WO2005001598A2 - Guichet automatique bancaire presentant une resistance amelioree a la fraude - Google Patents

Guichet automatique bancaire presentant une resistance amelioree a la fraude Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2005001598A2
WO2005001598A2 PCT/US2004/014477 US2004014477W WO2005001598A2 WO 2005001598 A2 WO2005001598 A2 WO 2005001598A2 US 2004014477 W US2004014477 W US 2004014477W WO 2005001598 A2 WO2005001598 A2 WO 2005001598A2
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
radiation
operative
controller
card
slot
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2004/014477
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
WO2005001598A8 (fr
WO2005001598A3 (fr
Inventor
Natarajan Ramachandran
Jeffery M. Enright
Dale Blackson
Original Assignee
Diebold, Incorporated
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from US10/601,813 external-priority patent/US7240827B2/en
Application filed by Diebold, Incorporated filed Critical Diebold, Incorporated
Priority to MXPA05013283A priority Critical patent/MXPA05013283A/es
Priority to CA2529005A priority patent/CA2529005C/fr
Priority to EP04785747A priority patent/EP1639537A4/fr
Priority to BRPI0411735A priority patent/BRPI0411735B1/pt
Priority to CN200480017471.8A priority patent/CN1809848B/zh
Publication of WO2005001598A2 publication Critical patent/WO2005001598A2/fr
Publication of WO2005001598A3 publication Critical patent/WO2005001598A3/fr
Publication of WO2005001598A8 publication Critical patent/WO2005001598A8/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • G07F19/205—Housing aspects of ATMs
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • G07F19/207—Surveillance aspects at ATMs

Definitions

  • This invention relates to automated banking machines. Specifically this invention relates to automated banking machine apparatus, systems and methods that provide for improved reliability and serviceability.
  • ATMs enable customers to carry out banking transactions.
  • Examples of banking transactions that are sometimes carried out with ATMs include the dispensing of cash, the making of deposits, the transfer of funds between accounts, the payment of bills, the cashing of checks, the purchase of money orders, the purchase of stamps, the purchase of tickets, the purchase of phone cards and account balance inquiries.
  • the types of banking transactions a customer can carry out at an ATM are determined by the particular banking machine, the system in which it is connected and the programming of the machine by the entity responsible for its operation.
  • Other types of automated banking machines may be operated in other types of environments. For example certain types of automated banking machines may be used in a customer service environment. For example service providers may use certain types of automated banking machines for purposes of counting currency or other items that are received from or which are to be given to a customer.
  • automated banking machines may be used to validate items which provide the customer with access, value or privileges such as tickets, vouchers, checks or other financial instruments.
  • Other examples of automated banking machines may include machines which are operative to provide users with the right to merchandise or services in an attended or a self-service environment.
  • an automated banking machine shall be deemed to include any machine may be operated to carry out transactions including transfers of value.
  • Automated banking machines are typically used in environments where they carry out or support the conduct of transactions. It is desirable to keep automated banking machines in operation at all appropriate times to the extent possible. If a machine should experience a fraud attempt, it is useful to detect such attempt and return the machine to service as quickly as possible. Thus, there exists a need for improvements in the operation, reliability, servicing and repair of automated banking machines.
  • an automated banking machine which is an ATM.
  • the ATM includes a plurality of transaction function devices.
  • the transaction function devices include input and output devices which are part of a user interface.
  • the transaction function devices also include devices for carrying out types of banking transactions such as a currency dispenser device and a deposit accepting device.
  • the exemplary ATM also includes at least one computer which is generally referred to herein as a controller, and which is operative to cause the operation of the transaction function devices in the machine.
  • the ATM includes a housing with a secure chest portion and an upper housing area. The chest portion houses certain transaction function devices such as the currency dispenser device.
  • the chest portion includes a chest door which is generally secured but which is capable of being opened when unlocked by authorized persons.
  • the upper housing area includes a first portion and a second portion. Access to the first and second portions are controlled by independently movable first and second fascia portions. In the exemplary embodiment one or more devices that must be manipulated in order to unlock the chest door are positioned within the first housing area. Access to the first portion of the upper housing is controlled by a fascia lock in operative connection with the first fascia portion.
  • the transaction areas are illuminated to facilitate operation of the machine by users.
  • the controller of the ATM is operative to illuminate the transaction areas at those times when the user would be expected to receive or place items in such transaction areas during the conduct of transactions. This facilitates guiding the user to the particular transaction area on the machine even when the machine is being operated during daylight hours.
  • the capability of illuminating selected areas of the machine during certain transaction steps may be utilized in conjunction with anti-fraud devices.
  • anti-fraud devices are used to reduce the risk that an unauthorized card reading device is installed externally of the machine adjacent to the card reader slot of the machine fascia. criminals are sometimes ingenious and in the past some have produced reading devices that can intercept magnetic stripe data on cards that are being input to an ATM by a consumer.
  • the housing in surrounding relation of the card reader slot is illuminated responsive to operation of the controller.
  • the housing is operative to illuminate an area generally entirely surrounding the slot so as to make it more readily apparent to a user that an unauthorized modification or attachment to the fascia may have been made.
  • the illumination of the area surrounding the fascia card slot is operative to help to guide the user to the slot during transactions when a user is required to input or take their card.
  • the exemplary ATM is provided with radiation sensing devices positioned adjacent to the illumination devices that are operative to illuminate the area surrounding the card reader slot.
  • the exemplary controller is programmed to sense changes in the magnitude of radiation sensed by the one or more radiation sensing devices.
  • the installation of an unauthorized card reading device in proximity to the card reading slot generally produces a change in the magnitude of the radiation sensed by the radiation sensing devices.
  • the exemplary controller is programmed to recognize such changes and to take appropriate action in response thereto so as to reduce the possibility of fraud.
  • Such action may include in some exemplary embodiments, the machine sending a status message through a network to a person to be notified of a possible fraud condition.
  • Such actions may also include in some embodiments, warning the user of the machine to look for the installation of a possible fraud device.
