CN103714639A - Method and system enabling safe operation of POS terminal to be achieved - Google Patents
Method and system enabling safe operation of POS terminal to be achieved Download PDFInfo
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- CN103714639A CN103714639A CN201310741948.8A CN201310741948A CN103714639A CN 103714639 A CN103714639 A CN 103714639A CN 201310741948 A CN201310741948 A CN 201310741948A CN 103714639 A CN103714639 A CN 103714639A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
- G06Q20/20—Point-of-sale [POS] network systems
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
Abstract
The invention relates to the field of electronic payment terminals and discloses a method enabling safe operation of a POS terminal to be achieved. The method includes the steps that the POS terminal generates random numbers and transmits the random numbers to an operating terminal; the operating terminal reads an operator card to generate a ciphertext and sends information of the operator card and the ciphertext to the POS terminal; the POS terminal verifies the received information and the content of the ciphertext. The invention further discloses a system enabling safe operation of the POS terminal to be achieved. The method and system have the advantages that triple verification is carried out in the verifying process, firstly, the validity of an operator certificate is verified, secondly, it is verified that whether the random numbers sent to the operating end and sent back after encryption are consistent to the random numbers originally generated by the POS terminal, and finally, it is verified that whether consumed time in the verifying process is within preset time or not; through the steps, it can be ensured that an operator of the operating terminal has a permission, and the safety of generating a TK by controlling the POS terminal through the operating terminal can be guaranteed.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to E-Payment field, relate in particular to a kind of method and system that realize the operation of POS terminal security.
Background technology
(BANK Card) is more and more universal as the means of payment for bank card, common bank card paying system comprises point of sales terminal (Point Of Sale, POS), POS receives single system (POSP), code keypad (PIN PAD) and hardware encipher machine (Hardware and Security Module, HSM).Wherein POS terminal can be accepted bank card information, has communication function, and the instruction of accepting teller completes financial transaction information and the equipment of exchange for information about; POS receives single system POS terminal is managed concentratedly, comprises parameter downloads, and key is downloaded, and accepts, processes or forward the transaction request of POS terminal, and to POS terminal loopback transaction results information, is the system of centralized management and transaction processing; Code keypad (PIN PAD) is that the relevant key of various financial transactions is carried out to safe storage protection, and the safety equipment that PIN are encrypted to protection; Hardware encipher machine (HSM) is to the peripheral hardware equipment that is encrypted of transmission data, for correctness and the storage key of encryption and decryption, checking message and the document source of PIN.Personal identification code (Personal Identification Number, PIN), personal identification number, is the data message of identifying holder's identity legitimacy in on-line transaction, in cyber-net system, any link does not allow to occur in mode expressly; Terminal master key (Terminal Master Key, TMK), during POS terminal works, the master key that working key is encrypted, encrypting storing is in system database; POS terminal is widely used in bank card and pays occasion, such as manufacturer's shopping, hotel's lodging etc., is a kind of indispensable modernization means of payment, has incorporated the various occasions of people's life.Bank card; debit card particularly; generally all by holder, be provided with PIN; in carrying out payment process; POS terminal is except above sending the data such as magnetic track information of bank card; also want holder to input the checking holder's of PINGong issuing bank identity legitimacy, guarantee bank card safety of payment, protection holder's property safety.In order to prevent that PIN from revealing or being cracked; requirement is from terminal to issuing bank in whole information interactive process; whole process is carried out safety encipher protection to PIN; do not allow any link in computer network system; PIN occurs in mode expressly, so the POS terminal of the PIN of acceptance input at present all requires to be equipped with key management system.
