WO1997022093A1 - Verfahren zur echtheitskontrolle eines bei einer transaktion verwendeten vorausbezahlten zahlungsmittels - Google Patents
Verfahren zur echtheitskontrolle eines bei einer transaktion verwendeten vorausbezahlten zahlungsmittels Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO1997022093A1 WO1997022093A1 PCT/EP1996/005347 EP9605347W WO9722093A1 WO 1997022093 A1 WO1997022093 A1 WO 1997022093A1 EP 9605347 W EP9605347 W EP 9605347W WO 9722093 A1 WO9722093 A1 WO 9722093A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- authenticity
- response signal
- signal
- payment
- transaction
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4093—Monitoring of device authentication
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/0866—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means by active credit-cards adapted therefor
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for checking the authenticity of a prepaid means of payment used in a transaction according to the preamble of claim 1
- Non-cash means of payment are, for example, chip cards, magnetic cards and optical cards. These are used when purchasing goods or service in a card slot of a reading device of the vending machine and checked in the vending machine or in a central office for their authenticity and their still existing monetary value. If the result of the test is positive, i.e. if the means of payment is genuinely and sufficiently monetary, the purchase of the goods or service is released and the Monetary value of the means of payment reduced by the value of the purchased goods or service
- First-generation means of payment are characterized by the existence of a large number of stored tokens that can be exchanged and represent a countervalue of the goods or services to be obtained. They are easy to use, but difficult to use for the services of different suppliers.
- the value units exist often from stored bytes, i.e. from 8 bit code words, which are, for example, a function of a card fiction date and a secret algorithm.
- the security against counterfeiting of the first generation means of payment depends exclusively on the difficulty with which it can be simulated, ie imitated
- a second, improved generation of means of payment can be used for the services of various suppliers. Their value is embodied by the content of a payer protected against increments and decrementable when purchasing a product or service, the payment unit of which corresponds to the value of the smallest transaction that is relevant for the application in question Coming up Unfortunately, the second generation means of payment do not allow a large diversification of a call signal used for authenticity control
- Third-generation means of payment are based on the concept of second-generation means of payment. Their authenticity detection system is based on the use of a complex call signal, a code code that can be designed in a variety of ways and an acoustic function.
- the call signal is a function of a random signal, an identification and / or security information of the means of payment and a booking value of the means of payment, the latter representing the still existing monetary value.
- the identification and / or security information contains, for example, a date of manufacture and / or a fact
- the invention has for its object to improve the security against fraud of the known authenticity checks and to make it dependent on the amount of a loss of money threatened by counterfeiting.
- FIG. 1 shows a schematic illustration of a card reader with an inserted card reader
- FIG. 2 shows a schematic illustration of an optical feature of a cashless optical payment means irradiated with a light beam.
- the authenticity check includes a plurality of authenticity comparisons, each of which is carried out with its own associated response signal 15, the number of authenticity comparisons N being a function which increases with the value of the transaction.
- the authenticity comparisons are preferably carried out in succession.
- the response signal 15 consists in each case of at least one bit and a maximum of z. B. 16 bits.
- the transaction is a telephone service
- there is one authenticity comparison per taxi pulse so that several, namely N time-staggered authenticity comparisons take place during the duration of the entire transaction, each with an associated, usually different response signal 15, the number of bits n of which is chosen to be low here can be, e.g. B. again 4 bits, since the value of a taxi pulse is usually relatively low and thus an increased risk of fraud can be accepted with the first taxi pulses.
- the value increases with the duration of the telephone service, but so does the number of tax impulses and thus the number N of authenticity comparisons, which in turn leads to a reduction in the risk of fraud l / (2 n N ).
- the latter is therefore relatively large at the beginning of a telephone conversation with l / (2 n ), but decreases in the course of the conversation the longer the conversation lasts, ie the greater its value and the greater N is.
- the prepaid means of payment is an optical card
- this is irradiated with a light beam when reading in the card reader at a predetermined angle, which light beam then determines one or more depending on the optical security feature present on the card given directions z. B. is reflected. 2, reflection occurs in a single direction. Instead of reflection, diffraction or refraction of the light beam is also possible. Fraud is possible, e.g. B. by irradiating the optical security feature with a light beam which is reflected in all directions, including in the given directions.
- the method according to the invention can also be used in this case in that the light beam used when reading the optical card is modulated and a number of features generated by the modulation are a measure of the diversity of the response signal. If the light beam is binary modulated, the number of pulses generated in this way is preferably the measure of the diversity of the response signal.
- the pulses can be amplitude, frequency or phase pulses.
