WO2001075830A1 - Appareil securise - Google Patents

Appareil securise Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2001075830A1
WO2001075830A1 PCT/GB2001/001359 GB0101359W WO0175830A1 WO 2001075830 A1 WO2001075830 A1 WO 2001075830A1 GB 0101359 W GB0101359 W GB 0101359W WO 0175830 A1 WO0175830 A1 WO 0175830A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
appliance
location
authorised
data
security controller
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/GB2001/001359
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Jonathan Hopkins
David Caldwell Mcglaughlin
Alexander Charles Croxall Brennan
Richard Charles Blyth
Stephen Michael Reeder
Original Assignee
British Telecommunications Public Limited Company
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by British Telecommunications Public Limited Company filed Critical British Telecommunications Public Limited Company
Priority to AU2001242600A priority Critical patent/AU2001242600A1/en
Publication of WO2001075830A1 publication Critical patent/WO2001075830A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
    • G08B13/02—Mechanical actuation
    • G08B13/14—Mechanical actuation by lifting or attempted removal of hand-portable articles
    • G08B13/1409—Mechanical actuation by lifting or attempted removal of hand-portable articles for removal detection of electrical appliances by detecting their physical disconnection from an electrical system, e.g. using a switch incorporated in the plug connector
    • G08B13/1418—Removal detected by failure in electrical connection between the appliance and a control centre, home control panel or a power supply

