CN101719895A - Data processing method and system for realizing secure communication of network - Google Patents
Data processing method and system for realizing secure communication of network Download PDFInfo
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- CN101719895A CN101719895A CN200910088327A CN200910088327A CN101719895A CN 101719895 A CN101719895 A CN 101719895A CN 200910088327 A CN200910088327 A CN 200910088327A CN 200910088327 A CN200910088327 A CN 200910088327A CN 101719895 A CN101719895 A CN 101719895A
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Abstract
The invention discloses a data processing method for realizing the secure communication of network. A key management server (KMS) generates a shared key KUE according to a shared main key established between the KMS and a user end (UE); the KMS encrypts the KUE by a self-set key Kkms and sends the encrypted KUE to the UE; the UE adopts KUE encryption transmission during transmitting data to the KMS and sends the encrypted KUE by the Kkms to the KMS; and the KMS decrypts by the Kkmc to obtain the KUE and protects data transmitted by the UE through the KUE. The invention also discloses a data processing system for realizing the secure communication of network, which reduces the state property of the KMS and improves the security of network communication.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the Network Communicate Security technology, relate in particular to a kind of data processing method and system that realizes secure communication of network.
Background technology
In IP Multimedia System (IMS, IP Multimedia Subsystem) medium face technical specification of security, the key agreement mechanism based on Key Management server (KMS-Based, Key Management Server) is proposed.This machine-processed basic principle is: two non-trust users use universal guiding structure (GBA, Generic Bootstrapping Architecture) mode and the KMS relation of breaking the wall of mistrust respectively, thereby set up two trusting relationships between the user.
GBA is intended to describe how in the context environmental that moves, use is based on third generation partner program (3GPP, 3rd Generation Partnership Project) Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA, Authentication and Key Agreement) mechanism is that client (UE, User Equipment) and application server provide prior shared secret.Subsequently, this shared secret can be used to authenticate the communication between client and the apps server.
AKA is an authentication mechanism commonly used among the mobile network, and GBA reuses the safety that AKA mechanism realizes that progressively guiding (bootstrap) is used.As shown in Figure 1, be GBA configuration diagram of the prior art, GBA has introduced a new network element Bootstrapping service function entity (BSF, BootstrappingService Function), its by with home subscriber server (HSS, Home Subscriber Server) between interface obtain user's security information and authentication information.Operation AKA authentication mechanism between UE and the BSF, and, between BSF and UE, produce a session key according to operation result (being encryption ciphering key K and Integrity Key IK).Application server (NAF, Network Application Function) can obtain this session key and contracted user's archives (Profile) from BSF.In this way, NAF and UE just can have a shared key, and this shared key can provide safeguard protection for application subsequently, particularly authentication UE and NAF when utility cession begins.And communicating by letter between communicating by letter between communicating by letter between UE and the BSF, NAF and the BSF, BSF and the HSS be independent of concrete application, so be general.
Existing GBA process is divided into two parts, and first is the Bootstrapping process of UE and BSF, generates to share key K
s, this process mainly may further comprise the steps as shown in Figure 2:
Step 201, UE sends HTML (Hypertext Markup Language) (HTTP, Hypertext TransferProtocol) request to BSF.
Step 202, BSF from HSS, obtain UE whole security parameters of corresponding GBA user and Ciphering Key (AV, AV=RAND||AUTN||XRES||CK||IK).Wherein, RAND represents random number, and AUTN represents authentication token, and XRES represents the authentication response expected.
Step 204, UE utilizes the value of RAND, by AKA algorithm computation AUTN, and the AUTN that the AUTN that calculates and BSF send over is compared, if both unanimities, then success identity network.In addition, UE also utilizes the value of RAND, and goes out CK, IK and RES by the AKA algorithm computation.Like this, BSF and UE have had IK and CK.
Step 205, UE sends another HTTP and asks BSF, comprises the summary AKA response that utilizes RES to calculate in the request.
Step 206, BSF compares the summary AKA response in the HTTP request that receives with the result who utilizes XRES to calculate, with this UE is carried out authentication.
Step 207, if the authentication success, BSF produces by CK and IK and shares key K
s, and encode according to RAND in the step 202 and BSF server name, produce Bootstrapping event identifier (B-TID) with the form of network address sign (NAI, NetworkAddress Identifier).B-TID can this time of unique identification Bootstrapping incident, and NAF can obtain the association key K that reaches between UE and the NAF according to this B-TID afterwards
s_ NAF.
Step 208, BSF sends 200OK message to UE, notice UE authentication success.Comprise B-TID and K in this message
sLife cycle.
Step 209, UE receives 200OK message, and produces shared key K according to IK and CK
s
Second portion is the process that UE and NAF set up security association, as shown in Figure 3, mainly may further comprise the steps:
Step 306, NAF is to K
s_ NAF preserves.