Landscapes
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP96942304A EP0870286A1 (de) | 1995-12-11 | 1996-12-03 | Verfahren zur echtheitskontrolle eines bei einer transaktion verwendeten vorausbezahlten zahlungsmittels |
AU11404/97A AU704773B2 (en) | 1995-12-11 | 1996-12-03 | Method of authenticity checking of a prepaid payment means used in a transaction |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CH3485/95 | 1995-12-11 | ||
CH348595A CH690530A5 (de) | 1995-12-11 | 1995-12-11 | Verfahren zur Echtheitskontrolle eines bei einer Transaktion verwendeten vorausbezahlten Zahlungsmittels. |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO1997022093A1 true WO1997022093A1 (de) | 1997-06-19 |
Family
ID=4257012
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP1996/005347 WO1997022093A1 (de) | 1995-12-11 | 1996-12-03 | Verfahren zur echtheitskontrolle eines bei einer transaktion verwendeten vorausbezahlten zahlungsmittels |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP0870286A1 (de) |
AU (1) | AU704773B2 (de) |
CH (1) | CH690530A5 (de) |
WO (1) | WO1997022093A1 (de) |
Cited By (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP1018713A1 (de) * | 1999-01-07 | 2000-07-12 | Nec Corporation | Vorrichtung zum Beurteilen von Nachahmungen |
WO2001071675A1 (fr) * | 2000-03-22 | 2001-09-27 | France Telecom | Procede cryptographique de protection contre la fraude |
FR2807249A1 (fr) * | 2000-03-30 | 2001-10-05 | Ascom Monetel Sa | Procede d'authentification de cartes a puces |
FR2807245A1 (fr) * | 2000-03-30 | 2001-10-05 | France Telecom | Procede de protection d'une puce electronique contre la fraude |
WO2002013153A1 (en) * | 2000-08-07 | 2002-02-14 | Dallas Semiconductor Corporation | Security device and method |
FR2826531A1 (fr) * | 2001-06-26 | 2002-12-27 | France Telecom | Procede cryptographique pour la protection d'une puce electronique contre la fraude |
Citations (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO1985003787A1 (en) * | 1984-02-14 | 1985-08-29 | Peter White | Electronic transaction security system |
EP0294248A1 (de) * | 1987-05-20 | 1988-12-07 | Dassault Automatismes Et Telecommunications | Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Ermächtigen des Zugangs zu Daten oder Datenkommunikationsleitungen |
EP0440549A1 (de) * | 1990-01-30 | 1991-08-07 | Gemplus Card International | Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Verwalten von Chipkartentransaktionen |
EP0574990A2 (de) * | 1992-06-17 | 1993-12-22 | Philips Patentverwaltung GmbH | Verfahren und Schaltungsanordnung zum Prüfen einer Wertkarte |
DE4339460C1 (de) * | 1993-11-19 | 1995-04-06 | Siemens Ag | Verfahren zur Authentifizierung eines Systemteils durch ein anderes Systemteil eines Informationsübertragungssystems nach dem Challenge-and Response-Prinzip |
-
1995
- 1995-12-11 CH CH348595A patent/CH690530A5/de not_active IP Right Cessation
-
1996
- 1996-12-03 EP EP96942304A patent/EP0870286A1/de not_active Withdrawn
- 1996-12-03 AU AU11404/97A patent/AU704773B2/en not_active Ceased
- 1996-12-03 WO PCT/EP1996/005347 patent/WO1997022093A1/de not_active Application Discontinuation
Patent Citations (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO1985003787A1 (en) * | 1984-02-14 | 1985-08-29 | Peter White | Electronic transaction security system |
EP0294248A1 (de) * | 1987-05-20 | 1988-12-07 | Dassault Automatismes Et Telecommunications | Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Ermächtigen des Zugangs zu Daten oder Datenkommunikationsleitungen |
EP0440549A1 (de) * | 1990-01-30 | 1991-08-07 | Gemplus Card International | Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Verwalten von Chipkartentransaktionen |
EP0574990A2 (de) * | 1992-06-17 | 1993-12-22 | Philips Patentverwaltung GmbH | Verfahren und Schaltungsanordnung zum Prüfen einer Wertkarte |
DE4339460C1 (de) * | 1993-11-19 | 1995-04-06 | Siemens Ag | Verfahren zur Authentifizierung eines Systemteils durch ein anderes Systemteil eines Informationsübertragungssystems nach dem Challenge-and Response-Prinzip |
Cited By (15)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP1018713A1 (de) * | 1999-01-07 | 2000-07-12 | Nec Corporation | Vorrichtung zum Beurteilen von Nachahmungen |
WO2001071675A1 (fr) * | 2000-03-22 | 2001-09-27 | France Telecom | Procede cryptographique de protection contre la fraude |
FR2806858A1 (fr) * | 2000-03-22 | 2001-09-28 | France Telecom | Procede cryptographique de protection contre la fraude |
US7284122B2 (en) | 2000-03-22 | 2007-10-16 | France Telecom | Cryptographic method for protection against fraud |
WO2001075817A1 (fr) * | 2000-03-30 | 2001-10-11 | Ascom Monetel S.A. | Procede d'authentification de cartes a puces |
WO2001075821A1 (fr) * | 2000-03-30 | 2001-10-11 | France Telecom | Procede de protection d'une puce electronique contre la fraude |