  • sensing devices may be provided in proximity to the keypad used by the customer to provide inputs, such as a personal identification number (PIN). Such sensors may be of the radiation sensing type or other type. Such sensors are adapted to sense the installation of unauthorized input intercepting devices above or adjacent to the keypad. The sensing of such an unauthorized device may cause an exemplary controller in the machine to give notice of the potential fraud device and/or to cease or modify the operation of the machine to reduce the risk of interception of customer inputs.
  • radiation emitting devices used for sensing may provide outputs of visible light and may be used to guide a user at appropriate times during transactions to provide inputs to the keypad.
  • Figure 1 is an isometric external view of an exemplary automated banking machine which is an ATM and which incorporates some aspects and features of inventions claimed in the present application.
  • Figure 2 is a front plan view of the ATM shown in Figure 1.
  • Figure 3 is a transparent side view showing schematically some internal features of the ATM.
  • Figure 4 is a schematic view representative of the software architecture of an exemplary embodiment.
  • Figure 5 is a front view showing the fascia portion moved to access a first portion of an upper housing of the machine.
  • Figure 6 is a partially transparent side view showing air flow through an air cooling opening of the machine.
  • Figure 7 is an isometric view of the ATM shown in Figure 1 with the components of the upper housing portion removed.
  • Figure 8 is a schematic side view of the housing showing schematically the illumination system for the transaction areas and representing in phantom the movement of the upper fascia portion so as to provide access for servicing.
  • Figure 9 is a schematic view of an illumination and anti-fraud sensing device which bounds a card reader slot of an exemplary embodiment.
  • Figure 10 is a schematic side view of an unauthorized card reading device in operative connection with a housing of the anti-fraud sensor.
  • Figure 11 is a schematic view of exemplary logic for purposes of detecting the presence of an unauthorized card reading device in proximity to the card reader during operation of the ATM.
  • Figure 12 is an exemplary side, cross sectional view of an ATM keypad.
  • Figure 13 is a schematic representation of a sensor for sensing whether an unauthorized key input sensing device has been placed adjacent to the keypad.
  • Figure 14 is a view of a keypad similar to Figure 12 but with an unauthorized key input sensing device attached.
  • Figure 15 is a schematic representation similar to Figure 13, but representing the change in reflected radiation resulting from the attachment of the unauthorized key input sensing device.
  • automated banking machine 10 is a drive up ATM, however the features described and claimed herein are not necessarily limited to ATMs of this type.
  • the exemplary ATM includes a housing 12. Housing 12 includes an upper housing area 14 and a secure chest area 16 in a lower portion of the housing. Access to the chest area 16 is controlled by a chest door 18 which when unlocked by authorized persons in the manner later explained, enables gaining access to the interior of the chest area.
  • the exemplary ATM 10 further includes a first fascia portion 20 and a second fascia portion 22.
  • the ATM includes a user interface generally indicated 24.
  • the exemplary user interface includes input devices such as a card reader 26 (shown in Figure 3) which is in connection with a card reader slot 28 which extends in the second fascia portion.
  • Other input devices of the exemplary user interface 24 include function keys 30 and a keypad 32.
  • the exemplary ATM 10 also includes a camera 34 which also may serve as an input device for biometric features and the like.
  • the exemplary user interface 24 also includes output devices such as a display 36. Display 36 is viewable by an operator of the machine when the machine is in the operative condition through an opening 38 in the second fascia portion 22.
  • Further output devices in the exemplary user interface include a speaker 40.
  • a headphone jack 42 also serves as an output device.
  • the headphone jack may be connected to a headphone provided by a user who is visually impaired to provide the user with voice guidance in the operation of the machine.
  • the exemplary machine further includes a receipt printer 44 (see Figure 3) which is operative to provide users of the machine with receipts for transactions conducted. Transaction receipts are provided to users through a receipt delivery slot 46 which extends through the second fascia portion.
  • Exemplary receipt printers that may be used in some embodiments are shown in U.S. Patent No. 5,729,379 and U.S. Patent No. 5,850,075, the disclosures of which are incorporated by reference herein.
  • the second fascia portion has included thereon a deposit envelope providing opening 48. Deposit envelopes may be provided from the deposit envelope providing opening to users who may place deposits in the machine.
  • the second fascia portion 20 also includes a fascia lock 50. Fascia lock 50 is in operative connection with the second fascia portion and limits access to the portion of the interior of the upper housing behind the fascia to authorized persons.
  • fascia lock 50 comprises a key type lock. However, in other embodiments other types of locking mechanisms may be used.
  • the exemplary ATM 10 further includes a delivery area 52.
  • Delivery area 52 is in connection with a currency dispenser device 54 which is alternatively referred to herein as a cash dispenser, which is positioned in the chest portion and is shown schematically in Figure 3.
  • the delivery area 52 is a transaction area on the machine in which currency sheets are delivered to a user.
  • the delivery area 52 is positioned and extends within a recessed pocket 56 in the housing of the machine.
  • ATM 10 further includes a deposit acceptance area 58.
  • Deposit acceptance area is an area through which deposits such as deposit envelopes to be deposited by users are placed in the machine.
  • the deposit acceptance area 58 is in operative connection with a deposit accepting device positioned in the chest area 16 of the ATM.
  • a deposit accepting device positioned in the chest area 16 of the ATM.
  • Exemplary types of deposit accepting devices are shown in U.S. Patent No. 4,884,769 and U.S. Patent No. 4,597,330, the disclosures of which are incorporated herein by reference.
  • the deposit acceptance area serves as a transaction area of the machine and is positioned and extends within a recessed pocket 60. It should be understood that while the exemplary embodiment of ATM 10 includes an envelope deposit accepting device and a currency sheet dispenser device, other or different types of transaction function devices may be included in automated banking machines and devices encompassed by the present invention.
  • First fascia portion 20 includes an illumination panel 62 for illuminating the deposit envelope providing opening.
  • Second fascia portion 22 includes an illumination panel 64 for illuminating the area of the receipt delivery slot 46 and the card reader slot 28.
  • an illuminated housing 66 later discussed in detail, bounds the card reader slot 28.
  • an illuminating window 68 is positioned in the recessed pocket 56 of the delivery area 52.
