WO2007060323A1 - Scelle de haute securite inviolable et reutilisable champ d’application de l’invention - Google Patents

Scelle de haute securite inviolable et reutilisable champ d’application de l’invention Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2007060323A1
WO2007060323A1 PCT/FR2006/002564 FR2006002564W WO2007060323A1 WO 2007060323 A1 WO2007060323 A1 WO 2007060323A1 FR 2006002564 W FR2006002564 W FR 2006002564W WO 2007060323 A1 WO2007060323 A1 WO 2007060323A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
seal
authenticators
authenticating
opening
new
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/FR2006/002564
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Francis Bourrieres
Clément KAISER
Franck Bourrieres
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Novatec SA
Original Assignee
Novatec SA
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Novatec SA filed Critical Novatec SA
Priority to US12/088,916 priority Critical patent/US7726708B2/en
Priority to CN2006800433923A priority patent/CN101313118B/zh
Priority to EP06831153.9A priority patent/EP1951974B1/fr
Priority to JP2008541788A priority patent/JP5006333B2/ja
Priority to BRPI0618427-8A priority patent/BRPI0618427A2/pt
Publication of WO2007060323A1 publication Critical patent/WO2007060323A1/fr
Priority to TNP2008000149A priority patent/TNSN08149A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G09EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09FDISPLAYING; ADVERTISING; SIGNS; LABELS OR NAME-PLATES; SEALS
    • G09F3/00Labels, tag tickets, or similar identification or indication means; Seals; Postage or like stamps
    • G09F3/02Forms or constructions
    • G09F3/03Forms or constructions of security seals
    • G09F3/0376Forms or constructions of security seals using a special technique to detect tampering, e.g. by ultrasonic or optical means
    • EFIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E05LOCKS; KEYS; WINDOW OR DOOR FITTINGS; SAFES
    • E05BLOCKS; ACCESSORIES THEREFOR; HANDCUFFS
    • E05B39/00Locks giving indication of authorised or unauthorised unlocking
    • EFIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E05LOCKS; KEYS; WINDOW OR DOOR FITTINGS; SAFES
    • E05BLOCKS; ACCESSORIES THEREFOR; HANDCUFFS
    • E05B73/00Devices for locking portable objects against unauthorised removal; Miscellaneous locking devices
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06KGRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • GPHYSICS
    • G09EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09FDISPLAYING; ADVERTISING; SIGNS; LABELS OR NAME-PLATES; SEALS
    • G09F3/00Labels, tag tickets, or similar identification or indication means; Seals; Postage or like stamps
    • G09F3/02Forms or constructions
    • G09F3/03Forms or constructions of security seals
    • GPHYSICS
    • G09EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09FDISPLAYING; ADVERTISING; SIGNS; LABELS OR NAME-PLATES; SEALS
    • G09F3/00Labels, tag tickets, or similar identification or indication means; Seals; Postage or like stamps
    • G09F3/02Forms or constructions
    • G09F3/03Forms or constructions of security seals
    • G09F3/0305Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used
    • G09F3/0347Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used having padlock-type sealing means
    • GPHYSICS
    • G09EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09FDISPLAYING; ADVERTISING; SIGNS; LABELS OR NAME-PLATES; SEALS
    • G09F3/00Labels, tag tickets, or similar identification or indication means; Seals; Postage or like stamps
    • G09F3/02Forms or constructions
    • G09F3/03Forms or constructions of security seals
    • G09F3/0305Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used
    • G09F3/0347Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used having padlock-type sealing means
    • G09F3/0352Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used having padlock-type sealing means using cable lock
    • GPHYSICS
    • G09EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09FDISPLAYING; ADVERTISING; SIGNS; LABELS OR NAME-PLATES; SEALS
    • G09F3/00Labels, tag tickets, or similar identification or indication means; Seals; Postage or like stamps
    • G09F3/02Forms or constructions
    • G09F3/03Forms or constructions of security seals
    • G09F3/0394Forms or constructions of security seals with violation indication by generating a random number
    • EFIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E05LOCKS; KEYS; WINDOW OR DOOR FITTINGS; SAFES
    • E05BLOCKS; ACCESSORIES THEREFOR; HANDCUFFS
    • E05B73/00Devices for locking portable objects against unauthorised removal; Miscellaneous locking devices
    • E05B73/0005Devices for locking portable objects against unauthorised removal; Miscellaneous locking devices using chains, cables or the like
    • YGENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y10TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC
    • Y10TTECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER US CLASSIFICATION
    • Y10T292/00Closure fasteners
    • Y10T292/48Seals
    • YGENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y10TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC
    • Y10TTECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER US CLASSIFICATION
    • Y10T292/00Closure fasteners
    • Y10T292/48Seals
    • Y10T292/507Tag type
    • YGENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y10TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC
    • Y10TTECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER US CLASSIFICATION
    • Y10T292/00Closure fasteners
    • Y10T292/48Seals
    • Y10T292/509Encasing

