WO2017131116A1 - Système pour déterminer un fonctionnement correct de communications sans fil - Google Patents

Système pour déterminer un fonctionnement correct de communications sans fil Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2017131116A1
WO2017131116A1 PCT/JP2017/002809 JP2017002809W WO2017131116A1 WO 2017131116 A1 WO2017131116 A1 WO 2017131116A1 JP 2017002809 W JP2017002809 W JP 2017002809W WO 2017131116 A1 WO2017131116 A1 WO 2017131116A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
signal strength
received signal
communication
radio wave
unit
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PCT/JP2017/002809
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English (en)
Japanese (ja)
Inventor
一輝 内木
惠 森
花木　秀信
明暁 岩下
佳之 大屋
Original Assignee
株式会社東海理化電機製作所
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Priority claimed from JP2016240289A external-priority patent/JP2017137751A/ja
Application filed by 株式会社東海理化電機製作所 filed Critical 株式会社東海理化電機製作所
Publication of WO2017131116A1 publication Critical patent/WO2017131116A1/fr

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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
    • B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
    • B60R25/24—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04Q—SELECTING
    • H04Q9/00—Arrangements in telecontrol or telemetry systems for selectively calling a substation from a main station, in which substation desired apparatus is selected for applying a control signal thereto or for obtaining measured values therefrom

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a wireless communication correctness determination system in which a communication terminal and a communication master perform wireless communication.
  • the vehicle transmits a transmission signal with radio waves having different intensities, and the received signal strength of the radio waves received by the electronic key is calculated. Then, based on the calculated received signal strength, it is determined whether or not the communication is normal.
  • An object of the present invention is to provide a wireless communication correct / incorrect determination system that can prevent the occurrence of unauthorized wireless communication using a repeater.
  • a wireless communication correctness determination system includes a first communication unit including a first transmission execution unit, and a second communication unit including a second transmission execution unit, and the first transmission execution unit and the first transmission unit.
  • a wireless communication correctness determination system capable of performing two-way radio communication in the same frequency band with each other, wherein the first communication unit is a reception signal strength of radio waves from the second communication unit.
  • 1st received signal strength calculation means which calculates 1 received signal strength is transmitted, the information of the 1st received signal strength is transmitted via said 1st transmission execution means, and said 2nd communication part is said 1st Second received signal strength calculating means for calculating a second received signal strength that is a received signal strength of a radio wave from the communication unit, and a calculation for calculating a determination value based on the first received signal strength and the second received signal strength Means, the judgment value and the reference range Based on the compare result, communication with the second communication unit and the first communication unit and a communication propriety determining means for determining whether or not normal communication.
  • the antenna directivity and the distance between the second communication unit and the first communication unit are not affected.
  • the determination value based on the first received signal strength (radio wave strength) and the second received signal strength (radio wave strength) falls within the reference range.
  • the determination value based on the first received signal strength and the second received signal strength is not within the reference range. . Therefore, it is possible to determine whether or not the normal communication is performed by comparing the determination value based on the first received signal strength and the second received signal strength with the reference range.
  • the calculating means may calculate a difference between the first received signal strength and the second received signal strength as the determination value. According to this configuration, since the determination value is the difference between the first received signal strength and the second received signal strength, it is possible to quickly determine whether the communication is regular communication with a simple calculation.
  • the communication correctness determination unit may determine that the communication is not normal when there are a plurality of times when the comparison result between the determination value and the reference range indicates that the communication is not normal. According to this configuration, if there is a repeater use fraud, the comparison result between the determination value based on the first received signal strength and the second received signal strength and the reference range indicates that the repeater use is fraudulent. In many cases, there are a plurality of times, and if the determination value and the reference range are different a plurality of times, it can be determined that the communication is not normal.
  • the first communication unit includes a first comparison unit that compares the first received signal strength with a first threshold value for detecting a received signal strength saturation, and the first received signal strength exceeds the first threshold value.
  • the first transmission execution means transmits a first attenuation request to the second communication unit, and the second transmission execution means determines that the transmission output is greater than the previous output based on the first attenuation request.
  • the power is controlled so as to be attenuated, and a radio wave is transmitted to the first communication unit, and the calculation means is transmitted from the first communication unit after the transmission output is attenuated and transmitted, and the first communication unit transmits the radio wave.
  • the determination value may be calculated on the basis of the second received signal strength of the radio wave without the attenuation request and the new first received signal strength notified by the radio wave for which the second received signal strength is calculated.
  • the first received signal strength is It may be saturated.
  • the second communication unit since the first attenuation request is sent from the first communication unit to the second communication unit, the second communication unit powers the transmission output to be attenuated from the previous output based on the first attenuation request. Control is performed and radio waves are transmitted to the first communication unit. Then, the calculation means of the second communication unit attenuates the transmission output and transmits the radio wave, and then the second received signal strength of the radio wave transmitted from the first communication unit and the radio wave from which the second received signal strength is calculated. The determination value is calculated based on the new first received signal strength notified in (1). Accordingly, the communication correctness determination unit can determine whether or not the communication is normal using a determination value based on the new first received signal strength and the second received signal strength.
  • the second communication unit includes a second comparison unit that compares the second received signal strength with a second threshold value for detecting a received signal strength saturation, and the second received signal strength is less than the second threshold value. If it exceeds, the second transmission execution means transmits a second attenuation request to the first communication unit, and the first transmission execution means determines that the transmission output is the previous time based on the second attenuation request.
