JP5298290B1 - Method and program for preventing fraud in gaming machine - Google Patents

Abstract

An object of the present invention is to reliably detect falsification of a program incorporated in a control board of a gaming machine.
A fraud prevention processing method in a gaming machine having a main control board and a sub control board, wherein a reference address on a ROM of the sub control board based on a unique identification number of a CPU of the main control board A step of generating duplicate data on the ROM based on the reference address and a predetermined interval and storing it in the temporary storage means of the sub-control board, and at the time of starting the gaming machine, A reference address on the ROM of the sub-control board is determined based on the unique identification number, and is generated from the ROM at the time of startup based on the reference address determined at the time of startup and the predetermined interval. And determining the fraudulent behavior of the gaming machine by collating the data with the duplicate data.
[Selection] Figure 6

Description

  The present invention relates to a technique for detecting falsification of a program ROM of a board widely used in gaming machines, and more specifically, in a gaming machine such as a slot machine including a main control board and a sub control board, the ROM of the sub control board The present invention relates to an invention for detecting fraud due to exchange or the like.

  In gaming machines such as slot machines (hereinafter collectively referred to as “gaming machines”), fraudulent behavior called so-called goto behavior is a problem.

  For example, in a model where the winning probability of a gaming machine can be set, the setting operation is performed illegally to change the setting value to be advantageous to the player, or the program and data contents such as ROM incorporated in the control board are rewritten, and the player Such as illegally generating or maintaining a profitable state. Specifically, the program modification is performed by replacing the regular ROM mounted on the board with an illegal ROM in which a program modified so that the player operates unfairly advantageously is written.

  The gaming machine is composed of a main control board (hereinafter referred to as “main control board”) and a peripheral control board (hereinafter referred to as “sub control board”) as its broad control structure. The program installed on the sub-control board has traditionally played the main role of controlling the effects of the gaming machine based on the lottery results determined by the main control board, but recently, as part of that effect In addition, an instruction process (“assist time”) that makes it easy to acquire a winning combination such as a small hit or replay by instructing the player in the order of stopping the spinning drum (hereinafter referred to as “revolving reel”) via a liquid crystal screen or the like. (AT) "etc.).

  In response to these recent effects, the player may be able to invalidate part of the signal transmitted from the main control board to the sub control board using a radio wave transmitter or a wire, or send an illegal signal. Goto acts that illegally generate or maintain a production that is advantageous to the public are also a problem.

  Based on the above situation, several techniques for preventing fraud have been disclosed (Patent Documents 1 to 3).

Patent Document 1 discloses a technique for determining whether or not a program of a gaming machine such as a slot machine or a pachinko machine has been illegally rewritten, and notifying by sound or light when it has been rewritten.
More specifically, it includes a CPU, a ROM that stores a program for operating the CPU, and a transmission unit that transmits data stored in the ROM, and performs an internal lottery and winning determination in response to a player's operation. And a main board that controls payout of game media according to winnings, a calculation unit that receives data from the main board and generates a test total of the data, and a test total storage unit that stores a test total related to the program in advance. And a sub-board including a determination unit that compares the inspection total with the inspection total in the storage unit, and a notification unit that notifies an error when the two do not match.

Patent Document 2 discloses a technique for detecting falsification of a program ROM of a board used in a gaming machine.
More specifically, a first processing unit that performs internal lottery and winning determination in response to a player's operation and controls payout of game media according to winning, a CPU, and a predetermined procedure that is read by the CPU A game storage device that stores a program for executing the program, and a second processing unit that performs an effect process in accordance with a command from the first processing unit. A program content change detecting device for receiving the contents of the program storage unit of the unit and comparing the contents with the prestored content, and a path for sending a signal from the first processing unit to the second processing unit. And a gate device that controls transmission of the command from the first processing unit to the second processing unit based on a comparison result in the device.

Patent Document 3 discloses a technique for detecting unauthorized replacement of a ROM or a main board, and turning off the power of the gaming machine when detected.
More specifically, the main board includes a ROM that stores data including a program in advance, and a CPU that operates according to the program. The CPU is unique to the data based on the ROM data when the power is turned on. When the checksum is calculated, the result is sent to the comparison unit of the power supply unit, and the comparison unit compares the checksum received from the main board with the checksum stored in advance in the storage unit and the two do not match Then, it is determined that the ROM or the main board has been replaced, and the supply of power to the main board is stopped at the power cut-off unit.

Japanese Patent Laying-Open No. 2005-040276 JP 2005-287911 A JP 2007-252547 A

  However, a malicious program is not created from scratch, but is often created by modifying a part of a program or data written on a regular ROM. Therefore, there have been cases where more sophisticated fraudulent acts that cannot be completely prevented by the techniques disclosed in Patent Documents 1 to 3 described above.

  For example, using the fact that the sub-control board uses a general checksum to determine whether there is an error in the ROM data at startup, it is not related to intentionally modified programs and / or data on the ROM. By modifying the data at the location, an illegal ROM that can be used for checksum processing is manufactured and replaced with a regular ROM in the gaming machine.