Definitions

  • the invention aims to provide a reusable seal of high security reusable without any alteration or destruction of its mechanism and to prove its opening.
  • This type of seal may be used: either to control and prove the non-intrusion into a link or system or the non-infringement of the integrity of an object or its contents by an unauthorized person, or on the contrary to be open by an agent to control and prove his passage.
  • the name system is taken in the broad sense, it may be for example a set of elements associated with each other or a packaging or any packaging such as a bottle with for example the need to preserve the integrity of the content, and it can be an information system dealing with sensitive data.
  • the present invention is more particularly aimed at these fields of application as will be seen hereinafter.
  • the oldest seal is the wax seal, usually stamped with the seal of the Authority.
  • metal or plastic seals incorporating an identifier in the form of a progressive tightening collar. These seals are not reusable because their destruction is irremediable when there is a violation of the place or the system to be protected.
  • metal seals in the form of fluted wire called "beaded” and whose two ends are crimped into a piece of soft metal, usually lead with a special clip that marks a relief seal said piece of lead, this is also generally called a sealing.
  • the latter type of seal is often used on meters of water, gas, electricity, to prohibit access to the metering device that it is mechanical or electronic.
  • seals or identification media have two major drawbacks: the first is that they are very easily reproducible identically with summary means including the authenticating element or seal, it is also possible to obtain them in large quantities on the market; the second is the substitution of an object or system to be protected.
  • the connection between the seal or the support and the parts which must be forbidden separation or opening is ineffective and can be easily destroyed by keeping intact the seal or the support. This is for example a bonding that can be dissolved by a suitable chemical or solvent and that will allow to recover the seal, to access the prohibited area and reposition the seal in the same place as before and thus having accessed or modified data without anyone noticing it. It also becomes possible to substitute a seal of an original product for a copy and thus to pass a copy for an original.
  • the holograms are not individualized, that is to say that they are all identical to each other for the same series and because of this, it becomes easy for an unauthorized person to obtain these holograms, to open the housing to be protected by destroying the hologram and replacing it with a new one in all respects identical. In the case where it is not possible to obtain the hologram, the counterfeiter can still take off the housing without destroying it and put it back in the same way.
  • the security seal must firstly prevent the compromise of physical access of the container to the content and secondly to reveal this compromise when, nevertheless, it has produced.
  • a security seal is not intended to make impossible attacks against a system or access to any place or container, however if it is well designed and well integrated on the product or the place to protect, it will dissuade the striker wishing to not leave a trace. It is primarily a defense, which means is able to highlight an attempt to undermine the physical integrity of the system or the object on which it is mounted.
  • the so-called security seal can take many forms.
  • a seal is in fact a physical means of achieving an authenticated union between himself and one or more elements by an Authority which will mark the seal of its seal (state seal for example).
  • Patent FR2848698 of the same applicant and inventor relates to a method of identification and authentication without a specific reader of an object or a living being.
  • this document does not refer to a non-intrusion verification system in a system or a place to protect or not to the integrity of an object which is precisely the object of this invention.
  • the method described in document FR2848698 does not in any way guarantee the non-opening of a system or a place to protect.
  • WO 01/11591 discloses a device for identifying objects. This identifier has the particularity of having a lens matrix that generates a three-dimensional optical effect, which does not mean that it is not reproducible. What is disclosed herein differs completely from the present invention essentially in that:
  • this identifier does not guarantee the highlighting of the opening or the intrusion of the object or the place to protect. -
  • the identifier described in this document is reproducible to infinity since it is based on a manufacturing process certainly complex but quite controlled. Therefore the uniqueness of this identifier is not assured. the identifier is not associated with a database.
  • the document EP 1087334 describes a seals system using a transponder which makes it possible to contain an electronic identification and remotely searchable.
  • This type of transponder is not unique since it is quite possible for a person or an organization having means of production to produce several having the same number. Therefore, it is quite possible to open the described device to access its contents and to reconstruct a set of two identical capsules to the first responses with a transponder giving the same answer as the first.
  • the flaw of this type of device is throughout the chain of supply of capsules and transponders, if a person or a malicious organization can divert parts, it will be able to reconstruct the seal identical to the first.
  • this type of seal is not reusable in case of opening.
  • the non-intrusion method relies on a unique and non-reproducible authenticator registered in a database, therefore, even if a person succeeds in stealing authenticators, these will have no use because they will not be saved in the database.
