WO2014139341A1 - 密钥管理方法及系统 - Google Patents

密钥管理方法及系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2014139341A1
WO2014139341A1 PCT/CN2014/071231 CN2014071231W WO2014139341A1 WO 2014139341 A1 WO2014139341 A1 WO 2014139341A1 CN 2014071231 W CN2014071231 W CN 2014071231W WO 2014139341 A1 WO2014139341 A1 WO 2014139341A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
terminal
random number
pos terminal
mtms
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PCT/CN2014/071231
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English (en)
French (fr)
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WO2014139341A8 (zh
Inventor
苏文龙
孟陆强
姚承勇
陈瑞兵
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福建联迪商用设备有限公司
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Priority to US14/775,633 priority Critical patent/US9705672B2/en
Publication of WO2014139341A1 publication Critical patent/WO2014139341A1/zh
Publication of WO2014139341A8 publication Critical patent/WO2014139341A8/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H04L9/0833—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key
    • H04L9/0836—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key using tree structure or hierarchical structure
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H04L9/3265—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate chains, trees or paths; Hierarchical trust model
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of electronic payment, and in particular, to a device-side key management method and system.
  • Bank card (BANK Card) is becoming more and more popular as a payment instrument.
  • the usual bank card payment system includes a point of sale terminal (Point Of Sale, POS), POS Acquiring System (POSP), PIN PAD and Hardware Encryption (Hardware and Security) Module, HSM).
  • the POS terminal can accept the bank card information, has the communication function, and accepts the instructions of the teller to complete the financial transaction information and the related information exchange device; the POS acquiring system performs centralized management on the POS terminal, including parameter downloading, key downloading, accepting, Processing or forwarding the transaction request of the POS terminal, and sending back the transaction result information to the POS terminal, which is a centralized management and transaction processing system; the password keyboard (PIN) PAD) is a security device that securely stores keys related to various financial transactions and encrypts PINs.
  • the hardware encryption machine (HSM) is a peripheral hardware device that encrypts transmitted data and is used for encryption of PINs. Decrypt, verify the correctness of the message and file source, and store the key.
  • Personal identification number (Personal Identification Number, PIN), which is the personal information, is the data information identifying the legality of the cardholder's identity in online transactions. It is not allowed to appear in plain text in any part of the computer and network system; terminal master key (Terminal) Master Key, TMK), when the POS terminal works, the master key for encrypting the work key is encrypted and stored in the system database; the POS terminal is widely used in bank card payment occasions, such as vendor shopping, hotel accommodation, etc. The lack of modern means of payment has been integrated into the various situations of people's lives. Bank cards, especially debit cards, generally have a PIN set by the cardholder.
  • the POS terminal In the process of payment, the POS terminal not only sends the track information of the bank card, but also the cardholder to input the PIN for the card issuing bank to verify.
  • the legality of the cardholder’s identity ensures the security of the payment of the bank card and protects the property of the cardholder.
  • it In order to prevent the PIN from being leaked or cracked, it is required to securely encrypt the PIN from the terminal to the issuing bank during the entire information exchange process. It is not allowed to appear in the clear text in any part of the computer network system, so the input PIN is currently accepted.
  • the POS terminal requires a key management system.
  • TMK terminal master key
  • WK work key
  • Key parent POS scheme The user transmits the encryption key in the same way as the POS acquiring system hardware encryptor and the key parent POS input.
  • the POS terminal initiates a terminal master key download request to the POS acquiring system through the key POS, and the POS acquiring system drives the hardware encrypting machine to randomly generate the terminal master key, and transmits and transmits the key to the key POS by using the transmission encryption key.
  • the parent POS is decrypted by the transmission encryption key and then transmitted to the POS terminal.
  • the POS terminal obtains the plain key of the terminal master key and saves it to the PIN terminal of the POS terminal, thereby realizing the synchronization of the terminal master key between the POS terminal and the POS acquiring system.
  • IC card decryption scheme The user injects the same transmission encryption key into the POS acquiring system hardware encryption machine and the IC card. The user inserts the IC card into the POS terminal, and the POS terminal initiates the terminal master key download request to the POS acquiring system.
  • the POS acquiring system drives the hardware encrypting machine to randomly generate the terminal master key, and encrypts and transmits the encrypted key to the POS terminal, and the POS
  • the terminal decrypts the terminal master key ciphertext by using the transmission encryption key in the IC card, obtains the plain key of the terminal master key, and saves it to the PIN terminal PIN pad, thereby realizing the synchronization of the terminal master key between the POS terminal and the POS acquiring system.
  • the plain key of the terminal master key appears outside the security device.
  • the download of the terminal master key must be controlled in the security room of the management center. Key. Therefore, the maintenance center has a large workload; after the equipment leaves the factory, it needs to be transported to the security center of the management center to download the key to deploy to the merchant, and the transportation cost increases; in order to concentrate the download of the key, a large amount of manpower and working time are required, and the maintenance cost is required. Large, long maintenance period and other issues.
  • the POS acquiring system calls the hardware encryption machine to generate a pair of public and private keys, and the POS terminal randomly generates the master key TMK by calling the cryptographic keyboard, and encrypts and uploads with the public key of the POS acquiring system.
  • TMS calls the hardware encryption machine and decrypts the TMK with the private key, and then downloads it to the POS terminal with the TMK encryption work key.
  • the solution has the following disadvantages: the POS acquiring system lacks identity authentication for the POS terminal, and cannot prevent the pseudo terminal from connecting to the POS acquiring system to download the terminal master key; the POS terminal lacks the identity authentication of the POS acquiring system, and cannot prevent the pseudo POS acquiring. The system downloads the pseudo terminal master key.
  • a key management method including: the MTMS system calls the first hardware encryption machine to generate the public key Pu and the private key Pr, stores the private key Pr in the first hardware encryption machine, and sends the public key Pu to the POS terminal security module.
  • the MTMS system calls the first hardware encryption machine, and the KMS system calls the second hardware encryption machine, and respectively combines the MTMS permission component and the KMS permission component into the protection key PK and the MAC key MAK in the respective hardware encryption machine, and
  • the protection key PK and the MAC key MAK are stored together in the first hardware encryption machine and the second hardware encryption machine; the operation terminal controls the POS terminal to generate the transmission key TK in the security module and saves it in the security module of the POS terminal.
  • the transport key TK is composed of a transport encryption key TEK and an authentication key AUK; the POS terminal generates a first transport key ciphertext Ctk_Pu using the public key Pu encrypted transport key TK in the security module; the POS terminal will be the first
  • the transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal sequence number SN are sent to the MTMS system through the operation terminal; the MTMS system stores the received terminal sequence number SN and the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu in the SN-Key_MTMS database in association with each other.
  • the MTMS system invokes the first hardware encryptor to decrypt the first transport key ciphertext Ctk_Pu using the private key Pr to obtain the transport key TK, and then encrypts the transport key TK using the protection key PK and calculates the MAC value using the MAC key MAK to generate a second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk; the MTMS system transmits the terminal sequence number SN and the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk to the KMS system; the KMS system transmits the terminal sequence number SN and the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk sent by the MTMS system Stored in the SN-TK_KMS database in association; the POS terminal sends the terminal serial number SN and the download master key request to the KMS system; after receiving the terminal serial number SN and the download master key application sent by the POS terminal, the KMS system queries and The second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk corresponding to the terminal serial number SN; the KMS
  • the KMS system calls the second hardware encryption machine to use the transmission encryption key TEK to encrypt the terminal master key TMK to generate the master key ciphertext Ctmk and send the master key ciphertext.
  • the POS terminal decrypts the master key ciphertext Ctmk using the transport encryption key TEK to obtain the terminal master key TMK and stores it in the security module.
  • the MTMS system invokes the first hardware encryption machine to generate the public key Pu and the private key Pr, and stores the private key Pr in the first hardware encryption machine and sends the public key Pu to the POS terminal security module, which specifically includes: the MTMS system.
  • the MTMS system obtains the generated work certificate HsmWCRT from the CA center and saves it in the database.
  • the work certificate HsmWCRT is generated by using the root certificate HsmRCRT to sign the public key Pu; the operation terminal obtains the work certificate HsmWCRT from the MTMS system database, and the work certificate HsmWCRT
  • the POS terminal uses the root certificate HsmRCRT pre-installed by the POS terminal to verify the validity of the work certificate HsmWCRT. After the verification, the POS terminal extracts the public key Pu from the work certificate HsmWCRT and saves it in the security module.
  • the POS terminal sends the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal sequence number SN to the MTMS system through the operation terminal, and the MTMS system associates the received terminal sequence number SN with the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu.
  • the storage in the SN-Key_MTMS database specifically includes: the POS terminal sends the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal sequence number SN to the operation terminal; and the operation terminal receives the received first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number.
  • the SN is packaged and signed by the operator card, and the signed first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal sequence number SN are sent to the MTMS system; the MTMS system verifies the validity of the signature, and if it is legal, the terminal serial number is The SN is stored in the SN-Key_MTMS database in association with the first transport key ciphertext Ctk_Pu.
  • the key management method further includes the following steps: the MTMS system extracts the terminal sequence number SN and the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu that need to be sent from the SN-Key_MTMS database, and verifies the legality of the signature, if legal And executing the MTMS system to invoke the hardware encryption machine to decrypt the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu using the private key Pr to obtain the transmission key TK step.
