JPH11197339A - Game machine control device - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To surely and easily detect a foul deed wherein an authentic game program which is provided by a game machine maker is illegally used even by a constitution wherein a CPU and a ROM are separate bodies by irreversibly prohibiting an ex post facto access for genuine/false information which is stored in a genuine/false information memory part. SOLUTION: An identification circuit 10H substantially stops a CPU for one time, and confirms the agreement between a check code which is calculated by a ROM check circuit 10Hh and a program check code of a built-in ROM, and judges that an application program for a game is an authentic program which is fed frown the game maker. In addition, the ROM check circuit 10Hh confirms the agreement between an individual check code which is secretely and peculiarly stored by itself, and the check code of the built-in ROM, and judges whether the authetic program is prepared for other game machines or not. Then, only when all of these conditions are satisfied, the operation of the CPU is allowed.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a game machine control device for controlling a game machine, and more particularly to a technology for preventing fraudulent acts on a storage means storing a game program by a reliable and simple system.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art In recent years, electronic gaming machines such as pachinko machines have been extensively digitized, and a multi-digit number is rotated for a predetermined time in accordance with a prize at a specific winning opening, and a combination of multi-digit numbers is used. Is controlled, the movable piece of the winning opening is moved to a position where it is easy to win. These game conditions are programmed as a game program, and are stored and supplied to a ROM as an external storage element or a CPU built-in ROM as a game machine control element which is stored in a nonvolatile manner. The gaming machine control element, mainly the CPU, controls the gaming machine by appropriately reading and executing the gaming programs stored in these storage units. That is, this type of gaming machine control device comprising a combination of a gaming machine control element and a storage means, based on the game conditions of the game program stored in the storage means, for example, the probability of variable winning in the case of a pachinko machine Since the game program is operated, it is possible to falsify the game program and perform an illegal game.

In order to cope with such alteration of a game program, specific authenticity information is stored in a built-in ROM of a game machine control element as disclosed in Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 7-299204, for example. Prior to such control, there has been proposed a technique for checking the consistency between the true / false information and the true / false collation information added to the game program. According to this technology, a situation in which the gaming machine control element executes an unauthorized gaming program is reliably avoided, and the tampering of the gaming program stored in the storage means or the replacement of the ROM as the external storage element and the illegal act performed are performed. Can be eliminated.

[0004]

However, conventional game machine control elements and game machine control devices are completely ineffective against the following illegal acts, and have not yet fulfilled a sufficient security function. In the conventional fraud detection technology that stores specific authenticity information in a built-in ROM and checks the validity of the game program based on the authenticity information, when the authenticity verification information added to the game program is valid. Of course cannot be detected as fraudulent.
In other words, if the storage means is properly supplied from the gaming machine maker, the game program stored in the storage means is always processed as being valid, and the gaming machine control device starts controlling the gaming machine. is there.

However, game machine manufacturers provide a wide variety of game machines on the market, and there are valid game programs of a type corresponding to the model of the game machine and a storage element for storing the program. That is, a game program or a storage element determined to be valid for the gaming machine control element is:
There are at least as many models as the manufacturer.

In addition, since it is inefficient for each gaming machine maker to independently develop and manufacture a gaming machine control element, each gaming machine maker stores predetermined true / false information in a true / false information storage unit. Generally, special game machine control elements are purchased from semiconductor element manufacturers. Therefore, a game machine maker using the same element will use certain authenticity matching information that conforms to certain authenticity information, and the game machine control element will determine that the gaming machine control element determines that it is legitimate. Is the sum of the number of models of all gaming machines provided by each gaming machine maker, which is a considerable number.

As described above, since the game machine control element executes a large number of game programs to be executed, the game program of a certain game machine is rewritten as a game program of another model, or the game program is stored. External RO
A new fraudulent act of replacing M with an external ROM of another model is established. For example, a game program of a certain model restricts the number of times of operation of the variable wing to 10 due to a high probability of winning a pachinko ball to the variable wing which is a variable winning opening. If the operating frequency of the variable wing is changed to 20 and the game program is changed to another type of game program because the winning probability of the ball is low, a large number of winnings can be obtained illegally.