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a moveable appliance, and in particular to an appliance incorporating security systems to discourage theft.
  • Homes and workplaces commonly house large numbers of technological appliances, and developments in information and communication technology are tending to increase still further the number and value of the appliances.
  • a domestic living room might now house a digital television, hi fi components, a digital video disc player, a video cassette recorder and a personal computer. All such appliances are vulnerable to theft. Even if premises are secured with burglar alarms, determined thieves may still not be deterred.
  • some appliances, such as laptop computers it may often be necessary to take the appliance outside the home, further increasing the risk of theft.
  • a moveable appliance including a location sensor, and a security controller integrated with the appliance, the security controller being arranged to inhibit at least some of the functions of the appliance when the location of the appliance indicated by data from the location sensor is not an authorised location.
  • the present invention fundamentally reduces the value of an appliance to a thief by incorporating in the appliance a system that ensures that the appliance ceases to function, or at least has its functionality limited, if the appliance is stolen.
  • This system comprises a location sensor together with a security controller that controls the functioning of the appliance, for example by preventing the appliance powering up.
  • the location sensor detects signals indicating the current location of the appliance and that location is then compared with the authorised location.
  • the authorised location may have been recorded, for example by a retailer using customer details provided at the time of purchase, or by the customer themselves on installing the appliance. For example, the retailer might take the postcode of the customer, translate that postcode into a co-ordinate range by reference to a geographical information systems (GIS) database, and then record the co-ordinate range .
  • GIS geographical information systems
  • the apparatus further comprises a communications interface for communicating data via a communications network with a remote operations centre, in use a permission code being transmitted from the remote operations centre to the appliance depending on the location reported by the location sensor and the security controller enabling functions of the appliance in response to the said security permission code.
  • the location sensor may be responsive to signals transmitted by a mobile cellular communications network. Such signals can be used to identify which cell of the network the appliance is located in, and receivers for this purpose are readily and cheaply available.
  • the location sensor may be responsive to a satellite positioning signal such as that provided by the GPS (global positioning system). This provides a more accurate determination of the appliance location.
  • Other types of signal may also be used, for example in other networks divided into different domains, the sensor may detect a signal identifying the domain to which the appliance is connected.
  • the appliance may be a computer, in which case the security controller is preferably arranged to inhibit access to at least some of the data on the computer when outside an authorised location.
  • This feature of the invention addresses the further problem associated with the theft of computers, that the thief may gain access to sensitive data stored on the computer.
  • the controller may completely disable the computer, or may selectively inhibit access to certain sets of data, for example to a particular folder that then provides a secure store for particularly sensitive data.
  • This latter arrangement is of particular value in the case of a laptop computer which may routinely be used by the owner away from authorised locations, for example on a journey between work and home. The owner can then still make use of the computer on the journey, whilst knowing that data in the secure store will not be compromised if the computer is lost.
  • a method of operating a moveable appliance including detecting with a location sensor integrated with the appliance the location of the appliance and, with a security controller integrated with the appliance, inhibiting at least some of the functions of the appliance when the location of the appliance indicated by data from the location sensor is not an authorised location.
  • the customer premises interface was developed to provide an environmental alarm arrangement for simple installation and use in communal premises, for example to provide smoke or fire detection in an apartment block.
  • a control and communications network uses the PSTN 1 to effect communications between a remote operations centre 4 and customer premises 3. It will be appreciated that for simplicity only one remote operations centre is shown although there may be many such centres distributed across the PSTN.
  • a home control centre 2 provides an interface for communication on the one hand by way of the customer telephone line 7 and the PSTN with the remote operations centre and on the other hand by way of the mains electricity supply 6 of the customers premises 3 with suitably adapted electrical appliances 5.
  • FIG. 1 Also shown in Figure 1 is a repatriation unit 8 which enables stolen property to be identified by authorised persons for return to the owner. It will be appreciated that other control centres accessible by way of the PSTN may also benefit from the arrangement.
  • Figure 1 is a block schematic diagram of a communications and control network
  • Figure 2 is a block schematic diagram of the "home control centre" of figure
  • Figure 3 is a block schematic diagram of adapted apparatus
  • Figure 4 is a flow chart showing the operation of the home control centre of figure 2;
  • Figure 5 is a flow chart showing the operation of relevant circuits of the apparatus of figure 3;
  • Figure 6 is a block schematic diagram of apparatus in the remote operations centre
  • Figure 7 is a flow chart showing functionality of the operation of the remote operations centre of Figure 1 ;
  • Figure 8 shows a flow chart of an information request response in the remote operations centre
  • Figure 9 shows operation of a capability change section of the operations centre
  • Figure 10 shows a further flow chart in relation to a keyed changed request from a control centre to the remote operations centre
  • Figure 1 1 shows operation of the processor of the apparatus of Figure 3 in respect of a specific function request
  • Figure 12 is a schematic representation of a geographical control arrangement.
  • FIG. 1 shows an implementation of a communications and control network of the kind modified by the present invention and as disclosed in European patent application number 960406.
