US20130337770A1 - Management of communication pipes in a telecommunication device coupled to an nfc circuit - Google Patents

Management of communication pipes in a telecommunication device coupled to an nfc circuit Download PDF

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Publication number
US20130337770A1
US20130337770A1 US13/996,458 US201113996458A US2013337770A1 US 20130337770 A1 US20130337770 A1 US 20130337770A1 US 201113996458 A US201113996458 A US 201113996458A US 2013337770 A1 US2013337770 A1 US 2013337770A1
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United States
Prior art keywords
router
pipe
card
sim
telecommunication device
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Abandoned
Application number
US13/996,458
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English (en)
Inventor
Thierry Huque
Olivier Van Nieuwenhuyze
Alexandre Charles
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Proton World International NV
STMicroelectronics Rousset SAS
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Proton World International NV
STMicroelectronics Rousset SAS
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Assigned to STMICROELECTRONICS (ROUSSET) SAS, PROTON WORLD INTERNATIONAL N.V. reassignment STMICROELECTRONICS (ROUSSET) SAS ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: HUQUE, THIERRY, Van Nieuwenhuyze, Olivier, CHARLES, ALEXANDRE
Publication of US20130337770A1 publication Critical patent/US20130337770A1/en
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1466—Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
    • H04L63/0245—Filtering by information in the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0492—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload by using a location-limited connection, e.g. near-field communication or limited proximity of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/107—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources wherein the security policies are location-dependent, e.g. entities privileges depend on current location or allowing specific operations only from locally connected terminals
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
    • H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication

