download safer terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading.
Below just the present invention is overcome to the problems referred to above technical scheme be elaborated.
Refer to Fig. 1, for the structured flowchart of a kind of terminal master key TMK of an embodiment of the present invention secure download system, this system comprises the first hardware encipher machine 60, the second hardware encipher machine 70, vendor key management system 40, payment terminal 10, CA center 50, operating terminal 20 and KMS system 30; Described vendor key management system 40 comprises arranging key A module 401, PKI generation module 403, turns encrypting module 402, payment terminal 10 comprises TK generation module 101, two-way authentication A module 103, TMK receiver module 102, operating terminal 20 comprises TK acquisition module 202, the upper transmission module 201 of TK, ca authentication A module 203, and KMS system 30 comprises arranging key B module 301, TK receiver module 302, ca authentication B module 303, two-way authentication B module 304, TMK sending module 305.
Arranging key A module 401 and arranging key B module 301 are for calling the first hardware encipher machine 60 and the second hardware encipher machine 70, respectively at the first hardware encipher machine 60 and the second hardware encipher Ji70Zhong Jiang supplier authority component and the synthetic Protective Key PK of KMS System Privileges component and MAC key MAK, and described Protective Key PK and MAC key MAK are stored in respectively in the first hardware encipher machine 60 and the second hardware encipher machine 70 in the lump;
PKI generation module 403 produces public private key pair Pu_hsm, Pr_hsm for calling the first hardware encipher machine 60, and PKI Pu_hsm is sent to payment terminal 10;
TK generation module 101 is for calling code keypad generating transmission key TK, and described TK comprises traffic encryption key TEK and certified transmission key A UK;
TK generation module 101 is also encrypted TK for calling the code keypad Pu_hsm that uses public-key, and generates the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu, and the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to vendor key management system 40;
Turning encrypting module 402 uses private key Pr_hsm to decipher the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu acquisition transmission security key TK for calling the first hardware encipher machine 60;
Turning encrypting module 402 also uses Protective Key PK encrypted transmission cipher key T K and uses MAC key MAK to calculate MAC value for calling the first hardware encipher machine 60, generate the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk, and the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk is sent to payment terminal 10;
TK acquisition module 202 is for gathering the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk of payment terminal;
Ca authentication A module 203 and ca authentication B module 304 are for carrying out authentication by CA center 50 between operating terminal 20 and KMS system 30; The upper transmission module 201 of TK, for after passing through when authentication, sends to KMS system 30 by the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk;
TK receiver module 302 is used MAC key MAK to the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk verification MAC legitimacy inquiring for calling the second hardware encipher machine 70, also, for when verification is passed through, use Protective Key PK to decipher the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk and obtain transmission security key TK and be stored in described the second hardware encipher machine 70;
Two-way authentication A module 103 is with two-way authentication B module 304 for obtaining after transmission security key TK when KMS system 30, and the second hardware encipher machine 70 that calls uses authenticate key AUK and payment terminal to carry out two-way authentication;
TMK sending module 305 is for after passing through when KMS system 30 and payment terminal 10 authentications, and the second hardware encipher machine 70 that calls uses traffic encryption key TEK to encrypt terminal master key TMK and generates master key ciphertext Ctmk and master key ciphertext Ctmk is sent to payment terminal 10;
TMK receiver module 102 is used traffic encryption key TEK deciphering master key ciphertext Ctmk obtain terminal master key TMK and terminal master key TMK is stored in to code keypad for calling code keypad.
Wherein, described ca authentication A module comprises the first random number generation unit, the first data transmit-receive unit, the first encryption/decryption element, the first judging unit, ca authentication B module comprises the second random number generation unit, the second data transmit-receive unit, the second encryption/decryption element, the second judging unit, and CA center comprises certificate preset module.