  • the KMS system obtains the transmission key TK and then invokes the second hardware encryption machine to use the authentication key AUK to perform mutual authentication with the POS terminal. Specifically, the POS terminal generates the first random number Rnd1 and sends the first random number Rnd1 to the KMS system.
  • the KMS system After receiving the first random number Rnd1, the KMS system generates a random number second Rnd2, and invokes the second hardware encrypting machine to encrypt the first random number Rnd1 by using the authentication key AUK to obtain the first random number ciphertext Crnd1, and the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 And the second random number Rnd2 is sent to the POS terminal; the POS terminal decrypts the received first random number ciphertext Crnd1 using the authentication key AUK to obtain the third random number Rnd1', and determines the third random number Rnd1' and the first random number Rnd1 Consistent: if the third random number Rnd1' is consistent with the first random number Rnd1, the POS terminal encrypts the second random number Rnd2 using the authentication key AUK to generate the second random number ciphertext Crnd2, and sends the second random number ciphertext Crnd2 To the KMS system; the KMS system calls the second hardware encryptor to decrypt the received second random number ciphertext
  • a key management system including: a first hardware encryption machine, a second hardware encryption machine, an operation terminal, a POS terminal, an MTMS system, and a KMS system, where the first hardware encryption machine is used for calling by the MTMS system, The second hardware encryption machine is used for calling by the KMS system, wherein the MTMS system is configured to invoke the first hardware encryption machine to generate the public key Pu and the private key Pr, and store the private key Pr in the first hardware encryption machine and The key Pu is sent to the POS terminal security module; the MTMS system is used to invoke the first hardware encryption machine, the KMS system is used to invoke the second hardware encryption machine, and the MTMS permission component and the KMS are respectively respectively in the respective hardware encryption machines.
  • the rights component synthesizes the protection key PK and the MAC key MAK, and stores the protection key PK and the MAC key MAK together in the first hardware encryption machine and the second hardware encryption machine;
  • the operation terminal is used for controlling
  • the POS terminal generates a transmission key TK in the security module and stores it in the security module of the POS terminal, wherein the transmission key TK is composed of a transmission encryption key TEK and an authentication key AUK; the POS terminal is used in the security module Use public
  • the Pu encrypted transmission key TK generates a first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and transmits the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal sequence number SN to the MTMS system through the operation terminal;
  • the MTMS system is configured to receive the received terminal sequence
  • the number SN is stored in the SN-Key_MTMS database in association with the first transport key ciphertext Ctk_Pu, and is used to invoke the first hardware encryptor to decrypt the first
  • the second transmission key is decrypted by using the protection key PK.
  • the Ctk_pk obtains the transmission key TK and stores it in the second hardware encryption machine; the KMS system is further configured to obtain the transmission key TK and then call the second hardware encryption machine to use the authentication key AUK to perform bidirectional with the POS terminal.
  • the KMS system calls the second hardware encryptor to generate the master key ciphertext Ctmk using the transport encryption key TEK to encrypt the terminal master key TMK and send the master key ciphertext to the POS terminal;
  • the master key ciphertext CTM is decrypted using the transport encryption key TEK to obtain the terminal master key TMK and stored in the security module.
  • the MTMS system is configured to invoke the first hardware encryption machine to generate the public key Pu and the private key Pr, store the private key Pr in the first hardware encryption machine, and record the index number of the private key Pr in the first hardware confidential machine.
  • the public key Pu is sent to the CA center; the MTMS system is also used to obtain the generated work certificate HsmWCRT from the CA center and stored in the database, and the work certificate HsmWCRT is generated by using the root certificate HsmRCRT to sign the public key Pu.
  • the operation terminal is configured to obtain the work certificate HsmWCRT from the MTMS system database, and send the work certificate HsmWCRT to the POS terminal; the POS terminal is used to verify the legality of the work certificate HsmWCRT by using the root certificate HsmRCRT pre-installed by the burn-in, and is used for verification after passing the verification
  • the public key Pu is extracted from the work certificate HsmWCRT and saved in the security module.
  • the POS terminal is configured to send the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal sequence number SN to the operation terminal; the operation terminal is configured to receive the received first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN Performing packaging and signing with an operator card, and transmitting the signed first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and terminal serial number SN to the MTMS system; the MTMS system is used to verify the validity of the signature, if legal,
  • the terminal sequence number SN is stored in association with the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu in the SN-Key_MTMS database.
  • the MTMS system is configured to extract a terminal sequence number SN and a first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu that need to be sent from the SN-Key_MTMS database, and verify the validity of the signature. If it is legal, execute the MTMS system call hardware.
  • the encryption machine decrypts the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu using the private key Pr to obtain the transmission key TK step.
  • the POS terminal is configured to generate a first random number Rnd1 and send the first random number Rnd1 to the KMS system.
  • the KMS system is configured to generate a random number second Rnd2 after receiving the first random number Rnd1, and invoke the first
  • the second hardware encryption machine uses the authentication key AUK to encrypt the first random number Rnd1 to obtain the first random number ciphertext Crnd1, and sends the first random number ciphertext ciphertext Crnd1 and the second random number Rnd2 to the POS terminal; Decrypting the received first random number ciphertext Crnd1 using the authentication key AUK to obtain a third random number Rnd1', determining whether the third random number Rnd1' is consistent with the first random number Rnd1: the POS terminal is used to determine When the three random numbers Rnd1' coincide with the first random number Rnd1, the second random number cryptotext Crnd2 is generated by encrypting the second random number Rnd2 using the authentication key AUK, and the second random number ciphertext Crnd2
  • the key management method and system of the present invention remotely downloads the master key, so as to prevent the POS terminal from downloading the master key in a centralized manner before being deployed to the merchant, thereby reducing logistics costs and maintenance costs.
  • the KMS system uses a symmetric algorithm to encrypt the key to be transmitted, ensuring that only the corresponding POS terminal can decrypt the encrypted key and ensure the high integrity of the data transmission.
  • the application of the POS terminal does not have access to the plaintext key that needs to be remotely downloaded to the POS terminal, and can only access the ciphertext form of the key, thereby ensuring secure loading.
  • This scheme combines non-pairing algorithms with symmetric algorithms, which reduces the complexity of the system.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the structure of a key management system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a flow chart of a key management method in an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Operating terminal 10 hardware encryption machine 20; POS terminal 30; MTMS system 40;
  • KMS system 50 operator card 11.
  • Symmetric key Both parties that send and receive data must use the same key to encrypt and decrypt the plaintext.
  • Symmetric key encryption algorithms mainly include: DES, 3DES, IDEA, FEAL, BLOWFISH, and so on.
  • Asymmetric Key An asymmetric encryption algorithm requires two keys: a public key (Private key) and a private key (Public key) Key). The public key and the private key are a pair. If the data is encrypted with the public key, only the corresponding private key can be used for decryption; if the data is encrypted with the private key, only the corresponding public key can be used. Decrypt. Because encryption and decryption use two different keys, this algorithm is called an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
  • the basic process of asymmetric information exchange for asymmetric encryption is: Party A generates a pair of keys and exposes one of them as a public key to other parties; Party B, which obtains the public key, uses the key to perform confidential information.
  • Party A After encryption, it will be sent to Party A; Party A will decrypt the encrypted information with another private key saved by Party A.
  • Party A may use Party B's public key to encrypt the confidential information and then send it to Party B; Party B then uses its own private key to decrypt the encrypted information.
  • the main algorithms are RSA, Elgamal, backpack algorithm, Rabin, D-H, ECC (elliptic curve encryption algorithm).
  • RSA An asymmetric key algorithm.
  • RSA public key encryption algorithm was founded in 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamirh and Len Adleman was developed at (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA).
  • RSA is named after the name of the three of them.
  • RSA is currently the most influential public key encryption algorithm. It is capable of resisting all the password attacks known so far and has been recommended by ISO as the public key data encryption standard.
  • the RSA algorithm is based on a very simple theory of numbers: it is easy to multiply two large prime numbers.
  • the RSA algorithm is the first algorithm that can be used for both encryption and digital signatures, and is easy to understand and operate.
  • RSA is the most widely studied public key algorithm. It has been tested by various attacks for more than 30 years since its introduction. It is widely accepted as one of the best public key solutions.
  • TDES Triple-DES DES is a symmetric encryption algorithm with a key of 8 bytes.
  • TDES is a DES-based encryption algorithm whose key is 16 bytes or 24 bytes.
  • TDES/3DES is English Triple DES abbreviation (ie triple data encryption standard), DES is English Data Encryption Acronym for Standard (Data Encryption Standard).
  • DES is a symmetric key encryption algorithm, that is, the same encryption algorithm as the data encryption key and the decryption key. DES was developed and published by IBM in the 1970s, followed by the US government, and was adopted by the US National Bureau of Standards and the American National Standards Institute. (ANSI) acknowledged.
  • TDES/3DES is a mode of the DES encryption algorithm that uses three 64-bit keys to encrypt the data three times. Is a safer variant of DES.
  • the key management system includes: an operation terminal 10, a first hardware encryption machine 20, a second signature encryption machine 60, and a POS terminal 30.
  • the MTMS system 40 and the KMS system 50 The first hardware encryption machine 20 is used for calling by the MTMS system 40, and the second hardware encryption machine 60 is used for calling by the KMS system 50.
