JP2012061339A - Game machine - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a game machine, reducing fraudulence using an unauthorized board.SOLUTION: In this game machine, the calculations performed by an calculation unit of a main control unit and a peripheral control unit are specified by internal control unit of the respective corresponding control unit. In this case, the calculation contents of the calculation unit executed by these internal control unit are both difficult to be recognized or altered, thereby making it difficult to manufacture the unauthorized board which imitates and outputs the management information sequentially updated by the above calculation unit. Further, the values obtained by the calculation unit are stored in a first initial value storage unit whose contents are held even when the power supply is shut off. When the power is again turned on after the power-off, the main control unit and the peripheral control unit are fixed as a combination corresponding to one to one by the values stored in the first initial value storage unit. As a result, the fraudulence using an unauthorized board can be prevented.

Description

  The present invention relates to a gaming machine represented by a pachinko machine or the like.

A pachinko machine, which is a type of gaming machine, generally includes a display device capable of variably displaying a plurality of types of symbols, and a game ball that has been driven into a gaming area enters a predetermined area (for example, wins a symbol operating slot). And the variable display is started. When this variation display stops in agreement with a predetermined symbol combination, a big win is generated, and a gaming state advantageous to the player is generated, and a large amount of game balls can be paid out.
Whether or not the jackpot is generated is determined at the timing when the game ball passes through the symbol operating port. That is, a random number counter that is periodically updated in a certain range by one count is provided, and when the game ball wins a symbol operation port, the value of the counter is read, and the read counter value is, for example, A jackpot is generated when the value matches a predetermined value such as “7”. When the jackpot occurs, a command indicating the jackpot is transmitted to the display control device, and the display control device controls the variable display based on the received command, and stops the symbol in a predetermined combination to display the jackpot display. .

JP 2003-164595 A

  However, in each gaming machine such as the above-described pachinko machine or slot machine, an illegal board is attached to a control device that performs a lottery lottery based on the value of a random number counter, or the control device itself is replaced with an illegal board, There is a problem in that a fraudulent act that unreasonably generates a big hit by the control by such a fraudulent board and pays out a large amount of game media may be performed, and this fraudulent act may incur a great loss in the game hall. there were.

  The present invention has been made to solve the above-described problems, and an object of the present invention is to provide a gaming machine that can reduce fraud using a fraudulent board.

  In order to achieve this object, the gaming machine according to claim 1 controls the basic operation in software or hardware, and recognizes and modifies the control contents substantially impossible, User program control means for controlling operations specific to each user program by executing a user program arbitrarily stored in the storage area, and by the control by the user operation control means in the internal control means, Main control means for performing main control related to the game, internal control means for controlling basic operations in software or hardware, and the control contents cannot be recognized or modified, and any given storage area User program control means for controlling operations specific to each user program by executing the user program stored in And peripheral control means for performing peripheral control related to the game according to the received command when a command is received from the main control means by the control by the user operation control means, the main control means And the peripheral control means both management information storage means for storing management information, first initial value storage means for storing a value to be stored as the first management information in the management information storage means, A first initial value setting means for writing a value stored in the first initial value storage means as first management information in the management information storage means with the power-on of the gaming machine; Every time, the nth (n is an integer of 1 or more) management information stored in the management information storage means is calculated to obtain the (n + 1) th management information. Management information holding management information stored in the first initial value storage means as a value for storing the management information as first management information in the management information storage means Means, updating the management information stored in the management information storage means to management information obtained by the calculation by the calculation means, and updating the management information updated by the updating means When the management information output means for outputting to the control means and the nth management information from the counterpart control means are received, the received nth management information and the nth management information stored in the management information storage means And determining means for determining whether or not there is an abnormality in the main control means or the peripheral control means, and the operation of the main control means and the peripheral control means. The calculations performed by the calculation means are respectively defined by the internal control means of the corresponding control means, and the first initial value storage means is stored even when the power of the gaming machine is cut off. It is configured to be retained.

  A gaming machine according to claim 2 is the gaming machine according to claim 1, wherein a first storage member that stores the main control means inside, a second storage member that stores the peripheral control means inside, and a gaming machine When the power of the gaming machine is cut off, and the first memory holding power supply means for holding the contents stored in the first initial value storage means in the main control means A second storage holding power supply means for holding the contents stored in the first initial value storage means in the peripheral control means, and the first storage holding power supply means and the second storage holding power supply means At least one is configured to be positioned outside the first storage member or the second storage member. In addition, in claim 2, the first memory holding power supply means and the second memory holding power supply means may be configured as separate power supply means or as integrated power supply means. .

  The gaming machine according to claim 3 is the gaming machine according to claim 1, wherein when the power of the gaming machine is cut off, the memory holding power supply means for holding the contents stored in the first initial value storage means The memory holding power supply means supplies a memory holding voltage in common to the first initial value storage means in the main control means and the first initial value storage means in the peripheral control means. It is configured as follows.

  The gaming machine according to claim 4 is the gaming machine according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein one of the main control means and the peripheral control means is a second initial value storage means for storing a predetermined value. When the power is turned on in a mode involving the initialization of the gaming machine, the second initial value setting for writing the value stored in the second initial value storage means as the first management information in the management information storage means And an initial value output means for outputting the value stored in the second initial value storage means to the counterpart control means when the power is turned on in a mode involving initialization of the gaming machine. And when the control unit on the side receiving the value output by the initial value output unit receives the value output by the initial value output unit in the control unit on the other side, the received value is stored in the management information. The first management information in the storage means And a third initial value setting means for writing to.

  The gaming machine according to claim 5 is the gaming machine according to claim 4, wherein the value stored in the second initial value setting means is unique information that is different for each gaming machine.

  The gaming machine according to claim 6 is the gaming machine according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the determination means of the main control means or the peripheral control means has an abnormality in the main control means or the peripheral control means. When it is determined that there is, it is provided with notification means for notifying the outside.

  The gaming machine according to claim 7 is the gaming machine according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein the arithmetic means of the main control means performs the nth operation after power-on and the peripheral control means. The calculation means is configured to be the same as the calculation performed at the nth time after the power is turned on.

  The gaming machine according to claim 8 is the gaming machine according to claim 7, wherein a value used in a first calculation performed after the power is turned on by the calculation means of the main control means, and the peripheral control means The value used in the first calculation performed after the power is turned on by the calculation means is configured to be the same.

  The gaming machine according to claim 9 is the gaming machine according to any one of claims 1 to 8, wherein the arithmetic means in at least one of the main control means or the peripheral control means is controlled by a counterpart control means. When the n-th management information is received, the n-th calculation is performed on the received n-th management information. Otherwise, the calculation result by the calculation means of the same control means is obtained. The nth calculation is performed on the obtained nth management information.

  The gaming machine according to claim 10 is the gaming machine according to any one of claims 1 to 9, wherein the time measuring means for measuring a predetermined period and the time measurement by the time measuring means are within the predetermined period, Even when a determination of abnormality is made by the determination means of the main control means or the peripheral control means, a determination delay means for delaying the determination is provided.

  A gaming machine according to claim 11 is the gaming machine according to any one of claims 1 to 10, wherein the main control means detects a winning by means of a winning detection means for detecting a winning in the game and the winning detection means. And a payout instructing means for outputting to the peripheral control means a command for instructing the payout of the number of game media corresponding to the detected winning, and the peripheral control means comprises the payout instructing means When a command for instructing payout of game media is received, payout execution means for paying out the number of game media according to the command is provided.

  A gaming machine according to claim 12 is the gaming machine according to claim 11, wherein a communication path for transmitting and receiving the management information between the main control means and the peripheral control means is determined by a payout instruction means of the main control means. The communication path is the same as the communication path for outputting a command for instructing the game medium to be paid out.

  According to the gaming machine of the first aspect, main control relating to the game is performed by the main control means based on the control by the internal control means and the user operation control means of the main control means, and the peripheral control means When a command is received from the control means, peripheral control relating to the game is performed based on the control by the internal control means and user operation control means of the peripheral control means in accordance with the received command. Note that both the user operation control means of the main control means and the user operation control means of the peripheral control means control specific operations for each user program by executing a user program arbitrarily stored in a predetermined storage area. Is.

  On the other hand, the internal control means of the main control means and the internal control means of the peripheral control means both control the basic operation in software or hardware. It is virtually impossible.

  Here, the first management information is stored in the management information storage means corresponding to the value stored in the corresponding first initial value storage means by the first initial value setting means in response to power-on of the gaming machine. Written as That is, when the power to the gaming machine is turned on, the value stored in the initial value storage means of the main control means is stored in the management information storage means of the main control means by the first initial value setting means of the main control means. It is stored as the first management information. On the other hand, the value stored in the initial value storage means of the main control means is stored in the management information storage means of the peripheral control means by the first initial value setting means of the peripheral control means when the power to the gaming machine is turned on. It is stored as the first management information. Therefore, in both the main control means and the peripheral control means, the value of the first initial value storage means is stored as the first management information in the management information storage means.

  Further, calculation is performed at predetermined timings by the calculation means of the main control means and the peripheral control means, and the nth (n is an integer of 1 or more) management information is the (n + 1) th management by calculation. Updated with information. That is, the management information is sequentially updated at predetermined timings by the calculation means of the main control means and the peripheral control means. The “every predetermined timing” includes every execution timing of a specific operation (for example, a write operation or a read operation) or every elapse of a predetermined time.

  The management information stored in the management information storage means is updated by the update means to the management information obtained by the calculation by the calculation means. That is, the management information stored in the management information storage means of the main control means is updated to the management information obtained by the calculation by the calculation means of the main control means by the update means of the main control means. On the other hand, the management information stored in the management information storage unit of the peripheral control unit is updated to the management information obtained by the calculation by the calculation unit of the peripheral control unit by the update unit of the peripheral control unit. As a result, the management information storage unit of each control unit is sequentially updated to the management information obtained by the calculation every time the calculation unit performs the calculation.

  The management information updated by the updating means is output to the counterpart control means by the corresponding management information output means. The “other party control means” is the peripheral control means in the case of the main control means, and is the main control means in the case of the peripheral control means. That is, the management information stored in the management information of the main control means is output by the management information output means of the main control means to the peripheral control means that is the counterpart control means. On the other hand, the management information stored in the management information of the peripheral control means is output to the main control means by the management information output means of the peripheral control means.

  On the other hand, when the nth management information is received from the counterpart control means as a result of the output of the nth management information by the management information output means or the initial value output means in the counterpart control means. In this case, the determination means of the control means on the receiving side compares the nth management information stored in the management information storage means of the control means on the receiving side with the received nth management information. Based on the comparison, the determination unit determines whether or not there is an abnormality in the main control unit or the peripheral control unit. In other words, when the main control means receives the nth management information from the peripheral control means that is the counterpart control means, the main control means determines the management of the main control means (reception side control means). The nth management information stored in the information storage means is compared with the nth management information received from the peripheral control means, and as a result, there is an abnormality in the main control means or the peripheral control means. A determination is made as to whether or not. On the other hand, when the peripheral control means receives the nth management information from the main control means, it is stored in the management information storage means of the peripheral control means (reception-side control means) by the determination means of the peripheral control means. The n-th management information and the n-th management information received from the main control means are collated, and as a result, whether or not there is an abnormality in the main control means or the peripheral control means is determined. Is made. Therefore, when a malfunction occurs due to an illegal act such as attachment of an unauthorized board to the main control means or the peripheral control means, the malfunction is determined by the determination means as an abnormality.

  Here, the calculations performed by the calculation means of the main control means and the peripheral control means are respectively defined by the internal control means of the corresponding control means. That is, the calculation performed by the calculation means of the main control means is defined by the internal control means of the main control means, while the calculation performed by the calculation means of the peripheral control means is defined by the internal control means of the peripheral control means. The

  As described above, both the main control means and the peripheral control means are configured such that the control content of the internal control means is substantially impossible to recognize or modify. Accordingly, the calculation contents of the calculation means executed by the internal control means are naturally difficult to recognize or modify.

  Therefore, it becomes difficult to produce an illegal board that imitates and outputs the management information that is sequentially updated by the arithmetic means, and as a result, there is an effect that an illegal act using the illegal board can be surely prevented.

  On the other hand, when new management information is obtained by computation by the computation means, the newly obtained management information is stored in the first initial value storage means in the management information holding means. Here, the contents stored in the first initial value storage means are retained even when the gaming machine is powered off. Therefore, when the gaming machine is turned on again after the gaming machine is turned off, the management information obtained by the computation by the computing means executed last before the power is turned off is the first information described above. The initial value setting means stores the first management information in the management information storage means. That is, when the power is turned on again after the power is turned off, the main control means and the peripheral control means are set to 1: by the management information obtained by the calculation performed by the calculation means last executed before the power is turned off. The combination corresponding to 1 is fixed. Therefore, in order to perform fraud, a fraudulent board corresponding to a regular combination is required, but as described above, it is difficult to sequentially imitate values obtained by computation by the computation means executed by the internal control means. Therefore, it is difficult to manufacture such an illegal board, and there is an effect that an illegal act using the illegal board can be prevented.

  According to the gaming machine of the second aspect, in addition to the effect of the gaming machine of the first aspect, the following effect can be obtained. When the power of the gaming machine is cut off, the first memory holding power supply means supplies the memory holding voltage (backup voltage) to the first initial value storing means in the main control means, while the second memory The holding power supply means supplies a storage holding voltage (backup voltage) to the first initial value storage means in the peripheral control means. As a result, the contents stored in the first initial value storage means in the main control means and the first initial value storage means in the peripheral control means are held.

  Here, at least one of the first memory holding power supply means and the second memory holding power supply means is a first storage member that stores the main control means inside, or a second storage member that stores the peripheral control means inside. It is comprised so that it may be located outside.

  Therefore, the regular board (the board including the main control means and the board including the peripheral control means) is replaced with an illegal board together with the storage member (the first storage member or the second storage member) storing the board outside the business hours. Even if there is, the memory holding power supply means (the first memory holding power supply means or the second memory holding power supply means) outside the replaced storage member (first storage member or second storage member) If the storage member (first storage member or second storage member) is removed, the storage holding voltage supplied from the storage holding power supply means is cut off, so that the management information is held. The value stored in the first initial value storage means is erased by the means. Therefore, unless the power of the installation island is turned on and the first initial value storage means is initialized (RAM clear), the determination means determines that an abnormality exists.

  Similarly, a storage medium (eg, ROM) that stores the control contents of the main control board or the peripheral control means or the user program control means may be replaced with a storage medium that stores illegal control contents. Even if the storage holding power supply means for supplying the storage holding voltage to the substrate having the replaced storage medium, the storage member (first storage member or second storage member) for storing the substrate is used. In the case of being located outside, the storage holding voltage supplied from the storage holding power supply means is cut off with the removal of the storage medium, so that it is stored in the first initial value storage means by the management information holding means. Will be erased. Therefore, unless the power of the installation island is turned on and the first initial value storage means is initialized (RAM clear), the determination means determines that an abnormality exists.

  Therefore, it becomes difficult to use an unauthorized substrate or a storage medium (for example, ROM) that stores unauthorized control contents, and therefore, it is possible to prevent unauthorized acts more reliably.

  According to the gaming machine of the third aspect, in addition to the effect produced by the gaming machine according to the first aspect, the following effect is produced. When the power of the gaming machine is cut off, the memory holding voltage is shared by the memory holding power supply means in common with the first initial value storage means in the main control means and the first initial value storage means in the peripheral control means. And the contents stored in the first initial value storage means are held.

  Therefore, even if the regular board (the board including the main control means and the board including the peripheral control means) is replaced with an unauthorized board outside the business hours, the management information is removed by removing the regular board when replacing the board. Since the value stored in the first initial value storage means is erased by the holding means, the determination means unless the power of the installed island is turned on and the first initial value storage means is initialized (RAM clear). Therefore, it is determined that an abnormality exists.

  Similarly, a storage medium (eg, ROM) that stores the control contents of the main control board or the peripheral control means or the user program control means may be replaced with a storage medium that stores illegal control contents. However, when the storage medium is removed at the time of replacement, the value stored in the first initial value storage means is erased by the management information holding means. Will be.

  Therefore, it becomes difficult to use an unauthorized substrate or a storage medium (for example, ROM) that stores unauthorized control contents, and therefore, it is possible to prevent unauthorized acts more reliably.

  According to the gaming machine of the fourth aspect, in addition to the effect produced by the gaming machine according to any one of the first to third aspects, the following effect is produced. When the power is turned on in a mode involving initialization of the gaming machine, the value stored in the second initial value storage means of one of the main control means or the peripheral control means is changed by the second initial value setting means. It is written in the management information storage means as the first management information. Further, the value stored in the second initial value storage means is output to the counterpart control means by the initial value output means.

  On the other hand, when the control means on the side receiving the value output by the initial value output means receives the value, the third initial value setting means stores the first management information in the management information storage means. Written. The “control means on the side of receiving the first management information output by the initial value output means” is a peripheral control means when a value is output by the initial value output means of the main control means. When the value is output by the initial value output means of the peripheral control means, it is the main control means.

  Therefore, when the power is turned on in a mode involving initialization of the gaming machine, the first management information in the main control means and the first management information in the peripheral control means have the same value, that is, the second It is set to the value of the initial value storage means. As a result, the main control means and the peripheral control means are fixed as a combination corresponding to 1: 1 when the power is turned on in a mode involving initialization of the gaming machine. Therefore, in order to perform fraud, a fraudulent board corresponding to a regular combination is required. However, it is difficult to manufacture such a fraudulent board, and it is possible to prevent fraud using the fraudulent board. .

