CN100471740C - Hand over procedure from a first to a second train control system - Google Patents
Hand over procedure from a first to a second train control system Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN100471740C CN100471740C CNB2005100829082A CN200510082908A CN100471740C CN 100471740 C CN100471740 C CN 100471740C CN B2005100829082 A CNB2005100829082 A CN B2005100829082A CN 200510082908 A CN200510082908 A CN 200510082908A CN 100471740 C CN100471740 C CN 100471740C
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- signal
- safety system
- railway safety
- control
- shifter
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/30—Trackside multiple control systems, e.g. switch-over between different systems
- B61L27/33—Backup systems, e.g. switching when failures occur
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
- Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
- Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)
- Control Of Multiple Motors (AREA)
Abstract
The method is for the changing over from a first to a second train protection system in which in dependence upon signals sent through the first train protection system a control signal is generated for the second train protection system. In the event of a disconnection or failure of the control signal the second train protection system is activated. The control signal is generated while a first and a second release signal of the first train protection system are evaluated. An independent claim is included for a switching unit (8) data-technically connected to a first and a second train protection system and has means for the monitoring of signals from the first train protection system and which activates the second train protection system based on a predetermined event.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the method and the shifter that first railway safety system are switched to second railway safety system.
Background technology
As the known a kind of inductance type railway safety system of railway safety system (Indusi), at present the title of the inductance type railway safety system that uses at the DB AG of Deutsche Bahn AG is PZB90.This railway safety system is made up of vehicle fitting and highway section device.When showing stop signal, use it for the highway section that monitoring driver or monitor speed and monitoring pass by.
Europe railway control system ETCS (European railway control system) be use in Europe with the irrelevant railway safety system of Indusi/PZB 90.
If there are two railway safety systems, must guarantee that having only one in two activates, so railway safety system can not influence each other.When vehicle or locomotive engine sail the orbital region that only is equipped with Indusi/PZB 90 into, railway safety system Indusi/PZB 90 must can be switched in addition.
Known, railway safety system Indusi is switched to the railway safety system of each other countries in national boundary.
Task of the present invention provides a kind of method and a kind of device, can guarantee to automatically switch and meets the switching of engineering factor with them.
Summary of the invention
This task is to solve by the method that first railway safety system is switched to second railway safety system, wherein according to the signal that sends by first railway safety system, produce the signal of control second railway safety system by shifter, when control signal is closed or stop, second railway safety system is activated.This means that if produce control signal, second railway safety system keeps not activating by control signal, and if do not produce or do not have control signal, second railway safety system is activated.Conceivablely be, be different from according to existing control signal that second railway safety system is activated or do not activate, and produce control signal that keep second railway safety system do not activate or activate according to signal level this moment with first and second signal levels.
Can arrange, as long as shifter detects the signal of first railway safety system that function is arranged, perhaps sort signal trouble free ground is received or the processing of trouble free ground, second railway safety system is kept not activating (principal and subordinate's principle) through control signal, and as long as shifter does not detect the signal of first railway safety system that function is arranged, perhaps receive signal in bad order or fault ground processing signals is arranged, second railway safety system is activated.This means,, or failure-free data transmission existed when suspecting, second railway safety system is activated automatically if to the trouble free functional mode of first railway safety system.Can imagine in addition,,,, and not produce control signal, so do not have to receive the signal that sends from first railway safety system by shifter with the signal at stop of shifter owing to the condition of service reason if in first railway safety system.Therefore first railway safety system can be switched to with on purpose meeting condition of service second railway safety system.This means, first railway safety system is used as leading, and second railway safety system is used as subordinate.If control signal is interrupted, so only second railway safety system is activated.This means, only under special especially situation, two railway safety systems may be activated simultaneously.Second railway safety system has been represented the continuous safety of railway in addition, because when first railway safety system interrupts, can also use a railway safety system.Because second railway safety system can be controlled by shifter by first railway safety system, can arrange, control highway section at second railway safety system, promptly particularly when first railway safety system, when parts of signal transmitting apparatus or shifter interrupt, second railway safety system is activated.This has just been avoided engine driver's interference.