  • the operation terminal 10 needs to insert the operator card 11 and the password verification of the operator card 11 is allowed to be used.
  • the operator card 11 is used to identify the operator identity by entering a password to complete the signing of the TK packet.
  • the MTMS system 40 is a material traceability system for recording equipment related information for production at the time of factory production.
  • the KMS system is a key management system and is located in a security room. It is responsible for generating and maintaining keys such as the POS terminal master key and work key, and is usually placed in the customer premises.
  • the MTMS system 40 is configured to invoke the first hardware encryption machine 20 to generate the public key Pu and the private key Pr, store the private key Pr in the first hardware encryption machine 20, and send the public key Pu to the security module of the POS terminal 30.
  • the public-private key pair is generated only once if the private key Pr is not leaked or damaged.
  • the MTMS system 40 is configured to invoke the first hardware encryption machine 20 to generate the public key Pu and the private key Pr, store the private key Pr in the first hardware encryption machine 20, and record the private key Pr in the first hardware confidential machine.
  • the index number in 20 and the public key Pu is sent to the CA center.
  • the CA center is also called the CA institution, that is, the certificate authority (Certificate) Authority ), or certificate authority, has the functions of authentication digital certificate legality, certificate key management, certificate approval and certificate generation.
  • the MTMS system 40 is also used to obtain the generated work certificate HsmWCRT from the CA center and save it in the database.
  • the work certificate HsmWCRT is generated by using the root certificate HsmRCRT to sign the public key Pu.
  • the operation terminal 10 is configured to obtain the work certificate HsmWCRT from the MTMS system 40 database, and send the work certificate HsmWCRT to the POS terminal 30; the POS terminal 30 is used to verify the validity of the work certificate HsmWCRT using the root certificate HsmRCRT pre-installed by the burn-in, and is used for When the verification is passed, the public key Pu is extracted from the work certificate HsmWCRT and saved in the security module.
  • the MTMS system 40 is configured to invoke a first hardware encryption machine 20, and the KMS system 50 is configured to invoke a second hardware encryption machine 60 to separately synthesize a protection key for the MTMS authority component and the KMS authority component in a respective hardware encryption machine.
  • the PK and the MAC key MAK, and the protection key PK and the MAC key MAK are stored together in the first hardware encryption machine 20 and the second hardware encryption machine 60.
  • the operation terminal 10 is configured to control the POS terminal 30 to generate a transmission key TK in the security module and save it in the security module of the POS terminal 30, wherein the transmission key TK is composed of a transmission encryption key TEK and an authentication key AUK.
  • the transmission encryption key TEK is a symmetric key for the encrypted transmission of the master key TMK between the POS terminal 30 and the KMS system 50, and is encrypted and stored in the database of the KMS system 50.
  • the authentication key AUK is a symmetric key for the POS.
  • the two-way authentication between the terminal 30 and the KMS system 50 is encrypted and stored in the KMS system 50 database.
  • the POS terminal 30 is configured to generate a first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu using the public key Pu encryption transmission key TK in the security module, and send the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN to the MTMS through the operation terminal.
  • System 40 The POS terminal 30 is configured to generate a first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu using the public key Pu encryption transmission key TK in the security module, and send the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN to the MTMS through the operation terminal.
  • the POS terminal 30 is configured to send the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN to the operation terminal 10; the operation terminal 10 is configured to receive the received first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and The terminal sequence number SN is packaged and signed using an operator card, and the signed first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and terminal sequence number SN are sent to the MTMS system 40; the MTMS system 40 is used to verify the validity of the signature. If it is legal, the terminal sequence number SN and the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu are stored in association with each other in the SN-Key_MTMS database.
  • the MTMS system 40 is configured to store the received terminal sequence number SN and the first transport key ciphertext Ctk_Pu in the SN-Key_MTMS database, and to invoke the first hardware encryptor 20 to decrypt using the private key Pr.
  • a transport key ciphertext Ctk_Pu obtains the transport key TK, then encrypts the transport key TK using the protection key PK and calculates the MAC value using the MAC key MAK, generates a second transport key ciphertext Ctk_pk, and sets the terminal serial number SN And transmitting to the KMS system 50 with the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk.
  • the KMS system 50 is configured to store the terminal sequence number SN and the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk transmitted by the MTMS system 40 in the SN-TK_KMS database in association with each other.
  • the POS terminal 30 is configured to send the terminal serial number SN and the download master key request to the KMS system 50; the KMS system 50 is configured to receive the terminal serial number SN and the download master key application after the POS terminal 30 receives the application Querying the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk corresponding to the terminal serial number SN; the KMS system 50 is further configured to invoke the second hardware encryption machine 60 to use the MAC key MAK pair to query the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk Verifying MAC legitimacy, if the check passes, decrypting the second transport key ciphertext Ctk_pk using the protection key PK to obtain the transport key TK and storing it in the second hardware encryptor 60; the KMS system 50 Also used to obtain the transport key TK, the second hardware encryptor 60 is called to perform mutual authentication with the POS terminal 30 using the authentication key AUK.
  • the KMS system 50 calls the second hardware encryptor 60 to encrypt using the transport encryption key TEK.
  • the terminal master key TMK generates a master key ciphertext Ctmk and transmits the master key ciphertext to the POS terminal 30; the POS terminal 30 is configured to use the transport encryption after receiving the master key ciphertext Ctmk sent by the KMS system 50.
  • Key TEK decryption master key ciphertext Ctmk obtained And the end of the main key TMK is stored in the security module.
  • the two-way authentication implementation process is as follows: the POS terminal 30 is configured to generate a first random number Rnd1 and send a first random number Rnd1 to the KMS system 50; the KMS system 50 is configured to receive the first random number After the number Rnd1, a random number second Rnd2 is generated, and the second hardware encrypting machine is called to encrypt the first random number Rnd1 by using the authentication key AUK to obtain the first random number ciphertext Crnd1, and the first random number ciphertext ciphertext Crnd1 and the second random number are obtained.
  • the number Rnd2 is sent to the POS terminal 30; the POS terminal 30 is configured to decrypt the received first random number ciphertext Crnd1 using the authentication key AUK to obtain a third random number Rnd1', and determine the third random number Rnd1' and the first random number Whether the number Rnd1 is consistent: the POS terminal 30 is configured to, when determining that the third random number Rnd1' is consistent with the first random number Rnd1, invoke the second hardware encryption machine to encrypt the second random number Rnd2 by using the authentication key AUK to generate a second random number.
  • the ciphertext Crnd2, and the second random number ciphertext Crnd2 is sent to the KMS system 50; the KMS system 50 is configured to decrypt the received second random number ciphertext Crnd2 using the authentication key AUK to obtain the fourth random number Rnd2' , judging the fourth random number Rnd2 Coincides with a second random number Rnd2; the KMS system 50 further KMS system 50 for determining the POS terminal 30 when the authentication by matching determination fourth random number Rnd2 'and the second random number Rnd2.
  • the POS terminal 30 is configured to decrypt the master key ciphertext Ctmk using the transport encryption key TEK after receiving the master key ciphertext Ctmk sent by the KMS system 50 to obtain the terminal master key TMK and store it in the security module.
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a key management method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the key download method runs in the key management system, and the method includes:
  • Step S101 The MTMS system calls the first hardware encryption machine to generate the public key Pu and the private key Pr, stores the private key Pr in the first hardware encryption machine, and sends the public key Pu to the POS terminal security module; the MTMS system invokes the first The hardware encryption machine and the KMS system call the second hardware encryption machine, respectively synthesize the MTMS authority component and the KMS authority component into a protection key PK and a MAC key MAK in the respective hardware encryption machine, and the protection key PK and MAC The key MAK is stored together in the first hardware encryption machine and the second hardware encryption machine;
  • Step S102 the operation terminal controls the POS terminal to generate a transmission key TK in the security module and saves it in the security module of the POS terminal, wherein the transmission key TK is composed of the transmission encryption key TEK and the authentication key AUK;
  • Step S103 the POS terminal uses the public key Pu to encrypt the transmission key TK in the security module to generate a first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu;
  • Step S104 The POS terminal sends the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal sequence number SN to the MTMS system through the operation terminal;
  • Step S105 The MTMS system stores the received terminal sequence number SN and the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu in the SN-Key_MTMS database in association with each other;
  • Step S106 The MTMS system invokes the hardware encryption machine to decrypt the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu using the private key Pr to obtain the transmission key TK, and then encrypts the transmission key TK using the protection key PK and calculates the MAC value using the MAC key MAK to generate Second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk;
  • Step S107 The MTMS system sends the terminal serial number SN and the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk to the KMS system;
  • Step S108 The KMS system stores the terminal sequence number SN and the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk sent by the MTMS system in association with the SN-TK_KMS database;
  • Step S109 The POS terminal sends the terminal serial number SN and the download master key request to the KMS system.
  • Step S110 After receiving the terminal serial number SN and the download master key request sent by the POS terminal, the KMS system queries the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk corresponding to the terminal serial number SN;
  • Step S111 The KMS system invokes the second hardware encryption machine to check the MAC validity of the queried second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk by using the MAC key MAK. If the verification passes, the second transmission key is decrypted by using the protection key PK. The ciphertext Ctk_pk obtains the transport key TK and stores it in the second hardware encryptor;
  • Step S112 After obtaining the transmission key TK, the KMS system invokes the second hardware encryption machine to perform mutual authentication with the POS terminal by using the authentication key AUK. If the authentication is passed, the KMS system calls the second hardware encryption machine to encrypt the terminal host by using the transmission encryption key TEK.