  The manufacturing principle of this illegal ROM is shown in FIG. In the figure, assuming that the regular ROM 11A is composed of a program area 1101 and an unused area 1102, the illegal ROM 11B modifies a part 1103b in the program area 1103 so as to perform an operation that is illegally advantageous to the player. . However, as it is, the checksum results of the ROM 11A and the ROM 11B differ depending on the modification portion 1103b, and an unauthorized modification is detected. Therefore, the part 1104b is further modified so that the checksum result in the unused area 1104 of the ROM 11B is the same as that of the ROM 11A.

  In this way, if an illegal ROM whose checksum result is the same as that of a regular ROM is manufactured and replaced with a regular ROM of a specific gaming machine so that it is not detected in the game store or the surroundings, the game machine is turned on. In the checksum determination performed at times, etc., the existence of the replaced illegal ROM cannot be detected.

  Therefore, the fraud prevention processing method according to the present invention includes a step of determining a reference address on the ROM of the sub control board based on a unique identification number of the CPU of the main control board, and the reference address and a predetermined interval. And generating the duplicate data on the ROM based on the above and storing it in the temporary storage means of the sub-control board, and at the time of starting the gaming machine, on the ROM of the sub-control board based on the unique identification number Of the gaming machine by comparing the data generated from the ROM at the time of activation with the duplicate data based on the reference address determined at the time of activation and the predetermined interval. And a step of determining fraud.

  The fraud prevention processing program according to the present invention determines the reference address on the ROM of the sub control board based on the unique identification number of the CPU of the main control board when the program is executed in the gaming machine. A step of generating duplicate data on the ROM based on the reference address and a predetermined interval and storing the duplicate data in the temporary storage means of the sub-control board; A reference address on the ROM of the sub-control board is determined based on the identification number, and data generated from the ROM at the start-up is determined based on the reference address determined at the start-up and the predetermined interval. A step of determining fraudulent behavior of the gaming machine by collating with the duplicate data.

  According to the illegal act prevention processing method or the like in the gaming machine according to the present invention, the alteration of the program stored in the memory incorporated in the control board of the gaming machine is detected, and the gaming machine is reliably used in an unauthorized state. Can be prevented.

It is explanatory drawing explaining the external appearance of the game machine in one Embodiment of this invention. It is explanatory drawing explaining the external appearance of the game machine in one Embodiment of this invention. It is explanatory drawing explaining the mode of a game machine's internal structure and power supply box in one Embodiment of this invention. It is explanatory drawing explaining the functional block of the game machine in one Embodiment of this invention. It is a flowchart explaining processing procedures, such as a fraud prevention processing method of a game machine in one Embodiment of this invention. It is a flowchart explaining processing procedures, such as a fraud prevention processing method of a game machine in one Embodiment of this invention. It is explanatory drawing explaining the example of collation data generation produced | generated by the method etc. concerning one Embodiment of this invention. It is explanatory drawing explaining the data generation example for collation produced | generated by the method etc. concerning other embodiment of this invention. It is explanatory drawing explaining the data generation example for collation produced | generated by the method etc. concerning other embodiment of this invention. It is explanatory drawing explaining the data generation example for collation produced | generated by the method etc. concerning other embodiment of this invention. It is explanatory drawing explaining the principle of manufacture of the more sophisticated illegal ROM of the past.

  A mode for carrying out a gaming machine fraud prevention processing method and the like according to the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.

  FIG. 1 shows an appearance of a gaming machine according to an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 1A is a front view of a gaming machine, and FIG. 1B is a right side view of the gaming machine.

  As shown in FIGS. 1 (A) and 1 (B), the gaming machine 100 is roughly divided in terms of the mechanism, and is attached to the housing 101 whose front surface is open and the opening surface of the housing 101 so that it can be opened and closed by a hinge or the like. The front door 102 is provided. As will be described later, buttons, a display unit, and the like for the player to play a game are arranged on the front portion of the front door 102.

  A display unit 1021, an illumination unit (not shown in FIG. 1), and a speaker unit (not shown in FIG. 1) are arranged on the upper part of the front door 102 located on the front surface of the gaming machine 100. A display window 103 is provided in the middle upper part of the front door 102. The player can view the outer peripheral surfaces of the plurality of rotating reels housed in the housing 101 through the display window 103.

  More specifically, the rotary reel includes a first rotary reel 1041, a second rotary reel 1042, and a third rotary reel 1043 that are rotatably provided, and a predetermined plurality of reels are provided on the outer peripheral surface of each reel. The design of is attached. The player can view the three vertical symbols attached to the outer peripheral surfaces of the first rotating reel 1041, the second rotating reel 1042, and the third rotating reel 1043 from the display window 103, and from the first rotating reel. A total of nine symbols can be visually recognized in the vertical direction up to the third rotating reel.

A game medium (medal) slot 105, a MAXBET button 106, and a status display unit (not shown in FIG. 1) are arranged on the upper surface of the table which is located in the middle of the front door 102 and protrudes from the front. Has been.
Also, on the front of the table provided in a protruding manner, there are a start lever 107, a 1BET button 108, a settlement button 109, a first rotation reel stop button 110, a second rotation reel stop button 101, and a third rotation reel stop button 102. Has been placed. Further, a game medium (medal) tray 108 having a game medium (medal) payout opening is attached to the lower part of the front door 102.

The display unit 1021 disposed at the upper center of the front door 102 is typically a liquid crystal display (LCD), and displays an effect such as an image to a player, presents information, and the like.
In addition, a speaker unit and an illumination unit can be provided at arbitrary positions on the left and right of the display unit 1021. The display effect of the game can be enhanced by the display portion 1021, the speaker portion, and the illumination portion.

