CN103729940A - Method and system for safe downloading of TMK - Google Patents
Method and system for safe downloading of TMK Download PDFInfo
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- CN103729940A CN103729940A CN201310740285.8A CN201310740285A CN103729940A CN 103729940 A CN103729940 A CN 103729940A CN 201310740285 A CN201310740285 A CN 201310740285A CN 103729940 A CN103729940 A CN 103729940A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
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- G—PHYSICS
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- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
- G06Q20/20—Point-of-sale [POS] network systems
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method for safe downloading of a TMK. The method comprises the steps that a TK is generated by a POS terminal, wherein the TK comprises an asymmetric TEK and a symmetric transmission AUK; the TK is encrypted by the POS terminal so that a transmission key cryptograph Ctk_Pu can be generated and the transmission key cryptograph Ctk_Pu is collected by an operation terminal and transmitted to a KMS; bidirectional authentication is conducted by the POS terminal and the KMS through the symmetric transmission AUK; if authentication is passed, the TMK is encrypted by the KMS through the TEK and then a terminal master key cryptograph is sent to the POS terminal. The invention further provides a system for safe downloading of the TMK. The method and system for safe downloading of the TMK have the advantages that encryption transmission is conducted on the TMK through the TK, remote TMK downloading of the POS terminal is achieved, collection and uploading of the TK are greatly facilitated through the operation terminal, and the transmission safety of the TK is improved at the same time.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to E-Payment field, relate in particular to a kind of terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading and system.
Background technology
(BANK Card) is more and more universal as the means of payment for bank card, common bank card paying system comprises point of sales terminal (Point Of Sale, POS), POS receives single system (POSP), code keypad (PIN PAD) and hardware encipher machine (Hardware and Security Module, HSM).Wherein POS terminal can be accepted bank card information, has communication function, and the instruction of accepting teller completes financial transaction information and the equipment of exchange for information about; POS receives single system POS terminal is managed concentratedly, comprises parameter downloads, and key is downloaded, and accepts, processes or forward the transaction request of POS terminal, and to POS terminal loopback transaction results information, is the system of centralized management and transaction processing; Code keypad (PIN PAD) is that the relevant key of various financial transactions is carried out to safe storage protection, and PIN is encrypted to the safety equipment of protection; Hardware encipher machine (HSM) is to the peripheral hardware equipment that is encrypted of transmission data, for correctness and the storage key of encryption and decryption, checking message and the document source of PIN.Personal identification code (Personal Identification Number, PIN), i.e. personal identification number, is the data message of identifying holder's identity legitimacy in on-line transaction, in cyber-net system, any link does not allow to occur in mode expressly; Terminal master key (Terminal Master Key, TMK), during POS terminal works, the master key that working key is encrypted, encrypting storing is in system database; POS terminal is widely used in bank card and pays occasion, such as manufacturer's shopping, hotel's lodging etc., is a kind of indispensable modernization means of payment, has incorporated the various occasions of people's life.Bank card; particularly debit card; generally all by holder, be provided with PIN; carrying out in payment process; POS terminal is except above sending the data such as the magnetic track information of bank card; also want holder to input the identity legitimacy of PIN for the checking holder of issuing bank, guarantee bank card safety of payment, protection holder's property safety.In order to prevent that PIN from revealing or being cracked; requirement is from terminal to issuing bank in whole information interactive process; whole process is carried out safety encipher protection to PIN; do not allow any link in computer network system; PIN occurs in mode expressly, and the POS terminal of therefore accepting at present input PIN all requires to be equipped with key management system.
The key code system of POS terminal is divided into secondary: terminal master key (TMK) and working key (WK).Wherein TMK is encrypted protection to WK.Every POS terminal has unique TMK, must have safeguard protection, and assurance can only also participate in calculating by write device, can not read; TMK is a very crucial root key, if TMK is intercepted, working key is just cracked than being easier to, by serious threat bank card safety of payment.So can secure download TMK to POS terminal, become the key of whole POS terminal security.
In order to guarantee the downloading in POS terminal of terminal master key TMK safety, the safe machine room that the download of terminal master key TMK must be controlled at the administrative center of acquirer carries out, and therefore essentially will concentrate POS terminal by artificial, and download terminal master key TMK.Thereby bring maintenance centre's machine room workload large; After equipment dispatches from the factory, need to be transported to administrative center's safe machine room download key and just can be deployed to trade company, transportation cost rises; In order to concentrate lower dress key, need a large amount of staff and working time, the problem such as maintenance cost is large, maintenance period is long.
Summary of the invention
For solving the problems of the technologies described above, the technical scheme that the present invention adopts is:
A kind of terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading, comprises step: S101, KMS system call hardware encipher machine produce PKI Pu and private key Pr, and PKI Pu is sent to POS terminal and is stored in code keypad; S102, POS terminal are called code keypad and are produced transmission security key TK, and described transmission security key TK comprises asymmetric traffic encryption key TEK and symmetrical certified transmission key A UK; S103, POS terminal are called the code keypad Pu encrypted transmission cipher key T K generating transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu that uses public-key, and operating terminal gathers described transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to KMS system; S104, KMS system call hardware encipher machine use private key Pr deciphering transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu to obtain transmission security key TK; S105, POS terminal and KMS system are used symmetrical certified transmission key A UK to carry out two-way authentication; If S106 authentication is passed through, KMS system is used traffic encryption key TEK to encrypt terminal master key TMK and is generated master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk and master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk is sent to POS terminal; S107, POS terminal are called code keypad and are used traffic encryption key TEK deciphering master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk obtain terminal master key TMK and terminal master key TMK is stored in code keypad.