  • WO02 / 33682A discloses a reusable seal whose passage from the closed position to the open position involves the activation of a random electronic code generator. Reading this code on a display shows that the seal has been opened if the code has changed or, conversely, has not been opened if the code has not changed. If the objectives of this patent are identical to those of the present invention, not only the means are different but also the results in terms of security are much higher in the developed invention. Indeed the proof of the non-opening is made in this patent by reading an electronic display, or such a display can be reproduced identically from the knowledge of code generation algorithms.
  • this reusable seal may be substituted by another identical in all respects whose display may show a code identical to the original but whose programming has been performed by a counterfeit internal electronic system providing codes to the request. It is therefore quite impossible to interchange this type of seal with another authenticating characteristics in all respects identical.
  • US-A-4118057 discloses a reusable seal whose authenticating characteristic part is provided by the random arrangement of the balls of different colors appearing in a window.
  • the extremely high number of combinations makes it possible to affirm that it is impossible to reproduce two identical combinations and consequently to make sure of the opening or not of the seal.
  • the system is completely mechanical, there is no electronics, the substitution of a seal by another sealed in all respects identical and providing the same arrangement of beads is theoretically possible because the balls themselves are perfectly reproducible in size and in color. As a result, it is sufficient to access the viewing window and to position balls in identical ways. In this sense, if it may seem difficult to modify the device in use, it is always easy to prepare another similar device which will be prepared in advance an identical arrangement of the authenticating part, that is to say ie the identical positioning of colored beads.
  • the invention aims to provide a global solution to all three problems that arise in the use of seals, namely:
  • the high security seal according to the invention is reusable indefinitely over time, while allowing to detect and prove its opening and closing which corresponds to a new reuse.
  • Its essential feature constituting the heart of the invention lies in the fact that it provides a new authenticating characteristic each time it is opened and therefore it is closed again to be put into service. It is characterized in that it incorporates a device allowing the uncontrolled evolution of its authenticating characteristic at each change of state, that is to say during the transition from the closed to open position (Fig IA) canceling the characteristic preceding authenticator and from the open to closed position (FIG. 1B) restoring a new authenticating characteristic thanks to the chaotic self-generation of new authenticating characteristics caused by said change of state.
  • Each authenticating characteristic is stored in a secure memory or reference database in order to prove whether there has been opening or attempt to open said seal.
  • the joint and stable action of the non-reproducible individual authenticators 1, 2 makes it possible to generate a new common authenticator 15, 16, 17 totally random, depending on the relative position of said individual authenticators 1, 2.
  • the separate and unstable action of the authenticators 1, 2 is generated by at least one relative movement of an authenticator with respect to the other (s).
  • the new common authenticator 15, 16, 17 generated by the new position of the individual authenticators 1, 2 makes it possible to create a new code or signature whose representation is stored in a local database and / or distant.
  • the unique and non-reproducible authenticating characteristics of the individual authenticators 1, 2 come from a chaotic process.
  • the authenticating characteristics are self-generated visible bubbles in the material.
  • this chaotic process may be the formation of bubbles during the hardening of the material constituting said authenticator.
  • a transparent material having heterogeneities dispersed randomly in the volume.
  • These heterogeneities that can be distinguished visually are captured for example in the form of a photograph and one or more representations characterizing this form of identifier are stored in a memory or a database either in the form of a two-dimensional image or in numerical form calculated from remarkable elements, positioning, dimension, etc. heterogeneities embedded in the volume, the two forms of image and digital representation can coexist.
  • transparent individual volume authenticators are used in glass, ceramic, plastic or polymer containing visible bubbles whose number, shape and layout are the result of a chaotic self-generation which can not be controlled by the man.
  • This type of authenticator is particularly interesting because it is always unique and not clonable by the man.
  • EPOl 904039.3 of the same applicant and the same inventors suggests this type of bubble authenticator with an appropriate reading system.
  • this bubble authenticator it is a matter of using this bubble authenticator in a particular method whose purpose or purpose is to block or prohibit access to systems or places or to verify the integrity or the identity with associated information of an original object.
  • a representation in the form of an image and / or digital image is stored in a database so as to verify the integrity of the authenticating characteristic.
  • the memory and / or the database in which a representation of the authenticating characteristic is stored is physically located in the system and / or the location to be protected and / or on the support itself but whose content may be read from outside by an authorized person.
  • This representation of the authenticator constitutes a key to access the physical system and / or logical information.