  The rotating reel provided in the housing 101 is typically composed of three pieces (first rotating reel 1041, second rotating reel 1042, and third rotating reel 1043) as described above, and has a reel-like shape. And are rotatably arranged by a rotary reel driving unit composed of a stepping (pulse) motor. The rotating reels that are rotating can be stopped independently by pressing the first rotation reel stop button 110, the second rotation reel stop button 111, and the third rotation reel stop button 112, respectively. Each rotary reel stop button has a built-in lamp, and the built-in lamp lights up in a state in which the rotation stop button can be operated. Further, when the rotary reel stop button is pressed, the lamp is turned off and the operation of the rotary reel stop button is not accepted.

  Note that the number of rotating reels may be more than three (for example, four).

  In the display window where the symbols of the first rotating reel 1041, the second rotating reel 1042, and the third rotating reel 1043 can be confirmed, the symbols of the rotating reel are effective according to the number of medals (the number of bets) inserted by the player. An effective line that is a sequence is set.

  The winning combination determined by the lottery process to be described later and the corresponding combination of the rotating reel symbols are defined in advance, and it is determined whether the predetermined symbol combination is aligned on the active line, and the symbol combination is determined. It is determined that the winning line is obtained when they are aligned on the active line.

  A medal slot 105 provided on the upper surface of the projecting table located in the middle of the front door 102 is for inserting a predetermined number of medals before the game starts. When a medal is inserted or the start lever 107 is operated after the BET button is pressed, the first rotating reel 1041, the second rotating reel 1042, and the third rotating reel 1043 are rotated, and the game is started and a winning lottery is performed. Done.

The 1BET button 108 is for automatically inserting one medal stored in the gaming machine 100 and betting one medal on one game. By pressing the 1BET button 10, it is not necessary to insert one medal from the medal slot 105.
When betting two medals, the 1BET button 108 is pressed twice. When betting three medals at once, it is convenient to press the following MAXBET button 106.

  The MAXBET button 106 is for automatically inserting three medals stored in the gaming machine 100 and betting three medals on one game. This MAXBET button 106 eliminates the need to insert three medals from the medal insertion slot 105 or press the 1BET button 108 three times.

  The checkout button 109 is used for paying out the internally stored (credited) medal from the medal payout opening to the medal tray 198.

FIG. 2 shows the external appearance of the upper surface of a table that is located in the middle of the front door 102 and is provided to protrude from the front surface. FIG. 2A is a top view of the gaming machine 100 including the upper surface of the table, and it can be seen that the medal slot 105, the MAXBET button 106, and the status display unit 201 are arranged on the upper surface of the table.
FIG. 2B is an enlarged view of the status display unit 201 arranged on the upper surface of the table.

  In FIG. 2B, the status display unit 201 is provided with a plurality of 7-segment LEDs for displaying the number of medals and the like as numbers, and various LEDs for notifying the player of the usage state of the gaming machine 100 and the like.

  The medal insertion number LED 2011 displays the number of medals currently bet. As an example, when one medal is bet, the “1 BET” LED is lit, and when the second medal is bet, the “2 BET” LED is further lit, and the third medal is bet. When “3BET” LED is turned on, the LED is further turned on.

The insertable LED 2012 is an LED indicating that a medal can be inserted at present.
The weight LED 2013 is an LED indicating that a medal cannot be inserted at present. The start LED 2014 is an LED indicating that a game is currently started. The re-game LED 2015 is an LED indicating that it is a re-game.

  The payout number display 7-segment LED 2016 displays the payout number at the time of winning. As an example, every time a medal is actually paid out, it can be displayed by calculating back from the total payout number.

  The stored medal number display 7-segment LED 2017 is an LED that displays the number of medals currently stored.

  FIG. 3 shows the internal structure of the gaming machine and the state of the power supply box in one embodiment of the present invention. Although the present invention is not limited to this configuration, as shown in FIG. 3A, the power supply box 301 inside the front surface of the gaming machine 100 is set to change the winning probability in addition to the power switch 3011. A key 3012 and a select switch 3013 are arranged.

FIG. 3B is an enlarged view of the setting key 3012 in FIG. The setting key 3012 includes a cylinder part 3012a and a keyhole part 3012b. When changing the setting value of the winning probability, first, a key (operation key) is inserted into the keyhole portion 3012b and rotated from the OFF position to the ON position to change the setting, and the select switch 3013 is pressed. Increment the set value. After the maximum set value, the value returns to the minimum set value again. As an example, in the case of a gaming machine for which six levels of setting values are prepared, “1” → “2” → “3” → “4” → “5” → “6” → “1” → “2” → Change as follows. As an example, the set value sequentially changed by the select switch can be configured to be displayed on the payout number display 7-segment LED 2016 and confirmed.
Further, the select switch 3013 can also function as an error cancel switch for canceling an error state occurring in the gaming machine in a setting change impossible state (a state where the keyhole is in the “OFF” position).

  FIG. 4 illustrates functional blocks of the gaming machine according to one embodiment of the present invention. A series of characteristic operations of the gaming machine 100 to be described later is realized by individual operations of hardware described below and cooperative operations of these hardware and software.