  • the key TMK generates a master key ciphertext Ctmk and sends the master key ciphertext to the POS terminal;
  • Step S113 After receiving the master key ciphertext Ctmk sent by the KMS system, the POS terminal decrypts the master key ciphertext Ctmk by using the transport encryption key TEK to obtain the terminal master key TMK and stores it in the security module.
  • the MTMS system calls the first hardware encryption machine to generate the public key Pu and the private key Pr, and the private key Pr is stored in the first hardware encryption machine and the public key Pu is sent to the POS terminal security module.
  • the MTMS system invokes the first hardware encryption machine to generate the public key Pu and the private key Pr, stores the private key Pr in the first hardware encryption machine, and records the index number of the private key Pr in the first hardware confidential machine, and the public key Pu sent to the CA Center;
  • the CA center generates a work certificate HsmWCRT by using a root certificate HsmRCRT signature;
  • the MTMS system obtains the generated work certificate HsmWCRT from the CA center and saves it in the database;
  • the operation terminal obtains the work certificate HsmWCRT from the MTMS system database, and sends the work S205 and the certificate HsmWCRT to the POS terminal.
  • the POS terminal verifies the legality of the work certificate HsmWCRT by using the root certificate HsmRCRT pre-installed in the burning chip;
  • the POS terminal extracts the public key Pu from the work certificate HsmWCRT and saves it in the security module.
  • the POS terminal transmits the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal sequence number SN to the MTMS system through the operation terminal, and the MTMS system stores the received terminal sequence number SN and the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu in association with each other.
  • the SN-Key_MTMS database includes:
  • the POS terminal sends the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN to the operation terminal.
  • the operation terminal packages the received first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN and signs the same by using the operator card, and sends the signed first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the terminal serial number SN.
  • the MTMS system To the MTMS system;
  • the MTMS system checks the validity of the signature. If it is legal, the terminal serial number SN and the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu are stored in association with the SN-Key_MTMS database.
  • the KMS system obtains the transmission key TK and uses the authentication key AUK to perform mutual authentication with the POS terminal, including:
  • the POS terminal generates a first random number Rnd1 and sends the first random number Rnd1 to the KMS system.
  • the KMS system receives the first random number Rnd1 and generates a random number second Rnd2, and invokes the second encryptor to encrypt the first random number Rnd1 by using the authentication key AUK to obtain the first random number ciphertext Crnd1, and the first random number ciphertext.
  • the ciphertext Crnd1 and the second random number Rnd2 are sent to the POS terminal;
  • the POS terminal decrypts the received first random number ciphertext Crnd1 by using the authentication key AUK to obtain a third random number Rnd1', and determines whether the third random number Rnd1' is consistent with the first random number Rnd1.
  • the POS terminal encrypts the second random number Rnd2 by using the authentication key AUK to generate the second random number ciphertext Crnd2, and sends the second random number ciphertext Crnd2 to KMS system;
  • the KMS system invokes the second encryptor to decrypt the received second random number ciphertext Crnd2 using the authentication key AUK to obtain a fourth random number Rnd2', and determines whether the fourth random number Rnd2' is consistent with the second random number Rnd2; The fourth random number Rnd2' is consistent with the second random number Rnd2, and the KMS system and the POS terminal are authenticated.
  • the key management method and system of the present invention remotely downloads the master key, so as to prevent the POS terminal from downloading the master key in a centralized manner before being deployed to the merchant, thereby reducing logistics costs and maintenance costs.
  • the KMS system uses a symmetric algorithm to encrypt the key to be transmitted, ensuring that only the corresponding POS terminal can decrypt the encrypted key and ensure the high integrity of the data transmission.
  • the application of the POS terminal does not have access to the plaintext key that needs to be remotely downloaded to the POS terminal, and can only access the ciphertext form of the key, thereby ensuring secure loading.
  • This scheme combines non-pairing algorithms with symmetric algorithms, which reduces the complexity of the system.
  • the transmission encryption key and the authentication key are used by the POS terminal, and the ciphertext is transmitted to the KMS system through the asymmetric algorithm and the symmetric algorithm, and the decryption process is performed in the hardware encryption machine to ensure the key security. .

Abstract

本发明公开一种密钥管理方法及系统，远程下载主密钥，避免POS终端需要集中下载主密钥后才能布放到商户，减少物流成本和维护成本。远程下载密钥时，KMS系统使用对称算法加密需要传输的密钥，保证只有对应POS终端才能解密加密后的密钥，保证数据传输的高全性。在双向认证的时候，POS终端的应用程序并不能够接触到需要远程下装到POS终端中的明文密钥，只能接触到该密钥的密文形式，从而确保了安全转载。此过程中使用到传输加密密钥和认证密钥，由POS终端产生，通过非对称算法和对称算法方式密文传输到KMS系统中，解密过程均在硬件加密机中进行，保证密钥安全性。

Description

密钥管理方法及系统
技术领域