  • the authenticated features reader stores the reading made during the last pass and automatically compares it with the new one. In case of discrepancy, an audible or light signal warns the controller which means that there has been opening.
  • each seal may be associated with an identifier in the form of a barcode or electronic (RFID) thus constituting an address in the database so as to make comparisons easier.
  • the representation of the authenticator in the form of an image and / or digital representation is searchable by an Internet-type telecommunication network.
  • the content stored in digital form and / or image can be accessed by a controller or authorized agent in several ways.
  • a first way is to visually compare the image representation stored in the local and / or remote database with the authenticator physics by analyzing the similarity of positioning of bubbles or heterogeneities.
  • the database is not local but remote
  • a call code constituting the identifier of the Pauthentifier in the remote database is used, the call code can be numeric, alphanumeric, barcode magnetic stripe, electronic chip, etc. It is obvious that the local or remote database is secured or protected against any attempt to modify or replace by other information.
  • the non-intrusion verification method in a system or a place to protect or not to compromise the integrity of an object according to the invention is carried out by automatic comparison of the authenticator, with the aid of an appropriate reader, with its digital representation stored in a local or remote database.
  • the authenticating representation stored in a database will evolve with each new use of the seal, it is also this correspondence between what is stored in the database and what is actually noted on the seal which makes it possible to attest that the seal has not been opened.
  • FIG 1 there is shown a device according to a preferred embodiment of the invention, this being only a non-limiting example.
  • Fig IA shows the device open and free.
  • Figure 1B shows the closed and blocked device.
  • Figure IC is a top view of the device showing the authenticating part.
  • a lid (4) has a transparent bubble generator (2) (8) generated chaotically.
  • This authenticator (2) is fixed on the cover (4) comprising a viewing window (7).
  • the body (3) comprises an authenticator (1) transparent but whose background is reflective, for example silver.
  • the bubbles (8) were generated chaotically.
  • In the body (3) is provided a countersink (10) in which balls (11) can freely move. On the balls (11) is placed the authenticator (1) which can move freely on the balls within the limits of its housing.
  • the fastener (5) is the link that binds the security seal as a whole to the object or the container to protect.
  • This link (5) is separable from the seal via the device (12) placed blindly in its housing (13). To remove the link (5) in order to open the container or to reach the protected system, it is necessary to match the passage (14) of the cover (4) with the corresponding part of the body (3).
  • the cover (4) is sufficiently unscrewed from the body (3) so that on the one hand it is possible to remove the link (5) from the body (4) in which it is a prisoner in order to match the opening (14) with the housing (13) and secondly, to separate the authenticators (1) and (2).
  • the authenticator (1) completely free on the balls (11) will move and occupy an unstable random position that will change permanently at the slightest action exerted on the system.
  • Authenticators (1) and (2) are inaccessible from the outside.
  • the lid (4) is in the closed and locked position. In this position, the link (5) is completely prisoner of the body (3) closed by the cover (4).
  • This position also makes it possible to block the authenticators (1) and (2) by pressure and thus stabilize the authenticator (1) which was mobile during the open position.
  • This locked position necessarily corresponds a new relative and stable position of the authenticators (1) and (2) which is different from the previous stable position, which makes it possible to prove that to access a new stable relative position of the authenticators it is necessary to to have unlocked the lid (4).
  • Each stable position being recorded in a database by reading the associated position of the bubbles of the two transparent authenticators, it becomes easy and easy to compare any new relative positions of bubbles and thus to prove the opening leading to this change.
  • FIG. 2 shows a photograph taken in application of the present invention showing the starting position of each of the authenticators (1) and (2) then successively associated in (15), (16) and (17) after three unlocking and reblocking , thus showing the different combinations providing different signatures.
  • this type of seal may be used to carry out passage control by agents in monitored areas, for example by returning a new signature from the opening of the seal to the database with the aid of a reader.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Collating Specific Patterns (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
PCT/FR2006/002564 2005-11-23 2006-11-20 Scelle de haute securite inviolable et reutilisable champ d’application de l’invention Ceased WO2007060323A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (6)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US12/088,916 US7726708B2 (en) 2005-11-23 2006-11-20 Tamper-proof and reusable high security seal
CN2006800433923A CN101313118B (zh) 2005-11-23 2006-11-20 防篡改和可重复使用的高安全性封闭物
EP06831153.9A EP1951974B1 (fr) 2005-11-23 2006-11-20 Scelle de haute securite inviolable et reutilisable
JP2008541788A JP5006333B2 (ja) 2005-11-23 2006-11-20 改ざん防止および再使用可能な高安全性シール
BRPI0618427-8A BRPI0618427A2 (pt) 2005-11-23 2006-11-20 lacre de alta segurança - reutilizável e a prova de adulterações
TNP2008000149A TNSN08149A1 (fr) 2005-11-23 2008-04-01 Scelle de haute securite inviolable et reutilisable champ d'application de l'invention