Another technical scheme provided by the invention is:
A kind of terminal master key TMK secure download system, the operating terminal that comprises KMS system, is connected with KMS system communication, and operating terminal the POS terminal and the hardware encipher machine that communicate to connect; Described POS terminal comprises TK generation module, deciphering module, two-way authentication A module, and described KMS system comprises public and private key generation module, TK receiver module, two-way authentication B module, encrypting module, and described operating terminal comprises TK acquisition module; Described public and private key generation module is used for calling hardware encipher machine and produces PKI Pu and private key Pr, and PKI Pu is sent to POS terminal and is stored in code keypad; Described TK generation module is used for calling code keypad and produces transmission security key TK, and described transmission security key TK comprises asymmetric traffic encryption key TEK and symmetrical certified transmission key A UK; Described TK encrypting module is used for calling the code keypad Pu encrypted transmission cipher key T K generating transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu that uses public-key, and TK acquisition module is used for gathering described transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to KMS system; Described TK receiver module is used for calling hardware encipher machine and uses private key Pr deciphering transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu to obtain transmission security key TK; Described two-way authentication A module and two-way authentication B module are used symmetrical certified transmission key A UK to carry out two-way authentication for POS terminal and KMS system; Described encrypting module, for when authentication is passed through, is used traffic encryption key TEK to encrypt terminal master key TMK and generates master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk and master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk is sent to POS terminal; Described deciphering module is used for calling code keypad and uses traffic encryption key TEK deciphering master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk obtain terminal master key TMK and terminal master key TMK is stored in to code keypad.
Beneficial effect of the present invention is: the present invention is encrypted transmission by POS terminal upload transfers cipher key T K transmission to T MK, realize POS terminal remote download terminal master key TMK, wherein TK is gathered and is uploaded by operating terminal, improve widely POS terminal and uploaded the time efficiency of TK, also improved the transmission security of TK simultaneously.Further, described transmission security key TK comprises asymmetric traffic encryption key TEK and symmetrical certified transmission key A UK, POS terminal and KMS system are first carried out bidirectional identity authentication through authenticate key AUK, authentication is encrypted terminal master key TMK by the asymmetric traffic encryption key TEK of rear use and is transmitted, and has improved the transmission of TMK and has downloaded safety.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is the structured flowchart of a kind of terminal master key TMK of an embodiment of the present invention secure download system;
Fig. 2 is the structured flowchart of POS terminal in an embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 3 is the structured flowchart of KMS system in an embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 4 is the structured flowchart of operating terminal in an embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 5 is the structured flowchart of two-way authentication A module in an embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 6 is the structured flowchart of two-way authentication B module in an embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 7 is the method flow diagram of a kind of terminal master key TMK of an embodiment of the present invention method for safely downloading.
Main element symbol description
10:POS terminal; 20:KMS system; 30: hardware encipher machine; 40: operating terminal; 101:TK generation module; 102: deciphering module; 103: two-way authentication A module; 201: public and private key generation module; 202:TK receiver module; 203: encrypting module; 204: two-way authentication B module; 401:TK acquisition module; 402: two-way authentication A module; 403: operator's card; 404: keeper's card; 405: packetization module; 1031: the first random number generation units; 1032: the first data transmit-receive unit; 1033: the first encryption/decryption elements; 1034: the first judging units; 2041: the second random number generation units; 2042: the second data transmit-receive unit; 2043: the second encryption/decryption elements; 2044: the second judging units.
Embodiment
By describing technology contents of the present invention, structural attitude in detail, being realized object and effect, below in conjunction with embodiment and coordinate accompanying drawing to be explained in detail.
First, the abbreviation the present invention relates to and Key Term are defined and are illustrated:
The abbreviation of AUK:Authentication Key, authentication authorization and accounting key, for the two-way authentication between PINPAD and key management system KMS;
CA center: so-called CA(Certificate Authority) center, it is to adopt PKI(Public Key Infrastructure) public key infrastructure technology, network ID authentication service is provided specially, be responsible for signing and issuing and managing digital certificate, and there is third party's trust authority of authoritative and fairness, its effect is just as the company of issue certificates in our actual life, as passport is handled mechanism;
The abbreviation of HSM:High Security Machine, high safety equipment are hardware encipher machine in this system;
KMS system: Key Management System, key management system, for office terminal master key TMK;
The abbreviation of MAK:Mac Key, i.e. MAC computation key, consults to determine 24 byte symmetric keys with client, for the MAC value of TK between MTMS system and KMS system, calculates;
MTMS: full name Material Tracking Management System, Tracing Material management system is mainly used when plant produced;
The abbreviation of PIK:Pin Key, i.e. Pin encryption key, is the one of working key;
PINPAD: code keypad;
The abbreviation of PK:Protect Key, i.e. Protective Key, consults to determine with client, 24 byte symmetric keys.For the encrypted transmission of TK between MTMS/TCS and KMS;
The abbreviation of POS:Point Of Sale, i.e. point-of-sale terminal
SNpinpad: the sequence number of code keypad, when PINPAD is built-in, SNpos is consistent with POS terminal serial number;
The sequence number of SN:POS terminal;
The abbreviation of TEK:Transmission Encrypt Key, i.e. traffic encryption key, 24 byte symmetric keys, for the encrypted transmission of TMK between PINPAD and key management system KMS;
The abbreviation of TK:Transmission Key, i.e. transmission security key.Transmission security key is comprised of traffic encryption key TEK and two-way authentication key A UK;
The abbreviation of TMS:Terminal Management System, i.e. terminal management system, for completing the functions such as the management of POS end message, software and parameter configuration, remote download, the management of terminal running state information, remote diagnosis;
The abbreviation of TMK:Terminal Master Key, i.e. terminal master key, for the encrypted transmission of working key between POS terminal and payment receipts single system;
Safe house: have higher security level other, for the room of service device, this room needs just can enter after authentication.