The gaming machine includes a main control board 41 and a sub control board 42 connected via wiring (harness) as a control configuration in one embodiment, and is housed in the housing 101.
The main control board 41 is a kind of board computer, a CPU 411 that performs arithmetic processing, device control of the gaming machine 100, a rewritable RAM 412 that temporarily stores data as a program work area, and a gaming machine ROM 413 that stores 100 control programs and lottery tables for game lottery processing, etc., control unit 414 that controls the data communication bus, etc., inputs from buttons and switches, outputs to various LEDs, etc., and rotating reels And an input / output unit 415 for driving the unit and the like.

  The main function of the main control board 41 is to perform winning lottery processing, control of rotating reels, and the like, and is designed to perform processing operations based on rules and standards relating to gaming machines.

  The sub-control board 42 is a kind of board computer, a CPU 421 that performs arithmetic processing, control of the display unit 481, and the like, a rewritable RAM 422 that temporarily stores data as a program work area, and a display unit 481. A ROM 423 storing a program for controlling the illumination unit 482 and the speaker unit 483 and various data, a control unit 424 for controlling a data communication bus, an input / output unit 425 for driving illumination, and a display unit 481. And a sound source IC 427 storing a sound source for generating sound, sound effects, and the like from the speaker 482.

  The main functions of the sub control board 42 are effects based on the lottery result determined by the main control board. Specifically, the ROM 423 of the sub control board 42 also stores effect data including image data for performing various effects by the display 481, the illumination unit 482, and the speaker unit 483, and the main control board 41. The content of the effect is determined from the effect data stored in the ROM by the signal output from the ROM, and the display unit 481, the illumination unit 482, and the speaker unit 483 are driven based on the effect content. As an example, the display unit 481 is presented with information such as the pressing order of stop buttons, and the like is performed to support the continuation of the player's profit state (so-called “assist time (AT)”).

  The effects made by the display unit 481, the illumination unit 482, and the speaker unit 483 as described above are stored in the ROM 423 and the like as computer programs, and are realized by being called and executed by the CPU 421 to the RAM 422 and the like as appropriate. Is done.

  It should be noted that the control for performance on the sub-control board 42 is not subject to restrictions such as rules and standards relating to the performance of the gaming machine, so that the gaming machine 100 can perform relatively free performance processing by the sub-control board 42. It is possible.

  Next, the input / output system of the main control board 41 will be described. As shown in FIG. 4, first, the main control board 41 has a BET button 451 (including a 1BET button and a MAXBET button), a clearing button 452, a start lever 453, and a first rotary reel stop button via an input / output unit 415. 454, pressing of the second rotation reel stop button 455 and the third rotation reel stop button 456 can be read.

  In addition, the main control board 41 has a weight LED 461, a throwable LED 462, a replay LED 463, a start LED 464, a throwing number 7-segment LED 465, a payout number 7-segment LED 466, a stored medal via the input / output unit 415. A 7-segment LED 467 is connected, and is configured to perform lighting control of various LEDs and display control of numbers to be output to each display.

The selector unit 457 includes an insertion sensor and a solenoid (not shown), reads a signal from the insertion sensor provided in the medal insertion port 105 via the input / output unit 415, and counts the number of inserted medals. Check the authenticity of the inserted medals.
Further, the solenoid of the selector unit 457 operates so that the medal is returned even when a medal is inserted when a prescribed number of medals are inserted or when the start lever 107 is operated. Functions so that is not thrown.

  The setting key 471 of the power supply box 47 has a function of changing the payout rate for each setting by providing a stage for the winning probability of each combination in the lottery table in the lottery during the game. As an example, the winning probability can be set in six stages. The main control board 41 can manage the setting value set by the setting key 471 via the input / output unit 415. More specifically, when the setting key is turned ON, the main control board enters the setting changeable mode, and when the select switch is pressed, a signal pressed to the main control board is performed and managed by the main control board. The set value is incremented / decremented. The select switch 472 of the power supply box 47 is a switch for changing the setting value to forward feed (or reverse feed) when the setting key 471 is settable (set ON), and the setting is not possible (OFF). When an error or the like occurs in the gaming machine, the CPU 411 of the main control board 41 can be initialized. The power switch 473 is for supplying power to the gaming machine.

  The rotary reel unit 43 includes a first rotary reel drive unit 431 and a second rotary reel drive unit 432 that include stepping motors for rotating the first rotary reel 1041, the second rotary reel 1042, and the third rotary reel 1043, respectively. The third rotation reel drive unit 433 is provided, and can be controlled to rotate and / or stop each rotation reel independently. Further, a first rotation reel position sensor 434, a second rotation reel position sensor 435, a third rotation reel position sensor 436 for detecting the position of each rotation reel during rotation, and indexes corresponding to the respective sensors (FIG. (Not shown in FIG. 4).

For example, a predetermined position of the rotating first rotating reel is detected by the first rotating reel position sensor 434, and stepping is performed from the predetermined position (index position) of the first rotating reel detected by the first rotating reel position sensor 434. The position information of the first reel can be acquired by counting the number of pulses that have driven the motor. Similarly, for the second and third rotating reels, the position information of the respective rotating reels can be obtained by the second rotating reel position sensor 435 and the third rotating reel position sensor 436.
In this way, it is possible to control the display of symbols based on the result of lottery processing described later.

  The hopper unit 44 is for paying out medals at the time of winning a prize. Although not shown, a predetermined number of medals are paid out by a hopper driving unit and a payout sensor.