Step 307, NAF sends response message to UE, informs that UE has finished the foundation of security association.
By Fig. 2 and GBA process shown in Figure 3, set up shared key K between UE and the NAF
s_ NAF is with this shared master key as UE and NAF.
Also adopt the GBA framework in IMS medium face safety, and introduce the function that KMS realizes NAF, each UE need set up with KMS and share key.Yet, share key because KMS must set up with each UE, and shared key needs periodic refreshing, so KMS need safeguard that the storage overhead of the shared key between itself and each UE is very huge, thereby increase the state of KMS.In addition, because the shared key of KMS and each UE all leaves among the KMS, can cause the fail safe of network service to reduce like this, in case KMS is broken, KMS and each user's shared key will be revealed.
Summary of the invention
In view of this, main purpose of the present invention is to provide a kind of data processing method and system that realizes secure communication of network, with the state of reduction KMS, and the fail safe of raising network service.
For achieving the above object, technical scheme of the present invention is achieved in that
The invention provides a kind of data processing method that realizes secure communication of network, this method comprises:
The shared master key of setting up between Key Management server KMS basis and the client UE generates shares key K
UE
Described KMS utilizes self-set key K
KmsTo K
UEEncrypt, and the K after will encrypting
UESend to described UE;
Described UE adopts K to KMS transmission data the time
UEEncrypted transmission, and with K
KmsThe K that encrypts
UESend to described KMS;
Described KMS adopts K
KmsDeciphering obtains K
UE, and utilize the K that obtains
UEData to the UE transmission are protected.
Set up between described KMS and the UE and share master key, be specially:
Described UE and Bootstrapping service function entity BSF set up by Authentication and Key Agreement AKA mechanism and share key K
s
Described UE generates identical shared master key with BSF according to identical parameter;
Described BSF will share master key and send to KMS.
This method further comprises: described UE and BSF adopt GBA_ME pattern or GBA_U pattern to generate shared master key.
With K
UETogether adopt K
KmsThe parameter of encrypting comprises following at least a: timestamp, random number, sequence number, user ID ID, K
UELife cycle.
This method further comprises: described KMS is with K
UE, and K
KmsThe K that encrypts
UESession Description Protocol security descriptor SDES message by media network key MIKEY message or internet protocol secure IPsec message or safe transmission layer protocol TLS message or Media Stream sends to described UE.
Described MIKEY message or IPsec message or TLS message or SDES message adopt the derivative key of sharing master key or shared master key to encrypt.
The present invention also provides a kind of data handling system that realizes secure communication of network, and this system comprises: KMS and UE, wherein,
Described KMS, the shared master key that is used for setting up between basis and the described UE generate and share key K
UE, and utilize self-set key K
KmsTo K
UESend to described UE after encrypting; Also be used for when receiving the data of UE transmission, adopting K
KmsDeciphering obtains K
UE, and utilize the K that obtains
UEData to the UE transmission are protected;
Described UE is used for adopting K when described KMS transmits data
UEEncrypted transmission, and with K
KmsThe K that encrypts
UESend to described KMS.
With K
UETogether adopt K
KmsThe parameter of encrypting comprises following at least a: timestamp, random number, sequence number, user ID ID, K
UELife cycle.
Described KMS is further used for, with K
UE, and K
KmsThe K that encrypts
UESend to described UE by MIKEY message or IPsec message or TLS message or SDES message.
Described MIKEY message or IPsec message or TLS message or SDES message adopt the derivative key of sharing master key or shared master key to encrypt.
A kind of data processing method and system that realizes secure communication of network provided by the present invention sets up shared master key between UE and the KMS by the GBA mode, and generates and share key K by sharing master key
UE, utilize K
UEProduce encryption safe parameter required in the key agreement protocol, and then realize the secure communication between UE and the KMS.Because the K among the present invention
UEBe to adopt the ciphertext form of having only KMS to understand to be sent to UE, by UE ciphertext is returned to KMS again, so KMS need not storage and maintenance K
UE, this has just reduced the state of KMS; In addition, because KMS no longer stores K
UE, therefore cause K when KMS is broken Shi Buhui
UELeakage, thereby improved the fail safe of network service.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is a GBA configuration diagram of the prior art;
Fig. 2 is the flow chart of the Bootstrapping process of UE and BSF in the prior art;
Fig. 3 sets up the flow chart of secure association procedure for UE in the prior art and NAF;
Fig. 4 is a kind of flow chart of realizing the data processing method of secure communication of network of the present invention;
Fig. 5 is K in the embodiment of the invention
UEThe schematic diagram that generates;
Fig. 6 is a kind of composition structural representation of realizing the data handling system of secure communication of network of the present invention.