Intellective IC card: be CPU card, integrated circuit in card comprises central processor CPU, programmable read only memory EEPROM, random access memory ram and is solidificated in the card internal operating system COS (Chip Operating System) in read only memory ROM, and in card, data are divided into outside and read and inter-process part.
Symmetric key: the both sides that transmit and receive data must use identical key to being expressly encrypted and decrypt operation.Symmetric key encryption algorithm mainly comprises: DES, 3DES, IDEA, FEAL, BLOWFISH etc.
Unsymmetrical key: rivest, shamir, adelman needs two keys: public-key cryptography (private key Public key) and private cipher key (PKI Private key).Public-key cryptography and private cipher key are a pair of, if data are encrypted with public-key cryptography, only have and could decipher with corresponding private cipher key; If data are encrypted with private cipher key, only have so and could decipher with corresponding public-key cryptography.Because what encryption and decryption were used is two different keys, so this algorithm is called rivest, shamir, adelman.The basic process that rivest, shamir, adelman is realized confidential information exchange is: Party A generates pair of secret keys and a handle is wherein disclosed as Public key to other side; After using this key to be encrypted confidential information, the Party B who obtains this Public key sends to again Party A; Another private key that Party A preserves with oneself is again decrypted the information after encrypting.Party A sends to Party B after can using Party B's PKI to be encrypted confidential information again; Party B is decrypted the information after encrypting with the private spoon of oneself again.Main algorithm has RSA, Elgamal, knapsack algorithm, Rabin, D-H, ECC(elliptic curve encryption algorithm).
RSA: a kind of asymmetric key algorithm.RSA public key encryption algorithm is by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamirh and Len Adleman, in (Massachusetts Institute Technology), to be developed for 1977.RSA is named the name from they three of exploitation.RSA is the most influential public key encryption algorithm at present, and it can resist up to the present known all cryptographic attacks, by ISO, is recommended as public key data encryption standard.RSA Algorithm is based on a foolproof number theory fact: two large prime numbers are multiplied each other very easy.RSA Algorithm be first can be simultaneously for encrypting and the algorithm of digital signature, also easy to understand and operation.RSA is studied public key algorithm the most widely, from proposing three ten years till now, has experienced the test of various attack, for people accept, generally believes it is one of current classic PKI scheme gradually.
TDES Triple-DES:DES is a kind of symmetric encipherment algorithm, and key is 8 bytes.TDES is the cryptographic algorithm based on DES, and its key is 16 bytes or 24 bytes.TDES/3DES is the abbreviated expression (being triple DES) of English TripleDES, and DES is that English Data Encryption Standard(counts encryption standard) abbreviated expression.DES is a kind of symmetric key encryption algorithm, i.e. the data encryption key cryptographic algorithm identical with decruption key.DES is developed and discloses at 20 century 70s by IBM Corporation, subsequently for U.S. government adopts, and is admitted by NBS and ANSI (ANSI).TDES/3DES is a kind of pattern of des encryption algorithm, and it uses the key of 3 64 to carry out three encryptions to data.It is a safer distortion of DES.
For solving the technical matters existing in background technology, the present invention adopts a kind of new master key download scenarios, by POS terminal, produce at random TK(Transmission Key, transmission security key), TK after producing is stored in the code keypad of POS terminal, and TK is sent to KMS(Key Management System by transmission mode required under various application scenarioss, key management system, for office terminal master key TMK).
When POS terminal to apply download terminal master key TMK, KMS system is used TK to encrypt terminal master key TMK, and the terminal master key ciphertext after encrypting is sent to POS terminal, after receiving, POS terminal with TK, master key ciphertext is decrypted, obtain terminal master key TMK, and terminal master key TMK is kept in code keypad.
So, by TK, encrypt terminal master key TMK, make TMK can carry out remote transmission, facilitate the secure download of TMK.
Above-mentionedly by POS terminal, gather and be sent to bank's end after transmission security key TK TMK is encrypted, then by the method that POS terminal remote is downloaded the TMK after TK encrypts, can realize the remote download of TMK.But, major function by operation POS terminal is to pay by mails, by operation POS terminal, produce transmission security key TK loaded down with trivial details, the inefficiency that operates on the one hand, simultaneously, also inconvenience operates accordingly to TK, POS terminal need to arrange the special limited hardware resource of transmission security key generation pattern waste POS terminal on the other hand, therefore needs a kind of prompt operation POS terminal to produce and upload the terminal master key TMK secure download scheme of TK.
The technical scheme that just the present invention is overcome to the problems referred to above is below elaborated.