本发明涉及电子支付领域，尤其涉及一种设备端的密钥管理方法及系统。
背景技术
银行卡（BANK Card）作为支付工具越来越普及，通常的银行卡支付系统包括销售点终端（Point Of Sale，POS）、POS收单系统（POSP）、密码键盘（PIN PAD）和硬件加密机（Hardware and Security Module，HSM）。其中POS终端能够接受银行卡信息，具有通讯功能，并接受柜员的指令完成金融交易信息和有关信息交换的设备；POS收单系统对POS终端进行集中管理，包括参数下载，密钥下载，接受、处理或转发POS终端的交易请求，并向POS终端回送交易结果信息，是集中管理和交易处理的系统；密码键盘（PIN PAD）是对各种金融交易相关的密钥进行安全存储保护，以及对PIN进行加密保护的安全设备；硬件加密机（HSM）是对传输数据进行加密的外围硬件设备，用于PIN的加密和解密、验证报文和文件来源的正确性以及存储密钥。个人标识码（Personal Identification Number，PIN），即个人密码，是在联机交易中识别持卡人身份合法性的数据信息，在计算机和网络系统中任何环节都不允许以明文的方式出现；终端主密钥（Terminal Master Key，TMK），POS终端工作时，对工作密钥进行加密的主密钥，加密保存在系统数据库中；POS终端广泛应用于银行卡支付场合，比如厂商购物、酒店住宿等，是一种不可或缺的现代化支付手段，已经融入人们生活的各种场合。银行卡，特别是借记卡，一般都由持卡人设置了PIN，在进行支付过程中，POS终端除了上送银行卡的磁道信息等资料外，还要持卡人输入PIN供发卡银行验证持卡人的身份合法性，确保银行卡支付安全，保护持卡人的财产安全。为了防止PIN泄露或被破解，要求从终端到发卡银行整个信息交互过程中，全程对PIN进行安全加密保护，不允许在计算机网络系统的任何环节，PIN以明文的方式出现，因此目前接受输入PIN的POS终端都要求配备密钥管理体系。
POS终端的密钥体系分成二级：终端主密钥（TMK）和工作密钥（WK）。其中TMK在WK更新过程中，对WK进行加密保护。每台POS终端与POS之间共享唯一的TMK，必须要有安全保护，保证只能写入设备并参与计算，不能读取；TMK是一个很关键的根密钥，如果TMK被截取，工作密钥就比较容易被破解，将严重威胁银行卡支付安全。所以能否安全下载TMK到POS终端，成为整个POS终端安全性的关键。下面归纳现有的TMK下载方案如下：
1、密钥母POS方案：用户在POS收单系统硬件加密机和密钥母POS输入一样的传输加密密钥。POS终端通过密钥母POS向POS收单系统发起终端主密钥下载请求，POS收单系统驱动硬件加密机随机生成终端主密钥，并用传输加密密钥加密传输给密钥母POS，密钥母POS用传输加密密钥解密后再传输给POS终端，POS终端获得终端主密钥明文，保存到POS终端密码键盘，从而实现POS终端和POS收单系统之间终端主密钥的同步。
2、IC卡解密方案：用户在POS收单系统硬件加密机和IC卡中注入一样的传输加密密钥。用户将IC卡插入POS终端，POS终端向POS收单系统发起终端主密钥下载请求，POS收单系统驱动硬件加密机随机生成终端主密钥，并用传输加密密钥加密传输给POS终端，POS终端用IC卡中的传输加密密钥解密终端主密钥密文，获得终端主密钥明文，保存到POS终端密码键盘，从而实现POS终端和POS收单系统之间终端主密钥的同步。
上述两种方案都有以下缺点：终端主密钥明文出现在安全设备之外，为防范密钥泄露风险，终端主密钥的下载必须控制在管理中心的安全机房进行，通过人工集中下载终端主密钥。从而带来“维护中心机房工作量大；设备出厂后需要运输到管理中心安全机房下载密钥才能部署到商户，运输成本上升；为了集中下装密钥，需要大量的人手和工作时间，维护成本大、维护周期长”等问题。
目前也有一种远程密钥下载方案：该方案POS收单系统调用硬件加密机产生一对公私钥，POS终端调用密码键盘随机生成主密钥TMK，并用POS收单系统的公钥进行加密后上传给TMS，TMS调用硬件加密机并用私钥解密TMK后存储，用TMK加密工作密钥下载给POS终端。该方案有以下缺点：POS收单系统对POS终端缺少身份鉴别，无法防止伪终端连接POS收单系统下载终端主密钥；POS终端缺少对POS收单系统的身份鉴别，无法防止伪POS收单系统下载伪终端主密钥。
发明内容
为解决上述技术问题，本发明采用的一个技术方案是：
提供一种密钥管理方法，包括：MTMS系统调用第一硬件加密机产生公钥Pu和私钥Pr，将私钥Pr存储在第一硬件加密机中并将公钥Pu发送至POS终端安全模块中；MTMS系统调用第一硬件加密机、KMS系统调用第二硬件加密机，分别在各自的硬件加密机中将MTMS权限分量及KMS权限分量合成保护密钥PK和MAC密钥MAK，并且将所述保护密钥PK和MAC密钥MAK一并存储在第一硬件加密机和第二硬件加密机中；操作终端控制POS终端在安全模块中产生传输密钥TK并保存在POS终端的安全模块中，其中，传输密钥TK由传输加密密钥TEK和认证密钥AUK构成；POS终端在安全模块中使用公钥Pu加密传输密钥TK生成第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu；POS终端将第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN通过操作终端发送至MTMS系统；MTMS系统将接收到的终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu关联地存储在SN-Key_MTMS数据库中；MTMS系统调用第一硬件加密机使用私钥Pr解密第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu获得传输密钥TK，然后使用保护密钥PK加密传输密钥TK并使用MAC密钥MAK计算MAC值，生成第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk；MTMS系统将终端序列号SN和第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk发送给KMS系统；KMS系统将MTMS系统发送的终端序列号SN和第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk关联地存储在SN-TK_KMS数据库中；POS终端将终端序列号SN和下载主密钥申请发送至KMS系统；KMS系统接收到POS终端发送的终端序列号SN和下载主密钥申请后，查询与终端序列号SN对应的第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk；KMS系统调用第二硬件加密机使用MAC密钥MAK对查询到的第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk校验MAC合法性，如果校验通过，使用保护密钥PK解密第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk获得传输密钥TK并将其存储在所述第二硬件加密机中；KMS系统获得传输密钥TK后调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK与POS终端进行双向认证，如果认证通过，KMS系统调用第二硬件加密机使用传输加密密钥TEK加密终端主密钥TMK生成主密钥密文Ctmk并将主密钥密文发送至POS终端；POS终端接收到KMS系统发送的主密钥密文Ctmk后使用传输加密密钥TEK解密主密钥密文Ctmk获得终端主密钥TMK并存储在安全模块中。
其中，所述MTMS系统调用第一硬件加密机产生公钥Pu和私钥Pr，将私钥Pr存储在第一硬件加密机中并将公钥Pu发送至POS终端安全模块中具体包括：MTMS系统调用第一硬件加密机产生公钥Pu和私钥Pr，将私钥Pr存储在第一硬件加密机中并记录私钥Pr在第一硬件机密机中的索引号，将公钥Pu发给CA中心；MTMS系统从CA中心获得生成的工作证书HsmWCRT并保存在数据库中，工作证书HsmWCRT是使用根证书HsmRCRT对公钥Pu签名生成；操作终端从MTMS系统数据库获得工作证书HsmWCRT，并将工作证书HsmWCRT发送至POS终端；POS终端使用烧片预装的根证书HsmRCRT验证工作证书HsmWCRT的合法性；验证通过后POS终端从工作证书HsmWCRT提取公钥Pu并保存在安全模块中。
其中，所述“POS终端将第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN通过操作终端发送至MTMS系统，MTMS系统将接收到的终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu关联地存储在SN-Key_MTMS数据库中”具体包括：POS终端将第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN发给操作终端；操作终端对接收到的第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN进行打包并使用操作员卡进行签名，以及将经过签名的第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN发送至MTMS系统；MTMS系统校验签名的合法性，如果合法，将终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu关联地存储在SN-Key_MTMS数据库。
其中，所述的一种密钥管理方法还包括步骤：MTMS系统从SN-Key_MTMS数据库中提取需要发送的终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu,并验证签名的合法性，如果合法，则执行所述MTMS系统调用硬件加密机使用私钥Pr解密第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu获得传输密钥TK步骤。
其中，KMS系统获得传输密钥TK后调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK与POS终端进行双向认证具体包括：POS终端产生第一随机数Rnd1并将第一随机数Rnd1发送至KMS系统；KMS系统接收第一随机数Rnd1后产生随机数第二Rnd2，调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK加密第一随机数Rnd1获得第一随机数密文Crnd1，将第一随机数密文Crnd1和第二随机数Rnd2发送给POS终端；POS终端使用认证密钥AUK解密接收到的第一随机数密文Crnd1获得第三随机数Rnd1’，判断第三随机数Rnd1’与第一随机数Rnd1是否一致：如果第三随机数Rnd1’与第一随机数Rnd1一致，POS终端使用认证密钥AUK加密第二随机数Rnd2生成第二随机数密文Crnd2，并将第二随机数密文Crnd2发送给KMS系统；KMS系统调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK解密接收到的第二随机数密文Crnd2获得第四随机数Rnd2’，判断第四随机数Rnd2’与第二随机数Rnd2是否一致；如果第四随机数Rnd2’与第二随机数Rnd2一致，KMS系统与POS终端认证通过。
本发明采用的另一个技术方案是：
