JPS62280697A - Nuclear reactor safety protective device - Google Patents

Abstract

(57) [Summary] This bulletin contains application data before electronic filing, so abstract data is not recorded.

Description

Detailed Description of the Invention 3. Detailed Description of the Invention [Field of Industrial Application] The present invention relates to a nuclear reactor safety protection device, and in particular to a nuclear reactor operated by a scram electromagnet having two excitation coils. Regarding safety protection devices.

[Conventional technology]

In order to ensure the safety of the nuclear reactor, nuclear couplers are equipped with safety protection devices to prevent abnormal transient conditions from occurring.1
For example, Atomic Band Book, 1986, P263~
P267 describes the functions and configuration of the safety protection device. This structural concept is shown in Figure 2. In FIG. 2, the signal processing devices 1'j9 to 12 are connected to each sensor A I-N.
t r A x~Nz +A8~Nδ, A4~N4
Input the output signal a from .

Each signal processing device i? 9 to 12 output a trip signal if any one of all input signals exceeds a specified value. The trip signals output from each (g processing device 9 to 12) are output to the excitation coils 15 and 16 of the scram electromagnet 11 via the OR gates 13 and 14.The scram electromagnet 17 is.

The reactor is scrammed when both excitation coils 15 and 16 are de-energized. That is, the portion consisting of the OR gates 13 and 14 and the excitation coils 15 and 16 is 1
It has an out-of-two-twice majority logic. However, this is a configuration that operates with logic +i 0 +t.

[Problem that the invention seeks to solve]

The signal processing bags W19 to W12, which process and process signals from a plurality of sensors, are composed of four independent systems as shown in FIG. In this way, since the four systems are independent, the 1-out-of-2 tow-wise configuration is 2
Comparing the scrum failure probability of a 1-out-of-2 two-way configuration and a 2-out-of-4 configuration, which can be easily extended to an out-of-4 configuration, the 2-out-of-4 configuration is lower;
It is desirable to have an out-of-four configuration.

However, in the current atomic couplet, the scram electromagnet maintains the safety of the atomic couplet with a configuration compatible with 17 out-of-2 tow-wise logic, but the reliability of the plant can be further improved by using a 2-out-of-4 configuration. It becomes possible to do so. However, it is difficult to directly construct a 2-out-of-4 logic using the output signals (trip signals) from the signal processing devices 9 to 12 installed in the four systems to control the two excitation coils.

The present invention has been made in view of the above points, and the purpose of the invention is to combine 2-out-of-4 logic with the current configuration of scram electromagnets, and to separate one signal processing system. Another object of the present invention is to provide a nuclear reactor and a safety protection device that can further improve reliability by forming a 2-out-of-3 logic using other trip signals while satisfying a single failure criterion.

[Means to be Solved by the Invention] The above-mentioned problems are caused by four sensors installed, a signal processing device that inputs the output signal of the sensor and outputs a trip signal, and an opening/closing means operation signal. The first . Second. A scram electromagnet having a third and fourth signal processing system, a first and second excitation coil, and a first W1m provided in a circuit connecting the first W1m and the first excitation coil and connected in series to each other. and a second opening/closing means, and third and fourth opening/closing means provided in a circuit connecting the second power source and the second excitation coil and connected to each other in series, each of the signal processing systems The logic circuit inputs the trip signal of the signal processing device of the own signal processing system and the trip signal of the signal processing device of the other three signal processing systems, and also inputs the logic of the plurality of input trip signals. Sum and theory El! The opening/closing means operation signal is outputted by a logical operation based on the product, and i the first . Second
．． Each opening/closing means operation signal outputted from the third and fourth signal processing systems is connected to the first. The second problem can be solved by configuring the third and fourth opening/closing means to perform an opening operation.

[Effect]

By configuring the safety protection device for a nuclear reactor as described above, it is possible to realize a safety protection system based on 2-out-of-4 logic even in current nuclear couplants by directly using the scram electromagnets installed on the site. , even if one of the four signal processing systems breaks down or one of the four signal processing systems is disconnected for maintenance, the remaining equipment can always make a majority decision, which reduces the reliability of the reactor safety protection system. can be made very high.

〔Example〕

Hereinafter, a specific embodiment of the nuclear reactor safety protection device according to the present invention will be described in detail with reference to FIG.

The reactor safety protection device of this embodiment includes one signal processing device, one logic circuit, two switching circuits, and one diagnostic device (for example, signal processing device 9, logic circuit 18, switching circuit 3
It has four signal processing systems in parallel, each consisting of a diagnostic device 39 and a diagnosis device 39.

The signal processing device 9 connects the sensors A1 to Ns to the signal processing device 1.
0 to sensors A2 to N2, and signal processing device 11 to sensor A.
8 to Nδ, and the signal processing device 12 has sensors A4 to N4.
connected to. Here, the four sensors (for example, Alg Azg All, A4) indicated by the same alphabella 1- are arranged in close proximity and measure the same state quantity of the atomic couplant. In contrast, although four sensors are provided as described above, it is also possible to provide one sensor and distribute the output of this sensor to the signal processing devices 9 to 12. 1119, 10.11 and 12 are
Redundant sensors A5 to Ns, Ax to Nz, Aa to N3
The signals from numbers A to N& are processed and processed, and if the processing result exceeds a specified value, a trip signal is output to scram the plant.

The signal processing devices 9 to 12 include switching circuits 40, 40A, 40
They are connected to logic circuits 18 to 21 via B and 40C, respectively. Logic circuits 18, 19, 20 and 21 input a trip signal output from a signal processing device and perform processing based on a logic configuration described later.
The opening/closing means operation signal outputted from ~21 is sent to the switching circuit 3.
Relays (or contactors) 23 and 24 that drive the excitation coil 15 of the scram electromagnet 17 via 0.30A, 30B, 430C. It is applied to relays (or contactors) 25 and 26 that drive excitation coil L6.

Relays 23-26 have movable contacts 23A-26A and fixed contacts 23B-26+'3, respectively. During normal operation of the atomic coupler, the movable contacts 23A to 26A are in a closed state and in contact with the fixed contacts 23B to 26B.

The movable contact 23A is operated by the output signal of the logic circuit 18, the movable contact 24A is operated by the output signal of the logic circuit 19, the movable contact 25A is operated by the output signal of the logic circuit 20, and the movable contact 26A is operated by the output signal of the logic circuit 21. do. 22A and 22B are power supplies. 39,39A,3
911 and 39C are abnormality diagnostic devices for diagnosing the presence or absence of abnormalities in signal processing devices and logic circuits. In this embodiment, 27 out of 4 logics are constructed by logic circuits, relays (or contactors), and excitation coils. Note that when both the excitation coils 15 and 16 are de-energized, the scram electromagnet 17 operates to scram the reactor. The scram electromagnet 17 operates a valve body provided in the electromagnetic valve 2.