  According to the gaming machine of the fifth aspect, in addition to the effect achieved by the gaming machine according to the fourth aspect, the following effect is achieved. Since the value stored in the second initial value storage means stores different unique information for each gaming machine, both control means (main control) when the assembled gaming machine is first turned on. The value for associating the means and the peripheral control means) with 1: 1 is set to different unique information for each gaming machine. Therefore, in order to perform fraud, a fraud board that can use the first management information that is different for each gaming machine is required. However, it is difficult to manufacture such an illegal substrate, and there is an effect that an illegal act using the illegal substrate can be surely prevented.

  The specific information in claim 5 is, for example, information stored as binary data in specific information storage means (for example, ROM, EEPROM, etc.). Specifically, for example, a serial number (ID) set so as not to be duplicated for each gaming machine manufacturer, each gaming machine model, or each gaming machine component (for example, a control device typified by MPU). No.) for specifying the production time and production lot.

  According to the gaming machine of the sixth aspect, in addition to the effect produced by the gaming machine according to any one of the first to fifth aspects, the following effect is produced. When the determination means of the main control means or the peripheral control means determines that there is an abnormality in the main control means or the peripheral control means, the notification means notifies the outside. Therefore, it is possible to clearly distinguish whether or not there is an abnormality (eg, a malfunction of the main control means or the peripheral control means based on an illegal act such as the use of an illegal substrate) depending on whether or not notification is performed by the notification means. In addition, it is possible to notify the store clerk of the game hall of the presence of the main control means or the peripheral control means having an abnormality by the notification.

  According to the gaming machine of the seventh aspect, in addition to the effect produced by the gaming machine according to any one of the first to sixth aspects, the following effect is achieved. The calculation performed by the nth operation after the power is turned on by the calculation means of the main control means is the same as the calculation performed by the calculation means of the peripheral control means after the power is turned on, so that it varies depending on the calculation. The transition pattern of the management information is the same transition pattern in both the main control means and the peripheral control means. Therefore, since it is easy to determine whether or not there is an abnormality in the main control means or the payout control means by collating both management information in the determination means, considering this similar transition pattern, the development of the internal control means and There is an effect that the design becomes easy.

  According to the gaming machine according to the eighth aspect, in addition to the effect achieved by the gaming machine according to the seventh aspect, the following effect is achieved. Values used in the first calculation after the power is turned on by the calculation means of the main control means, and values used in the first calculation after the power is turned on by the calculation means of the peripheral control means As a result, the (n + 1) th management information obtained as a result of the nth calculation by the calculation means in each of the main control means and the peripheral control means has the same value. Therefore, both the main control means and the determination means of the peripheral control means have an abnormality in the main control means or the peripheral control means depending on whether or not the nth ((n + 1) th) management information to be compared is the same. There is an effect that it can be easily determined whether or not there is.

  According to the gaming machine of the ninth aspect, in addition to the effect produced by the gaming machine according to any one of the first to eighth aspects, the following effect is produced. When at least one of the main control means and the peripheral control means receives the nth management information from the counterpart control means (for example, the main control means in the case of the peripheral control means), the received control information is received. For the nth management information, the nth calculation is performed by the calculation means. On the other hand, in other cases, that is, when the nth management information is not received from the counterpart control means, the calculation result by the same control means (for example, the peripheral control means in the case of the peripheral control means). The n-th calculation is performed by the calculation means on the n-th management information obtained as follows.

  In one control means (for example, peripheral control means), when management information obtained by computation by the computation means is used and further updated by computation by the computation means, the management information is accidental such as noise. Once it is disturbed by an incorrect value due to a factor, after that, it does not return to the correct management information as it should be, and as a result, it is erroneously determined to be abnormal by the determination means collating with the management information in the counterpart control means. It will be.

  However, according to the gaming machine of the ninth aspect, when the nth management information is received from the counterpart control means, the calculation means (the nth calculation) is performed using the received management information. Therefore, as long as the received management information is correct, there is an effect that the erroneous management information caused by the accidental factor as described above is corrected to a correct value as it should be. Therefore, for example, even if it is determined to be abnormal by comparing the management information with the control means on the other side by the determination means, it may be due to an accidental factor rather than an artificial factor such as fraud For example, by suspending the determination during the predetermined period, it is possible to prevent the correct control means from being erroneously determined to be illegal by being corrected with the correct management information received from the other-side control means.

  According to the gaming machine of the tenth aspect, in addition to the effect produced by the gaming machine according to any one of the first to ninth aspects, the following effect is produced. If the time measured by the time measuring means is within a predetermined period, the determination is delayed even if the determination grace means determines the abnormality by the determination means of the main control means or the peripheral control means.

  Therefore, even if it is determined that there is an abnormality in the main control means or the peripheral control means due to accidental factors such as noise, if the cause is corrected within the grace period, the presence of the abnormality The indicated determination is ignored as it is temporary. As a result, there is an effect that it is possible to prevent an erroneous determination due to an accidental factor.

According to the gaming machine of the eleventh aspect, in addition to the effect produced by the gaming machine according to any one of the first to tenth aspects, the following effect is produced. When a winning is detected by the winning detection means of the main control means, a command for instructing the payout of the number of game media corresponding to the detected winning is output to the peripheral control means by the payout instructing means. On the other hand, when the peripheral control means receives a command for supporting the payout of the game medium, the number of game media indicated by the command is paid out by the payout executing means in the peripheral control means.
As described above, the peripheral control unit performs the payout control of the game medium. Whether or not an abnormality exists by using the management information between the peripheral control unit performing the payout control and the main control unit. Therefore, it is possible to determine fraudulent behavior regarding the payout of the game medium, and there is an effect that the loss of the game hall can be surely suppressed.

  According to the gaming machine of the twelfth aspect, in addition to the effect achieved by the gaming machine of the eleventh aspect, the following effect is achieved. Since the communication path for transmitting / receiving management information between the main control means and the peripheral control means is the same communication path as the communication path for outputting a command instructing the payout of game media by the payout instruction means of the main control means, A fraudulent act relating to the payout of a medium, that is, a fraudulent act that gains an illegal profit by illegally generating a command instructing the payout of a game medium can be reliably determined as abnormal, and as a result, There is an effect that it can be prevented.

It is a front view of the pachinko machine in a 1st embodiment. It is a front view of a game board. It is a rear view of a pachinko machine. It is a block diagram which shows the electrical structure of the pachinko machine in 1st Embodiment. (A) is a figure which shows typically the area division setting and effective line setting of a display screen, (b) is a figure which illustrates an actual display screen. It is a figure which shows the outline | summary of various counters. It is a flowchart which shows the starting process performed by MPU in a main controller by a user program. It is a flowchart which shows the main process performed by MPU in a main controller by a user program. It is a flowchart which shows the fluctuation | variation process performed in the main process of FIG. It is a flowchart which shows the change start process performed in the symbol change process of FIG. It is a flowchart which shows the fraud monitoring timer update process performed in the main process of FIG. FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing a management password output setting process executed in the main process of FIG. 8. FIG. FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing a management password reception process executed in the main process of FIG. 8. It is a flowchart which shows a timer interruption process. It is a flowchart which shows the start winning process performed in the timer interruption process of FIG. It is a flowchart which shows a NMI interruption process. It is a flowchart which shows the internal starting process performed by MPU in a main controller by an internal program. It is a flowchart which shows the 1st management password process performed by MPU in a main controller by an internal program. It is a flowchart which shows the 1st collation process performed in the 1st management password setting process of FIG. It is a flowchart which shows the 1st calculation process performed in the 1st management password setting process of FIG. It is a flowchart which shows the starting process performed by MPU in a payout control apparatus by a user program. It is a flowchart which shows the main process performed by MPU in a payout control apparatus by a user program. It is a flowchart which shows the management password process performed by MPU in a payout control apparatus by a user program. It is a flowchart which shows the management password output process performed by MPU in a payout control apparatus by a user program. It is a flowchart which shows the internal starting process performed by MPU in a payout control apparatus by an internal program. It is a flowchart which shows the 2nd management password process performed by MPU in a payout control apparatus by an internal program. It is a flowchart which shows the 2nd collation process performed in the 2nd management password setting process of FIG. It is a flowchart which shows the 2nd calculation process performed in the 2nd management password setting process of FIG. It is a block diagram which shows the electric constitution of the pachinko machine in 2nd Embodiment. It is a flowchart which shows the internal starting process performed by MPU in a payout control apparatus by an internal program. It is a flowchart which shows the 2nd collation process in 2nd Embodiment. It is a flowchart which shows the fraud monitoring timer update process performed by MPU in a payout control apparatus by a user program.

  Hereinafter, an embodiment of a pachinko gaming machine (hereinafter simply referred to as “pachinko machine”) will be described with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a front view of the pachinko machine 10 according to the first embodiment, FIG. 2 is a front view of the game board 13 of the pachinko machine 10, and FIG. 3 is a rear view of the pachinko machine 10.

  As shown in FIG. 1, the pachinko machine 10 includes an outer frame 11 having an outer shell formed of a wooden frame combined in a substantially rectangular shape, and an outer frame 11 having substantially the same outer shape as the outer frame 11. And an inner frame 12 supported to be openable and closable. In order to support the inner frame 12, metal hinges 18 are attached to the outer frame 11 at two upper and lower portions on the left side when viewed from the front (see FIG. 1), and the side on which the hinge 18 is provided is used as an opening / closing axis. The frame 12 is supported so as to be openable and closable to the front front side.

  A game board 13 (see FIG. 2) having a large number of nails, winning holes 63, 64, and the like is detachably mounted on the inner frame 12 from the back side. A ball ball game is performed when the ball flows down the front surface of the game board 13. The inner frame 12 has a ball launch unit 112a (see FIG. 4) that launches a ball to the front area of the game board 13 and a launch that guides the ball launched from the ball launch unit 112a to the front area of the game board 13. A rail (not shown) or the like is attached.

  On the front side of the inner frame 12, a front frame 14 that covers the upper side of the front surface and a lower dish unit 15 that covers the lower side of the front frame 14 are provided. In order to support the front frame 14 and the lower dish unit 15, metal hinges 19 are attached to two upper and lower portions on the left side when viewed from the front (see FIG. 1), and the side on which the hinges 19 are provided is used as an opening / closing axis. 14 and the lower pan unit 15 are supported so as to be openable and closable toward the front front side. The locking of the inner frame 12 and the locking of the front frame 14 are respectively released by inserting a dedicated key into the key hole 21 of the cylinder lock 20 and performing a predetermined operation.

  The front frame 14 is assembled with decorative resin parts, electrical parts, and the like, and a window part 14c that is formed in an approximately elliptical shape is provided at a substantially central part thereof. A glass unit 16 having two plate glasses is disposed on the back side of the front frame 14, and the front surface of the game board 13 can be seen on the front side of the pachinko machine 10 through the glass unit 16. On the front frame 14, an upper plate 17 that stores balls is formed in a substantially box shape that protrudes forward and the upper surface is opened, and prize balls and rental balls are discharged to the upper plate 17. The bottom surface of the upper plate 17 is formed to be inclined downward to the right when viewed from the front (see FIG. 1), and the sphere thrown into the upper plate 17 is guided to the ball launch unit 112a by the inclination. A frame button 22 is provided on the upper surface of the upper plate 17. This frame button 22 is operated by the player, for example, when changing the effect pattern of the variable display displayed on the third symbol display device 81 or changing the effect content at the reach effect.

  In addition, the front frame 14 is provided with light emitting means such as various lamps around the periphery (for example, a corner portion). These light-emitting means play a role of enhancing the effect of the game during the game by changing or controlling the light-emitting mode by turning on or flashing according to the change in the gaming state at the time of big hit or predetermined reach. On the peripheral edge of the window portion 14c, there are provided electric decoration portions 29 to 33 incorporating light emitting means such as LEDs. In the pachinko machine 10, these lighting parts 29 to 33 function as effect lamps such as jackpot lamps, and the lighting parts 29 to 33 are turned on by lighting or blinking of the built-in LEDs at the time of jackpot or reach effects. Alternatively, it blinks to notify that the jackpot is being hit or that the reach is one step before the jackpot.

  Further, in the upper left part of the front frame 14 as viewed from the front (see FIG. 1), there is provided a display lamp 34 which has built-in light emitting means such as LEDs and can display the payout of a prize ball and when an error occurs. In addition, a small window 35 is formed by attaching a transparent resin from the back side so that the back side of the front frame 14 can be visually recognized, on the lower side of the right illumination part 32, and a sticking space K1 on the front side of the game board 13 (FIG. 2) is visible from the front surface of the pachinko machine 10. In addition, in the pachinko machine 10, a plated member 36 made of ABS resin that is chrome-plated is attached to an area around the electric decoration parts 29 to 33 in order to bring out more gorgeousness.

  A ball rental operation unit 40 is disposed below the window 14c. The ball lending operation unit 40 is provided with a frequency display unit 41, a ball lending button 42, and a return button 43. When the ball lending operation unit 40 is operated in a state where a bill or a card is inserted into a card unit (ball lending unit) (not shown) arranged on the side of the pachinko machine 10, Loans are made. Specifically, the frequency display unit 41 is an area in which the remaining amount information such as a card is displayed, and the built-in LED is lit to display the remaining amount as the remaining amount information. The ball lending button 42 is operated to obtain a lending ball based on information recorded on a card or the like (recording medium), and the lending ball is supplied to the upper plate 17 as long as there is a remaining amount on the card or the like. Is done. The return button 43 is operated when requesting the return of a card or the like inserted into the card unit. In addition, in a pachinko machine in which a ball is lent directly to the upper plate 17 from a ball lending device or the like without using a card unit, a so-called cash machine does not require the ball lending operation unit 40. In this case, the ball lending operation unit 40 It is also possible to add a decorative seal or the like to the installation portion of the parts so that the component configuration is common. A pachinko machine using a card unit and a cash machine can be shared.

  In the lower plate unit 15 located on the lower side of the upper plate 17, a lower plate 50 for storing a ball that could not be stored in the upper plate 17 is formed in a substantially box shape having an open upper surface. Yes. On the right side of the lower plate 50, an operation handle 51 that is operated by a player to drive a ball into the front surface of the game board 13 is disposed. And a variable resistor (not shown) for detecting a rotation operation amount of the operation handle 51 by a change in electric resistance. When the operation handle 51 is rotated clockwise by the player, the touch sensor is turned on and the resistance value of the variable resistor changes corresponding to the operation amount, and according to the rotation operation amount of the operation handle 51. A ball is fired with a strength corresponding to the resistance value of the variable resistor that changes, and the ball is driven into the front surface of the game board 13 with a jump amount corresponding to the player's operation.

  In the lower part of the front of the lower plate 50, a ball removal lever 52 is provided for operating when the balls stored in the lower plate 50 are discharged downward. The ball removal lever 52 is always urged in the right direction. By sliding the ball release lever 52 in the left direction against the urge, the bottom opening formed in the bottom surface of the lower plate 50 is opened. A ball naturally falls from the bottom opening and is discharged. The operation of the ball removal lever 52 is normally performed in a state where a box (generally referred to as “a thousand box”) for receiving the balls discharged from the lower plate 50 is placed below the lower plate 50. As described above, the operation handle 51 is disposed on the right side of the lower plate 50, and the ashtray 53 is attached on the left side of the lower plate 50.

  As shown in FIG. 2, the game board 13 includes a wooden base plate 60 cut into a substantially square shape when viewed from the front, a large number of ball nails, windmills and rails 61 and 62, a general winning opening 63, The ball entrance 64, the variable winning device 65, the variable display device unit 80, and the like are assembled, and the peripheral edge thereof is attached to the back side of the inner frame 12. The general winning port 63, the first winning port 64, the variable winning device 65, and the variable display device unit 80 are arranged in a through hole formed in the base plate 60 by router processing, and the wood screw is provided from the front side of the game board 13. It is fixed by etc. Further, the front center portion of the game board 13 can be viewed from the front side of the inner frame 13 through the window portion 14 c of the front frame 14. Below, the structure of the game board 13 is demonstrated.

  An outer rail 62 formed by bending a strip-shaped metal plate into a substantially arc shape is planted on the front surface of the game board 13, and the strip-shaped metal plate is located on the inner side of the outer rail 62 in the same manner as the outer rail 62. The arc-shaped inner rail 61 formed by the above is planted. The inner circumference 61 and the outer rail 62 surround the outer periphery of the front surface of the game board 13, and the game board 13 and the glass unit 16 surround the front and rear. A game area to be played is formed. The game area is a substantially circular area that is formed on the front surface of the game board 13 and defined by the two rails 61 and 62 and the arc member 70.

  The two rails 61 and 62 are provided to guide the ball fired from the ball launching unit 112a to the upper part of the game board 13. A return ball preventing member 68 is attached to the front end portion of the inner rail 61 (upper left portion in FIG. 2) to prevent the ball once guided to the upper portion of the game board 13 from returning to the ball guide path again. Is done. A return rubber 69 is attached to the tip of the outer rail 62 (upper right part in FIG. 2) at a position corresponding to the maximum flying portion of the sphere. Is bounced back to the center while being attenuated. A resin arc member 70 formed by providing an arc connecting the rails on the inner surface side between the lower right end of the inner rail 61 and the upper right end of the outer rail 62 is a base. The plate 60 is driven and fixed.

