WO2015102359A1 - 랜덤한 디지털 값을 생성하는 장치 및 방법 - Google Patents
랜덤한 디지털 값을 생성하는 장치 및 방법 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2015102359A1 WO2015102359A1 PCT/KR2014/013020 KR2014013020W WO2015102359A1 WO 2015102359 A1 WO2015102359 A1 WO 2015102359A1 KR 2014013020 W KR2014013020 W KR 2014013020W WO 2015102359 A1 WO2015102359 A1 WO 2015102359A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3278—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response using physically unclonable functions [PUF]
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/73—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by creating or determining hardware identification, e.g. serial numbers
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- G—PHYSICS
- G09—EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
- G09C—CIPHERING OR DECIPHERING APPARATUS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR OTHER PURPOSES INVOLVING THE NEED FOR SECRECY
- G09C1/00—Apparatus or methods whereby a given sequence of signs, e.g. an intelligible text, is transformed into an unintelligible sequence of signs by transposing the signs or groups of signs or by replacing them by others according to a predetermined system
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/12—Details relating to cryptographic hardware or logic circuitry
Definitions
- PUF Physical Unclonable Function
- PUFs Physically Unclonable Functions
- PUF may be referred to as Physical One-Way Function practically impossible to be duplicated (POWF) or Physical Random Function (PRF).
- PWF Physical One-Way Function practically impossible to be duplicated
- PRF Physical Random Function
- PUF Physical Uplink Detection Function
- PUF may be used to provide a unique key to distinguish devices from one another.
- Korean Patent Registration No. 10-1139630 (hereinafter '630 patent) has been presented a method for implementing the PUF.
- a process variation of a semiconductor is used to probabilistically determine whether an inter-layer contact or via is generated between conductive layers or conductive nodes of the semiconductor.
- a method for generating a PUF has been presented.
- One of the embodiments presented in the '630 patent is to design a small size of the via to be formed between the conductive layers so that the vias are formed randomly and when they are not. Thus, random digital values were generated that were not possible to artificially guess.
- the size of the optical via is set so that the individual bit values included in the digital value generated by the PUF are not randomly shifted to' 0 'or' 1 'so that they are true random numbers. You need to decide.
- the optical via size determined for use in the particular process may be a value that is not optimal for some wafers and / or chips. In the same process, process variations can occur to different degrees per individual wafer and / or per individual chip. Furthermore, even in the same process and the same line, the optical value may change according to changes in the process environment or various factors over time. Therefore, there is a need for a method capable of increasing the yield of PUF generation.
- an apparatus for generating digital values using semiconductor process variations is provided.
- the device comprises: a generator for generating a plurality of digital values using the semiconductor process variation; And a processor configured to process the plurality of digital values to provide a first digital value.
- the generation unit may include a plurality of PUFs, and at least some of the plurality of PUFs are manufactured by applying at least one parameter that causes the process variation to be different from each other, and each of the plurality of PUFs may generate a digital value. Can be.
- At least one of the plurality of PUFs includes at least one via formed between conductive layers of a semiconductor, and whether the conductive layers are shorted by the at least one via.
- the parameter comprises a size of the via.
- the size of the via is less than or equal to the minimum value or less than the maximum value of the via size, which is found to be short-circuited or not short-circuited between the conductive layers in a preliminary test process for producing the device. Is selected from a range (which may be referred to as an 'effective interval'), and different via sizes may be applied to each of the plurality of PUFs.
- the processor may select a value corresponding to a predetermined condition from among the plurality of digital values as the first digital value.
- the predetermined condition may be generated by a PUF having the minimum applied parameter among at least one PUF for which a bit sequence provides a digital value including both '1' and '0'.
- the predetermined condition is that, among at least one PUF that provides a digital value in which the bit sequence includes both '1' and '0', the applied parameter is the minimum value and the maximum value. It may be generated by the median PUF.
- the processor may calculate the first digital value by performing a logical operation on the plurality of digital values for each bit sequence.