[0008] Since this kind of misconduct is not performed using special equipment during the game, the appearance of the device does not differ from the ordinary game device at all. For this reason, it has been difficult to detect with a fraud detection device conventionally installed in a game store, for example, a monitoring camera, a magnetic sensor, or a radio wave sensor. In addition, since this fraudulent act is continuously performed by the falsified gaming machine control device, a great damage occurs that is incomparable to damage caused by other fraudulent acts.

[0009] Further, since the falsification of the game program of the game machine control device is carried out exclusively on holidays or at night when the game store is closed, hiring security personnel 24 hours a day to detect this is necessary. It is becoming increasingly necessary, and the security costs of amusement stores are steadily increasing.

The present invention has been made in order to solve the above-mentioned problem, and it has been proposed that an illegal operation utilizing a legitimate game program provided by a game machine maker can be performed in a configuration in which a CPU and a ROM are provided separately. It is an object of the present invention to provide a gaming machine control device capable of reliably and easily detecting a game machine.

[0011]

A game machine control device according to the present invention is a game machine control device for controlling the operation of a game machine, comprising: a program storage section for storing a game program; A true / false information storage unit capable of storing true / false information for determining the authenticity of a program, and the program storage unit and the true / false information storage unit are provided separately, and at least the program storage unit is accessible. Computer, external access prohibiting means for irreversibly prohibiting external access to the truth information stored in the truth information storage unit, and controlling the operation of the gaming machine by the computer at a predetermined timing. And stop
While the computer is stopped, the true / false information stored in the true / false information storage unit is read from the inside, and a determining means for determining the authenticity of the gaming program, and the determining means causes the gaming program to be transmitted to the gaming machine. The gist of the invention is that the game machine further comprises a processing stopping means for stopping the control of the gaming machine by the gaming program when it is determined that the gaming machine is not valid.

The external access prohibition means of the gaming machine control device according to the present invention irreversibly prohibits subsequent access to the true / false information stored in the true / false information storage unit. Therefore, if access from outside is prohibited, access can no longer be enabled. Here, “external” to the true / false information storage unit may be outside the gaming machine control device, but if the determination unit is provided integrally with the true / false information storage unit, the computer All other elements and devices, including those, can be considered "external." As a result, the technique of knowing the truth information once stored in the truth information storage unit is completely eliminated, and it is possible to make information decoding impossible.

Therefore, according to the gaming machine control device of the present invention, for example, a ROM or CP for controlling the gaming machine control device is provided.
Even if the elements such as U are standard products that are mass-produced, and the storage unit that stores the game program is configured separately from the computer, each of the game machine control elements has a game machine manufacturer. Can reliably determine the consistency with various game programs stored in the program storage unit by using the true / false information determined to be appropriate for the fraud elimination, and can reliably eliminate fraud in the gaming machine control device. .

Further, as such a game machine control device,
The true / false information storage unit stores, as the true / false information, one of predetermined information prepared in advance corresponding to the types of a plurality of game programs, and the determination unit stores the information in the program storage unit. By comparing the correspondence between the game program and the true / false information, it is possible to consider a unit that determines the authenticity of the game program.

In this gaming machine control device, when a plurality of gaming programs exist for a specific gaming machine due to a difference in version, etc., true / false information is prepared in advance for each type of gaming program. The authenticity of the game program is determined by checking the correspondence between the authenticity information and the game program. Therefore, the gaming machine control device of the present invention determines that the game information is valid only when the true / false information and the game program correspond to each other, and controls the game, which is different from the specific game program to be executed by the computer. Even if the game program is properly supplied from a game machine maker, the game program can be reliably excluded, and any illegality in the program storage unit can be prevented.

[0016]

Other Embodiments of the Invention The present invention includes the following embodiments. The truth information stored in the truth information storage unit may be information unique to the game maker, or may be a combination of information unique to the game maker and information corresponding to the game program on a one-to-one basis. In this way, if information unique to the game maker is stored in the true / false information storage unit, a situation in which the computer executes a game program of another game maker, which is an algorithm unknown to the game maker, is avoided. Fraud can be prevented only by considering the exchange of storage elements and game programs managed by each game maker.