  A first symbol display device 37 provided with a plurality of LEDs 37a, which are light emitting means, and a 7-segment display 37b is disposed in the upper right portion of the game area as viewed from the front (upper right portion in FIG. 2). The first symbol display device 37 displays information corresponding to each control performed by the main control device 110, and mainly displays the gaming state of the pachinko machine 10. The plurality of LEDs 37a indicate whether the pachinko machine 10 is in the process of being probabilistically changing, operating in a short time, or in a normal state, indicating whether the pachinko machine 10 is changing or not by a lighting state, and the symbols corresponding to the probable big hit. Whether the symbol is a symbol corresponding to a normal jackpot or an out-of-game symbol is indicated by a lighting state, or the number of reserved balls is indicated by a lighting state. The 7-segment display device 37b displays the number of rounds that are a big hit and an error display. In addition, LED37a is comprised so that the light emission color (for example, red, green, blue) of each LED may differ, The various game states of the pachinko machine 10 can be suggested with few LEDs by the combination of the light emission color. .

  In addition, the above-mentioned pachinko machine 10 being probable is a game state in which the jackpot probability is increased and it is easy to shift to the special game state. Further, during the probability change in the present embodiment, the game is in a state where the probability of hitting the second symbol is increased and the ball easily enters the first entrance 64 (see FIG. 3). In addition, when the pachinko machine 10 is short-running, it means a game state in which the hit probability of the second symbol is increased and the hit probability of the second symbol is increased, and the ball easily enters the first entrance 64 (see FIG. 3). . In addition, when the pachinko machine 10 is in a normal state, it is a game state in which neither the probability change nor the time is short (the state where neither the big hit probability nor the second symbol hit probability is increased). It should be noted that, depending on the gaming state of the pachinko machine 10, the time for opening the electric accessory (not shown) associated with the first entrance 64 and the number of times the electric accessory is released per hit are changed. It is good as a thing.

  The game area is provided with a plurality of general winning openings 63 through which 5 to 15 balls are paid out as winning balls when the balls win. In addition, a variable display device unit 80 is disposed in the central portion of the game area. The variable display device unit 80 includes a third symbol display device 81 configured with a liquid crystal display (hereinafter simply referred to as “LCD”) that displays the third symbol in a variable manner with a winning at the first entrance 64 as a trigger. There is provided a second symbol display device 82 composed of a light emitting diode (hereinafter abbreviated as “LED”) that variably displays the second symbol with the passage of the ball of the second entrance 67 as a trigger.

  The display content of the third symbol display device 81 is controlled by a display control device 114, which will be described later, and for example, three symbol sequences of left, middle, and right are displayed. Each symbol row is composed of a plurality of symbols, and these symbols are vertically scrolled for each symbol row so that the third symbol is variably displayed on the display screen of the third symbol display device 81. Further, in the present embodiment, the third symbol display device 81 is constituted by a large liquid crystal display of 8 inch size, and the variable display device unit 80 surrounds the outer periphery of the third symbol display device 81 so as to surround the center frame. 86 is arranged. In the third symbol display device 81 of the present embodiment, the display of the gaming state accompanying the control of the main control device 110 is performed by the first symbol display device 37, whereas the display of the first symbol display device 37 is performed. The decorative display according to is performed. Instead of the LCD, for example, the third symbol display device 81 may be configured using a reel or the like.

  In addition, when the ball enters the first entrance 64 until the stop symbol (any one of the probable jackpot symbol, the normal jackpot symbol, or the off symbol) is displayed on the first symbol display device 37. The number of entered balls is held up to 4 times, and the number of held times is indicated by the first symbol display device 37 and the number of lights of the holding lamp 85. Four hold lamps 85 are provided corresponding to the maximum number of holds, and are arranged symmetrically above the third symbol display device 81. In the present embodiment, the winning at the first entrance 64 is configured to be held up to 4 times, but the maximum holding number is not limited to 4 times, but 3 times or less. Alternatively, the number may be set to 5 times or more (for example, 8 times). In addition, the hold lamp 85 is deleted, and the number of times the variable display is held based on the winning at the first entrance 64 is numerically held in a part of the third symbol display device 81, or the area divided into four is held. You may make it display in a different aspect (for example, a color and a lighting pattern) by the frequency | count. In addition, since the number of times of holding is indicated by the first symbol display device 37, the holding lamp 85 may not perform lighting display.

  The second symbol display device 82 includes a second symbol display unit 83 and a holding lamp 84, and each time the ball passes through the second entrance 67, the display unit 83 displays a display symbol (second symbol). The “○” symbol and the “×” symbol are alternately lit and displayed in a variable manner. When the fluctuation display stops at a predetermined symbol (in this embodiment, the symbol “O”) The 1 entrance 64 is configured to be activated (opened) for a predetermined time. The number of passes through the second entrance 67 of the sphere is suspended up to a maximum of 4 times, and the number of suspensions is displayed by the above-described first symbol display device 37 and is also lit on the hold lamp 84. The second symbol variation display is performed by switching on and off of a plurality of lamps in the display unit 83 as in the present embodiment, as well as the first symbol display device 37 and the third symbol display device. A part of 81 may be used. Similarly, the hold lamp 84 may be turned on by a part of the third symbol display device 81. In addition, the passage of the second entrance 67 is not limited to 4 times as in the case of the 1st entrance 64, and is not limited to 4 times, or 3 times or less (for example, (8 times). In addition, since the number of times of holding is indicated by the first symbol display device 37, the holding lamp 84 may not perform lighting display.

  Below the variable display device unit 80, a first entrance 64 into which a sphere can enter is disposed. When a ball enters the first entrance 64, a first entrance switch (not shown) provided on the back side of the game board 13 is turned on, and the first entrance switch is turned on. The main controller 110 performs a lottery lottery, and a display corresponding to the lottery result is indicated by the LED 37 a of the first symbol display device 37. The first entrance 64 is also one of the entrances through which 5 balls are paid out as prize balls when a ball enters.

  A variable winning device 65 is disposed below the first ball opening 64, and a horizontally-long rectangular specific winning port (large opening) 65a is provided at a substantially central portion thereof. In the pachinko machine 10, when the lottery in the main controller 110 is a big hit, after a predetermined time (fluctuation time) has elapsed, the LED 37a of the first symbol display device 37 is turned on so as to become a big hit stop symbol. The stop symbol corresponding to the jackpot is displayed on the third symbol display device 81 to indicate the occurrence of the jackpot. Thereafter, the gaming state transitions to a special gaming state (big hit) where the ball is easy to win. In this special gaming state, the special winning opening 65a that is normally closed is opened for a predetermined time (for example, until 30 seconds have elapsed or 10 balls have been won).

  The specific winning opening 65a is closed when a predetermined time elapses, and after the closing, the specific winning opening 65a is opened again for a predetermined time. The opening / closing operation of the specific winning opening 65a can be repeated up to 16 times (16 rounds), for example. The state in which the opening / closing operation is performed is a form of a special gaming state advantageous to the player, and the player is given out a larger amount of prize balls than usual in order to give a gaming value (game value). Is done.

  Specifically, the variable winning device 65 includes a horizontally long rectangular opening / closing plate covering the specific winning opening 65a and a large opening opening solenoid (solenoid 209 (FIG. 4)). The special winning opening 65a is normally closed so that the ball cannot win or is difficult to win. In the case of a big hit, the large opening opening solenoid is driven to tilt the opening / closing plate to the lower front side to temporarily form an open state in which the ball is likely to win the specific winning opening 65a. It operates to repeat the state and the state alternately.

  Note that the special gaming state is not limited to the above-described form. When the game area is provided with a large opening that is opened and closed separately from the specific winning opening 65a, and the LED 37a corresponding to the jackpot is turned on in the first symbol display device 37, the specific winning opening 65a is opened for a predetermined time, and the specific winning opening A special gaming state is defined as a game state in which a large opening provided separately from the specific winning port 65a is opened for a predetermined time and a predetermined number of times when the ball 65 is opened into the specific winning port 65a. You may make it form.

  Adhesive spaces K1, K2 for adhering certificate papers, identification labels, etc. are provided at the left and right corners on the lower side of the game board 13, and the certificate paper, etc., adhered to the adhesive space K1, is a front frame 14. Can be visually recognized through the small window 35.

  Further, the game board 13 is provided with an out port 66 and a second entrance (through gate) 67. A ball that has not entered any of the winning openings 63, 64, 65a is guided through an out port 66 to a ball discharge path (not shown). A number of nails are planted on the game board 13 in order to appropriately disperse and adjust the falling direction of the ball, and various members (instruments) such as a windmill are arranged.

  As shown in FIG. 3, control board units 90 and 91 and a back pack unit 94 are mainly provided on the back side of the pachinko machine 10. The control board unit 90 is unitized by mounting a main board (main control apparatus 110), an audio lamp control board (audio lamp control apparatus 113), and a display control board (display control apparatus 114). The control board unit 91 is unitized by mounting a payout control board (payout control apparatus 111), a firing control board (launching control apparatus 112), a power supply board (power supply apparatus 115), and a card unit connection board 116.

  The back pack unit 94 includes a back pack 92 and a dispensing unit 93 that form a protective cover. In addition, each control board is used for MPU as a one-chip microcomputer that controls each control, a port for communicating with various devices, a random number generator used for various lotteries, time counting and synchronization. A clock pulse generation circuit or the like is mounted as necessary.

  The main control device 110, the sound lamp control device 113 and the display control device 114, the payout control device 111 and the firing control device 112, the power supply device 115, and the card unit connection board 116 are housed in the board boxes 100 to 104, respectively. . The board boxes 100 to 104 include a box base and a box cover that covers the opening of the box base. The box base and the box cover are connected to each other, and each control device and each board are accommodated.

  Further, the substrate box 100 (main control device 110) and the substrate box 102 (dispensing control device 111 and launch control device 112) connect the box base and the box cover so that they cannot be opened by a sealing unit (not shown) (caulking structure). Consolidated). In addition, a seal (not shown) is attached to the connecting portion between the box base and the box cover so as to cover the box base and the box cover. This seal seal is made of a brittle material. If the seal is to be peeled off in order to open the substrate boxes 100, 102, or if the substrate boxes 100, 102 are forcibly opened, the box base side and the box cover are removed. Cut to the side. Therefore, it is possible to know whether or not the substrate boxes 100 and 102 have been opened by checking the sealing unit or the sealing seal.

  The payout unit 93 includes a tank 130 that is located at the top of the back pack unit 94 and opens upward, a tank rail 131 that is connected to the lower side of the tank 130 and is gently inclined toward the downstream side, and downstream of the tank rail 131. A case rail 132 that is vertically connected to the side, and a payout device 133 that is provided at the most downstream portion of the case rail 132 and that pays out a ball by a predetermined electrical configuration of the payout motor 216 (see FIG. 4). ing. The tank 130 is successively replenished with balls supplied from the island equipment of the game hall, and a required number of balls are paid out by the payout device 133 as appropriate. A vibrator 134 for applying vibration to the tank rail 131 is attached to the tank rail 131.

  The payout control device 111 is provided with a state return switch 120, the firing control device 112 is provided with a variable resistor operation knob 121, and the power supply device 115 is provided with a RAM erase switch 122. The state return switch 120 is operated, for example, to eliminate ball clogging (return to a normal state) when a payout error occurs, such as ball clogging in the payout motor 216 (see FIG. 4). The operation knob 121 is operated to adjust the firing force of the firing solenoid. The RAM erase switch 122 is operated when the power is turned on to return the pachinko machine 10 to the initial state.

  Next, the electrical configuration of the pachinko machine 10 will be described with reference to FIG. FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing an electrical configuration of the pachinko machine 10 according to the first embodiment.

  The main controller 110 is equipped with an MPU 201 as a one-chip microcomputer that is an arithmetic unit. The MPU 201 includes a ROM 202, a RAM 203, an ID ROM 207, and a fraud monitoring timer 208. In addition, the MPU 201 includes various circuits (not shown) such as an interrupt circuit, a timer circuit, and a data transmission / reception circuit. .

  The ROM 202 stores various control programs executed by the MPU 201 and fixed value data. As shown in FIG. 4, the ROM 202 includes a user unusable area 202a and a user program area 202b.

  The user unusable area 202a in the ROM 202 is an area for storing an internal program 202a1 that is a control program for controlling the basic operation of the MPU 201 and corresponding fixed value data.

  The content stored in the user unusable area 202a is inevitably known by being directly or indirectly involved in the manufacture of the MPU 201 (for example, a developer in charge of the manufacturer of the MPU 201 or a record Only those who belong to a part of a closed group consisting of those who can know the best) can handle. In other words, the user unusable area 202a is an area that cannot be handled by anyone other than those who can inevitably know its contents. Therefore, the control content of the internal program 202a1 stored in the user unusable area 202a is substantially impossible to be recognized or modified by anyone other than those who can inevitably know the control content. is there.

  On the other hand, the user program area 202b is an area for storing a user program 202b1 created according to the type of game by the manufacturer that manufactures the pachinko machine 10, and fixed value data. The user program 202b1 stored in the user program area 202b is a control program for executing an operation corresponding to the type of game performed on the pachinko machine 10.

  The contents stored in the user program area 202b are different from the user unusable area 202a described above, and can be read by a predetermined operation. For example, the contents stored in the user program area 202b by opening the board box 100 and removing the ROM 202 and using a ROM reader to the removed ROM 202 or connecting a dedicated reader to the connector of the board box 100 Can be read out. Therefore, it is relatively easy for the control content of the user program 202b1 to be recognized by anyone other than those who can inevitably know the control content. For this reason, a person who tries to cheat recognizes the contents of the user program 202b1 and at least part of the control contents (for example, control contents related to the occurrence of a jackpot that allows a large amount of game balls to be paid out). Create a fraudulent board with a modified fraudulent program, and conduct fraudulent acts using the fraudulent board. For example, an illegal board is additionally attached to the main control device 110, or an illegal device including the illegal board and imitating the main control device 110 is replaced with the main control device 110, and control by the illegal board, for example, A fraudulent act such as generating a big hit in the game and paying out a large amount of game balls is performed.

  Although details will be described later, the pachinko machine 10 according to the present embodiment calculates an 8-byte management password (management information) in the internal program 202a1 as a process for preventing fraud in accordance with a specified arithmetic expression, and creates a new management password. The contents for controlling the processing to be updated are included. As described above, since the control content by the internal program 202a1 is substantially impossible to recognize by anyone other than the person who can inevitably know the content, it is difficult for the fraudster to imitate the update pattern of the management password. is there. As a result, the pachinko machine 10 according to the present embodiment can surely prevent an illegal act using an illegal substrate.

  The RAM 203 temporarily stores various data when executing control programs such as the internal program 202a1 and the user program 202b1 stored in the ROM 202 described above. As shown in FIG. 4, the RAM 203 includes a first management PW memory 203a, a second management PW memory 203b, a third management PW memory 203c, an operation counter 203d, a management PW output request flag 203e, and a management PW reception. A standby flag 203f and a management PW collation request flag 203g are provided. The RAM 203 is configured such that a backup voltage for RAM backup is supplied from the power supply device 115 even after the power of the pachinko machine 10 is shut off. With this configuration, even if the power of the pachinko machine 10 is shut off. Data stored in the RAM 203 is held (backed up).

  Each of the first management PW memory 203a and the second management PW memory 203b stores an 8-byte management password. More specifically, the first management PW memory 203a is configured to store the internal program from the initial value (first management password) of the management password of the main control device 110 that is set when the power to the pachinko machine 10 is turned on. The latest management password at that time of the management password sequentially updated by the control by 202a1 is stored. On the other hand, the second management PW memory 203b stores the management password when the management password is received from the payout control device 111.

  The third management PW memory 203c also stores an 8-byte management password in the same manner as the first management PW memory 203a and the second management PW memory 203b. The third management PW memory 203c is used to back up (hold) the nth management password (n is an integer equal to or greater than 1) in the main controller 110. Specifically, the third management PW memory 203c stores the updated value as a backup value each time the management password is updated by calculation in the first calculation process (FIG. 20) described later. . When the power of the pachinko machine 10 is shut off and then the power is turned on again without operating the RAM erase switch 122, the value stored in the third management PW memory 203c is the second management PW memory. 203b and used as the first management password in the main controller 110.

  The arithmetic counter 203d is a counter provided in a RAM area (internal RAM) that can be read only by control by the internal program 202a1. The operation counter 203d is a counter used for managing the operation pattern of the operation executed by the internal program 202a1, and is configured as a loop counter that can take values from 0 to 3. The calculation counter 203d is initialized to 0 when the power is turned on, and is updated by one every time the calculation for the management password is executed based on the internal program 202a1. Then, after the operation counter 203d reaches the maximum value (that is, 3), it returns to 0 by the next update. It should be noted that the content stored in the internal RAM is substantially impossible to recognize or modify, similar to the user unusable area 202a in the ROM 202 described above. Therefore, the value of the operation counter 203d provided in such an internal RAM is also substantially impossible to recognize and modify.

  The management PW output request flag 203e is a flag indicating whether or not it is necessary to output a management password from the main control device 110 to the payout control device 111. The management PW output request flag 203e is initialized to OFF when the power is turned on, and then stored in the first management PW memory 203a in the internal startup process (see FIG. 17) or the first calculation process (see FIG. 20). Turned on when it becomes necessary to output the stored management password to the payout control device 111. The management PW output request flag 203e turned on in this way is turned off when the management password output setting process (see FIG. 12) is set to output the management password to be output.

