US4897640A - Method and electrical circuit for the reliable detection of process states within freely couplable units - Google Patents

Method and electrical circuit for the reliable detection of process states within freely couplable units Download PDF

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Publication number
US4897640A
US4897640A US07/189,175 US18917588A US4897640A US 4897640 A US4897640 A US 4897640A US 18917588 A US18917588 A US 18917588A US 4897640 A US4897640 A US 4897640A
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United States
Prior art keywords
current
subloop
units
loops
monitoring
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Expired - Fee Related
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US07/189,175
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English (en)
Inventor
Klaus Rapoen
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Licentia Patent Verwaltungs GmbH
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Licentia Patent Verwaltungs GmbH
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B23/00—Testing or monitoring of control systems or parts thereof
    • G05B23/02—Electric testing or monitoring
    • G05B23/0205—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults
    • G05B23/0218—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults characterised by the fault detection method dealing with either existing or incipient faults
    • G05B23/0256—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults characterised by the fault detection method dealing with either existing or incipient faults injecting test signals and analyzing monitored process response, e.g. injecting the test signal while interrupting the normal operation of the monitored system; superimposing the test signal onto a control signal during normal operation of the monitored system
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60L—PROPULSION OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; SUPPLYING ELECTRIC POWER FOR AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES IN GENERAL; MAGNETIC SUSPENSION OR LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; MONITORING OPERATING VARIABLES OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRIC SAFETY DEVICES FOR ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES
    • B60L15/00—Methods, circuits, or devices for controlling the traction-motor speed of electrically-propelled vehicles
    • B60L15/42—Adaptation of control equipment on vehicle for actuation from alternative parts of the vehicle or from alternative vehicles of the same vehicle train
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60L—PROPULSION OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; SUPPLYING ELECTRIC POWER FOR AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES IN GENERAL; MAGNETIC SUSPENSION OR LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; MONITORING OPERATING VARIABLES OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRIC SAFETY DEVICES FOR ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES
    • B60L3/00—Electric devices on electrically-propelled vehicles for safety purposes; Monitoring operating variables, e.g. speed, deceleration or energy consumption
    • B60L3/12—Recording operating variables ; Monitoring of operating variables
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60L—PROPULSION OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; SUPPLYING ELECTRIC POWER FOR AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES IN GENERAL; MAGNETIC SUSPENSION OR LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; MONITORING OPERATING VARIABLES OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; ELECTRIC SAFETY DEVICES FOR ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES
    • B60L2200/00—Type of vehicles
    • B60L2200/26—Rail vehicles