When the movable contacts 23A to 26A of the relays (or contactors) 23 to 26 are opened, the scram electromagnet 1
7 operates to open the solenoid valve 2, and the control rod drive device ff (not shown) quickly inserts the control rod into the reactor core to scram the reactor. This is a 2-out-of-4 logic that logically favors II Oj+. Note that although this embodiment shows the case where only one scram electromagnet is used, four scram electromagnets with a similar circuit configuration are provided, and the output signal from the logic circuit is connected to the scram tlt in parallel. The same applies to the case where the voltage is applied to the magnet to perform a scram operation.

By the way, the logic circuit 18 has a configuration shown in FIG. Other logic circuits 19, 20 and 21 are also logic circuits 18
is the same as Logic circuit 18 is composed of AND gates 27 and 29 and OR gates 28 and 56. Opening/closing means operation signal A-D which is the output of each logic circuit 18 to 21
The trip signals b and trip signals a=d are the output signals of the signal processing devices 9 to 12, respectively, as shown below.

A=a (b+cd)−(c+d) −・=(1
)B=b (c+da)(d+a) ・-=(2
)C=c (d+ab)(a+b) --(3)
D=d (a+bc) (b+c) -=・(4)
Here, when the signals A to D shown by equations (1) to (4) are applied to the relays 23 to 26 and the movable contacts of each relay are operated, the scram fd signal is applied to the scram electromagnet 17. When Z is 2, 2 is expressed by the following formula.

Z = A B + CD ・=
-(5) Substituting equations (1) to (4) into equation (5) yields the following equation.

Z=abc+bcd+cda+dab-(6)(6
) formula, if any two of the trip signals a, b, c, and d are set to logic IJ OII, 2 = "O11" even if the other signals are #I II. In other words, logic It can be seen that a nuclear reactor safety protection device with a 2-out-of-4 logic configuration that prioritizes "'O" can be easily realized even in a nuclear couplant.

Next, in the reactor safety protection device constructed in this way, even if one signal processing system device breaks down or is disconnected for maintenance, the remaining three signal processing systems It will be explained that 27 out of 3 logic is constructed in one position of .

This can be achieved by configuring one signal processing system as shown in FIG. That is, the signal processing system includes a switching circuit 30 provided at the output stage of the logic circuit 18, a diagnostic device 39 controlling the switching circuit 30, and a signal processing device! ! This can be achieved by providing a switching circuit 40 at the output stage of No. 9 and controlling the switching circuit 4o by a diagnostic device. Note that the switching circuits 30A to 30C have the same configuration as the switching circuit 3o, and the switching circuits 40A to 40C have the same configuration as the switching circuit 40.
It has the same configuration as . The logic circuits 18 to 21 are connected to a signal processing device l! as shown in FIG. Signal a which is the output of 9 to 12
, b, c, and d are all input. Of the signals input to each logic circuit, the bottom two signals (logic circuit 2
0, the signals a, b) are sent to the AND gate 27 and the OR gate 56, and the top signal (signal C in the logic circuit 20) is sent to the A
and the remaining one signal (logic circuit 2
0, the signal d) is respectively input to the OR gate 28.

If the signal processing bag e19 is malfunctioning, use self-diagnosis or diagnostic device 3.
9, and this detection can be achieved by various means (e.g.

(See Japanese Patent Application No. 135983/1983). As an example,
1. When the diagnostic device 39 detects that the logic circuit 18 is out of order,
The diagnostic device 39 outputs the switching command signal 38 to the changeover switch 31 in the changeover circuit 30 so that the opening/closing means operation signal A output from the logic circuit 18 becomes the logic Li I II.

Further, the 1 diagnostic device 39 outputs a switching command 48 to the changeover switch 41 in the changeover circuit 40 so that the trip signal a output from the signal processing device 9 also becomes logic 111It. As a result, the contact 35 in the changeover switch 31 is disconnected from the contact 32 and connected to the contact 33, and at the same time, the contact 45 in the changeover switch 41 is disconnected from the contact 42 and connected to the contact 43. (In the switching circuits 30 and 40, the resistance 36.4G and the DC power supply 37°47 are the logic 111
This is for generating a signal II. ) At the time of switching the contacts in the aforementioned changeover switch, the scram signal 2 of equation (5) is expressed as follows.

Z=B+CD...(7
)=bc+cd+db==-(8)
As is clear from equation (8), a 2-out-of-3 logical configuration can be realized from a 2-out-of-4 logical configuration.

Therefore, the reliability of the system becomes higher. In the above example, the case where the logic circuit 18 failed was described.
It is easy to understand that even if the signal processing bag W19 breaks down, this can be detected by the diagnostic device 39 and the same measures can be taken. In this case, the output of the logic circuit 18 is not switched to logic 111 II by the changeover switch 31 as described above, but only the output of the signal processing bag fi9 is changed to logic 111 by the changeover switch 41.
Furthermore, even when maintaining a device in one signal processing system, by setting the signals A and a of the signal processing system to be maintained to logic "1" in the same manner as described above. It is easy to understand that a 27 out of 3 logic configuration can be constructed using the signals of the remaining signal processing system.

In the embodiment of FIG. 1, basically the switching circuit 30.3
The object of the present invention can also be achieved using four signal processing systems from which 0A to 30C, 40, 40A to 40G and the diagnostic devices 39, 39A to 39C are removed.

In the above example, the scram operation was performed by giving priority to the logic "On, but depending on the system, it is also possible to give priority to the logic 1'I II. At this time, the scram electromagnet 17 shown in FIG. 1 has two excitation coils. This is done by excitation spinning of 15 and 16.

The scram signal Z at this time is expressed by equation (9).

Z= (A+B)(C+D) ・
...(9) However, the opening/closing means operation signals A-D are as follows:
It is shown by the following formula.

A=a+b (c+d)+cd...1
10) B = b + c (d + a) + d a
...411) C=c+d (a+b)
+a b −・=(12) D=d+a
(b+c) +bc ・・・・・・(1
:It) When equations (10) to (13) are substituted into equation (9) and solved, the following equation is obtained.

Z = a b + a c + a d + b c
+ b d + c a (14) In other words, a 27 out of 4 logical configuration with priority on logic It I 11 has been realized. By the way, (10)~
Equation (13) is realized by replacing the logic circuits 18 to 21 in FIG. 1 with the logic circuit 18A in FIG. 5.

Next, FIG. 5b shows a nuclear reactor safety protection device which is another embodiment of the present invention in which the above logic "1" is prioritized.
One of the four signal processing systems of this embodiment is shown.

FIG. 5 shows a portion corresponding to FIG. 4, that is, one signal processing system.

This embodiment has four signal processing systems shown in FIG. 5 in parallel, just as the embodiment shown in FIG. 1 has four M signal processing systems shown in FIG. 4. That is, in this embodiment, in FIG. 1, the logic circuits 18 to 21 are replaced by the logic circuit 18A, the switching circuits 30.30A to 30G are replaced by the switching circuit 30F,
The switching circuits 40.degree. 40A to 40C are each replaced with a switching circuit 40E. If one signal processing device fails or one system is disconnected for maintenance, an out-of-three logic configuration can be achieved as shown in Figure 5.6 For example, when diagnosing that the logic circuit 18A has failed, When the device 39 detects, the diagnostic device 39 switches the switching circuit 30
A switching command signal 38 is output to the changeover switch 31 in E. As a result, contact 35 is separated from contact 32 and connected to contact 34.