提供一种密钥管理系统，包括：第一硬件加密机、第二硬件加密机、操作终端、POS终端、MTMS系统以及KMS系统，所述第一硬件加密机用于供MTMS系统调用，所述第二硬件加密机用于供KMS系统调用，其中，所述MTMS系统用于调用第一硬件加密机产生公钥Pu和私钥Pr，将私钥Pr存储在第一硬件加密机中并将公钥Pu发送至POS终端安全模块中；所述MTMS系统用于调用第一硬件加密机、所述KMS系统用于调用第二硬件加密机，分别在各自的硬件加密机中将MTMS权限分量及KMS权限分量合成保护密钥PK和MAC密钥MAK，并且将所述保护密钥PK和MAC密钥MAK一并存储在第一硬件加密机和第二硬件加密机中；所述操作终端用于控制POS终端在安全模块中产生传输密钥TK并保存在POS终端的安全模块中，其中，传输密钥TK由传输加密密钥TEK和认证密钥AUK构成；所述POS终端用于在安全模块中使用公钥Pu加密传输密钥TK生成第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu以及将第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN通过操作终端发送至MTMS系统；所述MTMS系统用于将接收到的终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu关联地存储在SN-Key_MTMS数据库中，以及用于调用第一硬件加密机使用私钥Pr解密第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu获得传输密钥TK，然后使用保护密钥PK加密传输密钥TK并使用MAC密钥MAK计算MAC值，生成第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk，以及将终端序列号SN和第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk发送给KMS系统；所述KMS系统用于将MTMS系统发送的终端序列号SN和第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk关联地存储在SN-TK_KMS数据库中；所述POS终端用于将终端序列号SN和下载主密钥申请发送至KMS系统；所述KMS系统用于当接收到POS终端发送的终端序列号SN和下载主密钥申请后，查询与终端序列号SN对应的第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk；所述KMS系统还用于调用第二硬件加密机使用MAC密钥MAK对查询到的第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk校验MAC合法性，如果校验通过，使用保护密钥PK解密第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk获得传输密钥TK并将其存储在所述第二硬件加密机中；所述KMS系统还用于获得传输密钥TK后调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK与POS终端进行双向认证，如果认证通过，KMS系统调用第二硬件加密机使用传输加密密钥TEK加密终端主密钥TMK生成主密钥密文Ctmk并将主密钥密文发送至POS终端；所述POS终端用于当接收到KMS系统发送的主密钥密文Ctmk后使用传输加密密钥TEK解密主密钥密文Ctmk获得终端主密钥TMK并存储在安全模块中。
其中，所述MTMS系统用于调用第一硬件加密机产生公钥Pu和私钥Pr，将私钥Pr存储在第一硬件加密机中并记录私钥Pr在第一硬件机密机中的索引号并将公钥Pu发给CA中心；MTMS系统还用于从CA中心获得生成的工作证书HsmWCRT并保存在数据库中，工作证书HsmWCRT是使用根证书HsmRCRT对公钥Pu签名生成。操作终端用于从MTMS系统数据库获得工作证书HsmWCRT，并将工作证书HsmWCRT发送至POS终端；POS终端用于使用烧片预装的根证书HsmRCRT验证工作证书HsmWCRT的合法性，并用于当验证通过后从工作证书HsmWCRT提取公钥Pu并保存在安全模块中。
其中，所述POS终端用于将第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN发给操作终端；所述操作终端用于对接收到的第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN进行打包并使用操作员卡进行签名，以及将经过签名的第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN发送至MTMS系统；所述MTMS系统用于校验签名的合法性，如果合法，将终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu关联地存储在SN-Key_MTMS数据库。
其中，所述MTMS系统用于从SN-Key_MTMS数据库中提取需要发送的终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu,并验证签名的合法性，如果合法，则执行所述MTMS系统调用硬件加密机使用私钥Pr解密第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu获得传输密钥TK步骤。
其中，所述POS终端用于产生第一随机数Rnd1并将第一随机数Rnd1发送至KMS系统；所述KMS系统用于当接收到第一随机数Rnd1后产生随机数第二Rnd2，调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK加密第一随机数Rnd1获得第一随机数密文Crnd1，将第一随机数密文密文Crnd1和第二随机数Rnd2发送给POS终端；所述POS终端用于使用认证密钥AUK解密接收到的第一随机数密文Crnd1获得第三随机数Rnd1’，判断第三随机数Rnd1’与第一随机数Rnd1是否一致：所述POS终端用于当判定第三随机数Rnd1’与第一随机数Rnd1一致时，使用认证密钥AUK加密第二随机数Rnd2生成第二随机数密文Crnd2，并将第二随机数密文Crnd2发送给KMS系统；所述KMS系统用于调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK解密接收到的第二随机数密文Crnd2获得第四随机数Rnd2’，判断第四随机数Rnd2’与第二随机数Rnd2是否一致；所述KMS系统还用于当判定第四随机数Rnd2’与第二随机数Rnd2一致时确定KMS系统与POS终端认证通过。
本发明的密钥管理方法及系统，远程下载主密钥，避免POS终端需要集中下载主密钥后才能布放到商户，减少物流成本和维护成本。远程下载密钥时，KMS系统使用对称算法加密需要传输的密钥，保证只有对应POS终端才能解密加密后的密钥，保证数据传输的高全性。在双向认证的时候，POS终端的应用程序并不能够接触到需要远程下装到POS终端中的明文密钥，只能接触到该密钥的密文形式，从而确保了安全装载。本方案将非对算法和对称算法结合，降低了系统的复杂度。
附图说明
图1是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥管理系统的结构框图；
图2是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥管理方法的流程图。
主要元件符号说明
操作终端10；硬件加密机20；POS终端30；MTMS系统40；
KMS系统50；操作员卡11。
具体实施方式
为详细说明本发明的技术内容、构造特征、所实现目的及效果，以下结合实施方式并配合附图详予说明。
首先，对本发明涉及的缩略语和关键术语进行定义和说明：
对称密钥：发送和接收数据的双方必须使用相同的密钥对明文进行加密和解密运算。对称密钥加密算法主要包括：DES、3DES、IDEA、FEAL、BLOWFISH等。
非对称密钥：非对称加密算法需要两个密钥：公开密钥（私钥Public key）和私有密钥（公钥Private key）。公开密钥与私有密钥是一对，如果用公开密钥对数据进行加密，只有用对应的私有密钥才能解密；如果用私有密钥对数据进行加密，那么只有用对应的公开密钥才能解密。因为加密和解密使用的是两个不同的密钥，所以这种算法叫作非对称加密算法。非对称加密算法实现机密信息交换的基本过程是：甲方生成一对密钥并将其中的一把作为公用密钥向其它方公开；得到该公用密钥的乙方使用该密钥对机密信息进行加密后再发送给甲方；甲方再用自己保存的另一把专用密钥对加密后的信息进行解密。甲方可以使用乙方的公钥对机密信息进行加密后再发送给乙方；乙方再用自己的私匙对加密后的信息进行解密。主要算法有RSA、Elgamal、背包算法、Rabin、D-H、ECC（椭圆曲线加密算法）。
RSA：一种非对称密钥算法。RSA公钥加密算法是1977年由Ron Rivest、Adi Shamirh和Len Adleman在（美国麻省理工学院）开发的。RSA取名来自开发他们三者的名字。RSA是目前最有影响力的公钥加密算法，它能够抵抗到目前为止已知的所有密码攻击，已被ISO推荐为公钥数据加密标准。RSA算法基于一个十分简单的数论事实：将两个大素数相乘十分容易。RSA算法是第一个能同时用于加密和数字签名的算法，也易于理解和操作。RSA是被研究得最广泛的公钥算法，从提出到现在的三十多年里，经历了各种攻击的考验，逐渐为人们接受，普遍认为是目前最优秀的公钥方案之一。
TDES Triple-DES：DES是一种对称加密算法，密钥是8字节。TDES是基于DES的加密算法，其密钥是16字节或者24字节。TDES/3DES是英文Triple DES的缩语（即三重数据加密标准），DES则是英文Data Encryption Standard（数据加密标准）的缩语。DES是一种对称密钥加密算法，即数据加密密钥与解密密钥相同的加密算法。DES由IBM公司在20世纪70年代开发并公开，随后为美国政府采用，并被美国国家标准局和美国国家标准协会 (ANSI)承认。TDES/3DES是DES加密算法的一种模式，它使用3条64位的密钥对数据进行三次加密。是DES的一个更安全的变形。
请参阅图1，是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥管理系统的结构框图，该密钥管理系统包括：操作终端10、第一硬件加密机20、第二印鉴加密机60、POS终端30、MTMS系统40以及KMS系统50。所述第一硬件加密机20用于供MTMS系统40调用，所述第二硬件加密机60用于供KMS系统50调用。操作终端10需要插入操作员卡11并且操作员卡11的密码验证通过后才允许使用。操作员卡11用于通过输入密码对操作员身份进行识别，以完成对TK数据包的签名。所述MTMS系统40为物料追溯系统，用于在工厂生产时记录生产的设备相关信息。所述KMS系统为密钥管理系统，位于安全房中，负责POS终端主密钥、工作密钥等密钥的生成和维护，通常布放在客户处所。
所述MTMS系统40用于调用第一硬件加密机20产生公钥Pu和私钥Pr，将私钥Pr存储在第一硬件加密机20中并将公钥Pu发送至POS终端30安全模块中，其中，公私钥对在私钥Pr未泄密或损坏的情况下，只产生一次。具体地，所述MTMS系统40用于调用第一硬件加密机20产生公钥Pu和私钥Pr，将私钥Pr存储在第一硬件加密机20中并记录私钥Pr在第一硬件机密机20中的索引号并将公钥Pu发给CA中心，CA中心又称CA机构，即证书授权中心(Certificate Authority )，或称证书授权机构，有认证数字证书合法性、证书密钥管理、证书审批和证书生成等功能。MTMS系统40还用于从CA中心获得生成的工作证书HsmWCRT并保存在数据库中，工作证书HsmWCRT是使用根证书HsmRCRT对公钥Pu签名生成。操作终端10用于从MTMS系统40数据库获得工作证书HsmWCRT，并将工作证书HsmWCRT发送至POS终端30；POS终端30用于使用烧片预装的根证书HsmRCRT验证工作证书HsmWCRT的合法性，并用于当验证通过后从工作证书HsmWCRT提取公钥Pu并保存在安全模块中。
所述MTMS系统40用于调用第一硬件加密机20、所述KMS系统50用于调用第二硬件加密机60，分别在各自的硬件加密机中将MTMS权限分量及KMS权限分量合成保护密钥PK和MAC密钥MAK，并且将所述保护密钥PK和MAC密钥MAK一并存储在第一硬件加密机20和第二硬件加密机60中。
所述操作终端10用于控制POS终端30在安全模块中产生传输密钥TK并保存在POS终端30的安全模块中，其中，传输密钥TK由传输加密密钥TEK和认证密钥AUK构成，传输加密密钥TEK为对称密钥，用于POS终端30与KMS系统50之间主密钥TMK的加密传输，加密保存在KMS系统50数据库中，认证密钥AUK为对称密钥，用于POS终端30与KMS系统50之间的双向认证，加密保存在KMS系统50数据库中。
所述POS终端30用于在安全模块中使用公钥Pu加密传输密钥TK生成第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu以及将第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN通过操作终端发送至MTMS系统40。具体地，所述POS终端30用于将第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN发给操作终端10；所述操作终端10用于对接收到的第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN进行打包并使用操作员卡进行签名，以及将经过签名的第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN发送至MTMS系统40；所述MTMS系统40用于校验签名的合法性，如果合法，将终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu关联地存储在SN-Key_MTMS数据库。