The key code system of POS terminal is divided into secondary: terminal master key (TMK) and working key (WK).Wherein TMK is encrypted protection to WK.Every POS terminal has unique TMK, must have safeguard protection, and assurance can only also participate in calculating by write device, can not read; TMK is a very crucial root key, if TMK is intercepted, working key is just cracked than being easier to, by serious threat bank card safety of payment.So can secure download TMK to POS terminal, become the key of whole POS terminal security.Conclude existing TMK download scenarios below as follows:
1, the female POS scheme of key: user receives single system hardware encipher machine and the same traffic encryption key of the female POS input of key at POS.POS terminal is received single system initiating terminal master key download request by the female POS of key to POS, POS receives single system and drives hardware encipher machine to generate at random terminal master key, and by traffic encryption key encrypted transmission to the female POS of key, the female POS of key is with being transferred to POS terminal after traffic encryption key deciphering again, POS terminal obtains terminal master key expressly, be saved in POS terminal password keyboard, thereby realize POS terminal and POS, receive the synchronous of terminal master key between single system.
2, IC-card decrypt scheme: user receives single system hardware encipher machine and injects the same traffic encryption key in IC-card at POS.User inserts POS terminal by IC-card, POS terminal is received single system initiating terminal master key download request to POS, POS receives single system and drives hardware encipher machine to generate at random terminal master key, and by traffic encryption key encrypted transmission to POS terminal, traffic encryption key deciphering terminal master key ciphertext in IC-card for POS terminal, obtain terminal master key expressly, be saved in POS terminal password keyboard, thereby realize POS terminal and POS, receive the synchronous of terminal master key between single system.
Above-mentioned two schemes has following shortcoming: terminal master key expressly appears at outside safety equipment, for taking precautions against Key Exposure risk, the safe machine room that the download of terminal master key must be controlled at administrative center carries out, by artificial, concentrate download terminal master key, thereby bring " maintenance centre's machine room workload is large; After equipment dispatches from the factory, will transport to administrative center's safe machine room download key and just can be deployed to trade company, transportation cost rises; In order to concentrate lower dress key, need a large amount of staff and working time, maintenance cost is large, maintenance period is long " etc. problem.
Summary of the invention
For solving the problems of the technologies described above, the technical scheme that the present invention adopts is, a kind of method realizing the operation of POS terminal security is provided, and comprises step:
S1, POS terminal produce random number, and random number are sent to operating terminal;
S2, operating terminal judge whether to detect operator's card after receiving random number;
S3, when operating terminal detects operator and blocks, the information on read operation person's card, this information comprises operator's certificate and is contained in the private key in operator's certificate, then enters step S4;
S4, operating terminal obtain the current very first time, adopt private key to be encrypted random number and the very first time, generating ciphertext;
S5, operating terminal are sent to POS terminal by operator's certificate and ciphertext;
Whether S6, POS terminal verification operation person certificate be expired, and whether it is legal to use superior root certification authentication, if so, enters step S7, if not, judges authentification failure;
S7, POS terminal are extracted PKI decrypting ciphertext from operator's certificate, obtain random number plain text and the very first time expressly;
S8, judge that whether random number plain text is consistent with random number, if so, enter step S9, if not, judge authentification failure;
S9, POS terminal obtain the second current time and judged for the second time and very first time difference expressly whether in default effective range, if so, judge authentication success, if not, judge authentification failure.
Another technical solution used in the present invention is: a kind of system realizing the operation of POS terminal security is provided, comprise POS terminal and operating terminal with superior root certificate, described POS terminal comprises random number generation module, correction verification module, the first deciphering module, the first judge module and the second judge module, and described operating terminal comprises that operator blocks detection module, operator blocks read module, the first encrypting module and the first sending module;
Described random number generation module is for generation of random number, and random number is sent to operating terminal;
Described operator blocks detection module for judging whether to detect operator's card after receiving random number at operating terminal;
Described operator blocks read module for when operator being detected and block, the information on read operation person's card, and this information comprises operator's certificate and is contained in the private key in operator's certificate;
Described the first encrypting module is used for obtaining the current very first time, and adopts private key to be encrypted random number and the very first time, generating ciphertext;
Described the first sending module is for being sent to POS terminal by operator's certificate and ciphertext;
Whether described correction verification module is expired for verification operation person's card, and whether it is legal to use superior root certification authentication, if illegal, judges authentification failure;
Described the first deciphering module, for after passing through the checking of operator's certificate when correction verification module, extracts PKI decrypting ciphertext and obtains random number plain text and very first time plaintext from operator's certificate;
Described the first judge module is used for judging that whether random number plain text is consistent with random number, if inconsistent, judges authentification failure;
Described the second judge module is for when the first judge module judges that random number plain text is consistent with random number, obtain the second current time and judged for the second time and very first time difference expressly whether in default effective range, if so, judge authentication success, if not, judge authentification failure.
