WO2014139408A1 - Procédé et système pour télécharger en aval de manière sécurisée une clé maître de terminal (tmk) - Google Patents

Procédé et système pour télécharger en aval de manière sécurisée une clé maître de terminal (tmk) Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2014139408A1
WO2014139408A1 PCT/CN2014/073220 CN2014073220W WO2014139408A1 WO 2014139408 A1 WO2014139408 A1 WO 2014139408A1 CN 2014073220 W CN2014073220 W CN 2014073220W WO 2014139408 A1 WO2014139408 A1 WO 2014139408A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
terminal
random number
authentication
module
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PCT/CN2014/073220
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
孟陆强
苏文龙
彭建忠
Original Assignee
福建联迪商用设备有限公司
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Priority claimed from CN2013100843972A external-priority patent/CN103237004A/zh
Priority claimed from CN2013100846735A external-priority patent/CN103220271A/zh
Priority claimed from CN2013100846716A external-priority patent/CN103220270A/zh
Priority claimed from CN2013100846538A external-priority patent/CN103237005A/zh
Application filed by 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 filed Critical 福建联迪商用设备有限公司
Publication of WO2014139408A1 publication Critical patent/WO2014139408A1/fr

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
    • G06Q20/20—Point-of-sale [POS] network systems
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of electronic payment, and in particular, to a method and system for securely downloading a terminal master key TMK.
  • Bank card (BANK Card) is becoming more and more popular as a payment instrument.
  • the usual bank card payment system includes a point of sale terminal (Point Of Sale, POS), POS Acquiring System (POSP), PIN PAD and Hardware Encryption (Hardware and Security) Module, HSM).
  • the POS terminal can accept the bank card information, has the communication function, and accepts the instructions of the teller to complete the financial transaction information and the related information exchange device; the POS acquiring system performs centralized management on the POS terminal, including parameter downloading, key downloading, accepting, Processing or forwarding the transaction request of the POS terminal, and sending back the transaction result information to the POS terminal, which is a centralized management and transaction processing system; the password keyboard (PIN) PAD) is a security device that securely stores keys related to various financial transactions and encrypts PINs.
  • the hardware encryption machine (HSM) is a peripheral hardware device that encrypts transmitted data and is used for encryption of PINs. Decrypt, verify the correctness of the message and file source, and store the key.
  • Personal identification number (Personal Identification Number, PIN), which is the personal information, is the data information identifying the legality of the cardholder's identity in online transactions. It is not allowed to appear in plain text in any part of the computer and network system; terminal master key (Terminal) Master Key, TMK), when the POS terminal works, the master key for encrypting the work key is encrypted and stored in the system database; the POS terminal is widely used in bank card payment occasions, such as vendor shopping, hotel accommodation, etc. The lack of modern means of payment has been integrated into the various situations of people's lives. Bank cards, especially debit cards, generally have a PIN set by the cardholder.
  • the POS terminal In the process of payment, the POS terminal not only sends the track information of the bank card, but also the cardholder to input the PIN for the card issuing bank to verify.
  • the legality of the cardholder’s identity ensures the security of the payment of the bank card and protects the property of the cardholder.
  • it In order to prevent the PIN from being leaked or cracked, it is required to securely encrypt the PIN from the terminal to the issuing bank during the entire information exchange process. It is not allowed to appear in the clear text in any part of the computer network system, so the input PIN is currently accepted.
  • the POS terminal requires a key management system.
  • TMK terminal master key
  • WK work key
  • TMK encrypts WK.
  • Each POS terminal has a unique TMK, which must be secure, ensure that it can only be written to the device and participate in calculations, and cannot be read.
  • TMK is a key root key. If TMK is intercepted, the work key is easier. Being cracked will seriously threaten the security of bank card payments. Therefore, whether the TMK can be safely downloaded to the POS terminal becomes the key to the security of the entire POS terminal.
  • the download of the terminal master key must be controlled in the security room of the management center to manually download the terminal master key.
  • the maintenance center has a large workload; after the equipment leaves the factory, it needs to be transported to the security center of the management center to download the key to be deployed to the merchant, and the transportation cost increases; in order to concentrate the download of the key, a large amount of manpower and working time are required, and the maintenance cost is large. , long maintenance period and other issues.