  • the power is controlled so as to be attenuated from the output, and radio waves are transmitted to the second communication unit, and the calculation means is transmitted from the first communication unit after transmitting the second attenuation request, and The determination value is calculated based on the new second received signal strength of the radio wave that does not require attenuation request and the first received signal strength notified by the radio wave for which the new second received signal strength is calculated. Also good.
  • the second received signal strength is It may be saturated.
  • the first communication unit powers the transmission output to be attenuated from the previous output based on the second attenuation request. Control is performed to transmit radio waves to the second communication unit.
  • the calculation means of the second communication unit transmits a second second received signal strength of a radio wave transmitted from the first communication unit after transmitting the second attenuation request and does not require the second attenuation request, and the new A determination value is calculated based on the first received signal strength notified by the radio wave for which the second received signal strength is calculated.
  • the communication correctness determination unit can determine whether or not the communication is normal using a determination value based on the first received signal strength and the new second received signal strength.
  • the communication correctness determination unit is configured when the amount of change between the previous determination value calculated by the calculation unit in the previous processing routine and the current determination value calculated by the calculation unit in the current processing routine is equal to or less than a specified value. May determine that communication between the first communication unit and the second communication unit is regular communication.
  • the determination value is the same between the previous time and the current time, or the determination between the previous time and the current time
  • the amount of change in value is negligible.
  • the previous processing routine is executed normally and the repeater use fraud is performed when the current processing routine is executed, the change amount of the determination value between the previous time and the current time becomes large. Therefore, in order to determine these, the amount of change between the latest judgment value and the current judgment value is compared with a specified value, and the judgment value is compared with the reference range. In addition to being able to determine, the influence of communication component variations (temperature characteristics, voltage characteristics, aging, etc.) can be reduced.
  • the criterion for determining whether or not regular communication is performed becomes loose, and the determination accuracy is lowered. Since the influence of component variations can be reduced, the criteria can be tightened and the accuracy of judgment can be improved.
  • the block diagram of the communication fraud establishment prevention system of 1st Embodiment The timing chart which shows the communication sequence of smart communication. Explanatory drawing which shows the outline
  • the block diagram of the communication fraud establishment prevention system of 4th Embodiment. 10 is a flowchart of wireless communication correctness determination in the wireless communication correctness determination system in smart communication according to the fifth embodiment.
  • the vehicle 1 transmits a wireless inquiry (request signal Srq) from the vehicle 1 to the electronic key 2, and performs ID verification based on a response (ID signal Sid) of the electronic key 2 to this inquiry.
  • a key operation free system 3 is installed.
  • the key operation free system 3 includes an entry function in which door locking / unlocking is permitted or executed when ID verification is established outside the vehicle, and a power transition operation of the vehicle 1 and the engine by the engine switch 4 in the vehicle when ID verification is established in the vehicle.
  • the electronic key 2 is an example of a communication terminal and corresponds to the first communication unit, the request signal Srq corresponds to an inquiry, and the ID signal Sid corresponds to a response.
  • the vehicle 1 includes a key verification device 5 that performs ID verification with the electronic key 2, a door lock device 6 that manages the locking and unlocking of the door, and an engine starter 7 that manages the operation of the engine. These are connected by an in-vehicle bus 8.
  • the key verification device 5 is provided with a control unit of the key verification device 5 or a verification ECU (Electronic Control Unit) 9.
  • the ID code of the electronic key 2 that forms a pair with the vehicle 1 is registered.
  • the verification ECU 9 is an example of a communication master and corresponds to the second communication unit.
  • the verification ECU 9 transmits an LF (Low Frequency) band radio wave to the outside and the inside of the vehicle, and transmits an UHF (Ultra High Frequency) band radio wave and the UHF band to the outside and inside the vehicle.
  • a UHF transceiver 12 is connected.
  • the UHF transmitter / receiver 12 transmits a request signal Srq as an ID reply request to the electronic key 2 by a radio wave in the UHF band, and attempts to establish so-called smart communication.
  • the electronic key 2 is provided with a key control unit 13 that performs overall control of the operation of the electronic key 2.
  • An ID code that is an ID unique to the key is registered in a memory (not shown) of the key control unit 13.
  • the key control unit 13 includes an LF receiver 14 that can receive LF band radio waves, a UHF band that can receive UHF band radio waves and that has the same frequency band as the UHF band radio waves transmitted from the key verification device 5. Is connected to a UHF transmitter / receiver 15 capable of transmitting the radio wave.
  • an LF band wake signal 16 is intermittently transmitted from the LF transmitter 11, and the wake signal 16 is received by the electronic key 2 so that smart communication outside the vehicle (external communication) is performed.
  • a UHF band ACK signal 17 is returned from the electronic key 2.
  • the verification ECU 9 When the verification ECU 9 receives the ACK signal 17 after transmitting the wake signal 16, the verification ECU 9 subsequently transmits a vehicle ID 18 in the UHF band.
  • the vehicle ID 18 is a unique ID of the vehicle 1.
  • the electronic key 2 receives the vehicle ID 18, it performs vehicle ID collation.
  • the electronic key 2 confirms that the vehicle ID collation is established, the electronic key 2 returns the UHF band ACK signal 19 again.