In a kind of preferable methods modification,, produce the signal of control second railway safety system if when first and second release signals of first railway safety system are handled.Must be clearly and unimpeachably determine, first railway safety system sends signal in bad order or during the transmission signal is distorted.Therefore preferably use two signals.If do not receive first or second release signal, this just means that perhaps railway safety system (for example ETCS equipment) breaks down, perhaps transmit release signal the data conductor of process fault is arranged.Because data conductor can be the component part of first railway safety system, and be necessary, also second railway safety system must be activated in this case the faultless function of first railway safety system.Yet for example owing to data conductor, shifter or control signal break down, if two railway safety systems are activated, and the forced brake that causes operation, system response that is to say to " safety " aspect, under any circumstance carries out vehicle or locomotive forced brake.Preferably, the control of the forced brake of two systems is independent of each other.
In the expansion structure of method, can arrange, first release signal is first control monitor unit of the first supervision parts particularly, and second release signal will be particularly second control monitor unit of the second supervision parts discharge, the output signal of control monitor unit be logical combination and corresponding to the result of logical combination, that is to say when logical combination foregone conclusion spare, produce control signal.By first release signal first control monitor unit is resetted.By second release signal second control monitor unit is resetted.With the output signal of two control monitor units for example by interconnecting with arithmetic and logic unit.Produce control signal because this connects, preferably pulse duration modulation (PBM) signal is transferred to second railway safety system with it.Second railway safety system detects this signal and it is switched to and do not activate.This moment, control monitor unit was represented time element, must according to the distance that equates time element be resetted by release signal.Expression first railway safety system that resets regularly is activating with preparing of activating.If one in the control monitor unit is not resetted, this means that first railway safety system has fault, particularly on the first railway security equipment, or on the data conductor between the first railway security equipment and the shifter, fault is arranged.In this case, the incident of logical combination changes and can not produce control signal.If this situation activates second railway safety system.
In the preferable methods modification, arrange first control monitor unit to activate second control monitor unit.This means,, second control monitor unit can be resetted if first control monitor unit resets.Further improved the reliability of shifter by this measure.
Particularly preferably be, if when the logical combination incident changes, control signal is followed the tracks of at interval with preset time.Because if second control monitor unit is activated by first control monitor unit, it just can reset, some time gaps in the past between first control monitor unit and second control monitor unit reset.During this time gap, the change of possible short time of logical combination incident.Yet do not allow to cause the change of control signal and second railway safety system is activated.Therefore arrangement control signal is followed the tracks of at interval with preset time.Preferably, the time delay between this time gap approximately resets corresponding to first control monitor unit and second control monitor unit.
In addition, this task solves by shifter, shifter is and the first and second railway safety system data technique bonded assemblys, and has and be used to monitor the control monitor unit of the first railway safety system signal and activate second railway safety system when foregone conclusion spare.Wherein, first railway safety system comprises the data conductor that is connected to shifter at least in part.Particularly data conductor can be constituted data bus, preferably constitute the fieldbus of MVB (multi-functional transmission bus) or Siemens Company exploitation.Be meant the fault that on first railway safety system, occurs as incident, the fault that occurs in fault that in the signal transmission, occurs or the signal conditioning or meet the signal that shifter is closed in condition of service control.If at first railway safety system or on data transmission, break down, will activate up to second railway safety system that this time point only be in standby mode.This means to turn back to safe condition, particularly this means, train can be passed through the first railway safety system forced brake (fault reaction) reliably, and second railway safety system is switched to actv..
Can arrange in preferred form of implementation, control monitor unit comprises first and second control monitor units, and they are respectively by the control of first and second release signals of first railway safety system, and this moment, output signal or control monitor unit were by the logical-arithmetic unit bonded assembly.Redundant information has been set up in connection by logical-arithmetic unit, so under any circumstance, if foregone conclusion spare occurs, second railway safety system is activated in time and fully.