  • a method for securely downloading a terminal master key TMK includes the steps of: S1, a process in which a KMS system transmits a public key Pu to a POS terminal; and S2, a process in which the POS terminal encrypts the transmission key TK by using the public key Pu and uploads it to the KMS system.
  • Step S3 the POS terminal downloads the process of the master key TMK encrypted by the transmission key TK from the KMS system; wherein the specific steps of the step S1 include: S11, the KMS system calls the hardware encryption machine to generate the public key Pu And the private key Pr; S12, the operation terminal and the KMS system perform mutual authentication through the CA center; S13, after the authentication is passed, the KMS system sends the public key Pu to the POS terminal through the operation terminal and stores it in the password keyboard; Step S2 specifically includes: S21.
  • the POS terminal invokes the cryptographic keyboard to generate a symmetric transmission key TK, where the transmission key TK includes a transmission encryption key TEK and a transmission authentication key AUK; S22, and the POS terminal invokes the cryptographic keyboard to use the public key Pu.
  • the transmission key TK includes a transmission encryption key TEK and a transmission authentication key AUK; S22, and the POS terminal invokes the cryptographic keyboard to use the public key Pu.
  • the encrypted transmission key TK generates a transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu;
  • S23 the operation terminal transmits the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN to the KMS
  • the S24 and the KMS system store the terminal serial number SN and the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu in the KMS database in association with each other;
  • the step S3 specifically includes: S31, the POS terminal sets the terminal serial number SN And downloading the master key application to send to the KMS system;
  • S32 the KMS system receives the terminal serial number SN sent by the POS terminal After downloading the master key request, querying the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu corresponding to the terminal serial number SN;
  • S33 the KMS system calls the hardware encryption machine to decrypt the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu using the private key Pr to obtain the transmission key TK;
  • S34 After obtaining the transmission key TK, the KMS system calls the hardware encryption machine to
  • the KMS system calls the hardware encryption machine to use the transmission encryption key TEK to encrypt the terminal master key TMK to generate the master.
  • the key ciphertext Ctmk_tk and the master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk are sent to the POS terminal; S36, the POS terminal invokes the cryptographic keyboard to decrypt the master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk using the transport encryption key TEK to obtain the terminal master key TMK and the terminal master key TMK is stored in the PIN pad.
  • a terminal master key TMK security download system includes a hardware encryption machine, a POS terminal, an operation terminal, a CA center, and a KMS system; the POS terminal includes a TK generation module, a first TK upload module, and a master key download request module.
  • the CA center includes a CA authentication module; the public and private key issuing module is used to invoke a hardware encryption machine to generate a public key Pu.
  • the CA authentication module is used for the operation terminal and the KMS system to perform mutual authentication through the CA center;
  • the public and private key issuance module is configured to send the public key Pu to the POS terminal through the operation terminal and store it in the operation terminal after the authentication is passed.
  • the TK generating module is configured to invoke a cryptographic keyboard to generate a symmetric transmission key TK, the transmission key TK includes a transmission encryption key TEK and a transmission authentication key AUK; and the first TK uploading module is used to invoke a cryptographic keyboard.
  • the encrypted transport key TK generates a transport key ciphertext Ctk_Pu;
  • the second TK upload module is configured to send the transport key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN to the KMS
  • the TK receiving module is configured to store the terminal serial number SN and the transport key ciphertext Ctk_Pu in the KMS database in association;
  • the master key download request module is configured to use the terminal serial number SN And downloading the master key request to send to the KMS system;
  • the request response module is used when the KMS system receives the terminal serial number SN sent by the POS terminal And after downloading the master key application, querying the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu corresponding to the terminal serial number SN;
  • the request response module is configured to invoke the hardware encryption machine to decrypt the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu using the private key Pr to obtain the transmission key TK;
  • the authentication A module and the two-way authentication B module are used to invoke the hardware encryption
  • the machine uses the transport encryption key TEK to encrypt the terminal master key TMK to generate the master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk and sends the master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk to the POS terminal; the TMK receiving module is used to invoke the cryptographic keyboard to decrypt the primary key using the transport encryption key TEK.