The invention has the beneficial effects as follows: the operator who only holds the operator's card through authenticating could operate POS terminal by operating terminal, in the process of checking, carry out triple checkings, first the legitimacy of verification operation person's certificate, moreover verify to be sent to operating terminal and to encrypt the random number of returning whether be consistent with the initial random number generating of POS terminal after deciphering, finally verify the consuming time whether in Preset Time of above-mentioned proof procedure, the operator who guarantees operating terminal by such step has authority, thereby guarantee to control by operating terminal the security that POS terminal produces TK.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is a kind of structured flowchart of realizing the system of POS terminal security operation in an embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 2 is a kind of main flowchart realizing the method for POS terminal security operation in an embodiment of the present invention.
Main element symbol description:
100, POS terminal; 110, random number generation module; 120, correction verification module; 130, the first deciphering module; 140, the first judge module; 150, the second judge module; 200, operating terminal; 210, operator blocks detection module; 220, operator blocks read module; 230, the first encrypting module; 240, the first sending module.
Embodiment
By describing technology contents of the present invention, structural attitude in detail, being realized object and effect, below in conjunction with embodiment and coordinate accompanying drawing to be explained in detail.
For solving the technical matters existing in background technology, the present invention adopts a kind of new master key download scenarios, by POS terminal, produce at random TK(Transmission Key, transmission security key), TK after producing is stored in the code keypad of POS terminal, and TK is sent to KMS(Key Management System by transmission mode required under various application scenarioss, key management system, for office terminal master key TMK).
When POS terminal to apply download terminal master key TMK, KMS system is used TK to encrypt terminal master key TMK, and the terminal master key ciphertext after encrypting is sent to POS terminal, POS terminal is decrypted master key ciphertext with TK after receiving, obtain terminal master key TMK, and terminal master key TMK is kept in code keypad.
So, by TK, encrypt terminal master key TMK, make TMK can carry out remote transmission, facilitate the secure download of TMK.
Under some scene, adopt operating terminal to gather the TK that POS terminal produces, and be responsible for TK to be transferred to MTMS system (Material Tracking Management System by operating terminal, Tracing Material system, mainly in plant produced, use), by MTMS systematic unity management TK, and TK is sent to corresponding KMS system, described course of conveying YouCA center (Certificate Authority, certificate granting center, adopt Public Key Infrastructure public key infrastructure technology, network ID authentication service is provided specially, be responsible for signing and issuing and managing digital certificate, and third party's trust authority with authoritative and fairness) differentiate operating terminal, the identity of MTMS system and KMS system.Adopt operating terminal to gather TK and can facilitate the acquisition operations (can realize a key collection etc.) of TK and the rights management that TK gathers; Employing MTMS system can be conveniently to TK unified management, and during convenient after-sales service later, data search and the download of POS terminal, can realize by manufacture order bulk transfer TK by MTMS system, facilitates the transfer management of TK, prevents that TK from misinformating to wrong object; Introduce CA center and can prevent that pseudo-terminal and pseudo-KMS system from stealing TK.
In order to guarantee that the generation of TK is legal, guarantee the security that TK produces, must take certain method to authenticate the operator of operating terminal, to guarantee the legitimacy of operation.
Below just the present invention is overcome to the problems referred to above technical scheme be elaborated.