  • the ATM 10 includes one or more internal computers. Such internal computers include one or more processors. Such processors may be in operative connection with one or more data stores. In some embodiments processors may be located on certain devices within the ATM so as to individually control the operation thereof. Examples such as multi-tiered processor systems are shown in U.S. Patent No. 6,264,101 and U.S. Patent No. 6,131,809, the disclosures of which are incorporated herein by reference.
  • the exemplary embodiment will be described as having a single controller which controls the operation of devices within the machine. However it should be understood that such reference shall be construed to encompass multicontroller and multiprocessor systems as may be appropriate in controlling the operation of a particular machine. In
  • the controller is schematically represented 72. Also as schematically represented, the controller is in operative connection with one or more data stores 78. Such data stores in exemplary embodiments are operative to store program instructions, values and other information used in the operation of the machine. Although the controller is schematically shown in the upper housing portion of ATM 10, it should be understood that in alternative embodiments controllers may be located within various portions of the automated banking machine.
  • the exemplary ATM 10 communicates with remote computers. The remote computers are operative to exchange messages with the machine and authorize and record the occurrence of various transactions. This is represented in Figure 3 by the communication of the machine through a network with a bank 78, which has at least one computer which is operative to exchange messages with the ATM through a network.
  • the bank 78 may receive one or more messages from the ATM requesting authorization to allow a customer to withdraw $200 from the customer's account.
  • the remote computer at the bank 78 will operate to determine that such a withdrawal is authorized and will return one or more messages to the machine through the network authorizing the transaction.
  • the ATM After the ATM conducts the transaction, the ATM will generally send one or more messages back through the network to the bank indicating that the transaction was successfully carried out.
  • these messages are merely exemplary.
  • the ATM may communicate with other entities and through various networks.
  • the ATM will communicate with computers operated by service providers 80. Such service providers may be entities to be notified of status conditions or malfunctions of the ATM as well as entities who are to be notified of corrective actions.
  • the exemplary software architecture includes an operating system such as for example Microsoft® Windows, IBM OS/2® or Linux.
  • the exemplary software architecture also includes an ATM application 82.
  • the exemplary application includes the instructions for the operation of the automated banking machine and may include, for example, an AgilisTM 91x application that is commercially available from Diebold, Incorporated which is a cross vendor software application for operating ATMs. Further examples of software applications which may be used in some embodiments is shown in U.S. Patent Nos. 6,289,320 and 6,505,177, the disclosures of which are incorporated herein by reference.
  • middleware software schematically indicated 84 is operative in the controller. In the exemplary embodiment the middleware software operates to compensate for differences between various types of automated banking machines and transaction function devices used therein.
  • the use of a middleware layer enables the more ready use of an identical software application on various types of ATM hardware.
  • the middleware layer may be Involve® software which is commercially available from Nexus Software, a wholly owned subsidiary of the assignee of the present invention.
  • the exemplary software architecture further includes a diagnostics layer 86.
  • the diagnostics layer 86 is operative as later explained to enable accessing and performing various diagnostic functions of the devices within the ATM.
  • the diagnostics operate in conjunction with a browser schematically indicated 88.
  • the exemplary software architecture further includes a service provider layer schematically indicated 90.
  • the service provider layer may include software such as WOSA XFS service providers for J/XFS service providers which present a standardized interface to the software layers above and which facilitate the development of software which can be used in conjunction with different types of ATM hardware.
  • WOSA XFS service providers for J/XFS service providers which present a standardized interface to the software layers above and which facilitate the development of software which can be used in conjunction with different types of ATM hardware.
  • this software architecture is exemplary and in other embodiments other architectures may be used.
  • a controller 72 is in operative connection with at least one communications bus 92.
  • the communications bus may in some exemplary embodiments be a universal serial bus (USB) or other standard or nonstandard type of bus architecture.
  • the communications bus 92 is schematically shown in operative connection with transaction function devices 94.
  • the transaction function devices include devices in the ATM which are used to carry out transactions.
  • the first fascia portion 20 and the second fascia portion 22 are independently movably mounted on the ATM housing 12. This is accomplished through the use of hinges attached to fascia portion 20.
  • the opening of the fascia lock 50 on the first fascia portion 20 enables the first fascia portion to be moved to an open position as shown in Figure 5.
  • an authorized user is enabled to gain access to a first portion 102 in the upper housing area 14.
  • the chest lock input device comprises a manual combination lock dial, electronic lock dial or other suitable input device through which a combination or other unlocking inputs or articles may be provided.
  • input of a proper combination enables the chest door 18 to be moved to an open position by rotating the door about hinges 106.
  • the chest door is opened once the proper combination has been input by manipulating a locking lever 108 which is in operative connection with a boltwork.
  • the boltwork which is not specifically shown, is operative to hold the chest door in a locked position until the proper combination is input.
  • the locking lever Upon input of the correct combination the locking lever enables movement of the boltwork so that the chest door can be opened.
  • the boltwork also enables the chest door to be held locked after the activities in the chest portion have been conducted and the chest door is returned to the closed position.
  • other types of mechanical or electrical locking mechanisms may be used.
  • the chest lock input device 104 is in supporting connection with a generally horizontally extending dividing wall 110 which separates the chest portion from the upper housing portion.
  • an authorized servicer who needs to gain access to an item, component or device of the ATM located in the chest area may do so by opening the fascia lock and moving the first fascia portion 20 so that the area 102 becomes accessible. Thereafter the authorized servicer may access and manipulate the chest lock input device to receive one or more inputs, which if appropriate enables unlocking of the chest door 18.
  • the chest door may thereafter be moved relative to the housing and about its hinges 106 to enable the servicer to gain access to items, devices or components within the chest.
  • These activities may include for example adding or removing currency, removing deposited items such as envelopes or checks, or repairing mechanisms or electrical devices that operate to enable the machine to accept deposited items or to dispense currency.
  • the chest door When servicing activity within the chest is completed, the chest door may be closed and the locking lever 108 moved so as to secure the boltwork holding the chest door in a closed position.
  • this structure and service method is exemplary and in other embodiments other approaches may be used.