  • a detailed explanation of the arrangement shown in Figure 1 may be had by reference to the previous application in respect of coding of electrical appliances 5 and only a limited description of the functionality of the remote operations centre (ROC) and home control centre (HCC) in respect of the prior art will be given herein.
  • the HCC 2 of Figure 1 comprises a processor 23, with associated data stores 24, 26.
  • the processor has an analogue shift key (ASK) signalling interface 25 for communicating on the mains electricity supply 6.
  • ASK analogue shift key
  • the ASK interface 25 may be replaced by other signalling arrangements communicating by way of the mains electricity supply.
  • radio transmission or Intranet or telephony line communication may be used in place of the ASK interface 25 or in addition thereto.
  • communication is described as being on the mains electricity supply to electrical appliances and/or detectors and/or sensors, it should not be taken as limiting the invention to communication by way of the electricity supply.
  • the processor is also shown as having access to a tone generator modem 22 for communication by way of network termination equipment 20 to telephone lines 7.
  • a tone generator modem 22 for communication by way of network termination equipment 20 to telephone lines 7.
  • CLI calling line identity
  • other communications methods and location identification may be used including, but not limited to, used of cellular networks for communication including triangulation between cellular network masts to determine the location identity.
  • Low Earth orbital satellite and/or direct radio communication between the HCC 2 and ROC 4 may also be used while global positioning by satellite (GPS) and/or burnt in identification of the HCC 2 should not be considered to be excluded.
  • GPS global positioning by satellite
  • a protected or controlled appliance e.g. 5 of Figure 1
  • modification of the process control 15 within the appliance requires the process control to signal to operational circuits of the appliance.
  • the process control 1 5 has an interface 14 for communicating by way of a communications device, for example a mobile cellular phone connected to a phone connector 1 1 or directly by radio aerial 21 with the HCC 2.
  • the HCC 2 returns control information to the process control 1 5 by way of the phone circuit or radio communication and the interface 14 to permit or deny activation of operational circuits.
  • one method of discouraging theft is to have the power supply of the appliance 5 cease to supply power to the operational circuits unless or until the process control 1 5 has received an appropriate code downloaded from a ROC by way of the HCC 2.
  • the device until coded forwards a message to the HCC each time it is activated and requests a coding.
  • the HCC in addition to receiving operation and blanking codes, also includes the ability to transfer additional information to the process control 15 this information including identity of "capability sets" and timer information.
  • the capability sets are programmed in to a memory 1 9 and define which functions of the appliance are available for use. For example, in a lap top computer, the facilities available to be used may be held in the capability set along with data access permissions.
  • the process control may determine from the capability set in combination with the current location determined by location sensor 13 whether the appropriate function is available. The process control may thus permit or refuse activation of the appropriate function which enables the functionality of the apparatus to be varied from the ROC 4 by way of the home control 2 to the process control 15.
  • This facility therefore allows apparatus owners to permit or deny access to certain functions by way of a secure route.
  • appliances may be coded through the supply chain from manufacturer, to wholesaler, to retailer, to end customer so that theft in transit is more difficult and electronic sales (for example by way of the Internet) can be secured.
  • electronic sales for example by way of the Internet
  • the goods will be of no benefit to the fraudulent user since they will be pre- coded at the point of sale to the specific HCC of the proper card owner.
  • delivery of goods to a specific address is secured since any theft will leave the thief with an unusable apparatus which is readily traceable to its proper owner and which may reveal its location to proper authorities to facilitate recovery.
  • the processor 23 of the HCC 2 of Figure 2 is normally quiescent in a main state 900 until it receives, by way of the communications channel, an "unlock request" message (901 ) from an appliance 5.
  • the message includes the identity of the requesting apparatus by type, manufacturer and electronic serial number. If the requesting apparatus is not in the list of appliances held in the volatile data store 24 then by way of the path 906 to 970 coding is requested from the ROC 4 by way of the PSTN 1 .
  • Various checks are made to ensure that the requesting appliance codes appropriately and that the new equipment is now included in the appliance list. Full details of this part of the operation are disclosed in the earlier published European applications, including a more complete flow chart for those operations involved after the commencement of the Lock Enable Timer at step 910.
  • the message type is analysed to determine how the message is to be handled by the HCC. If the message is an environmental alarm (944) then it is handled in a manner described in other co-pending patent applications of the proprietor to ensure that appropriate response to the alarm occurs. This is indicated here for the sake of completeness only.
  • the Signal Group Basic route 945 is followed.
  • a check is carried out to determine whether in respect of the particular appliance the blanking code is present and, if so, the equipment is ordered to decode itself as disclosed in published European patent application no 960407 which includes a full flow chart in respect of the code blanking activity.
  • the unlock code is recovered from the data store (904) and is transmitted as an unlock response (905) to the communications channel.
  • a precoded appliance from an electronic sale record
  • its unlock code will already be present in the equipment list of the HCC 2 provided that the equipment is licitly present at its location and that the HCC has either made a connection to the ROC 4 in the period between coding and delivery and connection or has been forced to make such a call by the owner causing a reset of the HCC 2.
  • the equipment is licitly present at its location, when the HCC receives an unlock request it will follow the path indicated at step 902 and the ROC 4 will recognise the coding request and return the appropriate (already stored) coding for the appliance to operate.
