WO1989010599A1 - Carte et systeme de paiement - Google Patents

Carte et systeme de paiement Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO1989010599A1
WO1989010599A1 PCT/AU1989/000175 AU8900175W WO8910599A1 WO 1989010599 A1 WO1989010599 A1 WO 1989010599A1 AU 8900175 W AU8900175 W AU 8900175W WO 8910599 A1 WO8910599 A1 WO 8910599A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
token
storage means
value
represented
monetary value
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/AU1989/000175
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
David Robert Brooks
Original Assignee
Magellan Corporation (Australia) Pty. Ltd.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Magellan Corporation (Australia) Pty. Ltd. filed Critical Magellan Corporation (Australia) Pty. Ltd.
Publication of WO1989010599A1 publication Critical patent/WO1989010599A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
    • G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/0866—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means by active credit-cards adapted therefor

Definitions

  • Tokens may take the form of decremental cards, "smart" cards, credit cards or other suitable means, adapted to represent a sum of money, which are to be used in place of conventional paper note or coin money.
  • a portable device herein termed a "token" which includes some means of representing a number or numbers, said number(s) representing a sum of money.
  • This token is presented to a suitable Reader Means, which having validated the token, reduces (or decrements) the stored amount by a suitable value, and then authorises some sale or service.
  • a suitable Reader Means which having validated the token, reduces (or decrements) the stored amount by a suitable value, and then authorises some sale or service.
  • An example is the magnetically encoded cards used in the United Kingdom for public telephones, where the "value” is encoded on a magnetic stripe. The telephone equipment adjusts this value downwards, as a call proceeds. When the card has been exhausted (i.e. the stored value has decremented to zero), a new card must be purchased.
  • Means are provided for cancelling such cells, but not for initially setting them (this being done at the factory).
  • An example is the use of an array of microscopic "fuses" on a VLSI chip. When such fuse is blown (by the Reader Means), it cannot be restored.
  • Such a system is described in U.S. 4,256,955, wherein the value stored is represented by a count of the number of fuse-sites remaining un-blown.
  • the present invention discloses employment of a property of modular arithmetic to construct a store of value from which value can only be withdrawn, but never replaced.
  • the method used depends upon the application of certain properties of "modular" arithmetic (that is, arithmetic in which the computations are performed in a fixed number of digits, rather than, as in ordinary hand arithmetic, allowing the numbers as many digits as necessary).
  • modulear that is, arithmetic in which the computations are performed in a fixed number of digits, rather than, as in ordinary hand arithmetic, allowing the numbers as many digits as necessary.
  • binary (ba ⁇ e-2) arithmetic will be used.
  • this is to be understood as exemplary only; the invention may be executed in any number-base desired, as will be understood by those skilled in the relevant arts.
  • a portable token including a storage means adapted to store a representation of a monetary value, wherein said monetary value is represented as the difference between the highest number that can be represented in said storage means and the monetary value actually intended to be represented.
  • the storage means is re-writeable such as an Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-only Memory EEPROM or the like.
  • the "token” there is provided in the "token”, as many storage bits as the ba ⁇ e-2 logarithm of the maximum value is required to store. As in the earlier instance, 16 bits would suffice to represent $600.00 by steps of 1 cent (since 2 to the power
  • a buffer means being adapted so as to receive data read from said storage means, or to present data to said storage means, to be written back thereto.
  • an adder means arranged to accept two numbers, one from said buffer means, and the other from the reader means aforesaid.
  • the adder means is arranged to compute the binary sum (in ordinary binary arithmetic) of the two numbers presented, and to replace the sum so computed in said buffer means, replacing the number originally present.
  • said adder means may receive its input numbers directly from said reader means and from said storage means, without the need to pass through said buffer means.
  • an overflow detector means so adapted as to record the presence or otherwise of a "carry” (in the usual arithmetic meaning of that term) from the most significant bits computed by said adder means.
  • said storage means shall contain binary zero. Value is represented as its binary complement, that is, if said storage means contains the binary number M, * N represented in N bits, the value so represented is 2 -M-l, in whatever monetary units have been chosen. It may be seen that the initially manufactured state represents a value of
  • the token is utilised by having said reader means present a value, Q, to said adder means, said value Q being represented in ordinary arithmetic notation, not in the "complement” notation aforesaid.
  • Said adder means then computes the sum of the number Q, and whatever value was previously stored in said storage means. Said sum is then placed in said buffer means.
  • said overflow detector means does not detect a carry-out from the most-significant bit-position of said adder means, the new sum is written back to said storage means (replacing the number previously stored), and a signal
  • system may be regarded as representing the stored value as the difference between the highest positive number which the storage means can accept
  • any attempt to "reduce” the stored value past zero, to a value numerically less (i.e. a larger monetary value) than its previous value, will likewise generate a carry-out, as will any attempt to "increment” the stored value by supplying a 2-s complement negative quantity from the reader means.
  • the "A" signal referred to above may be understood by said reader means as confirming that the required amount of value has been issued, while signal "B indicates that the amount required exceeds the stored