FR2807245A1 (fr) * | 2000-03-30 | 2001-10-05 | France Telecom | Procede de protection d'une puce electronique contre la fraude |
US7165177B2 (en) | 2000-03-30 | 2007-01-16 | France Telecom | Method of protecting an electronic chip against fraud |
FR2807249A1 (fr) * | 2000-03-30 | 2001-10-05 | Ascom Monetel Sa | Procede d'authentification de cartes a puces |
WO2002013153A1 (en) * | 2000-08-07 | 2002-02-14 | Dallas Semiconductor Corporation | Security device and method |
US6986057B1 (en) | 2000-08-07 | 2006-01-10 | Dallas Semiconductor Corporation | Security device and method |
FR2826531A1 (fr) * | 2001-06-26 | 2002-12-27 | France Telecom | Procede cryptographique pour la protection d'une puce electronique contre la fraude |
WO2003001464A1 (fr) * | 2001-06-26 | 2003-01-03 | France Telecom | Procede cryptographique pour la protection d'une puce electronique contre la fraude |
US7526648B2 (en) | 2001-06-26 | 2009-04-28 | France Telecom | Cryptographic method of protecting an electronic chip against fraud |
KR100906518B1 (ko) * | 2001-06-26 | 2009-07-07 | 프랑스 텔레콤 | 도용으로부터 전자 칩을 보호하는 암호화 방법 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
AU1140497A (en) | 1997-07-03 |
EP0870286A1 (de) | 1998-10-14 |
CH690530A5 (de) | 2000-09-29 |
AU704773B2 (en) | 1999-05-06 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
DE2645564C2 (de) | Automatischer Geldausgeber | |
DE1944134C3 (de) | Zugangs- bzw. Zugriff-Kontrollvorrichtung, beispielsweise für die Ausgabe von Banknoten | |
DE19539801C2 (de) | Überwachung von Transaktionen mit Chipkarten | |
DE3904215C2 (de) | Verfahren und Anordnung zur Identifikation eines Benützers einer Chipkarte | |
DE2935199A1 (de) | Sicherheitssystem | |
DE2350418A1 (de) | Verfahren und einrichtung zur erstellung und auswertung von faelschungssicheren maschinell lesbaren zahlungsbelegen | |
DE2512902A1 (de) | System zur uebertragung von daten mit hilfe eines unabhaengigen tragbaren gegenstandes und einer autonomen registriervorrichtung | |
DE4219739A1 (de) | Verfahren und Schaltungsanordnung zum Prüfen einer Wertkarte | |
EP0097203B1 (de) | Verfahren zur Erkennung von gefälschten Datenträgern sowie Datenträger zur Durchführung des Verfahrens | |
DE60027696T2 (de) | Geldannahmevorrichtung | |
DE4305421A1 (de) | ||
WO1997022093A1 (de) | Verfahren zur echtheitskontrolle eines bei einer transaktion verwendeten vorausbezahlten zahlungsmittels | |
EP0257596A2 (de) | Verfahren zum Erkennen einer missbräuchlichen Benutzung von Chipkarten | |
EP0789336A2 (de) | Verfahren zur Transaktionskontrolle elektronischer Geldbörsensysteme | |
EP1066607B1 (de) | Gerät und verfahren zur gesicherten ausgabe von wertscheinen | |
EP1178452B1 (de) | Verfahren für eine sichere Datenübertragung beim Warenverkauf | |
DE2825793A1 (de) | Rueckgabe und kassierung bei einem muenzfernsprecher | |
EP1780684A1 (de) | System und Verfahren zum Auszahlen von Bargeld | |
EP1387326A2 (de) | Verfahren zur Betrugsverhinderung für münz-oder banknotenbetätigte Automaten | |
EP0881608B1 (de) | Kartenlesegerät und Verfahren zur Auslösung eines Ereignisses in einem solchen Gerät | |
DE2323978A1 (de) | Automat zum umwechseln von geld | |
DE2928643C2 (de) | ||
AT500775B1 (de) | Spielkonsole | |
EP1519296A1 (de) | Vorrichtung zur Herstellung einer Kommunikationsverbindung zu Karten unterschiedlichen Typs | |
DE3512547C2 (de) |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
AK | Designated states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY CA CH CN CU CZ DE DK EE ES FI GB GE HU IL IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MD MG MK MN MW MX NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG SI SK TJ TM TR TT UA UG US UZ VN AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM |
|
AL | Designated countries for regional patents |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): KE LS MW SD SZ UG AT BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE BF BJ CF CG |
|
DFPE | Request for preliminary examination filed prior to expiration of 19th month from priority date (pct application filed before 20040101) | ||
121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application | ||
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 1996942304 Country of ref document: EP |
|
NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: JP Ref document number: 97521687 Format of ref document f/p: F |
|
WWP | Wipo information: published in national office |
Ref document number: 1996942304 Country of ref document: EP |
|
REG | Reference to national code |
Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: 8642 |
|
WWW | Wipo information: withdrawn in national office |
Ref document number: 1996942304 Country of ref document: EP |