  The management PW reception standby flag 203f is a flag indicating whether or not the main control device 110 is in a state of waiting for reception of a management password from the payout control device 111 after outputting the management password to the payout control device 111. is there. The management PW reception standby flag 203f is turned off when the management password to be output is set in the management password output setting process (see FIG. 12) after being initialized to OFF with power-on. The management PW reception standby flag 203f turned on in this way is turned off when it is confirmed that the management password has been received from the payout control device 111 in the management password reception process (see FIG. 13).

  The management PW collation request flag 203f indicates whether or not there is an abnormality in the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 (including a malfunction of the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 based on an illegal act such as the use of an illegal board). In the management password receiving process (see FIG. 13), the flag indicating whether or not the management password is verified in the main control device 110 is initialized to OFF when the power is turned on. It is turned on when it is confirmed that the management password has been received from the payout control device 111. The management PW collation flag 203f that is turned on in this way is turned off after performing computation on the collated management password in the first computation processing (see FIG. 18).

  In addition to the memory, flags, and counters described above, the RAM 203 stores a stack area that stores the contents of the internal registers of the MPU 201, the return address of a control program executed by the MPU 201, various flags and counters, I And a work area (work area) in which a value such as / O is stored.

  As described above, all data stored in the RAM 203 is configured to be backed up. When the power is shut off due to the occurrence of a power failure or the like, the power is shut off (including the time of the power failure. The same applies hereinafter). Are stored in the RAM 203. On the other hand, at the time of power-on (including power-on due to power failure cancellation, the same applies hereinafter), the state of the pachinko machine 10 is restored to the state before power-off based on information stored in the RAM 203. Writing to the RAM 203 is executed when the power is shut off by the main process (see FIG. 8), and restoration of each value written in the RAM 203 is executed in a start-up process when the power is turned on (see FIG. 7). Note that the power failure signal SG1 from the power failure monitoring circuit 252 is input to the NMI terminal (non-maskable interrupt terminal) of the MPU 201 when the power is interrupted due to the occurrence of a power failure or the like. Is input immediately, the NMI interrupt process (see FIG. 15) as a power failure process is immediately executed.

  The ID ROM 207 is a ROM for storing a unique identification number (unique information) set for each pachinko machine 10, and a unique code memory 207a to which 8 bytes are allocated is provided as a storage area. . In the unique code memory 207a, a value (unique information) as an identification number unique to the MPU 201 (that is, unique to the pachinko machine 10) is written. The value of the unique code memory 207a plays a role as security information of the pachinko machine 10, and is configured with a unique number that is different for each MPU. Although details will be described later, in the present embodiment, the value stored in the specific code memory 207a is read when the power to the pachinko machine 10 is turned on, and the read value is the main controller 110. Is written in the first management PW memory 203a as the first management password (initial value of the management password).

  The MPU 201 is provided with an inspection port (not shown) (not shown) and a modular jack (not shown) is connected to the end. When a checker (not shown) is connected to the MPU 201 via this modular jack, the value of the unique code memory 207a can be read from the outside, and a security check for verifying the authenticity of the MPU 201 can be performed. For this reason, it is possible to detect an illegal act of illegally rewriting the value or the like of the unique code memory 207a or exchanging the MPU 201 with an illegal MPU, making it difficult to execute the illegal act. It is not always necessary to configure the checker to be connected to the modular jack, and the MPU identification number may be verified by a checker that can be verified wirelessly.

  In addition to the unique code memory 207a, the ID ROM 207 is also provided with a memory (not shown) for storing the manufacturer code, model code, and the like of the pachinko machine 10.

  When the fraud monitoring timer 208 determines that there is an abnormality in the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 as a result of the comparison between the management password on the main control device 110 side and the management password on the payout control device 111 side, It is a timer for measuring the period (grace period) during which the judgment (determination indicating abnormality) is suspended.

  Although details will be described later, in this fraud monitoring timer 208, when the initial value of the management password is stored in the first management PW memory 203a, or after the verification by the management password, the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111. When it is confirmed that there is no abnormality, a grace period (30 sec in the present embodiment) for suspending determination indicating abnormality due to fraud or the like is set as an initial value. Then, after the initial value is set, it is configured to be decremented by 1 each time a fraud monitoring timer update process (see FIG. 11) described later is executed.

  In the present embodiment, the fraud monitoring timer update process (see FIG. 11) is executed every 4 ms. Therefore, when an initial value is set in the fraud monitoring timer 208, it corresponds to timing by subtraction every 4 ms. A value converted into a value is set. That is, in this embodiment, since the grace period is set to 30 sec, the fraud monitoring timer 208 is set to 7500 as an initial value.

  In the present embodiment, when the fraud monitoring timer 208 indicates a value exceeding 0, that is, within the set grace period, the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 in the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111. Even if it is determined that the control device 111 is suspected of being abnormal due to fraud or the like, the determination indicating the abnormality is postponed. On the other hand, after the fraud monitoring timer 208 indicates 0, the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 determines that the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 is suspected of having an abnormality due to fraud. In the case where it is made, it is configured such that an anti-fraud process including notification to the outside is executed.

  Therefore, even if it is determined that the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 is suspected of having an abnormality due to fraud due to an accidental factor such as noise, the cause may be corrected within the grace period. In this case, the previous determination indicating an abnormality is ignored as being temporary. Therefore, by measuring the predetermined grace period using the fraud monitoring timer 208, it is possible to prevent erroneous determination that the normal control devices 110 and 111 are fraudulent due to an accidental factor.

  An input / output port 205 is connected to the MPU 201 of the main control device 110 via a bus line 204 composed of an address bus and a data bus. Sub-control devices (peripheral control devices) such as the payout control device 111 and the sound lamp control device 113 are connected to the input / output port 205. The main control device 110 is configured to transmit various commands by a data transmission / reception circuit (not shown) of the MPU 201 in order to instruct the sub-control devices to perform various operations. Here, a command communication path (command line) between the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 is configured to be capable of bidirectional communication. The command communication path (command line) between the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 includes, for example, a connector connected to the main control device 110, a connector connected to the payout control device 111, both It is formed by a harness composed of a plurality of signal lines wired between the connectors.

  In addition to the above-described sub control device, the input / output port 205 includes a first symbol display device 37, a second symbol display device 82, various switches 206 including a switch group and a sensor group (not shown), and a specific prize. A solenoid 209 comprising a large opening solenoid for opening and closing the front side with the lower side of the opening and closing plate of the opening 65a as an axis, a solenoid for driving an electric accessory, and the like is connected.

  The payout control device 111 drives the payout motor 216 to perform payout control of prize balls and rental balls. The MPU 211 that is an arithmetic unit includes a ROM 212 that stores a control program executed by the MPU 211, fixed value data, and the like, and a RAM 213.

  As shown in FIG. 4, the ROM 212 includes a user unusable area 212a and a user program area 202b. Similar to the user unusable area 202a in the main controller 110 described above, the user unusable area 212a may be recognized or modified by a person other than those who can inevitably know the contents stored in the area. This is a virtually impossible area. The user unusable area 212a stores an internal program 212a1 that is a control program for controlling the basic operation of the MPU 211 and corresponding fixed value data.

  Although details will be described later, the internal program 212a1 stored in the user unusable area 212a also has the same anti-fraud processing as the internal program 202a1 stored in the user unusable area 202a of the main controller 110. , Content for controlling the process of calculating an 8-byte management password according to a prescribed calculation formula and updating it to a new management password is included. It is difficult for a fraudster who is substantially impossible to recognize the control contents of the internal program 212a1 to imitate the update pattern of the management password. It can be prevented.

  In the pachinko machine 10 according to the present embodiment, in both the internal program 212a of the payout control device 111 and the internal program 201a1 of the main control device 110 described above, the nth (n is an integer of 1 or more) management. The n-th calculation operation performed to obtain the (n + 1) -th management password from the password is configured to be the same.

  On the other hand, the user program area 212b also has a predetermined operation (for example, use of a ROM reader for the removed ROM 212, connection to the board box 102, etc.) in the same manner as the user program area 202b in the main controller 110 described above. This user program area 212b is a user program that is a user program created according to the type of game by the manufacturer that manufactures the pachinko machine 10. The program 212b1 and fixed value data are stored.

  The RAM 213 temporarily stores various data when executing control programs such as the internal program 212a1 and the user program 212a1 stored in the ROM 212. As shown in FIG. 4, the RAM 203 includes a first management PW memory 213a, a second management PW memory 213b, a third management PW memory 213c, an operation counter 213d, a management PW output request flag 213e, and a management PW reception. And a flag 213f. The RAM 213 is configured such that a backup voltage for RAM backup is supplied from the power supply device 115 even after the power of the pachinko machine 10 is shut off. With this configuration, even if the power of the pachinko machine 10 is shut off. All data stored in the RAM 213 is retained (backed up).

  The first management PW memory 213a and the second management PW memory 213b in the payout control device 111 are respectively 8-byte management, similar to the first management PW memory 203a and the second management PW memory 203b in the main control device 110 described above. The password is memorized. The first management PW memory 213a in the payout control device 111 stores the received management password when the management password is received from the main control device 110, while the second management PW memory 213b The management password that is sequentially updated under the control of the internal program 212a1 is stored with the latest management password in the payout control device 111 at that time.

  The third management PW memory 213c also backs up (holds) the nth management password (n is an integer equal to or greater than 1), similarly to the third management PW memory 203c in the main controller 110 described above. . The third management PW memory 203c stores the updated value as a backup value each time the management password is updated by calculation in a second calculation process (FIG. 28) described later. When the power of the pachinko machine 10 is turned off and then the power is turned on again without operating the RAM erase switch 122, the value stored in the third management PW memory 213c is stored in the first management PW memory 213a. It is stored and used as the first management password in the payout control device 111.

  The arithmetic counter 213d is a counter provided in a RAM area (internal RAM) that can be read only by the control of the internal program 212a1 as with the arithmetic counter 203d of the main controller 110 described above, and is executed by the internal program 212a1. It is a loop counter that can take a value from 0 to 3 used to manage the operation pattern of the operation to be performed. Similarly to the operation counter 203d, the operation counter 213d is also initialized to 0 when the power is turned on, and is updated by 1 every time an operation for the management password is executed based on the internal program 212a1.

  The management PW output request flag 213e is a flag indicating whether or not it is necessary to output a management password from the payout control device 111 to the payout control device 110. This management PW output request flag 203e is initialized to OFF when the power is turned on, and then in the second calculation process (see FIG. 28), the management password stored in the second management PW memory 213b is used as the main control unit. Turned on when it is necessary to output to 111. The management PW output request flag 213e turned on in this way is turned off when the management password is output in the management password output process (see FIG. 24).

  The management PW reception flag 213f is a flag that indicates whether or not the payout control device 111 has received a management password from the main control device 110. The management PW reception flag 213f is initialized from OFF when the power is turned on and then managed from the main control device 110. It is turned on in a management password reception process (see FIG. 23) executed when a password is received. The management PW reception flag 213d turned on in this way updates the received management password, and then outputs the updated management password to the main controller 110 by a management password output process (see FIG. 24) described later. When turned off.

  The RAM 213 of the payout control device 111 is similar to the RAM 203 of the main control device 110, and includes a stack area for storing the contents of the internal registers of the MPU 211, the return address of the control program executed by the MPU 211, and various flags. And a work area (work area) in which values such as a counter and I / O are stored.

  As described above, all the data stored in the RAM 213 is configured to be backed up. Similarly to the MPU 201 of the main controller 110, the NMI terminal of the MPU 211 also monitors the power failure when the power is cut off due to the occurrence of a power failure or the like. The power failure signal SG1 is input from the circuit 252, and when the power failure signal SG1 is input to the MPU 211, an NMI interruption process (see FIG. 16) as a power failure process is immediately executed.

  An input / output port 215 is connected to the MPU 211 of the payout control device 111 via a bus line 214 composed of an address bus and a data bus. The main control device 110, the payout motor 216, the firing control device 112, and the like are connected to the input / output port 215, respectively. Although not shown, the payout control device 111 is connected to a prize ball detection switch for detecting a prize ball that has been paid out. The prize ball detection switch is connected to the payout control device 111 but is not connected to the main control device 110.

  The launch control device 112 controls the ball launch unit 112a so that the launch strength of the ball according to the rotational operation amount of the operation handle 51 is obtained when the main control device 110 gives an instruction to launch a ball. The ball launching unit 112a includes a launching solenoid and an electromagnet (not shown), and the firing solenoid and the electromagnet are permitted to be driven when predetermined conditions are met. Specifically, it corresponds to the amount of rotation of the operation handle 51 on the condition that the touch sensor detects that the player is touching the operation handle 51 and the firing stop switch for stopping the firing is not operated. Then, the launch solenoid is excited, and the ball is launched with a strength corresponding to the operation amount of the operation handle 51.

  The voice lamp control device 113 is a voice output in a voice output device (such as a speaker not shown) 226, an output of lighting and extinguishing in a lamp display device (such as the illumination units 29 to 33 and the display lamp 34), The setting of the display mode of the 3rd symbol display apparatus 81 performed etc. is controlled. The MPU 221 that is an arithmetic unit includes a ROM 222 that stores a control program executed by the MPU 221, fixed value data, and the like, and a RAM 223 that is used as a work memory or the like.

  An input / output port 225 is connected to the MPU 221 of the sound lamp control device 113 via a bus line 224 including an address bus and a data bus. The main control device 110 is connected to the input / output port 225, and the display control device 114, the audio output device 226, the lamp display device 227, and the like are connected to the input / output port 225, respectively.

  The display control device 114 controls the change display of the third symbol on the third symbol display device (LCD) 81. The display control device 114 includes an MPU 231, a ROM (program ROM) 232, a work RAM 233, a video RAM 234, a character ROM 235, an image controller 236, an input port 237, an output port 238, and bus lines 239 and 240. It has. The input side of the input port 237 is connected to the output side of the sound lamp control device 113, and the output side of the input port 237 is connected to the MPU 231, ROM 232, work RAM 233, and image controller 236. A video RAM 234 and a character ROM 235 are connected to the image controller 236, and an output port 238 is connected via a bus line 240. A third symbol display device 81 is connected to the output side of the output port 238. Even if the pachinko machine 10 is a different model with different winning probability for winning the jackpot and the number of prize balls to be paid out in one jackpot, there is a model having the same specifications as the symbols displayed on the third symbol display device 81. Therefore, the display control device 114 is made into a common part to reduce the cost.

  The MPU 231 of the display control device 114 controls the display content of the third symbol display device 81 based on the symbol display command input from the sound lamp control device 113. The ROM 232 is a memory for storing various control programs executed by the MPU 231 and fixed value data. The work RAM 233 is a memory for temporarily storing work data and flags used when the MPU 231 executes various programs. The character ROM 235 is a memory that stores data for effects such as symbols (background symbols and third symbols) displayed on the third symbol display device 81. The video RAM 234 is a memory for storing effect data displayed on the third symbol display device 81, and the display content of the third symbol display device 81 is changed by rewriting the contents of the video RAM 234.

  The image controller 236 adjusts the timing of the MPU 231, the video RAM 234, and the output port 238 to intervene in reading and writing data, and reads display data stored in the video RAM 234 at a predetermined timing to read the third symbol display device 81. Is displayed.

  The power supply device 115 includes a power supply unit 251 for supplying power to each unit of the pachinko machine 10, a power failure monitoring circuit 252 for monitoring power interruption due to a power failure, and a RAM erase switch 122 (see FIG. 3). And a switch circuit 253. The power supply unit 251 is a device that supplies a necessary operating voltage to each of the control devices 110 to 114 through a power supply path (not shown). As its outline, the power supply unit 251 takes in the voltage of AC 24 volts supplied from the outside, and drives various switches such as various switches 208, solenoids such as the solenoid 209, motors, etc. A 5 volt voltage for logic, a backup voltage for RAM backup, and the like are generated, and the 12 volt voltage, the 5 volt voltage, and the backup voltage are supplied to the control devices 110 to 114 as necessary voltages.

  The power failure monitoring circuit 252 is a circuit for outputting a power failure signal SG1 to each NMI terminal of the MPU 201 of the main control device 110 and the MPU 211 of the payout control device 111 when the power is cut off due to the occurrence of a power failure or the like. The power failure monitoring circuit 252 monitors the DC stable voltage of 24 volts, which is the maximum voltage output from the power supply unit 251, and determines that a power failure (power interruption, power interruption) occurs when this voltage falls below 22 volts. Then, the power failure signal SG1 is output to the main controller 110 and the payout controller 111. Based on the output of the power failure signal SG1, the main controller 110 and the payout controller 111 recognize the occurrence of the power failure and execute the NMI interrupt process. Note that the power supply unit 251 outputs a voltage of 5 volts, which is a drive voltage of the control system, for a time sufficient to execute the NMI interrupt processing even after the DC stable voltage of 24 volts becomes less than 22 volts. Is maintained at a normal value. Therefore, main controller 110 and payout controller 111 can normally execute and complete the NMI interrupt process (see FIG. 16).

  The RAM erase switch circuit 253 is a circuit for outputting a RAM erase signal SG2 for clearing backup data to the main controller 110 when the RAM erase switch 122 is pressed. When the RAM erase signal SG2 is input when the pachinko machine 10 is turned on, the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 clear the respective backup data and the payout control device 111 for clearing the backup data. A payout initialization command is transmitted to the payout control device 111.