  • Any of the well-known error control mechanisms may be applied to said storage means and/or to the communication channel to said reader means if desired, to reduce the risk of circuit failures falsely appearing as excessive stored "credit".
  • some form of personalisation may be added, to prevent a thief from utilising a stolen token.
  • This might comprise a further number stored in said storage means, which is initially compared to a password entered by the user, and transmitted by said reader means. Such a comparison may readily be performed by a simple modification to the said adder means, as hereinafter described.
  • said adder means may be convenient to implement said adder means as a bit (or digit) serial circuit, comprising a single-digit adder, and an auxiliary storage means capable of holding a single binary bit. Successive digits of the incoming numbers are shifted through such an adder, and said auxiliary storage means holds the carry (if any) from each digit position to the next.
  • said auxiliary storage means itself serves the function of said overflow detector means, holding the overflow bit when the addition operation is concluded.
  • Fig. 1 shows the general arrangement of the system.
  • Fig. 2 shows a detailed internal arrangement of the token of the present invention.
  • Fig. 3 shows the general arrangement of a prior art option pad.
  • the preferred embodiment includes the password protection feature described above (this may of course, be omitted if not required). Error-checking is provided on transmitted messages, using the well-known CRC-16 code. Further details of this technique are described by International Business Machines (IBM) in their publication “Synchronous Data Link Control", order no. GA27-3093-2.
  • IBM International Business Machines
  • both the monetary credit and the password are represented as 16-bit binary numbers.
  • Operation commences when the token is presented to (brought into electrical contact with) the reader.
  • Some external means e.g. a keypad
  • the reader then prepares and transmits a message, in the format shown below, to the token.
  • the storage means (SM) to read its contents (32 bits) into the buffer means (BM), and also resets the bit counter (BC), the carry bit (CY) and the CRC Register (CR) .
  • the receiver presents the received data, together with a clock signal synchronised to that data, at one input of the adder means, serial adder (SA).
  • SA serial adder
  • the receiver merely accepts data and clock I directly from electrical contacts driven by the reader.
  • the bit counter is required to divide the incoming message into 3, 16-bit fields (charge amount, password, and CRC), for a total of 48 bits.
  • a 6-bit binary counter is used, wherein the lower 4 bits count bits within a field, 0 and the high 2 bits designate the current field.
  • the required credit amount is processed.
  • the amount to be charged is shifted in from the receiver, and simultaneously the existing stored 5 amount is shifted from the buffer means.
  • the serial adder here functions as a simple adder, and the 16-bit binary sum is shifted back into the left end of the buffer means.
  • the carry bit will be clear if sufficient 0 credit exists to cover the new charge, and set if not.
  • the CRC Register commences to compute the CRC result.
  • the receiver now supplies the 16 password bits.
  • the serial adder operates differently, 5 now comparing the bits from the buffer means and the receiver. In this mode, the serial adder copies the bits from the receiver to its output, from where they are shifted into the buffer means. If the bits differ, the carry becomes set, 0 otherwise it retains its previous value.
  • the CRC Register continues operations in parallel with the above. Note that there is no means, in this second field, for the carry bit to be cleared, once set. Hence, should it be set as 5 this field commences (denoting insufficient credit available), it will remain set. It follows that a set carry at the end of this field, indicates that the transaction may not proceed. 3.
  • the receiver finally supplies the remaining 16 CRC check-bits.
  • the CRC Register continues to evaluate the CRC algorithm. At the end of this field, a correct CRC is indicated by a certain constant result (see the IBM publication referred to above) in the CRC Register.
  • the serial adder performs two functions in the first two input fields, those of addition and comparison respectively. It is idle in the third field,
  • a PLA Programmed Logic Array
  • Recvd Buffer Carry Field : Adder Output Data Means In 1 : Sum Carry
  • PC password-control
  • An effective method is to provide a "test mode", in
  • test mode 35 all-zeros to be written to the storage means. Further in test mode, zero, not one, will normally be written to the password control bit. Before the token reaches the market, this test mode must be disabled.
  • One known method is to use a microscopic fuse (similar to the data-storage elements used in the prior art cited above); however these are awkward to produce on conventional MOS fabrication lines, and can cause reliability problems.
  • the 3 large squares denote 3 contact-pad sites at the edge of a semiconductor "chip".
  • the outer two are normal ground and V+ (supply voltage) pads, while the central pad implements the option. Note the arrangement of interdigitated metallic combs in the centre pad, and also the resistor between that pad and the V+ point.
  • test mode While the chip is being tested (i.e. test mode is active), contact probes are applied to the two outer pads, to operate the chip.
  • the resistor pulls the central pad towards V+, so asserting the signal test mode, and conditioning the internal logic accordingly.
  • the chip With testing complete, the chip is placed in a suitable package, and the connecting wires are attached.
  • the present invention contemplates many applications.
  • the present invention can be utilised at a toll collection point, for example the entrance to the
  • the Bridge entrance comprises 8 entrances and each car passing therethrough must stop, pay a toll, wait for verification of payment, and then proceed. This causes immense delays and traffic congestion on approaches to the Bridge. Similar problems are evident in many other parts of the world.
  • each Bridge lane may be fitted with an antenna structure for radiating a magnetic field.
  • Information data can be imposed over the field.
  • a driver having a token in the car can drive into a Bridge

