US20070150752A1 - Secure system-on-chip - Google Patents
Secure system-on-chip Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- US20070150752A1 US20070150752A1 US11/613,294 US61329406A US2007150752A1 US 20070150752 A1 US20070150752 A1 US 20070150752A1 US 61329406 A US61329406 A US 61329406A US 2007150752 A1 US2007150752 A1 US 2007150752A1
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- United States
- Prior art keywords
- encryption
- data
- module
- input
- decryption
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- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/30—Monitoring
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
- G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
Definitions
- the present invention concerns the field of system-on-chip and in particular the security around it.
- SoC System-on-a-chip or System on Chip
- SoC System on Chip
- the processor has two modes of operations; in the first mode, called the secure mode, access is permitted to the secure memory; and in the unsecure mode, the access to the secure memory is forbidden.
- the unsecure mode is intended to development purposes, i.e. testing or debugging the circuit.
- the access to the secure memory is physically blocked, i.e. a “disable” signal is generated. This “disable” signal forbids any attempt to access the secure memory.
- the descrambling unit comprises an encryption engine to encrypt the descrambled data before they are temporarily stored in an external memory.
- the processor finishes the organization task the data are decrypted in the output module and sent to the displaying device.
- the aim of the present invention is to provide a secure system-on-chip for processing data, this system-on-chip comprising at least a central processing unit, an input and an output channel, an encryption/decryption engine and a memory, characterized in that said input channel comprises an input encryption module to add an internal encryption layer on all incoming data, said output channel comprising an output decryption module to remove the internal encryption layer on all outgoing data, said central processing unit receiving the encrypted data from the input encryption module and storing them in the memory, and while processing the stored data, said central processing unit reading the stored data from the memory, requesting the removal of the internal encryption layer of same in the encryption/decryption engine, processing the data and requesting encryption of the result by the encryption/decryption engine so as to add the internal encryption layer and storing the encrypted result, outputting the result to the output decryption module for removing the internal encryption layer and outputting the result via the output channel.
- said input channel comprises an input encryption module to add an internal encryption layer on all incoming data
- the main feature of the invention is to add an encryption layer within the system-on-chip.
- the data entering into and exiting the system on chip are usually encrypted.
- An additional encryption layer is applied to these data so that all data stored in the system-on-chip have at least one encryption layer.
- One the data are received in the system-on-chip, they are usually decrypted with the key pertaining to the transmission system and the result is stored in clear.
- one the encrypted message is read by the system-on-chip, an internal encryption layer is applied on this message and passed to the processing unit. Said unit can store it for further use or immediately process the message.
- the first step is to remove the internal encryption layer so that the data is in the same condition as received by the system-on-chip. After the message is processed and the right (e.g.) is extracted, this right is further encrypted to add the internal encryption layer before being stored.
- the removal of the internal encryption layer occurs only at the later stage when the data are really used by the central unit, the clear data being never accessible in a static state.
- the data can be stored in clear if they are for internal purpose or re-encrypted (i.e. adding the internal encryption layer) if they are intended to be outputted from the system-on-chip.
- the data are temporarily stored in a buffer before being sent to the output channel.
- the key to encrypt and decrypt the data is in a preferred embodiment unique for that system-on-chip.
- This key can be preprogrammed at the manufacturing step or can be randomly generated at the initialization stage and never known by anybody. This key is used only internally.
- the algorithm used can be kept secret as well as the parameters of said algorithm. For example, the algorithm IdeaNxt is used as encryption engine and the values of the substitution box are randomly generated in the system-on-chip.
- the encryption/decryption algorithm is asymmetric, so that a key pair (public/private) is used to respectively encrypt and decrypt the data.
- the input encryption module can be replaced by a signature module, the data being signed while entering in the system-on-chip and the signature stored together with the data.
- the encryption/decryption engine which is now a signature verification engine, checks the signature and authorizes the use of the data if the signature is correct.
- data it is meant a single byte or a set of bytes e.g. to form a message or a entitlement message in the system-on-chip.
- FIG. 1 describes the system-on-chip and its various elements in the encryption/decryption mode
- FIGS. 2A and 2B describes the encryption stage using two units
- FIG. 3 describes the system-on-chip and its various elements in the signature mode.
- the secure system-on-chip SOC is based on a central processing unit CPU.
- the aim of this unit is to execute the code and to perform the requested tasks.
