WO2014139342A1 - 密钥下载方法、管理方法、下载管理方法及装置和系统 - Google Patents

密钥下载方法、管理方法、下载管理方法及装置和系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2014139342A1
WO2014139342A1 PCT/CN2014/071243 CN2014071243W WO2014139342A1 WO 2014139342 A1 WO2014139342 A1 WO 2014139342A1 CN 2014071243 W CN2014071243 W CN 2014071243W WO 2014139342 A1 WO2014139342 A1 WO 2014139342A1
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Prior art keywords
key
rks
ciphertext
wcrt
server
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PCT/CN2014/071243
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
姚承勇
彭荣收
孟陆强
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福建联迪商用设备有限公司
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Priority to US14/777,228 priority Critical patent/US9806889B2/en
Publication of WO2014139342A1 publication Critical patent/WO2014139342A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0807—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using tickets, e.g. Kerberos
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H04L9/0833—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key
    • H04L9/0836—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key using tree structure or hierarchical structure
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H04L9/3265—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate chains, trees or paths; Hierarchical trust model
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/24—Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/72—Signcrypting, i.e. digital signing and encrypting simultaneously

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of electronic payment, and in particular, to a device-side key downloading method, a management method, a download management method, a device and a system.
  • Bank card (BANK Card) is becoming more and more popular as a payment instrument.
  • the usual bank card payment system includes a point of sale terminal (Point Of Sale, POS), Terminal Management System (TMS), PIN Pad (PIN PAD) and Hardware Encryptor (Hardware and Security Module, HSM).
  • POS Point Of Sale
  • TMS Terminal Management System
  • PIN PAD PIN Pad
  • HSM Hardware Encryptor
  • the POS terminal can accept the bank card information, has the communication function, and accepts the instructions of the teller to complete the financial transaction information and the information exchange device; the TMS system centrally manages the POS terminal, including parameter download, key download, acceptance, processing or Forwarding the transaction request of the POS terminal and returning the transaction result information to the POS terminal, which is a centralized management and transaction processing system; the password keyboard (PIN) PAD) is a security device that securely stores keys related to various financial transactions and encrypts PINs.
  • the hardware encryption machine (HSM) is a peripheral hardware device that encrypts transmitted data and is used for encryption of PINs. Decrypt, verify the correctness of the message and file source, and store the key.
  • Personal identification number (Personal Identification Number, PIN), which is the personal information, is the data information identifying the legality of the cardholder's identity in online transactions. It is not allowed to appear in plain text in any part of the computer and network system; terminal master key (Terminal) Master Key, TMK), when the POS terminal works, the master key for encrypting the work key is stored in the system hardware and can only be used and cannot be read.
  • the POS terminal is widely used in bank card payment occasions, such as vendor shopping, hotels. Accommodation, etc., is an indispensable means of modern payment, and has been integrated into various occasions of people's lives.
  • Bank cards, especially debit cards generally have a PIN set by the cardholder.
  • the POS terminal In the process of payment, the POS terminal not only sends the track information of the bank card, but also the cardholder to input the PIN for the card issuing bank to verify.
  • the legality of the cardholder’s identity ensures the security of the payment of the bank card and protects the property of the cardholder.
  • it In order to prevent the PIN from being leaked or cracked, it is required to securely encrypt the PIN from the terminal to the issuing bank during the entire information exchange process. It is not allowed to appear in the cipher text in any part of the computer network system, so the input is currently accepted.
  • the PIN terminal of the PIN is required to have a key management system.
  • TMK terminal master key
  • WK work key
  • TMK encrypts and protects WK during the WK update process.
  • Each POS terminal and TMS share a unique TMK, must have security protection, ensure that only write to the device and participate in the calculation, can not read;
  • TMK is a key root key, if TMK is intercepted, work secret The key will be easily cracked, which will seriously threaten the security of bank card payment. Therefore, whether the TMK can be safely downloaded to the POS terminal becomes the key to the security of the entire POS terminal.
  • TMK download scheme summarizes the existing TMK download scheme as follows:
  • TMK plaintext is generated by TMS, which is directly input into the PIN terminal of the POS terminal by manual mode. This method has a large security hole, the operator can easily intercept the TMK plaintext, and there is a possibility of manual input error, and a large number of devices need to input the corresponding TMK one by one, usually for the purpose of improving security, the TMK of each POS is not In the same way, management costs and workloads are quite complex and huge.
  • IC card ciphertext import scheme IC card ciphertext import. After the TMK is generated by the TMS, it is stored in the IC card, and the IC card holder sets the IC card password to protect the TMK in the IC card.
  • the IC card password is input through the POS terminal password keyboard, and then imported from the IC card. Password keyboard.
  • This solution requires the administrator to insert the IC card one by one and set the IC card password when the TMS generates the POS terminal.
  • the IC card password still needs to be manually input. The leakage of the IC card password still causes the TMK to leak, and there are risks.
  • a large number of POSs adopt this method, and the management cost and workload are also quite large.
  • the key downloading of the current payment industry adopts the local download mode.
  • the master key downloaded to the financial POS terminal needs to be locally downloaded for secure downloading, that is, the financial POS terminal needs to be carried to the management center.
  • the security room is physically connected to the key POS located in the security room, and under the administrator's operation, the master key is downloaded from the key POS, and then the financial POS is deployed to the deployment location, and then the master key is used. Download the work key remotely.
  • the device needs to go to the security room of the management center to manually download the key.
  • the maintenance center room has a large workload; after the device leaves the factory, it needs to be calculated to the management center security room download key to deploy to the merchant.
  • the transportation cost rises; in order to concentrate the download of the key, a large amount of manpower and working time are required, and the maintenance cost is large and the maintenance period is long.
  • the solution calls the encryption machine to generate a pair of public and private keys, and the POS terminal randomly generates the master key TMK by calling the cryptographic keyboard, encrypts it with the public key of the TMS, and uploads it to the TMS, and the TMS calls the encryption machine. And use the private key to decrypt the TMK and store it, and use the TMK encryption work key to download to the POS terminal.
  • the solution has the following disadvantages: TMS lacks identity authentication for the POS terminal, and cannot prevent the pseudo terminal from connecting to the TMS to download the work key; the POS terminal lacks the identity authentication for the TMS, and cannot prevent the pseudo TMS background from downloading the pseudo work key.
  • a method for downloading a key including: sending a device serial number DSN and a device identity authentication request to the RKS server on the device side; receiving a work certificate public key RKS_WCRT_PK sent by the RKS server on the device side; and verifying the RKS_WCRT_PK on the device side using the root public key certificate RKS_RCRT Whether the digital signature is legal, if it is legal, the device uses the RKS_WCRT_PK encryption divergence factor to obtain the divergence factor ciphertext, and sends the divergence factor ciphertext to the RKS server; the device end receives the AT_TK1 ciphertext sent by the RKS server, and the AT_TK1 ciphertext is
  • the device identity authentication secondary key DIK2 encrypts the authentication token AT and the first transmission key component TK1, and the DIK2 generates the secondary key generation function according to the device serial number DSN and the device identity authentication primary key DIK1 by calling the device identity authentication secondary key generation function.
  • the device side uses DIK2 to decrypt the AT_TK1 ciphertext to obtain the AT and TK1 plaintext; the device side generates the third random number as the second transmission key component TK2, and the TK1 and TK2 are XORed to obtain the transmission key TK, and the T256 SHA256 checksum is calculated.
  • TK_SHA2 To TK_SHA2; device side uses RKS_WCRT_PK to encrypt AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 to get AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext and AT_TK2_TK
  • the _SHA2 ciphertext is sent to the RKS server; the device side receives the key ciphertext sent by the RKS server, and the key ciphertext is obtained by the TK encryption key that needs to be downloaded; the device side uses the TK decryption key ciphertext to obtain the key plaintext. Save the key to the security module; the device determines if the key download is complete, and if the download is complete, clear AT, TK, and RKS_WCRT_PK.
  • a key management method including: the RKS server receives at least one device serial number DSN and a device identity authentication request sent by the device end; the RKS server sends the work certificate public key RKS_WCRT_PK to the device end; and the RKS server receives the divergence sent by the device end.
  • the RKS server uses the work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK to decrypt the divergence factor ciphertext to obtain the divergence factor plaintext; the RKS server uses the DSN as the index to read the corresponding device identity authentication primary key DIK1 from the device identity primary key database;
  • the calling device identity secondary key generation function generates a device identity secondary key DIK2 according to the device serial number DSN and DIK1; the RKS server generates a 24-byte first random number as the authentication token AT, and generates a second random number as The first transmission key component TK1;
  • the RKS server uses the DIK2 encryption AT and TK1 to obtain the AT_TK1 ciphertext, and sends the AT_TK1 ciphertext to the device end;
  • the RKS server receives the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext sent by the device side, and the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext is encrypted by the RKS_WCRT_PK.
  • the second transmission key components TK2 and TK_SHA2 are obtained, and the TK_SHA2 is a transmission key.
  • the SHA256 check value of TK, the TK is obtained by XOR of TK1 and TK2; the RKS server decrypts the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext using the work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK to obtain the plaintext of AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2, which are asymmetric key pairs; RKS The server determines whether the received AT is equal to the transmitted AT.
  • TK1 and TK2 are XORed to obtain TK, and the SHA256 check value of TK is calculated to obtain TK_256; the RKS server determines whether TK_256 is equal to the received TK_SHA2, and if they are equal, Use TK encryption to obtain the key ciphertext for the downloaded key; the RKS server sends the key ciphertext to the device; the RKS server clears the AT and TK, and completes the key download process.