Definitions

  • the present disclosure generally relates to transactions performed by means of mobile telecommunication devices of cell phone type.
  • the present disclosure more specifically applies to such devices, further equipped with a near field communication circuit (NFC).
  • NFC near field communication circuit
  • Cell phones are more and more often equipped with a near-field communication interface which enables them to combine electromagnetic transponder functions with mobile telephony functions.
  • this adds functions of emulation of an electromagnetic transponder, of contactless or contactless card reader type to the mobile telecommunication device, for example a personal digital assistant, a cell phone, a smartphone, etc.
  • This considerably enhances the features of the mobile device, which can then be used, for example, as an electronic purse, as an access or transport ticket validation device, etc.
  • the mobile telecommunication device is equipped with a contactless front-end integrated circuit (CLF), also called NFC router.
  • CLF contactless front-end integrated circuit
  • This router is equipped with a radio frequency (RF) transceiver front head associated with a low-range antenna to communicate like an electromagnetic transponder.
  • RF radio frequency
  • the router uses the capacities of the processor(s) of the mobile device for data processing and storage operations.
  • a secure element enabling to authenticate the user is used.
  • This secure element is either integrated to the mobile telecommunication device (dedicated integrated circuit, circuit welded to the printed circuit board) or contained in a microcircuit supported by a subscriber identification module (SIM), or any other removable card, for example, in the standard format of a memory card.
  • SIM subscriber identification module
  • An NFC router may also be present in a mobile device of USB key type, in a bank teller terminal, in an adhesive device (sticker), etc.
  • An emulation of a contactless card in a mobile telecommunication device is capable of generating weak points in terms of transaction security.
  • Embodiments overcome all or part of the disadvantages of mobile telecommunication devices associated with a near-field transmission module.
  • Another embodiment improves the security against a hacking attempt on a security module of subscriber identification module type, contained in a telecommunication device associated with a near-field transmission module.
  • Another embodiment provides a method for detecting an attempt at diversion of a communication pipe between a port of a security module and a port of a near-field communication router present in a telecommunication device, wherein the router filters the messages addressed to said security module.
  • the message comprises at least one pipe identifier and one instruction code, the router comparing the instruction code with authorized codes that it contains.
  • the router compares the format of the data of the message with authorized formats that it contains.
  • the router comprises a table containing, for each type of control signal that may be received, an authorization or denial code.
  • An embodiment also provides a method of secure data transmission in a telecommunication device.
  • An embodiment also provides a near-field communication router.
  • An embodiment also provides a telecommunication device equipped with a near-field communication router.
  • FIG. 1 schematically shows a mobile telecommunication device of the type to which the present disclosure applies as an example
  • FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a function of a near-field transmission module of the device of FIG. 1 ;
  • FIG. 3 very schematically illustrates an attack capable of exploiting a weakness of the telecommunication device of FIG. 1 ;
  • FIG. 4 illustrates an embodiment of a preparatory phase of such an attack
  • FIG. 5 illustrates an embodiment of a method of protection against such an attack
  • FIGS. 6A and 6B very schematically illustrate an embodiment of a method of protection against the attack illustrated in FIG. 3 .
  • FIG. 1 very schematically shows a mobile telecommunication device (for example, a cell phone) of the type to which the embodiments apply as an example.
  • a mobile telecommunication device for example, a cell phone
  • the different elements of interface with the user have not been shown, since these elements are not modified by the implementation of the embodiments which will be described.
  • Device 1 comprises a central processing unit 12 (CPU/TH) formed of at least one microcontroller forming the device core.
  • This microcontroller is referred to as a terminal host.
  • the microcontroller uses identification and authentication data provided by a subscriber identification module 14 (SIM) which forms a security module of the device.
  • SIM subscriber identification module 14
  • Microcontroller 12 is capable of using one or several internal memories, not shown, of the telephone.
  • Telephone 1 may also comprise a memory card reader 16 or other buses of communication with the outside to load data and/or applications into the telephone.
  • device 1 comprises a circuit 18 (CLF—ContactLess Front-End) forming a near-field communication module like an electromagnetic transponder.
  • Module 18 also called NFC router, is associated with an antenna 182 distinct from an antenna 20 intended for the mobile telephony network.
  • Circuit 18 may be associated with a security module (SSE) 24 distinct from SIM card 14 and directly present on the printed circuit board of the telephone, or supported by a removable microcircuit card (for example, in the format of a memory card).
  • SSE security module
