WO2008116415A1 - Dispositif de détection inviolable à fonction de protection par auto-destruction et procédé associé - Google Patents

Dispositif de détection inviolable à fonction de protection par auto-destruction et procédé associé Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2008116415A1
WO2008116415A1 PCT/CN2008/070547 CN2008070547W WO2008116415A1 WO 2008116415 A1 WO2008116415 A1 WO 2008116415A1 CN 2008070547 W CN2008070547 W CN 2008070547W WO 2008116415 A1 WO2008116415 A1 WO 2008116415A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
verification
self
destruction
trigger circuit
code
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2008/070547
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Pingxiao Deng
Original Assignee
Pingxiao Deng
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Pingxiao Deng filed Critical Pingxiao Deng
Priority to JP2009553895A priority Critical patent/JP2010521753A/ja
Priority to US12/532,169 priority patent/US7954697B2/en
Priority to EP08715283A priority patent/EP2133812A4/en
Publication of WO2008116415A1 publication Critical patent/WO2008116415A1/zh

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01N—INVESTIGATING OR ANALYSING MATERIALS BY DETERMINING THEIR CHEMICAL OR PHYSICAL PROPERTIES
    • G01N35/00—Automatic analysis not limited to methods or materials provided for in any single one of groups G01N1/00 - G01N33/00; Handling materials therefor
    • G01N35/00584—Control arrangements for automatic analysers
    • G01N35/00722—Communications; Identification
    • G01N35/00732—Identification of carriers, materials or components in automatic analysers
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B65—CONVEYING; PACKING; STORING; HANDLING THIN OR FILAMENTARY MATERIAL
    • B65D—CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OR TRANSPORT OF ARTICLES OR MATERIALS, e.g. BAGS, BARRELS, BOTTLES, BOXES, CANS, CARTONS, CRATES, DRUMS, JARS, TANKS, HOPPERS, FORWARDING CONTAINERS; ACCESSORIES, CLOSURES, OR FITTINGS THEREFOR; PACKAGING ELEMENTS; PACKAGES
    • B65D79/00—Kinds or details of packages, not otherwise provided for
    • B65D79/02—Arrangements or devices for indicating incorrect storage or transport
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01N—INVESTIGATING OR ANALYSING MATERIALS BY DETERMINING THEIR CHEMICAL OR PHYSICAL PROPERTIES
    • G01N35/00—Automatic analysis not limited to methods or materials provided for in any single one of groups G01N1/00 - G01N33/00; Handling materials therefor
    • G01N35/00584—Control arrangements for automatic analysers
    • G01N35/00594—Quality control, including calibration or testing of components of the analyser
    • G01N35/00613—Quality control
    • G01N35/00663—Quality control of consumables
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B65—CONVEYING; PACKING; STORING; HANDLING THIN OR FILAMENTARY MATERIAL
    • B65D—CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OR TRANSPORT OF ARTICLES OR MATERIALS, e.g. BAGS, BARRELS, BOTTLES, BOXES, CANS, CARTONS, CRATES, DRUMS, JARS, TANKS, HOPPERS, FORWARDING CONTAINERS; ACCESSORIES, CLOSURES, OR FITTINGS THEREFOR; PACKAGING ELEMENTS; PACKAGES
    • B65D2201/00—Means or constructions for testing or controlling the contents
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B65—CONVEYING; PACKING; STORING; HANDLING THIN OR FILAMENTARY MATERIAL
    • B65D—CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OR TRANSPORT OF ARTICLES OR MATERIALS, e.g. BAGS, BARRELS, BOTTLES, BOXES, CANS, CARTONS, CRATES, DRUMS, JARS, TANKS, HOPPERS, FORWARDING CONTAINERS; ACCESSORIES, CLOSURES, OR FITTINGS THEREFOR; PACKAGING ELEMENTS; PACKAGES
    • B65D2203/00—Decoration means, markings, information elements, contents indicators
    • B65D2203/10—Transponders
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B65—CONVEYING; PACKING; STORING; HANDLING THIN OR FILAMENTARY MATERIAL
    • B65D—CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OR TRANSPORT OF ARTICLES OR MATERIALS, e.g. BAGS, BARRELS, BOTTLES, BOXES, CANS, CARTONS, CRATES, DRUMS, JARS, TANKS, HOPPERS, FORWARDING CONTAINERS; ACCESSORIES, CLOSURES, OR FITTINGS THEREFOR; PACKAGING ELEMENTS; PACKAGES
    • B65D2203/00—Decoration means, markings, information elements, contents indicators
    • B65D2203/12—Audible, olfactory or visual signalling means
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B65—CONVEYING; PACKING; STORING; HANDLING THIN OR FILAMENTARY MATERIAL
    • B65D—CONTAINERS FOR STORAGE OR TRANSPORT OF ARTICLES OR MATERIALS, e.g. BAGS, BARRELS, BOTTLES, BOXES, CANS, CARTONS, CRATES, DRUMS, JARS, TANKS, HOPPERS, FORWARDING CONTAINERS; ACCESSORIES, CLOSURES, OR FITTINGS THEREFOR; PACKAGING ELEMENTS; PACKAGES
    • B65D2401/00—Tamper-indicating means
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01N—INVESTIGATING OR ANALYSING MATERIALS BY DETERMINING THEIR CHEMICAL OR PHYSICAL PROPERTIES
    • G01N35/00—Automatic analysis not limited to methods or materials provided for in any single one of groups G01N1/00 - G01N33/00; Handling materials therefor
    • G01N35/00584—Control arrangements for automatic analysers
    • G01N35/00722—Communications; Identification
    • G01N35/00732—Identification of carriers, materials or components in automatic analysers
    • G01N2035/00821—Identification of carriers, materials or components in automatic analysers nature of coded information
    • G01N2035/00851—Identification of carriers, materials or components in automatic analysers nature of coded information process control parameters

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a commodity or logistics verification test technology, in particular to a verification device and a verification device for verifying and authenticating the authenticity information in the verification medium through the verification device with self-destruction protection function
  • a verification device for verifying and authenticating the authenticity information in the verification medium through the verification device with self-destruction protection function
  • the anti-counterfeiting of goods mainly adopts the anti-counterfeiting packaging materials of individual materials and structures, and the anti-counterfeiting marks of special materials and special processes are set on the goods or the packaging of the commercial products, and the true and false identification is realized through visual inspection.
  • counterfeiters can easily counterfeit, and can achieve a degree of realism. Therefore, such anti-counterfeiting materials no longer have anti-counterfeiting functions, and in turn can provide "legal" protection for counterfeit goods.
  • the anti-counterfeiting technology used in the prior art once the anti-counterfeit search code on the commodity is copied and copied by the counterfeiter, the first item to be inquired is "authentic", and then the inquired item is suspected as "defective". The conclusion of the inquiry is only related to the order of the inquiry, and it is not necessarily related to the authenticity of the goods.
  • Radio frequency identification anti-counterfeiting technology is a non-contact anti-counterfeiting identification technology that has been implemented in recent years by using radio frequency technology.
  • the technology attaches an information card storing information to be identified to an anti-counterfeit item, and then through special setting.
  • the card reader reads the information in the card to identify the authenticity of the item.
  • the RFID anti-counterfeiting technology cannot overcome the difficulties of being copied or counterfeited after being stolen and reused after being detached from the genuine product, and the limitations imposed by the layout of the card reader and the cost of anti-counterfeiting cannot be fundamentally Reversing the passive situation in which commodity anti-counterfeiting is currently in place. Summary of the invention
  • the present invention provides a A real-time device with self-destruction protection.
  • the present invention provides a method of verifying a self-destructive protection function.
  • the technical solution adopted by the present invention to solve the above first technical problem is: providing a verification service
  • the self-destruction protection working part and the verification work part for identifying the substance to be verified are disposed, and the verification is used in cooperation with the substance to be tested.
  • the authenticating device and the material to be tested are in an integrated structure; the integrated structure is implemented by adding the authenticating device and the substance to be verified.
  • the air pressure or the air pressure is sealed in one piece by means of the carrier or the fixing device is fixedly connected to the material to be tested.
  • the self-destruction protection working part includes a pressure change self-destruction protection working part or a separation self-destruction protection working part; wherein the air pressure change self-destruction protection working part is activated by the The change in gas pressure within the sealed carrier is initiated.
  • the self-destruction protection working part includes a pressure change self-destruction protection working part or a separation self-destruction protection working part; wherein the separation self-destruction protection working part is activated by the inspection A change in the relative position of the true device after the fixed connection with the substance to be tested is initiated.
  • the verification device provided with the air pressure change self-destruction protection working portion divides the verification device into a first working chamber by an intermediate medium that can be extended and contracted according to a change in air pressure.
  • the whole medium is controlled by the change of the air pressure in the second working chamber to realize the extension and contraction, thereby controlling the start of the self-destruction protection working portion of the air pressure change.
  • the magnetic device provided with the separation self-destruction protection working portion is provided with a magnetic substance, and the magnetic substance disposed on the substance to be verified constitutes a magnetic field balance state.
  • the verification device is fixedly connected to the real substance to be inspected, and a magnetic control switch is disposed between the two magnetic substances, and the magnetic control switch is controlled by the balance state of the magnetic field to realize state transition. Controlling the startup of the separation self-destruction protection work.
  • the verification device further includes an authentication medium, the verification work unit is used in cooperation with the verification medium, and the verification medium stores random information in the random All the verification information of the verification medium is hidden in the information.
  • the verification device specifically includes: an authenticating medium for storing the random information; and reading, identifying, and encrypting the operation in the verification medium according to a setting rule.
  • Microprocessor for verifying information self-destruction protection for self-destruction protection of the microprocessor a circuit, a self-destructive trigger circuit for controlling the operation of the self-destruction protection circuit,
  • an output end of the self-destruction trigger circuit is connected to a controlled input end of the self-destruction protection circuit, and the self-destruction trigger circuit includes a package damage trigger circuit, a magnetic balance separation trigger circuit, At least one of a photosensitive trigger circuit, a disassembly trigger circuit, a power supply undervoltage trigger circuit, and a limited use trigger circuit; wherein, the input end of the package damage trigger circuit is connected with a package damage trigger device; and the magnetic balance separation trigger circuit a magnetic balance sensor is connected to the input end; a photosensitive sensor is connected to the input end of the photosensitive trigger circuit; a disassembly trigger device is connected to the input end of the disassembly trigger circuit; and an input end and a power output end of the power supply undervoltage trigger circuit Connecting; the input of the limited use trigger circuit is coupled to the limited use output of the microprocessor.
  • the self-destruction protection circuit is a self-destruction boost circuit or a storage registration information deletion circuit.
  • the invention also provides a method for verifying the self-destruction protection function, and the authenticity device after being sealed or fixedly connected with the substance to be verified is subjected to a verification test by the verification medium, specifically
  • the method includes the following steps: first, placing the verification medium in a cooperative working state of the authenticating device; second, performing an operation from the verification working unit in the authenticating device, from the verification medium Check the verification code in the middle; third, output the inspection result.
  • the first frame includes a sub-step: 1. checking whether the substance to be verified and the authenticating device are in a working state together; In the cooperative working state of the authenticating device; 3. Starting the start-stop control button set on the authenticating device to bring the authenticating device into a working state.