  • a key download management method including: sending, by a device, a device serial number DSN and a device identity authentication request to an RKS server; the RKS server sends a work certificate public key RKS_WCRT_PK to the device; and the device uses a root public key certificate RKS_RCRT check Whether the digital signature of RKS_WCRT_PK is legal. If it is legal, the device uses the RKS_WCRT_PK encryption divergence factor to obtain the divergence factor ciphertext; the device sends the divergence factor ciphertext to the RKS server; the RKS server decrypts the divergence factor ciphertext using the work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK to obtain the divergence.
  • the RKS server uses the DSN as the index to read the corresponding device identity authentication primary key DIK1 from the device identity primary key database; the RKS server invokes the device identity secondary key generation function according to the device serial number DSN and DIK1 Generating a device identity secondary key DIK2; the RKS server generates a 24-byte first random number as the authentication token AT, and generates a second random number as the first transmission key component TK1; the RKS server encrypts the AT and TK1 using DIK2 AT_TK1 ciphertext, send AT_TK1 ciphertext to the device; device D uses D IK2 decrypts AT_TK1 ciphertext to obtain AT and TK1 plaintext; device generates third random number as second transmission key component TK2, XK and TK2 XOR to obtain transmission key TK, and calculates TK SHA256 check value to obtain TK_SHA2; The terminal uses the RKS_WCRT_PK encryption AT, TK2 and TK_SHA2 to obtain the
  • TK1 and TK2 are XORed to obtain TK, and the SHA256 check value of TK is calculated to obtain TK_256, and it is determined whether TK_256 is equal to the received TK_SHA2. If they are equal, use the TK encryption key to obtain the key ciphertext and send the key ciphertext to the device; the device uses the TK decryption key ciphertext to obtain the key plaintext, and save the key to the security module; The terminal judges whether the key download is completed. If the download is completed, clear AT, TK, and RKS_WCRT_PK; the RKS server clears the AT, TK, and completes the key. Load flow.
  • a key downloading apparatus includes: an authentication request sending unit, configured to send a device serial number DSN and a device identity authentication request to an RKS server; and a first receiving unit, configured to receive a work certificate public key RKS_WCRT_PK sent by the RKS server;
  • the identity verification unit is configured to check whether the digital signature of the RKS_WCRT_PK is legal by using the root public key certificate RKS_RCRT;
  • the first encryption unit is configured to obtain the divergence factor ciphertext by using the RKS_WCRT_PK encryption divergence factor when the server verification unit checks the legality;
  • a first sending unit configured to send the divergence factor ciphertext to the RKS server;
  • the second receiving unit receives the AT_TK1 ciphertext sent by the RKS server, and the AT_TK1 ciphertext is encrypted by the device identity secondary key DIK2 to authenticate the token AT And the first transmission key component TK1 is obtained, and the DIK2 is generated by calling the device identity secondary key generation function according to the
  • Providing a key management apparatus includes: an authentication request receiving unit, configured to receive a device serial number DSN and a device identity authentication request sent by at least one device end; and a second sending unit, configured to send a work certificate public key RKS_WCRT_PK to the device end a fourth receiving unit, configured to receive a divergence factor ciphertext sent by the device, the divergence factor ciphertext is obtained by the RKS_WCRT_PK encryption divergence factor, and a third decryption unit, configured to decrypt the divergence factor ciphertext using the work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK to obtain a divergence factor
  • the device identification unit is configured to read the corresponding device identity authentication primary key DIK1 from the device identity primary key database by using the DSN as an index; the device identity secondary key generation unit is configured to invoke the device identity.
  • the authentication secondary key generation function generates a device identity secondary key DIK2 according to the device serial number DSN and DIK1; the authentication token generating unit is configured to generate a 24-byte first random number as the authentication token AT; the first transmission key a key generating unit, configured to generate a second random number as the first transmission key component TK1; and a second encryption unit,
  • the AT_TK1 ciphertext is obtained by using the DIK2 to encrypt the AT and the TK1;
  • the third sending unit is configured to send the AT_TK1 ciphertext to the device end; and the fourth receiving unit is configured to receive the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext sent by the device end, where the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext is RKS_WCRT_PK is obtained by encrypting the AT, the second transport key components TK2 and TK_SHA2, the TK_SHA2 is the SHA256 check value of the transport key TK, the TK is obtained by XOR of TK1 and
  • the private key RKS_WCRT_SK decrypts the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext to obtain the AT, TK2, and TK_SHA2 plaintext
  • the RKS_WCRT_PK and the RKS_WCRT_SK are asymmetric key pairs
  • the authentication token check unit is configured to determine whether the received AT is equal to the transmitted AT
  • a key operation unit configured to: when the authentication token verification unit determines that the equality is equal, obtain TK by X0, and calculate a SHA256 check value of TK to obtain TK_256; and transmit a key verification unit, for determining Whether the TK_256 generated by the second transmission key operation unit is equal to the received TK_SHA2
  • the third encryption unit is configured to use TK encryption when the transmission key verification unit determines that the equality is equal Downloaded key key ciphertext obtained; third transmitting means for transmitting the key ciphertext to the terminal apparatus; a second removal unit for removing AT, TK, the key to complete the download process.
  • the key downloading method, the management method, the downloading management method, the device and the system of the present invention enable the device to remotely download the master key from the RKS server, so as to prevent the device from being downloaded to the merchant after centralized downloading of the master key, and the device is shipped from the factory. After that, you can deploy the device directly to the deployment site to avoid the need to centralize the device to a fixed machine room and then deploy the key to the deployment site.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the structure of a key download management system according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the structure of a key downloading apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing the structure of a key management apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a method for downloading a key according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a flowchart of a key management method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 is a flowchart of a key download management method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Device end 1 key downloading device 10; RKS server 3; key management device 30;
  • a first decryption unit 14 a second transmission key component generation unit 15;
  • a first transmission key operation unit 16 a first encryption unit 17; a first transmission unit 18;
  • a second receiving unit 19 a second decrypting unit 20; a key downloading unit 21; a first clearing unit 22;
  • a third receiving unit 23 an authentication request receiving unit 31; a device identity identifying unit 32;
  • a second encryption unit 35 a third transmission unit 36; a fourth reception unit 37;
  • a third decryption unit 38 an authentication token verification unit 39; a second transmission key operation unit 40;
  • the second clearing unit 44; the device identity secondary key generating unit 45; and the fourth decrypting unit 46 are the same.
  • Symmetric key Both parties that send and receive data must use the same key to encrypt and decrypt the plaintext.
  • Symmetric key encryption algorithms mainly include: DES, 3DES, IDEA, FEAL, BLOWFISH, and so on.
  • Asymmetric key requires two keys: public key and private key (private Key). The public key and the private key are a pair. If the data is encrypted with the public key, only the corresponding private key can be used for decryption; if the data is encrypted with the private key, only the corresponding public key can be used. Decrypt. Because encryption and decryption use two different keys, this algorithm is called an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
  • the basic process of asymmetric information exchange for asymmetric encryption is: Party A generates a pair of keys and exposes one of them as a public key to other parties; Party B, which obtains the public key, uses the key to perform confidential information. After encryption, it will be sent to Party A; Party A will decrypt the encrypted information with another private key saved by Party A.
  • Party A may use Party B's public key to encrypt the confidential information and then send it to Party B; Party B then uses its own private key to decrypt the encrypted information.
  • the main algorithms are RSA, Elgamal, backpack algorithm, Rabin, D-H, ECC (elliptic curve encryption algorithm).
  • Digital signature It is the application of asymmetric key encryption technology and digital abstraction technology.
  • the digital signature technique encrypts the digest information with the sender's private key and transmits it to the recipient along with the original text.
  • the recipient can decrypt the encrypted digest information only by using the transmitted public key, and then generate a digest information for the received original text, which is compared with the decrypted digest information. If they are the same, the received information is complete and has not been modified during the transmission. Otherwise, the information has been modified, so the digital signature can verify the integrity and legality of the information.
  • Digital signature is an encryption process
  • digital signature verification is a process of decryption.
  • RSA An asymmetric key algorithm.
  • RSA public key encryption algorithm was founded in 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamirh and Len Adleman was developed at (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA).
  • RSA is named after the name of the three of them.
  • RSA is currently the most influential public key encryption algorithm. It is capable of resisting all the password attacks known so far and has been recommended by ISO as the public key data encryption standard.
  • the RSA algorithm is based on a very simple theory of numbers: it is easy to multiply two large prime numbers.
  • the RSA algorithm is the first algorithm that can be used for both encryption and digital signatures, and is easy to understand and operate.
  • RSA is the most widely studied public key algorithm. It has been tested by various attacks for more than 30 years since its introduction. It is widely accepted as one of the best public key solutions.
  • TDES Triple-DES DES is a symmetric encryption algorithm with a key of 8 bytes.
  • TDES is a DES-based encryption algorithm whose key is 16 bytes or 24 bytes.
  • TDES/3DES is English Triple DES abbreviation (ie triple data encryption standard), DES is English Data Encryption Acronym for Standard (Data Encryption Standard).
  • DES is a symmetric key encryption algorithm, that is, the same encryption algorithm as the data encryption key and the decryption key. DES was developed and published by IBM in the 1970s, followed by the US government, and was adopted by the US National Bureau of Standards and the American National Standards Institute. (ANSI) acknowledged.
  • TDES/3DES is a mode of the DES encryption algorithm that uses three 64-bit keys to encrypt the data three times. Is a safer variant of DES.
  • the RKS server 3 includes a key management device 30.
  • the device 1 includes a key download device 10, and the device 1 is a POS terminal.