Certificate preset module generates public private key pair Pu_optm and Pr_optm for call operation terminal, and by PKI Pu_optm and operating terminal identification information to issuing CA center, CA center generates root certificate AuthRCRT_optm and corresponding private key OptmWCRT_Prk, and for the PKI Pu_optm receiving and operating terminal identification information are used to private key OptmWCRT_Prk signature generating digital certificate OptmWCRT, and be stored in operating terminal for digital certificate OptmWCRT and private key OptmWCRT_Prk, root certificate AuthRCRT_optm is stored in to KMS system;
Certificate preset module is used for calling the second hardware encipher machine and produces public private key pair Pr_kms and Pu_kms, and PKI Pu_kms and KMS identification information are issued to CA center, CA center generates root certificate AuthRCRT_kms and corresponding private key ServerWCRT_Prk, and for the PKI Pu_kms receiving and KMS system identification information are used to private key ServerWCRT_Prk signature generating digital certificate ServerWCRT, and for digital certificate ServerWCRT and corresponding private key ServerWCRT_Prk are stored in to KMS system, root certificate AuthRCRT_kms is stored in to operating terminal,
The second data transmit-receive unit is for sending to operating terminal by digital certificate ServerWCRT;
The first judging unit is for being used the legitimacy of root certificate AuthRCRT_kms checking digital certificate ServerWCRT; The first random number generation unit, for after described digital certificate ServerWCRT is verified, generates the first random number AT1, and for the first random number AT1 is sent to KMS system;
The second encryption/decryption element is used for using the private key ServerWCRT_Prk first random number AT1 that signs to generate the first random number ciphertext Sign1, and the first random number ciphertext Sign1 is sent to operating terminal;
The first judging unit is for being used digital certificate ServerWCRT to verify the legitimacy of the first random number ciphertext Sign1, and the first data transmit-receive unit, for after the first random number ciphertext Sign1 is verified, sends to KMS system by digital certificate OptmWCRT;
The second judging unit is for being used the legitimacy of root certificate AuthRCRT_optm checking digital certificate OptmWCRT, the second random number generation unit is for after digital certificate OptmWCRT is verified, generate the second random number AT2, and the second random number is sent to operating terminal;
The first encryption/decryption element is used for using private key OptmWCRT_Prk to encrypt second random number AT2 generation the second random ciphertext Sign2, and the second random ciphertext Sign2 is sent to KMS system;
The second judging unit is for using the legitimacy of digital certificate OptmWCRT checking the second random ciphertext Sign2, and after being verified, KMS system and operating terminal authentication are passed through.
Refer to Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, wherein, Fig. 2 is the structured flowchart of described two-way authentication A module 103, Fig. 3 is the structured flowchart of described two-way authentication B module 304, described two-way authentication A module 103 comprises the 3rd random number generation unit, the 3rd data transmit-receive unit, the 3rd encryption/decryption element and the 3rd judging unit, and described two-way authentication B module comprises the 4th random number generation unit, the 4th data transmit-receive unit, the 4th encryption/decryption element and the 4th judging unit;
The 3rd random number generation unit is for generation of the 3rd random number AT3; The 3rd data transmit-receive unit is for being sent to KMS system by the 3rd random number AT3 producing; The 4th data transmit-receive unit is used for receiving the 3rd random number AT3; The 4th random number generation unit, for when receiving the 3rd random number AT3, produces the 4th random number AT4; The 4th encryption/decryption element is for when receiving the 3rd random number AT3, and the 4th hardware encipher machine that calls uses certified transmission key A UK to encrypt the 3rd random number AT3 and obtains the 3rd random number ciphertext Sign3; The 4th data transmit-receive unit is for sending to payment terminal by the 3rd random number ciphertext Sign3 and the 4th random number AT4;
The 3rd encryption/decryption element is for when receiving the 3rd random number ciphertext Sign3 and the 4th random number AT4, and the 3rd random number ciphertext Sign3 that uses certified transmission key A UK deciphering to receive obtains the 5th random number AT3 '; The 3rd judging unit is used for judging that whether the 5th random number AT3 ' is consistent with the 3rd random number AT3;
The 3rd encryption/decryption element is for when consistent, being used certified transmission key A UK encryption the 4th random number AT4 generation the 4th random number ciphertext Sign4 with the 3rd random number AT3 as the 5th random number AT3 '; The 3rd data transmit-receive unit is for sending to KMS system by the 4th random number ciphertext Sign4;
The 4th encryption/decryption element is for when receiving the 4th random number ciphertext Sign4, the 4th random number ciphertext Sign4 that the second hardware encipher machine that calls uses certified transmission key A UK deciphering to receive obtains the 6th random number AT4 ', the 4th judging unit is used for judging that whether the 6th random number AT4 ' is consistent with the 4th random number AT4, and when judging that the 6th random number AT4 ' is with the 4th random number AT4 when consistent, the two-way authentication between confirmation KMS system and payment terminal is passed through.