Refer to Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, wherein, Fig. 1 is the structured flowchart of a kind of terminal master key TMK secure download system in an embodiment of the present invention, Fig. 2 is the structured flowchart of POS terminal in an embodiment of the present invention, Fig. 3 is the structured flowchart of KMS system in an embodiment of the present invention, and Fig. 4 is the structured flowchart of operating terminal in an embodiment of the present invention.Operating terminal 40 that this terminal master key TMK secure download system comprises KMS system 20, communicate to connect with KMS system 20, the POS terminal 10 and the hardware encipher machine 30 that communicate to connect with operating terminal 40; Described POS terminal 10 comprises TK generation module 101, deciphering module 102, two-way authentication A module 103, described KMS system 20 comprises public and private key generation module 201, TK receiver module 202, two-way authentication B module 204, encrypting module 203, and described operating terminal 40 comprises TK acquisition module 401.
Described public and private key generation module 201 produces PKI Pu and private key Pr for calling hardware encipher machine 30, and PKI Pu is sent to POS terminal 10 and is stored in code keypad;
Described TK generation module 101 produces transmission security key TK for calling code keypad, and described transmission security key TK comprises asymmetric traffic encryption key TEK and symmetrical certified transmission key A UK;
Described TK encrypting module 102 is for calling the code keypad Pu encrypted transmission cipher key T K generating transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu that uses public-key, and TK acquisition module is used for gathering described transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to KMS system 20;
Described TK receiver module 202 is used private key Pr deciphering transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu to obtain transmission security key TK for calling hardware encipher machine 30;
Described two-way authentication A module 103 is used symmetrical certified transmission key A UK to carry out two-way authentication with two-way authentication B module 204 for POS terminal 10 and KMS system 20;
Described encrypting module 203, for when authentication is passed through, is used traffic encryption key TEK to encrypt terminal master key TMK generation master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk and also master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk is sent to POS terminal 10;
Described deciphering module 102 is used traffic encryption key TEK deciphering master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk obtain terminal master key TMK and terminal master key TMK is stored in to code keypad for calling code keypad.
Wherein, described operating terminal 40 also include operator block 403 and keeper block 404, described operator block 403 and keeper block and in 404, store operator's certificate and the administrator certificate that CA center produces.
Described operator block 403 and keeper block 404 for operating terminal 40 is operated, operating terminal 40 read the operator who is inserted on operating terminal block 403 and keeper block 404, by CA center, operator's certificate and administrator certificate are carried out to legitimacy authentication, and when authentication by after permission operating terminal 40 is operated.
Wherein, described operating terminal 40 also comprises packetization module 405, and described packetization module 405 is packed and uses operator to block and sign for the transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu to receiving and terminal serial number SN.
The hardware encipher machine module of described KMS system 20 also comprises correction verification module, described correction verification module is for when receiving transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu that described TK collecting unit transmits and terminal serial number SN, the legitimacy of the signature of packetization module described in verification, if legal, by associated with transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu terminal serial number SN the SN-Key_KMS database that is stored in.
Refer to Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, Fig. 5 is the structured flowchart of described two-way authentication module, Fig. 6 is the structured flowchart of described two-way authentication B module, wherein, described two-way authentication A module 103 comprises the first random number generation unit 1031, the first data transmit-receive unit 1032, the first encryption/decryption element 1033 and the first judging unit, and described in 1034, two-way authentication B module 204 comprises the second random number generation unit 2041, the second data transmit-receive unit 2042, the second encryption/decryption element 2043 and the second judging unit 2044.
The first random number generation unit 1031 is for generation of the first random number R nd1; The first data transmit-receive unit 1032 is for being sent to KMS system by the first random number R nd1 producing; The second data transmit-receive unit 2032 is for receiving the first random number R nd1; The second random number generation unit 2041, for when receiving the first random number R nd1, produces random number the 2nd Rnd2; The second encryption/decryption element 2043 is for when receiving the first random number R nd1, calls hardware encipher machine 30 and uses certified transmission key A UK to encrypt the first random number R nd1 to obtain the first random number ciphertext Crnd1; The second data transmit-receive unit 2042 is for sending to POS terminal 10 by the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 and the second random number R nd2;
The first encryption/decryption element 1034 is for when receiving the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 and the second random number R nd2, and the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 that uses certified transmission key A UK deciphering to receive obtains the 3rd random number R nd1 '; Whether the first judging unit 1034 is consistent with the first random number R nd1 for judging the 3rd random number R nd1 ';
The first encryption/decryption element 1033 is for judging that when described the first judging unit the 3rd random number R nd1 ' is with the first random number R nd1 when consistent, and use certified transmission key A UK encrypts the second random number R nd2 and generates the second random number ciphertext Crnd2; The first data transmit-receive unit is for sending to KMS system by the second random number ciphertext Crnd2;
The second encryption/decryption element 2043 is for when receiving the second random number ciphertext Crnd2, call the second random number ciphertext Crnd2 acquisition the 4th random number R nd2 ' that hardware encipher machine uses certified transmission key A UK deciphering to receive, the second judging unit is used for judging that whether the 4th random number R nd2 ' is consistent with the second random number R nd2, and when judging that the 4th random number R nd2 ' is with the second random number R nd2 when consistent, the two-way authentication between confirmation KMS system and POS terminal is passed through.