  • the second fascia portion 22 is also movable relative to the housing of the machine.
  • the second fascia portion 22 is movable in supporting connection with a rollout tray 112 schematically shown in Figure 3. The rollout tray is operative to support components of the user interface thereon as well as the second fascia portion.
  • the rollout tray enables the second fascia portion to move outward relative to the ATM housing thereby exposing components and transaction function devices supported on the tray and providing access to a second portion 114 within the upper housing and positioned behind the second fascia portion.
  • the components on the tray are disposed outside the housing of the machine so as to facilitate servicing, adjustment and/or replacement of such components.
  • Further components which remain positioned within the housing of the machine as the rollout tray is extended become accessible in the second portion as the second fascia portion 22 is disposed outward and away from the housing.
  • the rollout tray 112 is in operative connection with a releasible locking device.
  • the locking device is generally operative to hold the tray in a retracted position such that the second fascia portion remains in an operative position adjacent to the upper housing area as shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3.
  • This releasible locking mechanism may comprise one or more forms of locking type devices.
  • the releasible locking mechanism may be released by manipulation of an actuator 116 which is accessible to an authorized user in the first portion 102 of the upper housing 14.
  • an authorized servicer of the machine is enabled to move the second fascia portion outward for servicing by first accessing portion 102 in the manner previously discussed.
  • the second fascia portion is enabled to move outward as shown in phantom in Figure 8 so as to facilitate servicing components on the rollout tray.
  • Such components may include for example a printer or card reader.
  • the second fascia portion may be moved toward the housing so as to close the second portion 114.
  • Such movement in the exemplary embodiment causes the rollout tray to be latched and held in the retracted position without further manipulation of the actuator.
  • other types of locking mechanisms may be used to secure the rollout tray in the retracted position. It should be understood that this approach is exemplary and in other embodiments other approaches may be used.
  • the delivery area 52 and the deposit acceptance area 58 are in supporting connection with the chest door 18. As such when the chest door 18 is opened, the delivery area 52 and the deposit acceptance area 58 will move relative to the housing of the machine.
  • the exemplary embodiment shown facilitates servicing of the machine by providing for the illumination for the transaction areas by illumination sources positioned in supporting connection with the rollout tray 112. As best shown in Figure 6, these illumination sources 118 are movable with the rollout tray and illuminate in generally a downward direction. In the operative position of the second fascia portion 22 and the chest door 18, the illumination sources are generally aligned with apertures 120 and 122 which extend through the top of a cover 124 which generally surrounds the recessed pockets 60 and 56. As shown in Figure 10 aperture 120 is generally vertically aligned with window 68 and aperture 122 is generally aligned with window 70.
  • apertures 120 and 122 each have a translucent or transparent lens positioned therein to minimize the risk of the introduction of dirt or other contaminants into the interior of the cover 124.
  • the illumination sources 118 are positioned in generally aligned relation with apertures 120 and 122.
  • the illumination of the illumination devices is operative to cause light to be transmitted through the respective aperture and to illuminate the transaction area within the corresponding recessed pocket.
  • the controller executes programmed instructions so as to initiate illumination of each transaction area at appropriate times during the conduct of transactions.
  • the controller may initiate illumination of the delivery area 52 when the cash is delivered therein and is available to be taken by a user. Such illumination draws the user's attention to the need to remove the cash and will point out to the user that the cash is ready to be taken.
  • the controller is programmed so that when the user takes the cash the machine will move to the next transaction step. After the cash is sensed as taken, the controller may operate to cease illumination of the delivery area 56.
  • the controller may cause the machine to operate to initiate illumination of the deposit acceptance area 58.
  • the controller may operate to also illuminate the illumination panel 62 to illuminate the deposit envelope providing opening 48 so that the user is also made aware of the location from which a deposit envelope may be provided.
  • the controller may operate to cease illumination through the window 70 and/or the illumination panel 62 after the deposit envelope is indicated as being sensed within the machine.
  • other approaches may be taken. This may include for example drawing the customer's attention to the particular transaction area by changing the nature of the illumination in the recessed pocket to which the customer's attention is to be drawn.
  • ATM 10 is also operative to draw a user's attention at appropriate times to the card reader slot 28.
  • ATM 10 also includes features to minimize the risk of unauthorized interception of card data by persons who may attempt to install a fraud device such as an unauthorized card reading device on the machine. As shown in
  • the exemplary card slot 28 extends through a card slot housing 66 which extends in generally surrounding relation of the card slot. It should be understood that although the housing 66 generally bounds the entire card slot, in other embodiments the principles described herein may be applied by bounding only one or more sides of a card slot as may be appropriate for detecting unauthorized card reading devices. Further, it should be understood that while the exemplary embodiment is described in connection with a card reader that accepts a card into the machine, the principles being described may be applied to types of card readers that do not accept a card into the machine, such as readers where a user draws the card through a slot, inserts and removes a card manually from a slot and other card reading structures.
  • the housing 66 includes a plurality of radiation emitting devices 126.
  • the radiation emitting devices emit visible radiation which can be perceived by a user of the machine.
  • the radiation emitting devices may include devices which emit nonvisible radiation such as infrared radiation, but which nonetheless can be used for sensing the presence of unauthorized card reading devices adjacent to the card slot.
  • the controller operates to illuminate the radiation emitting devices 126 at appropriate times during the transaction sequence. This may include for example times during transactions when a user is prompted to input the card into the machine or alternatively when a user is prompted to take the card from the card slot 28.
  • the controller may be programmed to provide solid illumination of the radiation emitting devices or may vary the intensity of the devices as appropriate to draw the user's attention to the card slot.
  • the card slot housing 66 includes therein one or more radiation sensing devices 128.
  • the radiation sensing devices are positioned to detect changes in at least one property of the radiation reflected from the emitting devices 126.
  • the sensing devices 128 are in operative connection with the controller.
  • the controller is operative responsive to its programming to compare one or more values corresponding to the magnitude and/or other properties of radiation sensed by one or more of the sensors, to one or more stored values and to make a determination whether the comparison is such that there is a probable unauthorized card reading device installed on the fascia of the machine.