The authenticity information may be stored in advance in the authenticity information storage unit, and a game program to which the authenticity information is added may be recorded in the program storage unit when assembling as a gaming machine control device. In this way, if the process management for recording the game program is adopted when assembling as a gaming machine control device, the management of each part is simplified, and the occurrence of artificial defects such as incorrect mounting of the parts is prevented. be able to. Conversely, a game program may be prepared first, and the true / false information may be stored in the true / false information storage unit accordingly.

Further, it is desirable to store the true / false information in the true / false information storage unit using a dedicated storage device without using a normal ROM writer or the like. By using a dedicated storage device in this way, it is possible to manage genuine information with extremely high confidentiality, prevent information leakage, confidential leakage, etc., and more securely and robustly manage fraud prevention. Can be implemented.

[0019]

Next, embodiments of the present invention will be described based on examples. FIG. 1 shows a microcomputer chip (hereinafter, referred to as a gaming machine control chip) 10 that functions as a gaming machine control device by storing a gaming machine control element and a storage element for storing a game program in one chip according to an embodiment. It is an internal structure block diagram. As shown, the center of the gaming machine control chip 10 is constituted by a central processing unit (hereinafter, referred to as a CPU) 10A for executing a logical operation.
A clock generation circuit 10B for taking communication timing with the CPU 10A and other constituent blocks to be described later, and the CPU 10A via an address bus Adr and a data bus Dat.
A parallel input / output port 10C for controlling information transfer between A and an external device, a predetermined identification code, a game application program, and a predetermined algorithm calculated by a predetermined algorithm such as a field redundancy or a cyclic redundancy check for use as authenticity verification information. A built-in ROM 10D for nonvolatilely storing necessary information such as a check code (hereinafter referred to as a program check code) between the identification code and the game application program, and a built-in RAM 10E for temporarily storing information necessary for processing of the CPU 10A. I have.

These two types of storage blocks, the built-in R
The OM 10D and the built-in RAM 10E correspond to the memory control circuit 10
F assigns and manages addresses as in the memory address map shown in FIG. That is, the built-in ROM 10
D from “0000” to “3FDF” is secured as a game application program area, and subsequent “3FE0” is a 32-byte identification code, a program check code as information for authenticity verification, and System information such as an error code prepared in accordance with the information is stored. From "4000" to "7D
Unused area up to address FF, 7 from address 7E00
The 512 bytes up to the "FFF address" are the RAM area allocated to the internal RAM 10E, and the rest are unused areas. The memory program control circuit 10G has a built-in R
This is a circuit for nonvolatilely recording information such as a game application program and an identification code in the OM 10D.

The identification circuit 10H stores an individual check code as true / false information by a storage process described later, and verifies the true / false of the individual check code as true / false verification information stored in the internal ROM 10D prior to the operation of the CPU 10A. This is a circuit for determining false and outputting a signal to the reset circuit 10I to prohibit the operation of the CPU 10A when the determination is unsuccessful.

In addition to the above, the gaming machine control chip 10 includes a counter / timer circuit 10J for controlling various timings from a set real time, a watchdog timer 10K for monitoring an abnormal operation of the CPU 10A, matching between a logical address and a physical address. , And a built-in device address decoder 10M that generates a chip select signal of a built-in device from an address signal.

FIG. 3 is a detailed internal block diagram of the identification circuit 10H. As shown, the identification circuit 10H includes:
A data input / output circuit 10Ha for managing data input / output between the identification circuit 10H and an external block, and a data input / output circuit 10
When data collation is input from an external device via Ha, a timing generation circuit 10Hb for adjusting timing with the external device, a built-in ROM 10D and a built-in RAM 10E.
Counter 10Hc for generating address information when accessing the data, a parallel / serial conversion circuit 10 for controlling the input / output of data between the identification circuit 10H and the internal data bus.
Hd, a divider / timer circuit 10He for generating a reference clock in the identification circuit 10H, determining a baud rate at the time of serial data transmission, and performing real-time management, and matching an identification code input from an external device with a previously stored identification code. Code determination circuit 10Hf for determining whether or not the CPU 1
It comprises an ID control circuit 10Hg for outputting a bus release request to bring 0A into a floating state, and a ROM check circuit 10Hh for performing a check using a check code.