  • the RKS server 3 is a remote key server and is located in the management center room and is responsible for the POS terminal.
  • the generation and maintenance of a key, a work key, etc., the RKS server 3 includes a key database, that is, a master key database or a work key database of the POS terminal, where the TMK key database that needs to be downloaded remotely is represented here.
  • the TMK key database is typically generated and stored by a dedicated encryption machine.
  • FIG. 2 is a structural block diagram of a key downloading apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • a key downloading apparatus 10 includes an authentication request transmitting unit 11, a first receiving unit 12, a server identity checking unit 13, a first decrypting unit 14, a second transmission key component generating unit 15, and a first transport key arithmetic unit. 16.
  • the authentication request sending unit 11 is configured to send the device serial number DSN and the device identity authentication request to the RKS server, wherein the DSN is in one-to-one correspondence with the device end 1; the first receiving unit 12 is configured to receive the work certificate sent by the RKS server 3.
  • the key RKS_WCRT_PK where RKS_WCRT_PK contains the digital signature of the root private key certificate RKS_RCRT_SK, ensures that the RKS_WCRT_PK is legal, there is no way to forge.
  • the work certificate RKS_WCRT is a pair of asymmetric key pairs. If it is an RSA key, the minimum number of digits is 2048 bits.
  • the work certificate RKS_WCRT consists of the work certificate public key RKS_WCRT_PK and the work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK.
  • the RKS_WCRT needs to be saved in the secure medium, for example It can be statically stored in the IC card as a backup and then imported into the secure storage medium of the RKS server 3.
  • the server identity verification unit 13 is configured to verify whether the digital signature of the RKS_WCRT_PK is legal using the root public key certificate RKS_RCRT_PK, wherein the RKS_RCRT_PK is pre-installed in the firmware when the device 1 is shipped from the factory, and the key server root certificate RKS_RCRT is a pair of asymmetric secrets.
  • the key pair if it is an RSA key, has a minimum number of 2048 bits.
  • the RKS_RCRT consists of the root public key certificate RKS_RCRT_PK and the root private key certificate RKS_RCRT_SK.
  • the RKS_RCRT_PK is used to check the validity of the RKS_WCRT_PK.
  • RKS_RCRT_SK is used to generate a digital signature to sign RKS_WCRT_PK.
  • RKS_RCRT needs to be stored in the secure medium.
  • the root private key certificate RKS_RCRT_SK needs to be strictly protected and can be saved in the IC card. It can only be used to sign the work certificate public key RKS_WCRT_PK.
  • the first encryption unit 17 is configured to obtain the divergence factor ciphertext by using the RKS_WCRT_PK encryption divergence factor when the server verification unit 13 checks the validity; the first sending unit 18 is configured to send the divergence factor ciphertext to the RKS server 3; the second receiving The unit 19 is configured to receive an AT_TK1 ciphertext obtained by the device identity authentication secondary key DIK2 encrypting the authentication token AT and the first transport key component TK1, and the DIK2 identifying the secondary key generation function by calling the device identity
  • the primary key DIK1 is generated according to the device serial number DSN and the device identity.
  • the device identity secondary key DIK2 and the divergence factor are generated at the device end 1 production stage by the local key POS.
  • the divergence factor is used to participate in the device identity authentication secondary key generation, which is a random number or data used to assist the RKS server or the local key POS, for example, the local key POS serial number, production date, production batch Number and other components.
  • the device identity primary key is generated by the RKS server and imported into the local key POS in a secure manner.
  • a security environment is established, and the device 1 and the local key POS are physically connected.
  • the local key POS reads the device serial number DSN from the device, and generates the device identification secondary secret within the local key POS.
  • the key is used to import the device authentication secondary key DIK2 and the divergence factor into the device 1 in a secure manner.
  • the device serial number DSN is unique per device, so that the device authentication secondary key DIK2 can also be unique per device.
  • the device identity identification secondary key generation function is a one-way divergence algorithm, and the one-way divergence algorithm is pre-agreed by the device end 1 and the RKS server 3 to ensure the device serial number.
  • the DSN and the divergence factor are used as input parameters 1.
  • the device identity identifies the primary key DIK1 as the input parameter 2, and the output result is the device device authentication secondary key DIK2. This process is one-way, that is, knowing that the device authenticates the secondary key DIK2 and the input parameter 1, and cannot reverse the parameter 2.
  • the device identity authentication key uses a 24-byte TDES key.
  • Step 1 Generate a SHA-256 check value of 32 bytes for the device sequence number, and take the first 24 bytes as the encrypted data DATA1.
  • the device ID is used to authenticate the primary key DIK1 to perform TDES-ECB encryption on DATA1 as KEY1.
  • Step 2 Generate a SHA-256 check value of 32 bytes for the divergence factor, and take the first 24 bytes as the encrypted data DATA2.
  • KEY1 performs TDES-ECB decryption on DATA2 as the device identity secondary key DIK2.
  • the first decryption unit 14 is configured to decrypt the AT_TK1 ciphertext using DIK2 to obtain the AT and TK1 plaintext; the second transport key component generating unit 15 is configured to generate the third random number as the second transport key component TK2; the first transport key operation The unit 16 is configured to XK the TK1 and the TK2 to obtain the transmission key TK, and calculate the SHA256 check value of the TK to obtain the TK_SHA2.
  • the third receiving unit 23 is configured to receive the key ciphertext sent by the RKS server 3, the key ciphertext.
  • the second decryption unit 20 is configured to obtain the key plaintext by using the TK decryption key ciphertext; the key download unit 21 is configured to save the key to the security module; the first clearing unit 22 uses Determines whether the key download is complete, and clears AT, TK, and RKS_WCRT_PK when the download is complete.
  • a key management apparatus 30 includes an authentication request receiving unit 31, a device identity identifying unit 32, an authentication token generating unit 33, a first transport key generating unit 34, a second encrypting unit 35, a second transmitting unit 36, and a fourth.
  • the authentication request receiving unit 31 is configured to receive the device serial number DSN and the device identity authentication request sent by the at least one device terminal 1; the second sending unit 36 is configured to send the working certificate public key RKS_WCRT_PK to the device end; and the fourth receiving unit 37 is configured to: Receiving the divergence factor ciphertext sent by the device end, the divergence factor ciphertext is obtained by the RKS_WCRT_PK encryption divergence factor; the third decryption unit 38 is configured to decrypt the divergence factor ciphertext using the work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK to obtain the divergence factor plaintext; the device identity discriminating unit 32 uses Reading the corresponding device identity primary key DIK1 from the device identity primary key database with the DSN as an index; the device identity secondary key generation unit 45 is configured to invoke the device identity secondary key generation function according to The device serial number DSN and DIK1 generate the device identity secondary key DIK2.
  • the authentication token generating unit 33 is configured to generate a 24-byte first random number as the authentication token AT; the first transmission key generating unit 34 is configured to generate the second random number as the first transmission key component TK1; the second encryption unit 35 is used to encrypt the AT and TK1 to obtain the AT_TK1 ciphertext; the third sending unit 36 is configured to send the AT_TK1 ciphertext to the device end; and the fourth receiving unit 37 is configured to receive the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext sent by the device end 1, the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2
  • the ciphertext is obtained by the RKS_WCRT_PK encryption AT, the second transmission key component TK2 and TK_SHA2, the TK_SHA2 is the SHA256 check value of the transmission key TK, the TK is obtained by XOR of TK1 and TK2; the fourth decryption unit 46 is used for Using the work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK to decrypt the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2
  • FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a method for downloading a key according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the key downloading method is run in the device end 1, and the method includes:
  • Step S101 The device sends the device serial number DSN and the device identity authentication request to the RKS server.
  • Step S102 the device end receives the work certificate public key RKS_WCRT_PK sent by the RKS server;
  • Step S103 The device side uses the root public key certificate RKS_RCRT to check whether the digital signature of the RKS_WCRT_PK is legal. If it is legal, the RSF_WCRT_PK is used to encrypt the divergence factor to obtain the divergence factor ciphertext, and the divergence factor ciphertext is sent to the RKS server;
  • Step S104 The device end receives the AT_TK1 ciphertext sent by the RKS server, where the AT_TK1 ciphertext is obtained by the device identity authentication public key DIK_PK encryption authentication token AT and the first transmission key component TK1, and the DIK2 identifies the secondary secret by calling the device identity.
  • the key generation function generates the primary key DIK1 according to the device serial number DSN and the device identity;
  • Step S105 the device side uses the DIK2 to decrypt the AT_TK1 ciphertext to obtain the AT and TK1 plaintext;
  • Step S106 the device side generates a third random number as the second transmission key component TK2, XK and TK2 are XORed to obtain the transmission key TK, and the SHA256 check value of the TK is calculated to obtain TK_SHA2;
  • Step S107 the device side uses the RKS_WCRT_PK encryption AT, TK2, and TK_SHA2 to obtain the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext and sends the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext to the RKS server;
  • Step S108 The device end receives the key ciphertext sent by the RKS server, and the key ciphertext is obtained by the TK encryption key that needs to be downloaded;
  • Step S109 The device uses the TK decryption key ciphertext to obtain the key plaintext, and saves the key to the security module.
  • Step S110 The device end determines whether the key download is completed, and if the download is completed, clears AT, TK, and RKS_WCRT_PK.
  • FIG. 5 is a flowchart of a key management method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the key management method runs in the RKS server 3, and the method includes:
  • Step S201 The RKS server receives at least one device serial number DSN and a device identity authentication request sent by the device.
  • Step S202 the RKS server sends the work certificate public key RKS_WCRT_PK to the device end;
  • Step S203 The RKS server receives the divergence factor ciphertext sent by the device.