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to an arrangement for the reliable detection of process states within freely couplable units, each controlled by a computer, the arrangement employing signal current loops and check tests.
  • the computers are to be suitable for redundant operation, i.e. it should be possible to couple them together without the computers influencing one another.
  • safety monitoring is performed in a residual current process.
  • a signal current loop is formed. Any interruption of the current is interpreted as a malfunction and causes, for example, a relay to trip, thus giving a signal and possibly causing the system to be switched off.
  • signal loops are conducted through all vehicles to ensure safety. All emergency switches or emergency brake switches or door locks or coupling contacts, etc. in the form of separate loops may be connected in series in such a circuit. The current is fed in and returned to, for example, the driver's cab. If one of these process switches is thrown, the vehicle is stopped.
  • feed problems exist, particularly in redundant systems where the computer of one vehicle is to take over the control functions for another and in which, for the proper operation of the entire system (e.g. a train), when there is a malfunction in one vehicle, all vehicle units operate in parallel.
  • the object is to reliably detect safety relevant process states in systems which are coupled (connected) together by a plurality of computers without influencing the total system if one computer is malfunctioning or is switched off. On-line tests should be possible without interrupting the general data compilation. If one computer is missing (in redundance operation) interruption-free switching must establish a truly parallel operation in which important functions of the malfunctioning vehicle are temporarily performed by another computer.
  • an arrangement for reliably monitoring process states within freely couplable units, each controlled by a computer, the arrangement employing signal current loops and check tests, and in which each one of n couplable units forms its own internal signal current loop including a controllable current source and at least two current detection members and series connected process contacts actuated by the process. If a plurality of such units are coupled together, the internal signal current loops of these units are electrically open and common signal current loops are formed for identical processes so as to pass through all units.
  • Each current source belonging to a unit, including its current detection members can be bridged by a subloop which can be activated for test purposes by means of a switch, with the position of the switch being monitored with respect to safety by special tests employing additional, position specific current loops.
  • FIG. 1 shows the electrical coupling between two cars of a train
  • FIG. 2 is a function scheme.
  • FIG. 1 shows a train composed of two coupled units, here cars I and II.
  • Each car which is controlled by its own fail-safe on-board computer, is provided with a number of electrically separated signal current loops corresponding to the number of processes to be monitored, i.e. covered. However, for the sake of clarity only one such signal current loop is shown.
  • each of these loops contains, as its essential elements, respective low internal resistance current sources 1 and 1' (e.g. 15 mA at a maximum of 30 V), which are controlled for respective computers R and R' and separated from the electrical network of the car with respect to voltage, and two like voltage separated current detection members 2 and 3, and 2' and 3', respectively.
  • respective low internal resistance current sources 1 and 1' e.g. 15 mA at a maximum of 30 V
  • the detection members provide monitoring signals to separate computer channels (CC1 and CC2 for detection members 2 and 3, CC1' and CC2' for detection member 2' and 3').
  • the signal current loop of each car also includes process signal contacts, here, for example, emergency switch contacts 4, 5 for car I, emergency switch contacts 4', 5' and car II.
  • relays have positively mechanically controlled contacts 6, 6' whose switch positions--shown open--are securely monitored.
  • the corresponding contacts 6" and 6"' at the beginning and end of the train are shown closed.
  • direct mechanical switches may of course also be used at the coupling points.
  • both contacts (switches) 4, 5(4',5') must then be checked within the malfunction disclosure time (AOZ) of the signalling device.
  • AOZ malfunction disclosure time
  • both contacts 4, 5 (4', 5') and their actuating mechanisms are considered as one unit under observation.
  • at least one contact 4 or 5 (4' or 5') interrupts the current loop within the malfunction disclosure time if a process event occurs.
  • the malfunction disclosure time AOZ is here defined according to guidelines issued by the German Federal Railway System as 1/1000 of the mean time between failures MTBF.
  • Safety regulations require that the two switches 4 and 5 as well as 4' and 5', respectively, be checked for proper operation during an interval of the length of the AOZ so that jamming can be detected and corrected.
  • Evaluation is made by current detection members 2, 3 and 2', 3', respectively, which are independent of one another and of the other signal loops.
  • Optocouplers for example, can be used here to advantage.
  • the output signals of the current detection members are each conducted to the associated computer channels CC1, CC2 and CC1', CC2' of the onboard fail-safe computer.
  • the signals from the current loops to the respective computers are valid as process reports only if a positively mechanically guided signal evaluation relay 7 (7') has been tripped under control of the computer R (R'), i.e. rest contact 7a (7'a) is open.
  • current detection members 2, 3 or 2', 3' send a "0" signal through channels CC1 and CC2 or CC1' and CC2' to inform the respective on-board computer which then actuates, for example, the brakes.
  • VDE 0113 is the DIN standard No. 0113 set by the Verband Deutscher Elektrotechniker. [Association of German Electrical Engineers]. This standard defines the proper and improper configurations of positively (mechanically) guided contacts.
  • the input for the failsafe signals within the malfunction disclosure time can also be checked.
  • This check includes a check of the evaluation circuit for the current loops (optocouplers) and the data paths of input cards (interface) of the computer.
  • the test recognizes "stuck at 1" (dangerous), "stuck at 0" (not dangerous) and pull-along effects between any two input bits of a respective channel. During the test, no process states can be obtained.
  • Input cards are plug-in cards for computer interfaces to connect them with peripherals. The signals are obtained at the ports.
  • Failsafe are all signals and systems which, upon the occurrence of any type of fault, produce a non-dangerous system state.
  • FIG. 2 is a function scheme of the process when the relay 7, as applied to train car I, for example, is coupled to the on-board computer.
  • the on-line tests are performed by way of a computer output card III (interface) of computer R (one computer channel CC1 or CC2 is sufficient) for, for example, 24 test outputs (to ports 0 to 23) after the various processes have been coupled out and subloops have been formed by way of switches 7a, 7'a.
  • a computer output card III interface
  • computer R one computer channel CC1 or CC2 is sufficient
  • test outputs themselves are not failsafe. These test outputs feed the process signal loops for up to 22 such loops via current sources 1 and form AND linkages with the processors. To obtain process states, the test outputs must be at "1", i.e. the first 22 ports (0 to 21) must emit a "1" to be fed to a corresponding process signal loop.
  • the computer must put out the nonfailsafe signal "Signal Evaluation On” to actuate relay 7 (see FIG. 1). Additionally, the two remaining test ports (ports 22 and 23) are given a predetermined sequence of signals. While ports 0 to 21 emit a fixed "1" during the process monitoring process, an alternating sequence of "1" and "0" appears at ports 22 and 23 with a keying ratio of 2 : 1 (artificial dynamization). Ports 22 and 23 are here always antivalent, i.e. if port 22 emits a "1", port 23 emits a "0" and vice versa. The clock period may lie between a few milliseconds and several seconds. If the emitted alternating clock pulse is no longer recognized from the input into the computer during the return signal via contacts 7b and 7c, all failsafe inputs are invalid.
  • the present invention therefore ensures failsafe process monitoring in a simple manner.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Power Engineering (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Transportation (AREA)
  • Sustainable Energy (AREA)
  • Life Sciences & Earth Sciences (AREA)
  • Sustainable Development (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
  • Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)
  • Tests Of Electronic Circuits (AREA)
  • Testing Electric Properties And Detecting Electric Faults (AREA)
  • Debugging And Monitoring (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
US07/189,175 1987-04-30 1988-05-02 Method and electrical circuit for the reliable detection of process states within freely couplable units Expired - Fee Related US4897640A (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE3714960 1987-04-30
DE19873714960 DE3714960A1 (de) 1987-04-30 1987-04-30 Anordnung zur sicheren erfassung von prozesszustaenden innerhalb frei miteinander kuppelbarer einheiten und verfahren zur durchfuehrung