  • the controller may be operative to execute fuzzy logic programming for purposes of determining whether the nature of the change in reflected radiation or other detected parameters are such that there has been an unauthorized device installed and whether appropriate personnel should be notified.
  • Figure 10 shows a side view of the housing 66.
  • An example of a fraud device which comprises unauthorized card reading device 130 is shown attached externally to the housing 66.
  • the unauthorized card reading device includes a slot 132 generally aligned with slot 128.
  • the device 130 also includes a sensor shown schematically as 134 which is operative to sense the encoded magnetic flux reversals which represent data on the magnetic stripe of a credit or debit card.
  • an arrangement of the type shown in Figure 10 enables the sensor 134 if properly aligned adjacent to the magnetic stripe of a card, to read the card data as the card passes in and out of slot 128.
  • Such an unauthorized reading device may be connected via radio frequency (RF) or through inconspicuous wiring to other devices which enable interception of the card data.
  • RF radio frequency
  • criminals may also endeavor to observe the input of the user's PIN corresponding to the card data so as to gain access to the account of the user.
  • the installation of the unauthorized card reading device 130 changes the amount of radiation from emitting devices 126 and that is reflected or otherwise transmitted to the sensors 128. Depending on the nature of the device and its structure, the amount or other properties of radiation may increase or decrease.
  • FIG. 11 demonstrates an exemplary simplified logic flow executed by a controller for detecting the installation of an unauthorized card reading device. It should be understood that this transaction logic is part of the overall operation of the machine to carry out transactions. In this exemplary logic flow the machine operates to carry out card reading transactions in a normal manner and to additionally execute the represented steps as a part of such logic each time a card is read.
  • the controller in the machine is operative to sense that a card is in the reader within the machine in a step 138.
  • the controller will be operating the radiation emitting devices 126 as the user has inserted their card and the card has been drawn into the machine.
  • the controller continues to operate the radiation emitting devices and senses the radiation level or levels sensed by one or more sensors 128. This is done in a step 140.
  • the controller is next operative to compare the signals corresponding to the sensed radiation levels to one or more values in a step 142.
  • This comparison may be done a number of ways and may in some embodiments execute fuzzy logic so as to avoid giving false indications due to acceptable conditions such as a user having the user's finger adjacent to the card slot 28 during a portion of the transaction.
  • the computer may determine whether an unauthorized reading device is installed based on the nature, magnitude and changes during a transaction in sensed radiation, along with appropriate programmed weighing factors.
  • various approaches may be used within the scope of the concept discussed herein.
  • the controller is operative to make a decision at step 144 as to whether the sensed value(s) compared to stored value(s) compared in step 142 have a difference that is in excess of one or more thresholds which suggest that an unauthorized card reading device has been installed. If the comparison does not indicate a result that exceeds the threshold(s) the ATM transaction devices are run as normal as represented in a step 146. For example, a customer may be prompted to input a PIN, and if the card data and PIN are valid, the customer may be authorized to conduct a cash dispensing transaction through operation of the machine. Further in the exemplary embodiment, the controller may operate to adjust the stored values to some degree based on the more recent readings.
  • step 148 the controller operates the ATM to conduct transaction steps in the usual manner as represented in a step 150. If in step 144 the difference between the sensed and stored values exceeds the threshold(s), then this is indicative that an unauthorized card reading device may have been installed since the last transaction. In the exemplary embodiment when this occurs, the controller is operative to present a warning screen to the user as represented in a step 152. This warning screen may be operative to advise the user that an unauthorized object has been sensed adjacent to the card reader slot. This may warn a user for example that a problem is occurring.
  • a user may withdraw it.
  • further logic steps may be executed such as prompting a user to indicate whether or not they can see the radiation emitting devices being illuminated adjacent to the card slot and prompting the user to provide an input to indicate if such items are visible.
  • the illuminating devices within the housing 66 may be operative to cause the emitting devices to output words or other symbols which a user can indicate that they can see or cannot see based on inputs provided as prompts from output devices of the machine. This may enable the machine to determine whether an unauthorized reading device has been installed or whether the sensed condition is due to other factors.
  • the controller in the exemplary embodiment will also execute a step 154 in which a status message is sent to an appropriate service provider or other entity to indicate the suspected problem. This may be done for example through use of a system like that shown in U.S. Patent No. 5,984,178 the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference. Alternatively messages may be sent to system addresses in a manner like that shown in U.S. Patent No. 6,289,320 the disclosure of which is also incorporated herein by reference.
  • a step 156 the controller will also operate to record data identifying for the particular transaction in which there has been suspected interception of the card holder's card data.
  • a message may be sent to the bank or other institution alerting them to watch for activity in the user's card account for purposes of detecting whether unauthorized use is occurring.
  • some embodiments may include card readers that change, add or write data to a user's card in cases of suspected interception. Such changed data may be tracked or otherwise used to assure that only a card with the modified data is useable thereafter.
  • the modified card may be moved in translated relation, moved irregularly or otherwise handled to reduce the risk that modified data is intercepted as the card is output from the machine.
  • the ATM is operated to conduct a transaction even in cases where it is suspected that an unauthorized card reading device has been installed. This is represented in a step 158.
  • other approaches may be taken such as refusing to conduct the transaction.
  • Other steps may also be taken such as capturing the user's card and advising the user that a new one will be issued. This approach may be used to minimize the risk that unauthorized transactions will be conducted with the card data as the card can be promptly invalidated.
  • other approaches may be taken depending on the programming of the machine and the desires of the system operator.
  • an oscillation sensor may be attached to the machine to detect changes in frequency or vibration that result from the installation of unauthorized devices on the ATM.
  • Figure 10 shows schematically an oscillator 127 attached to the interior surface of the ATM fascia. Oscillator 127 may be operative responsive to the controller and suitable vibration circuitry to impart vibratory motion to the fascia in the vicinity of the card reader slot.
  • a sensor 129 is in operative connection with the fascia and is operative to sense at least one parameter of the motion imparted to the fascia by the oscillator 127.
  • oscillator 127 and sensor 129 are shown as separate components, it should be understood that in some embodiments the functions of the components may be performed by a single device.