  • Step S204 The RKS server decrypts the divergence factor ciphertext using the work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK to obtain a clearing factor plaintext;
  • Step S205 the RKS server uses the DSN as an index to read the corresponding device identity authentication primary key DIK1 from the device identity primary key database;
  • Step S206 the RKS server invokes the device identity authentication secondary key generation function to generate the device identity secondary key DIK2 according to the device serial number DSN and DIK1;
  • Step S207 the RKS server generates a 24-byte first random number as the authentication token AT, and generates a second random number as the first transmission key component TK1;
  • Step S208 the RKS server encrypts the AT and TK1 by using DIK2 to obtain the AT_TK1 ciphertext;
  • Step S209 the RKS server sends the AT_TK1 ciphertext to the device end;
  • Step S210 The RKS server receives the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext sent by the device, and the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext is obtained by the RKS_WCRT_PK encryption AT, the second transmission key component TK2 and TK_SHA2, and the TK_SHA2 is the SHA256 check value of the transmission key TK.
  • TK is obtained by XOR of TK1 and TK2;
  • Step S211 The RKS server decrypts the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext using the work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK to obtain the plaintext of the AT, TK2, and TK_SHA2, where the RKS_WCRT_PK and the RKS_WCRT_SK are asymmetric key pairs;
  • Step S212 the RKS server determines whether the received AT is equal to the transmitted AT. If they are equal, the TK1 and TK2 are XORed to obtain TK, and the SHA256 check value of the TK is calculated to obtain TK_256;
  • Step S213 the RKS server determines whether the TK_256 is equal to the received TK_SHA2, and if they are equal, uses the TK encryption key to obtain the key ciphertext;
  • Step S214 The RKS server sends the key ciphertext to the device end.
  • Step S215 the RKS server clears the AT and TK, and completes the key downloading process.
  • FIG. 6 is a flowchart of a key download management method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the key download management method runs in the key download management system, and the method includes:
  • Step S301 The device sends the device serial number DSN and the device identity authentication request to the RKS server.
  • Step S302 the RKS server sends the work certificate public key RKS_WCRT_PK to the device end;
  • Step S303 the device side uses the root public key certificate RKS_RCRT to verify whether the digital signature of RKS_WCRT_PK is legal, if it is legal, step S304 is performed, otherwise, step S315 is performed;
  • Step S304 the device side uses the RKS_WCRT_PK encryption divergence factor to obtain the divergence factor ciphertext and sends the divergence factor ciphertext to the RKS server;
  • Step S305 The RKS server decrypts the divergence factor ciphertext using the work certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK to obtain a clearing factor plaintext;
  • Step S306 the RKS server uses the DSN as an index to read the corresponding device identity authentication primary key DIK1 from the device identity primary key database;
  • Step S307 the RKS server invokes the device identity authentication secondary key generation function to generate the device identity secondary key DIK2 according to the device serial number DSN and DIK1;
  • Step S308 the RKS server generates a 24-byte first random number as the authentication token AT, and generates a second random number as the first transmission key component TK1;
  • Step S309 the RKS server encrypts the AT and TK1 by using DIK2 to obtain the AT_TK1 ciphertext;
  • Step S310 the RKS server sends the AT_TK1 ciphertext to the device end;
  • Step S311 the device side uses the DIK2 to decrypt the AT_TK1 ciphertext to obtain the AT and TK1 plaintext;
  • Step S312 the device side generates a third random number as the second transmission key component TK2, XK and TK2 are XORed to obtain the transmission key TK, and the SHA256 check value of the TK is calculated to obtain TK_SHA2;
  • Step S313 the device side uses the RKS_WCRT_PK to encrypt the AT, TK2, and TK_SHA2 to obtain the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext;
  • Step S314 The device sends the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext to the RKS server.
  • Step S315 the authentication of the RKS server fails, and the download process ends.
  • Step S316 The RKS server decrypts the AT_TK2_TK_SHA2 ciphertext using the working certificate private key RKS_WCRT_SK to obtain the plaintext of AT, TK2, and TK_SHA2, where the RKS_WCRT_PK and the RKS_WCRT_SK are asymmetric key pairs;
  • Step S317 the RKS server determines whether the received AT is equal to the transmitted AT, if they are equal, step S318 is performed, otherwise, step S320 is performed;
  • Step S319 using TK to encrypt the key to be downloaded to obtain the key ciphertext and sending the key ciphertext to the device end;
  • Step S320 The authentication device fails, and the download process ends.
  • Step S321 The device uses the TK decryption key ciphertext to obtain the key plaintext, and saves the key to the security module.
  • Step S322 the device side determines whether the key download is completed, if the download is completed, step S323 is performed, otherwise, returns to step S301;
  • Step S323 the device side clears AT, TK, and RKS_WCRT_PK;
  • Step S324 the RKS server clears the AT and TK, and completes the key downloading process.
  • the key downloading method, the management method, the downloading management method, the device and the system of the present invention enable the device to remotely download the master key from the RKS server, so as to prevent the device from being downloaded to the merchant after centralized downloading of the master key, and the device is shipped from the factory. After that, you can deploy the device directly to the deployment site to avoid the need to centralize the device to a fixed machine room and then deploy the key to the deployment site.
  • the symmetric key management technology is used to implement the two-way legal identity authentication to ensure the legality of the identity of the RKS server and the device.