  In addition, an external relay terminal (not shown in FIG. 4) is provided, and the main control board 41 is connected to a data lamp (not shown in FIG. 4) for displaying game data provided on the outside. It functions as a terminal for transmitting a signal from the control board 41 to the data lamp.

  The programs or software necessary for implementing the present invention are usually installed or stored in a memory such as the ROM 413 or 423, and all or one of them is stored in the memory such as the RAM 412 or 422 as necessary when the program or software is executed. Are read out as software modules and are executed by the CPUs 411 and 421.

  It should be noted that the execution of the calculation is not necessarily performed by a central processing unit such as a CPU, and an auxiliary arithmetic unit such as a digital signal processor (DSP) (not shown) may be employed.

[Lottery processing]
For example, the lottery process in the gaming machine 100 is executed based on a program and a table stored in the ROM 413 of the main control board 41 when the start lever is operated. In addition to the lottery processing program, the ROM 413 stores a winning probability table, a symbol table, a winning symbol combination table, and the like. In the winning probability table, random numbers generated by a random number generation unit (not shown) are classified and stored in association with various winnings and “no winning (out)”. By referring to the generated random number data and a winning rate table, etc., various winnings or losing of the game are determined.

  At this time, if the result of the lottery process is out of control, control is performed so that the predetermined symbols are not aligned, or conversely, if the result of the lottery process is a winning, the stop button is pressed at a predetermined timing, etc. In some cases, control may be performed so that a predetermined pattern is arranged on the condition. After various winnings, medals corresponding to winning symbols are paid out when predetermined symbols are prepared.

[Basic concept of the present invention]
Next, the basic concept of processing such as the method according to the present invention will be described. In an exemplary embodiment, the present invention provides a sub-control board based on a unique identification number or ID (hereinafter referred to as “identification ID”) used for individual identification of a CPU used for the main control board at the first startup. One or more duplication locations or duplication ranges of the programs stored in the ROM mounted on the ROM are calculated, and the data in the calculated ranges are duplicated to temporarily store the RAM, flash memory, PROM or the like (explanation) Therefore, the first feature is that the data is stored in “RAM etc.” or simply “RAM”). As will be described later, the duplicated data can be stored together with the identification ID in a RAM or the like. Then, at the second and subsequent startups, the same replication range data as above is created from the ROM mounted on the sub-control board at the time of the startup (which may have already been illegally exchanged). And comparison data already stored in the RAM or the like. If the result of the comparison determination is that they do not match, an illegal act can be prevented by taking measures such as notifying an abnormality or not performing any production.

  According to the present invention, the memory capacity required for verification is sufficient, and the CPU mounted on the main control board has a unique identification number. Since collation data for each individual can be created, there is an advantage that the confidentiality of the created collation data is extremely high.

  Furthermore, if the created verification data is not stored in the RAM but a storage medium (such as PROM) that can be written only once at the first start-up is adopted, even rewriting of the saved verification data becomes difficult. There is an advantage that a more robust anti-fraud system can be realized.

  Next, a processing procedure such as a gaming machine fraud prevention processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the flowcharts of FIGS.

  FIG. 5 shows that in the case of the first activation after turning on the gaming machine, the flag for creating the verification data according to the present invention is turned on (then, the verification data is created in the flowchart shown in FIG. 6). In the second and subsequent activations, it is indicated that the determination process is performed based on the collation data already created.

  When the process is started in FIG. 5 (step S501), the process proceeds to step S502, where each device is initialized when the power is turned on, and an activation number counter or initial activation flag stored in a memory (not shown) is read. It is determined whether the activation is the first time (step S503).

  If it is determined that the activation is the first time in step S503 (Yes), the process proceeds to step S504, and the identification ID non-reception flag on the memory is set to ON. If it is determined in step S503 that the activation is the second or later (No), typically, ROM verification described later is performed on the sub-control board. As a result, when it is determined that they completely match (Yes in step S506), normal operation is possible, and the determination process ends (to step S508). If it is determined No in step S506, there is a high possibility that fraud such as ROM replacement has been performed, so the process proceeds to step S509, and error notification processing (notifying the error and not performing any production) The determination process is terminated (including step S508).

  FIG. 6 mainly shows the process of creating the verification data at the first activation, but it is assumed to be executed on the sub-control board as an example for convenience of explanation.

  When the process is started in FIG. 6 (step S601), the process proceeds to step S602, and the sub control board receives the CPU identification ID of the main control board transmitted from the main control board. In step S603, it is determined whether the identification ID non-reception flag described with reference to FIG. 5 is on. When the identification ID non-reception flag is on (Yes), it is the time of the first activation, and therefore, based on the identification ID received in step S602, an address range or the like to be duplicated is determined by a procedure described later (step S604). . Next, the process proceeds to step S606, and the data in the range on the ROM determined in step S604 is duplicated on the RAM. Specifically, one or more duplication locations or duplication range data among the programs stored in the ROM mounted on the sub control board are duplicated and stored in the RAM or the like. Here, it is assumed that it is stored together with the identification ID.