  • the sensor 129 is in operative connection with the controller of the ATM through appropriate circuitry. The controller selectively activates the oscillator and the sensor 129 is operative to sense the resulting movement of the fascia caused by the oscillation.
  • the installation of an unauthorized card reading device or other fraud device on the ATM will generally result in a change in at lest one property being sensed by the sensor 129. This may include changes in amplitude, frequency or both.
  • some embodiments may provide for the oscillator to impart vibration characteristics of various types or vibratory motion through a range of frequencies and/or amplitudes.
  • Sensed values for various oscillatory driving outputs may then be compared through operation of the controller to one or more previously stored values. Variances from prior values may be detected or analyzed through operation of the controller and notifications given in situations where a change has occurred which suggests the installation of an unauthorized device.
  • the controller may cause the oscillator and sensor to operate periodically to sense for installation of a possible unauthorized device. Alternatively, the controller may cause such a check to be made during each transaction. Alternatively in some embodiments oscillation testing may be conducted when a possible unauthorized device is detected by sensing radiation properties.
  • the controller may operate to take various actions in response to sensing a possible unauthorized reading device through vibration, radiation or both. For example detecting a possible fraud device by both radiation and oscillation may warrant taking different actions than only detecting a possible fraud device through only one test or condition.
  • the controller may be programmed to adjust the thresholds or other limits used for resolving the presence of a possible fraud device for responses to changes that occur over time at the machine. This may include for example adjusting the thresholds for indicating possible fraud conditions based on the aging of the oscillator or the sensor. Such adjustments may also be based on parameters sensed by other sensors which effect vibration properties. These may include for example, the fascia temperature, air temperature, relative humidity and other properties.
  • the oscillator may additionally or alternatively be used to prevent the unauthorized reading of card reader signals. This may be done for example when the banking machine has a device which takes a user card into the machine for purposes of reading data on the card.
  • the controller may operate to vibrate the area of the fascia adjacent to the card reader slot when a user's card is moving into and/or out of the slot. In such cases the vibration may be operative to cause the generation of noise or inaccurate reading by an unauthorized card reading sensor so as to make it more difficult to intercept the card stripe data using an unauthorized reading device.
  • such vibration may also serve to disclose or make more apparent the presence of unauthorized card reading devices.
  • these approaches are exemplary and in other embodiments other approaches may be used.
  • provision may be made for detecting the presence of unauthorized input sensing devices for sensing a user's inputs through the keypad on the ATM.
  • Such unauthorized input sensing devices may be used by criminals to sense the PIN input by the user.
  • Detecting unauthorized devices may be accomplished by providing appropriate sensing devices in or adjacent to the keypad.
  • Such sensing devices may be operative to detect that a structure has been placed over or adjacent to the keypad.
  • Such sensors may be in operative connection with the controller in the machine or other devices which are operative to determine the probable installation of such an unauthorized input sensing device.
  • FIG 12 shows the cross-sectional view of exemplary keypad 32.
  • Keypad 32 is shown schematically, and it should be xmderstood that not all of the components of the keypad are represented.
  • Keypad 32 includes a plurality of keys 250. Keys 250 are moveable responsive to pressure applied by a user's finger to provide an input corresponding to alphabetical or numerical characters. Extending between some of the keys 250 are areas or spaces 252. Extending in spaces 252 are sensors 254.
  • the sensors 254 are radiation type sensors, but as previously discussed, in other embodiments other approaches may be used. Overlying the sensors 254 is an outer layer 256. In the exemplary embodiment, layer 256 is translucent or otherwise comprised of material so as to partially enable the transmission of radiation from the sensors therethrough. As represented in Figure 13, the exemplary sensors 254 include a radiation emitter 258 and a radiation receiver 260. During operation the radiation emitter is operative to output radiation that is at least partially reflected from the inner surface of layer 256. The reflected radiation is received by the receiver 260. Corresponding electrical signals are produced by the receiver, and such signals are transmitted through appropriate circuitry so as to enable the controller to detect the changes in signals that correspond to probable presence of an unauthorized reading device.
  • Figure 14 is a schematic view of an unauthorized input intercepting device 262 that has been positioned in overlying relation of a keypad 32.
  • the input intercepting device 262 includes false keys 264 which are moveable and which are operatively connected to the corresponding keys 250 of the keypad.
  • input intercepting device 262 includes sensors which are operative to detect which of the false keys 264 have been depressed by a user. Because the depression of the false keys is operative to actuate the actual keys 250, the ATM is enabled to operate with the device 262 in place.
  • Input intercepting device 262 in exemplary embodiments may include a wireless transmitter or other suitable device for transmitting the input signals to a criminal who may intercept such inputs.
  • the input intercepting device 262 includes portions 267 which extend in the areas 252 in overlying relation of layer 256.
  • the portion of the input intercepting device extending in overlying relation of the layer 256 is operative to cause a change in the amount of radiation from the emitter 258 that is reflected and sensed by the receiver 260 of the sensor. This is because the overlying portion will have different radiation reflecting or absorbing characteristics which will change the radiation reflective properties of the layer 256 compared to when no such input intercepting device is present.
  • the controller may be operative to sense the level of reflected radiation at the sensors periodically.
  • sensor readings can be taken and compared during transactions to prior values stored in a data store to determine if a change lasting longer than normal has occurred which suggests that an unauthorized input intercepting device has been installed rather than a user has temporarily placed their hand or some other item adjacent to the keypad.
  • the controller may not resolve that there is a probable unauthorized input intercepting device on the machine until a significant change from a prior condition is detected in the radiation properties adjacent to the keypad on several occasions both during a transactions and thereafter.
  • a controller may be operative to determine that an improper device has been installed as a result of changes that occur during a time when no transactions have occurred.
  • the controller may operate to sense and analyze signals from the sensors responsive to detecting inputs from other sensors, such as for example an ultrasonic sensor which senses that a person has moved adjacent to the machine but has not operated the machine to conduct a transaction.
  • these approaches are merely exemplary of many approaches that may be used.