Particularly preferably be, if signal generation device is connected on the logical-arithmetic unit.Can imagine in principle, the output signal of logical-arithmetic unit is directly used in the activation or deexcitation of second railway safety system.Yet using the advantage of signal generation device is to produce the signal with signal tracking.This means,, yet need some times can obtain signal even the output signal of logical-arithmetic unit changes.Also signal generation device can be constituted integrated circuit (IC).
Particularly preferably be, if first and second control monitor units are in when interconnecting, wherein first control monitor unit sends activation signal to second control monitor unit with reception first release signal time delay ground.By this measure, first control monitor unit is passed through in the monitoring of second control monitor unit realize.If do not receive one or two release signal, the output signal of logical-arithmetic unit changes and therefore control signal time delay perhaps.Therefore to break down be foregone conclusion spare to one or two release signal, and this incident causes activating second railway safety system.
Preferably, first railway safety system has data bus, and shifter can be connected on the data bus through interface.This means, shifter can be connected the different local of data bus, perhaps can be connected on first railway safety system.Particularly can arrange, first railway safety system is constituted the ETCS-system and has data bus, and second railway safety system constituted the Indusi that is connected on the shifter, shifter is connected with the data bus of ETCS-system through interface again.Guaranteed when the parts on the Indusi control highway section interrupt that according to shifter of the present invention the control signal that can constitute the PBM-signal interrupts and Indusi is activated.This means and turn back to safe condition.Do not need this moment newly developed and permit just can using standard-Indusi.Can realize shifter with seldom development cost.It can be connected with data bus through standard interface without a doubt.Preferably the ETCS-system as leading and Indusi as subordinate.Wherein by ETCS equipment through shifter with the control of Indusi by means of the PBM-signal that not have to modulate as control signal.If the PBM signal is connected (available), Indusi is passive.If with PBM-signal at stop (that is to say, if it is lost), Indusi is switched to initiatively.
Particularly preferably be, the processing with pulse-width signal is integrated on the Indusi/PZB90.Therefore can use according to shifter of the present invention, need on Indusi/PZB90, not change or allowance again.
From the explanation of the following examples of the present invention, by means of the accompanying drawing that shows material particular of the present invention with from this claim, draw other features and advantages of the present invention.Each feature can be in modification of the present invention individually or a plurality of combination in any ground realize.
Description of drawings
The embodiment that has represented in the accompanying drawings and narrated in the following description, wherein:
Fig. 1 represents two railway safety systems and a shifter very simplifiedly;
Fig. 2 illustrates the sketch of Fig. 1 and the details drawing of shifter;
Fig. 3 illustrates the scheme drawing of the input and output signal of shifter.
The specific embodiment
Fig. 1 has represented that first railway safety system, 1, the first railway safety system comprises the data conductor 2 that constitutes bus.Through interface 3 to 5 various device 6 to 8 is connected on the data conductor 2, wherein equipment can be train control setup, read out instrument or similarly install.The equipment 8 that is connected on the interface 5 constitutes shifter, and this shifter will be supervised the PBM signal that triggers and export as control signal.Connected thereon and had second railway safety system 9 of handling PBM signal software.Second railway safety system 9 constitutes Indusi and has the assembly Indea10 that receives the PBM signal.
Fig. 2 has represented the details of shifter 8.First control monitor unit 20 that constitutes the supervision element through interface 5 obtains first release signal and constitutes second control monitor unit 21 of supervising element obtaining second release signal.First and second control monitor units 20 and 21 are through activating lead 22 bonded assemblys, can activating second control monitor unit 21 by first control monitor unit 20.The output signal of first and second control monitor units 20,21 is passed to the logical-arithmetic unit 23 that constitutes AND gate, logical-arithmetic unit 23 control signal generation devices 24.Logical combination by logical-arithmetic unit 23 draws logical one, produces the PBM signal by signal generation device 24, and it is passed to assembly Indea10.In addition the PBM signal is returned interface 5.And be connected with the first railway security device 1 through interfaces 5 with second railway safety system 9 that arrow 25 is represented.If receive such PBM signal by second railway safety system 9, second railway safety system is in standby mode, not that is to say to activate.If the output signal of logical-arithmetic unit 23 is logical zeroes, then do not produce the PBM signal, and therefore second railway safety system is in state of activation.