Wherein, described operating terminal also includes operator's card and keeper's card;
The certificate preset module at described CA center also for generation of operator, blocks certificate and keeper blocks certificate, and for operator being blocked to certificate storage in operator card and keeper being blocked to certificate storage in control card;
Described operator card and keeper's card be for read operator's card and the keeper's card being inserted on operating terminal when operating terminal, and when operator's certificate and administrator certificate being carried out legitimacy authentication and passed through by CA center, mandate operates operating terminal.
Wherein, described payment terminal is POS terminal, mobile phone terminal, intellective IC card or ATM terminal.
Referring to Fig. 4, is a kind of terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading in an embodiment of the present invention, and the method comprising the steps of:
S1, payment terminal produce transmission security key TK and generating transmission key ciphertext;
S2, payment terminal upload transfers key ciphertext and download master key TMK;
Referring to Fig. 5, is the concrete steps flow chart of step S1 in Fig. 4, and wherein, step S1 comprises:
S11, vendor key management system are called the first hardware encipher machine, KMS system call the second hardware encipher machine, respectively at the first hardware encipher machine and the second hardware encipher Ji Zhongjiang supplier authority component and the synthetic Protective Key PK of KMS System Privileges component and MAC key MAK, and described Protective Key PK and MAC key MAK are stored in respectively in the first hardware encipher machine and the second hardware encipher machine in the lump;
S12, vendor key management system are called the first hardware encipher machine and are produced public private key pair Pu_hsm, Pr_hsm, and PKI Pu_hsm is sent to payment terminal;
S13, payment terminal are called code keypad generating transmission key TK, and described TK comprises traffic encryption key TEK and certified transmission key A UK;
S14, payment terminal are called the code keypad Pu_hsm that uses public-key and are encrypted TK, generate the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu, and the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to vendor key management system;
S15, vendor key management system are called the first hardware encipher machine and are used private key Pr_hsm to decipher the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu acquisition transmission security key TK;
S16, vendor key management system are called the first hardware encipher machine and are used Protective Key PK encrypted transmission cipher key T K and use MAC key MAK to calculate MAC value, generate the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk, and the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk is sent to payment terminal;
Referring to Fig. 6, is the concrete steps flow chart of step S2 in Fig. 4, and wherein, step S2 comprises:
S21, operating terminal gather the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk of payment terminal;
Between S22, operating terminal and KMS system, by CA center, carry out authentication, authentication sends to KMS system by the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk after passing through;
S23, KMS system call the second hardware encipher machine use MAC key MAK to the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk verification MAC legitimacy inquiring, if verification is passed through, use Protective Key PK to decipher the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk and obtain transmission security key TK and be stored in described the second hardware encipher machine;
After S24, KMS system acquisition transmission security key TK, calling the second hardware encipher machine uses authenticate key AUK and payment terminal to carry out two-way authentication;
If S25 authentication is passed through, KMS system call the second hardware encipher machine uses traffic encryption key TEK to encrypt terminal master key TMK and generates master key ciphertext Ctmk and master key ciphertext Ctmk is sent to payment terminal;
S26, payment terminal are called code keypad and are used traffic encryption key TEK deciphering master key ciphertext Ctmk obtain terminal master key TMK and terminal master key TMK is stored in code keypad.