  • radiation type sensors are used for purposes of detection, in other embodiments other types of sensors may be used. These include, for example, inductance sensors, sonic sensors, RF sensors, or other types of sensing approaches that can be used to detect the presence of material in locations that suggest an unauthorized input intercepting device being positioned adjacent to the keypad. Further, in some embodiments the controller or other circuitry associated with the sensors may be operative to make adjustments for normal changes that may occur at the machine. These may include, for example, changes with time due to aging of emitters, the build up of dirt in the area adjacent to the keypad, weather conditions, moisture conditions, scratching of the surface of the sensing layer, or other conditions which may normally occur.
  • Appropriate programs may be executed by the controller or other circuitry so as to recalibrate and/or compensate for such conditions as may occur over time while still enabling the detection of a rapid change which is sufficiently significant and of such duration so as to indicate the probable installation of an unauthorized input intercepting device.
  • these approaches are exemplary of many approaches that may be used.
  • other or additional approaches to detecting fraudulent reading or other improper activities may be used.
  • the fascia of the banking machine may be subject to observation within a field of view of one or more imaging devices such as camera 131 schematically represented in Figure 10.
  • Camera 15 may be in operative connection with an image capture system of the type shown in U.S. Patent 6,583,813, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference.
  • the controller and or an image capture system may be operative to execute sequences of activities responsive to triggering events that may be associated with attempts to install or operate fraud devices.
  • the presence of a person in front of the banking machine may be sensed through image analysis, weight sensors, sonic detectors or other detectors.
  • the person remaining in proximity to the machine for a selected period or remaining too long after a transaction may constitute a triggering event which is operative to cause the system to take actions in a programmed sequence.
  • Such actions may include capturing images from one or more additional cameras and/or moving image data from one or more cameras from temporary to more permanent storage.
  • the sequence may also include capturing image data from the fascia to try to detect tampering or improper devices. Radiation or vibration tests may also be conducted as part of a sequence. Notifications and/or images may also be sent to certain entities or system addresses. Of course these actions are exemplary.
  • the controller of the ATM or other connected computers may be operatively programmed to analyze conditions that are sensed and to determine based on the sensed conditions that a fraud device is installed. Such a programmed computer may be operative to apply certain rules such as to correlate the repeated sensing of abnormal conditions with a possible fraud or tampering condition and to conduct tests for the presence of fraud devices. Such events may constitute soft triggers for sequences or other actions to detect and reduce the risk of fraud devices. Of course these approaches are merely exemplary and in other embodiments other approaches may be used.
  • the ATM may include sensors adapted to intercept signals from unauthorized card readers or customer input intercepting devices. For example, some fraud devices may operate to transmit RF signals to a nearby receiver operated by a criminal.
  • RF signals may be detected by appropriate circuitry and analyzed through operation of the ATM controller or other processor, and if it is determined that it is probable that such a device is installed, programmed actions may be taken.
  • suitable RF shielding material may be applied to or in the fascia to reduce the level of RF interference from devices within the ATM at the exterior of the fascia.
  • Antennas or other appropriate radiation sensing devices may be positioned adjacent to or installed on the fascia. A change in RF radiation in the vicinity of the fascia exterior may result upon the installation of an unauthorized device.
  • the RF signals can be detected by receiver circuitry, and signals or data corresponding thereto input to a processor.
  • the circuitry may also determine the frequency of the radiation sensed to be used in resolving if it is within the range emitted by legitimate devices such as cell phones of users operating the ATM.
  • the circuitry may analyze the signals to determine if they are varying, and the circuitry and/or the processor may evaluate whether the changes in signal correspond to the input of a PIN or a card to the ATM.
  • the processor may operate in accordance with its programming to evaluate the nature and character of the intercepted signals.
  • the processor may operate to take actions such as to wholly or partially cease operation of the ATM, capture images with a camera, and/or notify an appropriate remote entity through operation of the ATM.
  • the processor may compare the sensed RF signals to transaction activity at the ATM. If the sensed signals are determined to be varying in ways that correspond in a pattern or relationship to card or PIN inputs, for example, the processor may operate in accordance with its programming to cause the ATM or other devices to take appropriate programmed steps.
  • the processor may be in operative connection with an RF emitter. The processor may operate in accordance with its programming to cause the emitter to generate RF signals that interfere with the detected signals.
  • the processor controlling the emitter may operate the ATM or be in communication with a controller thereof.
  • the processor may operate to control the emitter to produce outputs at times when a user's card is moving into or out of a card slot, and/or when the ATM is accepting a user's PIN or other inputs.
  • the emitter may be operative to produce interfering signals during relatively brief periods so as to not disrupt RF transmissions for an extended period in the event an incorrect determination is made and the RF signals are from a legitimate source.
  • an emitter may be a type that transmits on a plurality of frequencies intended to disrupt transmissions within the expected range of frequencies for a fraud device.
  • the emitter may be controlled responsive to the processor to match the frequency or frequencies of suspect signals that have been detected.
  • these approaches are exemplary of approaches that may be used.
  • the ATM 10 is provided with enhanced diagnostic capabilities as well as the ability for servicers to more readily perform remedial and preventive maintenance on the machine. This is accomplished in an exemplary embodiment by programming the controller and/or alternatively distributed controllers and processors associated with the transaction function devices, to sense and capture diagnostic data concerning the operation of the various transaction function devices. In an exemplary embodiment this diagnostic data may include more than an indication of a disabling malfunction.
  • the data may include for example instances of speed, intensity, deflection, vacuum, force, friction, pressure, sound, vibration, wear or other parameters that may be of significance for purposes of detecting conditions that may be developing with regard to the machine and the transaction function devices contained therein.
  • the nature of the diagnostic data that may be obtained will depend on the particular transaction function devices and the capabilities thereof as well as the programming of the controllers within the machine.