所述MTMS系统40用于将接收到的终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu关联地存储在SN-Key_MTMS数据库中，以及用于调用第一硬件加密机20使用私钥Pr解密第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu获得传输密钥TK，然后使用保护密钥PK加密传输密钥TK并使用MAC密钥MAK计算MAC值，生成第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk，以及将终端序列号SN和第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk发送给KMS系统50。所述KMS系统50用于将MTMS系统40发送的终端序列号SN和第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk关联地存储在SN-TK_KMS数据库中。
所述POS终端30用于将终端序列号SN和下载主密钥申请发送至KMS系统50；所述KMS系统50用于当接收到POS终端30发送的终端序列号SN和下载主密钥申请后，查询与终端序列号SN对应的第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk；所述KMS系统50还用于调用第二硬件加密机60使用MAC密钥MAK对查询到的第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk校验MAC合法性，如果校验通过，使用保护密钥PK解密第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk获得传输密钥TK并将其存储在所述第二硬件加密机60中；所述KMS系统50还用于获得传输密钥TK后调用第二硬件加密机60使用认证密钥AUK与POS终端30进行双向认证，如果认证通过，KMS系统50调用第二硬件加密机60使用传输加密密钥TEK加密终端主密钥TMK生成主密钥密文Ctmk并将主密钥密文发送至POS终端30；所述POS终端30用于当接收到KMS系统50发送的主密钥密文Ctmk后使用传输加密密钥TEK解密主密钥密文Ctmk获得终端主密钥TMK并存储在安全模块中。
具体地，所述双向认证实现过程如下：所述POS终端30用于产生第一随机数Rnd1并将第一随机数Rnd1发送至KMS系统50；所述KMS系统50用于当接收到第一随机数Rnd1后产生随机数第二Rnd2，调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK加密第一随机数Rnd1获得第一随机数密文Crnd1，将第一随机数密文密文Crnd1和第二随机数Rnd2发送给POS终端30；所述POS终端30用于使用认证密钥AUK解密接收到的第一随机数密文Crnd1获得第三随机数Rnd1’，判断第三随机数Rnd1’与第一随机数Rnd1是否一致：所述POS终端30用于当判定第三随机数Rnd1’与第一随机数Rnd1一致时，调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK加密第二随机数Rnd2生成第二随机数密文Crnd2，并将第二随机数密文Crnd2发送给KMS系统50；所述KMS系统50用于使用认证密钥AUK解密接收到的第二随机数密文Crnd2获得第四随机数Rnd2’，判断第四随机数Rnd2’与第二随机数Rnd2是否一致；所述KMS系统50还用于当判定第四随机数Rnd2’与第二随机数Rnd2一致时确定KMS系统50与POS终端30认证通过。
所述POS终端30接用于当收到KMS系统50发送的主密钥密文Ctmk后使用传输加密密钥TEK解密主密钥密文Ctmk获得终端主密钥TMK并存储在安全模块中。
请参阅图2，是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥管理方法的流程图。该密钥下载方法运行于所述密钥管理系统中，该方法包括：
步骤S101、MTMS系统调用第一硬件加密机产生公钥Pu和私钥Pr，将私钥Pr存储在第一硬件加密机中并将公钥Pu发送至POS终端安全模块中；MTMS系统调用第一硬件加密机、KMS系统调用第二硬件加密机，分别在各自的硬件加密机中将MTMS权限分量及KMS权限分量合成保护密钥PK和MAC密钥MAK，并且将所述保护密钥PK和MAC密钥MAK一并存储在第一硬件加密机和第二硬件加密机中；
步骤S102、操作终端控制POS终端在安全模块中产生传输密钥TK并保存在POS终端的安全模块中，其中，传输密钥TK由传输加密密钥TEK和认证密钥AUK构成；
步骤S103、POS终端在安全模块中使用公钥Pu加密传输密钥TK生成第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu；
步骤S104、POS终端将第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN通过操作终端发送至MTMS系统；
步骤S105、MTMS系统将接收到的终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu关联地存储在SN-Key_MTMS数据库中；
步骤S106、MTMS系统调用硬件加密机使用私钥Pr解密第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu获得传输密钥TK，然后使用保护密钥PK加密传输密钥TK并使用MAC密钥MAK计算MAC值，生成第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk；
步骤S107、MTMS系统将终端序列号SN和第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk发送给KMS系统；
步骤S108、KMS系统将MTMS系统发送的终端序列号SN和第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk关联地存储在SN-TK_KMS数据库中；
步骤S109、POS终端将终端序列号SN和下载主密钥申请发送至KMS系统；
步骤S110、KMS系统接收到POS终端发送的终端序列号SN和下载主密钥申请后，查询与终端序列号SN对应的第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk；
步骤S111、KMS系统调用第二硬件加密机使用MAC密钥MAK对查询到的第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk校验MAC合法性，如果校验通过，使用保护密钥PK解密第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk获得传输密钥TK并将其存储在所述第二硬件加密机中；
步骤S112、KMS系统获得传输密钥TK后调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK与POS终端进行双向认证，如果认证通过，KMS系统调用第二硬件加密机使用传输加密密钥TEK加密终端主密钥TMK生成主密钥密文Ctmk并将主密钥密文发送至POS终端；
步骤S113、POS终端接收到KMS系统发送的主密钥密文Ctmk后使用传输加密密钥TEK解密主密钥密文Ctmk获得终端主密钥TMK并存储在安全模块中。
其中，所述MTMS系统调用第一硬件加密机产生公钥Pu和私钥Pr，将私钥Pr存储在第一硬件加密机中并将公钥Pu发送至POS终端安全模块中具体包括：
S201、MTMS系统调用第一硬件加密机产生公钥Pu和私钥Pr，将私钥Pr存储在第一硬件加密机中并记录私钥Pr在第一硬件机密机中的索引号，将公钥Pu发给CA中心；
S202、CA中心使用根证书HsmRCRT签名生成工作证书HsmWCRT；
S203、MTMS系统从CA中心获得生成的工作证书HsmWCRT并保存在数据库中；
S204、操作终端从MTMS系统数据库获得工作证书HsmWCRT，并将工作S205、证书HsmWCRT发送至POS终端；
S205、POS终端使用烧片预装的根证书HsmRCRT验证工作证书HsmWCRT的合法性；
S206、验证通过后POS终端从工作证书HsmWCRT提取公钥Pu并保存在安全模块中。
所述“POS终端将第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN通过操作终端发送至MTMS系统，MTMS系统将接收到的终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu关联地存储在SN-Key_MTMS数据库中”具体包括：
S301、POS终端将第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN发给操作终端；
S302、操作终端对接收到的第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN进行打包并使用操作员卡进行签名，以及将经过签名的第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN发送至MTMS系统；
S303、MTMS系统校验签名的合法性，如果合法，将终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu关联地存储在SN-Key_MTMS数据库。
其中，KMS系统获得传输密钥TK后使用认证密钥AUK与POS终端进行双向认证具体包括：
S401、POS终端产生第一随机数Rnd1并将第一随机数Rnd1发送至KMS系统；
S402、KMS系统接收第一随机数Rnd1后产生随机数第二Rnd2，调用第二加密机使用认证密钥AUK加密第一随机数Rnd1获得第一随机数密文Crnd1，将第一随机数密文密文Crnd1和第二随机数Rnd2发送给POS终端；
S403、POS终端使用认证密钥AUK解密接收到的第一随机数密文Crnd1获得第三随机数Rnd1’，判断第三随机数Rnd1’与第一随机数Rnd1是否一致；
S404、如果第三随机数Rnd1’与第一随机数Rnd1一致，POS终端使用认证密钥AUK加密第二随机数Rnd2生成第二随机数密文Crnd2，并将第二随机数密文Crnd2发送给KMS系统；
S405、KMS系统调用第二加密机使用认证密钥AUK解密接收到的第二随机数密文Crnd2获得第四随机数Rnd2’，判断第四随机数Rnd2’与第二随机数Rnd2是否一致；如果第四随机数Rnd2’与第二随机数Rnd2一致，KMS系统与POS终端认证通过。
本发明的密钥管理方法及系统，远程下载主密钥，避免POS终端需要集中下载主密钥后才能布放到商户，减少物流成本和维护成本。远程下载密钥时，KMS系统使用对称算法加密需要传输的密钥，保证只有对应POS终端才能解密加密后的密钥，保证数据传输的高全性。在双向认证的时候，POS终端的应用程序并不能够接触到需要远程下装到POS终端中的明文密钥，只能接触到该密钥的密文形式，从而确保了安全装载。本方案将非对算法和对称算法结合，降低了系统的复杂度。此过程中使用到传输加密密钥和认证密钥，由POS终端产生，通过非对称算法和对称算法方式密文传输到KMS系统中，解密过程均在硬件加密机中进行，保证密钥安全性。
以上所述仅为本发明的实施例，并非因此限制本发明的专利范围，凡是利用本发明说明书及附图内容所作的等效结构或等效流程变换，或直接或间接运用在其他相关的技术领域，均同理包括在本发明的专利保护范围内。

Claims (1)

  1. 1、一种密钥管理方法，其特征在于，包括：
    MTMS系统调用第一硬件加密机产生公钥Pu和私钥Pr，将私钥Pr存储在第一硬件加密机中并将公钥Pu发送至POS终端安全模块中；
    MTMS系统调用第一硬件加密机、KMS系统调用第二硬件加密机，分别在各自的硬件加密机中将MTMS权限分量及KMS权限分量合成保护密钥PK和MAC密钥MAK，并且将所述保护密钥PK和MAC密钥MAK一并存储在第一硬件加密机和第二硬件加密机中；
    操作终端控制POS终端在安全模块中产生传输密钥TK并保存在POS终端的安全模块中，其中，传输密钥TK由传输加密密钥TEK和认证密钥AUK构成；
    POS终端在安全模块中使用公钥Pu加密传输密钥TK生成第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu；
    POS终端将第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN通过操作终端发送至MTMS系统；
    MTMS系统将接收到的终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu关联地存储在SN-Key_MTMS数据库中；
    MTMS系统调用第一硬件加密机使用私钥Pr解密第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu获得传输密钥TK，然后使用保护密钥PK加密传输密钥TK并使用MAC密钥MAK计算MAC值，生成第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk；