  • the key ciphertext Ctmk_tk obtains the terminal master key TMK and stores the terminal master key TMK in the PIN pad.
  • the invention has the beneficial effects that the present invention uploads the transmission key TK through the POS terminal, encrypts the terminal master key TMK by the TK, and downloads it to the PIN terminal of the POS terminal, thereby realizing the POS terminal remote download terminal master key TMK.
  • the POS terminal is prevented from being distributed to the merchant by centrally downloading the master key, thereby reducing the logistics cost and the centralized download and maintenance cost.
  • collecting and uploading TK through the operation terminal improves the time efficiency of TK collection and uploading, and also strengthens the process control of TK collection and uploading, which effectively ensures the legality of uploading TK.
  • the identity authentication between the operation terminal and the KMS system is performed through the CA center, thereby ensuring that both sides of the data transmission are legal, thereby effectively preventing the pseudo terminal from stealing the terminal master key TMK.
  • FIG. 1 is a structural block diagram of a terminal master key TMK secure download system according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a structural block diagram of the two-way authentication A module of FIG. 1;
  • FIG. 3 is a structural block diagram of the bidirectional authentication B module of FIG. 1;
  • FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a method for securely downloading a terminal master key TMK according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 5 is a specific flow chart of step S1 in Figure 4.
  • FIG. 6 is a specific flow chart of step S2 in Figure 4.
  • FIG. 7 is a detailed flow chart of step S3 of Figure 4.
  • 10 POS terminal; 20: operation terminal; 30: KMS system; 40: CA center; 50: hardware encryption machine; 101: TK generation module; 102: first TK upload module; 103: master key download request module; 104: TMK receiving module; 105: two-way authentication A module; 201: a second TK uploading module; 301: public and private key issuing module; 302: TK receiving module; 303: request response module; 304: two-way authentication B module; 305: TMK sending module; 401: CA authentication module; 1051: first random number generating unit; 1052: first data transceiving unit; 1053: first encrypting and decrypting unit; 1054: first judging unit; 3041: second random number generating unit; 3042: second data transceiving unit; 3043: second encrypting and decrypting unit; 3044: second judging unit.
  • AUK Authentication Key Abbreviation, the authentication key, used for mutual authentication between PINPAD and the key management system KMS;
  • CA Center The so-called CA (Certificate Authority) Center, which uses PKI (Public Key) Infrastructure) Public Key Infrastructure Technology, which provides network identity authentication services, is responsible for issuing and managing digital certificates, and is an authoritative and impartial third-party trust organization that acts like a company that issues documents in real life.
  • PKI Public Key
  • HSM High Security Machine, high security device, which is a hardware encryption machine in this system
  • KMS system Key Management System, key management system for managing terminal master key TMK;
  • MAK short for Mac Key, which is the MAC calculation key.
  • MTMS full name Material Tracking Management System, material traceability management system, mainly used in factory production;
  • PIK short name of Pin Key, that is, Pin encryption key, which is a kind of work key
  • PINPAD password keyboard
  • PK Short for Protect Key, the protection key, negotiated with the customer to determine the 24-byte symmetric key.
  • MTMS/TCS Encrypted transmission of TK with KMS;
  • POS Short for Point Of Sale, which is the sales terminal
  • SNpinpad the serial number of the PIN pad. When PINPAD is built-in, it is the same as the serial number SNpos of the POS terminal.
  • SN the serial number of the POS terminal
  • TEK Transmission Encrypt The abbreviation of Key, that is, transmission encryption key, 24-byte symmetric key, used for encrypted transmission of TMK between PINPAD and key management system KMS;
  • TK Transmission The abbreviation of Key, that is, the transmission key.
  • the transport key is composed of a transport encryption key TEK and a mutual authentication key AUK;
  • TMS Terminal Management System Abbreviation, that is, terminal management system, used to complete POS terminal information management, software and parameter configuration, remote download, terminal operation status information collection management, remote diagnosis and other functions;
  • TMK Terminal Master
  • the abbreviation of Key that is, the terminal master key, is used for encrypted transmission of the work key between the POS terminal and the payment acquiring system;
  • Security room A room with a high security level for storing servers. This room requires authentication before it can enter.