  In FIG. 6, it is possible to control the case where the identification ID non-reception flag is off (No in Step S603) as an exception. In case of the second or subsequent activation, the process goes to Step S607. In step S602, the identification ID received in step S602 is checked against the identification ID stored for the first time. If the identification IDs match (Yes in step S607), it is determined that the operation is normal, and the determination process ends (to step S609). If the identification IDs do not match (No in step S607), the process proceeds to step S608, and an error notification process (including notifying the error and not performing any production, etc.) is performed for determination. The process ends (to step S609).

[Variation of address range determination when creating ROM verification data]
Next, a variation of determining a check address range for ROM verification from the received ID and creating verification data will be described with reference to the drawings.
The verification data is used for verification with the data to be inspected created from the ROM mounted on the sub-control board when the gaming machine is activated.

[First generation example]
FIG. 7 shows a first verification data generation example. FIG. 7 conceptually shows that a predetermined reference address is calculated, and data having a predetermined data length at predetermined intervals before and after the reference address is picked up and sequentially connected as collation data.

In the first generation example, first, a replication reference address is determined based on the CPU identification ID of the main control board. As an example, when the identification ID is 12DCEFD2 _H in hexadecimal notation, the data interval to be picked up is 4 KB, and the ROM area starts from the address 20000000 _H , the duplication reference address is calculated as follows.
(Identification ID of CPU) mod (the total capacity of ROM - data interval to pick _{up) +20000000 H = 12DCEFD2 H mod (} 400000 H - 1000 H) + 20000000 H
= 20219FD2 _H

By the above procedure, as shown in FIG. 7, the reference address of the ROM to be replicated in RAM 20219FD2 _H, and the data of 1byte content before and after each 4KB here is matching data startup it is replicated in RAM. In FIG. 7, the data of 1 byte length from the reference address 20219FD2 _H is numbered as “0”, and the 1 byte length data every 4 KB after the reference address includes “1”, “2”, “3”,. The 1 byte length data for every 4 KB before the reference address is numbered as “−1”, “−2”. The data replicated on the RAM is data before and after the data number “0” of the reference address as a reference, “−1” “0” “1” “2” “3”. .
Typically, forward pickup data from the reference address to reach the address 20000000 _H the ROM region begins, those rear of the pickup data from the reference address that is a predetermined number of times a pickup (or until the end of the program area) is used Is done.

  In addition to the above procedure, other arithmetic processing can be performed using the numerical value of the identification ID, and the result can be used as a replication reference address. Also, the interval from the reference address is not limited to 4 KB, and an arbitrary interval can be adopted according to the size of the area to be copied. Similarly, the length of data picked up at predetermined intervals is not limited to 1 byte, and other sizes (2 bytes, 3 bytes, 4 bytes, etc.) can be adopted.

[Second generation example]
FIG. 8 shows a second verification data generation example. In FIG. 8, a predetermined reference address is calculated, and a test value obtained by applying a check algorithm such as a checksum for data having a predetermined data length at regular intervals before and after the reference address is conceptually used as verification data. Show.

In the second generation example, first, a replication reference address is determined based on the CPU identification ID of the main control board. As an example, when the identification ID is 12DCEFD2 _H in hexadecimal notation, the data to be picked up is 4 KB, and the ROM area starts from the address 20000000 _H , the replication reference address is set based on the calculation formula used in the first generation example. 20219FD2 _H is used, and a check value such as a checksum is created based on 1-byte data every 4 KB before and after this reference address, and this check value is stored in the RAM as verification data. By performing processing in this way, it is possible to realize collation with high confidentiality with a shorter data length. In FIG. 8, the data of 1 byte length from the reference address 20219FD2 _H is numbered as “0”, and the 1 byte length data every 4 KB after the reference address includes “1”, “2”, “3”,. The 1 byte length data for every 4 KB before the reference address is numbered as “−1”, “−2”. The data copied on the RAM is the data before and after the data number “0” of the reference address,... “−1” “0” “1” “2” “3”. This is a value to which a check algorithm such as a checksum is applied.

  In addition to the above procedure, other arithmetic processing can be performed using the numerical value of the identification ID, and the result can be adopted as a replication reference address or the like. Also, the interval from the reference address is not limited to 4 KB, and an arbitrary interval can be adopted according to the size of the area to be copied. Similarly, the size of data replicated at a predetermined interval is not limited to 1 byte, and other sizes can be adopted. Other data sizes (2 bytes, 3 bytes, 4 bytes, etc.) can also be adopted.

[Third generation example]
FIG. 9 shows a third verification data generation example. FIG. 9 conceptually shows that two or more locations or ranges of programs stored in the ROM mounted on the sub-control board are to be copied.

In the third generation example, first, the identification ID of the main control board CPU is 12DCEFD2 _H in hexadecimal notation. Next, the program area on the ROM is divided every 256 bytes from the top address, and when the identification ID is divided every predetermined number of digits (8 bits), it is picked up one byte at a time from the indicated position, and these are connected. The data is used for verification.

  That is, if the program area on the ROM is divided into the first, second, third,... Every 256 bytes, the 1 byte data position picked up in each section is as shown in the table below.