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)

Abstract

On a mis au point une carte de paiement portative contenant un circuit de mémorisation pouvant être réécrit, conçu pour mémoriser une représentation d'une valeur monétaire (un "crédit"). Ladite représentation se présente sous une forme complémentaire chiffrée, représentant la différence entre le chiffre le plus élevépouvant être représenté dans une mémoire donnée et la valeur que l'on veut en fait représenter. Ladite carte est conçue pour accepter l'entrée d'un second chiffre, qui est représenté sous forme arithmétique normale et consitute la valeur en espèces d'une "imputation" que l'on veut appliquer au crédit stocké précité. On procède à ladite "imputation" en faisant une addition arithmétique normale à la valeur mémorisée, et audit chiffre d'"imputation". L'apparition d'un "report" à la fin d'une telle addition (signifiant que la somme finale est trop élevée pour être mémorisée dans la mémoire disponible) sert à indiquer une imputation non valable, ledit "report" servant à la fois à empêcher une éventuelle altération de ladite valeur de crédit mémorisée, et à indiquer à un autre moyen d'affichage associé que la transaction demandée ne peut être exécutée.
PCT/AU1989/000175 1988-04-22 1989-04-21 Carte et systeme de paiement WO1989010599A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AUPI788088 1988-04-22
AUPI7880 1988-04-22

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO1989010599A1 true WO1989010599A1 (fr) 1989-11-02

Family

ID=3773041

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/AU1989/000175 WO1989010599A1 (fr) 1988-04-22 1989-04-21 Carte et systeme de paiement

Country Status (4)

Country Link
EP (1) EP0413733A4 (fr)
JP (1) JPH04501026A (fr)
WO (1) WO1989010599A1 (fr)
ZA (1) ZA892976B (fr)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO1991015832A1 (fr) * 1990-04-02 1991-10-17 Security Telesis Limited Systeme de securite pour cartes
EP0607950A2 (fr) * 1993-01-19 1994-07-27 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé et support de données pour la vérification de l'authenticité des mémoires des puces