  Here, with reference to FIG. 5, the display content of the 3rd symbol display apparatus 81 is demonstrated. FIG. 5 is a diagram for explaining the display screen of the third symbol display device 81, and FIG. 5 (a) is a diagram schematically showing area division setting and effective line setting of the display screen, FIG. 5B is a diagram illustrating an actual display screen.

  The third symbol is composed of ten types of main symbols with numbers from “0” to “9” and one type of sub-shaped petal shape formed smaller than this main symbol. Each main symbol is composed of numbers from “0” to “9” on the rear symbol consisting of a wooden box, of which the main symbols with odd numbers (1, 3, 5, 7, 9) are A large number is added to almost the front of the wooden box. On the other hand, the main symbols with even numbers (0, 2, 4, 6, 8) are attached to the front of the wooden box almost fully, and attached symbols imitating characters such as furoshiki and helmets are added. An even number is small in green on the lower right side of the attached symbol and is added so as to be displayed on the front side of the attached symbol.

  Further, in the pachinko machine 10 according to the present embodiment, when the lottery result by the main controller 110 is a big win, a variable display in which the same main symbols are arranged is performed, and a big hit occurs after the variable display is finished. It is configured to When shifting to the high probability state (probability variation state) after the big hit, the variable display in which the main symbols (corresponding to “high probability symbols”) to which odd numbers are added is arranged. On the other hand, when shifting to the low probability state after the big hit, the variable display is performed in which the main symbols to which the even numbers are added (corresponding to “low probability symbols”) are arranged. Here, the high probability state refers to a state in which the subsequent jackpot probability is increased as an added value after the jackpot ends, that is, a so-called probability fluctuation (probability change). Further, the normal state (low probability state) refers to a time when the probability of hitting is not probable, and refers to a state where the probability of jackpot is normal, that is, a state where the probability of jackpot is lower than that during probability change.

  As shown in FIG. 5 (a), the display screen of the 3rd symbol display device 81 is roughly divided into two vertically and the lower 2/3 is the main display area Dm in which the 3rd symbol is variably displayed. The upper third is a sub display area Ds for displaying a notice effect and a character.

  In the main display area Dm, three symbol rows Z1, Z2, and Z3 of left, middle, and right are displayed. In each of the symbol rows Z1 to Z3, the above-described third symbols are displayed in a prescribed order. That is, in each symbol row Z1 to Z3, main symbols are arranged in ascending or descending numerical order, and one sub symbol is arranged between each main symbol. For this reason, a total of 20 third symbols of 10 main symbols and 10 sub-designs are set in each symbol row, and each symbol row Z1 to Z3 scrolls from top to bottom with periodicity. The display is changed. In particular, the left symbol row Z1 is arranged so that the numbers of the main symbols appear in descending order, and the middle symbol row Z2 and the right symbol row Z3 are arranged so that the numbers of the main symbols appear in ascending order.

  In the main display area Dm, the third symbols are displayed in the upper, middle, and lower three rows for each symbol row Z1 to Z3. Accordingly, the third symbol display device 81 displays a total of nine third symbols of 3 rows × 3 columns. In the main display area Dm, five effective lines, that is, an upper line L1, a middle line L2, a lower line L3, a right rising line L4, and a left rising line L5 are set. In each game, the variable display stops in the order of the left symbol row Z1 → the right symbol row Z3 → the middle symbol row Z2, and the combination of jackpot symbols on any active line at the time of the stop (in this embodiment, A jackpot moving image is displayed as a jackpot if the same combination of main symbols is arranged.

  The sub display area Ds is horizontally long above the main display area Dm, and is further equally divided into three notice areas Ds1 to Ds3 in the left-right direction. Here, the left and right notice areas Ds1, Ds3 are usually covered with double-open opaque doors that are electrically opened and closed by solenoids (not shown), and sometimes the solenoids are excited and the doors are on the front side. It is a display area that is visible to the player when it is opened. The center notice area Ds2 is a display area that is always visible without being covered by the door.

  As shown in FIG. 5B, on the actual display screen, a total of nine main symbols and sub-designs of the third symbol are displayed in the main display area Dm. In the sub display area Ds, the left and right doors are closed, and the left and right notice areas Ds1, Ds3 are covered and the display screen cannot be visually recognized. If either one of the left and right doors or both doors are opened during the variable display, a video is displayed in the left and right notice areas Ds1 and Ds3, and it is easy for the player to change to a big hit than usual. It is suggested. In the notice area Ds2 in the center, a predetermined character (a boy with a bee in this embodiment) usually performs a predetermined action and sometimes performs a special action different from the predetermined action, A notice effect is performed by appearing. The display screen of the third symbol display device 81 is divided into upper and lower display areas Dm and Ds in principle, but the third symbol and characters are displayed larger across the display areas Dm and Ds. A display effect can be performed.

  Next, a counter and the like provided in the RAM 203 of the main controller 110 will be described with reference to FIG. These counters and the like are used by the MPU 201 of the main control device 110 to perform jackpot lottery, display setting of the first symbol display device 37, lottery of display results of the second symbol display device 82, and the like.

  For the jackpot lottery or display setting of the first symbol display device 37, the first hit random number counter C1 used for the jackpot lottery, the first hit type symbol counter C2 used for the jackpot symbol selection, and the stop pattern selection counter C3, a first initial value random number counter CINI1 used for setting the initial value of the first random number counter C1, and variation type counters CS1, CS2, and CS3 used for variation pattern selection are used. The second symbol random number counter C4 is used for the lottery of the second symbol display device 82, and the second initial random number counter CINI2 is used for setting the initial value of the second random number counter C4. Each of these counters is a loop counter that adds 1 to the previous value every time it is updated and returns to 0 after reaching the maximum value.

  Each counter is updated at an interval of 4 ms, which is an execution interval of the main process (see FIG. 8), or at an interval of 2 ms, an execution interval of the timer interrupt process (see FIG. 14), and the updated value is set in a predetermined area of the RAM 203. Stored in the counter buffer. The RAM 203 is provided with a holding ball storage area composed of one execution area and four holding areas (holding first to fourth areas). The values of the first per-random number counter C1, the first per-type counter C2, and the stop pattern selection counter C3 are stored in accordance with the ball winning timing.

  Each counter will be described in detail. The first random number counter C1 is configured so that, for example, 1 is added in order within a range of 0 to 738, and after reaching the maximum value (that is, 738), it returns to 0. In particular, when the first random number counter C1 makes one round, the value of the first initial value random number counter CINI1 at that time is read as the initial value of the first random number counter C1. The first initial value random number counter CINI1 is configured as a loop counter that is updated in the same range as the first per-random number counter C1 (value = 0 to 738), and each time the timer interrupt process (see FIG. 14) is executed. It is updated once and updated repeatedly within the remaining time of the main process (see FIG. 8). The value of the first per-random number counter C1 is updated, for example, periodically (in this embodiment, once for each timer interrupt process), and the stored ball is stored in the RAM 203 at the timing when the ball wins the first entrance 64. Stored in the area. The number of random number values that are jackpots is set at low probability and high probability, and the number of random numbers that are jackpots at low probability is 2, and the value is “373, 727” There are 14 random numbers that are big hits at high probability, and the values are "59, 109, 163, 211, 263, 317, 367, 421, 479, 523, 631, 683, 733".

  The first hit type counter C2 determines the display mode of the first symbol display device 37 at the time of the big hit. In the present embodiment, the first hit type counter C2 is incremented one by one within the range of 0 to 4, and the maximum value ( That is, it is configured to return to 0 after reaching 4). The value of the first hit type counter C2 is updated, for example, periodically (once every timer interruption process in this embodiment), and the stored ball is stored in the RAM 203 at the timing when the ball wins the first entrance 64. Stored in the area. In addition, the value of the random number that becomes a high probability state after the jackpot is “1, 2, 3”, the value of the random number that becomes the low probability state after the jackpot is “0, 4”, and two types of hits are determined. The Therefore, the display mode corresponding to the stop symbol displayed on the first symbol display device 37 is a display mode corresponding to two types of jackpots of a high probability state and a low probability state, and one type of display mode corresponding to a deviation. Any one of the three display modes is selected.

  The stop pattern selection counter C3 is, for example, incremented by 1 in the range of 0 to 238, and returns to 0 after reaching the maximum value (that is, 238). In the present embodiment, the stop pattern selection counter C3 selects the effect pattern displayed on the third symbol display device 81, and after reaching, the final stop symbol is shifted by one before and after the reach symbol. “Stop before and after detachment reach” (for example, a range of 0 to 8), and “Leach other than detachment before and after detachment” (for example, a range of 9 to 38) after the reach has occurred and the final stop symbol stops other than before and after the reach design. The three stop (effect) patterns are selected as “completely out” (for example, a range of 39 to 238) that does not cause reach. The value of the stop pattern selection counter C3 is updated, for example, periodically (once every timer interrupt process in this embodiment), and the reserved ball storage area of the RAM 203 at the timing when the ball wins the first entrance 64. Stored in

  Further, the stop pattern selection counter C3 is provided with a plurality of tables having different ranges of random number values from which the stop pattern is selected. This is based on whether the current state of the pachinko machine 10 is a high probability state or a low probability state, in which area of the reserved ball storage area each random number value is stored (that is, the number of reservations), etc. This is to change the stop pattern selection ratio.

  For example, in a high probability state, a table with a wide random value range of 10 to 238 corresponding to the stop pattern “completely out” is selected so that a reach effect is not selected more than necessary because a big hit is likely to occur. It becomes easy to select “completely off”. In this table, “front / rear out of reach” is narrowed to 0-5, and “reach other than front / rear out of reach” is also narrowed to 6-9, making it difficult to select “rear out of front / rear out of reach” or “reach out of front / rear out of reach”. Further, if each random number value is not stored in the holding ball storage area in a low probability state, a disturbance corresponding to the stop pattern of “completely off” in order to secure the time for the ball to enter the first entrance 64. A table with a narrow numerical value range of 51 to 238 is selected, and “completely out” is difficult to select. In this table, the range of random numbers corresponding to the stop pattern of “reach other than front / rear deviation” is as wide as 9 to 50, and “reach other than front / rear deviation” is easily selected. Therefore, in the low probability state, the ball entry time to the first entrance 64 can be secured, and therefore, the variable display by the third symbol display device 81 is easily performed continuously.

  Of the two variation type counters CS1 and CS2, one variation type counter CS1 is incremented one by one within a range of 0 to 198, for example, and reaches a maximum value (that is, 198) and then returns to 0. On the other hand, the other variation type counter CS2 is, for example, incremented one by one within a range of 0 to 240 and reaches 0 after reaching the maximum value (that is, 240). In the following description, CS1 is also referred to as “first variation type counter”, and CS2 is also referred to as “second variation type counter”.

  Rough display modes such as so-called normal reach, super reach, and premium reach are determined by the first variation type counter CS1. Specifically, the display mode is determined by determining the variation time of the symbol variation. Further, the second variation type counter CS2 determines a variation time (in other words, the number of variation symbols) until the final stop symbol (in the present embodiment, the middle symbol) stops after the occurrence of reach. Based on the variation time determined by the variation type counters CS1 and CS2, the display control device 114 determines the reach type of the third symbol displayed on the third display device 81 and the detailed symbol variation mode. Therefore, a variety of variation patterns can be easily realized by combining these variation type counters CS1 and CS2. It is also possible to determine the symbol variation mode only by the first variation type counter CS1, or to determine the symbol variation mode similarly by combining the first variation type counter CS1 and the stop symbol. The values of the variation type counters CS1 and CS2 are updated once every time a main process (see FIG. 8) described later is executed once, and are repeatedly updated within the remaining time in the main process.

  For example, the value of the variation type counter CS3 is sequentially incremented by 1 within a range of 0 to 162, and returns to 0 after reaching the maximum value (that is, 162). In the following description, CS3 is also referred to as a “third variation type counter”. The 3rd symbol display device 81 of this Embodiment performs the decorative production according to the display mode of the 1st symbol display device 37, and can slide the symbol which is changing in addition to the variation of a symbol. A notice effect such as passing a notice character for notifying the occurrence of the reach effect is performed. The effect pattern of the notice effect is selected by the variation type counter CS3. Specifically, the time required for the notice effect is added to the variable time, or on the contrary, the variable time is subtracted to shorten the variable display time, or an effect pattern that does not add or subtract the variable time is selected. . As with the stop pattern selection counter C3, the variation type counter CS3 is provided with a plurality of tables with different ranges of random values from which the production pattern is selected, and whether the current state of the pachinko machine 10 is in a high probability state. Depending on the low probability state or in which area of the reserved ball storage area each random value is stored, the selection ratio of each effect pattern is different.

  As described above, the variation time of the symbol variation is determined by the variation type counters CS1 and CS2, and the time to be added to or subtracted from the variation time is determined by the variation type counter CS3. Therefore, the final fluctuation time until the final stop symbol stops is determined by the fluctuation type counters CS1, CS2, CS3.

  The second random number counter C4 is configured as a loop counter that is incremented one by one within a range of 0 to 250, for example, and returns to 0 after reaching the maximum value (that is, 250). In this embodiment, the value of the second random number counter C4 is updated periodically, for example, every timer interrupt process, and the ball has passed through the second entrance (through gate) 67 on either the left or right side. Obtained when detected. The number of random number values to be won is 149, and the range is “5 to 153”. The second initial value random number counter CINI2 is configured as a loop counter that is updated in the same range as the second per-random number counter C4 (value = 0 to 250), and is once per timer interrupt process (see FIG. 14). In addition to being updated, it is repeatedly updated within the remaining time of the main process (see FIG. 8).

  Next, each control process executed by the MPU 201 in the main controller 110 will be described with reference to FIGS. Of the control processes described below, the processes shown in FIGS. 7 to 16 are executed by the user program 202b1 of the main controller 110, and the processes shown in FIGS. This process is executed by the internal program 202a1 of the device 110.

  First, the process shown in FIGS. 7 to 20, that is, each control process executed by the user program 202b1 will be described. The processes executed by the user program 202b1 (the processes shown in FIGS. 7 to 20) are roughly divided into a startup process that is activated upon power-on, a main process that is executed after the startup process, and a periodic process. (In this embodiment, in a 2 ms cycle) timer interruption processing activated and NMI interruption processing activated upon input of the power failure signal SG1 to the NMI terminal. And NMI interrupt processing will be described, and then startup processing and main processing will be described.

  FIG. 14 is a flowchart showing the timer interrupt process. The timer interrupt process is executed by the MPU 201 of the main control device 110, for example, every 2 ms. In the timer interrupt process, first, a process for reading various winning switches is executed (S501). That is, the state of various switches connected to the main controller 110 is read, and the state of the switch is determined and the detection information (winning detection information) is stored.

  Next, the first initial value random number counter CINI1 and the second initial value random number counter CINI2 are updated (S502). Specifically, the first initial value random number counter CINI1 is incremented by 1 and cleared to 0 when the counter value reaches the maximum value (738 in the present embodiment). Then, the updated value of the first initial value random number counter CINI 1 is stored in the corresponding buffer area of the RAM 203. Similarly, 1 is added to the second initial value random number counter CINI2, and when the counter value reaches the maximum value (250 in this embodiment), it is cleared to 0 and the second initial value random number counter CINI2 is updated. The value is stored in the corresponding buffer area of the RAM 203.

  Further, the first per-random number counter C1, the first per-type counter C2, the stop pattern selection counter C3, and the second per-random number counter C4 are updated (S503). Specifically, 1 is added to each of the first per-random number counter C1, the first per-type counter C2, the stop pattern selection counter C3, and the second per-random number counter C4, and these counter values are the maximum values (this embodiment) Then, when they reach 738, 4, 238, 250), they are cleared to 0. Then, the updated values of the counters C1 to C4 are stored in the corresponding buffer area of the RAM 203.

  After that, the start winning process (see FIG. 15) accompanying the winning at the first entrance 64 is executed (S504), the firing control process is executed (S505), and the timer interruption process is ended. Note that the launch control process detects that the player is touching the operation handle 51 with a touch sensor and turns on / off the launch of the ball on the condition that the launch stop switch for stopping the launch is not operated. This is a process for determining OFF. The main controller 110 instructs the launch controller 112 to launch a sphere when the launch of the sphere is on.

  Here, with reference to FIG. 15, the start winning process executed in the process of S504 will be described. FIG. 15 is a flowchart showing the start winning process (S504) executed in the timer interrupt process (see FIG. 14).

  When this start winning process is executed, first, it is determined whether or not the ball has won a first winning opening 64 (start winning) (S601). If it is determined that the ball has won the first entrance 64 (S601: Yes), whether or not the number N of the operation reserved balls of the first symbol display device 37 is less than the upper limit (4 in the present embodiment). Is determined (S602). If there is a winning at the first entrance 64 and the number of operation-reserved balls N <4 (S602: Yes), the number N of operation-reserved balls is incremented by 1 (S603), and further updated in step S503. The values of the first per-random number counter C1, the first per-type counter C2, and the stop pattern selection counter C3 are stored in the first area among the free reserved areas in the reserved ball storage area of the RAM 203 (S604). On the other hand, if there is no winning at the first entrance 64 (S601: No), or even if there is a winning at the first entrance 64, if the number N of operational reserves is not N <4 (S602: No). , S603 and S604 are skipped, the start winning process is terminated, and the process returns to the timer interrupt process.