  • the second frame includes a sub-step: 1. reading, by the microprocessor set on the verification device, from the verification device according to a set program and instruction Identifying and arranging the verification information code; second, encrypting the verification information code by the microprocessor according to a set program, instruction, and key to obtain a verification original code; The authenticating original code is decoded to obtain an authentic code; and the authenticating code is confirmed by the authenticator whether or not the authenticity code unique to the verified media is matched.
  • the third frame comprises a display output or a voice output.
  • the self-destruction protection circuit can be improved, and the program command and the encryption key set in the microprocessor in the verification device are set by the mask process during the manufacture of the chip or after the self-destruction protection is effective Writed, unable to read from the outside, fundamentally preventing the imitation of the authenticating device of the present invention and stealing program instructions and encryption for demodulating and weighting the authentic information code in the microprocessor
  • the key in the case where the parent and the template cannot be obtained, the copying and copying of the authenticating device and its program instructions and encryption keys cannot be performed.
  • the beneficial effect of the merchandise verification method with self-destruction protection function of the present invention is: Since an external random coded verification card is used in the present invention, the set procedure is adopted by the verification device. , the instruction and the encryption key, the identification of the authentic information code scattered in the huge random information stream hidden in the verification card, and then performing multiple encryption operations, in order to obtain the authenticity judgment of the authentic product to be verified True code, and the hardware of the verification device and the verification program command and the encryption key are all placed in the self-destruction protection function, and the protected digital identification method, in addition to the verification function, The authenticity judgment conclusion is promoted from the degree of "image” and “dislike" of the existing anti-counterfeiting to the state discrimination of "yes” and “no".
  • the detection process is simple and fast, and the detection result is accurate and reliable.
  • Figure 1 is a block diagram showing the circuit structure of the authenticating device with self-destruction protection function in the self-destruction protection function and the verification method;
  • Figure 2 Schematic diagram of a cross-sectional structure of a verification device with self-destruction protection installed in a carrier carrying the substance to be tested;
  • Figure 3 Schematic diagram of the cross-sectional structure of the self-destructive protection function verification device and the fixed connection of the real substance to be tested;
  • Fig. 4 Schematic diagram of the flow of the method for verifying the trueness of the self-destructive protection function and the method of verifying the true method. detailed description
  • the principle of the invention is as follows: There are many anti-counterfeiting methods available on the market, but the anti-counterfeiting effect obtained is getting worse and worse.
  • the root cause lies in the disconnection between the genuine product manufacturer and the customer in the production chain.
  • the packaging materials and anti-counterfeit labels, logos, signs, anti-counterfeiting code labels and the like of the individual materials and structures used in the existing anti-counterfeiting methods are attached to the body of the anti-counterfeiting goods. All of them are presented in the face of counterfeiters, and they are all in a state of counterfeiting.
  • the anti-counterfeit materials cannot be unique at the same time, cannot be copied or copied.
  • the counterfeiter can conveniently copy or copy the above-mentioned anti-counterfeit material according to the authenticity, package the defective product, or pretend that the defective product is packaged by recycling the original packaging of the genuine product and then pretending to sell the genuine product. More seriously, there is no correlation between the anti-counterfeiting materials and the goods that need anti-counterfeiting. The authenticity of the anti-counterfeiting materials and the authenticity of the goods themselves do not constitute an inevitable causal relationship, which violates the straightforward three-party axioms in logic. Even if the anti-counterfeit is true, it cannot be judged that the goods are true.
  • the invention contemplates: by introducing a verification device and a verification method with a self-destruction protection function, to realize authenticity discrimination of goods. This will fundamentally strengthen the chain of production between the manufacturer and the customer, and block the chain of production between the product and the customer. Thereby obtaining the same counterfeit effect as the customer directly goes to the real product manufacturer to purchase the product.
  • the core of the content of the present invention is:
  • the verification device and the verification method used for achieving the fidelity purpose of the present invention simultaneously solve the technical problems that the original product is unique, cannot be copied or copied, and cannot be reused after being detached from the genuine product. And the authenticity of the authenticity device and the authenticity of the real product to be tested constitute an inevitable causal relationship, realizing the real-life commodity verification.
  • the specific working principle of the present invention is as follows: Providing an authenticating device coexisting with the unidentified product in the same body or in a fixed connection, the authenticating device and the product to be inspected are sealed into a whole by vacuuming or air pressure.
  • the verification device is fixedly connected with the product to be inspected, and drives the self-destruction protection circuit by introducing a self-destruction trigger circuit, thereby fundamentally preventing the commodity verification device from being copied and stolen in the microprocessor. Problems such as programs, instructions, and encryption keys occur.
  • the authenticity medium is distributed to the consumer and the consumer through a professional institution with credibility.
  • the verification medium is an authentic card; of course, the verification medium may also be in the form of other carriers, for example, using a mobile phone or the like as a verification medium for the verification test, and the principle is the same.
  • the card is combined with the authenticity detecting device to realize the authenticity discrimination of the commodity.
  • a large binary random data information code having a sufficient word length is stored in the card, and the data code used as the fidelity information only occupies a very small part of the random data information code. And being scattered and hidden in the random data information code, the authentic information code is not the original code of the authentic code, so even if all the binary codes in the verification test card are read out, the same cannot be separated.
  • the fidelity information code and the original code for obtaining the fidelity code must pass the program and instruction set in the microprocessor in the verification device to identify the test from the data code in the verification card.
  • the true information code, the verification information code and the encryption key are combined and subjected to multiple encryption operations to generate the original authentic code unique to each card, which is displayed on the authentic device after being decoded or played by voice. Check the code.
  • the authenticator can determine the authenticity of the product than whether the code matches the authentic code that is unique to the card that he is holding. Through such a design, accurate discrimination of the authenticity of the product can be achieved. Only can encrypt the card that is owned by the card
  • the authenticity device of the authentic code is the authenticity verification device, and the product that is inseparable from the authenticity verification device is the genuine product.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a circuit structure of a self-destruction protection function verification device and a verification device with self-destruction protection function, and is combined with the self-destruction protection function verification device installed in FIG. 2 .
  • FIG. 1 Schematic diagram of the cross-sectional structure in the carrier carrying the substance to be tested and FIG. 3. Schematic diagram of the cross-sectional structure in which the self-destruction-protecting device and the anti-counterfeiting material are fixedly connected.
  • the present invention provides a verification device 1000 having a self-destruction protection function, and the verification device 1000 is provided with a self-destruction protection working part and a verification work part for identifying the substance to be verified, the test The true device 1000 is used in conjunction with the substance to be tested 1004.
  • the self-destruction protection working part adopts a design scheme of the self-destruction protection circuit 4, and of course, other methods of self-destruction protection design may also be adopted, which are not described in the embodiment.
  • the verification device 1000 and the to-be-tested substance 1004 are integrated; the integrated structure is implemented by applying the air pressure or the air pressure to the verification device 1000 and the to-be-tested substance 1004.
  • the method is sealed in one piece by means of the carrier 1003 or the fixing device 1000 is fixedly connected to the material to be tested 1004.
  • the self-destruction protection working part is a pressure change self-destruction protection working part or a separation self-destruction protection working part; wherein, the air pressure change self-destruction protection working part is activated by a change of the air pressure in the sealing carrier 1003;
  • the startup mode of the separation self-destruction protection working portion is initiated by the change of the relative position after the fixing device 1000 is fixedly connected to the to-be-tested substance 1004.
  • the merchandise verification device 1000 with self-destruction protection function of the present invention includes an external verification card 8 and an authenticity device body 1000.
  • the verification device main body 1000 includes a microprocessor 1, a self-destruction protection circuit 4 connected to the microprocessor 1, a self-destruction trigger circuit 3 for controlling the operation of the self-destruction protection circuit 4, and a display for displaying the inspection result.
  • the microprocessor 1 is an ultra-micropower digital microprocessor chip, and its display output 14 is connected to the display input 52 of the display screen 5, and the start and stop control end of the microprocessor 1 11, 12 is connected with a start/stop control key 2, the verification input end of the microprocessor 1 is connected with a verification card socket 16, and the output plug 81 on the external verification card 8 can be inserted into the microprocessor 1
  • the verification card socket 16 on the input end of course, the verification card 8 can also be designed to be non-intrusive with the verification device 1000, such as using radio frequency to make the verification.
  • the device 1000 works in concert with the verification card 8.
  • the self-destruction protection circuit uses a chip self-destruction boost circuit 4 or a storage and registration information deletion circuit.
  • a chip self-destruction boost circuit is used.
  • the self-destruction trigger circuit 3 includes: a package damage trigger circuit 31, a magnetic balance separation trigger circuit 32, a photosensitive trigger circuit 33, a disassembly trigger circuit 34, a power supply undervoltage trigger circuit 35, and a limited use with the microprocessor 1.
  • the output terminal 17 is connected, and the microprocessor 1 uses the limited use trigger circuit 36 for limited use.
  • the high voltage output 42 of the self-destructing boost circuit is coupled to the self-destructive input 15 of the microprocessor 1.
  • the package damage trigger circuit 31, the magnetic balance separation trigger circuit 32, the photosensitive trigger circuit 33, the disassembly trigger circuit 34, the power supply undervoltage trigger circuit 35, and the output terminal 312 of the limited use trigger circuit 36 in the self-destruction trigger circuit 3, 322, 332, 342, 352, 362 are all connected to the controlled input 43 of the chip self-destruction boost circuit 4.
  • the package breakage trigger circuit 31 includes the trigger switch 315 that is touched by the air pressure change control in the carrier 1003 such as the product bag or container to be verified, and the magnetic balance separation trigger.
  • the circuit 32 includes a magnetic balance sensor composed of a magnetic substance 326 and the magnetron switch 325, the photosensitive trigger circuit 33 includes a photosensor 335, the disassembly trigger circuit 34 includes a tamper-proof switch 345, and the power supply undervoltage trigger circuit 35 and the limited use trigger circuit 36, the power input terminals 311, 321, 331, 341, 351, 361 of the trigger circuit and the power input terminal 41 of the chip self-destruction boost circuit 4, the microprocessor
  • the power input terminal 13 of the first power supply terminal 51 of the display screen 5 is connected to the power supply output terminal 61 of the battery 6.
  • the authenticating device 1000 separates the authenticating device 1000 by a sealing diaphragm 316 which can realize the extension and contraction according to the presence or absence of the air pressure difference on both sides.
  • Self-destruction protection of programs, instructions, and encryption keys are implemented, thereby controlling the operation of the self-destruction protection circuit 4, and realizing the setting in the microprocessor 1 in the verification device 1000.
  • the merchandise verification device 1000 with the self-destruction protection function of the present invention seals the display screen 5 outwardly on the inner wall of the product packaging bag 1003 or the packaging container 1003, and the outer side of the display screen 5 is provided with the The transparent protective sheet 53 of the display screen 5, the photo-detecting device 1000 divides the main body into two upper and lower working chambers by a sealing diaphragm 316, and the cavity above the sealing diaphragm 316 is defined as a first working chamber 1001.