  • Smart IC card It is a CPU card.
  • the integrated circuit in the card includes a central processing unit CPU, a programmable read-only memory EEPROM, a random access memory RAM, and an in-card operating system COS (Chip) which is solidified in a read-only memory ROM. Operating System), the data in the card is divided into external reading and internal processing.
  • Symmetric key Both parties that send and receive data must use the same key to encrypt and decrypt the plaintext.
  • Symmetric key encryption algorithms mainly include: DES, 3DES, IDEA, FEAL, BLOWFISH, and so on.
  • Asymmetric Key An asymmetric encryption algorithm requires two keys: a public key (Private key) and a private key (Public key) Key). The public key and the private key are a pair. If the data is encrypted with the public key, only the corresponding private key can be used for decryption; if the data is encrypted with the private key, only the corresponding public key can be used. Decrypt. Because encryption and decryption use two different keys, this algorithm is called an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
  • the basic process of asymmetric information exchange for asymmetric encryption is: Party A generates a pair of keys and exposes one of them as a public key to other parties; Party B, which obtains the public key, uses the key to perform confidential information.
  • Party A After encryption, it will be sent to Party A; Party A will decrypt the encrypted information with another private key saved by Party A.
  • Party A may use Party B's public key to encrypt the confidential information and then send it to Party B; Party B then uses its own private key to decrypt the encrypted information.
  • the main algorithms are RSA, Elgamal, backpack algorithm, Rabin, D-H, ECC (elliptic curve encryption algorithm).
  • RSA An asymmetric key algorithm.
  • the RSA public key encryption algorithm was in 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamirh Developed by Len Adleman (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA).
  • the RSA is named after the name of the three of them.
  • RSA It is currently the most influential public key encryption algorithm, it can resist all the password attacks known so far, and has been recommended by ISO as the public key data encryption standard.
  • RSA The algorithm is based on a very simple theory of numbers: it is easy to multiply two large prime numbers.
  • the RSA algorithm is the first algorithm that can be used for both encryption and digital signatures, and is easy to understand and operate.
  • RSA It is the most widely studied public key algorithm. It has been tested by various attacks for more than 30 years from the present to the present, and it is gradually accepted as one of the best public key solutions.
  • TDES Triple-DES DES is a symmetric encryption algorithm with a key of 8 bytes. TDES is based on DES The encryption algorithm whose key is 16 bytes or 24 bytes. TDES/3DES is the abbreviation of English TripleDES (ie triple data encryption standard), DES is English Data Acronym for Encryption Standard. DES is a symmetric key encryption algorithm, that is, the encryption algorithm with the same data encryption key and decryption key. DES by IBM The company was developed and made public in the 1970s and subsequently adopted by the US government and recognized by the US National Bureau of Standards and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). TDES/3DES is DES A pattern of encryption algorithms that uses three 64-bit keys to encrypt data three times. Is a safer variant of DES.
  • the present invention adopts a new master key downloading scheme, and randomly generates a TK (Transmission) through a POS terminal. Key, transport key), save the generated TK in the PIN terminal of the POS terminal, and transfer the TK to the KMS (Key Management) through various transmission modes required in various application scenarios.
  • the KMS system uses the TK to encrypt the terminal master key TMK, and sends the encrypted terminal master key ciphertext to the POS terminal, and the POS terminal receives the TK to the master key.
  • the text is decrypted to obtain the terminal master key TMK, and the terminal master key TMK is saved in the password keyboard.
  • the terminal master key TMK is encrypted by TK, so that the TMK can be remotely transmitted, and the secure download of the TMK is facilitated.
  • the TK generated by the POS terminal is collected by the operation terminal, and the operation terminal is responsible for transmitting the TK to the KMS system.
  • the TK can be conveniently collected by the operation terminal (such as one-key acquisition, etc.) and TK acquisition. Permission management.
  • the terminal master key there may be aft of the terminal master key through the pseudo operation terminal when uploading the TK and downloading the terminal master key TMK.