The opening/closing means operation signal A becomes logic ``0''. At the same time, the diagnostic device 39 outputs a switching command signal 48 to the changeover switch 41 in the changeover circuit 4OE. As a result.

Contact 45 is separated from contact 42 and connected to contact 44, and trip signal a becomes logic #O11. The scram signal Z at this time is determined as follows.

Z=B (C+D)...
・(15)=bc+cd+db-(1
6) As is clear from the equation (1G), the reliability of the reactor safety protection device of this embodiment is further improved because a 27 out of 3 logical configuration can be realized from a 2 out of 4 logical configuration. In the above example, a case was described in which the logic circuit 18A failed, but it is easy to understand that even if the signal processing device 9 fails, this can be detected by the diagnostic device 39 and a similar response can be taken. In this case, the output of the logic circuit 18A is the logic I
It is also possible to switch only the output of the signal processing device 9 to logic + (0#l) without switching to IOII.
Even when maintaining equipment of one signal processing system, the signals A and a of the signal processing system being maintained
It is easy to understand that by making the logic II OJJ in the same manner as described above, a 27-to-3 logic configuration can be constructed using the remaining signals of the signal processing system.

By the way, the logic circuit 18A, as shown in FIG.
It consists of gates 50.52 and AND gates 49.51.

Another embodiment of the nuclear reactor safety protection device of the present invention is shown in FIG. 6b. Although FIG. 6 shows only the part corresponding to FIG. As in the case of FIG. 5, four systems of the configuration shown in FIG. 6 are provided.

That is, in this embodiment, the bottom three signals input to the logic circuits 18 to 21 in FIG.
, a.

b) as shown in FIG.
This is input via the abnormality diagnosis device 3.
9. Diagnosis results are exchanged between 39A, 39B and 39C. The logic circuits of the four signal processing systems output switching means operation signals. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 4, the signal output from the signal processing device is set to logic t+11#, but in this embodiment, the input signal to the logic circuit is set to logic II I 1
It is configured to be set to 1. For this reason, the abnormality diagnosis device 3
9 is an abnormality diagnosis bag for other systems! When the signal processing device 9 or logic circuit 18 of the own system is out of order or disconnected for maintenance, it is transmitted to the 1tfs 39A to 39G as switching signals α, β, and γ. Switching signal α, β
, γ are logical "0" or "1".

The abnormality diagnosis device 39 is connected to another abnormality diagnosis device 39A.
The switching signals α', β', and γ' from ~39C are input, and the switching circuits 53 to 55 are controlled in response to these signals, that is, the switching circuits 53 to 55 are operated to indicate an abnormality. Preventing the output signal from the signal processing device from being input to the logic circuit. Further, input of the output signal from the signal processing device to the logic circuit indicating the abnormality is blocked.

For example, suppose that the logic circuit 21 shown in FIG. 1 has failed.

This result is input as the switching signal γ' of the abnormality diagnosis device 39. The abnormality diagnosis device 39 outputs a switching command signal to the changeover switch 55 and switches the changeover switch to the logic '1'' side (DC power supply 61 side).As a result, the opening/closing means operation signal A becomes as follows.

A = a (b + c)
--(17) In the switching circuits 53 to 55, the resistors 5G, 58.degree. 60 and the DC current @57, 59.61 generate a signal of logic 1'11#.

The configuration shown in FIG. 6 is based on the signal processing bag [10 to
12 and logic circuits 19-21. Therefore, the opening/closing means operation signal B.

C becomes as follows.

B = b (c + a) −
(1g)C=c(a+b)
-"419) Then, the white abnormality diagnostic device 1139G detects that the logic circuit 21 is at fault, and the logic circuit 2
Since the switching command is output to the switching circuits 53 to 55 on the input side of 1, the opening/closing means operation signal becomes 11111. By substituting the value of this signal and equations (17) to (19) into equation (5), the following equation is obtained.

z = to 8 + C, old... (2o) = a b + b c + c a
(21) That is, a 27 out of 3 logical configuration can be realized from a 2 out of 4 logical configuration, and reliability can be further improved in this embodiment as well. Furthermore, compared to the embodiments shown in FIGS. 1 and 5, since switching circuits 53 to 55 are provided on the input side of each logic circuit, it becomes possible to distribute risks and further improve reliability.

In addition, the abnormality diagnosis device considers not only the presence or absence of abnormality in its own system but also that in other systems,
55 also contributes to improved reliability.

FIG. 7 shows another embodiment of the present invention, in which the structure of the embodiment of FIG. 5 is added to the embodiment of FIG. 6 (logic circuit 18A, switching circuit 3
0E) is applied. Since the configuration shown in this figure is a logic that gives priority to logic "'1", contrary to the switching circuits 53 to 55 and 30 in FIG. 30
I am trying to output from E.

For example, if the logic circuit 21A (same configuration as the logic circuit 18A) corresponding to the logic circuit 21 shown in FIG. 1 fails, the operation of the diagnostic device and switching circuit corresponding to FIG. .

B, C, and D are as follows.

A = a + b c - (
22) B = b + ca
--(23)C=c+a b
- Old = (24) D = O (25) When formulas (22) to (25) are substituted into formula (9), the following formula is obtained.

Z= (A+B) C river...(26) =a b+b c+c a -(27
) That is, a 2 out of 3 logical configuration can be realized from a 2 out of 4 logical configuration. This embodiment provides the same effects as the embodiment shown in FIG.

Logic circuits 18 to 21 in the embodiments of FIGS. 4 and 6
The same effect can be obtained by changing the logical configuration as follows.

That is, in equation (5), signal 11. Suppose that D is expressed as the following formula.

B = b (d + da)
・−・(28) D=d (a + b c)
−・=(29) Equation (1), Equation (3), (
Even if equations (28) and (29) are substituted into equation (5), the scram signal Z obtains equation (6). For example, in order to disconnect the logic circuit 18 in FIG. 1 due to a failure, A=1.
If Z is determined by setting a=1, equation (8) is also obtained.

Also, by substituting equations (1), (3), and (20) into equation (5), D=1. By setting d=1, equation (21) can be obtained. In other words, signal B.

Even if D is given by equations (28) and (29), it is possible to realize a nuclear reactor safety protection device that obtains a 27-out-of-3 logical configuration from a 2-out-of-4 logical configuration. In addition, logic circuit 1 at this time
As for 8 to 21, 18.degree. 20 may remain the logic circuit shown in FIG. 3, and 19.degree. 21 only needs to delete the OR gate 56 from the logic circuit shown in FIG.

Furthermore, the logic circuit 18 in the embodiments of FIGS. 5 and 7
The logical configuration of A may be changed as follows, i.e.,
In equation (9), assume that signals B and D are expressed as follows.

Ll=b+c (d+a)...
・430) D=d+a (b+c)
=-・(31) (10) formula, (12) formula, (3
Even if Equations 0) and Equations (31) are substituted into Equation (9), the scram signal Z becomes as shown in Equation (14). 1. For example, in order to disconnect the logic circuit 18 in FIG. 1 due to a failure,
=O, a=o to obtain the scram signal Z.