Referring to Fig. 7, is the method flow diagram of a kind of terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading in an embodiment of the present invention, and the method comprises:
S101, KMS system call hardware encipher machine produce PKI Pu and private key Pr, and PKI Pu is sent to POS terminal and is stored in code keypad;
S102, POS terminal are called code keypad and are produced transmission security key TK, and described transmission security key TK comprises asymmetric traffic encryption key TEK and symmetrical certified transmission key A UK;
S103, POS terminal are called the code keypad Pu encrypted transmission cipher key T K generating transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu that uses public-key, and operating terminal gathers described transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to KMS system;
S104, KMS system call hardware encipher machine use private key Pr deciphering transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu to obtain transmission security key TK;
S105, POS terminal and KMS system are used symmetrical certified transmission key A UK to carry out two-way authentication;
If S106 authentication is passed through, KMS system is used traffic encryption key TEK to encrypt terminal master key TMK and is generated master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk and master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk is sent to POS terminal;
S107, POS terminal are called code keypad and are used traffic encryption key TEK deciphering master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk obtain terminal master key TMK and terminal master key TMK is stored in code keypad.
Wherein, described operating terminal can be PC, also can other intelligent hand-held terminals, described operating terminal is connected by serial ports or USB mouth with POS terminal, described operating terminal is provided with the function key of controlling POS terminal generation TK, by operating terminal, can be connected with the POS terminal of Multiple Type and gather upload transfers cipher key T K, therefore by described operating terminal, greatly facilitate the collection of TK and upload, the part resource of simultaneously controlling TK generation operation in POS terminal hardware resource can be released, make the limited hardware resource of POS terminal obtain better optimizing and using.
Wherein, described step S101 " KMS system call hardware encipher machine produces PKI Pu and private key Pr, and PKI Pu is sent to POS terminal and is stored in code keypad " specifically comprises:
KMS system call hardware encipher machine produces PKI Pu and private key Pr, and PKI Pu is issued to CA center;
KMS system CongCA center obtains the work certificate HsmWCRT generating and is kept in database, and work certificate HsmWCRT is sent to POS terminal, and work certificate HsmWCRT is used root certificate HsmRCRT to generate PKI Pu signature;
POS terminal is used the legitimacy of the root certificate HsmRCRT checking work certificate HsmWCRT that burns sheet prepackage, and POS terminal is extracted PKI Pu and is stored in code keypad from work certificate HsmWCRT after being verified.
Further, described in step S103, " operating terminal gathers described transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to KMS system " specifically comprises:
For operator's card and keeper's card, produce respectively public private key pair;
The PKI of generation is issued to CA center, and generating run person blocks certificate and keeper blocks certificate respectively;
Operator is blocked to certificate storage in operator card and keeper is blocked to certificate storage in control card;
Operating terminal reads the operator's card and the keeper's card that are inserted on operating terminal, by CA center, operator's certificate and administrator certificate are carried out to legitimacy authentication, when authentication by after operating terminal gather described transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu be sent to KMS system.
Wherein, described operating terminal is only at operator card with keeper's card is authorized and operator's card and keeper just can carry out TK acquisition operations after blocking by CA center certification simultaneously, therefore only have the operating personnel of appointment in the situation that keeper authorizes, could gather the TK of payment terminal, thereby guaranteed that transmission security key TK can arbitrarily not gathered, guaranteed the legitimacy of the TK that operating terminal collection uploads.
Further, described in step S103, " operating terminal gathers described transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to KMS system " also comprises:
POS terminal is issued operating terminal by transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and terminal serial number SN;
Operating terminal is packed and uses operator to block and sign the transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu receiving and terminal serial number SN, and will be sent to KMS system through transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN of signature.
Described " KMS system call hardware encipher machine uses private key Pr deciphering transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu to obtain transmission security key TK " also comprises:
The legitimacy of first signature verification when KMS system receives transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and terminal serial number SN, if legal, by associated with transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu terminal serial number SN, be stored in SN-Key_KMS database, when KMS receives the master key download request of POS terminal, call hardware encipher machine and use private key Pr deciphering transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu to obtain transmission security key TK.
By operating terminal, the transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu gathering and terminal serial number SN are packed and signed and can review this information and who operator to operate generation by, therefore KMS system can judge whether the transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN that upload are legal according to the legitimacy of the described signature of checking, strengthened the collection transfer management to transmission security key TK, prevented that pseudo-terminal from uploading pseudo-transmission security key TK.
Further, in step S105, described " after KMS system acquisition transmission security key TK, calling hardware encipher machine uses authenticate key AUK and POS terminal to carry out two-way authentication " specifically comprises:
POS terminal produces the first random number R nd1 and the first random number R nd1 is sent to KMS system;
KMS system produces random number the 2nd Rnd2 after receiving the first random number R nd1, calling hardware encipher machine uses authenticate key AUK to encrypt the first random number R nd1 to obtain the first random number ciphertext Crnd1, the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 and the second random number R nd2 are sent to POS terminal;
The first random number ciphertext Crnd1 that POS terminal is used authenticate key AUK deciphering to receive obtains the 3rd random number R nd1 ', judges that whether the 3rd random number R nd1 ' is consistent with the first random number R nd1:
If the 3rd random number R nd1 ' is consistent with the first random number R nd1, POS terminal is used authenticate key AUK to encrypt the second random number R nd2 and is generated the second random number ciphertext Crnd2, and the second random number ciphertext Crnd2 is sent to KMS system;
The second random number ciphertext Crnd2 that KMS system call hardware encipher machine uses authenticate key AUK deciphering to receive obtains the 4th random number R nd2 ', judges that whether the 4th random number R nd2 ' is consistent with the second random number R nd2;
If the 4th random number R nd2 ' is consistent with the second random number R nd2, KMS system and POS terminal authentication pass through.