  • the ROC may not return a valid coding and may cause an alert to be provided to appropriate authorities.
  • the apparatus may operate on a temporary basis, for example by returning a coding with a short time decay (hereinafter discussed) so that a fraudulent operator of the appliance may not realise that the authorities are aware of the illicit operation and its location.
  • step 947 the processor 23 determines whether there are instructions for the apparatus in the list. If at step 947 instructions exist and locational data in the message is valid then the information message is returned through the interface 25 at step 952 and the HCC resumes its quiescent state.
  • step 947 instructions in respect of the particular apparatus have not previously been received and stored then a call is established through the PSTN to the ROC 4 and an equipment information required message is transmitted (948).
  • the ROC 4 will respond with an equipment information response message (949) and the processor 25 determines whether the message includes information to be stored either in respect of the particular request or additional thereto (950). If not then the received information is passed through the interface to the mains as a transmit information message (952) prior to the quiescent state being resumed.
  • the list held in the data store 24 or 25 is updated (951 ) in accordance with the message and the information responding to the request received is then transmitted as before at step 952.
  • the process control may be interrupted or triggered as a result of user action or as a result of timer permissions decaying to zero.
  • the process control causes an Unlock Request Message to be transmitted 52 and commences a cover timer 53 for response from the HCC 2 as previously described with reference to Figure 4.
  • the unlock request message includes locational information from the location sensor 13.
  • messages from the apparatus to the HCC 2 may be by mobile phone or by use of radio transmission. Further, messages may be directed to an ROC or a control centre in other premises (for example work place).
  • the user may force a request to the HCC 2 by activating a reset function either directly or through remote control in order to activate or de-activate a capability in the controlled apparatus.
  • a reset function either directly or through remote control in order to activate or de-activate a capability in the controlled apparatus.
  • an SG Plus message (57) to be transmitted by way of the interface 14 to the mains supply line 6 and thence to the HCC 2.
  • a cover timer is started (58) while awaiting the response from the HCC 2.
  • any additional capability set "Y" may be stored as active in the data store 16 together with an appropriate timer associated therewith (if any) at step 61 .
  • the information message received includes a multiple capability set activate and/or deactivate instruction (possibly with respective associated decay timers) then these are stored at as indicated at steps 62 and 63.
  • a further facility which may be provided by the control system of the invention allows for sensors to be provided which may be smart card, smart badge, or passive or biometric sensors so that the presence or absence of a particular card or badge may be used to modify or determine the facilities provided.
  • sensors may be smart card, smart badge, or passive or biometric sensors so that the presence or absence of a particular card or badge may be used to modify or determine the facilities provided.
  • step 64 if there is a change in the card presence this may cause the process control 1 5 to generate an SG plus message as before following the steps 57 et sequenda.. This enables the particular apparatus to provide certain facilities only when an appropriate card is present.
  • the apparatus may have certain capabilities turned off unless a card indicative of presence of a qualified operator is present such that user access to specific information may be restricted
  • Sensor presence may also be a limited period authorisation such that the timer decays and causes a further SG Plus message to be transmitted as indicated at step 65.
  • the timers decaying to zero in the data store 16 and process control 1 5
  • the associated capability set "X" is marked as disabled (66) and a message transmitted as before. This will result either in an information message including a renewed time for the capability set or a disable message as appropriate through steps 59 to 63.
  • the process control may set a further timer to force an SG plus message at a subsequent time to attempt an update of the capability sets.
  • step 71 the process control reads the current capability set(s) which are active (step 71 ) and determines whether the particular function is controlled (step 72). If the function is an open function ("Always”) then as indicated at step 73 the function is implemented and the controlled appliance responds to the function request appropriately. If the function is marked as disabled or inactive (“No") then the function may be disabled (step 74) and a display activated indicating that the function is unavailable.
  • the third possibility is that the capability set requires that the function requested is authorised on the basis of location each time it is activated.
  • an information request message is transmitted to the HCC 2 including location data derived from the location sensor using GPS or sensed by the cellular system using triangulation and a cover timer started (77).
  • the process control On receipt of an information response (78) the process control will store any modification to the capability set authorisation (with a decay timer if present) and will again read the capability set. If the timer set at step 77 expires then the process control may check the number of attempts made (step not shown) and will either return to reading the capability set or will step to reject the request and disable functions.
  • the number of attempts to check authorisation may be bounded so that only a single request for information is made in respect of the function requested and if not authorised the requested function may be rejected.
  • the cover timer started at step 77 must be sufficient in some circumstances to allow for the HCC to effect a modem interchange with the ROC in case there should be a third party authorisation entered through the remote centre.
  • a "heartbeat timer” which may force application for authorisation at periodic intervals.
  • the ROC in its simplest form comprises a computer 30 with associated data storage 31 and communications capabilities represented by telephone lines 37 and modems 33. Location detection represented by CLI detector 32 is also provided, noting that GPS may also be detectable.
  • CLI detector 32 Much of the functionality of the ROC of figure 6 has been described in the proprietors earlier applications such that only a representative selection of program instances are from the previous operational description are shown in figure 7 to which reference is now also made.