Wherein, described step S22 is specially:
Operating terminal generates public private key pair Pu_optm and Pr_optm, PKI Pu_optm and operating terminal identification information are issued to CA center, CA center generates root certificate AuthRCRT_optm and corresponding private key OptmWCRT_Prk, and the PKI Pu_optm receiving and operating terminal identification information are used to private key OptmWCRT_Prk signature generating digital certificate OptmWCRT, digital certificate OptmWCRT and private key OptmWCRT_Prk are stored in operating terminal, root certificate AuthRCRT_optm is stored in to KMS system;
KMS system call the second hardware encipher machine produces public private key pair Pr_kms and Pu_kms, PKI Pu_kms and KMS system identification information are issued to CA center, CA center generates root certificate AuthRCRT_kms and corresponding private key ServerWCRT_Prk, and the PKI Pu_kms receiving and KMS system identification information are used to private key ServerWCRT_Prk signature generating digital certificate ServerWCRT, digital certificate ServerWCRT and corresponding private key ServerWCRT_Prk are stored in to KMS system, root certificate AuthRCRT_kms is stored in to operating terminal;
KMS system sends to operating terminal by digital certificate ServerWCRT;
Operating terminal is used the legitimacy of root certificate AuthRCRT_kms checking digital certificate ServerWCRT, and if the verification passes, operating terminal generates the first random number AT1, and the first random number AT1 is sent to KMS system;
KMS system is used the private key ServerWCRT_Prk first random number AT1 that signs to generate the first random number ciphertext Sign1, and the first random number ciphertext Sign1 is sent to operating terminal;
Operating terminal is used digital certificate ServerWCRT to verify the legitimacy of the first random number ciphertext Sign1, after being verified, digital certificate OptmWCRT is sent to KMS system;
KMS system is used the legitimacy of root certificate AuthRCRT_optm checking digital certificate OptmWCRT, after being verified, generating the second random number AT2, and the second random number AT2 is sent to operating terminal;
Operating terminal is used private key OptmWCRT_Prk to encrypt the second random number AT2 and generates the second random ciphertext Sign2, and the second random ciphertext Sign2 is sent to KMS system;
KMS system is used the legitimacy of digital certificate OptmWCRT checking the second random ciphertext Sign2, and after being verified, KMS system and operating terminal authentication are passed through.
Wherein, described step S24 specifically comprises:
Payment terminal produces the 3rd random number AT3 and the 3rd random number AT3 is sent to KMS system;
KMS system produces the 4th random number AT4 after receiving the 3rd random number AT3, the second hardware encipher machine that calls uses authenticate key AUK to encrypt the 3rd random number AT3 and obtains the 3rd random number ciphertext Sign3, and the 3rd random number ciphertext Sign3 and the 4th random number AT4 are sent to payment terminal;
The 3rd random number ciphertext Sign3 that payment terminal is used authenticate key AUK deciphering to receive obtains the 5th random number AT3 ', judges that whether the 5th random number AT3 ' is consistent with the 3rd random number AT3:
If the 5th random number AT3 ' is consistent with the 3rd random number AT3, payment terminal is used authenticate key AUK to encrypt the 4th random number AT4 and is generated the 4th random number ciphertext Sign4, and the 4th random number ciphertext Sign4 is sent to KMS system;
The 4th random number ciphertext Sign4 that KMS system call the second hardware encipher machine uses authenticate key AUK deciphering to receive obtains the 6th random number AT4 ', judges that whether the 6th random number AT4 ' is consistent with the 4th random number AT4;
If the 6th random number AT4 ' is consistent with the 4th random number AT4, KMS system and payment terminal authentication are passed through.
Wherein, to the operation of described operating terminal, must block mandate through operator's card and keeper, specifically comprise:
Operator's card and keeper's card produce respectively public private key pair, and PKI are issued to CA center respectively, and generating run person blocks certificate and keeper blocks certificate, and respectively operator are blocked to certificate storage, in operator's card, keeper is blocked to certificate storage in control card;
Operator's card and keeper's card are inserted on operating terminal, after ca authentication, allow the operation to operating terminal.
Wherein, described payment terminal is POS terminal, mobile phone terminal, intellective IC card or ATM terminal.
In the present invention, transmission security key TK calculates the original uncommon Kazakhstan value of TK while producing, and when each storage, transmission or use TK, the uncommon Kazakhstan value of first verification TK just can be used TK after upchecking.Uncommon Kazakhstan value by verification TK can prevent that memory device from causing the error in data of storage extremely, determines that whether key is correct.
Beneficial effect of the present invention is: the present invention is by payment terminal upload transfers cipher key T K, by transmission security key, TMK is encrypted to transmission, realize payment terminal remote download terminal master key TMK, wherein, TK comprises traffic encryption key TEK and certified transmission key A UK, payment terminal and KMS system are first carried out bidirectional identity authentication through authenticate key AUK, and authentication is encrypted terminal master key TMK by the asymmetric traffic encryption key TEK of rear use and transmitted, and have improved the transmission of TMK and have downloaded safety.Further, master key TMK of the present invention is generated by KMS system, therefore facilitates KMS system to the follow-up maintenance of master key TMK and management.Further, described master key TMK download and transmission security key TK upload in the lump and carry out, and all by operating terminal, are undertaken, and have therefore greatly improved the time efficiency that TMK downloads.Simultaneously in payment terminal, dispatch from the factory before throwing in to trade company and just can unify to carry out master key TMK download by operating terminal, owing to carrying out authentication by CA center between operating terminal and KMS system, and TMK concentrates and downloads, therefore greatly reduce master key TMK and downloaded risk, and trade company takes payment terminal and just can directly use, greatly facilitate the use of trade company.Further; described vendor key management system and KMS system store respectively Protective Key PK and MAC key MAK; the transmission security key TK that payment terminal produces uploads after being encrypted by the Protective Key PK of vendor key management system and MAC key MAK; therefore operating terminal is without TK is turned to encryption further; greatly simplify the encryption in TK upload procedure, under the prerequisite that guarantees TK safe transmission, improved the time efficiency that TK uploads.