  FIG. 16 is a flowchart showing the NMI interrupt process. The NMI interruption process is a process executed by the MPU 201 of the main controller 110 when the power of the pachinko machine 10 is shut down due to the occurrence of a power failure or the like. By this NMI interrupt processing, the information on the occurrence of power interruption is stored in the RAM 203. That is, when the power of the pachinko machine 10 is cut off due to the occurrence of a power failure or the like, the power failure signal SG1 is output from the power failure monitoring circuit 252 to the NMI terminal of the MPU 201 in the main controller 110. Then, the MPU 201 interrupts the control being executed and starts the NMI interrupt process, stores the power-off occurrence information in the RAM 203 as a setting of the power-off occurrence information (S701), and ends the NMI interrupt process. To do.

  The above NMI interrupt process is executed in the same manner in the payout and emission control device 111, and information on the occurrence of power interruption is stored in the RAM 213 by the NMI interrupt process. That is, when the power of the pachinko machine 10 is cut off due to the occurrence of a power failure or the like, the power failure signal SG1 is output from the power failure monitoring circuit 252 to the NMI terminal of the MPU 211 in the payout and emission control device 111, and the MPU 211 interrupts the control being executed. Then, the NMI interrupt process is started.

  Next, referring to FIG. 7, a startup process when the main controller 110 is powered on will be described. FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing start-up processing executed by the MPU 201 in the main controller 110. This start-up process is activated by a reset at power-on. In the start-up process, first, an initial setting process associated with power-on is executed (S101). Specifically, a predetermined value set in advance in the stack pointer is set, and the sub-side control devices (peripheral control devices such as the sound lamp control device 113 and the payout control device 111) become operable. In order to wait, a wait process (1 second in this embodiment) is executed. Next, access to the RAM 203 is permitted (S103).

  Thereafter, it is determined whether or not the RAM erase switch 122 (see FIG. 3) provided in the power supply device 115 is turned on (S104). If it is turned on (S104: Yes), the process proceeds to S111. On the other hand, if the RAM erasure switch 122 is not turned on (S104: No), it is further determined whether or not the information on occurrence of power interruption is stored in the RAM 203 (S105), and if not stored (S105: No). Since there is a possibility that the process at the time of the previous power shutdown has not been completed normally, the process proceeds to S111 also in this case.

  If power failure occurrence information is stored in the RAM 203 (S105: Yes), a RAM determination value is calculated (S106). If the calculated RAM determination value is not normal (S107: No), that is, the calculated RAM determination is performed. If the value does not match the RAM determination value stored when the power is shut off, the backed up data has been destroyed, and the process moves to S111 even in such a case. Note that the RAM determination value is, for example, a checksum value at the work area address of the RAM 203, as will be described later in the processing of S216 in FIG. Instead of the RAM determination value, the validity of the backup may be determined based on whether or not the keyword written in a predetermined area of the RAM 203 is correctly stored.

  In the process of S111, a payout initialization command is transmitted in order to initialize the payout control device 111 as a sub-side control device (peripheral control device) (S111). Upon receiving this payout initialization command, the payout control device 111 clears an area (work area) other than the stack area of the RAM 213, sets an initial value, and enters a state in which game ball payout control can be started.

  After the processing of S111, the value of the unique code memory 207a is transmitted to the payout control device 111 (S112). When the payout control device 111 receives the value of the unique code memory 207a, the payout control device 111 stores the received value in the second management PW memory 213b as the first management password in the payout control device 111. That is, in this embodiment, when RAM data is initialized at power-on, the value of the specific code memory 207a is set as the first management password in the payout control device 111.

  After the processing of S112, initialization processing (S113, S114) of the RAM 203 is executed. As described above, in the pachinko machine 10, when RAM data is initialized when the power is turned on, for example, when the hall starts business, the power is turned on while the RAM erase switch 122 is pressed. Therefore, if the RAM erase switch 122 is pressed during the start-up process, the RAM initialization process (S113, S114) is executed. Similarly, initialization processing (S113, S114) of the RAM 203 is executed even when the information on occurrence of power interruption is not set, or when a backup abnormality is confirmed by the RAM determination value (checksum value or the like). . In the RAM initialization process (S113, S114), the used area of the RAM 203 is cleared to 0 (S113), and then the initial value of the RAM 203 is set (S114). After executing the initialization process of the RAM 203, the process proceeds to S110.

  On the other hand, if the RAM erase switch 122 is not turned on (S104: No), the information on occurrence of power interruption is stored (S105: Yes), and the RAM judgment value (checksum value etc.) is normal ( S107: Yes), the information on the occurrence of power interruption is cleared while the backed up data is held in the RAM 203 (S108). Next, a payout return command at the time of power recovery for returning the sub-side control device (peripheral control device) to the gaming state at the time of driving power interruption is transmitted (S109), and the process proceeds to S110. When the payout control device 111 receives this payout return command, the payout control device 111 is in a state where the payout control of the game ball can be started while holding the data stored in the RAM 213. In the process of S110, the interruption is permitted and the process proceeds to a main process described later.

  Next, with reference to FIG. 8, the main process executed after the above-described startup process will be described. FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing main processing executed by the MPU 201 in the main controller 110. In this main process, the main process of the game is executed. As an outline, each process of S201 to S209 is executed as a periodic process with a period of 4 ms, and the counter update process of S212 and S213 is executed in the remaining time.

  In the main process, first, output data such as a command updated in the previous process is transmitted to each control device (peripheral control device) on the sub side (S201). Specifically, the presence / absence of winning detection information detected in the switch reading process of S501 is determined, and if there is winning detection information, a winning ball command corresponding to the number of acquired balls is transmitted to the payout control device 111. In addition, by this external output process, a variation pattern command, a stop symbol command, a stop command, an effect time addition command, etc. necessary for the third symbol variation display by the third symbol display device 81 are transmitted to the sound lamp control device 113. Further, when launching a sphere, a sphere launch signal is transmitted to the launch controller 112.

  Next, each value of the variation type counters CS1, CS2, CS3 is updated (S202). Specifically, 1 is added to the variation type counters CS1, CS2, and CS3, and when the counter values reach the maximum values (198, 240, and 162 in this embodiment), they are cleared to 0, respectively. Then, the update values of the variation type counters CS 1, CS 2, and CS 3 are stored in the corresponding buffer area of the RAM 203.

  When the update of the variation type counters CS1, CS2 and CS3 is completed, the winning ball counting signal and the payout abnormality signal received from the payout control device 111 are read (S203), and the process for displaying on the first symbol display device 37 is performed. A variation process for setting a variation pattern of the third symbol and the like by the three symbol display device 81 is executed (S204). Details of the variation process will be described later with reference to FIG.

  After the end of the variation process, a large opening opening / closing process for opening or closing the specific winning opening (large opening) 65a of the variable winning device 65 is executed in the case of the big win state (S205). That is, the specific winning opening 65a is opened for each round of the big hit state, and it is determined whether the maximum opening time of the specific winning opening 65a has elapsed or whether a specified number of balls have won the specific winning opening 65a. When any of these conditions is met, the specific winning opening 65a is closed. The opening and closing of the specific winning opening 65a is repeated for a predetermined number of rounds.

  Next, a display control process of the second symbol (for example, the symbol “◯” or “x”) by the second symbol display device 82 is executed (S206). Briefly, on the condition that the ball has passed through the second entrance (through gate) 67, the value of the second random number counter C4 is acquired at the timing of the passage, and the second symbol display device 82 is obtained. In the display unit 83, the second symbol variation display is performed. Then, the lottery of the second symbol is performed according to the value of the second winning random number counter C4, and when the winning state of the second symbol is reached, the electric accessory attached to the first entrance 64 is released for a predetermined time.

  After the process of S206, the fraud monitoring timer update process for updating the fraud monitoring timer 208 is executed (S207), and the management password output setting process for setting the output of the management password to the payout control device 111 is executed (S208). . Next, as a result of the output setting by the management password output setting process (S208), a management password reception process that is a process for the management password received from the payout control apparatus 111 is executed (S209). Note that specific processing of the fraud monitoring timer update processing (S207), management password output setting processing (S208), and management password reception processing (S209) is described with reference to FIGS. 11 and 12, respectively. It will be described later.

  After executing the process of S209, it is determined whether or not the information on the occurrence of power interruption is stored in the RAM 203 (S210). If the information on the occurrence of power interruption is not stored in the RAM 203 (S210: No), a power failure is determined. The power failure signal SG1 is not output from the monitoring circuit 252 and the power supply is not shut off. Therefore, in such a case, it is determined whether or not the execution timing of the next main process has been reached, that is, whether or not a predetermined time (4 ms in the present embodiment) has elapsed since the start of the previous main process (S211). If the predetermined time has already passed (S211: Yes), the process proceeds to S201, and the processes after S201 described above are repeatedly executed.

  On the other hand, if the predetermined time has not yet elapsed since the start of the previous main process (S211: No), within the remaining time until the predetermined time is reached, that is, until the execution timing of the next main process is reached. The initial value random number counter CINI1, the second initial value random number counter CINI2, and the variation type counters CS1, CS2, and CS3 are repeatedly updated (S212, S213).

  First, the first initial value random number counter CINI1 and the second initial value random number counter CINI2 are updated (S212). Specifically, 1 is added to the first initial value random number counter CINI1 and the second initial value random number counter CINI2, and when the counter value reaches the maximum value (738, 250 in this embodiment), it is cleared to 0. To do. Then, the updated values of the first initial value random number counter CINI1 and the second initial value random number counter CINI2 are stored in the corresponding buffer areas of the RAM 203, respectively.

  Next, the fluctuation type counters CS1, CS2, and CS3 are updated (S213). Specifically, 1 is added to the variation type counters CS1, CS2, and CS3, and when the counter values reach the maximum values (198, 240, and 162 in this embodiment), they are cleared to 0, respectively. Then, the update values of the variation type counters CS1, CS2, and CS3 are stored in the corresponding buffer areas of the RAM 203, respectively.

  Here, since the execution time of each process of S201 to S209 changes according to the state of the game, the remaining time until the next main process execution timing is not constant and varies. Therefore, by repeatedly performing the update of the first initial value random number counter CINI1 and the second initial value random number counter CINI2 using the remaining time, the first initial value random number counter CINI1 and the second initial value random number counter CINI2 (that is, , The initial value of the first per-random number counter C1 and the initial value of the second per-random number counter C4) can be updated at random. Similarly, the variation type counters CS1, CS2, and CS3 can be updated at random.

  In the process of S210, if the occurrence information of the power interruption is stored in the RAM 203 (S210: Yes), the power is shut off due to the occurrence of a power failure or the power is turned off, and the power failure monitoring circuit 252 outputs the power failure signal SG1. As a result, since the NMI interruption process of FIG. 16 has been executed, the process at the time of power-off after S214 is executed. First, the generation of each interrupt process is prohibited (S214), and a power-off notification command indicating that the power has been cut off is sent to other control devices (peripheral control devices such as the payout control device 111 and the sound lamp control device 113). It transmits to (S215). Then, the RAM determination value is calculated and stored (S216), access to the RAM 203 is prohibited (S217), and the infinite loop is continued until the power supply is completely shut down and the process cannot be executed. Here, the RAM determination value is, for example, a checksum value in the stack area and work area to be backed up in the RAM 203.

  It should be noted that the process of S210 is performed at the end of a series of processes corresponding to the game state change performed in S201 to S209, or at the end of one cycle of the processes of S212 and S213 performed within the remaining time. It is running. Therefore, in the main process of the main controller 110, the occurrence information of the power supply interruption is confirmed at the timing when each setting is completed. Therefore, when returning from the power interruption state, the process is performed after the start-up process is completed. It can start from the process of S201. That is, the process can be started from the process of S201 as in the case where the process is initialized in the startup process. Therefore, in the process at power-off, the stack pointer is not stored in the initial setting process (S101) without saving the contents of each register used by the MPU 201 to the stack area or saving the value of the stack pointer. By setting to a predetermined value (initial value), it is possible to start from the process of S201. Therefore, it is possible to reduce the control burden on the main control device 110 and to perform accurate control without causing the main control device 110 to malfunction or run away.

  Next, the variation process (S204) will be described with reference to FIG. FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing the variation process (S204) executed in the main process (see FIG. 8). In this variation process, first, it is determined whether or not a big hit is currently being made (S301). The jackpot includes the jackpot game displayed on the third symbol display device 81 and the first symbol display device 37 in the jackpot and the middle of a predetermined time after the jackpot game ends. As a result of the determination, if it is a big hit (S301: Yes), this processing is terminated as it is.

  If it is not a big hit (S301: No), it is determined whether or not the display mode of the first symbol display device 37 is changing (S302), and if the display mode of the first symbol display device 37 is not changing. (S302: No), it is determined whether or not the number N of active suspension balls is greater than 0 (S303). If the number N of active balls is 0 (S303: No), this process is terminated as it is. If the number of the operation hold balls N> 0 (S303: Yes), the operation hold ball number N is decremented by 1 (S304), and the data stored in the hold ball storage area is shifted (S305). This data shift process is a process of sequentially shifting the data stored in the reserved first to fourth areas of the reserved ball storage area to the execution area side, and the reserved first area → execution area, reserved second area → The data in each area is shifted such as the first hold area, the third hold area → the second hold area, the fourth hold area → the third hold area. After the data shift process, the fluctuation start process of the first symbol display device 37 is executed (S306). The variation start process will be described later with reference to FIG.

  In the process of S302, if it is determined that the display mode of the first symbol display device 37 is changing (S302: Yes), it is determined whether or not the change time has elapsed (S307). The display time during the change of the first symbol display device 37 is determined according to the change pattern selected by the change type counters CS1 and CS2 and the addition time selected by the change type counter CS3. If it has not elapsed (S307: No), the display of the first symbol display device 37 is updated (S308).

  In the present embodiment, among the LEDs 37a of the first symbol display device 37, for example, if the currently lit LED is red until the variation time elapses after the variation starts, the red LED is Turn off and turn on the green LED. If the green LED is on, turn off the green LED and turn on the blue LED. If the blue LED is on, turn on the blue LED. A display mode for turning off the red LED and turning on the red LED is set.

  Note that the variation process is executed every 4 ms, but if the LED lighting color is changed every time the variation process is executed, the player cannot confirm the change in the LED lighting color. Therefore, a counter (not shown) is counted once each time the variation process is executed so that the player can confirm the change in the lighting color of the LED. Change the lighting color of. That is, the lighting color of the LED is changed every 0.4 s. The counter value is reset to 0 when the lighting color of the LED is changed.

  On the other hand, if the variation time of the first symbol display device 37 has elapsed (S307: Yes), a display mode corresponding to the stop symbol of the first symbol display device 37 is set (S309). Whether or not the stop symbol is set is determined according to the value of the first random number counter C1, and if it is a big hit, the symbol that becomes a high probability state after the big hit by the value of the first hit type counter C2 Or a symbol that is in a low probability state is determined. In this embodiment, a red LED is turned on when a high probability state is reached after a big hit, a green LED is turned on when a low probability state is reached, and a blue LED is turned on when it is out of place. . In addition, although the lighting of each LED is released when the next fluctuation display is started, it may be turned on only for a few seconds after the fluctuation stops.

  When the display mode of the first symbol display device 37 corresponding to the stop symbol is set in the processing of S309, the variation stop of the third symbol display device 81 is stopped to synchronize with the lighting of the LED in the first symbol display device 37. A command is set (S310). When the sound lamp control device 113 receives this stop command, it instructs the display control device 114 to stop. When the variation time elapses, the third symbol display device 81 stops the variation, and receives the stop command, whereby one variation effect in the third symbol display device 81 ends.

  Next, the variation start process will be described with reference to FIG. FIG. 10 is a flowchart showing the change start process (S306) executed in the change process (see FIG. 9). In the variation start process (S306), first, it is determined whether or not a big hit is made based on the value of the first hit random number counter C1 stored in the execution area of the reserved ball storage area (S401). Whether or not it is a big hit is determined based on the relationship between the value of the first random number counter C1 and the mode at that time. As described above, “373,727” is a winning value among the values 0 to 738 of the first random number counter C1 at the normal low probability, and “59,109,163, 211,263,317,367, "421,479,523,631,683,733" is the winning value.

  When it is determined that it is a big hit (S401: Yes), the value of the first hit type counter C2 stored in the execution area of the reserved ball storage area is confirmed, and the display mode for the big hit is set (S402). ). In the process of S402, based on the value of the first hit type counter C2, whether to shift to the high probability state or shift to the low probability state after the big hit is set. When the transition state after the big hit is set, the display mode of the first symbol display device 37 (the lighting state of the LED 37a) is set. Further, based on the transition state after the jackpot, the jackpot stop symbol stopped and displayed on the third symbol display device 81 is set by the sound lamp control device 113 and the display control device 114. That is, the stop symbol in the third symbol display device 81 is set by setting the transition state after the big hit by the process of S402. Of the numerical values 0 to 4 of the first hit type counter C2, when “0, 4”, the state shifts to the low probability state, and when “1, 2, 3”, the state shifts to the high probability state. .

  Next, a variation pattern at the time of jackpot is determined (S403). When the variation pattern is set in the process of S403, the display time of the first symbol display device 37 is set and the variation time of the third symbol until the third symbol display device 81 stops at the jackpot symbol is determined. The At this time, the values of the fluctuation type counters CS1 and CS2 stored in the counter buffer of the RAM 203 are confirmed, and rough symbol fluctuations such as normal reach, super reach, premium reach, etc. based on the value of the first fluctuation type counter CS1. In addition to determining the variation time, the variation time (in other words, the number of variation symbols) until the final stop symbol (in the present embodiment, the middle symbol Z2) stops after the occurrence of reach is determined based on the value of the second variation type counter CS2. decide.