  • TMK therefore, requires a terminal master key TMK secure download scheme that can authenticate the delivery of two-way identity when transmitting the TK or TMK.
  • the terminal master key TMK security download system includes a hardware encryption machine 50, a POS terminal 10, an operation terminal 20, a CA center 40, and a KMS system 20;
  • the POS terminal 10 includes a TK generation module 101, a first TK upload module 102,
  • the operation terminal 20 includes a second TK uploading module 201
  • the KMS system 30 includes a public-private key issuing module 301, a TK receiving module 302,
  • the CA center 40 includes a CA authentication module 401.
  • the public key issuing module 301 is configured to invoke the hardware encryptor 50 to generate the public key Pu and the private key Pr;
  • the CA authentication module 401 is configured to perform bidirectional authentication by the CA terminal 30 and the KMS system 30 through the CA center 40;
  • the public key issuing module 301 is configured to send the public key Pu to the POS terminal 10 through the operation terminal 20 and store it in the PIN pad after the authentication is passed;
  • the TK generating module 101 is configured to invoke a cryptographic keyboard to generate a symmetric transmission key TK, where the transmission key TK includes a transmission encryption key TEK and a transmission authentication key AUK;
  • the first TK uploading module 102 is configured to invoke a cryptographic keyboard to encrypt the transmission key TK using the public key Pu. Generating a transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu;
  • the second TK uploading module 201 is configured to send the transport key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN to the KMS system;
  • the TK receiving module 302 is configured to store the terminal serial number SN and the transport key ciphertext Ctk_Pu in the KMS database in association with each other;
  • the master key download request module 103 is configured to send the terminal serial number SN and the download master key request to the KMS system 30;
  • the request response module 303 is configured to receive the terminal serial number SN sent by the POS terminal 10 when the KMS system 30 receives the SN And after downloading the master key application, query the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu corresponding to the terminal serial number SN;
  • the request response module 303 is configured to invoke the hardware encryption machine 50 to decrypt the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu using the private key Pr to obtain the transmission key TK;
  • the two-way authentication A module 105 and the two-way authentication B module 304 are used to invoke the hardware encryption machine 50 to perform mutual authentication with the POS terminal 10 using the authentication key AUK after the KMS system 30 obtains the transmission key TK;
  • the TMK sending module 305 is configured to, when the two-way authentication is passed, invoke the hardware encryption machine 50 to use the transmission encryption key TEK to encrypt the terminal master key TMK to generate the master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk and send the master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk to the POS terminal 10;
  • the TMK receiving module 104 is configured to call the cryptographic keyboard to decrypt the master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk using the transport encryption key TEK to obtain the terminal master key TMK and store the terminal master key TMK in the PIN pad.
  • the operation terminal 20 further includes an operator card and an administrator card;
  • the CA authentication module 401 is further configured to generate an operator card certificate and an administrator card certificate, and is configured to store the operator card certificate in the operator card and store the administrator card certificate in the management card;
  • the operator card and the administrator card are used when the operation terminal 20 reads the operator card and the administrator card inserted in the operation terminal, and passes the CAC 40 to legalize the operator certificate and the administrator certificate. Authorization operates the operation terminal 20.
  • the operation card is restricted by the operator card and the administrator, so that only the operator holding the operator card can collect the transmission key TK of the POS terminal 10 under the authorization of the administrator, thereby ensuring the transmission density.
  • the key TK will not be collected arbitrarily, effectively guaranteeing the true validity of the uploaded TK.
  • the operation terminal 20 further includes a packaging module, where the packaging module is configured to package the received transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN and use an operator card to sign;
  • the KMS system 30 further includes a verification module, and the verification module is configured to verify the signature of the packaging module when receiving the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN transmitted by the TK collection unit. Legitimacy, and for storing the terminal sequence number SN and the transport key ciphertext Ctk_Pu in the SN-Key_KMS database when the check is legal.
  • the packet transmission module packs and signs the collected transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN, and can trace back to which operator operation the TK information is generated, so it can be judged according to the validity of verifying the signature. Whether the uploaded transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN are legal, strengthens the collection and transmission management of the transmission key TK, and prevents the pseudo terminal from uploading the pseudo transmission key TK.