Refer to Fig. 1, Fig. 1 is a kind of structured flowchart of realizing the system of POS terminal security operation in an embodiment of the present invention, comprises the interconnective POS terminal 100 with superior root certificate OpRCRT and operating terminal 200.Described POS terminal 100 comprises random number generation module 110, correction verification module 120, the first deciphering module 130, the first judge module 140 and the second judge module 150.Described operating terminal 200 comprises that operator blocks detection module 210, operator blocks read module 220, the first encrypting module 230 and the first sending module 240.
Described random number generation module 110 is for generation of random number R nd, and Rnd is sent to operating terminal.
Described operator blocks detection module 210 for judging whether to detect operator's card after receiving random number at operating terminal.
Described operator blocks read module 220 for when operator being detected and block, the information on read operation person's card, and this information comprises operator's certificate OpWCRT and is contained in the private key OpWCRT_Pri in OpWCRT.
Described the first encrypting module 230 is for obtaining current very first time TimeOne, and adopts OpWCRT_Pri to be encrypted Rnd and TimeOne, generating ciphertext C_r nd_time.
Described the first sending module 240 is for being sent to POS terminal by OpWCRT and C_r nd_time.
Whether described correction verification module 120 is expired for verification OpWCRT, and uses OpRCRT to verify that whether it is legal, if illegal, judges authentification failure.Particularly, comprise its term of validity in OpWCRT, correction verification module 120 judges that by this term of validity whether OpWCRT is expired; In addition, OpWCRT is in the process generating, OpWCRT is by private key signature corresponding to OpRCRT, signed data is attached in OpWCRT, when correction verification module 120 is verified, first from OpWCRT, extract signed data, from OpRCRT, extract again PKI, the Hash data Hash1 that there is no signature section in decrypted signature data acquisition OpWCRT, the part that OpWCRT is not signed is carried out Hash operation and is obtained Hash2, and whether Hash2 is consistent with Hash1 in contrast, if consistent, authentication OpWCRT is legal, if inconsistent, judges authentification failure.
Described the first deciphering module 130, for after passing through the checking of OpWCRT when correction verification module 120, extracts PKI OpWCRT_pu deciphering C_r nd_time and obtains random number plain text Rnd ' and plaintext TimeOne ' of the current very first time from OpWCRT.
Whether described the first judge module 140 is consistent with Rnd for judging Rnd ', if inconsistent, judges authentification failure.
Described the second judge module 150 is for when the first judge module 140 judges that Rnd ' is consistent with Rnd, obtain current second time TimeTwo and judge TimeTwo and the difference of TimeOne ' whether in default effective range, if so, judge authentication success, if not, judge authentification failure.
Wherein, also comprise a certificate preset module, described certificate preset module is for preset described superior root certificate OpRCRT when POS terminal is burnt sheet.
Wherein, described POS terminal 100 is connected by USB cable with operating terminal 200.
Wherein, in described random number generation module, described POS terminal 100 is by calling built-in code keypad or external code keypad generates described random number R nd.
Wherein, present embodiment also comprises MTMS system and KMS system, POS terminal 100 also comprises TK generation module, the second encrypting module and TMK deciphering module, MTMS system comprises the second deciphering module and the 3rd encrypting module, and KMS system comprises the 3rd deciphering module, TMK encrypting module and the second sending module.
Described TK generation module, for judging after authentication success when the second judge module, generates random transmission security key TK, and TK is stored in code keypad.
The TK that described the second encrypting module produces for gathering POS terminal, is then encrypted rear generation TK ciphertext to TK, and TK ciphertext is uploaded to MTMS system.
Described the second deciphering module is for being decrypted TK ciphertext.
Described the 3rd encrypting module is for again adding and generate new TK ciphertext and be kept at MTMS system TK.
Described the 3rd deciphering module is for being decrypted the described new TK ciphertext that is sent to KMS system to obtain TK.
Described TMK encrypting module is used for adopting TK to be encrypted and to generate TMK ciphertext and be kept at KMS system terminal master key TMK.
Described the second sending module, for sending after TMK download request when POS terminal, is sent to POS terminal by TMK ciphertext.
Described TMK deciphering module obtains TMK after being used for adopting TK to be decrypted TMK ciphertext, completes the collection of POS terminal to TMK.