  The relationship between the numerical value of the first variation type counter CS1 and the variation time, and the relationship between the numerical value of the second variation type counter CS2 and the variation time are respectively defined in advance by a table or the like. However, the fluctuation time can be set using only the value of the first fluctuation type counter CS1 without using the value of the second fluctuation type counter CS2, and can be set only with the value of the first fluctuation type counter CS1. Whether or not to set with both values of both variation type counters CS1 and CS2 is appropriately determined according to the value of the first variation type counter CS1 and the game conditions each time.

  If it is determined in the process of S401 that it is not a big hit (S401: No), the display mode at the time of disconnection is set (S404). In the process of S404, the display mode of the first symbol display device 37 is set to the display mode corresponding to the off symbol, and based on the value of the stop pattern selection counter C3 stored in the execution area of the reserved ball storage area, An effect to be displayed on the third symbol display device 81 is set to indicate whether the reach is front / rear out of reach, reach other than front / rear out, or complete out. In the present embodiment, as described above, the range of values corresponding to each stop pattern of the stop pattern selection counter C3 depends on whether the state is a high probability state, a low probability state, and the operation suspension number N. Different tables are set up.

  Next, the variation pattern at the time of detachment is determined (S405), the display time of the first symbol display device 37 is set, and the variation time of the third symbol until the third symbol display device 81 stops at the detachment symbol. Is determined. At this time, as in the process of S403, the values of the variation type counters CS1 and CS2 stored in the counter buffer of the RAM 203 are confirmed, and the normal reach, super reach, and premium reach are determined based on the value of the first variation type counter CS1. In addition to determining the fluctuation time of the rough symbol variation such as, the variation time until the final stop symbol (the middle symbol Z2 in the present embodiment) stops after the reach occurs based on the value of the second variation type counter CS2 (in other words, paraphrase) For example, the number of fluctuation symbols) is determined.

  When the process of S403 or the process of S405 is completed, the effect time to be added to or subtracted from the variation time determined by the first and second type counters CS1 and CS2 is determined (S406). At this time, the addition / subtraction of effect time is determined based on the value of the third type counter CS3 stored in the counter buffer of the RAM 203, the display time of the first symbol display device 37 is set, and the third symbol display The variation time of the device 81 is set. In the present embodiment, the effect time addition / subtraction is determined according to the value of the third variation type counter CS3 when the variation display time is not changed and when the variation display time is added for one second, the variation display time is set to 2. In the case of adding seconds, four types of addition values are determined for the case of subtracting 1 second from the variable display time.

  In addition, when the variable display time is added or subtracted, a notice effect that increases the expected value of the jackpot on the third symbol display device 81 (for example, a slip effect that causes the change time of the variable symbol to be longer than usual and is accompanied by a slip) An effect of displaying a notice character is produced, for example, an effect of making the change time of one change symbol shorter than usual and stopping it immediately). If the value of the first random number counter C1 is a big hit, the probability that an added value of 2 seconds is selected is set high, so that the player expects a big hit by confirming the notice effect. Can do.

  Next, a variation pattern command is set according to the variation pattern (variation time) determined in S403 or S405 (S407), and a stop symbol command is set according to the stop symbol set in S402 or S404. (S408). Then, an effect time addition command is set according to the added value of the effect time determined in the process of S406 (S409), and the process returns to the variation process.

  Next, the fraud monitoring timer update process (S207) will be described with reference to FIG. FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing the fraud monitoring timer update process (S207) executed in the main process (see FIG. 8). As shown in FIG. 11, in this fraud monitoring timer update process (S207), it is first confirmed whether a timer clear command has been received from the payout control device 111 (S1001).

  As will be described in detail later, the timer clear command is issued by the main controller 110 and the payout control device 111 as a result of the check using the management password in the second check processing (see FIG. 27) executed in the payout control device 110. Is also output when it is confirmed that it is legitimate. Therefore, when the timer clear command is received from the payout control device 111 as a result of checking in the processing of S1001 (S1001: Yes), the fraud monitoring timer 208 is set to an initial value (corresponding to 30 sec in this embodiment). 7500) is set (S1003), and the fraud monitoring timer update process (S207) is terminated.

  On the other hand, if the timer clear command is not received from the payout control device 111 as a result of the confirmation in S1001 (S1001: No), the fraud monitoring timer 208 is decremented by 1 (S1002), and this fraud monitoring timer update process (S207) ) Ends.

  Next, the management password output setting process (S208) will be described with reference to FIG. FIG. 12 is a flowchart showing the management password output setting process (S208) executed in the main process (see FIG. 8).

  As shown in FIG. 12, in the management password output setting process (S208), first, it is confirmed whether the management PW output request flag 203e is on (S1021). If the management PW output request flag 203e is OFF as a result of checking in the processing of S1021 (S1021: No), the management password output is not necessary, so this management password output setting processing (S208) Exit.

  On the other hand, if the management PW output request flag 203e is turned on as a result of the confirmation in S1021 (S1021: Yes), the management password stored in the second management PW memory 203b is read (S1022), and the read management The password is set in an output ring buffer (not shown) of the RAM 203 (S1023). As a result of setting the management password in the output ring buffer by the processing of S1023, the management password read from the second management PW memory 203b in S1022 by the external output processing (S201) executed at the next timing is obtained. And output (transmitted) to the payout control device 111 via the command line.

  After the processing of S1023, the management PW output request flag 203e is turned off (S1024), the management PW reception standby flag 203f is turned on (S1025), and this management password output setting processing (S208) is ended.

  Although details will be described later, when a management password is output to the payout control apparatus 111 as a result of the processing of S1023, the payout control apparatus 111 returns (outputs) a management password at the next stage. That is, when the nth (n is an integer equal to or greater than 1) management password is output to the payout control device 111 as a result of the processing in S1023, the payout control device 111 receives the (n + 1) th management password. The password is returned to the main controller 110.

  Next, the management password reception process (S209) will be described with reference to FIG. FIG. 13 is a flowchart showing the management password reception process (S209) executed in the main process (see FIG. 8).

  As shown in FIG. 13, in the management password reception process (S209), first, it is confirmed whether the management PW reception standby flag 203f is on (S1041). If the management PW reception standby flag 203f is OFF as a result of the confirmation in S1041 (S1041: No), the management password output setting is not made in the management password output setting process (S208), and the payout is performed. Since the management password returned (output) from the control device 111 is not received, the management password reception process (S209) is terminated.

  On the other hand, if the management PW reception standby flag 203f is turned on as a result of the confirmation in S1041 (S1041: Yes), it is confirmed whether the management password is received from the payout control device 111 via the command line (S1042). .

  As a result of checking in the processing of S1042, when the reception of the management password returned from the payout control device 111 is confirmed (S1023: Yes), the management PW collation request flag 203g is turned on (S1043), and the received management is received. The password is written into the first management PW memory 203a (S1044). After the processing of S1044, the management PW reception standby flag 203f is turned off (S1045), and the management password reception processing (S209) is ended.

  Although details will be described later, when the management PW collation request flag 203g is turned on by the processing of S1045, in the first management password processing (see FIG. 18) executed by the internal program 202a1 triggered by the writing by S1044, S1044 There is an abnormality in the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 due to the comparison between the management password written in the first management PW memory 203a and the management password stored in the second management PW memory 203b. A determination is made whether or not.

  Here, as described above, in the process of S1023 in the management password output setting process (S208), for example, when the output setting of the nth management password is made, the payout control device 111 receives the (n + 1) th. Since the management password is returned, the management password stored in the first management PW memory 203a is the (n + 1) th management password as a result of the processing of S1043.

  On the other hand, as will be described in detail later, the first calculation process according to the internal program 202a1 triggered by the fact that the management password has been read from the second management PW memory 203b by the process of S1022 in the management password output setting process (S208) described above. (See FIG. 20) is executed, and the management password stored in the second management PW memory 203b at that time is updated to a new management password by calculation. Thus, for example, when the nth management password is read from the second management PW memory 203b by the process of S1022, the second management is executed by the first calculation process (see FIG. 20) that is executed when the read is performed. The value in the PW memory 203b is updated to the (n + 1) th management password.

  Accordingly, as a result of the management PW verification request flag 203g being turned on by the processing of S1045, the two management passwords verified in the first management password processing (see FIG. 18) executed thereafter are the main control device 110 and the payout. The management password is updated the same number of times (for example, n times) after the power is turned on in each of the control devices 111.

  On the other hand, if the management password is not received from the payout control apparatus 111 as a result of the confirmation in S1042 (S1042: No), the management password reception process (S209) is performed without performing the processes in S1043 to S1045. finish.

  Next, the processing shown in FIGS. 17 to 20, that is, processing executed by the internal program 202a1 will be described. FIG. 17 is a flowchart showing an internal startup process that is started when the main controller 110 is powered on.

  As shown in FIG. 17, in this internal start-up process, first, after executing the initial setting process associated with power-on (S1101), the RAM erase switch 122 (see FIG. 3) provided in the power supply device 115 is turned on. It is confirmed whether or not (S1102).

  If the RAM erasure switch 122 is turned on as a result of checking in the processing of S1102 (S1102: Yes), the third management PW memory 203c is initialized. In this case, the value of the unique code memory 207a is Read (S1104). After the process of S1104, the read value is written into the third management PW memory 203c (S1104), and the process proceeds to S1105.

  On the other hand, if the RAM erasure switch 122 is not turned on as a result of the confirmation in the process of S1102 (S1102: No), the processes of S1103 and S1104 are skipped and the process proceeds to S1105.

  In the process of S1105, the value of the third management PW memory 203c is read (S1105). Next, the read value is written in the second management PW memory 203b as the initial value (first management password) of the management password in the main controller 110 (S1106).

  Therefore, as a result of the processing of S1102 to S1106, when the RAM erase switch 122 is pressed when the power to the pachinko machine 10 is turned on, the value of the unique code memory 207a is the first value in the main controller 110. It will be the management password. On the other hand, when the RAM erase switch 122 is not pressed when the power to the pachinko machine 10 is turned on, the value backed up (held) in the third management PW memory 213c for backup, that is, the power The value of the management password last updated before being shut off is used as the first management password in the main controller 110.

  When the RAM erase switch 122 is pressed when the power to the pachinko machine 10 is turned on, the value of the unique code memory 207a, which is the first management password, is set to the third management password by the process of S1104. It is stored as a backup value in the PW memory 203c. On the other hand, when the RAM erase switch 122 is not pressed when the power to the pachinko machine 10 is turned on, the value held (backed up) before the power is turned off is directly stored in the third management PW memory 203c. It will be held as the first management password.

  After the processing of S1106, the management PW output request flag 203e is turned on (S1107), the initial value (7500 corresponding to 30 sec in this embodiment) is set in the fraud monitoring timer 208 (S1108), and this internal startup processing Exit.

  According to this internal startup process, the value of the third management PW memory 203c is stored (set) as the first management password of the main controller 110 in the second management PW memory 203b by the process of S1106. . Here, in S1102, when the RAM erase switch 122 is pressed when the power to the pachinko machine 10 is turned on, that is, when the third management PW memory 203c is initialized, the value of the specific code memory 207a Is the first management password in the main controller 110. On the other hand, in S1102, when the power to the pachinko machine 10 is turned on, if the contents of the third management PW memory 203c are held (backed up) without pressing the RAM erase switch 122, the third management PW memory The contents held in 213c, that is, the value of the management password last updated before the power is turned off, is used as the first management password in the main controller 110.

  The internal startup process is a process executed by the internal program 202a1. As described above, since the contents controlled by the internal program 202a1 are substantially impossible to recognize by anyone other than those who can inevitably know the contents, it is illegal to determine which value is set as the initial value of the management password. It is difficult for an actor to recognize. For this reason, it is difficult to accurately create a fraudulent board that imitates the first management password, which contributes to prevention of fraudulent acts using the fraudulent board.

  Since the management PW output request flag 203e is turned on by the process of S1106, the management password written in the first management PW memory 203a by the process of S1105 (the first management password in the main controller 110) is the following: Is output to the payout control device 111 as a result of the output setting by the management password output setting process (S208) executed at the timing. When the payout control device 111 receives the first management password in the main control device 110, the payout control device 111 executes a second verification process (see FIG. 27), which will be described later, and the first management password in the main control device 110, Checking with the first management password of the payout control device 111 is performed.

  FIG. 18 is a flowchart showing the first management password process executed by the internal program 202a1. This first management password process is performed by (1) reading the management password by the process of S1022 in the management password output setting process (see FIG. 12) or (2) by the process of S1044 in the management password receiving process (see FIG. 13). This process is started when one of the management passwords is written.

  As shown in FIG. 18, in the first management password process, first, it is confirmed whether the management PW collation request flag 203g is on (S1201). If the management PW verification request flag 203g is turned on as a result of the confirmation in S1201 (S1201: Yes), the management passwords stored in the first management PW memory 203a and the second management PW memory 203b are verified, A management password stored in the first management PW memory 203a or the second management PW memory 203b is executed by executing a first verification process for determining whether there is an abnormality in the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 (S1202). The process proceeds to the first calculation process (S1203) in which the calculation is performed and the password is updated to a new management password. Note that specific processes executed in the first matching process (S1202) and the first calculation process (S1203) will be described later with reference to FIGS. 19 and 20, respectively.

  On the other hand, if the management PW collation request flag 203g is off (S1201: No) as a result of the confirmation in S1201, the management password need not be collated, so the first collation process (S1202) is skipped. The process proceeds to the first calculation process (S1203).

After the execution of the first calculation process (S1203), it is confirmed whether the management PW collation request flag 203g is on (S1204). If it is on (S1204: Yes), it is stored in the second management PW memory 203b at that time. Since the management password is the management password to be output to the payout control device 111, the management PW output request flag 203e is turned on (S1205), the management PW collation request flag 203g is turned off (S1206), 1 The management password process is terminated.

  On the other hand, if the management PW collation request flag 203g is turned off as a result of the confirmation in the processing of S1204 (S1204: No), the management password stored in the second management PW memory 203a at that time is the payout control device 111. Since this is not the management password to be output to, the processing of S1205 and S1206 is skipped, and the first management password processing is terminated.

  Therefore, according to the first management password process, when the management PW collation request flag 203g is on, that is, the management password reception process executed when the management password is received from the main controller 110 (see FIG. 13). ) Is started as a result of the process of S1044 in step S1044, the management password updated by the calculation of the first calculation process (S1203) after the management password is verified by the first verification process (S1202) is issued. It is output to the control device 111.

  On the other hand, when the management PW collation request flag 203g is off, that is, when activated as a result of the process of S1022 in the management password output setting process (see FIG. 12), the first calculation process (S1203) is performed. The management password updated by the calculation is not output to the payout control device 111. The management password that has not been output to the payout control device 111 after the calculation by the first calculation processing (S1203) is used for collation with the management password received from the payout control device 111 next time.

  Next, with reference to FIG. 19, the first collation process (S1202) will be described. FIG. 19 is a flowchart showing the first verification process (S1202) executed in the first management password process (see FIG. 18).

  As shown in FIG. 19, in the first verification process (S1202), first, the management password stored in the first management PW memory 203a and the management password stored in the second management PW memory 203b are verified. Then, it is confirmed whether or not they are equal (S1301).

  Note that the management password stored in the first management PW memory 203a and the management password stored in the second management PW memory 203b, which are used in the verification in the process of S1301, are the main control device 110 and the payout control device. The management password is updated the same number of times after the power is turned on in each of 111. More specifically, in the process of S1301, the nth management password (where n is an even number equal to or greater than 2) stored in the first management PW memory 203a and the second management PW memory 203b are stored. And the nth management password (where n is an even number equal to or greater than 2).

  Here, although details will be described later, in the present embodiment, if both the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 are regular, the management obtained as a result of the nth calculation in the main control device 110. The password and the management password obtained as a result of the nth calculation in the payout control device 111 are configured to have the same value.

  Therefore, if the management password stored in the first management PW memory 203a is equal to the management password stored in the second management PW memory 203b as a result of the confirmation in the process of S1301 (S1301: Yes), the main control is performed. Since it is determined that there is no abnormality due to fraud in the device 110 or the payout control device 111, an initial value (7500 corresponding to 30 sec in this embodiment) is set in the fraud monitoring timer 208 in this case. (S1302), the first collation process (S1202) is terminated.

  On the other hand, if the management password stored in the first management PW memory 203a is not equal to the management password stored in the second management PW memory 203b as a result of the confirmation in the processing of S1301, (S1301: No) Since it is suspected that the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 has an abnormality due to fraud or the like, in this case, it is confirmed whether the value of the fraud monitoring timer 208 is 0 (S1303).

  As a result of checking in the processing of S1303, if the value of the fraud monitoring timer 208 is not 0 (S1303: Yes), even if the determination result in the processing of S1301 indicates the presence of an abnormality due to fraud etc. In this case, the first matching process (S1202) is terminated without performing anything.

  On the other hand, if the value of the fraud monitoring timer 208 is 0 (S1303: Yes) as a result of the confirmation in the process of S1303, the grace period is exceeded, so the determination result by the process of S1301 is confirmed, that is, the main control It is determined that there is an abnormality due to fraud in the device 110 or the payout control device 111. In this case, a fraud detection command is set (S1304), and the first matching process (S1202) is terminated.