- the logical operation may be an Exclusive Or (XOR) logical operation.
- a plurality of PUFs manufactured by applying at least one parameter that causes the process variation different from each other Generating three digital values; And processing by the processor to process the plurality of digital values to provide a first digital value.
- At least one of the plurality of PUFs may include at least one via formed between conductive layers of a semiconductor, and the generating of the at least one via may be performed by the at least one via. At least one of the plurality of digital values may be generated according to whether or not they are short-circuited.
- the parameter may include the size of the via.
- the size of the via is in the range of the minimum value or the maximum value of the via size which is confirmed to be short-circuited or not short-circuited between the conductive layers in a test process which has been conducted in advance of the process for generating the device. Can be selected.
- different via sizes may be applied to each of the plurality of PUFs within the above range.
- the processing may include selecting, as the first digital value, a value that meets a predetermined condition from among the plurality of digital values.
- the predetermined condition may be generated by a PUF having the minimum applied parameter among at least one PUF for which a bit sequence provides a digital value including both '1' and '0'.
- the predetermined condition is generated by the PUF of the at least one PUF of the bit sequence provides a digital value including both '1' and '0'
- the applied parameter is the median of the minimum and maximum values It may be.
- the processing may include calculating the first digital value by performing a logical operation on the plurality of digital values for each bit sequence.
- the logical operation may be an Exclusive Or (XOR) logical operation.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a digital value generating apparatus according to an embodiment.
- FIG. 2 is a conceptual diagram illustrating a detailed configuration of a generation unit according to an embodiment.
- FIG. 3 is a conceptual diagram illustrating an operation of a processor according to an exemplary embodiment.
- FIG. 4 is a conceptual diagram illustrating an operation of a processor according to an exemplary embodiment.
- FIG. 5 is a conceptual diagram illustrating an operation of a processor according to an exemplary embodiment.
- FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating a digital value generating method according to an embodiment.
- FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating a digital value generating method according to another exemplary embodiment.
- FIG. 8 is a flowchart illustrating a digital value generating method according to an embodiment.
- the apparatus 100 may include a generator 110 that generates a plurality of digital values using a semiconductor process variation, and a processor 120 that processes the plurality of digital values to provide a first digital value. It may include.
- the generation unit 110 may include a plurality of physically unclonable functions (PUFs) that generate random digital values according to semiconductor process variations.
- the plurality of PUFs may be conceptually divided parts of the semiconductor structure included in the generation unit 110.
- the PUFs PUF 1 to PUF n may generate random digital values according to semiconductor process variations. Each of these digital values may be a bit sequence.
- PUFs are not all physically replicable, and each digital value generated may be time invariant.
- PUFs may be classified as PUF i . Where i is an integer and is a conceptual index identifying the PUFs. However, this division may be a different concept from the arrangement or structural division in the actual circuit. Accordingly, it may be understood that the generator 110 itself is a PUF, and each of the PUF i is parts of the generator 110.
- the generation unit 110 may include n PUFs.
- n PUFs may include any process element and / or design element that affects the probability that individual bits included in the randomly generated digital value are '0' (or the probability that it is '1').
- the 'element' may be referred to as a 'parameter').
- the PUF i may include k vias formed between conductive layers of the semiconductor. Where k is a natural number and the number of vias included in PUF i .
- a digital value '1' or '0' may be generated for each via depending on whether each of the k vias included in the PUF i is shorted between the conductive layers or not. Accordingly, one PUF i provides a digital value of k bits, and the generation unit 110 generates n digital values.
- n PUFs may be generated by applying different parameters.
- this parameter may be the via size.
- PUF 1 to PUF n may be designed and / or manufactured to have different via sizes, respectively.
- the embodiment associated with the via is just one embodiment of making a PUF, and in other embodiments of making a PUF, the parameter may vary. Accordingly, unless otherwise stated, the embodiments associated with the vias are to be construed as illustrative in nature. For example, embodiments in which a PUF is implemented by using random differences in electrical characteristics of the same device in an electronic circuit, and embodiments by other types of PUF, such as spacing between conductive layers of a semiconductor, are also possible. . Thus, many other embodiments implementing PUF can be applied in conjunction with and / or in place of the via embodiment.