- the system-on-chip SOC comprises two channels connected to outer world, namely the input and the output channels.
- the input channel RCV comprises an input encryption module RCV-E which encrypts all the data coming from the outer world so as to add an internal encryption layer.
- the output channel SND comprises an output decryption module SND-D to decrypt the data received from the central unit CPU before sending them to the outer world so as to remove the internal encryption later.
- the central unit CPU has access to the encryption/decryption engine CR-EN.
- This engine has the same function as the input encryption module and the output decryption module.
- the key K loaded in the input encryption module is the same in the encryption part of the encryption/decryption engine. The same applies to the output decryption module and the decryption part of the encryption/decryption engine, for the decryption operations.
- the central unit CPU needs some data, either directly coming from the input encryption module or fetched from the memory MEM, these data are first passed through the decryption engine to remove the internal encryption layer before they are used by the central unit CPU.
- the central unit CPU when the central unit CPU has completed a task and produces a result, the following step being to store the result (or output the result to the output channel).
- This result is previously passed through the encryption engine CR-EN for adding the internal encryption layer before being stored.
- This encrypted result can then be stored in a memory or sent to the output channel.
- the central processing unit CPU can decide if the result is to be re-encrypted or left in clear. Instead of letting the processor to decide, the target location can select different behaviors as shown in FIG. 2A .
- the internal encryption layer is made of two encryption units ENC 1 , ENC 2 , using two different keys K 1 , K 2 , one permanent key, and one key randomly generated. If the result is to be stored in a volatile memory V-MEM, both encryption units will encrypt the data. In the contrary if the storage is in a non-volatile memory NV-MEM (EEPROM), only one encryption unit is used, the one with the permanent key. In the same manner, when reading data from the volatile memory, the double decryption is applied although reading data from the non-volatile memory, only one decryption unit is applied.
- EEPROM non-volatile memory
- the encryption process is replaced by a signature process.
- the data are not encrypted but a signature is generated and associated with the data.
- a signature is calculated in the input signature module RCV-S.
- the data are then stored with their signatures.
- the signature verification engine S-VER first verifies the signature before the central unit has the right to use the data.
- the signature is verified in the output signature module SDN-V. The signature is then removed from the data which are sent to the output channel SND.
- the encryption/decryption engine is directly located in the central unit CPU.
- a data is read from the memory, e.g. loading a variable in the accumulator of the CPU (e.g. LDAA #1200h for Motorola 68HC11)
- the data read at the location is passed automatically to the decryption engine so as to remove the internal encryption layer before being transferred to the accumulator.
- the instruction to store the content of the accumulator to the memory e.g. STAA #1200h
- the data in the accumulator is previously passed through the encryption engine (so as to add the internal encryption layer) before being stored at the location 1200h.
- the encryption/decryption engine is shared with the input and output channel.
- the input encryption module is therefore a virtual module and encryption operations at the input channel are achieved by the encryption engine through a data multiplexer.
- the data entering into the system-on-chip SOC, in particular through the input channel are passed through the encryption engine before further manipulation e.g. to store the data in an input buffer.
- the input encryption module is therefore a virtual module using the resource of the encryption/decryption engine in encryption mode.
- the same apply for the output decryption module which uses the encryption/decryption engine in decryption mode.
- the input encryption module RCV-E can comprise more than one encryption unit. According to particular embodiment shows in the FIG. 2A , two encryption units (or more) are connected in series, each having a different key.
- the first encryption unit is loaded with a key K 1 which pertains to the system-of chip, i.e. is unique and constant for a specific device. This key is either loaded during the installation step or generated internally.
- the second unit ENC 2 is loaded with a key K 2 which is dynamically generated at the power up of the device. When the system-on-chip is reinitialized, this key is lost and a new key is generated.
- the data which have to be permanently stored, once processed by the processor CPU, are only re-encrypted with the first unit with the permanent key K 1 .
- the output decryption module as well as the encryption/decryption engine comprise in the same manner also two or more units.
- the processor CPU can request from the encryption/decryption engine the decryption by only one decryption unit, i.e. the unit having the volatile key.
- the stored data still remain encrypted by the permanent key for later use.
- the system-on-chip SOC can additionally comprise an autonomous supervision module SM that can deterministically control the system-on-chip SOC.
- This module SM comprises a normal working condition definitions of the system-on-chip SOC, and disabling means when the normal conditions are no longer fulfilled. This is achieved by different means.