In the present embodiment, POS terminal, by the order of remote activation download terminal master key, sends to code keypad by master key index Index; Owing to there being multiple keys district in code keypad, use cipher key index Index to determine and master key TMK need to be downloaded to the concrete key district of code keypad.
The code keypad of POS terminal produces the first random number R nd1 and code keypad sequence number SNpinpad and the first random number R nd1 is sent to POS terminal after receiving and starting download command;
POS terminal is sent to system by the terminal serial number SN of code keypad sequence number SNpinpad, the first random number R nd1 and POS terminal;
Described code keypad can be that the built-in code keypad of POS terminal can be also the external code keypad being connected with POS terminal, when POS terminal connect be external code keypad time, the terminal serial number SN of code keypad sequence number SNpinpad and POS terminal is just inconsistent, but code keypad sequence number SNpinpad is just recorded on key management system backstage.So the terminal serial number SN of code keypad sequence number SNpinpad and POS terminal together need to be sent to KMS system.When POS is used built-in code keypad, these two sequence numbers are identical, now only send the terminal serial number SN of POS terminal.
By certified transmission key A UK, can realize the bidirectional identity authentication between POS terminal and TMK system, effectively guarantee the transmission security of terminal master key TMK, by cipher key index Index, master key TMK can be downloaded to key districts different in code keypad, and present embodiment can realize the built-in code keypad or the external code keypad that terminal master key TMK are downloaded to POS terminal by code keypad sequence number SNpinpad simultaneously.
In the present invention, transmission security key TK calculates the original uncommon Kazakhstan value of TK while producing, and when each storage, transmission or use TK, the uncommon Kazakhstan value of first verification TK just can be used TK after upchecking.By the uncommon Kazakhstan value of verification TK, can prevent that memory device from causing the error in data of storage extremely, determines that whether key is correct.
Beneficial effect of the present invention is: the present invention is by POS terminal upload transfers cipher key T K, by transmission security key, TMK is encrypted to transmission, realize POS terminal remote download terminal master key TMK, wherein, TK comprises asymmetric traffic encryption key TEK and symmetrical certified transmission key A UK, POS terminal and KMS system are first carried out bidirectional identity authentication through authenticate key AUK, authentication is encrypted terminal master key TMK by the asymmetric traffic encryption key TEK of rear use and is transmitted, and has improved the transmission of TMK and has downloaded safety.Further, master key TMK of the present invention is generated by KMS system, therefore facilitates follow-up maintenance and the management of KMS system to master key TMK.Further, described TK is gathered and is uploaded by operating terminal, by operating terminal, improved on the one hand the simple operation that produces TK, the hardware resource of POS terminal has only been optimized hardware resource utilization in responsible E-Payment aspect on the other hand, thereby improved widely POS terminal and uploaded the time efficiency of TK, simultaneously by gathering the transmission security of uploading TK and also improved TK on operating terminal.
The foregoing is only embodiments of the invention; not thereby limit the scope of the claims of the present invention; every equivalent structure or conversion of equivalent flow process that utilizes instructions of the present invention and accompanying drawing content to do; or be directly or indirectly used in other relevant technical fields, be all in like manner included in scope of patent protection of the present invention.
Claims (9)
1. a terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading, is characterized in that, comprises step:
S101, KMS system call hardware encipher machine produce PKI Pu and private key Pr, and PKI Pu is sent to POS terminal and is stored in code keypad;
S102, POS terminal are called code keypad and are produced transmission security key TK, and described transmission security key TK comprises asymmetric traffic encryption key TEK and symmetrical certified transmission key A UK;
S103, POS terminal are called the code keypad Pu encrypted transmission cipher key T K generating transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu that uses public-key, and operating terminal gathers described transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to KMS system;
S104, KMS system call hardware encipher machine use private key Pr deciphering transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu to obtain transmission security key TK;
S105, POS terminal and KMS system are used symmetrical certified transmission key A UK to carry out two-way authentication;
If S106 authentication is passed through, KMS system is used traffic encryption key TEK to encrypt terminal master key TMK and is generated master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk and master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk is sent to POS terminal;
S107, POS terminal are called code keypad and are used traffic encryption key TEK deciphering master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk obtain terminal master key TMK and terminal master key TMK is stored in code keypad.
2. terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading according to claim 1, is characterized in that, described " KMS system call hardware encipher machine produces PKI Pu and private key Pr, and PKI Pu is sent to POS terminal and is stored in code keypad " specifically comprises:
KMS system call hardware encipher machine produces PKI Pu and private key Pr, and PKI Pu is issued to CA center;
KMS system CongCA center obtains the work certificate HsmWCRT generating and is kept in database, and work certificate HsmWCRT is sent to POS terminal, and work certificate HsmWCRT is used root certificate HsmRCRT to generate PKI Pu signature;
POS terminal is used the legitimacy of the root certificate HsmRCRT checking work certificate HsmWCRT that burns sheet prepackage, and POS terminal is extracted PKI Pu and is stored in code keypad from work certificate HsmWCRT after being verified.
3. terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading according to claim 1, is characterized in that, described " operating terminal gathers described transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to KMS system " specifically comprises:
For operator's card and keeper's card, produce respectively public private key pair;
The PKI of generation is issued to CA center, and generating run person blocks certificate and keeper blocks certificate respectively;
Operator is blocked to certificate storage in operator card and keeper is blocked to certificate storage in control card;
Operating terminal reads the operator's card and the keeper's card that are inserted on operating terminal, by CA center, operator's certificate and administrator certificate are carried out to legitimacy authentication, when authentication by after operating terminal gather described transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu be sent to KMS system.
4. terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading according to claim 3, is characterized in that, described " operating terminal gathers described transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to KMS system " also comprises:
POS terminal is issued operating terminal by transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and terminal serial number SN;
Operating terminal is packed and uses operator to block and sign the transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu receiving and terminal serial number SN, and will be sent to KMS system through transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN of signature;
Described " KMS system call hardware encipher machine uses private key Pr deciphering transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu to obtain transmission security key TK " also comprises:
The legitimacy of first signature verification when KMS system receives transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and terminal serial number SN, if legal, by associated with transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu terminal serial number SN, be stored in SN-Key_KMS database, when KMS receives the master key download request of POS terminal, call hardware encipher machine and use private key Pr deciphering transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu to obtain transmission security key TK.
5. a kind of terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading according to claim 1, is characterized in that, described " after KMS system acquisition transmission security key TK, calling hardware encipher machine uses authenticate key AUK and POS terminal to carry out two-way authentication " specifically comprises:
POS terminal produces the first random number R nd1 and the first random number R nd1 is sent to KMS system;
KMS system produces random number the 2nd Rnd2 after receiving the first random number R nd1, calling hardware encipher machine uses authenticate key AUK to encrypt the first random number R nd1 to obtain the first random number ciphertext Crnd1, the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 and the second random number R nd2 are sent to POS terminal;
The first random number ciphertext Crnd1 that POS terminal is used authenticate key AUK deciphering to receive obtains the 3rd random number R nd1 ', judges that whether the 3rd random number R nd1 ' is consistent with the first random number R nd1:
If the 3rd random number R nd1 ' is consistent with the first random number R nd1, POS terminal is used authenticate key AUK to encrypt the second random number R nd2 and is generated the second random number ciphertext Crnd2, and the second random number ciphertext Crnd2 is sent to KMS system;
The second random number ciphertext Crnd2 that KMS system call hardware encipher machine uses authenticate key AUK deciphering to receive obtains the 4th random number R nd2 ', judges that whether the 4th random number R nd2 ' is consistent with the second random number R nd2;
If the 4th random number R nd2 ' is consistent with the second random number R nd2, KMS system and POS terminal authentication pass through.
6. a terminal master key TMK secure download system, is characterized in that, the operating terminal that comprises KMS system, be connected with KMS system communication, with POS terminal and the hardware encipher machine of operating terminal communication connection; Described POS terminal comprises TK generation module, deciphering module, two-way authentication A module,
Described KMS system comprises public and private key generation module, TK receiver module, two-way authentication B module, encrypting module,
Described operating terminal comprises TK acquisition module;
Described public and private key generation module is used for calling hardware encipher machine and produces PKI Pu and private key Pr, and PKI Pu is sent to POS terminal and is stored in code keypad;
Described TK generation module is used for calling code keypad and produces transmission security key TK, and described transmission security key TK comprises asymmetric traffic encryption key TEK and symmetrical certified transmission key A UK;
Described TK encrypting module is used for calling the code keypad Pu encrypted transmission cipher key T K generating transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu that uses public-key, and TK acquisition module is used for gathering described transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu is sent to KMS system;
Described TK receiver module is used for calling hardware encipher machine and uses private key Pr deciphering transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu to obtain transmission security key TK;
Described two-way authentication A module and two-way authentication B module are used symmetrical certified transmission key A UK to carry out two-way authentication for POS terminal and KMS system;
Described encrypting module, for when authentication is passed through, is used traffic encryption key TEK to encrypt terminal master key TMK and generates master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk and master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk is sent to POS terminal;
Described deciphering module is used for calling code keypad and uses traffic encryption key TEK deciphering master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk obtain terminal master key TMK and terminal master key TMK is stored in to code keypad.
7. terminal master key TMK secure download system according to claim 6, it is characterized in that, described operating terminal also includes operator's card and keeper's card, in described operator's card and keeper block, stores operator's certificate and the administrator certificate that CA center produces;
Described operator's card and keeper's card are for operating operating terminal, operating terminal reads the operator's card and the keeper's card that are inserted on operating terminal, by CA center, operator's certificate and administrator certificate are carried out to legitimacy authentication, and when authentication by after permission operating terminal is operated.
8. terminal master key TMK secure download system according to claim 7, it is characterized in that, described operating terminal also comprises packetization module, and described packetization module is for packing and use operator to block and sign the transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu receiving and terminal serial number SN;
The hardware encipher machine module of described KMS system also comprises correction verification module, described correction verification module is for when receiving transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu that described TK collecting unit transmits and terminal serial number SN, the legitimacy of the signature of packetization module described in verification, if legal, by associated with transmission security key ciphertext Ctk_Pu terminal serial number SN the SN-Key_KMS database that is stored in.