  • the first working chamber 1001 is ventilated to the outside through a vent hole 10 formed in the main body panel of the authenticating device 1000, so that the air pressure in the first working chamber 1001 is outside atmospheric pressure.
  • the cavity below the sealing diaphragm 316 is defined as a second working chamber 1002, and the second working chamber 1002 passes through the vent hole 11 opened in the lower portion of the main body of the authenticating device 1000, and the commodity packaging bag 1003 or the packaging
  • the inside of the container 1003 communicates with each other, and the air pressure in the second working chamber 1002 and the commodity packaging bag 1003 or the packaging container 1003 is positive or negative with respect to the external atmospheric pressure by adding air pressure or reducing air pressure.
  • the presence or absence of the difference between the air pressure in the second working chamber 1002 and the outside atmospheric pressure is sufficient to cause the sealing diaphragm 316 to undergo a change in the extension and contraction.
  • the sealing diaphragm 316 will contract downward under the action of negative pressure, and release Switch 315.
  • the package breakage trigger circuit 31 is set to a standby operation state, if the verification device 1000 is to be used. Separating from the actual product to be inspected, once the packaging bag 1003 or the packaging container 1003 is damaged, the outside atmosphere enters the second working chamber 1002 along with the damaged portion, and the second working chamber 1002 is at this time. The negative pressure in the medium will disappear and be equal to the external atmospheric pressure.
  • the sealing diaphragm 316 will also return from the contracted state under the action of the negative pressure to the normal state of the sealing diaphragm 316 to withstand the control switch 315. Switching the control switch 315 from one state to another, thereby causing the package breakage trigger circuit 31 to be triggered, and transmitting a trigger signal to the chip self-destruction boost circuit 4, through the chip
  • the smash boost circuit 4 releases the high voltage to destroy all the programs, instructions and encryption keys set in the microprocessor 1 on the authenticating device 1000.
  • the air pressure in the second working chamber 1002 and the product packaging bag 1003 or the packaging container 1003 may also be set to a positive pressure formed after the air pressure is applied, and the sealing diaphragm 316 may be under the action of positive pressure.
  • the package breakage trigger circuit 31 is set to a standby operation state, and if the verification device 1000 and the to-be-verified product 1004 are separated, once the package is The bag 1003 or the packaging container 1003 is damaged, and the internal positive pressure is released through the damaged portion. At this time, the positive pressure in the second working chamber 1002 disappears and is equal to the outside atmospheric pressure, and the sealing diaphragm 316 The contraction diaphragm 316 is restored to the normal state of the sealing diaphragm 316, and the control switch 315 is released to switch the control switch 315 from one state to another, thereby causing the package breakage trigger circuit. 31 is triggered, and the trigger signal is transmitted to the chip self-destruction boost circuit 4, and the program, the instruction and the encryption key set in the microprocessor 1 are released by the chip self-destruction boost circuit 4 Destroy all.
  • the physical device 1000 provided with the separation self-destruction protection working portion is provided with a magnetic substance 326 which is on the to-be-tested product 1004.
  • the magnetic substance 326 is disposed in a magnetic field balance state, and the physical verification device 1000 is fixedly coupled to the product to be verified 1004.
  • a magnetic switch 325 is disposed between the two magnetic substances 326. 325, because the change of the relative position of the authenticating device 1000 after the fixed connection with the authentic product 1004 causes the magnetic field balance state to change, and switches from one state to another state, thereby controlling the separation self-destruction protection. The start of the work department.
  • the permanent magnet substance 326 installed in the authenticating device 1000 and the permanent magnet substance 326 mounted on the to-be-verified product 1004 have the same magnetic field strength and are opposite to each other, and the magnetic switch 325 is disposed at a center position of the balanced magnetic field formed by the two permanent magnet materials 326.
  • the two permanent magnet materials 326 and the magnetron switch 325 together form a magnetic balance sensor, and the magnetron switch 325 is a reed switch.
  • the startup mode of the separation self-destruction protection working part is started by the change of the relative position after the verification device 1000 is fixedly connected with the to-be-verified product 1004, and the setting in the microprocessor 1 in the verification device 1000 is realized. Self-destruction protection of programs, instructions and encryption keys.
  • the photo-sensing device 33 when the photo-sensing device 33 is artificially disassembled, since the photo-sensor 335 sees light, its resistance value will be infinite from the light-proof state. The change to small is small to trigger the photosensitive trigger circuit 33 to operate.
  • the disassembling movement trigger switch 35 is connected by an array disposed in series on the circuit board 7 at a pressing end of the fastener end 3452 of the circuit board 7 through a fastener metal end 3452.
  • the tamper-proof contact 3451 and the fastener 3452 are formed, and once the fastener 3452 for fixing the circuit board 7 is loosened, the detachable movement trigger switch 345 connected in series is closed.
  • the battery undervoltage trigger circuit 35 is a voltage comparison circuit. When the voltage of the battery 6 set in the authenticating device 1000 drops to a set value, the circuit is triggered immediately; the limited use trigger
  • the working principle of the circuit 36 is that after the microprocessor 1 is used for a set number of times, a signal is output from the limited use signal output terminal 17 to the trigger input of the limited use trigger circuit 36. End 363, triggering the limit trigger circuit 36 immediately.
  • the plastic chip self-destruction boost circuit 4 is immediately activated at the high voltage output terminal 42 to output a high voltage to the self-destruct input terminal 15 of the microprocessor 1,
  • the microprocessor 1 breaks down in an instant, destroying all the programs, instructions and encryption keys in the microprocessor 1, and permanently invalidating the authenticating device 1000.
  • the power input terminal 41 or the high voltage output terminal 42 of the chip self-destruction boost circuit 4 may be used.
  • An insulating flexible tape (not shown) is placed in the passage to prevent the microprocessor 1 from being self-destructed during assembly and commissioning. After the assembly and commissioning of the authenticating device 1000 is completed, the number of times of starting has been cleared to "0", and vacuuming or adding air pressure is performed with the sealed bag 1003 or the sealed container 1004. After the packaging process, the insulating flexible tape is extracted from the panel of the authenticating device 1000, and the chip self-destructing boosting circuit 4 is turned on. The insulating tape is made of a small, thin, soft insulating material. After being extracted, it can no longer be put back into the already-packaged the authentic device 1000.
  • FIG. 4 For the verification test process of the present invention, reference can be made to FIG. 4, and it can be seen from the figure that in the process of verifying the genuine goods to be inspected, it is first determined whether the close-up state of the goods is invalid, and if there is no failure, the tester When the verification is performed, the verification card 8 needs to be inserted into the verification card socket 16 of the authenticating device 1000. If the RFID card is used, the RFID card can be placed close to the verification device 1000, and the start/stop button 2 is pressed to enable the verification device 1000 to start working, and it can also be determined whether the product to be verified is in the The effective protection state of the authenticating device 1000.
  • the verification device 1000 If the verification device 1000 cannot be activated, it proves that the verification device 1000 has failed self-destruction, and the following test will not be performed if the actual product to be verified is still in the effective protection state of the verification device 1000. Then, the following verification steps are automatically performed: First, the identification of the verification information code is performed, and the verification device 1000 performs address reading on the huge data information code in the verification card 8 according to the set program and instruction. Extracting and arranging the verification information code hidden therein; secondly, performing multiple encryption operations on the verification information code by using the encryption key Count. First, the verification device 1000 calculates the verification information code into its complement, inverse code, end-to-end reverse code, misalignment code according to a set program and instruction, and then presses any set program and instruction from these.
  • At least one of the codes is selected, combined with an encryption key set in the microprocessor 1 in the authenticating device 1000, and includes full addition (with carry), half plus (no carry) The single-encryption operation or the multi-encryption encryption operation in the operation method of adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing by the addition of half plus plus half plus, and obtaining the original authentic code completely different from the verification information code. .
  • the authenticity code is not a verification code for the identification of the authenticator; the microprocessor 1 in the verification device 1000 performs the binary verification original code obtained in the upper frame by two/decimal or two/ Hexadecimal decoding, and a verification code for display or playback is obtained; meanwhile, the microprocessor 1 in the verification device 1000 sends the decoded verification code to the verification device 1000.
  • the display screen 5 is displayed or sent to the voice circuit for playing, and simultaneously displays the verification prompt character, the image or the played voice prompt information, and the number of times the verification device 1000 has accumulated the number of inspections.
  • the authenticator compares the unique verification code of the card with the verification code displayed or heard on the display screen, and determines whether the two codes match, and realizes the authenticity judgment of the verified genuine goods;
  • the real person can automatically shut down the work of the verification device by pressing the start/stop button 2 on the control panel of the verification device 1000 or when the set shutdown time arrives, and the verification card 8 Pull out from the verification device 1000.
  • the verification information code in the verification card 8 randomly arranges random binary codes into data information code groups, and the verification information codes in the following table are dispersed in a plurality of random data codes in a four-bit manner.
  • the verification information code is identified and arranged by the program and the command set in the microprocessor 1 according to the address corresponding to the verification information code in the verification card 8.
  • the verification information code is set to six groups, and are respectively stored in addresses 1050, 3680, 15606, 23168, 57860, and 153686 in the verification card 8;
  • the microprocessor 1 calculates the verification f through the microprocessor 1 after obtaining the above-mentioned verification information code
  • the complement of the code, the obtained complement code is then fully added with a set or the set of the encryption key set or written in the microprocessor 1, to obtain the original code;
  • the binary verification original code is hex-coded to obtain the verification code.
  • the weights of H, L, P, C, F, and E are set to 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 in hexadecimal respectively.
  • the first aspect is the production and distribution of the verification card by a special authority.
  • the second aspect is to accept the manufacturer of the brand-name goods that need to be entered into the fidelity system.
  • the manufacturer of the designated authenticity device 1000 provides the branding manufacturer with the authenticity device, and then the branded goods manufacturer seals the authenticity device to the genuine product by vacuuming or adding air pressure.
  • the sealed bag 1003 or the sealed container 1003 is formed to be integral with the product to be inspected or the intimate device 1000 and the product to be inspected 1004 are closely combined into an inseparable whole body and then sold.
  • the security network consists of the technology of the present invention by distributing as many verification cards as possible 8 and absorbing as many branded goods as possible. Gradually build a huge fidelity network from small to large. By using this accurate and efficient fidelity technology, counterfeit goods can be eliminated within the scope of fidelity products, and the rights of brands and consumers can be protected to the utmost.
  • the authenticating apparatus 1000 can perform the verification only if the commodity packaging is not damaged. Out of the test conclusion.
  • the authenticity device 1000 is unique only by two measures: First, the verification program command and the encryption key set in the microprocessor 1 in the verification device 1000 are During the manufacturing process of the microprocessor chip, it is written by the mask or written after the self-destruction protection is effective, and cannot be read from the outside, and is not known during the whole assembly debugging and use of the authenticating device 1000, Very strong confidentiality; the second is, when the verification device 1000 and the to-be-tested genuine product 1004 are sealed into one body by vacuuming or pressing, once the package of the genuine product to be inspected is damaged, even if only a small pinhole, the vacuum or the state of the air in the second working chamber 1002 of the authenticating device 1000 and the package to be verified is immediately disappeared, and the device 100 is triggered to be damaged in the package.