- a first means includes measuring the quantity of data outputted, e.g. counting the number of data sets outputted. This operation will be hereafter described as counting data.
- a second means includes defining time windows during which input or output operations are allowed. A block of data is therefore is allowed if the length of same do not exceed the maximum time defined for a block.
- a third means includes detecting the state of the central unit CPU and their respective duration, and acting accordingly as will be illustrated hereafter.
- the central unit CPU typically has different possible states, such as acquisition state, processing state, waiting state and outputting result state.
- acquisition state When a message arrives to the system-on-chip, the same switches from waiting state to acquisition state.
- the input channel is enabled by the supervision module SM.
- the supervision module SM counts the data arriving and compares this number to a predefined maximum. Any abnormal situation leads to a warning state in which the central unit CPU can decide how to react.
- the supervision module SM has the capability, especially in case of a warning state, to block the input and output channels and/or the encryption/decryption engine CR-EN.
- the supervision module SM When the external message is received, the supervision module SM causes the central unit CPU to go to processing state. During this state, the input and output channels are disabled.
- the supervision module SM comprises a time pattern corresponding to the minimum processing time by the central unit CPU, and disables the channels during this time.
- the central unit CPU can inform the supervision module SM that no result will be outputted. This has the consequence that the supervision module SM only enables the input channel for waiting a new message. The output channel then remains disabled.
- the central unit CPU wishes to send data to the external world, it then informs accordingly the supervision module SM, which in turn enables the output channel.
- the supervision module SM still continues to watch the activities on the output channel by counting the data sent and applying a time window during which the sending is authorized.
- the supervision module SM is thus able to work with information received from the central unit CPU, as well as with preprogrammed working patterns.
- This module can also watch the encryption/decryption engine CR-EN by counting the data encrypted or decrypted. In the same manner, the working pattern of the encryption/decryption engine CR-EN is supervised in term of data quantity processed and time.
- the supervision module can disable the encryption/decryption engine CR-EN if abnormal conditions are detected.
- the supervision module SM can be implemented in a system-on-chip without the encryption/decryption in the input/output channel.
- the data are processed without adding an additional encryption (or decryption) level and the input/output channel is watched by the supervision module SM.
- This System-on-chip SOC is used in secure access control module in charge of receiving management messages including rights or keys.
- This module can also comprises an high speed descrambling unit to receive an encrypted video data stream.
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- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
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Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP05112980A EP1802030A1 (en) | 2005-12-23 | 2005-12-23 | Secure system-on-chip |
EPEP05112980.7 | 2005-12-23 |
Publications (1)
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US20070150752A1 true US20070150752A1 (en) | 2007-06-28 |
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Family Applications (2)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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US11/613,294 Abandoned US20070150752A1 (en) | 2005-12-23 | 2006-12-20 | Secure system-on-chip |
US11/614,816 Active 2029-12-29 US8356188B2 (en) | 2005-12-23 | 2006-12-21 | Secure system-on-chip |
Family Applications After (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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US11/614,816 Active 2029-12-29 US8356188B2 (en) | 2005-12-23 | 2006-12-21 | Secure system-on-chip |
Country Status (16)
Country | Link |
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US (2) | US20070150752A1 (zh) |