- n PUFs have different parameters (such as size).
- This via size may be the smallest in PUF 1 and the largest in PUF n .
- the smaller the via size the greater the probability that the processed vias will not normally be created, and the larger the via size, the greater the probability that the vias will be normally generated after the process.
- the validity interval may mean a range of parameters including both 0 and 1, not all of binary values generated by PUF i or all 1s.
- the range of the via size in which both 0 and 1 exist in the binary values of PUF i may mean a valid period.
- FIG. 2 is a conceptual diagram illustrating a detailed configuration of the generation unit 110 according to an embodiment.
- PUF PUF index i i may have the same size are both k vias. This size may be chosen to be an appropriate size where k vias may or may not randomly short between the conductive layers. Theoretically, there are cases where each of the k vias is equal to 1/2 of the probability of shorting between the conductive layers and the probability of not shorting, and the size of the case is the optical via size described above. As mentioned above, previously, the first pass described above was previously performed for a particular process of generating PUF.
- the optical via size to be used in the specific process is determined according to the progress of the first pass, and then the second via for mass production of the PUF to be actually used is performed using the optical via size.
- the second pass is applied by applying the optical via size determined by the first pass, there is a probability that the vias short between the conductive layers for each wafer and / or for each PUF chip (even on one wafer). There may be cases where it is not kept to 1/2. This is recognized as a challenge that needs to be solved in order to utilize random numbers generated by PUF in various industries, especially security.
- PUFs having various via sizes within a valid interval are generated on one chip, and then an optical PUF i is selected and used, or some PUF values are processed.
- an optical PUF i is selected and used, or some PUF values are processed.
- the generated digital value in order for the generated digital value to be a truly random number, it must pass a predetermined test for evaluating whether the occurrence frequency of '0' and '1' is similar.
- a predetermined test for evaluating whether the occurrence frequency of '0' and '1' is similar.
- NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
- the random numbers used in the security field are those frequencies. It specifies that a test (frequency test or monobit test) must be passed. According to embodiments, the yield of generating a PUF that can pass this randomness test is greatly improved.
- various via hole sizes are implemented together in the generation unit 110.
- the above-mentioned 'parameter causing process variation' is 'size of via hole'.
- the PUFs 1 to PUF n implemented in the generation unit 110 are manufactured to have different via hole sizes.
- a particular PUF index i there is a bit sequence of k bits length (hereinafter referred to as a 'PUF bit sequence').
- k-bit digital values there is a bit sequence of k bits length (hereinafter referred to as a 'PUF bit sequence').
- k-bit digital values k bits length
- the number of bits k or the type n of different via hole sizes implemented in one chip may be set in various ways depending on the length of the random number required, process progress conditions, requirements for passing the randomness test, and application fields of the PUF. Can be.
- the via hole size is the smallest in PUF 1 , and is sequentially increased so that the via hole size is largest in PUF n .
- this order is for convenience of description and does not have to be implemented in the order of increasing size.
- the size of the via hole may be increased in various ways.
- the size of the via hole may be increased by a certain ratio, such as by a uniform diameter .
- the via hole size difference may be greater than that of PUF 1 or PUF n. An example of increasing the accuracy by making it small is possible.
- a via shorts the conductive layers is described as a binary value '1'
- a case in which a via cannot be shorted is described as a binary value '0'.
- determining the binary value to either "1" or "0" based on a short circuit is just an example for clarity, and vice versa depending on whether the read circuit is a pull-down or pull-up configuration. As much as possible.
- the PUF bit sequences of k bits may all be '0'.
- all of the k-bit PUF bit sequences may be '1'.
- the via hole size of PUF 1 may be the minimum via hole size expected to be designed and manufactured in the process to produce '0' and '1', or previously described in the process.