Embodiment
The technical solution of the present invention is further elaborated below in conjunction with the drawings and specific embodiments.
A kind of data processing method that realizes secure communication of network provided by the present invention as shown in Figure 4, mainly may further comprise the steps:
At first, UE and BSF set up by AKA mechanism and share key K
s, and according to the identical identical shared master key of parameter generation; BSF will share master key and send to KMS by the interface between itself and the KMS, thereby UE has promptly had identical shared master key with KMS; Then, KMS is again according to the shared key K between shared master key generation KMS that obtains and the UE
UE
It is pointed out that according to strategy can adopt two kinds of patterns of GBA_ME and GBA_U to generate in the practical application and share master key, the shared master key that the GBA_ME pattern generates is K at BSF and KMS
s_ NAF, the shared master key that the GBA_U pattern generates is K
s_ ext_NAF and K
s_ int_NAF.
Because K
KmsHave only KMS to know that (UE can't be known K
Kms), so KMS is with K
KmsThe K that encrypts
UEAfter sending to UE, UE can't be decrypted, so KMS need be with K
UEWith K
KmsThe K that encrypts
UETogether send to UE, make UE can know K
UE, and then according to K
UECarry out protecting data.In addition, KMS is with K
KmsThe K that encrypts
UESend to behind the UE K
UELose, thereby KMS need not storage and maintenance K again
UE, this has just reduced the state of KMS.
If it is pointed out that KMS sends K to UE for the first time in step 402
KmsThis K that encrypts
UEThe time, this K that also will not encrypt
UEUE sends to UE, so that can be known the shared key K between itself and the KMS
UEAnd storage.Thereby UE adopts this K to KMS transmission data the time
UEEncrypted transmission is simultaneously with K
KmsThe K that encrypts
UESend to KMS again.
KMS receives K
KmsThe K that encrypts
UEAfter, utilize self K
KmsDeciphering can obtain K
UE, and then can utilize K
UEData to the UE transmission are decrypted.This shows that KMS is no longer to sharing key K among the present invention
UECarry out storage and maintenance, but when transmitting data, offer KMS, so not only saved the memory space of KMS, also reduced the state of KMS by UE.
Below in conjunction with K shown in Figure 5
UEThe schematic diagram that generates, and with K
s_ NAF is that example is elaborated.For K
s_ ext_NAF and K
sThe embodiment of _ int_NAF is then with K
sThe embodiment of _ NAF is similar.
Step 501, UE and BSF set up by AKA mechanism and share key K
s
Set up between UE and the BSF and share key K
sProcess be prior art, repeat no more herein.
Step 502, UE uses identical parameter to generate identical shared master key K with BSF
s_ NAF.
Step 503, BSF by and KMS between interface Zn with K
s_ NAF sends to KMS, and UE and KMS promptly have shared master key K like this
s_ NAF.
The safety of BSF and KMS is to guarantee that by network domain security level of security is not less than the level of security of UE and KMS.
Step 504, KMS generates and shares key K
UEWith random number RA ND.
K
UECan generate by the pseudorandom generating function with RAND.
Step 505, KMS utilizes K
KmsEncrypt K
UE, user ID (ID) and RAND obtain E
Kms(K
UE|| T||ID||RAND).
E
KmsBe the key that has only KMS just to know, ciphering process can use hardware to realize, can raise the efficiency like this, and E
KmsBoth can be that a key also can be in the group key.
It is pointed out that in order to prevent Replay Attack, use K
KmsEncrypt K
UEThe time, can add time stamp T (timestamp), random number RA ND, sequence number, user ID, K
UELife cycle isoparametric at least a, and K
UELife cycle both can be the time also can be to use number of times.Embodiments of the invention are with user ID and RAND and K
UEThe common encryption describes.
Step 506, KMS is with K
UE, RAND and E
Kms(K
UE|| T||ID||RAND) send to UE by media network key (MIKEY, Multimedia Internet KEYing) message.
If do not support MIKEY between UE and the KMS, then can adopt other secured fashions, as internet protocol secure (IPsec, Internet Protocol Security), safe transmission layer protocol (TLS, TransportLayer Security Protocol), the Session Description Protocol security descriptor of Media Stream (SDES, SessionDescription Protocol Security Descriptions for Media Streams) waits and transmits K
UE, RAND and E
Kms(K
UE|| T||ID||RAND), the fail safe of message can be by shared master key K
s_ NAF or K
sThe derivative key of _ NAF provides.In addition, if K
KmsBe in the group key, in message, need to provide the call number of key so.
Step 507, UE uses K
s_ NAF understands the MIKEY message from KMS, obtains K
UE, RAND and E
Kms(K
UE|| T||ID||RAND).