Again, we obtain equation (16).

Substituting equations (1o) to (12) into equation (26), I) =
By setting O, d=o, equation (27) can be obtained. That is, the signal f3. D is expressed as (3o).

(31) can also realize a nuclear reactor safety protection device that can obtain a 2-out-of-3 logical configuration from a 2-out-of-4 logical configuration. Regarding logic circuits 18A to 21A (corresponding to logic circuits 18 to 21) at this time, logic circuits L8A and 2O
A may remain the logic circuit 18A shown in FIGS. 5 and 7, and is a logic circuit.

1.9A and 21A are logic circuits 1 shown in FIGS. 5 and 7.
8A to ANr) It is only necessary to delete gate 49.

Even if configured as described above, the reliability of the reactor safety protection device can be further improved.

It should be noted that it is easy to understand that the signal processing device, logic circuit, each switching circuit, and diagnostic device installed in the system can be realized by a six-layer microcomputer system, and these functions can be configured by software.

Up to now, even if one signal processing system is bypassed, the output signals from the remaining three signal processing systems are 27 out of 3.
The method of constructing logic and its system configuration were described. Below, describe a system configuration and method that can maintain the scram function even if one other signal processing system fails in this state, that is, satisfy the single failure criterion. A specific example of this nuclear reactor safety protection device will be shown. The major difference from FIG. 1 lies in the configuration of the relay (or contactor) that controls the excitation of the excitation coils 15 and 16 that drive the scram electromagnet 17. Portions that differ from the configuration in FIG. 1 will be explained. In this embodiment, logic circuits 18B to 18B are replaced with logic circuits 18 to 21.
21B, logic circuits 60 to 63 are arranged in 4η columns in each of logic ports 1813 to 2113. Logic circuits 60-63 are connected to relays 64-67 via switching circuits 48.48A-48C, respectively. Relay 23°G
4, 24 and 65 are connected in series in this order to supply power supply 2.
2 and the excitation coil 15 are connected.

Relays 25, 66, 26 and 67 are connected in series in this order and connected to power supply 2 in parallel with the connection of the aforementioned relays.
2 and is also connected to the excitation coil 16.

Relays 64-67 have movable contacts 64A-67A and fixed contacts 64B-67B. The movable contact 64A is triggered by the output signal of the logic circuit 62, the movable contact 65A is triggered by the output signal of the logic circuit 63, and the movable contact 66A is triggered by the logic circuit 6.
0 output signal, and the movable contact 67A is activated by the logic circuit 6.
It operates with the output signal of 1. Switching circuit 48°48A~
48C has the same configuration as the switching circuits 30.30A to 30C, and this embodiment also has four signal processing systems arranged in parallel. One signal processing system includes, for example, a signal processing M position 9, logic circuits 18B and 60, a switching circuit 30,
40 and 48 degrees and a diagnostic device 39.

By configuring as shown in Figure 8, it is possible to maintain the scram function even if one of the remaining signal processing systems fails when one signal processing system is bypassed. . This will be explained in detail below.

First, the logics 18B to 21B and 60 to 63 will be described. No. 913 with logic circuit 60.18B as a representative! I and FIG. The logic circuit 6o can be easily configured with an OR gate, inputs the signals a and b output from the signal processing devices 9 and 10, and outputs the signal C'. Logic circuits 61 to 63 have the same configuration as logic circuit 60, but have different input signals as shown in FIG. Logic circuit 18B.

is composed of AND gates 27, 29 and an OR gate 28, the AND gate 27 receives the output signals C and d of the signal processing devices IL and 12, and the OR gate 28 receives the output signals C and d of the signal processing device 1o.
The output signal of , and the AND gate 29 are signal processing bag #
The output signals a of 119 are respectively input. logic circuit 19
13-21) 3 ANr) Gates 1-27 input the bottom two signals of the input signals of each logic circuit shown in FIG. 8, AND gate 29 inputs the top signal, and OR gate 28 inputs the remaining one signal. Each logic circuit 60
The opening/closing means operations A'-D' and A-D outputted from ~63 and 18B-21B are shown below.

A' = c + d ・・・・・・
(32)B'=d+a...
...(33)C'=a+b
・・・・・・(34)D'=b+c
・・・・・・(35) A = a (b+cd
) −・=(36)B=b (c+
d a) −(37)C= c (
d + a b) ・−・・(3g
)D=d (a+b c) --(
39) By the way, the scram signal applied to the scram electromagnet 17 is expressed by the following equation.

7.=A'AB'B+C'CD' D...
Group-(40) Substituting (33) to (3'l) into equation (40) yields the following equation.

2', = abc + bed + cda + dab - (41
) (41), if any two of the signals a, b, c, and d are set to logic "'0", the other signals become "'0".
1", Z=0. In other words, logic "0'"
A reactor safety protection device is realized with a 2-out-of-4 logic configuration that prioritizes the following. Next, consider the case where one signal processing system device is disconnected from the nuclear reactor safety protection device of this embodiment constructed as described above.

This includes a switching circuit 40 on the output side of the signal processing devices 9 to 10.
．． 4OA-40C is provided, and a switching circuit 30°30Δ-30C is provided on the output side of the logic circuits 18B-21B and 60-63.
48 and 48A to 48C, and each switching circuit is controlled by a switching command signal output from the diagnostic device 39.39A to 39C.
A position 39 is for the signal processing device 9 and the logic circuits 18B and 6.
If there is an abnormality, the switching circuit on the output side of the relevant device or circuit is set to logic II.
Output a switching command signal to switch so that it becomes I+.

Here, when the signal processing device 9 is disconnected, the switching circuit 40 is controlled to produce rL I I+ as described above, and the scram signal 2 is expressed by equation (42).

Z=A'AB'11+C'CD' D= b c
+ c d + d b ・=-(42
) Here, if the signal processing device 10 fails in an unsafe manner with respect to the scram operation, that is, if b=1, the scram signal Z can be expressed by the following equation.

Z = c + d...
(43) As is clear from equation (43), if the signal processing devices 11 and 12 are healthy, it can be seen that the scram function of the reactor is maintained by the reactor safety protection device.

Next, consider the case where the logic circuit 60 is separated, as shown in FIG. 8b. In this case, the logic circuit 18 shown in FIG. 4 may be replaced with 60. In other words, when the logic circuit 6o is disconnected, the switching circuit 48 is controlled to set C'=1, and the signal Z becomes (44). It can be expressed by a formula.

Z=A'AH'B+CD' D =abc+bed+cda+dab-(44) This is a 2-out-of-4 logic configuration.

Here, if the logic circuit 18B fails in an unsafe manner with respect to the scram operation, A="1", and therefore the signal Z is expressed by equation (45).