  • FIG. 2 is a structural block diagram of the bidirectional authentication A module of FIG. 1
  • FIG. 3 is a structural block diagram of the bidirectional authentication B module of FIG. 1
  • the two-way authentication A module 105 includes a first random number generating unit 1051, a first data transceiving unit 1052, a first encryption and decryption unit 1053, and a first judging unit 1054
  • the bidirectional authentication B module 304 includes a second random number generating unit. 3041.
  • the first random number generating unit 1051 is configured to generate a first random number Rnd1; the first data transceiving unit 1052 is configured to send the generated first random number Rnd1 to the KMS system 30; and the second data transceiving unit 3042 is configured to receive the first random number The number Rnd1; the second random number generating unit 3041 is configured to generate a random number second Rnd2 when receiving the first random number Rnd1; the second encryption and decryption unit 3043 is configured to invoke hardware encryption when receiving the first random number Rnd1
  • the machine 50 encrypts the first random number Rnd1 by using the transmission authentication key AUK to obtain the first random number ciphertext Crnd1; the second data transceiving unit 3042 is configured to send the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 and the second random number Rnd2 to the POS terminal 10. ;
  • the first encryption/decryption unit 1053 is configured to decrypt the received first random number ciphertext Crnd1 using the transmission authentication key AUK to obtain the third random number Rnd1' when receiving the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 and the second random number Rnd2.
  • the first determining unit 1054 is configured to determine whether the third random number Rnd1' is consistent with the first random number Rnd1;
  • the first encryption and decryption unit 1053 is configured to generate a second random number ciphertext by using the transmission authentication key AUK to encrypt the second random number Rnd2 when the first determining unit determines that the third random number Rnd1' is consistent with the first random number Rnd1. Crnd2; the first data transceiver unit 1052 is configured to send the second random number ciphertext Crnd2 to the KMS system 30;
  • the second encryption/decryption unit 3043 is configured to, when receiving the second random number ciphertext Crnd2, invoke the hardware encryption machine 50 to decrypt the received second random number ciphertext Crnd2 using the transmission authentication key AUK to obtain the fourth random number Rnd2',
  • the second determining unit 3044 is configured to determine whether the fourth random number Rnd2' is consistent with the second random number Rnd2, and when determining that the fourth random number Rnd2' is consistent with the second random number Rnd2, confirm that the KMS system 30 and the POS terminal 10 are The two-way authentication passed.
  • FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a method for securely downloading a terminal master key TMK according to an embodiment of the present invention. The method includes the following steps:
  • the POS terminal downloads the process of the master key TMK encrypted by the transmission key TK from the KMS system.
  • step S1 specifically includes the following steps:
  • the KMS system calls the hardware encryption machine to generate the public key Pu and the private key Pr;
  • the operation terminal and the KMS system perform mutual authentication through the CA center;
  • the KMS system After the authentication is passed, the KMS system sends the public key Pu to the POS terminal through the operation terminal and stores it in the password keyboard.
  • step S2 specifically includes the following steps:
  • the POS terminal invokes the cryptographic keyboard to generate a symmetric transmission key TK, and the transmission key TK includes a transmission encryption key TEK and a transmission authentication key AUK;
  • the POS terminal invokes the cryptographic keyboard to generate the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu using the public key Pu encryption transmission key TK;
  • the operation terminal sends the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN to the KMS system.
  • the KMS system stores the terminal serial number SN and the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu in the KMS database in association with each other;
  • step S3 specifically includes the following steps:
  • the POS terminal sends the terminal serial number SN and the download master key request to the KMS system.
  • the KMS system receives the terminal serial number SN sent by the POS terminal. And after downloading the master key application, query the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu corresponding to the terminal serial number SN;
  • the KMS system calls the hardware encryption machine to decrypt the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu using the private key Pr to obtain the transmission key TK;
  • the SMS and the KMS system call the hardware encryption machine to perform mutual authentication with the POS terminal by using the authentication key AUK;
  • the KMS system invokes the hardware encryption machine to generate the master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk by using the transport encryption key TEK to encrypt the terminal master key TMK and send the master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk to the POS terminal;
  • the POS terminal invokes the cryptographic keyboard to decrypt the master key ciphertext Ctmk_tk using the transport encryption key TEK to obtain the terminal master key TMK and store the terminal master key TMK in the PIN pad.