In the present invention, operating terminal is uploaded the health that carries out both sides with KMS system by CA center before TK and is authenticated, thereby guarantees that TK sends correct receipts list KMS system to, prevents that pseudo-KMS system from stealing TK information.
In the present invention, KMS system, before issuing master key TMK, is carried out both sides' authentication by authenticate key AUK, effectively prevents that pseudo-payment terminal from stealing TMK, and guarantees that payment terminal is from correct KMS system downloads TMK.
In the present invention, described operating terminal is also provided with operator card and keeper's card, only in the situation that operator's card and keeper block all mandates, could operate operating terminal, has effectively guaranteed authenticity and the validity of each TK of uploading.
The foregoing is only embodiments of the invention; not thereby limit the scope of the claims of the present invention; every equivalent structure or conversion of equivalent flow process that utilizes specification of the present invention and accompanying drawing content to do; or be directly or indirectly used in other relevant technical fields, be all in like manner included in scope of patent protection of the present invention.

Claims (10)

1. a terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading, is characterized in that, comprises step:
S1, payment terminal produce transmission security key TK and generating transmission key ciphertext;
S2, payment terminal upload transfers key ciphertext and download master key TMK;
Wherein step S1 comprises:
S11, vendor key management system are called the first hardware encipher machine, KMS system call the second hardware encipher machine, respectively at the first hardware encipher machine and the second hardware encipher Ji Zhongjiang supplier authority component and the synthetic Protective Key PK of KMS System Privileges component and MAC key MAK, and described Protective Key PK and MAC key MAK are stored in respectively in the first hardware encipher machine and the second hardware encipher machine in the lump;
S12, vendor key management system are called the first hardware encipher machine and are produced public private key pair Pu_hsm, Pr_hsm, and PKI Pu_hsm is sent to payment terminal;
S13, payment terminal are called code keypad generating transmission key TK, and described TK comprises traffic encryption key TEK and certified transmission key A UK;
S14, payment terminal are called the code keypad Pu_hsm that uses public-key and are encrypted TK, generate the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu, and the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to vendor key management system;
S15, vendor key management system are called the first hardware encipher machine and are used private key Pr_hsm to decipher the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu acquisition transmission security key TK;
S16, vendor key management system are called the first hardware encipher machine and are used Protective Key PK encrypted transmission cipher key T K and use MAC key MAK to calculate MAC value, generate the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk, and the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk is sent to payment terminal;
Wherein step S2 comprises:
S21, operating terminal gather the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk of payment terminal;
Between S22, operating terminal and KMS system, by CA center, carry out authentication, authentication sends to KMS system by the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk after passing through;
S23, KMS system call the second hardware encipher machine use MAC key MAK to the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk verification MAC legitimacy inquiring, if verification is passed through, use Protective Key PK to decipher the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk and obtain transmission security key TK and be stored in described the second hardware encipher machine;
After S24, KMS system acquisition transmission security key TK, calling the second hardware encipher machine uses authenticate key AUK and payment terminal to carry out two-way authentication;
If S25 authentication is passed through, KMS system call the second hardware encipher machine uses traffic encryption key TEK to encrypt terminal master key TMK and generates master key ciphertext Ctmk and master key ciphertext Ctmk is sent to payment terminal;
S26, payment terminal are called code keypad and are used traffic encryption key TEK deciphering master key ciphertext Ctmk obtain terminal master key TMK and terminal master key TMK is stored in code keypad.