7, = A'B'!3+CI)' D=abc+be
d+cda+dab - (45) In other words, in such a failure, the signal output from the signal processing device maintains its 2-out-of-4 logic configuration. by the way,
On the relay (or contactor) side, the movable contact 66A of the relay 66 is forcibly closed due to disconnection of the logic circuit 60, and the relay 23 is closed due to a failure of the logic circuit 18B.
Although the movable contact 23A is closed, the other relays are operated by the output signals of the corresponding logic circuits, so it can be seen that the scram operation function of the nuclear reactor is maintained. Note that when A=1, if the signal a also becomes logic "11", a 27 out of 3 logic configuration of signals b, c, and d is obtained. In the above example, the logic circuits 60 and 18B were explained as an example, but other logic circuits 61 to 63, 19B to 21
The same applies to B, and even when one logic circuit is separated, the single fault criterion can be satisfied.

In addition, Fig. 11 shows another implementation example 1 corresponding to Fig. 8.
It is. This is an example in which the signal processing device 9 and logic circuits 60 and 18B in FIG. 8 are realized by one arithmetic processing device, for example, a microcomputer, and the functions of the signal processing device and logic circuit are realized by the software of the microcomputer. 0 In this embodiment, one microcomputer corresponds to one signal processing system. This example is the eighth
Similar to the embodiment shown in the figure, a switching circuit 3 is provided on the output side of each logic circuit.
0゜30A~30C, 48, 48A~48C are installed, and a switching circuit 40.40A~40C is installed on the output side of the signal processing circuit.
has been established.

Suppose now that the microcomputer 70 is to be disconnected. At this time, by controlling the switching circuit 30.48, a=l, c'=
l, A=1. The scram signal 2 at this time is as follows.

Z=A'B'B+CD' D= b c +
c d + d b --(4
6) Here, it is assumed that the microcomputer 71 fails in a non-safe manner with respect to the scram operation. That is, b=1.
B=1. Assuming D' = 1, signal 2 becomes:

Z=A'B' +CD =c+d ・・・・・・(4
7) As is clear from equation (47), the microcomputer 72, 73 and relay (or contactor') 2
If 5, 64, 65.26 are healthy, trip signal c
, d, it is possible to scram.

Therefore, it can be seen that even if one signal processing system is disconnected for maintenance or the like, the single failure criterion is satisfied. In the above embodiment, the output logic circuit 60 is provided in the microcomputer 70;
The logic circuit 61 provided in 1 may be replaced. Also,
Similarly, logic circuit 62 and logic circuit 63 may be interchanged.

Next, another embodiment of the nuclear reactor safety protection device will be described which has the same functions as those described above even if the hardware configuration of the logic circuit and relay (or contactor) is simplified.

FIG. 12 shows an embodiment corresponding to the embodiment of FIG. 8.

The difference from the embodiment of FIG. 8 is that the logic circuit 61, 63 and relay (or contactor) 65 are different from the embodiment of FIG.
．． 67 was deleted. The switching means operation signals A', C', A, B, C, and D, which are the outputs of each logic circuit, are (
32) Equation.

It is shown by formulas (34) and (36) to (39).

The scram signal Z at this time is as follows.

Z=A'AB+C' CD ==abc+bcd+cda+dab ・=(48)
Thus, when each device is healthy, the 2-out-of-4 logical configuration maintains Scrum functionality.

By the way, if the signal processing device 9 is separated and the signal processing device 10 fails in an unsafe manner with respect to the scram operation, it is possible to obtain equation (43) as in the embodiment shown in FIG. It's easy to understand.

Therefore, it is assumed that the logic circuit 60 is disconnected. Assuming that C'=1 as in the explanation of FIG. 8, the scram signal 2 will be as follows.

Z=A' AB+CD =abc, +bad+ada+dab - (49) At this time, it is assumed that the logic circuit 18B operates on the unsafe side with respect to the scram operation. So, when A=1, the signal Z becomes as follows.

Z=A' B+CD ==bc+abd+acd -old・-(so
) As is clear from equation (50), if other devices and relays (or contactors) are healthy.

It can be seen that the scram function of the reactor is maintained. Note that when A=1, when the signal a also becomes the logic 111 I+, the 2-out-of-3 logic of the signals b, c, and d is obtained. In other words, when one signal processing system is disconnected for maintenance or the like, the scram function is ensured even if one of the remaining signal processing systems fails in an unsafe manner. Although the logic circuits 18B and 60 have been explained here as examples, the same applies to other logic circuits.

Next, also in the embodiment of FIG. 12, the signal processing device 9.
It is also possible to configure the logic circuit 60.18B using one arithmetic processing device, for example, a microcomputer. A concrete example of this is shown in FIG. Although not shown in the drawings, this embodiment is also provided with a switching circuit and a diagnostic device similar to the embodiment shown in FIG. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 13, it is assumed that the microcomputer 70 is now separated for maintenance etc. 6
As explained in FIG. 12, a=1. Since A=1 and C'=1, signal 2 becomes as follows.

Z=A' B+CD =bc+cd+d b ・-=(
51) Here, it is assumed that the microcomputer 71A fails in a non-safe manner with respect to the scram operation. In other words, bl
,, When B=4, (the number a Z becomes as follows.

Z=A'+CD=c+d
......As is clear from equations (52) and (50),
If the microcomputer 72, 73A and relay (or contactor) 24, 25, 26 are healthy, signal C
Can be scrammed by 2d.

Therefore, it can be seen that even if one signal processing system is disconnected for maintenance or the like, the single failure criterion is satisfied. In the above embodiment, the output logic circuit 60 was provided in the microcomputer 70;
It may be provided at 1A.

Furthermore, the logic circuit 61 may be provided in the microcomputer 73A, and the functions of the configuration shown in FIG.
It will be understood that the present invention can be applied to the configuration shown in FIG.

By configuring as described above, it is possible to realize a reactor safety protection system that satisfies the single failure criterion even if one signal processing system device is separated for maintenance etc. System reliability can be further improved.

Each of the embodiments shown in FIGS. 8 to 13 can realize a 2-out-of-4 logic configuration that prioritizes logic #O11, but
Based on the embodiment shown in FIG. 5 in which logic "1" is prioritized, it is possible to construct an embodiment corresponding to the embodiments shown in FIGS. 8 to 13. That is, if priority is given to logic "1", the configuration corresponding to FIGS. 8 and 11 can be obtained by configuring the relationship between each signal to be as shown in equations (53) to (61) below. ,
It will be understood that if the configuration is configured such that equations (54) and (56) are deleted, a configuration corresponding to FIGS. 12 and 13 can be obtained. It will also be understood that the functions of the configuration shown in FIG. 7 can be applied to these.

A'=cd...
(53)B'=da...
...(54) C.=ab
・・・・・・(55) D'=bc
・・・・・・(56) A = a + b
(c + d) −・=(57)
B = b + a (d + a)
−(58)C=c+d(a+b)
--(59)D = d + a
(b+c) ・−・・(60)Z
=(A'+A+F'3'+B)(C' +C
+D' +D) (61) Furthermore, a nuclear reactor safety protection device which is another embodiment of the present invention will be described. FIG. 14 shows a JM (child reactor safety protection device) shown in FIG. 8 with higher reliability.