- the first pass may be the minimum via hole size determined to generate both '0' and '1' as a bit sequence. Embodiments presented in this sense do not exclude the progress of the existing 2-Pass process only.
- the via hole size of PUF n may be the largest via hole size expected to be designed and manufactured in the process to make '0' and '1', or the first pass described above in advance in the process. As a result, it may be the maximum via hole size found to generate both '0' and '1' as the bit sequence.
- the processor 120 of FIG. 1 uses the n digital values to provide the final value provided by the digital value generator 100.
- a digital value hereinafter also referred to as a "first digital value"
- FIG. 3 to FIG. 6 are conceptual views illustrating some of the embodiments.
- FIG. 3 is a conceptual diagram illustrating an operation of the processing unit 120 according to an embodiment.
- the reader 121 of the processor 120 reads each PUF to read the PUF digital values A 1 to A n .
- PUF 1 has the smallest via hole size and increasingly larger via hole sizes, so A 1 includes more than '0' than '1' and An equals '1'. May contain more than 0 '.
- some digital values including A 1 may all include only '0', and some digital values including A n may all include only '1'.
- the determiner 122 of the processor 120 may determine a value from among A p to A q (values of the valid interval) including both digital values '0' and '1' among the read A 1 to A n . Any one may be selected and determined as the first digital value provided by the digital value generating apparatus 100. Various embodiments also exist as to which digital value to select.
- the determiner 122 may determine the first digital value A p including both the digital values '0' and '1' among A i as the first digital value. According to another embodiment, the determiner 122 may determine the last digital value A q including both the digital values '0' and '1' among the A i as the first digital value. According to another embodiment, the determination unit 122 may determine any value of A p to A q including both digital values '0' and '1' among A i as the first digital value.
- the determiner 122 may have an index among centers of p and q among A p to A q, which are values of an effective interval including both digital values '0' and '1' among A i .
- a m may be determined as the first digital value. This embodiment is reasonable in that A m will have a relatively even distribution of digital values '0' and '1'.
- the determiner 122 may calculate the first digital value by performing a logical operation by bit on at least a portion of the digital values A 1 to A n .
- This embodiment may make the randomness of the first digital value to a very high level and may be suitable for using the first digital value in security applications.
- the bits of the first digital value B may be calculated by performing a logical operation on digital values having the same column indexes A 1 to A n .
- the digital value A i consists of the bit sequences a i1 to a ik .
- the determiner 122 may calculate bits b j of the first digital value by performing a logical operation on a 1j to a nj having the same column index j (j is a natural number).
- the logical operation may be an exclusive OR (XOR) operation. XOR operation, if the input values a 1j to the a If nj is '1', includes odd number to output a '1', and inputs a 1j to a nj '1' contains an even number, and outputs "0" .
- the entropy of the plurality of digital values is summed, thus the overall entropy can be expected to be greatly improved.
- This XOR operation greatly increases the randomness of the first digital value B because n increases the probability that the bit value is '1' to 50%.
- the determining unit 122 excludes digital values of the read A 1 to A n having all bit values '0' or all '1', and the bit values are '0' and Only the digital values in the range including '1' may be used by the XOR operation.
- the first digital value B is calculated by performing an XOR operation on only A p to A q bit by bit.
- the column index j performs XOR operations on the same bit values.
- this is just an example, and the method of performing the XOR operation may be modified in any other form. Therefore, in addition to the operation of the same bit values of the column index j, it is also possible to operate the bits according to other predetermined rules or randomly selected bits.
- the PUF index i it is also possible for the PUF index i to perform XOR operations among the same bit values, among which the digital values of other individual PUF bit sequences are not all '0' and not all '1'. Furthermore, it is also possible to perform any other logical operation using a randomly selected individual PUF bit sequence.
- the XOR operation may be replaced by another logical operation, and other embodiments may be possible to combine the inputs of the logical operations.
- the determination unit 122 determines the first digital value A p including both digital values '0' and '1' among the digital values A i generated by the PUFs. Corresponds to an embodiment in which the first digital value B is selected.