Citations (11)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US3906460A (en) * 1973-01-11 1975-09-16 Halpern John Wolfgang Proximity data transfer system with tamper proof portable data token
US4001550A (en) * 1975-12-04 1977-01-04 Schatz Vernon L Universal funds transfer and identification card
AU3271578A (en) * 1977-01-25 1979-08-02 Bell-Fruit Manufacturing Company Limited Gaming machines
US4256955A (en) * 1977-03-31 1981-03-17 Compagnie Internationale Pour L'informatique System for keeping account of predetermined homogeneous units
US4341951A (en) * 1980-07-02 1982-07-27 Benton William M Electronic funds transfer and voucher issue system
AU8623382A (en) * 1982-07-20 1984-01-26 Paperless Accounting Inc. Portable data carrier incorporating manually presentable processing modes
AU8623282A (en) * 1981-01-30 1984-01-26 Paperless Accounting Inc. Adaptable value-token
US4511970A (en) * 1981-04-08 1985-04-16 Hitachi, Ltd. Portable terminal device
WO1986003040A1 (fr) * 1984-11-15 1986-05-22 Intellicard International, Inc. Systeme et procede de validation et de verification par carte unitaire autonome
GB2178207A (en) * 1985-05-20 1987-02-04 Dainippon Printing Co Ltd Recording data in a card memory
GB2206431A (en) * 1987-06-30 1989-01-05 Motorola Inc Debit card circuits

Family Cites Families (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US3870866A (en) * 1971-11-11 1975-03-11 Halpern John Wolfgang Fee charging system
FR2503423A1 (fr) * 1981-03-31 1982-10-08 Flonic Sa Systeme de cartes a memoire electronique pouvant etre rechargees a des valeurs fiduciaires

Patent Citations (12)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US3906460A (en) * 1973-01-11 1975-09-16 Halpern John Wolfgang Proximity data transfer system with tamper proof portable data token
US4001550A (en) * 1975-12-04 1977-01-04 Schatz Vernon L Universal funds transfer and identification card
US4001550B1 (fr) * 1975-12-04 1988-12-13
AU3271578A (en) * 1977-01-25 1979-08-02 Bell-Fruit Manufacturing Company Limited Gaming machines
US4256955A (en) * 1977-03-31 1981-03-17 Compagnie Internationale Pour L'informatique System for keeping account of predetermined homogeneous units
US4341951A (en) * 1980-07-02 1982-07-27 Benton William M Electronic funds transfer and voucher issue system
AU8623282A (en) * 1981-01-30 1984-01-26 Paperless Accounting Inc. Adaptable value-token
US4511970A (en) * 1981-04-08 1985-04-16 Hitachi, Ltd. Portable terminal device
AU8623382A (en) * 1982-07-20 1984-01-26 Paperless Accounting Inc. Portable data carrier incorporating manually presentable processing modes
WO1986003040A1 (fr) * 1984-11-15 1986-05-22 Intellicard International, Inc. Systeme et procede de validation et de verification par carte unitaire autonome
GB2178207A (en) * 1985-05-20 1987-02-04 Dainippon Printing Co Ltd Recording data in a card memory
GB2206431A (en) * 1987-06-30 1989-01-05 Motorola Inc Debit card circuits

Non-Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
PATENT ABSTRACTS OF JAPAN, p-437, page 90, JP,A, 60-207964 (Toshiba K.K.) 19 October 1985 (19.10.85) *
PATENT ABSTRACTS OF JAPAN, p-591, page 134, JP,A, 62-25372 (Hitachi Ltd) 3 February 1987 (03.02.87) *
See also references of EP0413733A4 *

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO1991015832A1 (fr) * 1990-04-02 1991-10-17 Security Telesis Limited Systeme de securite pour cartes
EP0607950A2 (fr) * 1993-01-19 1994-07-27 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé et support de données pour la vérification de l'authenticité des mémoires des puces
EP0607950A3 (fr) * 1993-01-19 1997-01-08 Siemens Ag Procédé et support de données pour la vérification de l'authenticité des mémoires des puces.

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
EP0413733A1 (fr) 1991-02-27
EP0413733A4 (en) 1991-10-16
JPH04501026A (ja) 1992-02-20
ZA892976B (en) 1990-12-28

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