The difference from the embodiment in FIG. 8 is that the logic circuits 60 and 6 in FIG.
The functions of 1, 62, and 63 are realized by relays (or contacts). That is, the relays 23, 64, 24, and 65 are arranged in series in this order between the power source 22 and the exciting coil 15. Furthermore, a relay 75 is arranged in parallel with the relay 64 and a relay 77 is arranged in parallel with the relay 65. Similar to the embodiment of FIG. 8, a logic circuit 18B, a signal processing device 11, a logic circuit 19B, and a signal processing device 12
The output signal of is applied to relays 23°G4, 24 and 65. The trip signal d of the signal processing device 12 is sent to the relay 75.
However, the trip signal a of the signal processing bag rm9 is applied to the relay 77. Further, relays 25, 66, 26 and 67 are connected in series between the electric current g22 and the exciting coil 16. Relay 76 is connected to relay 66, and relay 78 is connected to relay 6.
7 and are arranged in parallel. Signal processing device 10
The trip signal C of the signal processing device 11 is applied to the relay 76, and the trip signal C of the signal processing device 11 is applied to the relay 78. Logic circuit 20B, signal processing bag v! 19. The output signals of the logic circuit 21B and the signal processing bag W110 are transmitted to the relays 25 and 66.
．． 26 and 67, respectively. Logic circuit 19B
and a switching circuit 30 (not shown) on the output side of 20B.
A and 30B are installed. In FIG. 14, each logic circuit 18B, 19B, 20B, 21B has an output signal Δ,
It is constructed as shown in FIG. 10 so that B, C, and D are given by the following equations.

A=a (b+cd) --(62
)B=b (c+d a) ・Old=(
63) C=c (d + a b) −
−([14)D=d (a +b c)
-=465) As a result, the scram signal Z applied to the scram electromagnet 17 can be expressed by the following equation.

Z=A(c+d)B(a+d)+C(a+b)D(b+
c) (66) By substituting equations (62) to (65) into equation (64), the following equation is obtained.

Z=abc+bed+cda+dab-(67) In other words, a reactor safety protection device with a 2-out-of-4 logic configuration that prioritizes logic 110 I+ is realized.

In this embodiment, the logic circuits 60, 61°62.6 in FIG.
3 functions as relays (or contactors) 64-67.
75 to 78, similar to the embodiment shown in FIG. K
It is easy to understand that the t criterion can be satisfied.

FIG. 15 shows another embodiment corresponding to FIG. 11. This is an example in which one system of signal processing device and logic circuit is realized by one arithmetic processing device 1, for example, a microcomputer in FIG. This is realized by 1-. In this embodiment, as in FIG. 14, a switching circuit is provided at a location corresponding to the output stage of the signal processing device and logic circuit. The feature of this embodiment is 1. For example, the microcomputer 70 is a safe signal, that is, == 110 II
, A = '0'' is configured so that scram does not occur even if the signal is output. This is due to an abnormality in the microcomputer because the functions of the signal processing device 9 and logic circuit 18 are processed by software.

As mentioned above, a=II OII, A=lr O1
1, but the relay (Airoha contactor) activated by this is 23,77.66, and since 76 is closed, the excitation coil 15 is not de-energized, so it is necessary to scram. There is no, also a
It is easy to understand that even if the signals = II I II and A = II I II are output, the scram function is maintained as long as the other microcomputers are healthy. Note that the logic configuration is 27 out of 4 logic, similar to the embodiment shown in FIG.
Even if the system (one microcomputer) is disconnected, the single failure criterion is satisfied. Now, using the switching circuit, a
=1. Assume that A=1 and the microcomputer 70 is disconnected.

At this time, if the other microcomputers are healthy,
It is easy to understand that the Scrum function is maintained.In the above case, the microcomputer 71
Suppose that becomes abnormal and b=i and B=1. The relay (or contactor) at this time is 23, 24, 77
．． 66°76.78 is in the closed state, but if the other microcomputers are healthy, the scram function is maintained. Further, suppose that the microcomputer becomes abnormal so that b=o and B=O. At this time, 24.76.
The relay or contactor at 78 opens, but 66.
67 is closed, the excitation coil 15 is not de-energized.

Therefore, there is no chance of scrumming by mistake. Therefore, according to this method, it is possible to reduce the amount of hardware by processing the functions of the signal processing device and the logic circuit in a rough manner with one microcomputer. However, it has a scram function and can be said to be an extremely reliable reactor safety protection system.

FIG. 16 is an example corresponding to FIG.
The difference from the diagram is that the relay (or contactor) 65.
77.67.78 were removed. This is the first
The purpose is to reduce the amount of hardware in Figure 4, and the basic functions are the same. logic circuit 18
The output signals A, B, C, D of ~21 are the same as those of 60~63. The scram signal 2 can be expressed by the following equation.

Z=A (c+d)B0C(a+b)D=abc+be
d+cda+dab ·-(sg) In other words, this configuration realizes a reactor safety protection system with a 2 out of 4 logical configuration. It is easy to understand that in this embodiment as well, by providing a switching circuit in the output stage of the signal processing device and logic circuit as described in FIG. 14, the single failure criterion can be satisfied even if one system of devices is disconnected. Good morning.

FIG. 17 is realized by removing the relays or contactors 65, 77, 67, 68 from FIG. 15, and attempts to achieve the same function with less hardware than that in FIG. 15.

The logical configuration is similar to the embodiment shown in Fig. 16 (66).
It can be expressed as a formula and has a 2 out of 4 logical configuration. Therefore, even if system M (one microcomputer) is separated, the single failure criterion can be satisfied. Furthermore, when one system is disconnected, even if one of the remaining microcomputers fails in any mode, it will not erroneously perform a scram or lose the scram function, as shown in Figure 15. It can be easily understood based on the explanation. In Figures 15 and 17.

Relay or contactor section 6 in Figures 14 and 16
Although the example of deleting 5.77.67.78 has been shown, 64, 75.66.76 may be deleted instead.

Furthermore, it will be understood that the functions of the structure shown in FIG. 7 can be applied to the embodiments shown in FIGS. 14 to 17.

14 to 17 show a 2-out-of-4 logic configuration that prioritizes logic +1011, but logic 111
If priority is given to I+, configurations corresponding to FIGS. 14 and 16 can be obtained by configuring each signal so that it becomes the following formula, and the configuration is such that da and bc in formula (71) are deleted. As a result, it will be understood that configurations corresponding to FIGS. 15 and 17 can be obtained. It will also be understood that the momentum of the configuration shown in FIG. 7 can be applied to these.

A=a+b (c+d) ・-=(69
) B=b+c (d+a) −(70)
C= t= + d (a + b)
--(71)D=d+a (b+c)
...-(72) Z=(cd+A+d a+B)(
a b+C+b c+D)...(73) [Effects of the Invention] According to the present invention, in the current atomic coupler, a 2-out-of-4 logic configuration can be achieved while keeping the configuration of the scram electromagnet installed on the site as it is. Assemble.

Furthermore, even if one signal processing system out of the four systems breaks down or one signal processing system is disconnected for maintenance, the signal processing system of the remaining three signal processing systems can be maintained while satisfying the single-failure basis. Since a 27 out of 3 logical configuration can be constructed, it is possible to realize a nuclear reactor safety protection device with improved reliability.