なお、第５区分以降は、第１区分におけるピックアップ位置を再び採用し、以降、12_H番目、DC_H番目、EF_H番目、D2_H番目のものを繰り返しピックアップしていく（図９（Ａ）参照）。
この処理を上位概念化すると、ＣＰＵの識別ＩＤを一定の桁数ｍずつｎ等分し、その桁数ｍで表される最大サイズ毎にＲＯＭ上のプログラム領域を第１区分、第２区分、第３区分と区切ってゆき、ｎ等分されたｍ桁ずつの数値によって各区分においてピックアップされるデータ位置を決定するものである。

Incidentally, the fifth segment and later, once again employs a pick-up position in the first section, hereinafter 12 _H th, DC _H th, EF _H th, continue to repeatedly pick up things D2 _H th (Fig 9 (A) reference).
When this processing is conceptualized, the CPU identification ID is divided into n equal parts by a fixed number of digits m, and the program area on the ROM is divided into the first, second, and second divisions for each maximum size represented by the number of digits m. The data position picked up in each section is determined by a numerical value of m digits divided into n sections and divided into three sections.

  If processed in this way, the data to be copied for comparison at the time of start-up is only 16 KB out of the 4 MB control program (that is, 1/256 of the program procedure on the ROM). In addition, confidentiality equivalent to that of the first generation example can be ensured.

  There are no particular restrictions on the data length to be picked up. Increasing the size increases the reliability, but requires a larger amount of RAM to hold the data. Further, as already indicated as a superordinate concept, the size of the break is not particularly limited to 256 bytes. Furthermore, a part of the identification ID is used as it is to determine what number data in each section is picked up. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and other values using the numerical value of the identification ID can be used. The calculation processing may be performed, and data to be picked up may be determined based on the result.

As another variation, if the identification ID is a numerical value (for example, the last two digits in the hexadecimal display) (if the identification ID is “12DCEFD2 _H ” in the hexadecimal display, the lower two digits are “ the D2 _H "is employed) it may also be employed as a position to be picked up in each divided uniformly. In other words, 1 byte of the offset D2 _H of each area obtained by dividing the ROM program area every 256 bytes is picked up and connected, and this is stored in the RAM as collation data (see FIG. 9B).

[Fourth generation example]
FIG. 10 shows a fourth verification data generation example. FIG. 10 conceptually shows that the inspection values at two or more places or ranges in the program stored in the ROM mounted on the sub-control board are used as collation data. Hereinafter, a case where a checksum is employed as the inspection algorithm will be described.

In a fourth generation example, first, the identification ID of the main control board CPU is assumed to be the 12DCEFD2 _H in hexadecimal notation. The program is divided into sections of 256 bytes, 1 byte is picked up from offset 12 _H for the first section, 1 byte is picked up from offset DC _H for the second section, 1 byte is picked up from offset EF _H for the third section, the fourth segment will added to pick up the offset D2 and 1byte pickup from _H, offset 12 _H also subsequent segment, DC _H, from EF _H, D2 _H by 1byte. The added checksum value is stored in the RAM as verification data (see FIG. 10A).
When the data to be picked up is 1 byte at a time, the checksum detection rate is 255/256, but when the pickup data is 2 bytes at a time, the detection rate is 65535/65536. As this length, an arbitrary length can be adopted as long as overflow is not a problem.
Furthermore, it is also possible to create data for verification by connecting the picked-up data (third generation example), and apply a checksum to the data for verification.
In addition to the checksum described above, various algorithms applicable to those skilled in the art, such as cyclic redundancy check (CRC) and application of a hash function, can be adopted as the check algorithm.

  As described above, the data length picked up for checking the checksum or the like is not particularly limited, and the delimiter size is not limited to 256 bytes. Furthermore, a part of the identification ID is used as it is to determine what number data in each section is picked up. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and other values using the numerical value of the identification ID can be used. The calculation processing may be performed, and data to be picked up may be determined based on the result.

As another variation, if the identification ID is a numerical value (for example, the last two digits in the hexadecimal display) (if the identification ID is “12DCEFD2 _H ” in the hexadecimal display, the lower two digits are “ the D2 _H "is employed) it may also be employed as a position to be picked up in each divided uniformly. In other words, a checksum value is calculated by picking up and adding 1 byte of the offset D2 _H of each area obtained by dividing the ROM program area every 256 bytes, and storing this checksum value in the RAM as verification data (FIG. 10). (See (B)).
As described above, the data to be picked up may be 2 bytes or longer. In addition to the checksum described above, various algorithms applicable to those skilled in the art such as cyclic redundancy check (CRC) and application of a hash function can be adopted as the check algorithm.

[Generation example after the fifth]
It goes without saying that a more robust collation method or the like can be realized by combining two or more generation examples described above. For example, the first generation example and the third generation example are combined, a replication reference address (offset address) is determined based on the CPU identification ID of the main control board, and the program area on the ROM is determined every 256 bytes from the offset address. 1 byte is picked up from the position indicated when the identification ID is divided every 8 bits, and these are connected and used as collation data.

[About ROM verification]
In the ROM verification in step S505 in FIG. 5, data to be inspected is created from the ROM mounted on the sub-control board in the above-described procedure every time the game machine is started for the second time or later, and the data to be inspected and the above-described procedure The collation data already created and saved in the RAM or the like is collated to determine the presence or absence of fraud (step S506 in FIG. 5).

  As already mentioned, the memory capacity required for verification may be a small size, and verification for each gaming machine is possible, making it difficult to analyze the verification content from the outside and extremely confidential There is an advantage.