The functional mode of on Fig. 3, having represented shifter 8.On triangle 30, control monitor unit 20 is resetted owing to received first release signal.The reset mode of control monitor unit 20 is represented with thick line 31.Second control monitor unit 21 also receives second release signal.Yet first control monitor unit 20 back that resets that resets at of second control monitor unit 21 postpones a period of time and just carries out, and this is by triangle 32 expressions.Only on this time point, second control monitor unit 21 is just activated by first control monitor unit 20.The reset mode of second control monitor unit is by thick line 33 expressions.On the time point that second control monitor unit 20 resets, two " height " level signals are arranged on logical-arithmetic unit 23.Therefore logical-arithmetic unit 23 mouths are equally on " height " logic level, and generate the PBM-signal of being represented by reference number 34 by signal generation device 24.If first railway safety system 1 is an actv., then with first and second release signals Distance Transmission that equates.Therefore with first control monitor unit 20 in the place 35 and second control monitor unit 21 36 resetted in the place.For fear of the PBM-signal that changes control second railway safety system 9, arranged signal tracking, this is by line 37 expressions.If do not receive first release signal, for example, first control monitor unit 20 is not resetted because the first railway safety system fault or data conductor fault do not generate release signal, this is by triangle 38 expressions.Therefore second control monitor unit does not reset, and this is by triangle 39 expressions.Therefore after signal 40 was pass by, also 41 places closed in the position with the PBM signal, so second railway safety system 9 is activated.If additionally or selectively second release signal is interrupted, also possible this thing happens.
When first railway safety system is switched to the second railway safety system method, wherein produce the signal 34 of controlling second railway safety system by shifter 8, second railway safety system is kept passive through control signal 34 according to the signal that generates by first railway safety system.Second railway safety system is activated.If shifter does not detect the signal that is sent by first railway safety system.Therefore may meet of the interruption of condition of service ground, or even break down or the interruption of generation signal when transmission route breaks down when first railway safety system by the first railway safety system generation signal.Therefore when meeting condition of service, that is to say that the autotelic switching of external control has also guaranteed, is not the actives simultaneously of two railway safety systems, and under the situation of breaking down total system (first and second railway safety systems) activation is " safety ".Break down or signal conditioning might two railway safety systems be actvies when breaking down at transmission route, if two systems are different, be not linked on the forced brake (primary air pipeline) to coupling, avoiding triggering on the meaning of forced brake and can not influence each other.Fault recognition is to provide by engine driver's (demonstration on the operator platform) for this reason, and might instruct operation reaction (driving service regulation).
Claims (7)
1. one kind switches to second railway safety system (1 with first railway safety system, 9) method, wherein according to the signal that sends by first railway safety system (1), produce the control signal (34) that is used to control second railway safety system (9) by shifter (8), wherein the signal that is sent by first railway safety system (1) comprises first and second release signals, control signal (34) carries out evaluation by first and second release signals to first railway safety system (1) and produces, when closing or interrupt, described control signal (34) activates second railway safety system (9), it is characterized in that, first release signal resets first control monitor unit (20) of shifter (8), and second release signal second control monitor unit (21) of shifter (8) is resetted, according to described first and second control monitor units (20, the logical combination of output signal 21) and corresponding to the result of logical combination produces described control signal (34).
2. according to the method for claim 1, it is characterized in that first control monitor unit (20) activates second control monitor unit (21).
3. according to the method for claim 1, it is characterized in that, when the result of described logical combination changes, make described control signal (34) hysteresis specified time section.