  • the verification ECU 9 When the verification ECU 9 receives the ACK signal 19 after transmitting the vehicle ID 18, the verification ECU 9 subsequently transmits a challenge 20.
  • the challenge 20 includes a challenge code 20a and a key number 20b.
  • the challenge 20 corresponds to the request signal Srq.
  • the electronic key 2 When the electronic key 2 receives the challenge 20, first, the key number is collated, and if the collation is confirmed, the challenge code 20 a is passed through the encryption key of the electronic key 2 and the response code 21 a is calculated. Then, the electronic key 2 transmits a response 21 including the response code 21a and the ID code 21b as main data.
  • the response 21 corresponds to the ID signal Sid.
  • the verification ECU 9 transmits the challenge 20 to the electronic key 2, the verification ECU 9 calculates a response code through the challenge code 20a with the encryption key of the verification ECU 9.
  • the verification ECU 9 receives the response 21 from the electronic key 2
  • the verification ECU 9 checks whether the response code 21 a received from the electronic key 2 is correct and the response code calculated by the verification ECU 9, and the ID code 21 b received from the electronic key 2.
  • ID code verification for confirming whether the ID code of the electronic key 2 registered in advance in the verification ECU 9 is correct or not is performed.
  • the verification ECU 9 confirms that both verifications have been established, in principle, the verification ECU 9 processes smart verification (external vehicle verification) as successful, and permits or executes door locking / unlocking by the door lock device 6.
  • the key operation free system 3 is provided with a communication fraud establishment prevention system 23 for preventing the smart communication fraud establishment using the repeater 22 shown in FIG. .
  • the establishment of unauthorized communication using the repeater 22 means that when a user who possesses the electronic key 2 is far away from the vehicle 1, a third party who attempts the theft relays radio waves using the repeater 22, This is an act of illegally establishing communication (an illegal act using a repeater).
  • the unauthorized communication establishment prevention system 23 of this embodiment is for preventing the establishment of unauthorized communication using the repeater 22.
  • this type of repeater 22 can relay data contents, but cannot relay (copy) radio wave intensity. Therefore, if the received signal strength (RSSI: Received Signal Strength Indication) of the radio wave is confirmed in the electronic key 2, whether the smart communication is regular communication via the electronic key 2 or unauthorized communication using the repeater 22 is determined. I understand. For this reason, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 23 according to the present embodiment executes the communication correctness determination of the smart communication by confirming the received signal strength of the radio wave in the electronic key 2.
  • RSSI Received Signal Strength Indication
  • the key control unit 13 of the electronic key 2 has a received signal strength calculating unit 26 that calculates the received signal strength of the received radio wave when the radio wave in the UHF band is received from the verification ECU 9. Is provided.
  • the reception signal strength calculation unit 26 calculates the first reception signal strength RSSI1 by detecting the amplitude of the reception radio wave when the UHF transceiver 15 receives the radio wave.
  • the received signal strength calculation unit 26 corresponds to first received signal strength calculation means.
  • the key control unit 13 of the electronic key 2 is provided with a reception signal strength notification unit 27 that notifies the vehicle 1 of the first reception signal strength RSSI1 calculated by the reception signal strength calculation unit 26.
  • the electronic key 2 transmits various radio waves (hereinafter collectively referred to as the UHF radio wave 28) in response to the inquiry of the vehicle 1, the received signal strength notification unit 27, in addition to the main data 29 of the UHF radio wave 28, Received signal strength information 30, which may be a digital data value representing the first received signal strength RSSI 1 of the received radio wave, is placed on the UHF radio wave 28.
  • the main data 29 is the ID code 21b and the response code 21a.
  • the reception signal strength notification unit 27 corresponds to a first transmission execution unit.
  • UHF radio wave 24 various radio waves in the UHF band
  • the verification ECU 9 transmits this UHF radio wave.
  • a transmission processing unit 25 for transmitting 24 in the same frequency band is provided.
  • the transmission processing unit 25 corresponds to a second transmission execution unit.
  • the verification ECU 9 is provided with a received signal strength calculation unit 9a that calculates a second received signal strength RSSI2 that is a received signal strength of the received radio wave when a UHF band radio wave is received from the electronic key 2. .
  • the received signal strength calculator 9a corresponds to a second received signal strength calculator.
  • the verification ECU 9 receives the received signal strength information 30 (first received signal strength RSSI1) notified by the radio wave in the UHF band from the electronic key 2 and the second received signal when the received signal strength information 30 is received.
  • a calculating unit 9b that calculates a difference from the received signal strength RSSI2 is provided.
  • the calculation unit 9b corresponds to calculation means.
  • the verification ECU 9 is provided with a communication correctness determination unit 31.
  • the communication correctness determination unit 31 compares the difference with a reference value R registered in advance, and determines whether smart communication with the electronic key 2 is regular communication based on the comparison result.
  • the communication correctness determination unit 31 corresponds to a communication correctness determination unit, and the difference corresponds to a determination value.
  • the reference value R is registered in a memory (not shown) of the verification ECU 9 as follows.
  • the first received signal strength RSSI1 when the electronic key 2 receives a radio wave (received signal) in the UHF band from the vehicle 1 in communication when registering the ID code 21b or the encryption key of the electronic key 2 in the verification ECU 9 Is calculated by the received signal strength calculating unit 26, and the received signal strength notifying unit 27 notifies the vehicle 1 of the calculated first received signal strength RSSI1.