  As mentioned above, although embodiment of the fraud prevention processing method etc. in the gaming machine concerning this invention was described based on the specific example, in addition to the method or the program, the storage medium ( As an example, it is possible to adopt an embodiment as an optical disk, a magneto-optical disk, a CD-ROM, a CD-R, a CD-RW, a magnetic tape, a hard disk, a memory card, or the like.

  Further, the implementation form of the program is not limited to an application program such as an object code compiled by a compiler and a program code executed by an interpreter, but may be a form of a program module incorporated in an operating system. good.

  Furthermore, it is not always necessary for the program to be executed only by the CPU on the control board, but if necessary, an expansion board attached to the board or another processing unit (DSP or the like) mounted on the expansion unit. ) May be partly or wholly implemented.

  These features are mutually exclusive for all of the components described in this specification (including claims, abstract, and drawings) and / or for all steps of all disclosed methods or processes. Except for the combination, any combination can be used.

  Also, each feature described in the specification (including the claims, abstract, and drawings) serves the same purpose, equivalent purpose, or similar purpose, unless expressly denied. Alternative features can be substituted. Thus, unless expressly denied, each feature disclosed is one example only of a generic series of identical or equivalent features.

  Furthermore, the present invention is not limited to any specific configuration of the above-described embodiment. The invention includes all novel features or combinations thereof described in the specification (including claims, abstract and drawings), or all novel methods or process steps described, or Can be extended to any combination.

41 Main control board 42 Sub control board 43 Rotary reel unit 44 Hopper unit 47 Power supply unit 100 Game machine (slot machine)
DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 101 Case 102 Front door 103 Display window 105 Medal insertion slot 107 Start lever 108 Medal tray 109 Checkout button 431 First rotation reel drive unit 432 Second rotation reel drive unit 433 Third rotation reel drive unit 434 First rotation reel position sensor 435 Second rotation reel position sensor 436 Third rotation reel position sensor 454 First rotation reel stop button 455 Second rotation reel stop button 456 Third rotation reel stop button

Claims (6)

A fraud prevention processing method in a gaming machine having a main control board and a sub control board,
Determining a reference address on a ROM of the sub-control board based on a unique identification number of the CPU of the main control board;
Generating duplicate data on the ROM based on a plurality of predetermined length data extracted at predetermined intervals based on the reference address and storing them in the temporary storage means of the sub-control board;
At the time of starting the gaming machine, a reference address on the ROM of the sub control board is determined based on the unique identification number, and at each predetermined interval based on the reference address determined at the time of starting. And determining a fraudulent act of the gaming machine by comparing data generated from the ROM at the time of activation with the duplicate data based on a plurality of predetermined length data extracted . The duplicate data is an inspection value of data generated based on a plurality of predetermined length data extracted at predetermined intervals with the reference address as a base point, and is generated from the ROM at the time of startup The data is an inspection value of data generated based on a plurality of predetermined length data extracted at each predetermined interval with the reference address determined at the time of activation as a base point. Item 2. The method according to Item 1. A fraud prevention processing method in a gaming machine having a main control board and a sub control board,
Size and address to which the following numerical values indicated by the size an address of each said section for dividing equally spaced areas in the ROM of the sub-control board on the basis of the unique identification number of the CPU of the main control board A step of determining
Generating duplicate data on the ROM based on the size and the address and storing it in the temporary storage means of the sub-control board;
At the start of the game machine, the following numerical values indicated by the size of a size and address of each said section for dividing equally spaced areas in the ROM of the sub-control board on the basis of the unique identification number Determining an address, and determining fraudulent behavior of the gaming machine by comparing data generated from the ROM at the time of activation with the duplicate data based on the size and the address determined at the time of activation. A method characterized by comprising: A fraud prevention processing program executed on a gaming machine having a main control board and a sub-control board, when the program is executed on the gaming machine,
Determining a reference address on a ROM of the sub-control board based on a unique identification number of the CPU of the main control board;
Generating duplicate data on the ROM based on a plurality of predetermined length data extracted at predetermined intervals based on the reference address and storing them in the temporary storage means of the sub-control board;
At the time of starting the gaming machine, a reference address on the ROM of the sub control board is determined based on the unique identification number, and at each predetermined interval based on the reference address determined at the time of starting. A step of determining fraudulent behavior of the gaming machine by comparing data generated from the ROM at the time of startup with the duplicated data based on a plurality of extracted predetermined length data. program. The duplicate data is an inspection value of data generated based on a plurality of predetermined length data extracted at predetermined intervals with the reference address as a base point, and is generated from the ROM at the time of startup The data is an inspection value of data generated based on a plurality of predetermined length data extracted at each predetermined interval with the reference address determined at the time of activation as a base point. Item 5. The program according to item 4 . A fraud prevention processing program executed on a gaming machine having a main control board and a sub-control board, when the program is executed on the gaming machine,
Size and address to which the following numerical values indicated by the size an address of each said section for dividing equally spaced areas in the ROM of the sub-control board on the basis of the unique identification number of the CPU of the main control board A step of determining
Generating duplicate data on the ROM based on the size and the address and storing it in the temporary storage means of the sub-control board;
At the start of the game machine, the following numerical values indicated by the size of a size and address of each said section for dividing equally spaced areas in the ROM of the sub-control board on the basis of the unique identification number Determining an address , and determining fraudulent behavior of the gaming machine by comparing data generated from the ROM at the time of activation with the duplicate data based on the size and the address determined at the time of activation. And a program that is executed.

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