  • the first process shown (81 1 ) is a response to a HCC 2 requesting an equipment list.
  • the HCC 2 will lose data from the volatile data store 24 (of figure 2) if power is removed for any reason. It is therefore necessary for the ROC to return a complete listing to the HCC to enable apparatus in the controlled premises to function.
  • the location identity is recovered (from CLI detector 32/GPS or wired coding from the message) and a comparison made to determine whether the location is valid (line ID Registered 813).
  • An attempt from an unauthorised source including an invalid combination of identity and wired coding
  • Appropriate authorities may be notified of the attempt if there has been an indication that the HCC making application has been fraudulently removed from its previous location.
  • the equipment listing and codings appropriate to the premises in which the home control is located will be loaded (step 814) and encompassed in a message for return through the PSTN (81 5).
  • step 820 In the Equipment code required (step 820) process, when a request is received 820 then as previously location data is checked (822,823) before location code and equipment code and blanking codes are determined (824, 825). It should be noted here that where a pre-coded appliance (hereinafter described) causes application for an equipment code and there is an indication of invalid location of the appliance an appropriate action may be taken (steps not shown). Once codings for the requesting appliance have been determined then an equipment code response is transmitted 827 and a timer for confirmation of coding 826 is started. If on expiry of the timer no response has been received then a further attempt to transmit codings may be made and/or a query may be entered against the record of the appliance in the appropriate equipment list. Assuming that an equipment stored confirm message is received (828) then the cover timer is stopped (829) and the process ended.
  • a pre-coded appliance hereinafter described
  • an equipment code response is transmitted 827 and a timer for confirmation of coding 826 is started. If on
  • data for the particular location is recovered (75) from the data store 31 and an information response message encapsulating that data is transmitted (76) back through the PSTN.
  • FIG 9 there is shown a process whereby a service provider or appliance retailer may register changes against a particular customer location.
  • the supplier forwards a capability change message which is received at the ROC (step 80) and the identity of the supplier checked (81 ) and validated (82). Assuming that the supplier is appropriately identified the HCC is identified from the message content and a check carried out to ensure that the HCC is registered (84).
  • the capability change requested is subject to agreement from the HCC user then a check is made to ensure that the end user has given permission (85) prior to responding to the change request. If the change is simply one requiring a capability set modification then the appropriate information is amended (86) in the data store 31 so that on the next application of the respective HCC for information the amended capabilities are transmitted. A notification message is returned to the supplier at step 87 and the process terminates.
  • step 86 If at step 86 it is necessary to allocate a new item or appliance to the HCC then appropriate codings are generated and stored and these will be notified to the supplier so that the appliance being supplied or sold may be appropriately coded.
  • the HCC transmits a keyed change request to the ROC.
  • a keyed change request maybe in respect of modification of capability sets, time of availability, availability only on sensed presence and the location at which the apparatus may be used whereby user authorities are modified by the user or other authorised persons.
  • the ROC receives a keyed change request (1 10) the HCC is identified (1 1 1 ) and the usual identity and validity checks are carried out (1 12, 1 13 1 14). Assuming that the request is valid then the data for the appropriate HCC is recovered (1 15) from the data bank 31 to enable a check to be carried out (1 16) on any required PIN entry or smart card presence prior to modification of the respective data and an information message including the updated information being transmitted (1 1 8).
  • HCC should not be construed as limiting the application of the invention to domestic premises since the control mechanisms and methods disclosed hereinbefore may be equally applied to non domestic premises with little variation in the implementation.
  • an HCC located in a farm building 120 may be used to restrict usage of farm machinery 121 .
  • a process control may require a mobile phone to be connected to the connector (1 1 of Figure 3) and will establish a call to the HCC to receive permissions.
  • Sensors present in the machine 121 will provide location data and identity of any card or badge present.
  • the HCC may check that the machine is within authorised boundaries 1 22 and that the operator is allowed to use that machine.
  • a request from a machine 123 outside of the authorised boundary 122 will receive no operational permissions, while the machine 1 21 will be authorised to operate subject to sensed smart card presence.
  • the operational permissions may be required to be renewed at periodic intervals. Accordingly, such actions as changed an attached implement may result in a permissions request, the system being adapted to identify the implement(s) attached.
  • Such an arrangement may also be used for example to control operation of machinery on building sites so that operation is restricted to valid locations and by appropriate authorised persons.
  • the supplier may be able to authorise usage of certain functions while denying use of others.
  • a suitable GPS receiver is commercially available from Motorola Integrated Electronics Systems as the SL Oncore TM.
  • a suitable micro-controller for implementing the security control is a Motorola M-COR ETM micro-controller.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un appareil sécurisé comprenant un capteur de localisation, par exemple un capteur GPS. Cet appareil comprend également une fonction de communications, par exemple un téléphone mobile. Chaque fois que l'appareil est activé, et ce périodiquement, un appel est établi entre ledit appareil et un centre de commande afin de demander des autorisations d'accès fonctionnelles. Lorsque l'appareil fonctionne dans un emplacement interdit, ou lorsqu'il est activé par un opérateur non autorisé, les autorisations d'accès fonctionnel sont refusées.
PCT/GB2001/001359 2000-03-31 2001-03-27 Appareil securise WO2001075830A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU2001242600A AU2001242600A1 (en) 2000-03-31 2001-03-27 Secured appliance