- the initial index i is set to zero, and in step 610 the index i value is incremented by one.
- a test is performed to determine whether the current index i is equal to the final index n. As a result of the determination of step 620, if i becomes equal to n in a state where the first digital value B has not yet been determined, an error may be returned (621). In operation 620, if i is not equal to n, in operation 630, it is determined whether all bits of the digital value A i corresponding to the current index are '0'.
- FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating a digital value generating method according to another exemplary embodiment.
- the illustrated flowchart identifies A p to A q including both the digital values '0' and '1' among the digital values A i generated by the PUFs in the embodiment described with reference to FIG. 3, and the index p and the index q Corresponding to an embodiment in which the determiner 122 selects the digital value A m corresponding to the index m, which is the median value, as the first digital value B.
- the initial index i is set to zero, and in step 710 the index i value is incremented by one.
- step 730 it is determined at 730 whether all bits of A i are '1'. If all bits of A i are not '1', it is determined in step 740 whether all bits of A i are '0'. In step 740, if all bits of A i are '0', the process returns to step 710 to increase the bit index and then repeats the process. However, if at step 740 the total bits of A i are not '0' then the current index i is determined to be p and the process returns to step 710.
- q value is determined.
- the q value may be determined as the current index i, or (i-1), which is not shown but smaller than the current index, may be determined as q (step 760).
- the current index n may be determined to be q.
- median (p, q) which is the median value of p and q, is calculated to determine A median (p, q) corresponding to the index median (p, q) as the first digital value B. Can be.
- FIG. 8 is a flowchart illustrating a digital value generating method according to an embodiment.
- the plurality of digital values generated by the generation unit 110 of the digital value generation device 100 are read by the reading unit 121.
- Each of the plurality of digital values may be generated by the PUFs of FIG. 1.
- the reading process may be a process of reading digital values of A i to A n from PUFs exemplarily described with reference to FIGS. 1 and 2.
- n digital values (each of k bits) may be transmitted to the determiner 122 by this process.
- the determiner 122 determines the first digital value, which is a random number provided by the digital value generating apparatus 100, by using the read digital values.
- the determiner 122 identifies the values A p to A q including both the digital values '0' and '1' among the read digital values A 1 to A n . Then, any one of A p to A q may be selected and determined as the first digital value B. The selection may be by a predetermined rule, or may be a random selection.
- the determiner 122 may determine the first digital value A p including both the digital values '0' and '1' among the A i as the first digital value B.
- the determiner 122 may determine the last digital value A q including both digital values '0' and '1' among A i as the first digital value B. According to another embodiment, the determiner 122 may determine an arbitrary value of A p to A q including both digital values '0' and '1' among A i as the first digital value B. . Meanwhile, according to another exemplary embodiment, the determination unit 122 may select A m, which is the center of p and q, of A p to A q including both digital values '0' and '1' among A i . It may be determined as the first digital value B.
- the determiner 122 performs a logical operation by bit on at least a portion of the digital values A 1 to A n to perform the logical operation.
- the first digital value B may be calculated.
- the determiner 122 may calculate a bit value bj included in the first digital value B by performing a logical operation, for example, an XOR operation on a 1j to a nj having the same column index j (j is a natural number). . Details are as described above with reference to FIG.
- the determination unit 122 excludes digital values in which all bit values of read A 1 to A n are all “0” or all are “1”.
- the first digital value B may be calculated by performing an XOR operation on digital bits A p to A q in a range in which the bit values include both '0' and '1'.
- the process of determining the first digital value in step 820 may be variously modified in addition to the exemplary embodiments described with reference to FIGS. 3 to 5.
- any other operation that can increase the entropy of digital values is possible in addition to the XOR operation.
- B may be provided as a random number provided by the digital value generating apparatus 100 in operation 830.
- the entire generation unit chip including the corresponding PUF is available, and thus the PUF manufacturing yield may be increased.
- the PUFs with various parameters may be implemented at one time, it is possible to save time for performing a separate first pass, thereby minimizing the time required for the PUF process.