  • the received signal strength information 30 is notified by using a radio wave or the like when notifying the ID code 21b and the encryption key.
  • the second received signal strength RSSI2 of the UHF band radio wave carrying the received signal strength information 30 is calculated by the received signal strength calculating unit 9a, and the first received signal strength transmitted from the electronic key 2 by the calculating unit 9b.
  • the difference between RSSI1 and the second received signal strength RSSI2 calculated by the received signal strength calculator 9a is calculated. Using this difference as a reference value R, the verification ECU 9 registers it in a memory (not shown).
  • the frequency band of the radio wave in the UHF band at the time of registration of the reference value R is the same frequency band as that of the smart communication.
  • the electronic key 2 when registering the ID code 21b of the electronic key 2 or the encryption key, the electronic key 2 is in a position close to the vehicle 1 or in a vehicle interior, and does not use a repeater. be registered.
  • FIG. 4 is a flowchart of the wireless communication correctness determination in the wireless communication correctness determination system in smart communication.
  • the vehicle ID, the encryption key, and the key number of the vehicle 1 will be described on the premise that they are a proper combination.
  • the reception signal strength calculation unit 26 of the key control unit 13 in the electronic key 2 may be configured to calculate the reception signal strength of the UHF radio wave 24 every time the UHF radio wave 24 is received from the vehicle 1.
  • Vehicle 1 (verification ECU 9) first transmits a wake signal 16 of an LF band radio wave during smart communication.
  • the electronic key 2 receives the wake signal 16
  • the electronic key 2 transmits an ACK signal 17 of a radio wave in the UHF band to the vehicle 1.
  • the vehicle 1 (verification ECU 9) transmits the vehicle ID 18 using the UHF radio wave 24.
  • the electronic key 2 that has received the vehicle ID 18 confirms the establishment of the vehicle ID collation of the vehicle ID 18 of the UHF band radio wave, and then transmits an ACK signal 19 of the UHF band radio wave to the vehicle 1.
  • vehicle 1 (verification ECU 9) receives ACK signal 19, it transmits challenge 20 as request signal Srq (UHF radio wave 24) carrying challenge code 20a and key number 20b.
  • the electronic key 2 that has received the challenge 20 carries the response 21, which is the UHF radio wave 28, with the main data 29 (ID code 21 b and response code) and the first received signal strength RSSI 1 that is the received signal strength of the challenge 20. 1 to send.
  • the verification ECU 9 of the vehicle 1 performs response verification for confirming whether the response code is correct and ID code verification for confirming whether the ID code of the electronic key 2 is correct. If the verification ECU 9 confirms that both verifications have been established, next, in S10, the verification ECU 9 determines whether or not the communication conditions are satisfied.
  • P1ctx + Gc ⁇ Lr + Gk P1krx (2)
  • the received power P1krx of the electronic key is an approximate value of the first received signal strength RSSI1 at the electronic key.
  • Equation 1 Equation 1
  • the verification ECU 9 calculates the second received signal strength RSSI2 of the response 21 by the received signal strength calculating unit 9a, and the second received signal of the response 21 is calculated.
  • the calculation unit 9b calculates the difference between the strength RSSI2 and the received signal strength information 30 (first received signal strength RSSI1) notified by the response 21.
  • the communication correctness determination part 31 determines communication correctness by comparing the reference value R and the said difference. In the present embodiment, the fact that the difference matches the reference value R corresponds to the difference being in the reference range.
  • the reference value R and the difference ⁇ if the reference value R and the difference ⁇ are the same value, it may be determined that the communication is proper communication with no repeater use fraud.
  • ⁇ is within the range of R ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ R + ⁇ (that is, the reference range), it may be determined that the difference is constant and it is determined that the communication is proper without any repeater use fraud.
  • ⁇ is a value that it may be determined that there is no fraudulent use of the repeater.
  • the verification ECU 9 determines that smart communication is regular communication and processes smart verification (external vehicle verification) as established, and in S20, Permit or execute door locking / unlocking by the door lock device 6.
  • Gr is the gain of the antenna of the repeater 22
  • P1rtx is the transmission power of the repeater 22
  • P1rrx is the received power of the repeater 22.
  • Lx is a propagation loss due to the distance x between the repeater 22 and the vehicle 1
  • Ly is a propagation loss due to the distance y between the repeater 22 and the electronic key 2.
  • the antenna gain Gc, Gr, Gk involved in the communication from the vehicle 1 to the electronic key 2 and the communication from the electronic key 2 to the vehicle 1 are used. If the involved antenna gains Gc, Gr, and Gk are not equal, the difference ⁇ of the received signal strength is not constant, and Equation 1 is not satisfied. That is, when relaying radio waves by such a bidirectional relay system, it is difficult to create a repeater that makes the gain related to the forward path equal to the gain related to the return path. Therefore, it is possible to easily detect fraudulent use of the repeater.
  • the verification ECU 9 determines that the smart communication is an unauthorized communication, and in S30, the smart verification (external vehicle verification) is determined not to be established. Process.