2. secure download terminal master key TMK method according to claim 1, is characterized in that, described step S22 is specially:
Operating terminal generates public private key pair Pu_optm and Pr_optm, PKI Pu_optm and operating terminal identification information are issued to CA center, CA center generates root certificate AuthRCRT_optm and corresponding private key OptmWCRT_Prk, and the PKI Pu_optm receiving and operating terminal identification information are used to private key OptmWCRT_Prk signature generating digital certificate OptmWCRT, digital certificate OptmWCRT and private key OptmWCRT_Prk are stored in operating terminal, root certificate AuthRCRT_optm is stored in to KMS system;
KMS system call the second hardware encipher machine produces public private key pair Pr_kms and Pu_kms, PKI Pu_kms and KMS system identification information are issued to CA center, CA center generates root certificate AuthRCRT_kms and corresponding private key ServerWCRT_Prk, and the PKI Pu_kms receiving and KMS system identification information are used to private key ServerWCRT_Prk signature generating digital certificate ServerWCRT, digital certificate ServerWCRT and corresponding private key ServerWCRT_Prk are stored in to KMS system, root certificate AuthRCRT_kms is stored in to operating terminal;
KMS system sends to operating terminal by digital certificate ServerWCRT;
Operating terminal is used the legitimacy of root certificate AuthRCRT_kms checking digital certificate ServerWCRT, and if the verification passes, operating terminal generates the first random number AT1, and the first random number AT1 is sent to KMS system;
KMS system is used the private key ServerWCRT_Prk first random number AT1 that signs to generate the first random number ciphertext Sign1, and the first random number ciphertext Sign1 is sent to operating terminal;
Operating terminal is used digital certificate ServerWCRT to verify the legitimacy of the first random number ciphertext Sign1, after being verified, digital certificate OptmWCRT is sent to KMS system;
KMS system is used the legitimacy of root certificate AuthRCRT_optm checking digital certificate OptmWCRT, after being verified, generating the second random number AT2, and the second random number AT2 is sent to operating terminal;
Operating terminal is used private key OptmWCRT_Prk to encrypt the second random number AT2 and generates the second random ciphertext Sign2, and the second random ciphertext Sign2 is sent to KMS system;
KMS system is used the legitimacy of digital certificate OptmWCRT checking the second random ciphertext Sign2, and after being verified, KMS system and operating terminal authentication are passed through.
3. terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading according to claim 1, is characterized in that, described step S24 specifically comprises:
Payment terminal produces the 3rd random number AT3 and the 3rd random number AT3 is sent to KMS system;
KMS system produces the 4th random number AT4 after receiving the 3rd random number AT3, the second hardware encipher machine that calls uses authenticate key AUK to encrypt the 3rd random number AT3 and obtains the 3rd random number ciphertext Sign3, and the 3rd random number ciphertext Sign3 and the 4th random number AT4 are sent to payment terminal;
The 3rd random number ciphertext Sign3 that payment terminal is used authenticate key AUK deciphering to receive obtains the 5th random number AT3 ', judges that whether the 5th random number AT3 ' is consistent with the 3rd random number AT3:
If the 5th random number AT3 ' is consistent with the 3rd random number AT3, payment terminal is used authenticate key AUK to encrypt the 4th random number AT4 and is generated the 4th random number ciphertext Sign4, and the 4th random number ciphertext Sign4 is sent to KMS system;
The 4th random number ciphertext Sign4 that KMS system call the second hardware encipher machine uses authenticate key AUK deciphering to receive obtains the 6th random number AT4 ', judges that whether the 6th random number AT4 ' is consistent with the 4th random number AT4;
If the 6th random number AT4 ' is consistent with the 4th random number AT4, KMS system and payment terminal authentication are passed through.
4. terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading according to claim 1, is characterized in that, to the operation of described operating terminal, must block mandate through operator's card and keeper, specifically comprises:
Operator's card and keeper's card produce respectively public private key pair, and PKI are issued to CA center respectively, and generating run person blocks certificate and keeper blocks certificate, and respectively operator are blocked to certificate storage, in operator's card, keeper is blocked to certificate storage in control card;
Operator's card and keeper's card are inserted on operating terminal, after ca authentication, allow the operation to operating terminal.
5. terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading according to claim 4, is characterized in that, described payment terminal is POS terminal, mobile phone terminal, intellective IC card or ATM terminal.