- the finally provided first digital value B has a very high entropy, which increases the probability of being treated as a truly random number. Therefore, the reliability that PUF can be used for applications in which randomness is important, such as security, can be greatly improved.
- the embodiments described above may be implemented as hardware components, software components, and / or combinations of hardware components and software components.
- the devices, methods, and components described in the embodiments may include, for example, processors, controllers, arithmetic logic units (ALUs), digital signal processors, microcomputers, field programmable gates (FPGAs). It may be implemented using one or more general purpose or special purpose computers, such as an array, a programmable logic unit (PLU), a microprocessor, or any other device capable of executing and responding to instructions.
- the processing device may execute an operating system (OS) and one or more software applications running on the operating system.
- the processing device may also access, store, manipulate, process, and generate data in response to the execution of the software.
- OS operating system
- the processing device may also access, store, manipulate, process, and generate data in response to the execution of the software.
- processing device includes a plurality of processing elements and / or a plurality of types of processing elements. It can be seen that it may include.
- the processing device may include a plurality of processors or one processor and one controller.
- other processing configurations are possible, such as parallel processors.
- the software may include a computer program, code, instructions, or a combination of one or more of the above, and configure the processing device to operate as desired, or process it independently or collectively. You can command the device.
- Software and / or data may be any type of machine, component, physical device, virtual equipment, computer storage medium or device in order to be interpreted by or to provide instructions or data to the processing device. Or may be permanently or temporarily embodied in a signal wave to be transmitted.
- the software may be distributed over networked computer systems so that they may be stored or executed in a distributed manner.
- Software and data may be stored on one or more computer readable recording media.
- the method according to the embodiment may be embodied in the form of program instructions that can be executed by various computer means and recorded in a computer readable medium.
- the computer readable medium may include program instructions, data files, data structures, etc. alone or in combination.
- the program instructions recorded on the media may be those specially designed and constructed for the purposes of the embodiments, or they may be of the kind well-known and available to those having skill in the computer software arts.
- Examples of computer-readable recording media include magnetic media such as hard disks, floppy disks, and magnetic tape, optical media such as CD-ROMs, DVDs, and magnetic disks, such as floppy disks.
- Examples of program instructions include not only machine code generated by a compiler, but also high-level language code that can be executed by a computer using an interpreter or the like.
- the hardware device described above may be configured to operate as one or more software modules to perform the operations of the embodiments, and vice versa.
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Claims (18)
- 반도체 공정 변이를 이용하여 디지털 값을 생성하는 장치에 있어서, 상기 장치는:상기 반도체 공정 변이를 이용하여 복수 개의 디지털 값을 생성하는 생성부; 및상기 복수 개의 디지털 값을 처리하여 제1 디지털 값을 제공하는 처리부를 포함하고,상기 생성부는 복수 개의 PUF (Physically Unclonable Function)를 포함하고, 상기 복수 개의 PUF 중 적어도 일부는 상기 공정 변이를 야기하는 적어도 하나의 파라미터가 서로 상이하게 적용되어 제조되며, 상기 복수 개의 PUF가 상기 복수 개의 디지털 값을 생성하는 장치.
- 제1항에 있어서,상기 복수 개의 PUF 중 적어도 하나는,반도체의 전도성 레이어들 사이에 형성되는 적어도 하나의 비아(Via)를 포함하며, 상기 적어도 하나의 비아에 의해 상기 전도성 레이어들이 단락되는지의 여부를 이용하여 상기 복수 개의 디지털 값 중 적어도 하나를 생성하는 장치.
- 제2항에 있어서,상기 파라미터는 상기 비아의 사이즈를 포함하는 장치.
- 제3항에 있어서,상기 비아의 사이즈는 상기 장치를 생성하는 공정에 대해 선 진행한 테스트 공정에서 상기 전도성 레이어들 사이가 단락되기도 하고 단락되지 않기도 하는 것으로 확인된 비아 사이즈의 최소 값 이상 최대 값 이하의 범위에서 선택되고, 상기 복수 개의 PUF 각각에는 상기 범위 내에서 서로 다른 비아 사이즈가 적용되는 장치.