  • the chip self-destruction boosting circuit 4 is activated by the circuit 31, and outputs a high voltage to the self-destructive input terminal 15 of the microprocessor 1, and the verification program instruction and the encryption key in the microprocessor 1 are Destroy all.
  • the magnetic substance 326 is disposed in the verification device 1000 provided with the separation self-destruction protection working portion, and the magnetic substance 326 disposed on the to-be-tested genuine product 1004 constitutes a magnetic field balance state, The physical verification device 1000 is fixedly coupled to the product to be verified 1004.
  • the magnetic switch 325 is disposed between the two magnetic substances 326, and the magnetic control switch 325 is Having the fixed product 1004 fixedly connected, in a balanced magnetic field, once the authenticating device 1000 is displaced relative to the to-be-verified product 1004, the magnetic switch reed switch 325 is no longer in a balanced magnetic field.
  • the magnetic control switch 325 generates a state transition, thereby controlling the startup of the separation self-destruction protection working portion, and outputting a high voltage to the self-destructive input terminal 15 in the microprocessor 1, and the microprocessor 1 is The inspection procedures, instructions, and encryption keys are all destroyed. Therefore, the authenticity code for confirming the authenticity of the product can be encrypted only on the premise that the authenticity has the authenticity device 1000 of the genuine product that has not failed self-destruction.
  • the realization of the authenticity device 1000 is unique to the authentic product.
  • the verification device 1000 cannot be copied or copied.
  • the copy needs to have a parent, and the imitation must have a template.
  • all the hardware can be copied according to the principle and function, the verification program, the instruction and the encryption key set in the microprocessor 1 in the verification device 1000 of the present invention cannot be pirated except for the piracy.
  • the packaging bag 1003 or the packaging container 1003 that seals the authenticity device 1000 and the to-be-verified product 1004 is transparent, Leaking gas, or separating the authenticating device 1000 from the verified product 1004 or splitting the structural device of the authenticating device 1000, disassembling the screw 3452 of the fixed circuit board 7, the power source 6
  • the number of trials that are to be exhausted or the number of detections reaches the allowable use set by the microprocessor 1 as long as at least one of the conditions occurs, the corresponding trigger circuit in the authenticating device 1000 triggers the self-destruction of the chip.
  • the boosting circuit 4 generates a high voltage to immediately destroy the program, the command, and the encryption key set in the microprocessor 1.
  • the authenticity device 1000 is protected by not being able to pirate and adopt a fully functional self-destruction protection circuit, and the fraudulent parent and template are not provided to the counterfeiter, so that the authenticating device 1000 cannot be copied or copied.
  • the verification card 8 having a special function. Since the verification card 8 is used to store the random data information code, the verification card 8 needs to read the data information code stored in the card during use, and the verification card 8 will There is a problem of being stolen. Since it is impossible to avoid being stolen, it is necessary to solve the problem that the authenticity information code can be recognized and arranged after the verification card 8 is stolen.
  • the present invention solves the problem by adopting the following measures: First, the authentic information code useful in the verification card 8 only occupies a very small part of the random data information code stored in the card, and is scattered and hidden in the random data information code.
  • the counterfeiter reads all the data information codes stored in the verification card 8 since the identification of the identification information code and the arrangement of the program instructions cannot be obtained, the fraudulent person cannot solve the huge data stream in the card. Identify useful biometric information codes. Second, all the binary data information codes stored in the verification card 8 are randomly compiled, and even the coder does not know what kind of data information stream is automatically randomly compiled by the next card. However, after a large amount of random data information code is written in the verification card 8, the reader can be read by the same reader in the coder's hand as the program, instruction and encryption key set by the verification device 1000. The verification code unique to the card is printed or sealed on the verification card 8, and is used as the sole basis for authenticity determination by the cardholder.
  • the verification information code may or may not be the original code of the verification code. If the verification information code is not the original code, the program must pass the verification device 1000 according to the set program. The instruction calculates the verification information code into its complement, inverse code, end-to-end reverse code, misalignment code, and then selects at least one of the codes from any of the codes and instructions, and sets the test in the test.
  • the encryption key in the microprocessor 1 in the real device 1000 is combined, and performs mixed addition and subtraction, multiplication, including full addition (with carry), half addition (no carry), full addition and half addition.
  • a true original code that is completely different from the verification information code is obtained.
  • the microprocessor 1 in the verification device 1000 will further input the binary verification original code obtained in the upper frame, and perform binary/decimal or binary/hexadecimal decoding, and the decoded decimal or ten. After the hexadecimal code is displayed on the display screen on the authenticating device 1000, it is the authenticating code for the authenticator to compare.
  • This displayed code is already substantially different from the data information code in the verification card 8.
  • the authenticity verification device 1000 To obtain the authenticity code, the authenticity verification device 1000 must perform recognition, arrangement, and weighting operations on the data stream in the verification card 8 according to a preset program or instruction. In this way, even if the counterfeiter reads the original data information code stored in the verification card 8, it is impossible to compare or reverse the program, the instruction and the encryption method.
  • the original data information code in the real card 8 is checked for identification, arrangement, and encryption.
  • the counterfeiter will not copy or copy the card. If the counterfeiter copies the random data code stored in the verification card 8 as it is, it will never verify the product as a genuine product. This is to help the real product, and the counterfeiter will not implement it; if the counterfeiter The replica is stored in the card in a way that is re-edited.
  • the authenticity verification device 1000 cannot identify, arrange, and encrypt the verification information code from the fake card.
  • the original code of the real code will immediately expose the fake card, and the counterfeiter cannot track and obtain the verification code unique to each card that has been compiled by the real verification card.
  • the cards faked by the counterfeiters cannot enter the formal distribution channels, and are not cards issued by the designated agencies, and no one will accept them.
  • the verification code can be automatically upgraded at any time if necessary.
  • the program, the instruction, and the encryption key set by the microprocessor 1 in the verification device 1000 are only required to be upgraded, and the verification code may be added or decremented.
  • Card 8 can be left unchanged, cardholders only need to The card issuer re-reads the card or reads the card after the upgraded product, and the cardholder can record the upgraded version of the original verification code to facilitate the upgrade.
  • the old version of the authentic device and the upgraded version of the authentic device can be used in parallel.
  • the commercial real-time device and the verification method with self-destruction protection function have wide application fields, and are applicable to a wide variety of products; and can be extended to the field of logistics to fidelify articles during transportation, and can effectively prevent articles during transportation.
  • the ultra-micro power microprocessor 1 adopting the self-destruction protection function of the self-destruction protection device 1000 has a standby current of the order of nanoamperes, and the battery life enclosed therein can be several years.
  • the retention time of the verification function of the authentic device 1000 of the present invention is greatly extended, and Before the power of the battery 6 is about to be exhausted, the power supply undervoltage trigger circuit 35 also triggers the chip self-destruction boost circuit 4 to generate a high voltage to destroy the program command and the encryption key in the microprocessor 1.
  • the counterfeit device 1000 is prevented from being stolen or counterfeited after being stored for a long period of time or artificially causing the battery 6 to fail.
  • the sealing membrane 316 which can be stretched and contracted according to the change of the air pressure in the merchandise verification device 1000 with the self-destruction protection function is a spherical elastic rubber film.
  • the diaphragm 316 can also be used.
  • the photo-sensing circuit 33 may be used in the verification apparatus 1000 of the present invention.
  • One or more of the other four types of trigger circuits the de-energizing trigger circuit 34, the under-voltage trigger circuit 35, and the limited-use trigger circuit 36; It is also possible to use a voice notification method instead of a display screen to indicate a verification result. For example, when the verification device 1000 is completed in the verification, the sounding device on the verification device 1000 will immediately encrypt the verification code. The information is read out and judged by the authenticator.
  • the original verification code for the display is changed into a voice prompt signal, and the display circuit and the display screen are changed to the power amplifier circuit and the micro power consumption electroacoustic device;
  • the manual button 2 for starting the operation of the verification device 1000 is It can also be changed to a touch switch in the verification card socket 16 in the verification device 1000, and when the verification card 8 is inserted into the socket 16, the same can be started. And automatically removing the verification device 1000 after the verification card 8 is pulled out at the end of the verification; the verification device 1000
  • the air pressure in the first working chamber 1001 may also be a non-inner atmospheric pressure, as long as the sealing diaphragm 316 can be extended and contracted when the air pressure in the second working chamber 1002 changes, and the packaging is started.
  • the damage trigger circuit 31 can be operated.
  • a display device for verifying the result may be disposed on the verification card 8, and the verification result is separately displayed on the verification device 1000 and the verification card 8 respectively or in the The verification device 1000 and the verification card 8 are simultaneously displayed.