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR0511835A FR2893595B1 (fr) 2005-11-23 2005-11-23 Scelle de haute securite inviolable et reutilisable
FR0511835 2005-11-23

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2007060323A1 true WO2007060323A1 (fr) 2007-05-31

Family

ID=36889123

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/FR2006/002564 Ceased WO2007060323A1 (fr) 2005-11-23 2006-11-20 Scelle de haute securite inviolable et reutilisable champ d’application de l’invention

Country Status (13)

Country Link
US (1) US7726708B2 (https=)
EP (1) EP1951974B1 (https=)
JP (1) JP5006333B2 (https=)
KR (1) KR20080077226A (https=)
CN (1) CN101313118B (https=)
BR (1) BRPI0618427A2 (https=)
FR (1) FR2893595B1 (https=)
MA (1) MA29877B1 (https=)
RU (1) RU2384895C1 (https=)
TN (1) TNSN08149A1 (https=)
TR (1) TR200803287T2 (https=)
WO (1) WO2007060323A1 (https=)
ZA (1) ZA200803267B (https=)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP2068268A1 (de) 2007-12-07 2009-06-10 F. Hoffman-la Roche AG Codierung von pharmazeutischen Behältnissen durch Zufallsstrukturen
ITLU20100013A1 (it) * 2010-10-06 2012-04-07 Cosimo Antonio Prete Metodo per verificare autenticita' e integrita' di un prodotto con parti realizzate tramite fusione e solidificazione di materiali che assume disposizione caotica