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  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un guichet automatique bancaire (10) équipé d'un premier panneau frontal verrouillable (20) qui, lorsqu'il est déverrouillé, permet d'accéder à un dispositif de saisie à serrure auberonnière (104) sur lequel des données sont saisies pour ouvrir une porte du coffre (18) de la machine. L'ouverture du premier panneau frontal permet également d'accéder à un actionneur (116) pouvant enclencher le mouvement d'un second panneau frontal (22) autorisant la conduite d'activités de service. Un contrôleur (72) intégré à la machine éclaire sélectivement des dispositifs électroluminescents (118, 126) aux fins de faciliter l'exploitation de la machine par l'usager. Des dispositifs de détection (128) adjacents à une fente du lecteur de cartes (28) ménagée sur la machine permettent au contrôleur de détecter la présence d'un dispositif de fraude ou de lecteurs de cartes non autorisés. Des dispositifs de détection (254) jouxtant un clavier (32) permettent au contrôleur de détecter la présence d'un dispositif manuel d'interception de données saisies non autorisé.
PCT/US2004/014477 2003-06-23 2004-05-07 Guichet automatique bancaire presentant une resistance amelioree a la fraude WO2005001598A2 (fr)

Priority Applications (5)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
MXPA05013283A MXPA05013283A (es) 2003-06-23 2004-05-07 Maquina bancaria automatizada con resistencia mejorada al fraude.
CA2529005A CA2529005C (fr) 2003-06-23 2004-05-07 Guichet automatique bancaire presentant une resistance amelioree a la fraude
EP04785747A EP1639537A4 (fr) 2003-06-23 2004-05-07 Guichet automatique bancaire presentant une resistance amelioree a la fraude
BRPI0411735A BRPI0411735B1 (pt) 2003-06-23 2004-05-07 aparelho para máquina de auto-atendimento bancário; e método
CN200480017471.8A CN1809848B (zh) 2003-06-23 2004-05-07 具有改进的抗诈骗性的自动银行机

Applications Claiming Priority (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US10/601,813 US7240827B2 (en) 2002-11-26 2003-06-23 Automated banking machine with improved resistance to fraud
US10/601,813 2003-06-23
US56067404P 2004-04-07 2004-04-07
US60/560,674 2004-04-07

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2005001598A2 true WO2005001598A2 (fr) 2005-01-06
WO2005001598A3 WO2005001598A3 (fr) 2005-07-28
WO2005001598A8 WO2005001598A8 (fr) 2005-09-01

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EP (1) EP1639537A4 (fr)
BR (1) BRPI0411735B1 (fr)
CA (1) CA2529005C (fr)
MX (1) MXPA05013283A (fr)
RU (1) RU2006101691A (fr)
WO (1) WO2005001598A2 (fr)

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EP1533765A2 (fr) * 2003-11-19 2005-05-25 Ncr International Inc. Lecteur de carte à puce
GB2422705A (en) * 2005-01-28 2006-08-02 Ncr Int Inc An ATM with sensors to detect the addition of a fraud device
WO2007107876A2 (fr) * 2006-03-23 2007-09-27 Gilbarco S.P.A. Dispositif de verification du bon fonctionnement des terminaux automatiques de paiement
EP1847971A1 (fr) 2006-03-29 2007-10-24 Nidec Sankyo Corporation Dispositif de traitement du support
WO2007137919A1 (fr) * 2006-05-29 2007-12-06 Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh Appareil en libre-service doté d'un dispositif de détection
US8870072B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2014-10-28 Card Swipe Protection Technology B.V. Card feed unit, read out unit, ATM and method
US9269237B2 (en) 2010-11-04 2016-02-23 Keba Ag Apparatus and method for detecting a foreign object mounted in the near range of an input means used for identification and/or authentication, input means and service machine
EP3220322A1 (fr) * 2014-04-03 2017-09-20 Cubic Corporation Distributeur automatique commandé à distance

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JP5747652B2 (ja) * 2011-05-20 2015-07-15 沖電気工業株式会社 自動取引装置、情報処理端末および覗き見防止カバー

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EP1043704A1 (fr) 1999-04-06 2000-10-11 Ncr International Inc. Terminal libre service

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Cited By (12)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP1533765A2 (fr) * 2003-11-19 2005-05-25 Ncr International Inc. Lecteur de carte à puce
EP1533765A3 (fr) * 2003-11-19 2006-02-08 Ncr International Inc. Lecteur de carte à puce
GB2422705A (en) * 2005-01-28 2006-08-02 Ncr Int Inc An ATM with sensors to detect the addition of a fraud device
WO2007107876A2 (fr) * 2006-03-23 2007-09-27 Gilbarco S.P.A. Dispositif de verification du bon fonctionnement des terminaux automatiques de paiement
WO2007107876A3 (fr) * 2006-03-23 2008-01-10 Gilbarco S P A Dispositif de verification du bon fonctionnement des terminaux automatiques de paiement
US8132721B2 (en) 2006-03-23 2012-03-13 Gilbarco Inc. Device for checking the regularity of the operation of automatic payment terminals
EP1847971A1 (fr) 2006-03-29 2007-10-24 Nidec Sankyo Corporation Dispositif de traitement du support
CN101046898B (zh) * 2006-03-29 2012-07-04 日本电产三协株式会社 媒体处理装置
WO2007137919A1 (fr) * 2006-05-29 2007-12-06 Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh Appareil en libre-service doté d'un dispositif de détection
US8870072B2 (en) 2009-03-27 2014-10-28 Card Swipe Protection Technology B.V. Card feed unit, read out unit, ATM and method
US9269237B2 (en) 2010-11-04 2016-02-23 Keba Ag Apparatus and method for detecting a foreign object mounted in the near range of an input means used for identification and/or authentication, input means and service machine
EP3220322A1 (fr) * 2014-04-03 2017-09-20 Cubic Corporation Distributeur automatique commandé à distance

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CA2529005C (fr) 2010-08-10
EP1639537A2 (fr) 2006-03-29
BRPI0411735B1 (pt) 2017-02-14
RU2006101691A (ru) 2006-06-27
EP1639537A4 (fr) 2010-04-21
CA2529005A1 (fr) 2005-01-06
MXPA05013283A (es) 2006-03-09
WO2005001598A8 (fr) 2005-09-01
WO2005001598A3 (fr) 2005-07-28
BRPI0411735A (pt) 2006-08-08

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