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Description

具有自毁保护功能的验真装置及验真方法 技术领域
本发明涉及商品或物流验真检验技术，特别涉及一种通过带自毁保护功能的 验真装置读取、 识别并加密验真介质中的验真信息进行商品真伪验证的验真装 置及验真方法。 背景技术
现技术中商品防伪主要采用个性材料及结构的防伪包装物和在商品上或商 品的包装物上设置特殊材料和特殊工艺的防伪标识， 通过视觉进行真假识别。 在制造工艺和印刷技术日益先进的今天， 造假者可以很容易地进行仿冒， 而且， 可以达到以假乱真的程度。 因此， 此类防伪物不但已经不再具有防伪功能， 而 且反过来可以为假冒商品提供 "合法 "保护。
现有技术中采用的电码防伪技术中， 商品上的防伪查询码一旦被造假者抄 袭复制后， 首先查询的商品便是 "真品"， 其后查询的商品便被怀疑成 "赝品"。 查 询结论只与查询先后有关， 而与商品真伪没有必然联系。
射频识别防伪技术是近几年开始使用的一种利用射频技术实现的非接触式 防伪识别技术， 该技术将一个存储有需识别物品信息的信息卡附着于需防伪物 品上， 然后通过专门设置的读卡器读取卡中的信息， 对物品真伪进行识别。 但 是， 射频识别防伪技术因无法逾越盗读后被复制或仿冒和在脱离真品后被重复 使用这几道难关， 加之受读卡器布局所限和防伪成本等方面的限制， 也不能从 根本上扭转商品防伪在目前所处的被动局面。 发明内容
为了克服现有商品防伪物不是真品所独有， 容易被复制、 仿制和被被移置 到赝品上进行重复使用而导致防伪物不能有效的验证需防伪物品真伪的技术问 题， 本发明提供一种具有自毁保护功能的验真装置。
为了克服现有防伪方法中对判别商品真伪的依据没有任何加密保护措施， 造假者可容易地进行复制或仿制后， 以赝品冒充真品， 并且现有防伪方法对真 伪的判别主要是通过宏观视觉对防伪物进行"像"或"不像"的程度判别，因而缺乏 对被防伪物的真伪进行准确判别的依据。 本发明提供一种具有自毁保护功能的 验真方法。
本发明解决上述第一技术问题所采用的技术方案是： 提供一种所述验真装 置设置有自毁保护工作部和对待验真物质进行识别的验真工作部， 所述验真 置与所述待验真物质协同使用。
根据本发明的一优选实施例： 所述验真装置与所述待验真物质为一体式 结构； 所述一体式结构的实现方式为将所述验真装置与所述待验真物质采用 加气压或减气压的方式借助载体密封于一体或将所述验真装置与所述待验真 物质固定连接为一体。
根据本发明的一优选实施例： 所述自毁保护工作部包括气压变化自毁保 护工作部或分离自毁保护工作部； 其中， 所述气压变化自毁保护工作部的启 动方式为通过所述密封载体内气压的变化启动。
根据本发明的一优选实施例： 所述自毁保护工作部包括气压变化自毁保 护工作部或分离自毁保护工作部； 其中， 所述分离自毁保护工作部的启动方 式为通过所述验真装置与所述待验真物质固定连接后相对位置的变化启动。
根据本发明的一优选实施例： 设置有所述气压变化自毁保护工作部的所 述验真装置通过可根据气压变化实现伸、 缩的中间介质将所述验真装置分隔 成第一工作腔和第二工作腔； 所述第一工作腔与外界大气相通， 所述第二工 作腔与承载所述待验真物质的载体相通， 并与所述载体采用加气压或减气压 的方式密封为一整体;所述中间介质受所述第二工作腔内气压大小变化控制， 实现伸、 缩， 以此控制所述气压变化自毁保护工作部的启动。
根据本发明的一优选实施例： 设置有所述分离自毁保护工作部的所述验 真装置内设置有磁性物质， 其与所述待验真物质上设置的磁性物质构成磁场 平衡状态， 所述验真装置与所述待验真物质固定连接为一体， 在所述两磁性 物质之间设置有磁控开关， 所述磁控开关受所述磁场平衡状态变化控制， 实 现状态转换， 以此控制所述分离自毁保护工作部的启动。
根据本发明的一优选实施例： 所述验真装置还包括验真介质， 所述验真 工作部与所述验真介质协同使用， 所述验真介质内存储有随机信息， 在所述 随机信息内隐藏有所述验真介质所有的验真信息。
根据本发明的一优选实施例： 所述验真装置具体包括： 用于存储所述随 机信息的验真介质； 用于按照设定规则读取、 识别、 加密运算所述验真介质 内所述验真信息的微处理器； 用于对所述微处理器进行自毁保护的自毁保护 电路、 用于控制所述自毁保护电路工作的自毁触发电路、
用于显示或播放识别信息的装置和用于实现上述电路和装置工作的电源。
根据本发明的一优选实施例： 所述自毁触发电路的输出端与所述自毁保 护电路的受控输入端连接， 所述自毁触发电路包括包装破损触发电路、 磁平 衡分离触发电路、 光敏触发电路、 拆卸触发电路、 电源欠压触发电路和限次 使用触发电路的其中至少一种； 其中， 所述包装破损触发电路的输入端连接 有包装破损触发装置； 所述磁平衡分离触发电路的输入端连接有磁平衡传感 器;所述光敏触发电路的输入端连接有光敏传感器；所述拆卸触发电路的输入 端连接有拆卸触发装置;所述电源欠压触发电路的输入端与电源输出端连接； 所述限次使用触发电路的输入端与所述微处理器的限次使用输出端连接。
根据本发明的一优选实施例： 所述自毁保护电路为自毁升压电路或存储 寄存信息删除电路。
本发明还提供了一种具有自毁保护功能的验真方法， 对与所述待验真物质 密封或固定连接成一整体后的所述验真装置借助所述验真介质进行验真检验， 具体包括歩骤： 第一、 将所述验真介质置于所述验真装置的协同工作状态； 第 二、 通过所述验真装置中所述验真工作部进行运算,从所述验真介质中检验出验 真代码； 第三、 输出检验结果。
根据本发明的一优选实施例： 所述第一歩包括子歩骤： 一、 查验所述待 验真物质与所述验真装置是否共同处于有效工作状态； 二、将所述验真介质 置于所述验真装置的协同工作状态； 三、 启动所述验真装置上设置的启停控 制键， 使所述验真装置进入工作状态。
根据本发明的一优选实施例： 所述第二歩包括子歩骤： 一、 通过所述验 真装置上设置的所述微处理器按设定的程序、 指令从所述验真介中读取、 识 别并排列出所述验真信息码；二、通过所述微处理器按设定的程序、指令和密 钥对所述验真信息码进行加密运算，得到验真原码； 三、将所述验真原码进行 译码， 得到验真代码； 四、 将所述验真代码由验真者确认是否与所持有的所 述验真介质所独有的所述验真代码相符。
根据本发明的一优选实施例： 所述第三歩包括显示输出或语音输出。
由于本发明具有自毁保护功能的验真装置上设置的所述微处理器设置有功 能完善的自毁保护电路， 加之所述验真装置内的所述微处理器中设定的程序指 令和加密密钥是在其芯片制造时通过掩膜工艺设定或在自毁保护生效后写入 的， 无法从外界读取， 从根本上防止了对本发明所述验真装置的仿制和窃取所 述微处理器内对所述验真信息码进行解调和加权处理的程序指令及加密密钥， 在不能获取母体与样板的情况下， 也就不能对所述验真装置及其程序指令和加 密密钥进行复制和仿制。
相对于现行防伪方法， 本发明带自毁保护功能的商品验真方法的有益效果 是： 由于在本发明中采用外置的随机编码验真卡， 在通过所述验真装置按设定 的程序、 指令和加密密钥， 将分散隐藏在所述验真卡中的庞大随机信息流中的 验真信息码识别出来后再进行多重加密运算， 才能得出对待验真商品进行真伪 判别的验真代码， 并且将所述验真装置的硬件和检验程序指令及加密密钥这些 软件都置于自毁保护功能之中， 这种被保护的数码识别方法， 除实现验真功能 之外， 还将真伪判别结论从现有防伪的"像"与"不像"的程度判别提升为"是"与 "不是"的状态判别， 其检测过程简单快捷， 检测结果准确可靠。 附图说明
图 1.本发明具有自毁保护功能的验真装置及验真方法中带自毁保护功能的 验真装置的电路结构方框图；
图 2.带自毁保护功能的验真装置安装在承载待验真物质的载体内的剖面结 构示意图；
图 3. 带自毁保护功能的验真装置与待验真物质固定连接为一体的剖面结构 示意图；
图 4.本发明具有自毁保护功能的验真装置及验真方法中验真方法流程示意 图。 具体实施方式
下面结合附图和实施方式对本发明作进一歩说明。
本发明的构思原理如下： 市场上现有的防伪手段很多， 但是取得的防伪效 果却越来越差， 根本原因在于真品制造商与顾客之间在产销链上的脱节。 现有 防伪方法中所采用的个性材料及结构的包装物和防伪标贴、 标识、 标志、 防伪 查询码标贴等是依附于需防伪商品本体之外的。 无不呈现在造假者面前， 都处 于可仿冒的失控状态中， 防伪物不能同时具备唯真品独有、 不能被复制或仿制、 不能在脱离真品后被重复使用这三大要素，在逻辑构思上存在漏洞。 所以， 造假 者可依据真品方便地对上述防伪物进行复制或仿制， 对赝品进行包装， 或通过 回收真品的旧包装对赝品进行包装物后冒充真品出售。 更为严重的是， 防伪物 与需防伪的商品在逻辑关系上没有任何关联， 防伪物的真伪与商品本身的真伪 不构成必然的因果关系， 违背了逻辑学中的直言三段公理。 即使防伪物是真的， 也不能据此判定商品就是真的。 在逻辑功能上留下了一个不可逾越的障碍。 面 对此种情况， 最好的解决方法就是每个顾客都直接到真品制造厂家去购买商品， 这在逻辑上是可行的， 但是在现实中不具任何可行性。 本发明设想： 通过引入 一种带自毁保护功能的验真装置和验真方法， 以实现对商品进行真伪判别。 这 样就可以从根本上强化真品制造商与顾客之间的产销链， 并阻断赝品与顾客之 间的产销链。 从而获得与顾客直接到真品制造厂去购买商品的相同仿冒效果。 本发明内容核心是： 为达到本发明保真目的所采用的验真装置和验真检测方法 同时解决了唯真品独有、 不能被复制或仿制、 不能在脱离真品后被重复使用这 些技术问题， 并且验真装置的真伪与待验真商品的真伪构成了必然的因果关系, 实现真实意义上的商品验真。
本发明的具体工作原理如下： 提供一种与待验真商品同体密封并存或固定 连接共存的验真装置， 该验真装置与待验真商品采用抽真空、 加气压的方式密 封成一整体或将所述验真装置与所述待验真的商品固定连接成一整体， 并通过 引入自毁触发电路驱动自毁保护电路工作， 从根本上防止了商品验真装置被仿 制和窃取微处理器内的程序、 指令和加密密钥等问题的发生。 在本发明的实施 过程中， 通过具有公信力的专业机构向顾客向消费者和监管者发放验真介质。 在本实施例中， 所述验真介质为验真卡； 当然该验真介质也可以采用其他载体 的形式， 例如以手机等作为验真介质进行验真检验， 原理也是一样的。 并通过 该卡结合所述验真检测装置实现对商品的真伪判别。 为了使卡中的信息不能被 盗读， 在卡中存储有足够字长的庞大二进制随机数据信息码， 其中用来作为保 真信息的数据码只占该随机数据信息码中的极少一部分， 并且是分散隐藏在所 述随机数据信息码中， 所述验真信息码也不是验真代码的原码， 所以， 即使将 验真检测卡中的所有二进制码读出， 也无法分离出其中的保真信息码和进一歩 获得保真代码的原码， 必须要通过该验真装置中的微处理器按设定于其中的程 序、 指令， 才能从验真卡中的数据码中识别出验真信息码， 验真信息码与加密 密钥结合并经多重加密运算后才能产生出每个卡所独有的验真原码， 经译码后 在验真装置上显示或通过语音方式播放出验真代码。 此时， 验真者就可以比对 此代码与自己所持验真卡所独有的验真代码是否相符，来判别商品真伪。 通过这 样的设计可以实现对商品真伪的准确判别。 只有能加密出所持卡上独自拥有的 验真代码的验真装置才是真品验真装置， 而与此真品验真装置密不可分的商品 便是真品。