[Brief explanation of drawings]

FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram of a preferred nuclear reactor safety protection device of the present invention;
Figure 2 is a diagram explaining the configuration of a conventional reactor safety protection device, Figure 3 is a detailed structural diagram of the logic circuit in Figure 1, and Figure 4 is a detailed configuration of one signal processing system in Figure 1. Figures 5 to 7 are configuration diagrams of parts corresponding to Figure 4 in other embodiments of the present invention, and Figures 8 and 11 to 11 are configuration diagrams in other embodiments of the present invention. Figure 9 shows the logic circuit 6 of Figure 8.
Detailed structural diagram of 0, FIG. 10 is the logic circuit 1811 of FIG.
FIG. A1-A4. N, ~N4...Sensor, 9-12...
Signal processing device, 15.16... Excitation coil, 17...
・Scrum electromagnet, 18-21, 18A, 18B-2
1B. 60-63...Logic circuit, 23-26.64-67.
...Relay (or contactor), 30.30A~3
0C, 40, 40A~40C, 48, 48A~48C・
...Switching circuit, 39.39A to 39C...Diagnostic device,
27, 29, 49.51...AND gate, 28.5
0,52.56...OR gate, 70~xing 1 mouth 2g~9 et al...--l-pu°'-! Ji 3 Hiromori 40 3 knives...#-Tanbukuro gokan 5 sen et al.'s #T outside 8's 1 circle (0 kutzap duty 11's lips IZ's #13's TO $14 [i4蓼+5 f2] v-1 Otsu Ward

Claims (1)