  • a security module is an electronic circuit for securely executing applications and guaranteeing the security (secret/integrity) of data manipulated by such applications.
  • circuits 12 and 18 communicate over a link 1218 of I 2 C or SPI type
  • SIM card 14 communicates with microcontroller 12 over a link 1214 according to ISO standard 7816-3
  • security module 24 communicates with router 18 according to this standard over a link 2418
  • Router 18 communicates with the SIM card, for example, over a single-wire bus 1418 (SWP—Single Wire Protocol).
  • SWP Single Wire Protocol
  • the embodiments will be described in relation with a GSM telephone.
  • the embodiments more generally applies to any telecommunication device adapted to a mobile network (for example, Wifi, Bluetooth, WiMax, etc.) and associated with a contactless transmission module (NFC router), for example, a USB key, a bank terminal, a power consumption meter, or other), an access or transport ticket validation terminal, etc.
  • a mobile network for example, Wifi, Bluetooth, WiMax, etc.
  • NFC router contactless transmission module
  • USB key for example, a USB key, a bank terminal, a power consumption meter, or other
  • an access or transport ticket validation terminal etc.
  • the near-field communication module will be referred to as a router since it generally integrates all the functions useful for the emulation of a contactless card within a same circuit, the described embodiments however applying to any NFC-type module.
  • Router 18 comprises physical terminals of connection to links 1218 , 1418 , and 2418 and manages logic gates for assigning these terminals to the different functions associated with near-field communications.
  • Router 18 thus comprises a processor and volatile and non-volatile memories for storing, among others, a routing table for the different logic gates. Some gates are reserved for router administration functions while others can be freely assigned by the router.
  • router 18 makes available and manages different pipes of communication with the other circuits 12 , 14 , 24 , etc. of the mobile device to provide these circuits access to the near-field communication functions, that is, to gates connected to radio frequency transmission circuits, called RF gates.
  • FIG. 2 very schematically illustrates, in the form of blocks, the routing function of router 18 .
  • FIG. 2 is a structural representation while, in practice, the assignment of the different gates to the different circuits of the mobile device is a software operation performed by the routing table.
  • Each of the router terminals is assigned one or several gates (GATES).
  • GATES gates
  • FIG. 2 it is assumed that physical links 1418 and 1218 of SIM card 14 and of microcontroller 12 are connected to terminals of router 18 and that gates are assigned to these circuits.
  • Several gates may be assigned to a same circuit (which is symbolized in FIG. 2 by the connection of a same terminal to several gates).
  • the routing table (ROUTING TABLE) of router 18 assigns some gates to internal functions (for example, configuration and administration functions), but also creates pipes (PIPE) between some gates assigned to the SIM card or to the RF microcontroller, and gates (RFGATES) comprised in module 18 .
  • Authentication tools may be provided to make sure that the links between the router and the different external circuits are not pirated. However, this appears to be insufficient in view of a weak point that the present inventors have identified and which will be described hereafter.
  • Router or NFC module 18 generally is a single integrated circuit and its external accesses are rather well protected against possible hacking attempts.
  • router 18 also manages a pipe (ATPIPE symbolized in dotted lines in FIG. 2 ) of communication between SIM card 14 or any other security module and microcontroller 12 of the mobile telecommunication device.
  • This pipe is normally used so that SIM card 14 informs microcontroller 12 that a message reaches it over the NFC link. It is however also possible to divert this use to make security module 14 believe that it communicates with the router for a near-field transaction and thus over a pipe with the RF gates of the telephone, while it is actually communicating with microcontroller 12 .
  • FIG. 3 very schematically illustrates in the form of blocks the possible exploitation of a pipe ATPIPE between a SIM card 14 and a microcontroller 12 of a cell phone 1 .
  • One of the functions of application PA is to automatically trigger a response of phone 1 after a request originating from the telecommunication network and transmitted by another mobile device 3 owned by the attacker.
  • the pirate device for example is another GSM phone 3 which uses its own subscriber identification module to communicate over the GSM network (symbolized by a relay antenna 5 ). It may also be a microcomputer associated with a GSM module.
  • device 3 is also equipped with a contactless router, for example, to initiate near field transactions with a terminal 7 (for example, an NFC terminal or any other contactless communication terminal).
  • a terminal 7 for example, an NFC terminal or any other contactless communication terminal.
  • device 3 is used to make a purchase with a payment to be validated by its NFC router.
  • the router of telephone 3 manages a communication pipe with the subscriber identification module (or another dedicated security module) of this telephone to authenticate the user and validate the payment.
  • telephone 3 uses the GSM network to ask telephone 1 to validate the payment by means of its subscriber identification module.
  • device 3 sends an SMS over network 5 which, when received by telephone 1 , is processed by the pirate application.