请参阅图 1,本发明具有自毁保护功能的验真装置及验真方法中带自毁保护 功能的验真装置的电路结构方框图，并结合图 2带自毁保护功能的验真装置安装 在承载待验真物质的载体内的剖面结构示意图和图 3. 带自毁保护功能的验真装 置与需防伪物质固定连接为一体的剖面结构示意图。
如图所示,本发明提供一种具有自毁保护功能的验真装置 1000， 所述验真装 置 1000设置有自毁保护工作部和对待验真物质进行识别的验真工作部， 所述验 真装置 1000与待验真物质 1004协同使用。 在本发明专利技术中,所述自毁保护 工作部采用自毁保护电路 4 的设计方案， 当然也可以采用其它方式的自毁保护 设计， 在本实施例中不做过多说明。所述验真装置 1000与所述待验真物质 1004 为一体式结构； 所述一体式结构的实现方式为将所述验真装置 1000与所述待验 真物质 1004采用加气压或减气压的方式借助载体 1003密封于一体或将所述验 真装置 1000与所述待验真物质 1004固定连接为一体。 所述自毁保护工作部为 气压变化自毁保护工作部或分离自毁保护工作部； 其中， 所述气压变化自毁保 护工作部的启动方式为通过所述密封载体 1003内气压的变化启动； 所述分离自 毁保护工作部的启动方式为通过所述验真装置 1000与所述待验真物质 1004固 定连接后相对位置的变化启动。
具体说明： 本发明带自毁保护功能的商品验真装置 1000包括外置的验真卡 8和验真装置主体 1000。 所述的验真装置主体 1000包括微处理器 1、 连接微处 理器 1的自毁保护电路 4、用于控制所述自毁保护电路 4工作的自毁触发电路 3、 用于显示检验结果的显示屏 4或用于播放检验结果的语音装置和给上述电路及 装置供电的电源装置 6。
在本实施例中， 所述微处理器 1 为超微功耗数字微处理器芯片， 其显示输 出端 14与显示屏 5的显示输入端 52相连， 所述微处理器 1的启停控制端 11、 12连接有启停控制键 2， 所述微处理器 1的检验输入端连接有验真卡插座 16， 外置验真卡 8上的输出插头 81可定向插入所述微处理器 1的检验输入端上的所 述验真卡插座 16内， 当然,所述验真卡 8也可以设计成与所述验真装置 1000为 非插入式的配合方式， 如采用射频方式使所述验真装置 1000对所述验真卡 8进 行协同工作。 所述自毁保护电路采用的是芯片自毁升压电路 4或存储、 寄存信 息删除电路， 在本实施例中采用的是芯片自毁升压电路。 所述自毁触发电路 3 包括： 包装破损触发电路 31、 磁平衡分离触发电路 32、 光敏触发电路 33、 拆卸 触发电路 34、 电源欠压触发电路 35和与所述微处理器 1的限次使用输出端 17 连接， 通过所述微处理器 1限次使用控制的限次使用触发电路 36。 其中所述芯 片自毁升压电路的高压输出端 42与所述微处理器 1的自毁输入端 15连接。 所 述自毁触发电路 3中包装破损触发电路 31、 磁平衡分离触发电路 32、 光敏触发 电路 33、 拆卸触发电路 34、 电源欠压触发电路 35、 和限次使用触发电路 36的 输出端 312、 322、 332、 342、 352、 362都连接到所述芯片自毁升压电路 4的受 控输入端 43。在所述自毁触发电路 3中， 所述包装破损触发电路 31包括受所述 待验真商品包装袋或容器等载体 1003中气压变化控制触动的所述触发开关 315、 所述磁平衡分离触发电路 32包括由磁性物质 326和所述磁控开关 325构成的磁 平衡传感器， 所述光敏触发电路 33包括光敏器件 335、所述拆卸触发电路 34包 括防拆卸开关 345、所述电源欠压触发电路 35和所述限次使用触发电路 36,上述 触发电路的电源输入端 311、 321、 331、 341、 351、 361与所述芯片自毁升压电 路 4的电源输入端 41、 所述微处理器 1的电源输入端 13、 所述显示屏 5的电源 输入端 51均和电池 6的电源输出端 61相连接。
请参阅图 2,并结合图 1， 从图中可以看出， 所述验真装置 1000通过一可根 据两侧气压差的有无实现伸、 缩的密封隔膜 316将所述验真装置 1000分隔成第 一工作腔 1001和第二工作腔 1002; 其中第二工作腔 1002与承载所述待验真商 品的所述载体 1003相通， 并与所述载体 1003呈一密封整体； 所述密封隔膜 316 受所述第二工作腔 1002内气压变化控制， 实现伸、 缩， 以此控制所述自毁保护 电路 4的工作， 实现对所述验真装置 1000内所述微处理器 1中设定的程序、 指 令和加密密钥的自毁保护。
在本实施例中， 本发明带自毁保护功能的商品验真装置 1000将显示屏 5朝 外封帖于商品包装袋 1003或包装容器 1003的内壁上， 所述显示屏 5外侧设置 有所述显示屏 5的透明保护片 53， 所述验真装置 1000通过一所述密封隔膜 316 将主体分隔为上下两个工作腔， 所述密封隔膜 316 以上的腔体， 定义为第一工 作腔 1001， 该第一工作腔 1001通过所述验真装置 1000主体面板上开设的通气 孔 10与外界大气相通， 使得在所述第一工作腔 1001 内的气压为外界大气压。 所述密封隔膜 316以下的腔体， 定义为第二工作腔 1002， 所述第二工作腔 1002 通过所述验真装置 1000主体下部开设的通气孔 11与所述商品包装袋 1003或所 述包装容器 1003的内部相通， 通过加气压或减气压的方式， 使得所述第二工作 腔 1002和所述商品包装袋 1003或所述包装容器 1003内的气压相对于外界大气 压为正压或负压。 所述第二工作腔 1002内气压与外界大气压差的有无足以使所 述密封隔膜 316产生伸、缩变化。当所述第二工作腔 1002与所述商品包装袋 1003 或所述包装容器 1003内气压为抽真空后形成的负压时， 所述密封隔膜 316在负 压的作用下会向下收缩， 释放开关 315。 例如， 在释放所述开关 315的状态下， 设定为所述包装破损触发电路 31 为待机工作状态， 如果将所述验真装置 1000 和所述待验真商品进行分离， 一旦所述包装袋 1003或所述包装容器 1003出现 破损， 外界大气就会随破损部位进入所述第二工作腔 1002， 此时所述第二工作 腔 1002中的负压就会消失， 并与外界大气压相等， 所述密封隔膜 316也会从负 压作用下的收缩状态伸展恢复到所述密封隔膜 316 的正常状态， 去顶住所述控 制开关 315， 使所述控制开关 315从一种状态转换至另一种状态， 从而使所述包 装破损触发电路 31被触发， 并将触发信号传送到所述芯片自毁升压电路 4， 通 过所述芯片自毁升压电路 4释放高压将所述验真装置 1000上所述微处理器 1中 设定的程序、 指令和加密密钥全部销毁。 同理， 所述第二工作腔 1002与所述商 品包装袋 1003或所述包装容器 1003内气压也可以设定为加气压后形成的正压， 所述密封隔膜 316在正压的作用下会伸展， 顶住所述开关 315。 例如， 在顶住所 述开关 315的状态下， 设定所述包装破损触发电路 31为待机工作状态， 如果将 所述验真装置 1000和所述待验真商品 1004进行分离， 一旦所述包装袋 1003或 所述包装容器 1003出现破损， 内部的正压会通过破损部位被释放， 此时所述第 二工作腔 1002中的正压就会消失， 并与外界大气压相等， 所述密封隔膜 316便 会由伸展状态收缩恢复到所述密封隔膜 316 的正常状态， 并释放所述控制开关 315， 使所述控制开关 315从一种状态转换至另一种状态， 从而使所述包装破损 触发电路 31被触发， 并将触发信号传给所述芯片自毁升压电路 4， 通过所述芯 片自毁升压电路 4释放高压将所述微处理器 1 中设定的程序、 指令和加密密钥 全部销毁。
请参阅图 3并结合图 1， 从图中可以看出， 设置有所述分离自毁保护工作部 的所述验真装置 1000内设置有磁性物质 326，其与所述待验真商品 1004上设置 的磁性物质 326处于磁场平衡状态，所述验真装置 1000与所述待验真商品 1004 固定连接于一体， 在所述两磁性物质 326之间设置有磁控开关 325， 所述磁控开 关 325因所述验真装置 1000与所述待验真商品 1004固定连接后相对位置的变 化造成磁场平衡状态变化， 而从一种状态转换至另一种状态， 以此控制所述分 离自毁保护工作部的启动。 在本实施例中， 安装在所述验真装置 1000内的永磁 物质 326与安装在所述待验真商品 1004上的永磁物质 326的磁场强度相等并且 同极相对， 所述磁控开关 325设置于所述两永磁物质 326形成的平衡磁场的正 中位置。 所述两永磁物质 326与所述磁控开关 325共同构成磁平衡传感器， 所 述磁控开关 325 为干簧管。 所述分离自毁保护工作部的启动方式为通过所述验 真装置 1000与所述待验真商品 1004固定连接后相对位置的变化启动， 实现对 验真装置 1000内微处理器 1中设定的程序、 指令和加密密钥的自毁保护。
另外， 在本发明的实施例中， 所述光敏触发电路 33是在所述验真装置 1000 被人为拆解时， 由于所述光敏器件 335 见光， 其电阻值会从避光状态下的无穷 大变至很小， 去触发所述光敏触发电路 33工作。 所述拆卸机芯触发开关 35 由 设置在所述电路板 7上串连在一起的数组位于电路板 7的紧固件端头 3452紧压 部位下通过紧固件金属端头 3452 将其连通的防拆卸触点 3451 和所述紧固件 3452组成， 一旦松动任何一个固定所述电路板 7的所述紧固件 3452， 便会导致 串连在一起的所述拆卸机芯触发开关 345 由闭合状态转变成断开状态， 而触发 所述拆卸触发电路 34。所述电池欠压触发电路 35是一个电压比较电路， 当所述 验真装置 1000内设置的所述电池 6的电压降到设定值时，该电路会立即被触发； 所述限次使用触发电路 36的工作原理是：在所述微处理器 1使用到设定次数后， 会立即从所述限次使用信号输出端 17 输出一信号到所述限次使用触发电路 36 的所述触发输入端 363， 立即触发所述限次触发电路 36。 以上触发电路中， 只 要其中至少一个被触发， 会立即启动所塑芯片自毁升压电路 4在所述高压输出 端 42输出高压到所述微处理器 1的所述自毁输入端 15，将所述微处理器 1在瞬 间击穿损坏， 使所述微处理器 1 中的程序、 指令和加密密钥全部销毁， 使所述 验真装置 1000永久失效。
为了使所述验真装置 1000在装配调试过程中， 所述微处理器 1不被自毁， 可在所述芯片自毁升压电路 4的所述电源输入端 41或所述高压输出端 42的通 路中放入一个绝缘软带 （图中没有示出）， 用以防止所述验真装置 1000在装配、 调试过程中所述微处理器 1被自毁。 当所述验真装置 1000装配、 调试完成后， 先对已启动次数进行清" 0"，并与所述待验真商品通过所述密封袋 1003或所述密 封容器 1004进行抽真空或加气压封装处理后， 再从所述验真装置 1000的面板 上将此绝缘软带抽出， 所述芯片自毁升压电路 4便被接通， 此绝缘带采用细小、 轻薄、柔软的绝缘材料，在被抽出后不能再放回已经封装好的所述验真装置 1000 中。