  • the operation terminal and the KMS system perform mutual authentication through the CA center; after the authentication is passed, the KMS system sends the public key Pu to the POS terminal through the operation terminal and stores it in the password keyboard.
  • the KMS system sends the public key Pu and KMS identification information to the CA center.
  • the CA center uses the root certificate corresponding private key to sign the public key Pu and KMS system identification information, generates a digital certificate Crt_kms and sends the Crt_kms to the KMS system, and the KMS system stores The Crt_kms;
  • the KMS system sends the digital certificate Crt_kms to the operation terminal;
  • the operation terminal verifies the legality of the work certificate Crt_kms by using the root certificate HsmRCRT pre-installed on the burning chip.
  • the operation terminal sends the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN to the KMS.
  • the system also includes the steps of authorizing the operator card and the administrator card to operate the operation terminal, including:
  • the operation terminal reads the operator card and the administrator card inserted in the operation terminal, and authenticates the operator certificate and the administrator certificate through the CA center, and allows the operation terminal to operate after the authentication is passed.
  • the operation terminal sends the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN to the KMS system.
  • the method further includes:
  • the POS terminal sends the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN to the operation terminal;
  • the operation terminal packages the received transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN and signs with the operator card, and sends the signed transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN to the KMS system;
  • the KMS system stores the terminal serial number SN and the transport key ciphertext Ctk_Pu in association with the KMS. "In the database” also includes:
  • the KMS system first checks the validity of the signature when receiving the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal sequence number SN. If it is legal, the terminal sequence number SN and the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu are stored in association with the SN-Key_KMS database.
  • the “KMS system obtains the transmission key TK and then invokes the hardware encryption machine to use the authentication key AUK to perform mutual authentication with the POS terminal”, and specifically includes:
  • the POS terminal generates a first random number Rnd1 and sends the first random number Rnd1 to the KMS system;
  • the KMS system After receiving the first random number Rnd1, the KMS system generates a random number second Rnd2, and calls the hardware encryptor to encrypt the first random number Rnd1 by using the authentication key AUK to obtain the first random number ciphertext Crnd1, and the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 and the first Two random numbers Rnd2 are sent to the POS terminal;
  • the POS terminal decrypts the received first random number ciphertext Crnd1 using the authentication key AUK to obtain a third random number Rnd1', and determines whether the third random number Rnd1' is consistent with the first random number Rnd1:
  • the POS terminal encrypts the second random number Rnd2 using the authentication key AUK to generate the second random number ciphertext Crnd2, and sends the second random number ciphertext Crnd2 to the KMS system. ;
  • the KMS system calls the hardware encryptor to decrypt the received second random number ciphertext Crnd2 using the authentication key AUK to obtain the fourth random number Rnd2', and determines whether the fourth random number Rnd2' is consistent with the second random number Rnd2;
  • the original Chiha value of TK is calculated when the transmission key TK is generated, and the Chia value of TK is first checked each time the TK is stored, transmitted, or used, and TK can be used when the check is passed.
  • TK By verifying the Chia value of TK, it is possible to prevent the storage device from being abnormal and causing the stored data to be incorrect, and to determine whether the key is correct.
  • the invention has the beneficial effects that the present invention uploads the transmission key TK through the POS terminal, encrypts the terminal master key TMK by the TK, and downloads it to the PIN terminal of the POS terminal, thereby realizing the POS terminal remote download terminal master key TMK.
  • the POS terminal is prevented from being distributed to the merchant by centrally downloading the master key, thereby reducing the logistics cost and the centralized download and maintenance cost.
  • collecting and uploading TK through the operation terminal improves the time efficiency of TK collection and uploading, and also strengthens the process control of TK collection and uploading, which effectively ensures the legality of uploading TK.
  • the master key TMK of the present invention is generated by the KMS system, thus facilitating subsequent maintenance and management of the master key TMK by the KMS system. Further, when the POS terminal uploads the TK and the next, the identity authentication between the operation terminal and the KMS system is performed through the CA center, thereby ensuring that both sides of the data transmission are legal, thereby effectively preventing the pseudo terminal from stealing the terminal master key TMK.