  • the device verifies the validity of the RKS server by verifying the digital signature of the working certificate public key of the RKS server.
  • the RKS server generates the certificate.
  • An authentication token AT is encrypted by the secondary identity authentication key DK2 on the device side, and the ciphertext is sent to the device end, and the device side decrypts the secondary identity authentication key DK2 saved by the device, and then returns it with the work certificate public key and then returns.
  • the RKS server decrypts with the work certificate private key and then compares whether the authentication token AT is the same as the generated authentication token AT, and the same means that the device side is legal, thereby implementing two-way identity authentication;
  • the randomly generated symmetric key is used to protect the downloaded key.
  • the TMK of the line transmission is encrypted by a temporary transmission key.
  • the transmission key is generated by the POS terminal and the key server respectively, and is encrypted by the public key of the other party. To the other party, to achieve the synchronization of the temporary transmission key, thereby improving the security and efficiency of TMK transmission.

Abstract

本发明公开一种密钥下载管理方法，设备端通过校验RKS服务器的工作证书公钥的数字签名来认证RKS服务器的合法性，RKS服务器生成一个鉴别令牌AT，用设备端的二级身份鉴别密钥DK2加密，将密文发送给设备端，设备端用其保存的二级身份鉴别密钥DK2解密，再用工作证书公钥加密后返回给RKS服务器，RKS服务器用其工作证书私钥解密后再对比鉴别令牌AT与生成的鉴别令牌AT是否一样，一样则表示设备端合法，从而实现双向身份认证。

Description

密钥下载方法、管理方法、下载管理方法及装置和系统
技术领域
本发明涉及电子支付领域，尤其涉及一种设备端的密钥下载方法、管理方法、下载管理方法及装置和系统。
背景技术
银行卡（BANK Card）作为支付工具越来越普及，通常的银行卡支付系统包括销售点终端（Point Of Sale，POS）、终端管理系统（Terminal ManageSystem，TMS）、密码键盘（PIN PAD）和硬件加密机（Hardware and Security Module，HSM）。其中POS终端能够接受银行卡信息，具有通讯功能，并接受柜员的指令完成金融交易信息和有关信息交换的设备；TMS系统对POS终端进行集中管理，包括参数下载，密钥下载，接受、处理或转发POS终端的交易请求，并向POS终端回送交易结果信息，是集中管理和交易处理的系统；密码键盘（PIN PAD）是对各种金融交易相关的密钥进行安全存储保护，以及对PIN进行加密保护的安全设备；硬件加密机（HSM）是对传输数据进行加密的外围硬件设备，用于PIN的加密和解密、验证报文和文件来源的正确性以及存储密钥。个人标识码（Personal Identification Number，PIN），即个人密码，是在联机交易中识别持卡人身份合法性的数据信息，在计算机和网络系统中任何环节都不允许以明文的方式出现；终端主密钥（Terminal Master Key，TMK），POS终端工作时，对工作密钥进行加密的主密钥，保存在系统硬件中，只能使用，不能读取；POS终端广泛应用于银行卡支付场合，比如厂商购物、酒店住宿等，是一种不可或缺的现代化支付手段，已经融入人们生活的各种场合。银行卡，特别是借记卡，一般都由持卡人设置了PIN，在进行支付过程中，POS终端除了上送银行卡的磁道信息等资料外，还要持卡人输入PIN供发卡银行验证持卡人的身份合法性，确保银行卡支付安全，保护持卡人的财产安全。为了防止PIN泄露或被破解，要求从终端到发卡银行整个信息交互过程中，全称对PIN进行安全加密保护，不允许在计算机网络系统的任何环节，PIN以密文的方式出现，因此目前接受输入 PIN的POS终端都要求配备密钥管理体系。
POS终端的密钥体系分成二级：终端主密钥（TMK）和工作密钥（WK）。其中TMK在WK更新过程中，对WK进行加密保护。每台POS终端与TMS之间共享唯一的TMK，必须要有安全保护，保证只能写入设备并参与计算，不能读取；TMK是一个很关键的根密钥，如果TMK被截取，工作密钥就比较容易都会被破解，将严重威胁银行卡支付安全。所以能否安全下载TMK到POS终端，成为整个POS终端安全性的关键。下面归纳现有的TMK下载方案如下：
1、明文手工输入方案：由TMS生成TMK明文，由手工方式直接输入到POS终端的密码键盘。这种方式存在很大的安全漏洞，操作人员容易截取TMK明文，而且存在手工输入错误的可能性，而且大量的设备需要逐一输入对应的TMK，通常为了提高安全性，每台POS的TMK都不一样，管理成本和工作量都相当复杂和巨大。
2、IC卡密文导入方案：IC卡密文导入。TMK由TMS生成后，存在IC卡中，并由IC卡持有人设置IC卡密码保护IC卡中的TMK，导入POS终端时，通过POS终端密码键盘输入IC卡密码后，从IC卡导入到密码键盘中。该方案需要在TMS生成POS终端时由管理人员一一插入IC卡并设置IC卡片密码。并在POS终端导入时，依然需要手工输入IC卡密码，IC卡片密码泄露依然会导致TMK泄露也存在风险，而且大量的POS采用此方式，其管理成本及工作量也相当巨大。
3、本地密钥母POS方案：当前支付行业的密钥下载多采用本地下载的方式，下载到金融POS终端的主密钥需要本地才能进行安全的下载，即金融POS终端需要携带到管理中心的安全机房，和位于安全机房的密钥母POS进行物理连接，并在管理员的操作下，从密钥母POS下载主密钥，然后将金融POS布放到部署地点，再通过主密钥进行远程下载工作密钥。
上述三种方案都有以下缺点：设备需要到管理中心的安全机房，通过人工集中下载密钥。维护中心机房，工作量大；设备出厂后需要运算到管理中心安全机房下载密钥才能部署到商户。运输成本上升；为了集中下装密钥，需要大量的人手和工作时间，维护成本大、维护周期长。
目前也有一种远程密钥下载方案：该方案TMS调用加密机产生一对公私钥，POS终端调用密码键盘随机生成主密钥TMK，并用TMS的公钥进行加密后上传给TMS，TMS调用加密机并用私钥解密TMK后存储，用TMK加密工作密钥下载给POS终端。该方案有以下缺点：TMS对POS终端缺少身份鉴别，无法防止伪终端连接TMS下载工作密钥；POS终端缺少对TMS的身份鉴别，无法防止伪TMS后台下载伪工作密钥。
发明内容
为解决上述技术问题，本发明采用的一个技术方案是：
提供一种密钥下载方法，包括：设备端发送设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别请求至RKS服务器；设备端接收RKS服务器发送的工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK；设备端使用根公钥证书RKS_RCRT校验RKS_WCRT_PK的数字签名是否合法，如果合法，设备端使用RKS_WCRT_PK加密发散因子得到发散因子密文，并将发散因子密文发送至RKS服务器；设备端接收RKS服务器发送的AT_TK1密文，所述AT_TK1密文由设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2加密鉴别令牌AT和第一传输密钥分量TK1得到，DIK2通过调用设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数根据设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1生成；设备端使用DIK2解密AT_TK1密文得到AT和TK1明文；设备端产生第三随机数作为第二传输密钥分量TK2，将TK1和TK2异或得到传输密钥TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_SHA2；设备端使用RKS_WCRT_PK加密AT、TK2和TK_SHA2得到AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文并将AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文发送至RKS服务器；设备端接收RKS服务器发送的密钥密文，所述密钥密文由TK加密需要下载的密钥得到；设备端使用TK解密密钥密文得到密钥明文，将密钥保存至安全模块；设备端判断密钥下载是否完成，如果下载完成，清除AT、TK及RKS_WCRT_PK。
本发明采用的另一个技术方案是：
提供一种密钥管理方法，包括：RKS服务器接收至少一个设备端发送的设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别请求；RKS服务器将工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK发送至设备端；RKS服务器接收设备端发送的发散因子密文；RKS服务器使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密发散因子密文得到发散因子明文；RKS服务器以DSN为索引从设备身份鉴别一级密钥数据库读取相应的设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1;调用设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数根据设备序列号DSN和DIK1生成设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2；RKS服务器产生24字节第一随机数作为鉴别令牌AT，并产生第二随机数作为第一传输密钥分量TK1；RKS服务器使用DIK2加密AT和TK1得到AT_TK1密文，将AT_TK1密文发送至设备端；RKS服务器接收设备端发送的AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文，所述AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文由RKS_WCRT_PK加密AT、第二传输密钥分量TK2和TK_SHA2得到，所述TK_SHA2是传输密钥TK的SHA256校验值，所述TK由TK1和TK2异或得到；RKS服务器使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文得到AT、TK2和TK_SHA2明文，所述RKS_WCRT_PK和RKS_WCRT_SK是非对称密钥对；RKS服务器判断收到的AT与发送的AT是否相等，如果相等，将TK1和TK2异或得到TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_256；RKS服务器判断TK_256与接收到的TK_SHA2是否相等，如果相等，使用TK加密需要下载的密钥得到密钥密文；RKS服务器将密钥密文发送至设备端；RKS服务器清除AT、TK，完成密钥下载流程。
本发明采用的另一个技术方案是：
提供一种密钥下载管理方法，包括：设备端发送设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别请求至RKS服务器；RKS服务器将工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK发送至设备端；设备端使用根公钥证书RKS_RCRT校验RKS_WCRT_PK的数字签名是否合法，如果合法，设备端使用RKS_WCRT_PK加密发散因子得到发散因子密文；设备端将发散因子密文发送至RKS服务器；RKS服务器使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密发散因子密文得到发散因子明文；RKS服务器以DSN为索引从设备身份鉴别一级密钥数据库读取相应的设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1;RKS服务器调用设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数根据设备序列号DSN和DIK1生成设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2；RKS服务器产生24字节第一随机数作为鉴别令牌AT，并产生第二随机数作为第一传输密钥分量TK1；RKS服务器使用DIK2加密AT和TK1得到AT_TK1密文，将AT_TK1密文发送至设备端；设备端使用DIK2解密AT_TK1密文得到AT和TK1明文；设备端产生第三随机数作为第二传输密钥分量TK2，将TK1和TK2异或得到传输密钥TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_SHA2;设备端使用RKS_WCRT_PK加密AT、TK2和TK_SHA2得到AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文并将AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文发送至RKS服务器；RKS服务器使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文得到AT、TK2和TK_SHA2明文，所述RKS_WCRT_PK和RKS_WCRT_SK是非对称密钥对；RKS服务器判断收到的AT与发送的AT是否相等，如果相等，将TK1和TK2异或得到TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_256，判断TK_256与接收到的TK_SHA2是否相等，如果相等，使用TK加密需要下载的密钥得到密钥密文并将密钥密文发送至设备端；设备端使用TK解密密钥密文得到密钥明文，将密钥保存至安全模块；设备端判断密钥下载是否完成，如果下载完成，清除AT、TK及RKS_WCRT_PK；RKS服务器清除AT、TK，完成密钥下载流程。