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
US4897640A true US4897640A (en) 1990-01-30

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US07/189,175 Expired - Fee Related US4897640A (en) 1987-04-30 1988-05-02 Method and electrical circuit for the reliable detection of process states within freely couplable units

Country Status (6)

Country Link
US (1) US4897640A (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
CA (1) CA1300251C (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
CH (1) CH675563A5 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
DE (1) DE3714960A1 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
ES (1) ES2007824A6 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
MX (1) MX170980B (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)

Cited By (10)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5428769A (en) * 1992-03-31 1995-06-27 The Dow Chemical Company Process control interface system having triply redundant remote field units
WO1999065681A1 (en) * 1998-06-18 1999-12-23 Kline & Walker, Llc Automated devices to control equipment and machines with remote control and accountability worldwide
US6463337B1 (en) 1999-12-20 2002-10-08 Safetran Systems Corporation Railroad vital signal output module with cryptographic safe drive
US20060089763A1 (en) * 2004-10-22 2006-04-27 Barrett David S System and method for processing safety signals in an autonomous vehicle
US20060089764A1 (en) * 2004-10-22 2006-04-27 Misha Filippov System and method for terrain feature tracking
US20060089765A1 (en) * 2004-10-22 2006-04-27 Pack Robert T System and method for behavior based control of an autonomous vehicle
US20060089800A1 (en) * 2004-10-22 2006-04-27 Selma Svendsen System and method for multi-modal control of an autonomous vehicle
US20060089766A1 (en) * 2004-10-22 2006-04-27 James Allard Systems and methods for control of an unmanned ground vehicle
GB2433791A (en) * 2004-10-22 2007-07-04 Irobot Corp Means of Controlling a Vehicle
US20100117585A1 (en) * 2008-11-12 2010-05-13 Osa Edward Fitch Multi Mode Safety Control Module

Families Citing this family (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE4020733A1 (de) * 1990-06-29 1992-01-09 Benning Elektrotechnik Vorrichtung zum unterbrechen der jeweiligen spannungsversorgungen insbesondere fuer die antriebe in miteinander gekoppelten fahrzeugen, insbesondere grubenlolomotiven oder dgl. im notfall
DE4128861C2 (de) * 1991-08-30 1993-10-07 Roland Man Druckmasch Sicherheitsschaltung für wahlweise separat oder gekuppelt arbeitende, elektrisch gesteuerte Aggregate
CA2133318A1 (en) * 1992-04-28 1993-11-11 Christopher John Glenn Control means for electrically driven vehicules

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EP0122007A1 (en) * 1983-03-03 1984-10-17 Kawasaki Jukogyo Kabushiki Kaisha Loop transmission system
US4627055A (en) * 1984-01-09 1986-12-02 Hitachi, Ltd. Decentralized processing method and system
US4651317A (en) * 1982-11-24 1987-03-17 Hitachi, Ltd. Time division multiplex data transmission system
US4656586A (en) * 1983-08-09 1987-04-07 Mitsubishi Denki Kabushiki Kaisha Automatic vehicle testing apparatus
US4777330A (en) * 1985-02-15 1988-10-11 Hitachi, Ltd. Network system diagnosis system

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DE3209157C2 (de) * 1982-03-13 1984-11-29 Standard Elektrik Lorenz Ag, 7000 Stuttgart Anordnung zur Sicherheitsüberwachung eines Zuges

Patent Citations (5)