    MTMS系统将终端序列号SN和第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk发送给KMS系统；
    KMS系统将MTMS系统发送的终端序列号SN和第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk关联地存储在SN-TK_KMS数据库中；
    POS终端将终端序列号SN和下载主密钥申请发送至KMS系统；
    KMS系统接收到POS终端发送的终端序列号SN和下载主密钥申请后，查询与终端序列号SN对应的第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk；
    KMS系统调用第二硬件加密机使用MAC密钥MAK对查询到的第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk校验MAC合法性，如果校验通过，使用保护密钥PK解密第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk获得传输密钥TK并将其存储在所述第二硬件加密机中；
    KMS系统获得传输密钥TK后调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK与POS终端进行双向认证，如果认证通过，KMS系统调用第二硬件加密机使用传输加密密钥TEK加密终端主密钥TMK生成主密钥密文Ctmk并将主密钥密文发送至POS终端；
    POS终端接收到KMS系统发送的主密钥密文Ctmk后使用传输加密密钥TEK解密主密钥密文Ctmk获得终端主密钥TMK并存储在安全模块中。
    2、根据权利要求1所述的一种密钥管理方法，其特征在于，所述MTMS系统调用第一硬件加密机产生公钥Pu和私钥Pr，将私钥Pr存储在第一硬件加密机中并将公钥Pu发送至POS终端安全模块中具体包括：
    MTMS系统调用第一硬件加密机产生公钥Pu和私钥Pr，将私钥Pr存储在第一硬件加密机中并记录私钥Pr在第一硬件机密机中的索引号，将公钥Pu发给CA中心；
    MTMS系统从CA中心获得生成的工作证书HsmWCRT并保存在数据库中，工作证书HsmWCRT是使用根证书HsmRCRT对公钥Pu签名生成；
    操作终端从MTMS系统数据库获得工作证书HsmWCRT，并将工作证书HsmWCRT发送至POS终端；
    POS终端使用烧片预装的根证书HsmRCRT验证工作证书HsmWCRT的合法性；
    验证通过后POS终端从工作证书HsmWCRT提取公钥Pu并保存在安全模块中。
    3、根据权利要求2所述的一种密钥管理方法，其特征在于，所述“POS终端将第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN通过操作终端发送至MTMS系统，MTMS系统将接收到的终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu关联地存储在SN-Key_MTMS数据库中”具体包括：
    POS终端将第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN发给操作终端；
    操作终端对接收到的第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN进行打包并使用操作员卡进行签名，以及将经过签名的第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN发送至MTMS系统；
    MTMS系统校验签名的合法性，如果合法，将终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu关联地存储在SN-Key_MTMS数据库。
    4、根据权利要求3所述的一种密钥管理方法，其特征在于，还包括步骤：MTMS系统从SN-Key_MTMS数据库中提取需要发送的终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu,并验证签名的合法性，如果合法，则执行所述MTMS系统调用硬件加密机使用私钥Pr解密第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu获得传输密钥TK步骤。
    5、根据权利要求3所述的一种密钥管理方法，其特征在于，KMS系统获得传输密钥TK后调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK与POS终端进行双向认证具体包括：
    POS终端产生第一随机数Rnd1并将第一随机数Rnd1发送至KMS系统；
    KMS系统接收第一随机数Rnd1后产生随机数第二Rnd2，调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK加密第一随机数Rnd1获得第一随机数密文Crnd1，将第一随机数密文Crnd1和第二随机数Rnd2发送给POS终端；
    POS终端使用认证密钥AUK解密接收到的第一随机数密文Crnd1获得第三随机数Rnd1’，判断第三随机数Rnd1’与第一随机数Rnd1是否一致：
    如果第三随机数Rnd1’与第一随机数Rnd1一致，POS终端使用认证密钥AUK加密第二随机数Rnd2生成第二随机数密文Crnd2，并将第二随机数密文Crnd2发送给KMS系统；
    KMS系统调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK解密接收到的第二随机数密文Crnd2获得第四随机数Rnd2’，判断第四随机数Rnd2’与第二随机数Rnd2是否一致；
    如果第四随机数Rnd2’与第二随机数Rnd2一致，KMS系统与POS终端认证通过。
    6、一种密钥管理系统，其特征在于，包括：第一硬件加密机、第二硬件加密机、操作终端、POS终端、MTMS系统以及KMS系统，所述第一硬件加密机用于供MTMS系统调用，所述第二硬件加密机用于供KMS系统调用，其中，
    所述MTMS系统用于调用第一硬件加密机产生公钥Pu和私钥Pr，将私钥Pr存储在第一硬件加密机中并将公钥Pu发送至POS终端安全模块中；
    所述MTMS系统用于调用第一硬件加密机、所述KMS系统用于调用第二硬件加密机，分别在各自的硬件加密机中将MTMS权限分量及KMS权限分量合成保护密钥PK和MAC密钥MAK，并且将所述保护密钥PK和MAC密钥MAK一并存储在第一硬件加密机和第二硬件加密机中；
    所述操作终端用于控制POS终端在安全模块中产生传输密钥TK并保存在POS终端的安全模块中，其中，传输密钥TK由传输加密密钥TEK和认证密钥AUK构成；
    所述POS终端用于在安全模块中使用公钥Pu加密传输密钥TK生成第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu以及将第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN通过操作终端发送至MTMS系统；
    所述MTMS系统用于将接收到的终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu关联地存储在SN-Key_MTMS数据库中，以及用于调用第一硬件加密机使用私钥Pr解密第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu获得传输密钥TK，然后使用保护密钥PK加密传输密钥TK并使用MAC密钥MAK计算MAC值，生成第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk，以及将终端序列号SN和第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk发送给KMS系统；
    所述KMS系统用于将MTMS系统发送的终端序列号SN和第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk关联地存储在SN-TK_KMS数据库中；
    所述POS终端用于将终端序列号SN和下载主密钥申请发送至KMS系统；
    所述KMS系统用于当接收到POS终端发送的终端序列号SN和下载主密钥申请后，查询与终端序列号SN对应的第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk；
    所述KMS系统还用于调用第二硬件加密机使用MAC密钥MAK对查询到的第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk校验MAC合法性，如果校验通过，使用保护密钥PK解密第二传输密钥密文Ctk_pk获得传输密钥TK并将其存储在所述第二硬件加密机中；
    所述KMS系统还用于获得传输密钥TK后调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK与POS终端进行双向认证，如果认证通过，KMS系统调用第二硬件加密机使用传输加密密钥TEK加密终端主密钥TMK生成主密钥密文Ctmk并将主密钥密文发送至POS终端；
    所述POS终端用于当接收到KMS系统发送的主密钥密文Ctmk后使用传输加密密钥TEK解密主密钥密文Ctmk获得终端主密钥TMK并存储在安全模块中。
    7、根据权利要求6所述的一种密钥管理系统，其特征在于，所述MTMS系统用于调用第一硬件加密机产生公钥Pu和私钥Pr，将私钥Pr存储在第一硬件加密机中并记录私钥Pr在第一硬件机密机中的索引号并将公钥Pu发给CA中心；
    MTMS系统还用于从CA中心获得生成的工作证书HsmWCRT并保存在数据库中，工作证书HsmWCRT是使用根证书HsmRCRT对公钥Pu签名生成。
    操作终端用于从MTMS系统数据库获得工作证书HsmWCRT，并将工作证书HsmWCRT发送至POS终端；
    POS终端用于使用烧片预装的根证书HsmRCRT验证工作证书HsmWCRT的合法性，并用于当验证通过后从工作证书HsmWCRT提取公钥Pu并保存在安全模块中。
    8、根据权利要求7所述的一种密钥管理系统，其特征在于，
    所述POS终端用于将第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN发给操作终端；
    所述操作终端用于对接收到的第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN进行打包并使用操作员卡进行签名，以及将经过签名的第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu和终端序列号SN发送至MTMS系统；
    所述MTMS系统用于校验签名的合法性，如果合法，将终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu关联地存储在SN-Key_MTMS数据库。
    9、根据权利要求8所述的一种密钥管理系统，其特征在于，
    所述MTMS系统用于从SN-Key_MTMS数据库中提取需要发送的终端序列号SN和第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu,并验证签名的合法性，如果合法，则执行所述MTMS系统调用硬件加密机使用私钥Pr解密第一传输密钥密文Ctk_Pu获得传输密钥TK步骤。
    10、根据权利要求8所述的一种密钥管理系统，其特征在于，
    所述POS终端用于产生第一随机数Rnd1并将第一随机数Rnd1发送至KMS系统；
    所述KMS系统用于当接收到第一随机数Rnd1后产生随机数第二Rnd2，调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK加密第一随机数Rnd1获得第一随机数密文Crnd1，将第一随机数密文密文Crnd1和第二随机数Rnd2发送给POS终端；
    所述POS终端用于使用认证密钥AUK解密接收到的第一随机数密文Crnd1获得第三随机数Rnd1’，判断第三随机数Rnd1’与第一随机数Rnd1是否一致：
    所述POS终端用于当判定第三随机数Rnd1’与第一随机数Rnd1一致时，使用认证密钥AUK加密第二随机数Rnd2生成第二随机数密文Crnd2，并将第二随机数密文Crnd2发送给KMS系统；
    所述KMS系统用于调用第二硬件加密机使用认证密钥AUK解密接收到的第二随机数密文Crnd2获得第四随机数Rnd2’，判断第四随机数Rnd2’与第二随机数Rnd2是否一致；
    所述KMS系统还用于当判定第四随机数Rnd2’与第二随机数Rnd2一致时确定KMS系统与POS终端认证通过。
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