Families Citing this family (28)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US8171567B1 (en) 2002-09-04 2012-05-01 Tracer Detection Technology Corp. Authentication method and system
US7913870B2 (en) 2005-05-10 2011-03-29 Pactiv Corporation Tamper evident container
FR2895125B1 (fr) 2005-12-21 2008-12-12 Novatec Sa Procede d'authentification de documents et dispositif de lecture desdits documents a des fins d'enregistrement pour preuve
US10220986B2 (en) * 2009-03-06 2019-03-05 Pactiv Corporation Tamper evident container with full tab
CN102625669B (zh) 2009-06-08 2015-09-23 核磁共振成像介入技术有限公司 能够近实时地跟踪和生成柔性体内装置的动态可视化的mri导向的介入系统
WO2010148083A2 (en) 2009-06-16 2010-12-23 Surgivision, Inc. Mri-guided devices and mri-guided interventional systems that can track and generate dynamic visualizations of the devices in near real time
DE102010033181A1 (de) * 2010-08-03 2012-02-09 Eppendorf Ag Verfahren zum Wiedererkennen eines verwechselbaren Gegenstands
US8469282B2 (en) * 2011-03-21 2013-06-25 James Freeman Optically readable identification security tag or stamp
US8985471B2 (en) * 2011-10-12 2015-03-24 James Freeman Optically readable identification security tag or stamp
EP2998949B1 (en) 2013-03-12 2018-10-24 Arizona Board of Regents, a Body Corporate of the State of Arizona acting for and on behalf of Arizona State University Dendritic structures and tags as physical unclonable function for anti-counterfeiting
CN103198759B (zh) * 2013-03-26 2017-04-19 北京科杰华乐科技有限公司 一种防伪标签及其制备方法
WO2016073910A1 (en) 2014-11-07 2016-05-12 Arizona Board Of Regents On Behalf Of Arizona State University Information coding in dendritic structures and tags
US10152666B2 (en) * 2015-01-15 2018-12-11 The United States Of America, As Represented By The Secretary Of Commerce Authentication article and process for making same
EP3089118B1 (de) * 2015-04-29 2018-11-14 3S Simons Security Systems GmbH Zugangsberechtigungssystem umfassend wenigstens eine Anordnung von mehreren Mikropartikeln und wenigstens eine Identifizierungseinheit
JPWO2016185977A1 (ja) * 2015-05-19 2018-03-08 日本電気硝子株式会社 真贋認証用ガラスチップ及びその製造方法
JP7048064B2 (ja) * 2016-09-30 2022-04-05 株式会社環境レジリエンス 個別認証媒体を用いた個別認証システム
EP3639188A4 (en) 2017-06-16 2021-03-17 Arizona Board of Regents on behalf of Arizona State University POLARIZED SCANNING OF DENDRITIC IDENTIFICATORS
CN109118942B (zh) * 2017-06-22 2024-04-26 杭州沃朴物联科技有限公司 一种基于微量随机气泡的防伪标签
WO2019210129A1 (en) 2018-04-26 2019-10-31 Kozicki Michael N Fabrication of dendritic structures and tags
US11580885B2 (en) * 2018-09-28 2023-02-14 Honeywell International Inc. Tamper proof seal assembly
US20210393621A1 (en) 2018-10-26 2021-12-23 The Research Foundation For The State University Of New York Combination serotonin specific reuptake inhibitor and serotonin 1a receptor partial agonist for reducing l-dopa-induced dyskinesia
US11087643B2 (en) * 2018-11-21 2021-08-10 Honeywell International Inc. Smart seal assembly
CN110634210B (zh) * 2019-07-04 2022-05-10 国网浙江省电力有限公司湖州供电公司 一种基于移动作业终端的可复用计量电子封印及启封方法
WO2022056300A1 (en) 2020-09-10 2022-03-17 Arizona Board Of Regents On Behalf Of Arizona State University Authentication of dendritic structures
EP4095836A1 (en) * 2021-05-25 2022-11-30 The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), represented by the European Commission A sealing system and use thereof, a kit of parts and a method of assembling the kit of parts, and a method of sealing an item
WO2023069471A1 (en) 2021-10-18 2023-04-27 Arizona Board Of Regents On Behalf Of Arizona State University Authentication of identifiers by light scattering
US12486697B2 (en) * 2023-05-04 2025-12-02 Shenzhen Wins Electronic Technology Co., Ltd. Cable lock with locator
CN220434483U (zh) * 2023-05-04 2024-02-02 深圳市双盈运动科技有限公司 用于金属丝标签锁的定位装置