After said process is finished, KMS Maintenance free K
UESo, reduced the burden of KMS; In addition, because KMS no longer needs to store K
UE, therefore cause K when KMS is broken Shi Buhui
UELeakage, this has also strengthened the fail safe of KMS.
For realizing above-mentioned data processing method, the present invention also provides a kind of data handling system that realizes secure communication of network, and as shown in Figure 6, this system comprises: KMS 10 and UE 20.KMS 10, and the shared master key that is used for setting up between basis and the UE 20 generates shares key K
UE, and utilize self-set key K
KmsTo K
UESend to UE 20 after encrypting; Also be used for when receiving the data of UE 20 transmission, adopting K
KmsDeciphering obtains K
UE, and utilize the K that obtains
UEData to UE 20 transmission are protected.UE20 is used for adopting K to KMS 10 transmission data the time
UEEncrypted transmission, and with K
KmsThe K that encrypts
UESend to KMS 10.
It is pointed out that and K
UETogether adopt K
KmsThe parameter of encrypting comprises following at least a: timestamp, random number, sequence number, user ID, K
UELife cycle.
Preferable, KMS 10 can be with K
KmsThe K that encrypts
UESend to UE 20 by MIKEY message or IPsec message or TLS message or SDES message.MIKEY message or IPsec message or TLS message or SDES message can adopt the derivative key of sharing master key or shared master key to encrypt.
The above is preferred embodiment of the present invention only, is not to be used to limit protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. a data processing method that realizes secure communication of network is characterized in that, this method comprises:
The shared master key of setting up between Key Management server KMS basis and the client UE generates shares key K
UE
Described KMS utilizes self-set key K
KmsTo K
UEEncrypt, and the K after will encrypting
UESend to described UE;
Described UE adopts K to KMS transmission data the time
UEEncrypted transmission, and with K
KmsThe K that encrypts
UESend to described KMS;
Described KMS adopts K
KmsDeciphering obtains K
UE, and utilize the K that obtains
UEData to the UE transmission are protected.
2. according to the data processing method of the described realization secure communication of network of claim 1, it is characterized in that, set up between described KMS and the UE and share master key, be specially:
Described UE and Bootstrapping service function entity BSF set up by Authentication and Key Agreement AKA mechanism and share key K
s
Described UE generates identical shared master key with BSF according to identical parameter;
Described BSF will share master key and send to KMS.
3. according to the data processing method of the described realization secure communication of network of claim 2, it is characterized in that this method further comprises: described UE and BSF adopt GBA_ME pattern or GBA_U pattern to generate shared master key.
4. according to the data processing method of the described realization secure communication of network of claim 1, it is characterized in that, with K
UETogether adopt K
KmsThe parameter of encrypting comprises following at least a: timestamp, random number, sequence number, user ID ID, K
UELife cycle.
5. according to the data processing method of the described realization secure communication of network of claim 4, it is characterized in that this method further comprises: described KMS is with K
UE, and K
KmsThe K that encrypts
UESession Description Protocol security descriptor SDES message by media network key MIKEY message or internet protocol secure IPsec message or safe transmission layer protocol TLS message or Media Stream sends to described UE.
6. according to the data processing method of the described realization secure communication of network of claim 5, it is characterized in that described MIKEY message or IPsec message or TLS message or SDES message adopt the derivative key of sharing master key or shared master key to encrypt.
7. a data handling system that realizes secure communication of network is characterized in that, this system comprises: KMS and UE, wherein,
Described KMS, the shared master key that is used for setting up between basis and the described UE generate and share key K
UE, and utilize self-set key K
KmsTo K
UESend to described UE after encrypting; Also be used for when receiving the data of UE transmission, adopting K
KmsDeciphering obtains K
UE, and utilize the K that obtains
UEData to the UE transmission are protected;
Described UE is used for adopting K when described KMS transmits data
UEEncrypted transmission, and with K
KmsThe K that encrypts
UESend to described KMS.
8. according to the data handling system of the described realization secure communication of network of claim 7, it is characterized in that, with K
UETogether adopt K
KmsThe parameter of encrypting comprises following at least a: timestamp, random number, sequence number, user ID ID, K
UELife cycle.
9. according to the data handling system of claim 7 or 8 described realization secure communication of network, it is characterized in that described KMS is further used for, with K
UE, and K
KmsThe K that encrypts
UESend to described UE by MIKEY message or IPsec message or TLS message or SDES message.
10. according to the data handling system of the described realization secure communication of network of claim 9, it is characterized in that described MIKEY message or IPsec message or TLS message or SDES message adopt the derivative key of sharing master key or shared master key to encrypt.
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CN106936570A (en) * | 2015-12-31 | 2017-07-07 | 华为技术有限公司 | A kind of cipher key configuration method and KMC, network element |
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Application publication date: 20100602 |