EP (2) | EP1802030A1 (zh) |
JP (1) | JP2009521154A (zh) |
KR (1) | KR101329898B1 (zh) |
CN (1) | CN101346930B (zh) |
BR (1) | BRPI0621136B1 (zh) |
CA (1) | CA2633371C (zh) |
ES (1) | ES2569209T3 (zh) |
HK (1) | HK1117307A1 (zh) |
IL (1) | IL192187A0 (zh) |
PE (1) | PE20070934A1 (zh) |
PL (1) | PL1964316T3 (zh) |
RU (1) | RU2008123254A (zh) |
TW (1) | TWI406150B (zh) |
WO (1) | WO2007071754A1 (zh) |
ZA (1) | ZA200805510B (zh) |
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US8145958B2 (en) | 2005-11-10 | 2012-03-27 | Arm Limited | Integrated circuit and method for testing memory on the integrated circuit |
EP1802030A1 (en) | 2005-12-23 | 2007-06-27 | Nagracard S.A. | Secure system-on-chip |
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- 2005-12-23 EP EP05112980A patent/EP1802030A1/en not_active Withdrawn
-
2006
- 2006-12-19 TW TW095147691A patent/TWI406150B/zh active
- 2006-12-20 US US11/613,294 patent/US20070150752A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2006-12-20 PE PE2006001672A patent/PE20070934A1/es not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2006-12-21 WO PCT/EP2006/070064 patent/WO2007071754A1/en active Application Filing
- 2006-12-21 CA CA2633371A patent/CA2633371C/en active Active
- 2006-12-21 BR BRPI0621136 patent/BRPI0621136B1/pt active IP Right Grant
- 2006-12-21 ES ES06830777.6T patent/ES2569209T3/es active Active
- 2006-12-21 RU RU2008123254/09A patent/RU2008123254A/ru not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2006-12-21 PL PL06830777.6T patent/PL1964316T3/pl unknown
- 2006-12-21 US US11/614,816 patent/US8356188B2/en active Active
- 2006-12-21 EP EP06830777.6A patent/EP1964316B1/en active Active
- 2006-12-21 KR KR1020087015225A patent/KR101329898B1/ko active IP Right Grant
- 2006-12-21 ZA ZA200805510A patent/ZA200805510B/xx unknown
- 2006-12-21 CN CN2006800488983A patent/CN101346930B/zh active Active
- 2006-12-21 JP JP2008546463A patent/JP2009521154A/ja active Pending
-
2008
- 2008-06-15 IL IL192187A patent/IL192187A0/en unknown
- 2008-09-17 HK HK08110285.5A patent/HK1117307A1/zh unknown
Cited By (12)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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US20090328048A1 (en) * | 2001-12-03 | 2009-12-31 | Quartics, Inc. | Distributed Processing Architecture With Scalable Processing Layers |
US20070150756A1 (en) * | 2005-12-23 | 2007-06-28 | Nagracard S.A. | Secure system-on-chip |
US20070234072A1 (en) * | 2005-12-23 | 2007-10-04 | Nagracard S.A. | Secure system-on-chip |
US8181008B2 (en) * | 2005-12-23 | 2012-05-15 | Nagracard S.A. | Secure system-on-chip |
US8356188B2 (en) | 2005-12-23 | 2013-01-15 | Nagravision S.A. | Secure system-on-chip |
US8656191B2 (en) | 2005-12-23 | 2014-02-18 | Nagravision S.A. | Secure system-on-chip |
US20150082052A1 (en) * | 2006-12-12 | 2015-03-19 | Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. | Encryption-enabled interfaces |
US9268957B2 (en) | 2006-12-12 | 2016-02-23 | Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. | Encryption-and decryption-enabled interfaces |
US9116857B2 (en) | 2007-01-16 | 2015-08-25 | Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. | Secure archive |
US10061718B2 (en) * | 2012-06-28 | 2018-08-28 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Protecting secret state from memory attacks |
US9369446B2 (en) | 2014-10-19 | 2016-06-14 | Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. | Secure remote desktop |
US10356226B2 (en) | 2016-02-14 | 2019-07-16 | Waaterfall Security Solutions Ltd. | Secure connection with protected facilities |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
PE20070934A1 (es) | 2007-10-05 |
JP2009521154A (ja) | 2009-05-28 |
EP1802030A1 (en) | 2007-06-27 |
ZA200805510B (en) | 2009-11-25 |
ES2569209T3 (es) | 2016-05-09 |
BRPI0621136B1 (pt) | 2019-11-26 |
CN101346930A (zh) | 2009-01-14 |
EP1964316A1 (en) | 2008-09-03 |
IL192187A0 (en) | 2008-12-29 |
KR101329898B1 (ko) | 2013-11-20 |
HK1117307A1 (zh) | 2009-01-09 |
BRPI0621136A2 (pt) | 2017-03-14 |
US8356188B2 (en) | 2013-01-15 |
PL1964316T3 (pl) | 2016-09-30 |
KR20080078013A (ko) | 2008-08-26 |
WO2007071754A1 (en) | 2007-06-28 |
US20070150756A1 (en) | 2007-06-28 |
CA2633371C (en) | 2017-03-14 |
TWI406150B (zh) | 2013-08-21 |
EP1964316B1 (en) | 2016-03-09 |
TW200809572A (en) | 2008-02-16 |
CA2633371A1 (en) | 2007-06-28 |
RU2008123254A (ru) | 2010-01-27 |
CN101346930B (zh) | 2012-06-20 |
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