6. a terminal master key TMK secure download system, is characterized in that, comprises the first hardware encipher machine, the second hardware encipher machine, vendor key management system, payment terminal, CA center, operating terminal and KMS system; Described vendor key management system comprises arranging key A module, PKI generation module, turns encrypting module,
Payment terminal comprises TK generation module, two-way authentication A module, TMK receiver module,
Operating terminal comprises TK acquisition module, the upper transmission module of TK, ca authentication A module,
KMS system comprises arranging key B module, TK receiver module, ca authentication B module, two-way authentication B module, TMK sending module;
Arranging key A module and arranging key B module are used for calling the first hardware encipher machine and the second hardware encipher machine, respectively at the first hardware encipher machine and the second hardware encipher Ji Zhongjiang supplier authority component and the synthetic Protective Key PK of KMS System Privileges component and MAC key MAK, and described Protective Key PK and MAC key MAK are stored in respectively in the first hardware encipher machine and the second hardware encipher machine in the lump;
PKI generation module is used for calling the first hardware encipher machine and produces public private key pair Pu_hsm, Pr_hsm, and PKI Pu_hsm is sent to payment terminal;
TK generation module is used for calling code keypad generating transmission key TK, and described TK comprises traffic encryption key TEK and certified transmission key A UK;
TK generation module is also encrypted TK for calling the code keypad Pu_hsm that uses public-key, and generates the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu, and the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to vendor key management system;
Turning encrypting module uses private key Pr_hsm to decipher the first transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu acquisition transmission security key TK for calling the first hardware encipher machine;
Turn encrypting module and also for calling the first hardware encipher machine, use Protective Key PK encrypted transmission cipher key T K and use MAC key MAK to calculate MAC value, generate the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk, and the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk is sent to payment terminal;
TK acquisition module is for gathering the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk of payment terminal;
Ca authentication A module and ca authentication B module are for carrying out authentication by CA center between operating terminal and KMS system; The upper transmission module of TK, for after passing through when authentication, sends to KMS system by the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk;
TK receiver module is used MAC key MAK to the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk verification MAC legitimacy inquiring for calling the second hardware encipher machine, also, for when verification is passed through, use Protective Key PK to decipher the second transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_pk and obtain transmission security key TK and be stored in described the second hardware encipher machine;
Two-way authentication A module and two-way authentication B module are for obtaining after transmission security key TK when KMS system, and the second hardware encipher machine that calls uses authenticate key AUK and payment terminal to carry out two-way authentication;
TMK sending module is for after passing through when the authentication of KMS system and payment terminal, and the second hardware encipher machine that calls uses traffic encryption key TEK encryption terminal master key TMK generation master key ciphertext Ctmk and master key ciphertext Ctmk is sent to payment terminal;
TMK receiver module is used for calling code keypad and uses traffic encryption key TEK deciphering master key ciphertext Ctmk obtain terminal master key TMK and terminal master key TMK is stored in to code keypad.
7. terminal master key TMK secure download system according to claim 6, is characterized in that, described ca authentication A module comprises the first random number generation unit, the first data transmit-receive unit, the first encryption/decryption element, the first judging unit,
Ca authentication B module comprises the second random number generation unit, the second data transmit-receive unit, the second encryption/decryption element, the second judging unit,
CA center comprises certificate preset module;
Certificate preset module generates public private key pair Pu_optm and Pr_optm for call operation terminal, and by PKI Pu_optm and operating terminal identification information to issuing CA center, CA center generates root certificate AuthRCRT_optm and corresponding private key OptmWCRT_Prk, and for the PKI Pu_optm receiving and operating terminal identification information are used to private key OptmWCRT_Prk signature generating digital certificate OptmWCRT, and be stored in operating terminal for digital certificate OptmWCRT and private key OptmWCRT_Prk, root certificate AuthRCRT_optm is stored in to KMS system;
Certificate preset module is used for calling the second hardware encipher machine and produces public private key pair Pr_kms and Pu_kms, and PKI Pu_kms and KMS identification information are issued to CA center, CA center generates root certificate AuthRCRT_kms and corresponding private key ServerWCRT_Prk, and for the PKI Pu_kms receiving and KMS system identification information are used to private key ServerWCRT_Prk signature generating digital certificate ServerWCRT, and for digital certificate ServerWCRT and corresponding private key ServerWCRT_Prk are stored in to KMS system, root certificate AuthRCRT_kms is stored in to operating terminal,