  • Said application simulates requests from the RF gates and transmits them over pipe ATPIPE, so that identification module 14 responds and validates the transaction.
  • This validation is diverted by microcontroller 12 and is sent back to device 3 which, in turn, transmits it to its NFC router to validate the payment for terminal 7 .
  • the payment is debited to the subscriber of telephone 1 and not to the attacker owning device 3 .
  • a contactless application requires no interaction with the terminal ( 7 , FIG. 3 ) except for a presentation of a contactless device.
  • no PIN keying is required for a near-field communication to avoid lengthening the transactions, so that device 3 may easily hack distant device 1 .
  • the countermeasures providing encryptions and/or signatures between terminal 7 requesting the authentication and the security module are ineffective to counter this attack. Indeed, the data between terminal 7 and module 14 need no decoding.
  • a communication pipe has actually been established between module 14 of telephone 1 and terminal 7 via telecommunication network 5 , so that module 14 behaves as if it was in near field transaction with terminal 7 .
  • piracy may occur for passage authentication or validation applications, of secure access type.
  • this attack may also be successful even without for pirate device 3 to use its own NFC router, for example, if it uses a contactless communication mode, provided for the requested authentication to originate from a security module and to respect the formats and protocols used by the NFC protocol. Further, such an attack may be used to divert any data from device 1 in favor of a pirate system (for example, data duplicating the content of the magnetic track of a card in a bank payment application).
  • the attack may involve the SIM card of cell phone 1 or of any other security module (for example, module 24 ), provided for a pipe to be managed by router 18 between this module and a circuit (generally, microcontroller 12 ) capable of managing communications over network 5 .
  • module 24 any other security module
  • a pipe to be managed by router 18 between this module and a circuit generally, microcontroller 12
  • the microcontroller is allowed to create a pipe on any free gate.
  • a pirate application loaded into the microcontroller is capable of creating a pipe through the NFC router to the SIM card. If, afterwards, the SIM card performs no other checking than to acknowledge that the format of the requests corresponds to the format of a radio frequency frame originating from an NFC circuit, the pirate application may attack the SIM card.
  • security module 14 is more advanced and checks the association between the numbers of the pipes or of its own gates and the RF gates.
  • SIM card 14 does not take into account the circuit with which the gate is created (and thus, the fact that it may be a gate intended for the microcontroller).
  • This embodiment exploits the fact that the assignment of the pipe numbers (identifiers) is often sequential. It is first started by asking the microcontroller to suppress a pipe between the SIM card and the RF gates. Then, a pipe having the same identifier is created between the microcontroller and the SIM card.
  • FIG. 4 illustrates another embodiment of a preparatory phase of the attack aiming at diverting a pipe between router 18 (CLF) and the SIM card (SIM 1 ) of a user.
  • This embodiment is more specifically intended for systems in which the SIM card makes sure, before transmitting data to the CLF router, that it has effectively controlled the creating of the communication pipe therewith.
  • the SIM card checks whether it has already been in the presence of router 18 is exploited herein. If it has not, it reconfigures the pipes between its gates and the NFC router.
  • the card causes the creating, at the level of the so-called transport layer, of at least one communication pipe, identified as SYNCID 1 , with the CLF router.
  • SYNCID 1 the level of the so-called transport layer, of at least one communication pipe, identified as SYNCID 1
  • card SIM 1 sends to the CLF router both synchronization data SYNCID 1 and a number (typically, a random number RD 1 ). Number RD 1 is stored in the CLF router and is used by card 14 to check that it has already caused the creation of pipe with this router.
  • the card verifies the existence of number RD 1 in the router.
  • the card requests from the router to create a pipe between one of its gates, identified as GATEID, and one of the RF gates, identified as RFGATEID.
  • the router then creates a pipe and assigns it an identifier PIPEID and, at the same time, stores said identifier in the routing table and communicates it to card SIM 1 .
  • card SIM 1 verifies that identifier PIPEID of the pipe is correct.
  • the hacker should have cell phone 1 and card SIM 1 in his possession for a period of time. This is relatively easy, for example, by asking the owner of the cell phone to lend it to supposedly make a call, or by fraudulently using a phone during a maintenance operation, for example, in a mobile telephony shop.
  • the pirate starts by introducing card SIM 1 into a pirate device (PIRATE READER), for example, another cell phone having a microcontroller capable of executing a piracy program complying with the described functions, or a computer provided with a card reader and simulating a router. Since card SIM 1 has never met the NFC router of the pirate device or emulated by said device, it generates a new synchronization identifier SYNCID 2 . It sends back gate identifiers RFGATEID and GATEID to create the corresponding pipes.