Refer to Fig. 2, Fig. 2 is a kind of process flow diagram of realizing the method for POS terminal security operation in an embodiment of the present invention, comprises step:
S1, POS terminal produce random number R nd, and Rnd are sent to operating terminal;
S2, after receiving Rnd, operating terminal judges whether to detect operator card;
S3, when operating terminal detects operator and blocks, the information on read operation person's card, this information comprises operator's certificate OpWCRT and is contained in the private key OpWCRT_Pri in OpWCRT;
S4, operating terminal obtain current very first time TimeOne, adopt OpWCRT_Pri to be encrypted Rnd and TimeOne, generating ciphertext C_r nd_time;
S5, operating terminal are sent to POS terminal by OpWCRT and C_r nd_time;
Whether OpWCRT is expired for S6, the verification of POS terminal, and uses OpRCRT to verify that whether it is legal, if so, enters step S7, if not, judges authentification failure;
S7, POS terminal are extracted PKI OpWCRT_pu deciphering C_r nd_time from OpWCRT, obtain random number plain text Rnd ' and very first time plaintext TimeOne ';
S8, judge that whether Rnd ' is consistent with Rnd, if so, enter step S9, if not, judge authentification failure;
S9, POS terminal obtain the second current time T imeTwo and judge TimeTwo and the difference of TimeOne ' whether in default effective range, if so, judge authentication success, if not, judge authentification failure.
Wherein, before step S1, also comprise step: preset described superior root certificate OpRCRT when POS terminal is burnt sheet.
Wherein, described POS terminal is connected by USB cable with operating terminal.
Wherein, in step S1, POS terminal is by calling built-in code keypad or external code keypad generates described random number R nd.
Wherein, after step S9, also comprise:
S10, after judging authentication success, POS terminal generates random transmission security key TK, and TK is stored in code keypad;
S11, operating terminal gather the TK that POS terminal produces, and then TK are encrypted to rear generation TK ciphertext, and TK ciphertext is uploaded to MTMS system;
S12, MTMS system call encryption equipment are decrypted TK ciphertext;
S13, MTMS system call encryption equipment again add and generate new TK ciphertext and preserve TK;
S14, MTMS system are sent to described new TK ciphertext in KMS system and are decrypted and obtain TK;
S15, KMS system adopt TK to be encrypted and to generate TMK ciphertext and preserve terminal master key TMK;
S16, POS terminal send after TMK download request, and KMS system is sent to POS terminal by TMK ciphertext;
S17, POS terminal are obtained TMK after adopting TK to be decrypted TMK ciphertext, complete the collection of POS terminal to TMK.
The invention has the beneficial effects as follows: the operator who only holds the operator's card through authenticating could operate POS terminal by operating terminal, in the process of checking, carry out triple checkings, first the legitimacy of verification operation person's certificate, moreover verify to be sent to operating terminal and to encrypt the random number of returning whether be consistent with the initial random number generating of POS terminal after deciphering, finally verify the consuming time whether in Preset Time of above-mentioned proof procedure, accomplish POS terminal authentication operator legitimacy and prevent Replay Attack, the operator who guarantees operating terminal by such step has authority, thereby guarantee to control by operating terminal the security that POS terminal produces TK.In addition; in the flow process of follow-up generation TK and employing TK protection TMK transmission; also TK being sent to MTMS preserves like this and can facilitate the centralized management to TK in the future; and in all transmitting procedures; transferring content is all through encrypting; can farthest guarantee the safety of all information like this, finally guarantee the safe handling of POS terminal.