[Scope of Claims] It has sensors installed in one or four layers, a signal processing device that inputs the output signal of the sensor and outputs a trip signal, and a logic circuit that outputs an opening/closing means operation signal. A circuit that connects first, second, third, and fourth signal processing systems arranged in parallel, a scram electromagnet having first and second excitation coils, a first power source, and the first excitation coil. first and second switching means provided in the circuit and connected in series to each other; and third and fourth switching means provided in the circuit connecting the second power source and the second excitation coil and connected in series to each other. wherein the logic circuit of each signal processing system receives a trip signal of the signal processing device of its own signal processing system and a trip signal of the signal processing device of the other three signal processing systems. and outputs the opening/closing means operation signal by a logical sum and logical product of a plurality of input trip signals, and outputs the opening/closing means operation signal,
and an atom characterized in that each opening/closing means operation signal outputted from the fourth signal processing system performs an opening operation of any one of the first, second, third, and fourth opening/closing means. Furnace safety protection device. 2. The trip signal output from the signal processing device of the first signal processing system is a, the trip signal output from the signal processing device of the second signal processing system is b, and the trip signal of the third signal processing system is If the trip signal output from the signal processing device is c, and the trip signal output from the signal processing device of the fourth signal processing system is d, then the logic configuration of the logic circuit of the first signal processing system is a. (b+
cd) (c+d), the logical configuration of the logic circuit of the second signal processing system is b(c+da)(d+a), and the logical configuration of the logic circuit of the third signal processing system is c
(d+ab)(a+b), and the logic configuration of the logic circuit of the fourth signal processing system is d(a+bc)(b+c).
A nuclear reactor safety protection device according to claim 1. 3. A diagnostic device that determines whether the signal processing device and the logic circuit are healthy or not; and a case where the signal processing device is provided at an output section of the signal processing device and the signal processing device is disconnected by a command from the diagnostic device. a first switching circuit that outputs a signal that becomes logic "1"; and a first switching circuit provided at the output section of the logic circuit;
Each of the signal processing systems is provided with a second switching circuit that outputs a signal that becomes logic "1" when the logic circuit is disconnected based on a command from the diagnostic device. The nuclear reactor safety protection device described in Section 2. 4. a trip signal output from the signal processing device of the first signal processing system, b a trip signal output from the signal processing device of the second signal processing system, and b the trip signal output from the signal processing device of the third signal processing system. If the trip signal output from the signal processing device is c, and the trip signal output from the signal processing device of the fourth signal processing system is d, then the logic configuration of the logic circuit of the first signal processing system is a+b. (
c+d)+cd, the logic configuration of the logic circuit of the second signal processing system is b+c(d+a)+da, and the logic configuration of the logic circuit of the third signal processing system is c+d.
(a+b)+ab, and the logic configuration of the logic circuit of the fourth signal processing system is d+a(b+c)+bc. The nuclear reactor safety protection device according to claim 1. 5. A diagnostic device for determining whether the signal processing device and the logic circuit are healthy or not; and a case where the signal processing device is disconnected by a command from the diagnostic device, and is provided at an output section of the signal processing device; a first switching circuit that outputs a signal that becomes logic "0"; and a first switching circuit provided at the output section of the logic circuit;
Each of the signal processing systems is provided with a second switching circuit that outputs a signal that becomes logic "0" when the logic circuit is disconnected based on a command from the diagnostic device. The nuclear reactor safety protection device described in Section 3. 6. Parallel with four sensors installed, a signal processing device that inputs the output signal of the sensor and outputs a trip signal, and a first and second logic circuit that outputs the opening/closing means operation signal. a scram electromagnet having first, second, third, and fourth signal processing systems disposed in the circuit, a scram electromagnet having first and second excitation coils, and a circuit connecting the first power source and the first excitation coil; first provided and connected to each other in series;
Second, fifth, and sixth switching means, and third, fourth, seventh, and eighth switching means provided in a circuit connecting the second power source and the second excitation coil and connected in series with each other. and has
The first logic circuit of each of the signal processing systems receives a trip signal of the signal processing device of the own signal processing system and a trip signal of the signal processing devices of the other three signal processing systems, and It is configured to output the opening/closing means operation signal by a logical sum and logical product of a plurality of input trip signals, and the second logic circuit of each signal processing system is configured to a gate circuit that inputs a trip signal of the signal processing device and a trip signal of the signal processing device of another signal processing system and outputs the opening/closing means operation signal; Each opening/closing means operation signal outputted from the first logic circuit of the system is
When an opening operation is performed on any one of the opening/closing means, each opening/closing means operation signal output from the second logic circuit of the first to fourth signal processing systems is applied to any one of the fifth to eighth opening/closing means. A nuclear reactor safety protection device characterized in that it is configured to perform two opening operations. 7. The trip signal output from the signal processing device of the first signal processing system is a, the trip signal output from the signal processing device of the second signal processing system is b, and the trip signal of the third signal processing system is If the trip signal output from the signal processing device is c, and the trip signal output from the signal processing device of the fourth signal processing system is d, then the logical configuration of the first logic circuit in the first signal processing system is a(b+cd), the logic configuration of the second logic circuit is (a+b), and the logic configuration of the first logic circuit in the second signal processing system is b(c+da), and the logic configuration of the second logic circuit is (a+b), The logic configuration of the second logic circuit is (b+c), the logic configuration of the first logic circuit in the third signal processing system is c(d+ab), and the logic configuration of the second logic circuit is (c+d). In the fourth signal processing system, the logic configuration of the first logic circuit is d(a+bc), and the logic configuration of the logic circuit assembling the second logic is (d+
The nuclear reactor safety protection device according to claim 5, which is a). 8. A diagnostic device that determines whether the signal processing device and the first and second logic circuits are healthy; and a diagnostic device that is provided at the output section of the signal processing device and performs the signal processing according to a command from the diagnostic device. a first switching circuit that outputs a signal that becomes logic "1" when the device is disconnected; and a first switching circuit that is provided at the output section of the first logic circuit and that is provided in the output section of the first logic circuit when the first logic circuit is disconnected according to a command from the diagnostic device. a second switching circuit that outputs a signal that becomes logic "1"; and a second switching circuit that is provided at the output section of the second logic circuit and becomes logic "1" when the second logic circuit is disconnected by a command from the diagnostic device; 7. The nuclear reactor safety protection device according to claim 5, wherein a third switching circuit for outputting a signal is provided in each of the signal processing systems. 9. A trip signal output from the signal processing device of the first signal processing system, b, a trip signal output from the signal processing device of the second signal processing system, and a trip signal output from the signal processing device of the third signal processing system. If the trip signal output from the signal processing device is c, and the trip signal output from the signal processing device of the fourth signal processing system is d, then the logical configuration of the first logic circuit in the first signal processing system is a+b(c+d), and the logic configuration of the second logic circuit is ab, and in the second signal processing system, the logic configuration of the first logic circuit is b+c(d+a), and the logic configuration of the second logic circuit is ab. The logic configuration is bc, and the logic configuration of the first logic circuit in the third signal processing system is c+d(
a+b), and the logic configuration of the second logic circuit is cd, and in the fourth signal processing system, the logic configuration of the first logic circuit is d(a+bc), and the logic configuration of the second logic circuit is cd. The nuclear reactor safety protection device according to claim 5, which is da. 10. A diagnostic device that determines whether the signal processing device and the first and second logic circuits are healthy; and a diagnostic device that is provided at the output section of the signal processing device, and that is configured to operate the signal processing device according to a command from the diagnostic device. a first switching circuit that outputs a signal that becomes logic "0" when disconnected; and a first switching circuit that outputs a signal that becomes logic "0" when the first logic circuit is disconnected; a second switching circuit that outputs a signal that becomes "0"; and a signal that is provided at the output section of the second logic circuit and becomes logic "0" when the second logic circuit is disconnected according to a command from the diagnostic device; 9. The nuclear reactor safety protection device according to claim 5 or 8, wherein each of the signal processing systems is provided with a third switching circuit that outputs the signal. 11. A sensor installed in quadruple, a signal processing device that inputs the output signal of the sensor and outputs a trip signal, and a first logic circuit that outputs the opening/closing means operation signal and are arranged in parallel. a signal processing device that inputs the output signal of the sensor and outputs a trip signal, and a second and third logic circuit that outputs an opening/closing means operation signal. third and fourth signal processing systems arranged in parallel with the first and second signal processing systems, a scram electromagnet having first and second excitation coils, a first power supply and the first excitation coil; first, second and fifth switching means provided in a circuit connecting the circuits and connected in series with each other; and first, second and fifth switching means provided in a circuit connecting the second power source and the second excitation coil and connected in series with each other. Third,
and fourth and sixth opening/closing means, wherein the first logic circuit of the first and second signal processing systems and the second logic circuit of the third and fourth signal processing systems The trip signal of the signal processing device of the signal processing system and the trip signals of the signal processing devices of the other three signal processing systems are input, and the opening/closing means is operated by a logical operation based on the OR and AND of the plurality of input trip signals. The third logic circuit of the third and fourth signal processing systems is configured to output a trip signal of the signal processing device of its own signal processing system and the trip signal of the signal processing device of another one of the signal processing systems. a gate circuit for inputting a trip signal of a signal processing device and outputting the opening/closing means operation signal; Each opening/closing means operation signal outputted from the second logic circuit performs an opening operation of any one of the first to fourth opening/closing means, and is transmitted from the third logic circuit of the third and fourth signal processing systems. A nuclear reactor safety protection device characterized in that each output switching means operation signal is configured to perform an opening operation of any one of the fifth and sixth switching means. 12. A fourth sensor arranged in parallel with four sensors installed, a signal processing device that inputs the output signal of the sensor and outputs a trip signal, and a logic circuit that outputs a switching means operation signal. 1, 2nd, 3rd and 4th signal processing systems, scram electromagnets having first and second excitation coils, provided in a circuit connecting the first power supply and the first excitation coil and connected in series with each other. 1st, 2nd, 5th connected to
and a sixth opening/closing means, third, fourth, seventh, and eighth opening/closing means provided in a circuit connecting the second power source and the second excitation coil and connected in series with each other, and the fifth opening/closing means. a ninth opening/closing means connected in parallel with the means; a tenth opening/closing means connected in parallel with the sixth opening/closing means; an eleventh opening/closing means connected in parallel with the seventh opening/closing means; and a twelfth switching means connected in parallel with the switching means, wherein the logic circuit of each signal processing system receives a trip signal of the signal processing device of its own signal processing system and a twelfth switching means connected in parallel with the switching means.
trip signals of the signal processing devices of the three signal processing systems are input, and the opening/closing means operation signal is outputted by a logical operation based on the logical sum and logical product of the plurality of input trip signals, and the first to fourth signals are output. Each opening/closing means operation signal output from the logic circuit of the processing system performs an opening operation on any one of the first to fourth opening/closing means, and
Each trip signal output from the signal processing device of the fourth signal processing system is transmitted to one of the fifth to eighth opening/closing means.
one opening operation, and the ninth to twelfth opening/closing means are arranged in parallel with the fifth to eighth opening/closing means. A nuclear reactor safety protection device characterized in that it is configured to be opened at. 13. A sensor installed in four layers, a signal processing device that inputs the output signal of the sensor and outputs a trip signal, and a logic circuit that outputs a switching means operation signal and is arranged in parallel. A scram electromagnet having first, second, third and fourth signal processing systems, first and second excitation coils, and a circuit connecting the power source and the first excitation coil and connected in series to each other. the first, second, and fifth opening/closing means, which are connected to each other in series; It has a seventh opening/closing means connected in parallel with the fifth opening/closing means, and an eighth opening/closing means connected in parallel with the sixth opening/closing means, and the logic circuit of each signal processing system has its own By inputting the trip signal of the signal processing device of the signal processing system and the trip signals of the signal processing devices of the other three signal processing systems, and performing a logical operation based on the logical sum and logical product of the plurality of input trip signals. outputting the opening/closing means operation signal;
Each opening/closing means operation signal output from the logic circuit of the fourth signal processing system is applied to any one of the first to fourth opening/closing means.
Each trip signal output from the signal processing device of two signal processing systems among the first to fourth signal processing systems is connected to one of the fifth and sixth opening/closing means. The opening operation is performed, and each trip signal of the signal processing device of the remaining two signal processing systems among the first to fourth signal processing systems is activated to open any one of the seventh and eighth opening/closing means. A nuclear reactor safety protection device configured to operate.