4. a shifter (8), itself and first and second railway safety systems (1 that adopt data technique, 9) combine, and has control monitor unit, be used to monitor the signal that first railway safety system (1) sends, this signal comprises first and second release signals, it is characterized in that, described control monitor unit comprises first and second control monitor units (20,21), described first and second control monitor units (20,21) are controlled by first and second release signals of first railway safety system (1) separately, the output signal of wherein said first and second control monitor units (20,21) makes up by logical-arithmetic unit (23).
5. according to the shifter of claim 4, it is characterized in that signal generation device (24) is connected on the described logical-arithmetic unit (23).
6. according to the shifter of claim 4, it is characterized in that first and second control monitor units (20,21) are interconnective, after wherein first control monitor unit (20) receives first release signal, lingeringly activation signal is sent to second control monitor unit (21).
7. according to the shifter of claim 4, it is characterized in that first railway safety system (1) has a data bus (2), and shifter (8) is connected to this data bus (2) through interface (5).
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP04291710.4 | 2004-07-06 | ||
| EP04291710A EP1614604B1 (en) | 2004-07-06 | 2004-07-06 | Hand over procedure from a first to a second train control system |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN1718487A CN1718487A (en) | 2006-01-11 |
| CN100471740C true CN100471740C (en) | 2009-03-25 |
Family
ID=34931227
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNB2005100829082A Expired - Fee Related CN100471740C (en) | 2004-07-06 | 2005-07-05 | Hand over procedure from a first to a second train control system |
Country Status (4)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| EP (1) | EP1614604B1 (en) |
| CN (1) | CN100471740C (en) |
| AT (1) | ATE327934T1 (en) |
| DE (1) | DE502004000665D1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EP1908661A1 (en) * | 2006-10-04 | 2008-04-09 | Siemens Schweiz AG | Switchable and safe circuit for receiving and/or sending signals of an automatic train control system |
| DE602007007366D1 (en) * | 2007-02-07 | 2010-08-05 | Siemens Transp System S A S | ANTI-COLLISION WARNING SYSTEM FOR ONE VEHICLE |
| DE102007056598A1 (en) * | 2007-11-21 | 2009-06-25 | Siemens Ag | Multi-system configuration for train protection, has train-side legacy system, which has components for different functionalities, and master system, particularly European train control system |
| CN101700783B (en) * | 2009-11-11 | 2012-08-29 | 北京全路通信信号研究设计院有限公司 | Train control center system platform |
| WO2012149761A1 (en) * | 2011-09-22 | 2012-11-08 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method and device for switching train control systems |
| DE102012216405A1 (en) * | 2012-09-14 | 2014-04-10 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Operation of a rail vehicle by means of ETCS device |
| CN110422208B (en) * | 2019-08-14 | 2021-11-16 | 中车株洲电力机车有限公司 | Identification circuit of master-slave train and train reconnection marshalling |
Family Cites Families (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US4247897A (en) * | 1979-10-25 | 1981-01-27 | Westinghouse Electric Corp. | Train vehicle control microprocessor power reset |
| US4327415A (en) * | 1980-01-31 | 1982-04-27 | Westinghouse Electric Corp. | Transit vehicle handback control apparatus and method |
| IT1264915B1 (en) * | 1993-07-09 | 1996-10-17 | Metropolitana Milanese Struttu | AUTOMATIC PROTECTION EQUIPMENT OF ATP TYPE TRAINS WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTINUING RUNNING IN OPERATION ZUB FOLLOWING |
-
2004
- 2004-07-06 EP EP04291710A patent/EP1614604B1/en not_active Not-in-force
- 2004-07-06 AT AT04291710T patent/ATE327934T1/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2004-07-06 DE DE502004000665T patent/DE502004000665D1/en active Active
-
2005
- 2005-07-05 CN CNB2005100829082A patent/CN100471740C/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| ATE327934T1 (en) | 2006-06-15 |
| CN1718487A (en) | 2006-01-11 |
| EP1614604B1 (en) | 2006-05-31 |
| EP1614604A1 (en) | 2006-01-11 |
| DE502004000665D1 (en) | 2006-07-06 |
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