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Abstract

L'invention porte sur un procédé et un système pour télécharger en aval de manière sécurisée une clé maître de terminal (TMK). Le procédé comprend les étapes suivantes : un système KMS réalisant une authentification d'identité avec un terminal d'opération par utilisation d'un centre CA, et après que l'authentification est réussie, envoyant une clé privée (Pu) d'une paire de clés publiques à un terminal POS par utilisation du terminal d'opération ; le terminal POS générant une TK, et émettant la TK au système KMS par utilisation du terminal d'opération ; et le système KMS réalisant une authentification d'identité avec le terminal POS par utilisation d'une clé d'authentification (AUK) dans la TK, et après que l'authentification est réussie, chiffrant la TMK et envoyant la TMK chiffrée au terminal POS. La présente invention possède les avantages suivants : par téléchargement en amont d'une TK et après qu'une TMK est chiffrée par utilisation de la TK, un terminal POS télécharge en aval à distance la TMK ; l'efficacité temporelle du téléchargement en aval de TK est améliorée par utilisation d'un terminal d'opération pour télécharger en amont la TK ; et l'émission sécurisée de la TK est renforcée par réalisation d'une authentification d'identité, par le centre CA, sur le terminal d'opération et le système KMS.
PCT/CN2014/073220 2013-03-15 2014-03-11 Procédé et système pour télécharger en aval de manière sécurisée une clé maître de terminal (tmk) WO2014139408A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (10)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201310084673.5 2013-03-15
CN201310084671.6 2013-03-15
CN2013100843972A CN103237004A (zh) 2013-03-15 2013-03-15 密钥下载方法、管理方法、下载管理方法及装置和系统
CN2013100846735A CN103220271A (zh) 2013-03-15 2013-03-15 密钥下载方法、管理方法、下载管理方法及装置和系统
CN201310084397.2 2013-03-15
CN201310084653.8 2013-03-15
CN2013100846716A CN103220270A (zh) 2013-03-15 2013-03-15 密钥下载方法、管理方法、下载管理方法及装置和系统
CN2013100846538A CN103237005A (zh) 2013-03-15 2013-03-15 密钥管理方法及系统
CN201310740308.5A CN103729941B (zh) 2013-03-15 2013-12-27 一种终端主密钥tmk安全下载方法及系统
CN201310740308.5 2013-12-27

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PCT/CN2014/073225 WO2014139412A1 (fr) 2013-03-15 2014-03-11 Méthode et système de téléchargement descendant sécurisé de clé principale de terminal (tmk)
PCT/CN2014/073224 WO2014139411A1 (fr) 2013-03-15 2014-03-11 Procédé et système de téléchargement sécurisé de clé principale de terminal (tmk)
PCT/CN2014/073220 WO2014139408A1 (fr) 2013-03-15 2014-03-11 Procédé et système pour télécharger en aval de manière sécurisée une clé maître de terminal (tmk)
PCT/CN2014/073215 WO2014139406A1 (fr) 2013-03-15 2014-03-11 Procédé et système de téléchargement sûr de clé principale de terminal (tmk)

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PCT/CN2014/073225 WO2014139412A1 (fr) 2013-03-15 2014-03-11 Méthode et système de téléchargement descendant sécurisé de clé principale de terminal (tmk)
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CN103714633A (zh) 2014-04-09
CN103746800B (zh) 2017-05-03
CN103731259A (zh) 2014-04-16
CN103729943A (zh) 2014-04-16
CN103729944A (zh) 2014-04-16
CN103729940B (zh) 2016-06-15
CN103714636A (zh) 2014-04-09
CN103714641A (zh) 2014-04-09
CN103716153B (zh) 2017-08-01
CN103714638A (zh) 2014-04-09
CN103716155B (zh) 2016-08-17
CN103731260B (zh) 2016-09-28
CN103716154A (zh) 2014-04-09
CN103714635B (zh) 2015-11-11
CN103716320B (zh) 2017-08-01

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