9. terminal master key TMK secure download system according to claim 6, it is characterized in that, described two-way authentication A module comprises the first random number generation unit, the first data transmit-receive unit, the first encryption/decryption element and the first judging unit, and described two-way authentication B module comprises the second random number generation unit, the second data transmit-receive unit, the second encryption/decryption element and the second judging unit;
The first random number generation unit is for generation of the first random number R nd1; The first data transmit-receive unit is for being sent to KMS system by the first random number R nd1 producing; The second data transmit-receive unit is used for receiving the first random number R nd1; The second random number generation unit, for when receiving the first random number R nd1, produces random number the 2nd Rnd2; The second encryption/decryption element is for when receiving the first random number R nd1, calls hardware encipher machine and uses certified transmission key A UK to encrypt the first random number R nd1 to obtain the first random number ciphertext Crnd1; The second data transmit-receive unit is for sending to POS terminal by the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 and the second random number R nd2;
The first encryption/decryption element is for when receiving the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 and the second random number R nd2, and the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 that uses certified transmission key A UK deciphering to receive obtains the 3rd random number R nd1 '; The first judging unit is used for judging that whether the 3rd random number R nd1 ' is consistent with the first random number R nd1;
The first encryption/decryption element is for judging that when described the first judging unit the 3rd random number R nd1 ' is with the first random number R nd1 when consistent, and use certified transmission key A UK encrypts the second random number R nd2 and generates the second random number ciphertext Crnd2; The first data transmit-receive unit is for sending to KMS system by the second random number ciphertext Crnd2;
The second encryption/decryption element is for when receiving the second random number ciphertext Crnd2, call the second random number ciphertext Crnd2 acquisition the 4th random number R nd2 ' that hardware encipher machine uses certified transmission key A UK deciphering to receive, the second judging unit is used for judging that whether the 4th random number R nd2 ' is consistent with the second random number R nd2, and when judging that the 4th random number R nd2 ' is with the second random number R nd2 when consistent, the two-way authentication between confirmation KMS system and POS terminal is passed through.
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CN201310740285.8A CN103729940B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of main cipher key T MK method for safely downloading of terminal and system |
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CN2013100846735A CN103220271A (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-03-15 | Downloading method, management method, downloading management method, downloading management device and downloading management system for secret key |
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CN2013100846538A CN103237005A (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-03-15 | Method and system for key management |
CN2013100843972A CN103237004A (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-03-15 | Key download method, key management method, method, device and system for download management |
CN201310740285.8A CN103729940B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of main cipher key T MK method for safely downloading of terminal and system |
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CN201310741949.2A Active CN103731260B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and system |
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CN201310740644.XA Active CN103714638B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method and system of quick position terminal master key failed download |
CN201310740158.8A Active CN103716320B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and systems |
CN201310740380.8A Active CN103714637B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of transmission security key sending method and system, operating terminal |
CN201310740410.5A Active CN103729942B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | Transmission security key is transferred to the method and system of key server from terminal server |
CN201310740231.1A Active CN103714635B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of POS terminal and terminal master key downloading mode collocation method thereof |
CN201310740430.2A Active CN103729943B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method and system transmission security key being imported KMS system |
CN201310742713.0A Active CN103701610B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of acquisition method and system for transmitting cipher key T K |
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CN201310740100.3A Active CN103714633B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method of safe generating transmission key and POS terminal |
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CN201310740360.0A Active CN103714636B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method of batch capture and upload transfers cipher key T K data and operating terminal |
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CN201310742661.7A Active CN103716167B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | Method and device for safely collecting and distributing transmission keys |
CN201310740244.9A Active CN103701609B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of server and the method and system operating terminal two-way authentication |
CN201310740226.0A Active CN103714634B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method of main key of secure download terminal and system |
CN201310742686.7A Active CN103745351B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of acquisition method and system for transmitting cipher key T K |
CN201310742886.2A Active CN103716321B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and systems |
CN201310740574.8A Active CN103729945B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method and system of secure download terminal master key |
CN201310742648.1A Active CN103716155B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method of automated maintenance POS terminal and operation terminal |
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CN201310741949.2A Active CN103731260B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and system |
CN201310740642.0A Active CN103731259B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and systems |
CN201310740567.8A Active CN103729944B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method and system of secure download terminal master key |
CN201310740264.6A Active CN103701812B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | TMK (Terminal Master Key) secure downloading method and system |
CN201310740644.XA Active CN103714638B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method and system of quick position terminal master key failed download |
CN201310740158.8A Active CN103716320B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and systems |
CN201310740380.8A Active CN103714637B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of transmission security key sending method and system, operating terminal |
CN201310740410.5A Active CN103729942B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | Transmission security key is transferred to the method and system of key server from terminal server |
CN201310740231.1A Active CN103714635B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of POS terminal and terminal master key downloading mode collocation method thereof |
CN201310740430.2A Active CN103729943B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method and system transmission security key being imported KMS system |
CN201310742713.0A Active CN103701610B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of acquisition method and system for transmitting cipher key T K |
CN201310742681.4A Active CN103714640B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of sending method of transmission security key and system |
CN201310740100.3A Active CN103714633B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of method of safe generating transmission key and POS terminal |
CN201310740308.5A Active CN103729941B (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2013-12-27 | A kind of main cipher key T MK method for safely downloading of terminal and system |
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