The foregoing is only embodiments of the invention; not thereby limit the scope of the claims of the present invention; every equivalent structure or conversion of equivalent flow process that utilizes instructions of the present invention and accompanying drawing content to do; or be directly or indirectly used in other relevant technical fields, be all in like manner included in scope of patent protection of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. the method for realization to the operation of POS terminal security, is characterized in that, comprises step:
S1, POS terminal produce random number, and random number are sent to operating terminal;
S2, operating terminal judge whether to detect operator's card after receiving random number;
S3, when operating terminal detects operator and blocks, the information on read operation person's card, this information comprises operator's certificate and is contained in the private key in operator's certificate, then enters step S4;
S4, operating terminal obtain the current very first time, adopt private key to be encrypted random number and the very first time, generating ciphertext;
S5, operating terminal are sent to POS terminal by operator's certificate and ciphertext;
Whether S6, POS terminal verification operation person certificate be expired, and whether it is legal to use superior root certification authentication, if so, enters step S7, if not, judges authentification failure;
S7, POS terminal are extracted PKI decrypting ciphertext from operator's certificate, obtain random number plain text and the very first time expressly;
S8, judge that whether random number plain text is consistent with random number, if so, enter step S9, if not, judge authentification failure;
S9, POS terminal obtain the second current time and judged for the second time and very first time difference expressly whether in default effective range, if so, judge authentication success, if not, judge authentification failure.
2. a kind of method realizing the operation of POS terminal security according to claim 1, is characterized in that: before step S1, also comprise step: preset described superior root certificate when POS terminal is burnt sheet.
3. a kind of method realizing the operation of POS terminal security according to claim 1, is characterized in that: described POS terminal is connected by USB cable with operating terminal.
4. a kind of method realizing POS terminal security operation according to claim 1, is characterized in that: in step S1, POS terminal is by calling built-in code keypad or external code keypad generates described random number.
5. a kind of method realizing POS terminal security operation according to claim 1, is characterized in that: after step S9, also comprise:
S10, after judging authentication success, POS terminal generates random transmission security key TK, and TK is stored in code keypad;
S11, operating terminal gather the TK that POS terminal produces, and then TK are encrypted to rear generation TK ciphertext, and TK ciphertext is uploaded to MTMS system;
S12, MTMS system call encryption equipment are decrypted TK ciphertext;
S13, MTMS system call encryption equipment again add and generate new TK ciphertext and preserve TK;
S14, MTMS system are sent to described new TK ciphertext in KMS system and are decrypted and obtain TK;
S15, KMS system adopt TK to be encrypted and to generate TMK ciphertext and preserve terminal master key TMK;
S16, POS terminal send after TMK download request, and KMS system is sent to POS terminal by TMK ciphertext;
S17, POS terminal are obtained TMK after adopting TK to be decrypted TMK ciphertext, complete the collection of POS terminal to TMK.
6. the realization system to the operation of POS terminal security, it is characterized in that, comprise POS terminal and operating terminal with superior root certificate, described POS terminal comprises random number generation module, correction verification module, the first deciphering module, the first judge module and the second judge module, and described operating terminal comprises that operator blocks detection module, operator blocks read module, the first encrypting module and the first sending module:
Described random number generation module is for generation of random number, and random number is sent to operating terminal;
Described operator blocks detection module for judging whether to detect operator's card after receiving random number at operating terminal;
Described operator blocks read module for when operator being detected and block, the information on read operation person's card, and this information comprises operator's certificate and is contained in the private key in operator's certificate;
Described the first encrypting module is used for obtaining the current very first time, and adopts private key to be encrypted random number and the very first time, generating ciphertext;
Described the first sending module is for being sent to POS terminal by operator's certificate and ciphertext;
Whether described correction verification module is expired for verification operation person's card, and whether it is legal to use superior root certification authentication, if illegal, judges authentification failure;
Described the first deciphering module, for after passing through the checking of operator's certificate when correction verification module, extracts PKI decrypting ciphertext and obtains random number plain text and very first time plaintext from operator's certificate;
Described the first judge module is used for judging that whether random number plain text is consistent with random number, if inconsistent, judges authentification failure;
Described the second judge module is for when the first judge module judges that random number plain text is consistent with random number, obtain the second current time and judged for the second time and very first time difference expressly whether in default effective range, if so, judge authentication success, if not, judge authentification failure.
7. a kind of system realizing the operation of POS terminal security according to claim 6, is characterized in that: also comprise a certificate preset module, for preset described superior root certificate when described POS terminal is burnt sheet.