  • the vehicle 1 and the electronic key 2 perform smart communication using the UHF radio wave 24 and the UHF radio wave 28 in the same frequency band. Then, the electronic key 2 calculates the first received signal strength RSSI1 when the radio wave from the vehicle 1 is received. In the electronic key 2, the calculated first received signal strength RSSI 1 is transmitted to the vehicle 1 as received signal strength information 30. The vehicle 1 calculates the second received signal strength RSSI2 of the radio wave carrying the received signal strength information 30, and calculates the difference between the received signal strength information 30 (first received signal strength RSSI1) and the calculated second received signal strength RSSI2. If the difference is the same as the reference value, the smart communication is processed as a regular communication. On the other hand, if the difference is not the same, the smart communication is processed as an unauthorized communication using the repeater 22. Therefore, since it is possible to identify unauthorized communication using the repeater 22, it is possible to prevent the unauthorized communication from being processed as established.
  • the vehicle 1 and the electronic key 2 communicate with each other using UHF radio waves in the same frequency band, and the electronic key 2 calculates the first received signal strength RSSI1 of the radio wave 24 from the vehicle 1 and receives the received signal strength.
  • Signal strength information 30 is transmitted to the vehicle 1.
  • the vehicle 1 calculates the difference between the received signal strength information 30 (first received signal strength RSSI1) received from the electronic key 2 and the second received signal strength RSSI2 of the radio wave 28 on which the received signal strength information 30 is carried.
  • Whether or not the smart communication is correct is determined by checking whether or not the difference is the same as the reference value. For this reason, since it becomes possible to distinguish whether smart communication is communication using the repeater 22, it is difficult to establish unauthorized communication using the repeater 22. Therefore, security against unauthorized use or theft of the vehicle 1 can be ensured.
  • the key control unit 13 of the electronic key 2 is different from the first embodiment in that a comparison unit 13a is provided.
  • the comparison unit 13a compares the first reception signal strength RSSI1 of the UHF radio wave transmitted from the vehicle 1 calculated by the reception signal strength calculation unit 26 with a first threshold value for detection of reception signal strength saturation.
  • the first threshold value is slightly lower than the saturation value (maximum value) of the received signal strength of UHF radio waves that can be processed by, for example, the circuit inside the UHF transceiver 15.
  • the comparison unit 13a determines that the first received signal strength RSSI1 of the received radio wave is saturated.
  • the reception signal strength notification unit 27 notifies the vehicle 1 of the first reception signal strength RSSI1 and the attenuation request that are saturated with UHF radio waves. If it is determined that the UHF radio wave from the vehicle 1 is saturated, the electronic key 2 is transmitted as a response to the UHF radio wave to be notified.
  • the comparison unit 13a corresponds to a first comparison unit
  • the attenuation request corresponds to a first attenuation request.
  • the transmission processing unit 25 performs power control so that the transmission output is attenuated from the previous output based on them, and the electronic key 2 Send UHF radio waves to In this case, the attenuation ⁇ of the transmission output is a preset amount.
  • the verification ECU 9 of the vehicle 1 performs the same processing as described above every time it receives the first received signal strength RSSI1 and the attenuation request.
  • the calculation unit 9b receives the notification of the first received signal strength RSSI1 without the attenuation request from the electronic key 2 after the above processing, the calculation unit 9b receives the second received signal of the radio wave itself without the attenuation request. The difference between the strength RSSI2 and the new first received signal strength RSSI1 notified by the radio wave is calculated.
  • the communication correctness determination unit 31 compares the reference value changed from R to R + n ⁇ ⁇ with the difference calculated by the calculation unit 9b according to the number of times the transmission output is attenuated by the attenuation amount ⁇ . Then, the communication correctness is determined.
  • the following effects can be obtained.
  • the electronic key 2 requests the verification ECU 9 of the vehicle 1 to attenuate the transmission output of the radio wave, so that the received signal strength of the radio wave received by the electronic key 2 is not saturated. With this saturation disappearing, it is possible to determine whether the smart communication is correct or not. As a result, the same effect as the first embodiment is obtained.
  • the comparison ECU 9 of the vehicle 1 is different from the first embodiment in that a comparison unit 9c is provided.
  • the comparison unit 9c compares the second received signal strength RSSI2 of the UHF radio wave from the electronic key 2 calculated by the received signal strength calculating unit 9a with the second threshold value for detecting the received signal strength saturation, and compares the second received signal strength. When RSSI2 exceeds the second threshold for detection of received signal strength saturation, it is determined that the received signal strength of the received radio wave is saturated.
  • the second threshold value is slightly lower than the saturation value (maximum value) of the received signal strength of UHF radio waves that can be processed by, for example, the circuit inside the UHF transceiver 12.
  • the transmission processing unit 25 transmits the attenuation request and the second received signal strength RSSI2 exceeding the second threshold to the electronic key 2.
  • the comparison unit 9c corresponds to a second comparison unit
  • the attenuation request corresponds to a second attenuation request.
  • the reception signal strength notification unit 27 of the electronic key 2 performs power control so that the transmission output is attenuated from the previous output based on the attenuation request and the second reception signal strength RSSI2 exceeding the second threshold, and the vehicle Send radio waves to 1.
  • the attenuation ⁇ of the transmission output is a preset amount.
  • the attenuation amount ⁇ may be the same as or different from the attenuation amount ⁇ of the second embodiment.
  • the calculation unit 9b of the verification ECU 9 of the vehicle 1 performs a challenge 20 in which the transmission processing unit 25 does not include the attenuation request immediately after or after transmitting the attenuation request and the second received signal strength RSSI2 exceeding the second threshold.