This ROM check circuit 10Hh has a configuration shown in FIG.
As shown in (1), a true / false information storage section SS is provided which stores an individual check code, which is true / false information, in a nonvolatile manner by using one of two externally drawn signal lines. After the individual check code is once written in the true / false information storage unit SS, the information is used as secret information unique to the identification circuit 10H, that is, external access and data rewriting are physically impossible. Therefore, a configuration is adopted in which one signal line is blown by the other signal line. A method conventionally used for a fuse ROM or the like can be used for blowing the signal line. In this embodiment, a signal line for fusing the signal line is provided. However, a configuration in which an overvoltage is applied to one signal line to blow the signal line itself is also possible. Further, in the present embodiment, the signal line is blown through the internal bus circuit. However, immediately after the first check, the recognition code determination circuit 10Hf takes measures so that the individual check code cannot be externally rewritten. It is good to do. Such a response can also be realized by the recognition code determination circuit 10Hf blowing the signal line for storing the individual check code. For example, when the recognition code determination circuit 10Hf is turned on for the first time (usually in a factory). This is also realized by preparing a program that is executed only once in the inspection process, reading the individual check code SS with the program, and transferring it to an area that cannot be read and written from the internal bus (for example, an internal area of the recognition code determination circuit). be able to.

The gaming machine control chip 10 configured as described above operates as follows by its identification circuit 10H. When the power is turned on to the gaming machine on which the gaming machine control chip 10 is mounted, as shown in FIG.
Checks the pulse signal input from the outside (step S100) and checks whether or not the pulse signal SD is a predetermined signal via the data input / output circuit 10Ha (step S110). When the pulse signal SD is not normal, a signal is output to the reset circuit 10I and the CPU 10
A is reset, and the operation of the CPU 10A is prohibited (step S120).

On the other hand, when the external input pulse is normal (step S110), the ID control circuit 10Hg
A bus release request signal is output to the CPU 10A via the CPU (step S130). In response to this signal,
U10A relinquishes the right to use the bus and leaves each terminal in a floating state.
The ROM check is started by the OM check circuit 10Hh (step S140). ROM check circuit 10H
h accesses the built-in ROM 10D,
A check code is calculated based on a predetermined algorithm from a predetermined identification code and a game application program stored in 10D, and whether the calculated check code matches a program check code stored in advance in the built-in ROM 10 or not. Is determined (step S150). That is, it is determined whether the information in the internal ROM 10D has been destroyed or tampered with.

When the calculated check code matches the stored program check code, the CPU 10A determines that the game application program scheduled to be processed is a legitimate program supplied from the game maker. Is done. However, there is a possibility that this legitimate program is also a game application program created for another gaming machine. Therefore, the identification circuit 10H includes the ROM check circuit 1
By 0Hh, it is further confirmed that the individual check code uniquely stored in the internal storage area SS matches the check code stored in the built-in ROM 10D (step S160). Only when this check code matches all of the individual check codes, the CPU 10A
Of the floating state, otherwise the CP
Without returning the right to use the bus to U10A, the reset circuit 10I is driven to continuously output a reset signal to the CPU 10A, thereby continuing to prohibit the processing of the game application program. Since the right to use the path has not been returned to the CPU 10A, even if the reset circuit 10I
Even if the signal line from to the CPU 10A is physically disconnected, the CPU 10A does not start operating.

When the CPU 10A is operating,
Runaway of CPU 10A is avoided by watchdog timer 10K.