8. a kind of system realizing the operation of POS terminal security according to claim 6, is characterized in that: described POS terminal is connected by USB cable with operating terminal.
9. a kind of system realizing POS terminal security operation according to claim 6, is characterized in that: in described random number generation module, described POS terminal is by calling built-in code keypad or external code keypad generates described random number.
10. a kind of system realizing POS terminal security operation according to claim 6, it is characterized in that: native system is also provided with and also comprises MTMS system and KMS system, described POS terminal also comprises TK generation module, the second encrypting module and TMK deciphering module, MTMS system comprises the second deciphering module and the 3rd encrypting module, and KMS system comprises the 3rd deciphering module, TMK encrypting module and the second sending module;
Described TK generation module, for judging after authentication success when the second judge module, generates random transmission security key TK, and TK is stored in code keypad;
The TK that described the second encrypting module produces for gathering POS terminal, is then encrypted rear generation TK ciphertext to TK, and TK ciphertext is uploaded to MTMS system;
Described the second deciphering module is for being decrypted TK ciphertext;
Described the 3rd encrypting module is for again adding and generate new TK ciphertext and be kept at MTMS system TK;
Described the 3rd deciphering module is for being decrypted the described new TK ciphertext that is sent to KMS system to obtain TK;
Described TMK encrypting module is used for adopting TK to be encrypted and to generate TMK ciphertext and be kept at KMS system terminal master key TMK;
Described the second sending module, for sending after TMK download request when POS terminal, is sent to POS terminal by TMK ciphertext;
Described TMK deciphering module obtains TMK after being used for adopting TK to be decrypted TMK ciphertext, completes the collection of POS terminal to TMK.
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CN201310741948.8A CN103714639B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method and system that realize the operation of POS terminal security |
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CN2013100843972A CN103237004A (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-03-15 | Key download method, key management method, method, device and system for download management |
CN2013100846538A CN103237005A (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-03-15 | Method and system for key management |
CN201310741948.8A CN103714639B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method and system that realize the operation of POS terminal security |
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CN201310740158.8A Active CN103716320B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and systems |
CN201310740308.5A Active CN103729941B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of main cipher key T MK method for safely downloading of terminal and system |
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CN201310742686.7A Active CN103745351B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of acquisition method and system for transmitting cipher key T K |
CN201310741949.2A Active CN103731260B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and system |
CN201310740567.8A Active CN103729944B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method and system of secure download terminal master key |
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CN201310740430.2A Active CN103729943B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method and system transmission security key being imported KMS system |
CN201310740540.9A Active CN103716154B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and systems |
CN201310740264.6A Active CN103701812B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | TMK (Terminal Master Key) secure downloading method and system |
CN201310740226.0A Active CN103714634B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method of main key of secure download terminal and system |
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CN201310740537.7A Active CN103746800B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | TMK (terminal master key) safe downloading method and system |
CN201310740410.5A Active CN103729942B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | Transmission security key is transferred to the method and system of key server from terminal server |
CN201310742661.7A Active CN103716167B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | Method and device for safely collecting and distributing transmission keys |
CN201310742886.2A Active CN103716321B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and systems |
CN201310740285.8A Active CN103729940B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of main cipher key T MK method for safely downloading of terminal and system |
CN201310742648.1A Active CN103716155B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method of automated maintenance POS terminal and operation terminal |
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Inventor after: Hong Yixuan Inventor after: Su Wenlong Inventor after: Jiang Xincheng Inventor after: Meng Luqiang Inventor before: Su Wenlong Inventor before: Jiang Xincheng Inventor before: Meng Luqiang |
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COR | Change of bibliographic data |
Free format text: CORRECT: INVENTOR; FROM: SU WENLONG JIANG XINCHENG MENG LUQIANG TO: HONG YIXUAN SU WENLONG JIANG XINCHENG MENG LUQIANG |
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C14 | Grant of patent or utility model | ||
GR01 | Patent grant |