  • a difference between the new second received signal strength RSSI2 of the radio wave itself transmitted from the electronic key 2 and the first received signal strength RSSI1 notified by the radio wave for which the new second received signal strength RSSI2 is calculated calculate.
  • the communication correctness determination unit 31 then changes the reference value changed from R to R + m ⁇ ⁇ according to the number m of transmission output attenuation by the attenuation amount ⁇ (that is, the number of attenuation requests) and the difference calculated by the calculation unit 9b. To determine whether the communication is correct.
  • the following effects can be obtained.
  • the verification ECU 9 requests the electronic key 2 to attenuate the transmission output of the radio wave, so that the received signal intensity of the radio wave received by the verification ECU 9 can be prevented from being saturated. With this saturation disappearing, it is possible to determine whether the smart communication is correct or not. As a result, the same effect as the first embodiment is obtained.
  • the fourth embodiment is a combination of the second embodiment and the third embodiment. That is, in this embodiment, as shown in FIG. 9, the key operation free system 3 and the communication fraud establishment prevention system 23 are configured by the electronic key 2 having the comparison unit 13a and the verification ECU 9 having the comparison unit 9c. .
  • This unauthorized communication establishment prevention system 23 has the effects described in the second embodiment and the third embodiment.
  • the communication correctness determination unit 31 determines the transmission output from R according to the amount of attenuation by the vehicle 1 and the electronic key 2 respectively. Whether the communication is correct or not is determined by comparing the reference value changed to R + n ⁇ ⁇ m ⁇ ⁇ and the difference calculated by the calculation unit 9b.
  • the communication correctness determination unit 31 sets the reference value as R, and compares the reference value R with the difference calculated by the calculation unit 9b. Judgment of communication correctness is performed.
  • a comparison between the determination value and the reference range is performed by comparing the amount of change from the most recent determination value (an example is the difference between the first received signal strength RSSI1 and the second received signal strength RSSI2) with a specified value. This is different from the first embodiment in that it is determined whether or not regular communication is performed.
  • the vehicle 1 performs smart communication with the electronic key 2 as shown in FIG.
  • the smart communication is executed when the vehicle 1 (verification ECU 9) transmits the wake signal 16 of the LF band radio wave as in the first embodiment (see FIG. 4).
  • the vehicle 1 transmits a challenge 20 by the UHF radio wave 24.
  • the electronic key 2 that has received the challenge 20 calculates a first received signal strength RSSI1 when the challenge 20 is received, and then transmits a response 21 that is a UHF radio wave 28 including the first received signal strength RSSI1 to the vehicle 1. To do.
  • the verification ECU 9 of the vehicle 1 calculates the second received signal strength RSSI2 when the response 21 is received.
  • the RSSI Receiveived Signal Strength
  • the received signal strength calculator 26 of the electronic key 2 corresponds to first received signal strength calculator
  • the received signal strength calculator 9a of the vehicle 1 corresponds to second received signal strength calculator.
  • the verification ECU 9 of the vehicle 1 calculates a difference A between the first received signal strength RSSI1 and the second received signal strength RSSI2 in S50.
  • the difference A corresponds to the current determination value
  • the calculation unit 9b of the verification ECU 9 corresponds to a calculation unit.
  • the verification ECU 9 of the vehicle 1 determines whether or not the amount of change between the difference B calculated in the previous processing routine and the difference A calculated in the current processing routine is equal to or less than a specified value ⁇ .
  • the previous and current determination values in this example, the first received signal strength RSSI1 and the second received signal strength RSSI2 The difference
  • the amount of change in the judgment value between the previous time and the current time is very small.
  • the repeater is used incorrectly during the execution of the current processing routine, the amount of change in the determination value between the previous time and the current time becomes large.
  • the amount of change between the latest determination value and the current determination value is compared with the specified value ⁇ , so that the determination value is compared with the reference range. It is determined whether the communication is regular.
  • the challenge 20 and the response 21 are transmitted and received a plurality of times in the process of smart communication, if the current difference A is, for example, the second value, the previous difference B is the first value. .
  • the verification ECU 9 of the vehicle 1 determines YES in S60 (the amount of change is very small), it permits or executes door locking / unlocking in S70, while if it determines NO in S60 (the amount of change is large), it determines in S80. Then, smart collation (external vehicle collation) is processed as unsuccessful while detecting repeater use fraud.
  • the communication correctness determination unit 31 of the verification ECU 9 corresponds to communication correctness determination means.
  • the following effects can be obtained. (1) By comparing the amount of change between the latest determination value (for example, difference B) and the current determination value (for example, difference A) with the specified value ⁇ , the comparison between the determination value and the reference range is performed. In addition to determining whether or not the communication is normal, it is possible to reduce the influence of variations (temperature characteristics, voltage characteristics, aging, etc.) of communication components such as the UHF transceiver 12 of the vehicle 1 and the UHF transceiver 15 of the electronic key 2.
  • the criterion for determining whether or not regular communication is performed becomes loose, and the determination accuracy decreases. Since the influence of the variation of communication parts can be reduced, the judgment criteria can be tightened, and the judgment accuracy can be improved.
  • the first to fifth embodiments are not limited to the configurations described so far, and may be modified as follows.