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP00302780.2 2000-03-31
EP00302780 2000-03-31

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2001075830A1 true WO2001075830A1 (fr) 2001-10-11

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Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/GB2001/001359 WO2001075830A1 (fr) 2000-03-31 2001-03-27 Appareil securise

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AU (1) AU2001242600A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2001075830A1 (fr)

Cited By (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2003071546A1 (fr) * 2002-02-19 2003-08-28 Oded Melinek Computer alarm
GB2394588A (en) * 2000-11-21 2004-04-28 Peter Richard Woodyard Security device including telecommunication apparatus
EP1594098A1 (fr) * 2004-05-06 2005-11-09 ArboProfit Dispositif de prevention du vol par determination de position
GB2468349A (en) * 2009-03-06 2010-09-08 Timothy John Bell Securing devices against unauthorized use
FR2951843A1 (fr) * 2009-10-23 2011-04-29 Thales Sa Procede de controle d'un equipement de chiffrement susceptible de subir un incident de securite et dispositif associe
US8692649B2 (en) 2010-11-22 2014-04-08 International Business Machines Corporation Asset management infrastructure
ITRM20130362A1 (it) * 2013-06-25 2014-12-26 Eurotek Srl "metodo e apparato per la protezione da utilizzo fraudolento di apparecchiature di trasmissione di flussi di segnali video digitali dvb "

Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO1996001531A2 (fr) * 1994-03-09 1996-01-18 Karbasi, Amir, Kiumars Systeme de positionnement cellulaire
WO1996003728A1 (fr) * 1994-07-21 1996-02-08 Baljit Singh Kang Protection renforcee destinee a des appareils electriques
GB2305285A (en) * 1995-09-13 1997-04-02 Rover Group A vehicle security system
WO1998004967A1 (fr) * 1996-07-25 1998-02-05 Peter David Collins Systeme de protection d'immobilisation pour produits et elements electroniques
US5751246A (en) * 1995-04-04 1998-05-12 Itt Industries, Inc. Accountability and theft protection via the global positioning system

Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO1996001531A2 (fr) * 1994-03-09 1996-01-18 Karbasi, Amir, Kiumars Systeme de positionnement cellulaire
WO1996003728A1 (fr) * 1994-07-21 1996-02-08 Baljit Singh Kang Protection renforcee destinee a des appareils electriques
US5751246A (en) * 1995-04-04 1998-05-12 Itt Industries, Inc. Accountability and theft protection via the global positioning system
GB2305285A (en) * 1995-09-13 1997-04-02 Rover Group A vehicle security system
WO1998004967A1 (fr) * 1996-07-25 1998-02-05 Peter David Collins Systeme de protection d'immobilisation pour produits et elements electroniques

Cited By (12)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2394588A (en) * 2000-11-21 2004-04-28 Peter Richard Woodyard Security device including telecommunication apparatus
GB2394588B (en) * 2000-11-21 2004-06-30 Peter Richard Woodyard Security system
WO2003071546A1 (fr) * 2002-02-19 2003-08-28 Oded Melinek Computer alarm
EP1594098A1 (fr) * 2004-05-06 2005-11-09 ArboProfit Dispositif de prevention du vol par determination de position
WO2005109363A1 (fr) * 2004-05-06 2005-11-17 Arboprofit Dispositif antivol de verification de position
US20090009283A1 (en) * 2004-05-06 2009-01-08 Arboprofit Anti-Theft Location Check Device
US9685055B2 (en) 2004-05-06 2017-06-20 Arboprofit Anti-theft home location check device
GB2468349A (en) * 2009-03-06 2010-09-08 Timothy John Bell Securing devices against unauthorized use
FR2951843A1 (fr) * 2009-10-23 2011-04-29 Thales Sa Procede de controle d'un equipement de chiffrement susceptible de subir un incident de securite et dispositif associe
EP2325772A3 (fr) * 2009-10-23 2011-06-29 Thales Procédé de contrôle d'un équipement de chiffrement susceptible d'être déplacé sans autorisation et dispositif associé
US8692649B2 (en) 2010-11-22 2014-04-08 International Business Machines Corporation Asset management infrastructure
ITRM20130362A1 (it) * 2013-06-25 2014-12-26 Eurotek Srl "metodo e apparato per la protezione da utilizzo fraudolento di apparecchiature di trasmissione di flussi di segnali video digitali dvb "

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