The second data transmit-receive unit is for sending to operating terminal by digital certificate ServerWCRT;
The first judging unit is for being used the legitimacy of root certificate AuthRCRT_kms checking digital certificate ServerWCRT; The first random number generation unit, for after described digital certificate ServerWCRT is verified, generates the first random number AT1, and for the first random number AT1 is sent to KMS system;
The second encryption/decryption element is used for using the private key ServerWCRT_Prk first random number AT1 that signs to generate the first random number ciphertext Sign1, and the first random number ciphertext Sign1 is sent to operating terminal;
The first judging unit is for being used digital certificate ServerWCRT to verify the legitimacy of the first random number ciphertext Sign1, and the first data transmit-receive unit, for after the first random number ciphertext Sign1 is verified, sends to KMS system by digital certificate OptmWCRT;
The second judging unit is for being used the legitimacy of root certificate AuthRCRT_optm checking digital certificate OptmWCRT, the second random number generation unit is for after digital certificate OptmWCRT is verified, generate the second random number AT2, and the second random number is sent to operating terminal;
The first encryption/decryption element is used for using private key OptmWCRT_Prk to encrypt second random number AT2 generation the second random ciphertext Sign2, and the second random ciphertext Sign2 is sent to KMS system;
The second judging unit is for using the legitimacy of digital certificate OptmWCRT checking the second random ciphertext Sign2, and after being verified, KMS system and operating terminal authentication are passed through.
8. terminal master key TMK secure download system according to claim 6, it is characterized in that, described two-way authentication A module comprises the 3rd random number generation unit, the 3rd data transmit-receive unit, the 3rd encryption/decryption element and the 3rd judging unit, and described two-way authentication B module comprises the 4th random number generation unit, the 4th data transmit-receive unit, the 4th encryption/decryption element and the 4th judging unit;
The 3rd random number generation unit is for generation of the 3rd random number AT3; The 3rd data transmit-receive unit is for being sent to KMS system by the 3rd random number AT3 producing; The 4th data transmit-receive unit is used for receiving the 3rd random number AT3; The 4th random number generation unit, for when receiving the 3rd random number AT3, produces the 4th random number AT4; The 4th encryption/decryption element is for when receiving the 3rd random number AT3, and the 4th hardware encipher machine that calls uses certified transmission key A UK to encrypt the 3rd random number AT3 and obtains the 3rd random number ciphertext Sign3; The 4th data transmit-receive unit is for sending to payment terminal by the 3rd random number ciphertext Sign3 and the 4th random number AT4;
The 3rd encryption/decryption element is for when receiving the 3rd random number ciphertext Sign3 and the 4th random number AT4, and the 3rd random number ciphertext Sign3 that uses certified transmission key A UK deciphering to receive obtains the 5th random number AT3 '; The 3rd judging unit is used for judging that whether the 5th random number AT3 ' is consistent with the 3rd random number AT3;
The 3rd encryption/decryption element is for when consistent, being used certified transmission key A UK encryption the 4th random number AT4 generation the 4th random number ciphertext Sign4 with the 3rd random number AT3 as the 5th random number AT3 '; The 3rd data transmit-receive unit is for sending to KMS system by the 4th random number ciphertext Sign4;
The 4th encryption/decryption element is for when receiving the 4th random number ciphertext Sign4, the 4th random number ciphertext Sign4 that the second hardware encipher machine that calls uses certified transmission key A UK deciphering to receive obtains the 6th random number AT4 ', the 4th judging unit is used for judging that whether the 6th random number AT4 ' is consistent with the 4th random number AT4, and when judging that the 6th random number AT4 ' is with the 4th random number AT4 when consistent, the two-way authentication between confirmation KMS system and payment terminal is passed through.
9. terminal master key TMK secure download system according to claim 6, is characterized in that, described operating terminal also includes operator's card and keeper's card;
The certificate preset module at described CA center also for generation of operator, blocks certificate and keeper blocks certificate, and for operator being blocked to certificate storage in operator card and keeper being blocked to certificate storage in control card;
Described operator card and keeper's card be for read operator's card and the keeper's card being inserted on operating terminal when operating terminal, and when operator's certificate and administrator certificate being carried out legitimacy authentication and passed through by CA center, mandate operates operating terminal.
10. according to the terminal master key TMK secure download system described in claim 6 to 9, it is characterized in that, described payment terminal is POS terminal, mobile phone terminal, intellective IC card or ATM terminal.
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