本发明采用的另一个技术方案是：
提供一种密钥下载装置，包括：鉴别请求发送单元，用于发送设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别请求至RKS服务器；第一接收单元，用于接收RKS服务器发送的工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK；服务器身份校验单元，用于使用根公钥证书RKS_RCRT校验RKS_WCRT_PK的数字签名是否合法；第一加密单元，用于当服务器校验单元校验合法时，使用RKS_WCRT_PK加密发散因子得到发散因子密文；第一发送单元，用于将发散因子密文发送至RKS服务器；第二接收单元，接收RKS服务器发送的AT_TK1密文，所述AT_TK1密文由设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2加密鉴别令牌AT和第一传输密钥分量TK1得到，DIK2通过调用设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数根据设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1生成；第一解密单元，使用DIK2解密AT_TK1密文得到AT和TK1明文；第二传输密钥分量生成单元，用于产生第三随机数作为第二传输密钥分量TK2；第一传输密钥运算单元，用于将TK1和TK2异或得到传输密钥TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_SHA2；第三接收单元，用于接收RKS服务器发送的密钥密文，所述密钥密文由TK加密需要下载的密钥得到；第二解密单元，用于使用TK解密密钥密文得到密钥明文；密钥下载单元，用于将密钥保存至安全模块；第一清除单元，用于判断密钥下载是否完成，并当下载完成时清除AT、TK及RKS_WCRT_PK。
本发明采用的另一个技术方案是：
提供一种密钥管理装置包括：鉴别请求接收单元，用于接收至少一个设备端发送的设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别请求；第二发送单元，用于将工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK发送至设备端；第四接收单元，用于接收设备端发送的发散因子密文，发散因子密文由RKS_WCRT_PK加密发散因子得到；第三解密单元，用于使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密发散因子密文得到发散因子明文；设备身份鉴别单元，用于以DSN为索引从设备身份鉴别一级密钥数据库读取相应的设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1；设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成单元，用于调用设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数根据设备序列号DSN和DIK1生成设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2；鉴别令牌生成单元，用于产生24字节第一随机数作为鉴别令牌AT；第一传输密钥生成单元，用于产生第二随机数作为第一传输密钥分量TK1；第二加密单元，用于使用DIK2加密AT和TK1得到AT_TK1密文；第三发送单元，用于将AT_TK1密文发送至设备端；第四接收单元，用于接收设备端发送的AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文，所述AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文由RKS_WCRT_PK加密AT、第二传输密钥分量TK2和TK_SHA2得到，所述TK_SHA2是传输密钥TK的SHA256校验值，所述TK由TK1和TK2异或得到；第四解密单元，用于使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文得到AT、TK2和TK_SHA2明文，所述RKS_WCRT_PK和RKS_WCRT_SK是非对称密钥对；鉴别令牌校验单元，用于判断收到的AT与发送的AT是否相等；第二传输密钥运算单元，用于当所述鉴别令牌校验单元判定相等时，将TK1和TK2异或得到TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_256；传输密钥校验单元，用于判断第二传输密钥运算单元生成的TK_256与接收到的TK_SHA2是否相等；第三加密单元，用于当所述传输密钥校验单元判定相等时，使用TK加密需要下载的密钥得到密钥密文；第三发送单元，用于将密钥密文发送至设备端；第二清除单元，用于清除AT、TK，完成密钥下载流程。装置如上所述；所述设备端包括密钥下载装置，所述密钥下载装置如上所述。
本发明的密钥下载方法、管理方法、下载管理方法及装置和系统，实现设备端从RKS服务器远程下载主密钥，避免设备端需要集中下载主密钥后才能布放到商户，设备端出厂后，可以直接布放到部署地点，避免需要将设备端集中到某固定机房下载密钥后再布放到部署地点。
附图说明
图1是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥下载管理系统的结构框图；
图2是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥下载装置的结构框图；
图3是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥管理装置的结构框图；
图4是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥下载方法的流程图；
图5是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥管理方法的流程图；
图6是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥下载管理方法的流程图。
主要元件符号说明
设备端1；密钥下载装置10；RKS服务器3；密钥管理装置30；
鉴别请求发送单元11；第一接收单元12；服务器身份校验单元13；
第一解密单元14；第二传输密钥分量生成单元15；
第一传输密钥运算单元16；第一加密单元17；第一发送单元18；
第二接收单元19；第二解密单元20；密钥下载单元21；第一清除单元22；
第三接收单元23；鉴别请求接收单元31；设备身份鉴别单元32；
鉴别令牌生成单元33；第一传输密钥生成单元34；
第二加密单元35；第三发送单元36；第四接收单元37；
第三解密单元38；鉴别令牌校验单元39；第二传输密钥运算单元40；
传输密钥校验单元41；第三加密单元42；第三发送单元43；
第二清除单元44；设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成单元45；第四解密单元46。
具体实施方式
为详细说明本发明的技术内容、构造特征、所实现目的及效果，以下结合实施方式并配合附图详予说明。
首先，对本发明涉及的缩略语和关键术语进行定义和说明：
对称密钥：发送和接收数据的双方必须使用相同的密钥对明文进行加密和解密运算。对称密钥加密算法主要包括：DES、3DES、IDEA、FEAL、BLOWFISH等。
非对称密钥：非对称加密算法需要两个密钥：公开密钥（public key）和私有密钥（private key）。公开密钥与私有密钥是一对，如果用公开密钥对数据进行加密，只有用对应的私有密钥才能解密；如果用私有密钥对数据进行加密，那么只有用对应的公开密钥才能解密。因为加密和解密使用的是两个不同的密钥，所以这种算法叫作非对称加密算法。非对称加密算法实现机密信息交换的基本过程是：甲方生成一对密钥并将其中的一把作为公用密钥向其它方公开；得到该公用密钥的乙方使用该密钥对机密信息进行加密后再发送给甲方；甲方再用自己保存的另一把专用密钥对加密后的信息进行解密。甲方可以使用乙方的公钥对机密信息进行加密后再发送给乙方；乙方再用自己的私匙对加密后的信息进行解密。主要算法有RSA、Elgamal、背包算法、Rabin、D-H、ECC（椭圆曲线加密算法）。
数字签名：是非对称密钥加密技术与数字摘要技术的应用。数字签名技术是将摘要信息用发送者的私钥加密，与原文一起传送给接收者。接收者只有用发送的公钥才能解密被加密的摘要信息，然后用对收到的原文产生一个摘要信息，与解密的摘要信息对比。如果相同，则说明收到的信息是完整的，在传输过程中没有被修改，否则说明信息被修改过，因此数字签名能够验证信息的完整性和合法性。数字签名是个加密的过程，数字签名验证是个解密的过程。
RSA：一种非对称密钥算法。RSA公钥加密算法是1977年由Ron Rivest、Adi Shamirh和Len Adleman在（美国麻省理工学院）开发的。RSA取名来自开发他们三者的名字。RSA是目前最有影响力的公钥加密算法，它能够抵抗到目前为止已知的所有密码攻击，已被ISO推荐为公钥数据加密标准。RSA算法基于一个十分简单的数论事实：将两个大素数相乘十分容易。RSA算法是第一个能同时用于加密和数字签名的算法，也易于理解和操作。RSA是被研究得最广泛的公钥算法，从提出到现在的三十多年里，经历了各种攻击的考验，逐渐为人们接受，普遍认为是目前最优秀的公钥方案之一。
TDES Triple-DES：DES是一种对称加密算法，密钥是8字节。TDES是基于DES的加密算法，其密钥是16字节或者24字节。TDES/3DES是英文Triple DES的缩语（即三重数据加密标准），DES则是英文Data Encryption Standard（数据加密标准）的缩语。DES是一种对称密钥加密算法，即数据加密密钥与解密密钥相同的加密算法。DES由IBM公司在20世纪70年代开发并公开，随后为美国政府采用，并被美国国家标准局和美国国家标准协会 (ANSI)承认。TDES/3DES是DES加密算法的一种模式，它使用3条64位的密钥对数据进行三次加密。是DES的一个更安全的变形。
请参阅图1，是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥下载管理系统的结构框图，该密钥下载管理系统包括RKS服务器3和与所述RKS服务器3通信连接的至少一个设备端1，所述RKS服务器3包括密钥管理装置30，所述设备端1包括密钥下载装置10，该设备端1为POS终端，该RKS服务器3为远程密钥服务器，位于管理中心机房，负责POS终端主密钥、工作密钥等密钥的生成和维护等，该RKS服务器3包括密钥数据库，即POS终端的主密钥数据库或工作密钥数据库，此处代表需要通过远程下载的TMK密钥数据库，该TMK密钥数据库通常由一台专门的加密机进行产生并存储密钥。
请参阅图2，是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥下载装置的结构框图。一种密钥下载装置10包括鉴别请求发送单元11、第一接收单元12、服务器身份校验单元13、第一解密单元14、第二传输密钥分量生成单元15、第一传输密钥运算单元16、第一加密单元17、第一发送单元18、第二接收单元19、第二解密单元20、密钥下载单元21、第一清除单元22、第三接收单元23。
所述鉴别请求发送单元11用于发送设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别请求至RKS服务器，其中，DSN与设备端1一一对应；第一接收单元12用于接收RKS服务器3发送的工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK，其中，RKS_WCRT_PK包含根私钥证书RKS_RCRT_SK对其的数字签名，确保RKS_WCRT_PK的合法，没有办法进行伪造。工作证书RKS_WCRT是一对非对称密钥对，如果是RSA密钥，位数最低2048位，工作证书RKS_WCRT由工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK和工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK组成，RKS_WCRT需要保存在安全介质中，例如，可以静态存储于IC卡中作为备份，然后导入到RKS服务器3的安全存储介质中。
服务器身份校验单元13用于使用根公钥证书RKS_RCRT_PK校验RKS_WCRT_PK的数字签名是否合法，其中，RKS_RCRT_PK在设备端1出厂时预装在固件中，密钥服务器根证书RKS_RCRT是一对非对称密钥对，如果是RSA密钥，数最低为2048位，RKS_RCRT由根公钥证书RKS_RCRT_PK和根私钥证书RKS_RCRT_SK组成，RKS_RCRT_PK用于校验RKS_WCRT_PK的合法性。RKS_RCRT_SK用于产生数字签名给RKS_WCRT_PK进行签名。RKS_RCRT需要存储在安全介质中，根私钥证书RKS_RCRT_SK需要严格保护，可保存在IC卡中，只能用于对工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK进行签名。