- 제1항에 있어서,상기 처리부는,상기 복수 개의 디지털 값 중 미리 지정된 조건에 부합하는 값을 상기 제1 디지털 값으로 선택하는 장치.
- 제5항에 있어서,상기 미리 지정된 조건은, 비트 시퀀스가 '1' 및 '0'을 모두 포함하는 디지털 값을 제공하는 적어도 하나의 PUF 중, 상기 적용된 파라미터가 최소인 PUF 에 의해 생성되는 것인 장치.
- 제5항에 있어서,상기 미리 지정된 조건은, 비트 시퀀스가 '1' 및 '0'을 모두 포함하는 디지털 값을 제공하는 적어도 하나의 PUF 중, 상기 적용된 파라미터가 최소 값과 최대 값의 중앙 값인 PUF에 의해 생성되는 것인 장치.
- 제1항에 있어서,상기 처리부는,상기 복수 개의 디지털 값을 비트 시퀀스 별로 논리 연산하여 상기 제1 디지털 값을 계산하는 장치.
- 제8항에 있어서,상기 논리 연산은 익스클러시브 오어(XOR) 논리 연산인 장치.
- 반도체 공정 변이를 이용하여 디지털 값을 생성하는 장치가 디지털 값을 생성하는 방법에 있어서,상기 공정 변이를 야기하는 적어도 하나의 파라미터가 서로 상이하게 적용되어 제조된 복수 개의 PUF가 복수 개의 디지털 값을 생성하는 단계; 및처리부가 상기 복수 개의 디지털 값을 처리하여 제1 디지털 값을 제공하는 단계를 포함하는 방법.
- 제10항에 있어서,상기 복수 개의 PUF 중 적어도 하나는 반도체의 전도성 레이어들 사이에 형성되는 적어도 하나의 비아(Via)를 포함하며,상기 생성하는 단계는, 상기 적어도 하나의 비아에 의해 상기 전도성 레이어들이 단락되는지의 여부에 따라 상기 복수 개의 디지털 값 중 적어도 하나를 생성하는 방법.
- 제11항에 있어서,상기 파라미터는 상기 비아의 사이즈를 포함하는 방법.
- 제12항에 있어서,상기 비아의 사이즈는 상기 장치를 생성하는 공정에 대해 선 진행한 테스트 공정에서 상기 전도성 레이어들 사이가 단락되기도 하고 단락되지 않기도 하는 것으로 확인된 비아 사이즈의 최소 값 이상 최대 값 이하의 범위에서 선택되고, 상기 복수 개의 PUF 각각에는 상기 범위 내에서 서로 다른 비아 사이즈가 적용되는 방법.
- 제10항에 있어서,상기 처리하는 단계는, 상기 복수 개의 디지털 값 중 미리 지정된 조건에 부합하는 값을 상기 제1 디지털 값으로 선택하는 방법.
- 제14항에 있어서,상기 미리 지정된 조건은, 비트 시퀀스가 '1' 및 '0'을 모두 포함하는 디지털 값을 제공하는 적어도 하나의 PUF 중, 상기 적용된 파라미터가 최소인 PUF에 의해 생성되는 것인 방법.
- 제14항에 있어서,상기 미리 지정된 조건은, 비트 시퀀스가 '1' 및 '0'을 모두 포함하는 디지털 값을 제공하는 적어도 하나의 PUF 중, 상기 적용된 파라미터가 최소 값과 최대 값의 중앙 값인 PUF에 의해 생성되는 것인 방법.
- 제10항에 있어서,상기 처리하는 단계는, 상기 복수 개의 디지털 값을 비트 시퀀스 별로 논리 연산하여 상기 제1 디지털 값을 계산하는 방법.
- 제17항에 있어서,상기 논리 연산은 익스클러시브 오어(XOR) 논리 연산인 방법.
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