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US4651317A (en) * 1982-11-24 1987-03-17 Hitachi, Ltd. Time division multiplex data transmission system
EP0122007A1 (en) * 1983-03-03 1984-10-17 Kawasaki Jukogyo Kabushiki Kaisha Loop transmission system
US4656586A (en) * 1983-08-09 1987-04-07 Mitsubishi Denki Kabushiki Kaisha Automatic vehicle testing apparatus
US4627055A (en) * 1984-01-09 1986-12-02 Hitachi, Ltd. Decentralized processing method and system
US4777330A (en) * 1985-02-15 1988-10-11 Hitachi, Ltd. Network system diagnosis system

Cited By (28)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6061809A (en) * 1992-03-31 2000-05-09 The Dow Chemical Company Process control interface system having triply redundant remote field units
US5862315A (en) * 1992-03-31 1999-01-19 The Dow Chemical Company Process control interface system having triply redundant remote field units
US5970226A (en) * 1992-03-31 1999-10-19 The Dow Chemical Company Method of non-intrusive testing for a process control interface system having triply redundant remote field units
US5428769A (en) * 1992-03-31 1995-06-27 The Dow Chemical Company Process control interface system having triply redundant remote field units
US7259357B2 (en) 1998-06-18 2007-08-21 Kline And Walker Llc Electronically controlled sealing, unsealing and/or bonding with metal strip or wire coated with liquefiable substance for redundant application and tamper detection
WO1999065681A1 (en) * 1998-06-18 1999-12-23 Kline & Walker, Llc Automated devices to control equipment and machines with remote control and accountability worldwide
US6647328B2 (en) 1998-06-18 2003-11-11 Kline And Walker Llc Electrically controlled automated devices to control equipment and machinery with remote control and accountability worldwide
US20040049324A1 (en) * 1998-06-18 2004-03-11 Kline And Walker Llc Electrically controlled automated devices to operate, slow, guide, stop and secure, equipment and machinery for the purpose of controlling their unsafe, unattended, unauthorized, unlawful hazardous and/or legal use, with remote control and accountability worldwide
US6463337B1 (en) 1999-12-20 2002-10-08 Safetran Systems Corporation Railroad vital signal output module with cryptographic safe drive
GB2433791B (en) * 2004-10-22 2008-05-21 Irobot Corp Systems and Methods for Control of a Vehicle
US7499804B2 (en) 2004-10-22 2009-03-03 Irobot Corporation System and method for multi-modal control of an autonomous vehicle
US20060089800A1 (en) * 2004-10-22 2006-04-27 Selma Svendsen System and method for multi-modal control of an autonomous vehicle
US20060089766A1 (en) * 2004-10-22 2006-04-27 James Allard Systems and methods for control of an unmanned ground vehicle
GB2433791A (en) * 2004-10-22 2007-07-04 Irobot Corp Means of Controlling a Vehicle
US20060089764A1 (en) * 2004-10-22 2006-04-27 Misha Filippov System and method for terrain feature tracking
US20060089763A1 (en) * 2004-10-22 2006-04-27 Barrett David S System and method for processing safety signals in an autonomous vehicle
US7499775B2 (en) 2004-10-22 2009-03-03 Irobot Corporation System and method for terrain feature tracking
US7499774B2 (en) 2004-10-22 2009-03-03 Irobot Corporation System and method for processing safety signals in an autonomous vehicle
US20060089765A1 (en) * 2004-10-22 2006-04-27 Pack Robert T System and method for behavior based control of an autonomous vehicle
US7499776B2 (en) 2004-10-22 2009-03-03 Irobot Corporation Systems and methods for control of an unmanned ground vehicle
US20090198400A1 (en) * 2004-10-22 2009-08-06 James Allard Systems and methods for control of an unmanned ground vehicle
US10088845B2 (en) 2004-10-22 2018-10-02 Irobot Corporation System and method for behavior based control of an autonomous vehicle
US7979175B2 (en) 2004-10-22 2011-07-12 Irobot Corporation Systems and methods for control of an unmanned ground vehicle
US8078338B2 (en) 2004-10-22 2011-12-13 Irobot Corporation System and method for behavior based control of an autonomous vehicle
US9513634B2 (en) 2004-10-22 2016-12-06 Irobot Corporation System and method for behavior based control of an autonomous vehicle
US9110471B2 (en) 2004-10-22 2015-08-18 Irobot Corporation Systems and methods for multi-modal control of a vehicle
US8237389B2 (en) 2008-11-12 2012-08-07 Irobot Corporation Multi mode safety control module
US20100117585A1 (en) * 2008-11-12 2010-05-13 Osa Edward Fitch Multi Mode Safety Control Module

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE3714960C2 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow) 1990-06-07
MX170980B (es) 1993-09-23
CH675563A5 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow) 1990-10-15
ES2007824A6 (es) 1989-07-01
DE3714960A1 (de) 1988-11-10
CA1300251C (en) 1992-05-05

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