  • the received signal strength information 30 is put on the response 21, but in the UHF radio wave 28 transmitted from the electronic key 2, the radio wave on which the received signal strength information 30 is put is the ACK signals 17 and 19, the response described above. 21 may be used, and other types of UHF radio waves may be used.
  • the second received signal strength RSSI2 of the radio wave carrying the received signal strength information 30 is calculated by the received signal strength calculating unit 9a and the difference is calculated by the calculating unit 9b
  • the reference value R and the difference ⁇ may be compared.
  • the communication correctness determination unit 31 compares the amount of change between the current difference A calculated by the calculation unit 9b and the previous difference B calculated by the calculation unit 9b with a specified value ⁇ . To do.
  • the received signal strength of the radio wave carrying the received signal strength information 30 is the second received signal strength RSSI2, but the received signal strength of the radio wave from the electronic key 2 not including the received signal strength information 30 is It is good also as 2nd received signal strength RSSI2.
  • the difference between the second received signal strength RSSI2 of the response 21 and the first received signal strength RSSI1 (received signal strength information 30) of the challenge 20 is different from the reference value R. If there are times, it is not regular communication.
  • the second received signal of the radio wave that has been communicated a plurality of times and the vehicle 1 has been notified of the first received signal strength RSSI1 (received signal strength information 30). Even if the difference between the strength RSSI2 and the first received signal strength RSSI1 is not the same as the reference value and the difference becomes constant after the determination by the communication correctness determination unit 31, the difference is constant. Good.
  • the electronic key 2 when the UHF radio wave transmitted from the vehicle 1 is saturated, the electronic key 2 sends the attenuation request (first attenuation request) and the first received signal strength RSSI1 at that time to the vehicle 1. Although transmitted, only the attenuation request (first attenuation request) may be transmitted to the vehicle 1. In this case, the transmission processing unit 25 in the verification ECU 9 of the vehicle 1 attenuates the transmission output of the UHF radio wave based on this attenuation request.
  • the vehicle 1 when the UHF radio wave transmitted from the electronic key 2 is saturated, the vehicle 1 sends the attenuation request (second attenuation request) and the second received signal strength RSSI2 at that time to the electronic key 2.
  • the attenuation request (second attenuation request) may be transmitted to the electronic key 2.
  • the reception signal strength notification unit 27 of the electronic key 2 attenuates the transmission output of the UHF radio wave based on this attenuation request.
  • the electronic key system is not limited to the key operation free system 3, and may be an immobilizer system, for example.
  • the frequency band used for bidirectional communication is not limited to the UHF band.
  • other frequency bands such as an LF (Low Frequency) band and an HF (High Frequency) band may be used.
  • the same frequency band has the same radio wave propagation loss at the time of each communication, and it can be considered that the so-called reciprocity theorem (reciprocity theorem) holds between the two.
  • the reciprocity theorem is a theorem in which the determination value based on the received signal strength of both is constant regardless of the antenna directivity and the distance between the two at the same frequency.
  • the communication master is not limited to the verification ECU 9, and may be another ECU that manages communication.
  • the communication terminal is not limited to the electronic key 2 and may be any terminal capable of wireless communication.
  • the inquiry is not limited to the request signal Srq, and other signals can be employed.
  • the response is not limited to the ID signal Sid, but may be a signal returned from the electronic key 2 to the vehicle 1.
  • the communication fraud establishment prevention system 23 is not limited to being used for the vehicle 1 but can be applied to other devices and apparatuses.
  • the first communication unit is a communication terminal (electronic key 2) and the second communication unit is a communication master (verification ECU 9).
  • the first communication unit is a communication master (verification ECU 9).
  • the second communication unit may be a communication terminal (electronic key 2). That is, the configuration of the verification ECU 9 of each of the embodiments that performs communication correctness determination on the electronic key 2 side may be provided on the electronic key side.
  • either one of the first communication unit and the second communication unit performs the communication correctness determination.
  • the configuration of the verification ECU 9 of each embodiment that performs the communication correctness determination is as follows. You may provide in both a 1st communication part and a 2nd communication part.
  • the collation ECU 9 includes one or more processors that function as the received signal strength calculation unit 9a, the calculation unit 9b, the transmission processing unit 25, the communication correctness determination unit 31, and optionally the comparison unit 9c, and the one or more processors. And a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium storing instructions to be executed by the computer.
  • the key control unit 13 includes a received signal strength calculating unit 26, a received signal strength notifying unit 27, and optionally one or more processors functioning as a comparing unit 13a, and the one or more processors.
  • a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium storing instructions to be executed.
  • the non-transitory machine-readable storage medium may be a nonvolatile memory, a magnetic disk device including a magnetic disk, an optical disk device including an optical disk, or the like.
  • One or more implementation examples of the present invention include a master communicator (5) that transmits a query (Srq) using a first radio wave (24) and a response (Sid) that responds to the query (Srq) as a second radio wave (28).
  • a system for unlocking the vehicle (1) through two-way wireless communication with the client communication device (2) transmitting in the same frequency band is provided.
  • the system causes one or more processors provided in the master communicator (5) and / or the client communicator (2) to perform the method when executed by the one or more processors.
  • a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium storing instructions.
  • the one or more processors calculate a first received signal strength that is a received signal strength of the first radio wave (24) received by the client communication device (2) from the master communication device (5).