第一加密单元17用于当服务器校验单元13校验合法时，使用RKS_WCRT_PK加密发散因子得到发散因子密文；第一发送单元18用于将发散因子密文发送至RKS服务器3；第二接收单元19用于接收AT_TK1密文，所述AT_TK1密文由设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2加密鉴别令牌AT和第一传输密钥分量TK1得到，DIK2通过调用设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数根据设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1生成。其中，设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2和发散因子在设备端1生产阶段，由本地密钥母POS生成。发散因子用于参与设备身份鉴别二级密钥产生，是随机数或者用于辅助RKS服务器或本地密钥母POS的数据，例如，可以由本地密钥母POS序列号、生产日期、生产批次号等组成。设备身份鉴别一级密钥由RKS服务器生成，并以安全的方式导入到本地密钥母POS中。在生产阶段，建立一个安全环境，将设备端1和本地密钥母POS进行物理连接，本地密钥母POS从设备读取设备序列号DSN，在本地密钥母POS内部生成设备鉴别二级密钥，以安全的方式将设备鉴别二级密钥DIK2和发散因子导入到设备端1中。设备序列号DSN每设备端唯一，从而保证设备鉴别二级密钥DIK2也能每设备端唯一。设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数为单向发散算法，单向发散算法由设备端1和RKS服务器3预先约定而成，保证以设备序列号 DSN和发散因子作为输入参数1，设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1作为输入参数2,生成输出结果为设备设备鉴别二级密钥DIK2。此过程单向，即知道设备鉴别二级密钥DIK2和输入参数1，不能反推参数2。设备身份鉴别密钥采用24字节TDES密钥，发散过程举例如下：Step1：对设备序号生成SHA-256校验值32字节，取前24字节作为被加密数据DATA1。用设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1对DATA1做TDES-ECB加密，作为KEY1。Step2：对发散因子生成SHA-256校验值32字节，取前24字节作为被加密数据DATA2。KEY1对DATA2做TDES-ECB解密，作为该设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2。
第一解密单元14用于使用DIK2解密AT_TK1密文得到AT和TK1明文；第二传输密钥分量生成单元15用于产生第三随机数作为第二传输密钥分量TK2；第一传输密钥运算单元16用于将TK1和TK2异或得到传输密钥TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_SHA2;第三接收单元23用于接收RKS服务器3发送的密钥密文，所述密钥密文由TK加密需要下载的密钥得到；第二解密单元20用于使用TK解密密钥密文得到密钥明文；密钥下载单元21用于将密钥保存至安全模块；第一清除单元22用于判断密钥下载是否完成，并当下载完成时清除AT、TK及RKS_WCRT_PK。
请参阅图3，是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥管理装置的结构框图。一种密钥管理装置30包括鉴别请求接收单元31、设备身份鉴别单元32、鉴别令牌生成单元33、第一传输密钥生成单元34、第二加密单元35、第二发送单元36、第四接收单元37、第三解密单元38、鉴别令牌校验单元39、第二传输密钥运算单元40、传输密钥校验单元41、第三加密单元42、第三发送单元43、第二清除单元44、设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成单元45、第四解密单元46。
鉴别请求接收单元31用于接收至少一个设备端1发送的设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别请求；第二发送单元36用于将工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK发送至设备端；第四接收单元37用于接收设备端发送的发散因子密文，发散因子密文由RKS_WCRT_PK加密发散因子得到；第三解密单元38用于使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密发散因子密文得到发散因子明文；设备身份鉴别单元32用于以DSN为索引从设备身份鉴别一级密钥数据库读取相应的设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1；设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成单元45用于调用设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数根据设备序列号DSN和DIK1生成设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2。
鉴别令牌生成单元33用于产生24字节第一随机数作为鉴别令牌AT；第一传输密钥生成单元34用于产生第二随机数作为第一传输密钥分量TK1；第二加密单元35用于使用DIK2加密AT和TK1得到AT_TK1密文；第三发送单元36用于将AT_TK1密文发送至设备端；第四接收单元37用于接收设备端1发送的AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文，所述AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文由RKS_WCRT_PK加密AT、第二传输密钥分量TK2和TK_SHA2得到，所述TK_SHA2是传输密钥TK的SHA256校验值，所述TK由TK1和TK2异或得到；第四解密单元46用于使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文得到AT、TK2和TK_SHA2明文，所述RKS_WCRT_PK和RKS_WCRT_SK是非对称密钥对；鉴别令牌校验单元39用于判断收到的AT与发送的AT是否相等；第二传输密钥运算单元40用于当所述鉴别令牌校验单元39判定相等时，将TK1和TK2异或得到TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_256；传输密钥校验单元41用于判断第二传输密钥运算单元40生成的TK_256与接收到的TK_SHA2是否相等；第三加密单元42用于当所述传输密钥校验单元41判定相等时，使用TK加密需要下载的密钥得到密钥密文；第三发送单元43用于将密钥密文发送至设备端1；第二清除单元44用于清除AT、TK，完成密钥下载流程。
请参阅图4，是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥下载方法的流程图。该密钥下载方法运行于所述设备端1中，该方法包括：
步骤S101、设备端发送设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别请求至RKS服务器；
步骤S102、设备端接收RKS服务器发送的工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK；
步骤S103、设备端使用根公钥证书RKS_RCRT校验RKS_WCRT_PK的数字签名是否合法，如果合法，则使用RKS_WCRT_PK加密发散因子得到发散因子密文，并将发散因子密文发送至RKS服务器；
步骤S104、设备端接收RKS服务器发送的AT_TK1密文，所述AT_TK1密文由设备身份鉴别公钥DIK_PK加密鉴别令牌AT和第一传输密钥分量TK1得到，DIK2通过调用设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数根据设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1生成；
步骤S105、设备端使用DIK2解密AT_TK1密文得到AT和TK1明文；
步骤S106、设备端产生第三随机数作为第二传输密钥分量TK2，将TK1和TK2异或得到传输密钥TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_SHA2；
步骤S107、设备端使用RKS_WCRT_PK加密AT、TK2和TK_SHA2得到AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文并将AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文发送至RKS服务器；
步骤S108、设备端接收RKS服务器发送的密钥密文，所述密钥密文由TK加密需要下载的密钥得到；
步骤S109、设备端使用TK解密密钥密文得到密钥明文，将密钥保存至安全模块；
步骤S110、设备端判断密钥下载是否完成，如果下载完成，清除AT、TK及RKS_WCRT_PK。
请参阅图5，是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥管理方法的流程图。该密钥管理方法运行于所述RKS服务器3中，该方法包括：
步骤S201、RKS服务器接收至少一个设备端发送的设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别请求；
步骤S202、RKS服务器将工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK发送至设备端；
步骤S203、RKS服务器接收设备端发送的发散因子密文；
步骤S204、RKS服务器使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密发散因子密文得到发散因子明文；
步骤S205、RKS服务器以DSN为索引从设备身份鉴别一级密钥数据库读取相应的设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1；
步骤S206、RKS服务器调用设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数根据设备序列号DSN和DIK1生成设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2；
步骤S207、RKS服务器产生24字节第一随机数作为鉴别令牌AT，并产生第二随机数作为第一传输密钥分量TK1；
步骤S208、RKS服务器使用DIK2加密AT和TK1得到AT_TK1密文；
步骤S209、RKS服务器将AT_TK1密文发送至设备端；
步骤S210、RKS服务器接收设备端发送的AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文，所述AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文由RKS_WCRT_PK加密AT、第二传输密钥分量TK2和TK_SHA2得到，所述TK_SHA2是传输密钥TK的SHA256校验值，所述TK由TK1和TK2异或得到；
步骤S211、RKS服务器使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文得到AT、TK2和TK_SHA2明文，所述RKS_WCRT_PK和RKS_WCRT_SK是非对称密钥对；
步骤S212、RKS服务器判断收到的AT与发送的AT是否相等，如果相等，将TK1和TK2异或得到TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_256；
步骤S213、RKS服务器判断TK_256与接收到的TK_SHA2是否相等，如果相等，使用TK加密需要下载的密钥得到密钥密文；
步骤S214、RKS服务器将密钥密文发送至设备端；
步骤S215、RKS服务器清除AT、TK，完成密钥下载流程。
请参阅图6，是本发明一实施方式中一种密钥下载管理方法的流程图。该密钥下载管理方法运行于所述密钥下载管理系统中，该方法包括：
步骤S301、设备端发送设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别请求至RKS服务器；
步骤S302、RKS服务器将工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK发送至设备端；
步骤S303、设备端使用根公钥证书RKS_RCRT校验RKS_WCRT_PK的数字签名是否合法，如果合法，执行步骤S304，否则，执行步骤S315；
步骤S304、设备端使用RKS_WCRT_PK加密发散因子得到发散因子密文并将发散因子密文发送至RKS服务器；
步骤S305、RKS服务器使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密发散因子密文得到发散因子明文；
步骤S306、RKS服务器以DSN为索引从设备身份鉴别一级密钥数据库读取相应的设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1；
步骤S307、RKS服务器调用设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数根据设备序列号DSN和DIK1生成设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2；
步骤S308、RKS服务器产生24字节第一随机数作为鉴别令牌AT，并产生第二随机数作为第一传输密钥分量TK1；
步骤S309、RKS服务器使用DIK2加密AT和TK1得到AT_TK1密文；
步骤S310、RKS服务器将AT_TK1密文发送至设备端；
步骤S311、设备端使用DIK2解密AT_TK1密文得到AT和TK1明文；
步骤S312、设备端产生第三随机数作为第二传输密钥分量TK2，将TK1和TK2异或得到传输密钥TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_SHA2；
步骤S313、设备端使用RKS_WCRT_PK加密AT、TK2和TK_SHA2得到AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文；
步骤S314、设备端将AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文发送至RKS服务器；
步骤S315、鉴别RKS服务器失败，结束下载流程；
步骤S316、RKS服务器使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文得到AT、TK2和TK_SHA2明文，所述RKS_WCRT_PK和RKS_WCRT_SK是非对称密钥对；
步骤S317、RKS服务器判断收到的AT与发送的AT是否相等，如果相等，执行步骤S318，否则，执行步骤S320；
步骤S318、RKS服务器将TK1和TK2异或得到TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_256，判断TK_256与接收到的TK_SHA2是否相等，如果相等，执行步骤S319，否则，执行步骤S320；
步骤S319、使用TK加密需要下载的密钥得到密钥密文并将密钥密文发送至设备端；