Citations (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4118057A (en) * 1978-02-24 1978-10-03 The United States Of America As Represented By The United States Department Of Energy Reusable, tamper-indicating seal
GB2304077A (en) * 1995-06-30 1997-03-12 Andrew John Farrall Security device comprising reflective particles
GB2324065A (en) * 1997-04-09 1998-10-14 James Howard Slater An identification code for banknotes or credit cards comprising a pattern of random beads
WO2001011591A1 (en) * 1999-08-07 2001-02-15 Epigem Limited An optical display composite
WO2002033682A2 (en) * 2000-10-19 2002-04-25 Encrypta Electronics Limited Seal
US20030014647A1 (en) * 2000-02-04 2003-01-16 Francis Bourrieres Method and device for reading authentication means and adapted identification means

Family Cites Families (12)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4389063A (en) * 1981-06-23 1983-06-21 The United States Of America As Represented By The United States Department Of Energy Reusable tamper-indicating security seal
CA2183979A1 (en) * 1994-02-28 1995-08-31 Peter Leigh-Jones Difraction surfaces and methods for the manufacture thereof
EP1087334B1 (fr) 1999-09-15 2007-12-19 European Community Scellé multi-usage électronique à transpondeur passif
RU2000118007A (ru) * 2000-07-06 2002-06-27 Российский федеральный ядерный центр - Всероссийский научно-исследовательский институт технической физики имени академика Е.И. Забабахина Способ контроля оптических пломб и устройство для автоматического контроля идентификационных элементов оптических пломб
US6603312B2 (en) 2000-12-11 2003-08-05 Cbg Corporation Multi-frequency array induction tool
CN1474353A (zh) * 2002-08-08 2004-02-11 深圳市华阳微电子有限公司 Ic卡纸基射频天线的制造方法及电子标签
FR2848698B1 (fr) 2002-12-13 2005-02-25 Novatec Procede d'identification et d'authentification sans lecteur specifique d'un identificateur rattache a un objet ou a un etre vivant
FR2860670B1 (fr) 2003-10-02 2006-01-06 Novatec Procede de securisation de transaction a partir de cartes presentant des identificateurs uniques et inreproductibles
FR2877472B1 (fr) 2004-11-04 2008-06-06 Novatec Sa Sa Soc Procede et dispositif de verification de non intrusion dans un systeme et/ou de non atteinte a l'integrite d'un objet
JP2007011676A (ja) * 2005-06-30 2007-01-18 Ic Brains Co Ltd 開封検知システム
FR2895125B1 (fr) 2005-12-21 2008-12-12 Novatec Sa Procede d'authentification de documents et dispositif de lecture desdits documents a des fins d'enregistrement pour preuve
CN101479750A (zh) * 2006-05-11 2009-07-08 奇异编号有限公司 识别目标物的方法,识别标签,适于被识别的目标物以及相关装置和系统

Patent Citations (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4118057A (en) * 1978-02-24 1978-10-03 The United States Of America As Represented By The United States Department Of Energy Reusable, tamper-indicating seal
GB2304077A (en) * 1995-06-30 1997-03-12 Andrew John Farrall Security device comprising reflective particles
GB2324065A (en) * 1997-04-09 1998-10-14 James Howard Slater An identification code for banknotes or credit cards comprising a pattern of random beads
WO2001011591A1 (en) * 1999-08-07 2001-02-15 Epigem Limited An optical display composite
US20030014647A1 (en) * 2000-02-04 2003-01-16 Francis Bourrieres Method and device for reading authentication means and adapted identification means
WO2002033682A2 (en) * 2000-10-19 2002-04-25 Encrypta Electronics Limited Seal