As described above, in the gaming machine control chip 10 of the present embodiment, the identification circuit 10H requests the CPU 10A for the right to use the bus, temporarily stops the CPU 10A, It is checked whether the check code calculated by the ROM check circuit 10Hh matches the program check code stored in the built-in ROM 10D, and it is determined that the game application program is a legitimate program supplied from the game maker. I have. Then, the ROM check circuit 10Hh further checks whether the individual check code stored by itself and the secret code uniquely matches the check code stored in the built-in ROM 10D, and the valid program is used for another game machine. The CPU 10A is permitted to operate only when all the conditions are satisfied. For this reason, even if the CPU 10A and the ROM 10D are provided separately, it is possible to reliably prevent a game application program from being rewritten with another valid game machine. Even when the ROM in which the game program is recorded is an external ROM, it is possible to reliably prevent impropriety due to replacement with a valid external ROM. In particular, once the individual check code is written, it cannot be rewritten later. Therefore, the reliability of the function of detecting the fraud by the identification circuit 10H is extremely high. In the present embodiment, the individual check code is used as it is for judging validity. However, it is also possible to use a key code and obtain a value that functions as an individual check code by a predetermined calculation. It is also possible to set a code that is associated with a checksum of a game program, a CRC code, or the like. In these cases, it is sufficient to judge whether or not the individual check code and the check code stored in the built-in ROM 10D are coincident with each other, instead of judging the coincidence.

The individual check code stored in the ROM check circuit 10Hh can be arbitrarily stored by the game machine maker after the game machine control chip 10 is manufactured. Therefore, even if the gaming machine control chip 10 is a standard product that is mass-produced, each gaming machine control chip 10 may secretly store true / false information that the gaming machine maker determines to be appropriate for fraud elimination. it can. For example, in this embodiment, the individual check code is used as the true / false information in order to have a one-to-one correspondence with the game application program. However, the information is unique to the game maker, The program may be combined with information corresponding to the program on a one-to-one basis, or may be combined with lot management information.

Further, after the individual check code is stored in the ROM check circuit 10Hh, the storage signal line is blown, so that it is not only physically impossible to rewrite the reference check code, but also the code is externally stored. Reading is also prohibited. Accordingly, the confidentiality of the individual check code is complete, and the prevention of fraud can be ensured.

The embodiment of the present invention has been described above.
The present invention is not limited to such embodiments at all, and it is needless to say that the present invention can be implemented in various modes without departing from the gist of the present invention. For example, the present invention
The present invention is also applicable to the fraud prevention of other gaming machines such as slot machines. Also,

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the internal configuration of a technology control chip 10 according to an embodiment.

FIG. 2 is a memory address map of a built-in ROM 10D and a built-in RAM 10E.

FIG. 3 is a detailed internal configuration block diagram of the identification circuit 10H.

FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing an outline of a check program using an identification circuit 10H.

[Explanation of symbols]

 Reference Signs List 10: gaming machine control chip 10A: CPU 10B: clock generation circuit 10C: parallel input / output port 10D: built-in ROM 10F: memory control circuit 10G: memory program control circuit 10H: identification circuit 10Ha: data input / output circuit 10Hb: timing generation circuit 10Hc: Address counter 10Hd: Parallel / serial conversion circuit 10He: Divider / timer circuit 10Hf: Identification code determination circuit 10Hg: ID control circuit 10Hh: ROM check circuit 10I: Reset circuit 10J: Timer circuit 10K: Watchdog timer 10L: Address decoder 10M: Built-in device address decoder

Claims (2)

[Claims] 1. A game machine control device for controlling an operation of a game machine, comprising: a program storage section storing a game program; and a true / false information capable of storing true / false information for determining the authenticity of the game program. An information storage unit, a computer that is provided separately from the program storage unit and the authenticity information storage unit, and that can access at least the program storage unit; External access prohibiting means for irreversibly prohibiting external access of the game machine, and at a predetermined timing, controlling the operation of the gaming machine by the computer and stopping the computer while the computer is stopped. Determining means for reading the stored true / false information from the inside and determining whether the gaming program is true or false, and the determining means causes the gaming program to be transmitted to the gaming machine. A gaming machine control device comprising: processing stop means for stopping the control of the gaming machine by the gaming program when it is determined that the game machine is not valid. 2. The gaming machine control device according to claim 1, wherein the true / false information storage unit stores one of predetermined information corresponding to types of a plurality of game programs in the true / false state. A game machine that stores the information as information, and determines whether the game program is true or false by checking the correspondence between the game program stored in the program storage unit and the truth information. Control device.