对于本发明的验真检验过程可以参阅图 4， 从图中可以看出， 在对所述待验 真商品的验真检验过程中， 先判别商品密合状态是否失效， 如果没有失效， 检 验者在进行验真时， 需要将所述验真卡 8插入所述验真装置 1000的所述验真卡 插座 16中。 如采用射频识别卡， 只需将射频识别卡靠近所述验真装置 1000即 可， 按动所述启停键 2 ， 使所述验真装置 1000启动工作， 也可判断待验真商品 是否处于所述验真装置 1000的有效保护状态。 如果所述验真装置 1000不能被 启动， 则证明所述验真装置 1000已自毁失效， 将不能进行下述检验， 若所述待 验真商品仍处于所述验真装置 1000的有效保护状态，则自动进行如下检验歩骤： 首先进行验真信息码的识别， 由所述验真装置 1000按设定的程序、 指令对所述 验真卡 8 中的庞大数据信息码进行定地址读取， 提取并排列出分散隐藏在其中 的所述验真信息码； 其次是对所述验真信息码用所述加密密钥进行多重加密运 算。 先由所述验真装置 1000按设定的程序、 指令将所述验真信息码运算成它的 补码、 反码、 首尾颠倒码、 错位码， 再按任意设定的程序、 指令从这些码中选 择其中至少一种， 与设定在所述验真装置 1000中的所述微处理器 1中的加密密 钥进行组合， 并进行包括全加 （有进位）、 半加 （无进位）、 按位全加半加的混 合加和减、 乘、 除在内的运算方法中的单歩加密运算或多歩综合加密运算， 得 出与所述验真信息码完全不同的验真原码。 但这个验真原码不是供验真者识别 的验真代码； 所述验真装置 1000中的所述微处理器 1会将上歩中得到的二进制 验真原码进行二 /十进制或二 /十六进制译码， 得出供显示或播放的验真代码； 同 时， 所述验真装置 1000中所述微处理器 1会将所译出的验真代码发送到所述验 真装置 1000中的所述显示屏 5进行显示或发送到语音电路进行播放， 并同歩显 示验真提示字符、 图像或播放语音提示信息和所述验真装置 1000已累计检验次 数。 验真者将本卡独有的验真代码与显示屏显示的或听到的验真代码进行比对， 并判别两码是否相符， 实现对已验真商品真伪判断； 检验完成后， 验真者可以 通过按动所述验真装置 1000控制面板上的所述启停键 2关机或在设定的关机时 间到达时自动关闭所述验真装置的工作，并将所述验真卡 8从所述验真装置 1000 上拔出。
对于所述验真装置 1000对所述验真卡 8中数据信息码的识别、 加密过程可 以参阅以下实施例说明：
所述验真卡 8 中的所述验真信息码是将随机二进制码随机排列成数据信息 码组， 下表中验真信息码是以四位一组的方式分散排列在大量的随机数据码中;
Figure imgf000012_0001
通过所述微处理器 1中设定的程序、 指令按所述验真卡 8中验真信息码所对 应的地址， 将验真信息码识别并排列出来。 在本实施例中,将验真信息码设定为 六组，分别存储在所述验真卡 8中的 1050号、 3680号、 15606号、 23168号、 57860 号和 153686号地址中；
Figure imgf000012_0002
所述微处理器 1在得到上述验真信息码后通过所述微处理器 1运算出验真 f 息码的补码， 得出的补码再与设定或写入、 寄存在所述微处理器 1中的一组所述 加密密钥进行全加运算， 得出验真原码；
Figure imgf000013_0001
将二进制验真原码进行十六进制译码， 得出所述验真代码。在本实施例中除
0至 9十个阿拉伯数字外， 另将 H、 L、 P、 C、 F、 E的权分别设定为十六进制中的 10、 11、 12、 13、 14和 15。
Figure imgf000013_0002
当然， 通过所述微处理器 1内设定的程序、 指令和密钥对验真卡 8中数据 信息码进行识别、 排列、 加密运算和译码还有好多种方式， 以上的实施例只 是其中的一种。
利用本验真技术， 可组建一个庞大的保真网络。 在操作过程中， 可以分 两个方面着手进行。第一方面是由专门的权威机构制作并发放验真卡 8， 第二 方面是接纳需进行保真的品牌商品制造商进入本保真系统。 由指定的验真装 置 1000制造商向品牌制造商提供验真装置， 再由品牌商品制造商将该验真装 置通过抽真空或加气压处理的方式， 将验真装置 1000密封于待验真商品的密 封袋 1003或是密闭容器 1003中， 形成一个与待验真商品不可分割的整体或将 验真装置 1000与待验真商品 1004密合为一个不可分离的整体后进行销售。 保 真网络的构成是通过发放尽量多的验真卡 8和吸纳尽量多的品牌商品制造商 采用本发明技术。 逐渐从小到大的构建一个庞大的保真网络， 通过运用这一 准确、 高效的保真技术， 可以在已保真商品范围内杜绝假冒商品， 最大限度 的对品牌和消费者的权益进行保护。
现将本发明的具体效果详述如下： 第一： 由于所述验真装置 1000的所述微处理器 1设置有功能完善的自毁保 护电路， 使所述验真装置 1000只有在商品包装没有被破坏的前提下才能实施 验真并得出检测结论。 保证所述验真装置 1000唯真品所独有是通过两个措施 实现的： 其一是， 所述验真装置 1000中所述微处理器 1内设定的检验程序指令 和加密密钥是在微处理器芯片的制造过程中通过掩膜设定或在自毁保护生效 后写入， 不能从外界读取， 在所述验真装置 1000的整个装配调试和使用过程 中都不为人知， 具有很强的保密性； 其二是， 当所述验真装置 1000与所述待 验真商品 1004通过抽真空或加压方式被密封成一体后， 一旦待验真商品的包 装破损， 哪怕只出现一个小针孔， 就会使所述验真装置 1000的所述第二工作 腔 1002与待验真商品包装内的真空或加气压状态立即消失， 所述验真装置 1000在所述包装破损触发电路 31的作用下启动所述芯片自毁升压电路 4，输出 高压到所述微处理器 1的所述自毁输入端 15， 将所述微处理器 1中的检验程序 指令和加密密钥全部销毁。 设置有所述分离自毁保护工作部的所述验真装置 1000内设置有所述磁性物质 326，其与所述待验真商品 1004上设置的所述磁性 物质 326构成磁场平衡状态，所述验真装置 1000与所述待验真商品 1004固定连 接于一体， 在所述两磁性物质 326之间设置有所述磁控开关 325， 所述磁控开 关 325因所述验真装置 1000与所述待验真商品 1004固定连接， 处于平衡磁场 中， 一旦所述验真装置 1000与所述待验真商品 1004发生相对位移， 所述磁控 开关干簧管 325不再处于平衡磁场中， 所述磁控开关 325就会产生状态转换， 以此控制所述分离自毁保护工作部的启动，输出高压到所述微处理器 1中所述 自毁输入端 15， 将所述微处理器 1中的检验程序、 指令和加密密钥全部销毁。 从而达到只有真品在拥有未自毁失效的真品所述验真装置 1000的前提下， 才 能加密出用来确认商品真伪的验真代码。 实现了所述验真装置 1000唯真品所 独有。
第二、 所述验真装置 1000不能被复制或仿制。 复制需要有母体， 仿制也 要有样板。 虽然， 所有硬件是可以根据原理和功能进行仿制的， 但是本发明 的所述验真装置 1000中所述微处理器 1内设定的验真程序、指令和加密密钥除 不能进行盗读外， 还通过完善的自毁保护电路进行保护的， 当密封所述验真 装置 1000和所述待验真商品 1004的所述包装袋 1003或所述包装容器 1003透、 漏气， 或将所述验真装置 1000与所述被验真商品 1004分离或将所述验真装置 1000结构件撬开、 所述拆卸固定电路板 7的所述螺钉 3452、 所述电源 6即将耗 尽或是检测次数达到所述微处理器 1设定的允许使用的验真次数，只要其中至 少一种情况发生， 所述验真装置 1000中相应的触发电路都会触发所述芯片自 毁升压电路 4产生高压将所述微处理器 1内设定的程序、 指令和加密密钥立即 销毁。 通过不能盗读和采用功能完善的自毁保护电路对所述验真装置 1000进 行保护，不给造假者提供造假的母体和样板，使其就不能对所述验真装置 1000 进行复制或仿制。
第三、所述验真装置 1000在脱离真品后不能被重复使用。正如前面所述， 只要所述验真装置 1000脱离真品， 所述微处理器 1内设定的程序、指令和加密 密钥便会立即被销毁， 所述验真装置 1000不再具有任何功能， 实现了所述验 真装置 1000—旦离开真品， 便不能被重复使用。
第四、 功能特殊的所述验真卡 8。 由于所述验真卡 8是用来存储所述随机 数据信息码的，所述验真卡 8在使用过程中需要对卡中存储的数据信息码进行 读取， 所述验真卡 8就会存在一个被盗读的问题。 既然不能回避被盗读， 这就 需要解决当所述验真卡 8被盗读后、 能否识别、 排列出验真信息码的难题。 本 发明解决此难题采用了如下措施： 其一、所述验真卡 8中有用的验真信息码只 占卡中所存储的随机数据信息码的极少一部分， 并且分散隐藏在随机数据信 息码中， 造假者在盗读出所述验真卡 8中存储的全部数据信息码后， 由于不能 得到验真信息码的识别、 排列的程序指令， 也就无法从卡中庞大的数据流中 解分辨出有用的验真信息码。其二、所述验真卡 8中所存储的所有二进制数据 信息码是采用随机编制， 甚至连编码者都不知道下一张卡会自动随机编制出 什么样的数据信息码流。但是， 在所述验真卡 8内被写入大量随机数据信息码 后， 可通过编码者手中的与所述验真装置 1000所设定的程序、 指令和加密密 钥相同的读卡器读出该卡所独有的所述验真代码， 并印制或密封在所述验真 卡 8上， 供持卡者进行验真时作为真伪判别的唯一依据。此措施使造假者无法 跟踪编码程序。 其三、 将所述验真卡 8接入所述验真装置 1000并启动验真后， 只有所述真品验真装置 1000才能迅速按设定的程序、指令对所述验真卡 8中的 庞大数据信息码进行定地址读取，提取出分散隐藏在其中的所述验真信息码， 实现对所述验真信息码的识别和排列。 其四、 所述验真信息码可以是也可以 不是所述验真代码的原码， 如果所述验真信息码不是验真原码， 就必须经过 所述验真装置 1000按设定的程序、指令将验真信息码运算成它的补码、反码、 首尾颠倒码、 错位码， 再按任意设定的程序、 指令从这些码中选择其中至少 一种， 与设定在所述验真装置 1000中的所述微处理器 1中的加密密钥进行组 合， 并进行包括全加 （有进位）、 半加 （无进位）、 按位全加半加的混合加和 减、 乘、 除在内的运算方法中的单歩运算或多歩综合运算， 得出与验真信息 码完全不同的验真原码。所述验真装置 1000中的所述微处理器 1会进一歩将上 歩中得到的二进制验真原码， 进行二 /十进制或二 /十六进制译码， 所译出的十 进制或十六进制码再通过所述验真装置 1000上的显示屏显示出来后， 才是供 验真者进行比对的所述验真代码。这个显示的代码已经与验真卡 8中的数据信 息码有本质上的区别了。 要得出所述验真原码， 就必须经过所述真品验真装 置 1000按照预先设定的程序、指令对所述验真卡 8中的数据流进行识别、排列 和加权运算才能实现。这样就使造假者即使盗读出所述验真卡 8中存储的原始 数据信息码，也不可能比对或反推出所述验真装置 1000是通过什么样的程序、 指令和加密方式对所述验真卡 8中的原始数据信息码进行识别、排列和加密处 理的。