  • the client communicator (2) transmits the first received signal strength (30) to the master communicator (5) by the second radio wave (28), and the master communicator (5)
  • the one or more processors calculate a second received signal strength that is a received signal strength of the second radio wave (28) received from the client communicator (2);
  • the determination value according to the first received signal strength and the second received signal strength is calculated, and the one or more processors compare the determination value with a reference range to determine the master communicator (5 ) Determining whether the communication with the client communication device (2) is normal or illegal, and if the communication between the master communication device (5) and the client communication device (2) is illegal, the one or more The processor comprises prohibiting unlocking of the vehicle (1) and / or outputting an alert.
  • One or more implementation examples of the present invention include a master communicator (5) that transmits a query (Srq) using a first radio wave (24) and a response (Sid) that responds to the query (Srq) as a second radio wave (28).
  • a client communication device (2) that transmits data in the same frequency band performs two-way wireless communication to unlock the vehicle (1).
  • the method is such that one or more processors provided in the master communicator (5) and / or the client communicator (2) receive the client communicator (2) from the master communicator (5). Calculating the first received signal strength which is the received signal strength of the first radio wave (24), and the client communicator (2) sets the first received signal strength (30) to the second radio wave (28).
  • a second received signal strength that is a received signal strength of the second radio wave (28) received by the master communicator (5) from the client communicator (2);
  • One or more processors calculating, the one or more processors calculating a determination value according to the first received signal strength and the second received signal strength, the one or more processors.
  • the processor compares the determination value with a reference range to determine whether communication between the master communication device (5) and the client communication device (2) is normal or illegal, and the master communication device (5 ) And the client communicator (2), the one or more processors may prohibit the unlocking of the vehicle (1) and / or output an alert.
  • the master communicator (5) is configured to store a prescribed value and a determination value calculated by the one or more processors, and the master communicator The one or more processors of (5) may be configured such that the master communicator is based on the amount of change between the previous determination value calculated in the previous processing routine and the current determination value calculated in the current processing routine and the specified value. (5) is configured to determine whether communication between the client communication device (2) is normal or illegal.
  • the master communicator (5) may be a key verification device mounted on the vehicle (1) and the client communicator (2) may be a portable electronic key.
  • the present invention may be embodied in other specific forms without departing from the technical spirit thereof. For example, some of the parts described in the embodiment (or one or more aspects thereof) may be omitted, or some parts may be combined. The scope of the invention should be determined with reference to the appended claims, along with the full scope of equivalents to which such claims are entitled.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un système dans lequel un véhicule (1) et une clé électronique (2) communiquent à l'aide d'ondes radio UHF (24, 28) de la même fréquence, la clé électronique (2) calculant la puissance de signal de réception de l'onde radio (24) provenant du véhicule (1), et transmettant, au véhicule (1), des informations de puissance de signal de réception (30) indiquant la puissance de signal de réception de l'onde radio (24). Le véhicule (1) calcule la différence entre les informations de puissance de signal de réception (30) reçues à partir de la clé électronique (2) et la puissance de signal de réception de l'onde radio (28) transportant les informations de puissance de signal de réception (30), et détermine si des communications intelligentes fonctionnent ou non correctement par confirmation du point de savoir si ladite différence tombe ou non dans une plage de référence.
PCT/JP2017/002809 2016-01-29 2017-01-26 Système pour déterminer un fonctionnement correct de communications sans fil WO2017131116A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (4)

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JP2016016332 2016-01-29
JP2016-016332 2016-01-29
JP2016240289A JP2017137751A (ja) 2016-01-29 2016-12-12 無線通信正否判定システム
JP2016-240289 2016-12-12

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Cited By (1)

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WO2020211794A1 (fr) * 2019-04-16 2020-10-22 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Système et procédé pour authentifier une connexion entre un dispositif d'utilisateur et un véhicule

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US20030071717A1 (en) * 2001-10-04 2003-04-17 Andreas Hagl Authentication of a first transceiver unit with respect to a second transceiver unit located at a distance
JP2010121297A (ja) * 2008-11-17 2010-06-03 Calsonic Kansei Corp スマートキーレスエントリシステム
JP2012036582A (ja) * 2010-08-04 2012-02-23 Denso Corp 制御システム
JP2012060482A (ja) * 2010-09-10 2012-03-22 Denso Corp 制御システム
JP2014139752A (ja) * 2013-01-21 2014-07-31 Omron Automotive Electronics Co Ltd 通信システム及び通信装置

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US20030071717A1 (en) * 2001-10-04 2003-04-17 Andreas Hagl Authentication of a first transceiver unit with respect to a second transceiver unit located at a distance
JP2010121297A (ja) * 2008-11-17 2010-06-03 Calsonic Kansei Corp スマートキーレスエントリシステム
JP2012036582A (ja) * 2010-08-04 2012-02-23 Denso Corp 制御システム
JP2012060482A (ja) * 2010-09-10 2012-03-22 Denso Corp 制御システム
JP2014139752A (ja) * 2013-01-21 2014-07-31 Omron Automotive Electronics Co Ltd 通信システム及び通信装置

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2020211794A1 (fr) * 2019-04-16 2020-10-22 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Système et procédé pour authentifier une connexion entre un dispositif d'utilisateur et un véhicule
US11381970B2 (en) 2019-04-16 2022-07-05 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. System and method for authenticating a connection between a user device and a vehicle using physical layer features

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