步骤S320、鉴别设备端失败，结束下载流程；
步骤S321、设备端使用TK解密密钥密文得到密钥明文，将密钥保存至安全模块；
步骤S322、设备端判断密钥下载是否完成，如果下载完成，执行步骤S323，否则，返回步骤S301；
步骤S323、设备端清除AT、TK及RKS_WCRT_PK；
步骤S324、RKS服务器清除AT、TK，完成密钥下载流程。
本发明的密钥下载方法、管理方法、下载管理方法及装置和系统，实现设备端从RKS服务器远程下载主密钥，避免设备端需要集中下载主密钥后才能布放到商户，设备端出厂后，可以直接布放到部署地点，避免需要将设备端集中到某固定机房下载密钥后再布放到部署地点；
利用对称密钥管理技术实现双向合法身份认证，确保RKS服务器和设备端双方身份的合法性，设备端通过校验RKS服务器的工作证书公钥的数字签名来认证RKS服务器的合法性，RKS服务器生成一个鉴别令牌AT，用设备端的二级身份鉴别密钥DK2加密，将密文发送给设备端，设备端用其保存的二级身份鉴别密钥DK2解密，再用工作证书公钥加密后返回给RKS服务器，RKS服务器用其工作证书私钥解密后再对比鉴别令牌AT与生成的鉴别令牌AT是否一样，一样则表示设备端合法，从而实现双向身份认证；
利用随机生成的对称密钥来保护下载的密钥，线路传输的TMK由一个临时传输密钥加密，传输密钥由POS终端和密钥服务器各自生成一个分量，并采用对方的公钥加密后传输给对方，实现临时传输密钥的同步，从而提高TMK传输安全性和效率。
以上所述仅为本发明的实施例，并非因此限制本发明的专利范围，凡是利用本发明说明书及附图内容所作的等效结构或等效流程变换，或直接或间接运用在其他相关的技术领域，均同理包括在本发明的专利保护范围内。

Claims (1)

  1. 1、一种密钥下载方法，其特征在于，包括：
    设备端发送设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别请求至RKS服务器；
    设备端接收RKS服务器发送的工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK；
    设备端使用根公钥证书RKS_RCRT校验RKS_WCRT_PK的数字签名是否合法，如果合法，设备端使用RKS_WCRT_PK加密发散因子得到发散因子密文，并将发散因子密文发送至RKS服务器；
    设备端接收RKS服务器发送的AT_TK1密文，所述AT_TK1密文由设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2加密鉴别令牌AT和第一传输密钥分量TK1得到，DIK2通过调用设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数根据设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1生成；
    设备端使用DIK2解密AT_TK1密文得到AT和TK1明文；
    设备端产生第三随机数作为第二传输密钥分量TK2，将TK1和TK2异或得到传输密钥TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_SHA2；
    设备端使用RKS_WCRT_PK加密AT、TK2和TK_SHA2得到AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文并将AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文发送至RKS服务器；
    设备端接收RKS服务器发送的密钥密文，所述密钥密文由TK加密需要下载的密钥得到；
    设备端使用TK解密密钥密文得到密钥明文，将密钥保存至安全模块；
    设备端判断密钥下载是否完成，如果下载完成，清除AT、TK及RKS_WCRT_PK。
    2、一种密钥管理方法，其特征在于，包括：
    RKS服务器接收至少一个设备端发送的设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别请求；
    RKS服务器将工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK发送至设备端；
    RKS服务器接收设备端发送的发散因子密文；
    RKS服务器使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密发散因子密文得到发散因子明文；
    RKS服务器以DSN为索引从设备身份鉴别一级密钥数据库读取相应的设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1；
    调用设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数根据设备序列号DSN和DIK1生成设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2；
    RKS服务器产生24字节第一随机数作为鉴别令牌AT，并产生第二随机数作为第一传输密钥分量TK1；
    RKS服务器使用DIK2加密AT和TK1得到AT_TK1密文，将AT_TK1密文发送至设备端；
    RKS服务器接收设备端发送的AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文，所述AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文由RKS_WCRT_PK加密AT、第二传输密钥分量TK2和TK_SHA2得到，所述TK_SHA2是传输密钥TK的SHA256校验值，所述TK由TK1和TK2异或得到；
    RKS服务器使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文得到AT、TK2和TK_SHA2明文，所述RKS_WCRT_PK和RKS_WCRT_SK是非对称密钥对；
    RKS服务器判断收到的AT与发送的AT是否相等，如果相等，将TK1和TK2异或得到TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_256；
    RKS服务器判断TK_256与接收到的TK_SHA2是否相等，如果相等，使用TK加密需要下载的密钥得到密钥密文；
    RKS服务器将密钥密文发送至设备端；
    RKS服务器清除AT、TK，完成密钥下载流程。
    3、一种密钥下载管理方法，其特征在于，包括：
    设备端发送设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别请求至RKS服务器；
    RKS服务器将工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK发送至设备端；
    设备端使用根公钥证书RKS_RCRT校验RKS_WCRT_PK的数字签名是否合法，如果合法，设备端使用RKS_WCRT_PK加密发散因子得到发散因子密文；
    设备端将发散因子密文发送至RKS服务器；
    RKS服务器使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密发散因子密文得到发散因子明文；
    RKS服务器以DSN为索引从设备身份鉴别一级密钥数据库读取相应的设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1；
    RKS服务器调用设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数根据设备序列号DSN和DIK1生成设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2；
    RKS服务器产生24字节第一随机数作为鉴别令牌AT，并产生第二随机数作为第一传输密钥分量TK1；
    RKS服务器使用DIK2加密AT和TK1得到AT_TK1密文，将AT_TK1密文发送至设备端；
    设备端使用DIK2解密AT_TK1密文得到AT和TK1明文；
    设备端产生第三随机数作为第二传输密钥分量TK2，将TK1和TK2异或得到传输密钥TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_SHA2；
    设备端使用RKS_WCRT_PK加密AT、TK2和TK_SHA2得到AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文并将AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文发送至RKS服务器；
    RKS服务器使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文得到AT、TK2和TK_SHA2明文，所述RKS_WCRT_PK和RKS_WCRT_SK是非对称密钥对；
    RKS服务器判断收到的AT与发送的AT是否相等，如果相等，将TK1和TK2异或得到TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_256，判断TK_256与接收到的TK_SHA2是否相等，如果相等，使用TK加密需要下载的密钥得到密钥密文并将密钥密文发送至设备端；
    设备端使用TK解密密钥密文得到密钥明文，将密钥保存至安全模块；
    设备端判断密钥下载是否完成，如果下载完成，清除AT、TK及RKS_WCRT_PK；
    RKS服务器清除AT、TK，完成密钥下载流程。
    4、一种密钥下载装置，其特征在于，包括：
    鉴别请求发送单元，用于发送设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别请求至RKS服务器；
    第一接收单元，用于接收RKS服务器发送的工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK；
    服务器身份校验单元，用于使用根公钥证书RKS_RCRT校验RKS_WCRT_PK的数字签名是否合法；
    第一加密单元，用于当服务器校验单元校验合法时，使用RKS_WCRT_PK加密发散因子得到发散因子密文；
    第一发送单元，用于将发散因子密文发送至RKS服务器；
    第二接收单元，接收RKS服务器发送的AT_TK1密文，所述AT_TK1密文由设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2加密鉴别令牌AT和第一传输密钥分量TK1得到，DIK2通过调用设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数根据设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1生成；
    第一解密单元，使用DIK2解密AT_TK1密文得到AT和TK1明文；
    第二传输密钥分量生成单元，用于产生第三随机数作为第二传输密钥分量TK2；
    第一传输密钥运算单元，用于将TK1和TK2异或得到传输密钥TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_SHA2；
    第三接收单元，用于接收RKS服务器发送的密钥密文，所述密钥密文由TK加密需要下载的密钥得到；
    第二解密单元，用于使用TK解密密钥密文得到密钥明文；
    密钥下载单元，用于将密钥保存至安全模块；
    第一清除单元，用于判断密钥下载是否完成，并当下载完成时清除AT、TK及RKS_WCRT_PK。
    5、一种密钥管理装置，其特征在于，包括：
    鉴别请求接收单元，用于接收至少一个设备端发送的设备序列号DSN和设备身份鉴别请求；
    第二发送单元，用于将工作证书公钥RKS_WCRT_PK发送至设备端；
    第四接收单元，用于接收设备端发送的发散因子密文，发散因子密文由RKS_WCRT_PK加密发散因子得到；
    第三解密单元，用于使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密发散因子密文得到发散因子明文；
    设备身份鉴别单元，用于以DSN为索引从设备身份鉴别一级密钥数据库读取相应的设备身份鉴别一级密钥DIK1；
    设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成单元，用于调用设备身份鉴别二级密钥生成函数根据设备序列号DSN和DIK1生成设备身份鉴别二级密钥DIK2；
    鉴别令牌生成单元，用于产生24字节第一随机数作为鉴别令牌AT；
    第一传输密钥生成单元，用于产生第二随机数作为第一传输密钥分量TK1；
    第二加密单元，用于使用DIK2加密AT和TK1得到AT_TK1密文；
    第三发送单元，用于将AT_TK1密文发送至设备端；
    第四接收单元，用于接收设备端发送的AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文，所述AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文由RKS_WCRT_PK加密AT、第二传输密钥分量TK2和TK_SHA2得到，所述TK_SHA2是传输密钥TK的SHA256校验值，所述TK由TK1和TK2异或得到；
    第四解密单元，用于使用工作证书私钥RKS_WCRT_SK解密AT_TK2_TK_SHA2密文得到AT、TK2和TK_SHA2明文，所述RKS_WCRT_PK和RKS_WCRT_SK是非对称密钥对；
    鉴别令牌校验单元，用于判断收到的AT与发送的AT是否相等；
    第二传输密钥运算单元，用于当所述鉴别令牌校验单元判定相等时，将TK1和TK2异或得到TK，计算TK的SHA256校验值得到TK_256；
    传输密钥校验单元，用于判断第二传输密钥运算单元生成的TK_256与接收到的TK_SHA2是否相等；
    第三加密单元，用于当所述传输密钥校验单元判定相等时，使用TK加密需要下载的密钥得到密钥密文；
    第三发送单元，用于将密钥密文发送至设备端；
    第二清除单元，用于清除AT、TK，完成密钥下载流程。
    6、一种密钥下载管理系统，包括RKS服务器和与所述RKS服务器通信连接的至少一个设备端，其特征在于，所述RKS服务器包括密钥管理装置，所述密钥管理装置如权利4所述；所述设备端包括密钥下载装置，所述密钥下载装置如权利要求5所述。
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