第五、 造假者不会复制或仿制所述验真卡 8。 造假者若将所述验真卡 8中 所存储的随机数据码进行原样复制， 也绝不会将赝品验成真品， 这是帮真品 造卡， 造假者是不会去实施的； 若造假者以重新编一套码存储在卡中的方式 进行仿制， 这种假卡遇到真品验真装置 1000时， 真品验真装置 1000无法从假 卡中识别、 排列出验真信息码并加密出验真代码的原码， 会立即暴露假卡， 并且造假者无法跟踪和取得真验真卡已编制出的每张卡所独有的所述验真代 码。 另外， 造假者伪造出的卡因为不能进入正规的发放渠道， 不是专门指定 机构发出的卡， 也不会有人接受。
第六、 在本发明实际应用过程中， 为了使本技术能长期发挥良好的保真 效果， 在必要的情况下， 所述验真代码可以随时自动升级。 升级时只须改动 所述验真装置 1000内所述微处理器 1所设定的程序、指令和加密密钥， 并可对 所述验真代码进行增位或缩位处理， 所述验真卡 8可不予改动， 持卡者只须到 发卡机构重新读卡或是到已经升级后的商品上去读卡， 由持卡者记下属于自 己独有的升级版验真代码就可方便的实现升级。 在升级过渡期内， 旧版验真 装置与升级版验真装置可并行使用。
本发明带自毁保护功能的商品验真装置和验真方法应用领域广泛， 适用 商品种类多； 并可扩展到物流领域， 对运输过程中的物品进行保真， 能有效 防止运输过程中的物品被调换； 本发明带自毁保护功能的商品验真装置 1000 采用的超微功耗微处理器 1， 其待机电流在毫微安数量级， 封固在内的电池寿 命可达数年之久。 随着科技的进歩， 通过采用功耗更低的微处理器及容量更 大、 自放电更小的电池， 也会大大延长本发明所述验真装置 1000验真功能的 保持时间， 加之在所述电池 6的电能即将耗尽之前， 所述电源欠压触发电路 35 也会触发所述芯片自毁升压电路 4产生高压销毁所述微处理器 1中的程序指令 和加密密钥， 从而防止所述验真装置 1000经长期存放后或人为使所述电池 6 失效而被盗用或仿冒。
在本实施例中， 带自毁保护功能的商品验真装置 1000中可根据气压变化 实现伸、 缩的所述密封隔膜 316为球面型具弹性的橡胶膜， 当然， 也可以将所 述隔膜 316设计成当在该密封隔膜一侧施加正压或负压后能实现伸展或收缩， 在正压或负压消失后又能恢复到正常形态的其它材质的任何形状和结构的密 封隔膜。 在保证能实现触发自毁的情况下， 本发明所述验真装置 1000中除必 须使用所述包装破损触发电路 31或所述磁平衡分离触发电路 32外， 还可以采 用所述光敏触发电路 33、 所述拆卸机芯触发电路 34、 所述欠压触发电路 35以 及所述限次使用触发电路 36另四种触发电路的其中一种以及一种以上； 对某 些特殊商品或应客户要求， 也可以采用声音告知方式代替显示屏显示的方式 表明验真结论， 比如当所述验真装置 1000在验真完成时， 所述验真装置 1000 上的发声装置会立即将加密出的验真代码等信息读出， 供验真者进行判别。 此时只要将原供显示的验真代码改成语音提示信号， 并将显示电路和显示屏 改为功放电路和微功耗电声器件即可； 启动所述验真装置 1000工作的手动按 键 2也可以改为在所述验真装置 1000中所述验真卡插座 16内的一触动开关，当 所述验真卡 8的插入插座 16内时可以同歩启动所述验真装置 1000工作，并在验 真结束时拔出所述验真卡 8后自动关闭所述验真装置 1000;所述验真装置 1000 内的所述第一工作腔 1001内气压也可以是非外界大气压， 只要能保障当所述 第二工作腔 1002内气压发生变化时能使所述密封隔膜 316实现伸、缩， 并启动 所述包装破损触发电路 31工作即可。
在本实施例中还可在所述验真卡 8上设置验真结果的显示装置， 实现验 真结果分别在所述验真装置 1000上和所述验真卡 8上单独显示或在所述验真 装置 1000和所述验真卡 8上同时显示。
上述详细描述仅是示范性描述， 本领域技术人员在不脱离本发明所保护 的范围和精神的情况下， 可根据不同的实际需要设计出各种实施方式。

Claims

权 利 要 求
1.一种具有自毁保护功能的验真装置，其特征在于：所述验真装置（1000) 设置有自毁保护工作部和对待验真物质 （1004) 进行识别的验真工作部， 所 述验真装置 （1000) 与待验真物质 （1004) 协同使用。
2.根据权利要求 1所述验真装置， 其特征在于： 所述验真装置 （1000) 与所述待验真物质 （1004) 为一体式结构； 所述一体式结构的实现方式为将 所述验真装置 （1000) 与所述待验真物质 （1004) 采用加气压或减气压的方 式借助载体 （1003 ) 密封于一体或将所述验真装置 （1000) 与所述待验真物 质 （1004) 固定连接为一体。
3.根据权利要求 1所述验真装置， 其特征在于： 所述自毁工作部包括气 压变化自毁保护工作部或分离自毁保护工作部； 其中， 所述气压变化自毁保 护工作部的启动方式为通过所述密封载体 （1003 ) 内气压的变化启动。
4.根据权利要求 1所述验真装置， 其特征在于： 所述自毁工作部包括气 压变化自毁保护工作部或分离自毁保护工作部； 其中， 所述分离自毁保护工 作部的启动方式为通过所述验真装置 （1000) 与所述待验真物质 （1004) 固 定连接后相对位置的变化启动。
5.根据权利要求 3所述验真装置， 其特征在于： 设置有所述气压变化自 毁保护工作部的所述验真装置 （1000) 通过可根据气压变化实现伸、 缩的中 间介质（316)将所述验真装置（1000)分隔成第一工作腔（1001 )和第二工 作腔（ 1002);所述第一工作腔（ 1001 )与外界大气相通，所述第二工作腔（ 1002) 与承载所述待验真物质（1004)的载体（1003 )相连通，并与所述载体（1003 ) 采用加气压或减气压的方式密封为一整体； 所述中间介质（316)受所述第二 工作腔 （1002) 内气压大小变化控制， 实现伸、 缩， 以此控制所述气压变化 自毁保护工作部的启动。
6.根据权利要求 4所述验真装置， 其特征在于： 设置有所述分离自毁保 护工作部的所述验真装置 （1000) 内设置有磁性物质 （326)， 其与所述待验 真物质（1004)上设置的磁性物质（326)构成磁场平衡状态， 所述验真装置 ( 1000)与所述待验真物质（1004)固定连接为一体，在所述两磁性物质（326) 之间设置有磁控开关（325)， 所述磁控开关（325)受所述磁场平衡状态变化 控制， 实现状态转换， 以此控制所述分离自毁保护工作部的启动。
7.根据权利要求 1所述验真装置， 其特征在于： 还包括验真介质 （8)， 所述验真工作部与所述验真介质 （8) 协同使用， 所述验真介质 （8) 内存储 有随机信息， 在所述随机信息内隐藏有所述验真介质 （8) 所有的验真信息。
8.根据权利要求 1所述验真装置， 其特征在于： 所述验真装置 （1000) 具体包括：
用于存储所述随机信息的所述验真介质 （8);
用于按照设定规则读取、 识别、 加密运算所述验真介质（8) 内所述验真 信息的微处理器 （1);
用于对所述微处理器 （1) 进行自毁保护的自毁保护电路 （4)、 用于控制所述自毁保护电路 （4) 工作的自毁触发电路 （3)、
用于显示或播放识别信息的装置（5)和用于实现上述电路和装置工作的 电源 （6)。
9.根据权利要求 8所述验真装置， 其特征在于： 所述自毁触发电路 （3) 的输出端 （312、 322、 332、 342、 352、 362) 与所述自毁保护电路（4) 的受 控输入端（43)连接， 所述自毁触发电路（3)包括包装破损触发电路（31)、 磁平衡分离触发电路（32)、 光敏触发电路（33)、 拆卸触发电路（34)、 电源 欠压触发电路 （35) 和限次使用触发电路 （36) 的其中至少一种；
其中：
所述包装破损触发电路（31)的输入端连接有包装破损触发装置（315); 所述磁平衡分离触发电路 （32) 的输入端连接有磁平衡传感器 （325); 所述光敏触发电路 （33) 的输入端连接有光敏传感器 （335);
所述拆卸触发电路 （34) 的输入端连接有拆卸触发装置 （345);
所述电源欠压触发电路（35)的输入端（351)与电源输出端（61)连接； 所述限次使用触发电路 （36) 的输入端 （363) 与所述微处理器 （1) 的 限次使用输出端 （17) 连接。
10.根据权利要求 8 所述验真装置， 其特征在于： 所述自毁保护电路 (4) 为自毁升压电路或存储、 寄存信息删除电路。
11.一种具有自毁保护功能的验真方法， 其特征在于： 对与所述待验真物 质 （1004) 密封或固定连接成一整体后的所述验真装置 （1000) 借助所述验 真介质 （8) 进行检验， 具体包括歩骤：
A. 将所述验真介质 （8) 置于所述验真装置 （1000) 的协同工作状态；
B. 通过所述验真装置 （1000) 中所述验真工作部进行运算，从所述验真 介质 (8)中检验出验真代码；
C. 输出检验结果。
12.根据权利要求 11所述检验方法，其特征在于：所述歩骤 A包括子歩骤： A1. 查验所述待验真物质 （1004) 与所述验真装置 （1000) 是否共同处 于有效工作状态；
A2. 将所述验真介质 （8) 置于所述验真装置 （1000) 协同工作状态； A3. 启动所述验真装置 （1000)上设置的启停控制键 (2)， 使所述验真装 置 （1000) 进入工作状态。
13.根据权利要求 11所述检验方法， 其特征在于： 所述歩骤 B包括子歩骤： B1.通过所述验真装置 （1000) 上设置的所述微处理器 (1)按设定的程序、 指令从所述验真介质 （8) 中读取、 识别并排列出所述验真信息码；
B2.通过所述微处理器 (1)按设定的程序、 指令对所述验真信息码进行加 密运算，得到验真原码；
B3.将所述验真原码进行译码， 得到验真代码；
B4.将所述验真代码由验真者确认是否与所持有的所述验真介质 （8) 所 独有的所述验真代码相符。
14.根据权利要求 11所述检验方法，其特征在于：所述歩骤 C包括显示输出 和 /或语音输出。
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CN101290652A (zh) 2008-10-22
US7954697B2 (en) 2011-06-07
EP2133812A1 (en) 2009-12-16
EP2133812A4 (en) 2011-11-09
JP2010521753A (ja) 2010-06-24
US20100032478A1 (en) 2010-02-11
CN101290652B (zh) 2011-04-20

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