  • PIRATE READER for example, another cell phone having a microcontroller capable of executing a piracy program complying with the described functions, or a computer provided with a card reader and simulating a router. Since card SIM 1 has never met the NFC router of the pirate device or emulated by said device, it generates a new synchronization identifier SYNCID 2 . It sends back gate identifiers RFGATEID and GATEID to create the corresponding pipes.
  • the pirate router then assigns, to at least one pair of gates, a pipe FPIPEID which corresponds to a gateway between the router and an external gate of the microcontroller instead of associating gate GATEID to an RF gate.
  • Identifier FPIPEID and identifiers SYNCID 2 and RD 2 are then loaded into a falsified card SIM 2 .
  • Card SIM 2 then contains a routing table associating gates RFGATEID and GATEID with pipe FPIPEID.
  • card SIM 2 is introduced into telephone 1 .
  • Identifiers SYNCID 2 and RD 2 are then transferred to CLF router 18 to create pipe FPIPEID between gates designated as GATEID and RFGATEID. This amounts to modifying the routing table of the router so that when the pipe between gates GATEID and RFGATEID is called, the assigned pipe is pipe FPIPEID instead of PIPEID.
  • the assignment of pipe FPIPEID may take various forms according to the way in which the pipes are assigned to the gates in the router. For example, a phase of observation of the gate assignment is gone through by placing card SIM 2 in the router to observe the pipe assignment method, before introducing card SIM 2 into the pirate reader.
  • the “real” card SIM 1 is then placed back into telephone 1 . Since the CLF router knows identifiers RD 2 and SYNCID 2 , the card considers that it “knows” the router and does not recreate pipes therewith. When card SIM 1 requests a communication towards gate RFGATEID, the router uses the assigned pipe FPIPEID.
  • the GSM terminal has effectively been hacked, that is, a pipe FPIPE (or ATPIPE, FIG. 2 ) has been created between a gate GATEID of the SIM card and a gate of microcontroller 12 , while card SIM 1 believes that this pipe connects its gate GATEID to gate RFGATEID.
  • This pipe can then be diverted for a distant access over the GSM network from another terminal ( FIG. 3 ).
  • the downloading of pirate application PA can be performed either subsequently or at the same time as the pirate pipe generation.
  • the routing table may be read from. If this is not possible, it is possible, when card SIM 1 is in the pirate reader, to emulate an operation of the CLF circuit, in order to obtain the full configuration stored in this card.
  • a pirate card SIM 2 or a card emulator may also be used to extract the data from the routing table in valid phone 1 .
  • the pirate application must comprise the function of redirecting pipe FPIPE towards the RF circuits of the router when a data request towards the SIM is transmitted by router 18 .
  • FIG. 5 partially shows in the form of blocks an embodiment of a mobile telecommunication device according to an embodiment.
  • TH Terminal Host
  • CCF contactless router 18
  • security module 14 for example, a SIM card
  • router 18 comprises a routing table (not shown) putting a pipe identifier PIPEID in correspondence with two gate identifiers GATEID between which the pipe is created.
  • the router further comprises an interception module 20 comprising a filtering table containing, for each pipe (PIPE), between the router and the SIM card, parameters enabling the router to determine whether a message or an instruction addressed to the SIM card is to be authorized or not (Y/N).
  • PIPE pipe
  • the router is modified to intercept all requests of pipe creation with secure module 14 .
  • the table preferably also contains data relative to the events authorized on the pipe, which enables to refine the selection of the permitted functions.
  • a filtering table is provided for each security module connected to the router, for example, the microcontroller, another security element, etc.
  • an instruction INST transiting through router CLF comprises the pipe over which the message is to be transmitted the type of message, an actual instruction code and, possibly, data. This message is intercepted by the filter comprised within the CLF router before allowing its transmission to the SIM card.
  • all messages going from the microcontroller to the SIM card are blocked by the router based on a specific instruction code (for example, the code known as HTP) or on the combination of the table and of the parameter format of this instruction. Messages are thus limited to those between the actual telephone central processing unit and the SIM card, which respect the expected instruction format.
  • a specific instruction code for example, the code known as HTP
  • messages meaning nothing for the application have to be sent. Such messages are thus blocked and do not reach the SIM card.
  • FIGS. 6A and 6B illustrate the operation of the system of FIG. 5 , respectively for an authorized control signal (Y) and for a non-authorized control signal (N).
  • a message or control signal CMD(Y) is sent by the telephone (HS), more specifically by the telephone microcontroller, to the CLF router. It is assumed that this control signal has a format and/or parameters authorized by the filtering table of the router.
  • the router after having checked (CHECK) in its tables, authorizes the transmission of this control signal to the SIM card. Once the SIM card has received it on its pipe created through the NFC router, it responds (RES) to the microcontroller through the router.
  • control signal is assumed to correspond to an unauthorized control signal.
  • the microcontroller of the telephone thus sends this control signal to the SIM card via the CLF router.
  • Said router by performing the checking steps (CHECK) intercepts this control signal and stops it (STOP). It may here be an attack such as previously described in relation with FIGS. 3 and 4 .