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP2068268A1 (de) 2007-12-07 2009-06-10 F. Hoffman-la Roche AG Codierung von pharmazeutischen Behältnissen durch Zufallsstrukturen
ITLU20100013A1 (it) * 2010-10-06 2012-04-07 Cosimo Antonio Prete Metodo per verificare autenticita' e integrita' di un prodotto con parti realizzate tramite fusione e solidificazione di materiali che assume disposizione caotica

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
FR2893595A1 (fr) 2007-05-25
FR2893595B1 (fr) 2010-08-27
CN101313118B (zh) 2011-07-06
MA29877B1 (fr) 2008-10-03
EP1951974A1 (fr) 2008-08-06
KR20080077226A (ko) 2008-08-21
ZA200803267B (en) 2009-05-27
JP5006333B2 (ja) 2012-08-22
TNSN08149A1 (fr) 2009-10-30
RU2384895C1 (ru) 2010-03-20
US7726708B2 (en) 2010-06-01
TR200803287T2 (tr) 2008-07-21
CN101313118A (zh) 2008-11-26
JP2009516790A (ja) 2009-04-23
EP1951974B1 (fr) 2016-08-03
BRPI0618427A2 (pt) 2012-04-17
US20080217931A1 (en) 2008-09-11
RU2008124967A (ru) 2009-12-27

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
EP1951974B1 (fr) Scelle de haute securite inviolable et reutilisable
EP1810266B1 (fr) Procede et dispositif de verification de non intrusion dans un systeme et / ou de non atteinte a l'integrite d'un objet ou de son contenu
CN104428798B (zh) 用于明确标记对象的方法
US7309011B2 (en) Method of authenticating products using hardware compatibility flag
FR2895125A1 (fr) Procede d'authentification de documents et dispositif de lecture desdits documents a des fins d'enregistrement pour preuve
CN103577780B (zh) 用于管理受保护物品的系统和方法
FR2866139A1 (fr) Procede pour proteger de la lecture directe des informations sensibles, un support porteur de telles informations protegees et un procede de lecture de ces informations protegees
US10891726B2 (en) Seal tamper detection
WO2006042913A1 (fr) Procede de securisation de transactions et d'authentification d'objets ou de documents
EP3686761B1 (fr) Élément de marquage sécurisé et procédés d'encodage et d'authentification dudit élément de marquage
US10599898B2 (en) Warranty tracking method for a consumer product
US11281954B2 (en) Tamper-activated authenticable security device
CN110060067A (zh) 消费产品的保证的追踪方法
JP2005193584A (ja) 偽造防止情報担体およびその認証方法
WO2020183017A1 (fr) Procede de realisation d'une etiquette comportant un code de securite cache, et procede de mise en œuvre de l'etiquette obtenue
HK40004806A (en) Warrenty tracking method for a consumer product
FR2996660A1 (fr) Support d'identification et procede de realisation d'un support d'identification et procede de verification d'authenticite
HK1109237A (en) Method and device for verification of non intrusion into a system and/or non-violation of the integrity of an object or the contents thereof

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
WWE Wipo information: entry into national phase

Ref document number: 200680043392.3

Country of ref document: CN

121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application
WWE Wipo information: entry into national phase

Ref document number: 12088916

Country of ref document: US

REEP Request for entry into the european phase

Ref document number: 2006831153

Country of ref document: EP

WWE Wipo information: entry into national phase

Ref document number: 2006831153

Country of ref document: EP

WWE Wipo information: entry into national phase

Ref document number: 2008/03287

Country of ref document: TR

WWE Wipo information: entry into national phase

Ref document number: 2008541788

Country of ref document: JP

NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: DE

WWE Wipo information: entry into national phase

Ref document number: 1262/MUMNP/2008

Country of ref document: IN

WWE Wipo information: entry into national phase

Ref document number: DZP2008000396

Country of ref document: DZ

WWE Wipo information: entry into national phase

Ref document number: 2008124967

Country of ref document: RU

Ref document number: 1020087015283

Country of ref document: KR

WWP Wipo information: published in national office

Ref document number: 2006831153

Country of ref document: EP

ENP Entry into the national phase

Ref document number: PI0618427

Country of ref document: BR

Kind code of ref document: A2

Effective date: 20080422