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Telephone Function (AREA)
US13/996,458 2010-12-20 2011-12-16 Management of communication pipes in a telecommunication device coupled to an nfc circuit Abandoned US20130337770A1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR1060819A FR2969341B1 (fr) 2010-12-20 2010-12-20 Gestion de canaux de communication dans un dispositif de telecommunication couple a un circuit nfc
FR1060819 2010-12-20
PCT/FR2011/053023 WO2012085409A1 (fr) 2010-12-20 2011-12-16 Gestion de canaux de communication dans un dispositif de telecommunication couple a un circuit nfc

Related Parent Applications (1)

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PCT/FR2011/053023 A-371-Of-International WO2012085409A1 (fr) 2010-12-20 2011-12-16 Gestion de canaux de communication dans un dispositif de telecommunication couple a un circuit nfc

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US15/585,107 Continuation US10511626B2 (en) 2010-12-20 2017-05-02 Protection against rerouting a communication channel of a telecommunication device having an NFC circuit and a secure data circuit

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US20130337770A1 true US20130337770A1 (en) 2013-12-19

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US13/996,458 Abandoned US20130337770A1 (en) 2010-12-20 2011-12-16 Management of communication pipes in a telecommunication device coupled to an nfc circuit
US15/585,107 Active US10511626B2 (en) 2010-12-20 2017-05-02 Protection against rerouting a communication channel of a telecommunication device having an NFC circuit and a secure data circuit
US16/698,519 Active US10931712B2 (en) 2010-12-20 2019-11-27 Protection against rerouting a communication channel of a telecommunication device having an NFC circuit and a secure data circuit
US17/146,063 Active 2033-06-17 US11962616B2 (en) 2010-12-20 2021-01-11 Protection against rerouting a communication channel of a telecommunication device having an NFC circuit and a secure data circuit

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US15/585,107 Active US10511626B2 (en) 2010-12-20 2017-05-02 Protection against rerouting a communication channel of a telecommunication device having an NFC circuit and a secure data circuit
US16/698,519 Active US10931712B2 (en) 2010-12-20 2019-11-27 Protection against rerouting a communication channel of a telecommunication device having an NFC circuit and a secure data circuit
US17/146,063 Active 2033-06-17 US11962616B2 (en) 2010-12-20 2021-01-11 Protection against rerouting a communication channel of a telecommunication device having an NFC circuit and a secure data circuit

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US (4) US20130337770A1 (de)
EP (1) EP2656578B1 (de)
CN (1) CN103404099B (de)
FR (1) FR2969341B1 (de)
WO (1) WO2012085409A1 (de)

Cited By (11)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20130207777A1 (en) * 2003-06-13 2013-08-15 Varia Holdings Llc Emulated radio frequency identification
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US9179301B2 (en) 2010-08-31 2015-11-03 Proton World International N.V. Protection of a communication channel of a telecommunication device coupled to an NFC circuit against misrouting
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EP2656578B1 (de) 2015-04-29
US10931712B2 (en) 2021-02-23
US20170237774A1 (en) 2017-08-17
FR2969341B1 (fr) 2013-01-18
CN103404099B (zh) 2015-12-16
WO2012085409A1 (fr) 2012-06-28
EP2656578A1 (de) 2013-10-30
FR2969341A1 (fr) 2012-06-22
US10511626B2 (en) 2019-12-17
US11962616B2 (en) 2024-04-16
CN103404099A (zh) 2013-11-20
US20200099717A1 (en) 2020-03-26

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