  When the fraud detection command is set by the processing of S1304, the fraud detection command is transmitted to the voice lamp control device 113. As a result, the voice output device 226, the lamp display device 227, and the third symbol display device 81 are used. The output (auditory output or visual display) notifies the outside of the existence of fraud. As described above, when it is determined as a result of the processing of S1303 that an illegal act has been made to the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111, the fact is notified to the outside. The store clerk can be made to clearly distinguish whether there is any fraud.

  On the other hand, in the first collation process (S1202), as described above, if the branch process of No in S1303, that is, within the grace period, the determination result by the process of S1301 indicates the presence of an abnormality. Even so, the determination is configured to be delayed. For this reason, even if the management password value may be temporarily different due to an accidental factor such as noise, the temporary control devices 110 and 111 are erroneously considered to be illegal due to such temporary difference. It can prevent being judged.

  Next, the first calculation process (S1203) will be described with reference to FIG. FIG. 20 is a flowchart showing the first calculation process (S1203) executed in the first management password process (see FIG. 18).

  As shown in FIG. 20, in the first calculation process (S1203), first, it is confirmed whether the management PW collation request flag 203g is on (S1321), and if it is on (S1321: Yes), the first management The management password stored in the PW memory 203a is read (S1322), and the value of the operation counter 203d is confirmed (S1323).

  As a result of checking in the processing of S1323, if the value of the operation counter 203d is 0 (S1323: 0), the management password read out in the processing of S1322 is shifted to the right by 1 bit (S1324), and the processing proceeds to S1325.

  On the other hand, if the value of the operation counter 203d is 2 (S1323: 2) as a result of checking in the process of S1323 (S1323: 2), the management password read out in the process of S1322 is shifted to the right by 3 bits (S1329), and the process proceeds to S1325. Transition.

  If the value of the operation counter 203d is 1 or 3 as a result of checking in the process of S1323 (S1323: 1, 3), the management password read out in the process of S1322 is reversed (S1330), and the process proceeds to S1325. To do.

  Since the calculation counter 203d is updated in the order of 0 → 1 → 2 → 3 → 0 → 1 →... Every time the calculation is performed, the value of the management password is determined as a result of the processing in S1323, S1324, S1329, and S1330. , (1) 1 bit shift to the right → (2) inversion → (3) 3 bit shift to the right → (4) inversion → (1) 1 bit shift to the right →... In this way, the update (calculation) of the management password is performed by repeating the period with four calculations (calculations (1) to (4)) as one period, so imitation of the calculation pattern of one period It is difficult to manufacture a fraudulent board by the above, and as a result, illegal acts using the fraudulent board can be surely prevented.

  In the process of S1325, the new management password updated by the calculation performed in S1324, S1329, and S1330 is written to the second management PW memory 203b by overwriting (S1325). After the process of S1325, the new management password updated by the calculations performed in S1324, S1329, and S1330 is written to the third management PW memory 203c (S1326), and the calculation counter 203d is updated (S1327). The calculation process (S1203) is terminated.

  Since the content of the RAM 203 is held by the backup voltage supplied from the power supply device 115 even when the power of the pachinko machine 10 is shut off, the content of the RAM 203 is stored in the third management PW memory 203c as a result of the processing of S1326. The value is retained even after the pachinko machine 10 is powered off. Therefore, when the power is turned on again without pressing the RAM erase switch 122 after the power of the pachinko machine 10 is turned off, the value held in the third management PW memory 203c is executed last before the power is turned off. This is the management password obtained by the operation.

  On the other hand, if the management PW collation request flag 203g is off (S1321: No) as a result of the confirmation in S1321, the management password stored in the second management PW memory 203b is read (S1328), and the process proceeds to S1323. Then, similarly to the case where the management PW collation request flag 203g is on, the processes of S1323 to S1326, S1329, and S1330 are executed, and the first calculation process (S1203) is terminated. However, when performing calculations in S1324, S1329, and S1330, the calculation according to the value of the calculation counter 203d at that time is performed on the value read out in the process of S1328.

  According to the first calculation process (S1203), when the management PW collation request flag 203g is on, the management password stored in the first management PW memory 203a is calculated according to the value of the calculation counter 203d. And is written in the second management PW memory 203b. On the other hand, as described above, in the present embodiment, when the management PW collation request flag 203g is on, the management password updated by the calculation in the first calculation process (S1203) is the payout control device 111. It is configured to be output to.

  Therefore, when the management PW collation request flag 203g is on, that is, when the management password is received from the payout control device 111, the received management password is updated by the calculation performed in the first calculation process (S1203). The management password updated in the main control device 110 is returned to the payout control device 111.

  Here, the management password updated by the first calculation process (S1203) executed next from the management password obtained in the first calculation process (S1203) executed last time in one main controller 110 is changed. If it is obtained, once the management password is disturbed to an incorrect value due to an accidental factor such as noise, it does not return to the correct management password that should be originally, and as a result, the management password in the payout control device 111 is verified. May be erroneously determined as abnormal.

  However, according to the pachinko machine 10 of the present embodiment, when the nth management information is received from the payout control device 110, the calculation by the first calculation process (S1203) using the received management password ( As long as the received management password is correct, the wrong management information generated by the accidental factor as described above can be corrected to the correct value as it should be. is there.

  Therefore, for example, as a result of a change in the management password value due to an accidental factor such as noise, in the first verification process (see FIG. 19) or the second verification process (see FIG. 27), a determination that fraud is suspected (such as fraud) Even if a judgment is suspected of the presence of an abnormality caused by the error, if the management password is corrected as described above during the grace period counted by the fraud monitoring timer 208, the presence of the abnormality is indicated. The previous determination is ignored as being temporary. Accordingly, it is possible to prevent an erroneous determination that the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 are both illegal even though they are legitimate.

  In the present embodiment, the first arithmetic processing (S1203) is performed using the management password received from the payout control device 110 for the main control device 110 that performs control related to the occurrence of a special gaming state (bonus) that is advantageous to the player. ) (The nth calculation). That is, the management password updated by the calculation performed in the main control device 110 depends on the management password obtained as a result of the calculation performed in the payout control device 111. Therefore, it is detected more sensitively than an illegal act against the payout control device 111. In general, since the main control device 110 related to the occurrence of jackpot is often replaced by a fraudulent person, the fraud can be effectively prevented by detecting the replacement of the main control device 110 more sensitively. .

  Next, with reference to FIGS. 21 to 28, each control process executed by the MPU 211 in the payout control apparatus 111 will be described. Of the control processes described below, the processes shown in FIGS. 21 to 24 are control processes executed by the user program 212b1 of the payout control apparatus 111, and the processes shown in FIGS. 25 to 28 are payouts. This process is executed by the internal program 212a1 of the control device 111.

  First, the processing shown in FIGS. 21 to 24, that is, each control processing executed by the user program 202b1 will be described. FIG. 21 is a flowchart showing a start-up process of the payout control apparatus 111, and this start-up process is activated when the power is turned on. First, an initial setting process associated with power-on is executed (S801). Specifically, a predetermined value set in advance is set in the stack pointer, and an interrupt mode is set. Then, the RAM access is permitted (S802), and an external interrupt vector is set (S803).

  After that, data backup processing is executed for the RAM 213 in the MPU 211. Specifically, it is determined whether or not the information on the occurrence of power interruption is stored in the RAM 213 (S804). If not stored (S804: No), the backup data is not stored, so the process proceeds to S811. Transition. If power failure occurrence information is stored in the RAM 213 (S804: Yes), a RAM determination value is calculated (S805). If the calculated RAM determination value is not normal (S805: No), that is, the calculated RAM determination is performed. If the value does not match the RAM determination value stored when the power is turned off, the backed up data has been destroyed. In such a case as well, the process proceeds to S811. As will be described later in the processing of S917 in FIG. 22, the RAM determination value is, for example, a checksum value at a work area address in the RAM 213. Instead of the RAM determination value, the validity of the backup may be determined based on whether or not the keyword written in a predetermined area of the RAM 213 is correctly stored.

  In the RAM initialization process of S811 and S812, all areas of the RAM 213 are cleared to 0 (S811), and then the initial value of the RAM 213 is set (S812). Thereafter, the peripheral devices of the MPU 211 are initialized (S809), an interrupt is permitted (S810), and the process proceeds to the main process.

  On the other hand, if the occurrence information of power interruption is set (S804: Yes) and the RAM judgment value (checksum value etc.) is normal (S806: Yes), the data backed up in the RAM 213 is retained. In addition to clearing the information on occurrence of power interruption (S807), the payout permission flag is turned off (S808) in order to wait for the payout of the winning ball. Thereafter, the peripheral devices of the MPU 211 are initialized (S809), an interrupt is permitted (S810), and the process proceeds to the main process.

  Next, the main process executed by the MPU 211 in the payout control apparatus 111 will be described with reference to the flowchart of FIG. In this main process, first, a winning ball command, a payout return command, and a payout initialization command from the main control device 110 are received, and a command determination process for determining the type of these commands is performed (S901). In this process, when a normal command transmitted from the main controller 110 is received, a payout permission flag is turned on, and payout of prize balls and lending balls is permitted.

  When the command determination process (S901) ends, it is determined whether or not the payout is permitted, that is, the state of the payout permission flag is determined (S902), and if the payout is not permitted (S902: No), the main control unit is still present. Since 110 is not in a stand-up state, in this case, the command determination process (S901) is repeatedly executed until the payout is permitted in the command determination process (S901). On the other hand, if the payout is permitted in the processing of S902 (S902: Yes), the state return switch 120 is checked, and if it is determined that the state return operation is started, the state return operation is executed (S903).

  Thereafter, the setting of the lower pan full tank state or the lower pan full tank release state is executed according to the change in the state of the lower pan 50 (S904). That is, when the lower pan 50 is determined based on the detection signal of the lower pan full switch, the lower pan full state is set when the lower pan is full. , Set the lower pan full release state. Further, the setting of the tank ball absence state or the tank ball absence release state is executed according to the change in the state of the tank ball (S905). In other words, the tank ball no switch state is determined based on the detection signal of the tank ball no switch, and when there is no tank ball, the setting of the tank ball no state is executed. Perform configuration. Thereafter, the presence / absence of a notification state is determined, and if there is a notification state, notification is made by a 7-segment LED provided in the payout control device 111 (S906).

  Next, a winning ball payout process is executed by each process of S907 to S909. That is, if the total number of winning balls is not 0 (S907: No, S908: No), the winning ball control process is started to pay out winning balls (S909). . On the other hand, if the prize ball cannot be paid out (S907: Yes) or if the total number of prize balls is 0 (S908: Yes), the process proceeds to the lending and payout process.

  In the lending process of S910 to S912, if the lending is not disabled and a lending payout request from the card unit has been received (S910: No, S911: Yes), The lending control process is started. On the other hand, if the rental ball cannot be dispensed (S910: Yes) or if a rental ball dispensing request has not been received (S911: No), the process proceeds to S913. Similarly, after the ball rental control process (S912) is completed, the process proceeds to S913.

  In the process of S913, the control of the vibrator 134 (vibration motor control) is executed on the condition that the ball is clogged (S913). Thereafter, it is determined whether or not the occurrence information of power interruption is stored in the RAM 213 (S914). If the occurrence information of power interruption is not stored (S914: No), the power failure signal SG1 is received from the power failure monitoring circuit 252. Since it is not output and the power supply is not shut off, in such a case, the process proceeds to S901, and the main process from S901 to S913 is repeatedly executed.

  On the other hand, if the occurrence information of power interruption is stored in the process of S914 (S914: Yes), the result of the power failure is output due to the occurrence of a power failure or the power is turned off and the power failure monitoring circuit 252 outputs the power failure signal SG1. This means that the NMI interrupt process of FIG. 15 has been executed. Therefore, in such a case, the generation of each interrupt process is prohibited (S915), and the command determination process is executed again in order to prevent the reception of a command transmitted from the main controller 110 (S916). Then, the RAM determination value is calculated and stored in the RAM 213 (S917), access to the RAM 213 is prohibited (S918), and the infinite loop is continued until the power supply is completely shut down and the process cannot be executed. Here, for example, the RAM determination value is a checksum value in the stack area and the work area to be backed up in the RAM 213.

  Note that in the process of S914, the occurrence information of the power supply interruption is confirmed at the timing when one cycle of the main process of the payout control device 111 is completed. After the process is completed, the process can be started from S901. That is, the main process can be started in the same manner as when the initialization process is initialized. Therefore, in the process at power-off, the contents of each register used by the MPU 211 are not saved in the stack area, or the stack pointer value is not saved in the initial setting process (S801) without saving the stack pointer value. By setting to a predetermined value (initial value), the process can be started from S901. Therefore, the control burden on the payout control device 111 can be reduced, and accurate control can be performed without causing the payout control device 111 to malfunction or run away. In addition, since the power-off process is executed at the timing when each process is completed, the amount of information to be backed up in the RAM 213 can be reduced.

  Next, with reference to FIG. 23, the management password receiving process executed when the management password is received from the main control device 110 will be described. FIG. 23 is a flowchart showing management password reception processing. This management password reception process is started when a management password is received from the main controller 110 via the command line, and first, the management PW reception flag 213f is turned on (S1401). Next, the management password received from the main controller 110 is written in the second management PW memory 213b (S1402), and this management password reception process is terminated. Thus, for example, when the payout control device 111 receives the nth management password from the main control device 110, the received nth management password is stored in the second management PW memory 213b by the process of S1402. .

  Although details will be described later, the second management password process (see FIG. 26) according to the internal program 212a1 is started when the management password is written in the second management PW memory 213b by the process of S1402. Here, when the second management password process (see FIG. 26) is activated as a result of the process of S1402, the management PW reception flag 213f is turned on by the process of S1401, so Then, the second matching process (see FIG. 27) is executed. In the second verification process (see FIG. 27), the management password received from the main controller 110 and stored in the second management PW memory 213b by the process of S1402, and the first management PW memory 213a at that time It is determined whether or not there is an abnormality in the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 by collating with the management password stored in.

  Next, a management password output process for controlling the output (transmission) of the management password to the main control device 110 will be described with reference to FIG. FIG. 24 is a flowchart showing the management password output process. This management password output process is an interrupt process that is activated at predetermined time intervals (for example, every 2 ms).

  As shown in FIG. 24, in this management password output process, first, it is confirmed whether the management PW output request flag 213e is on (S1421), and if it is off (S1421: No), output to the main controller 110. Since there is no management password to be used, this management password output process is terminated.

  On the other hand, if the management PW output request flag 213e is on (S1421: Yes) as a result of the confirmation in S1421, the management password stored in the first management PW memory 213a is read (S1422) and read. The management password is output to the main controller 110 via the command line (S1423). Then, after the processing of S1423, the management PW output request flag 213e is turned off (S1424), and this management password output processing is terminated.

  Next, the process shown in FIGS. 25 to 28, that is, the process executed by the internal program 212a1 will be described. FIG. 25 is a flowchart showing an internal start-up process that is started when the payout control device 111 is powered on.

  As shown in FIG. 25, in this internal start-up process, first, an initial setting process associated with power-on is executed (S1701), and then the result of the process of S112 (see FIG. 7) executed by main controller 110. Then, it is confirmed whether the value of the unique code memory 207a is received from the main controller 110 (S1702).

  If the value of the unique code memory 207a is received from the main controller 110 as a result of the confirmation in the processing of S1702 (S1702: Yes), the received value is written to the third management PW memory 213c (S1703), and the processing of S1704 Migrate to

  On the other hand, if the value of the unique code memory 207a is not received from the main controller 110 as a result of the confirmation in the process of S1702 (S1702: No), the process of S1703 is skipped and the process proceeds to S1704. .

  In the process of S1704, the value of the third management PW memory 213c is read (S1704). Next, the read value is written in the first management PW memory 213a as the initial value (first management password) of the management password in the payout control device 111 (S1705), and this internal startup process is terminated.

  According to this internal startup process, the value of the third management PW memory 213c is stored (set) as the first management password of the payout control apparatus 111 in the first management PW memory 213a by the process of S1705. . Here, in S1702, when it is confirmed that the value of the unique code memory 207a is received from the main controller 110, that is, when the RAM erase switch 122 is pressed when the power to the pachinko machine 10 is turned on. The value of the unique code memory 207a is the first management password in the payout control device 111. On the other hand, if it is not confirmed in S1702 that the value of the unique code memory 207a has been received from the main controller 110, that is, when the power to the pachinko machine 10 is turned on, the RAM erase switch 122 has not been pressed. In this case, the value stored in the third management PW memory 213c for backup, that is, the value of the management password last updated before the power is turned off is the first management in the payout control device 111. It is a password.

  As described above, in the main control device 110, the value set as the first management password in the main control device 110 is obtained when the RAM erase switch 122 is pressed when the power to the pachinko machine 10 is turned on. Is the value of the unique code memory 207a, and if the RAM erase switch 122 is not pressed, the management password last updated before the power stored in the third management PW memory 213c is shut off. Value. Therefore, regardless of whether or not the RAM erase switch 122 is operated, the main controller 110 and the payout controller 111 are fixed as a combination corresponding to 1: 1 by turning on the power to the pachinko machine 10. Therefore, in order to perform fraud, an illegal board corresponding to a regular combination is required. However, it is difficult to manufacture such an illegal board, and an illegal act using the illegal board can be prevented.

  In particular, in the present embodiment, the value of the unique code memory 203 that is a unique value for each pachinko machine 10 is used as the first management password. In other words, an illegal board that can set a different first management password is required. However, since it is difficult to manufacture such a fraudulent board, it contributes to prevention of fraud using the fraudulent board. Similarly, the backup value stored in the third management PW memory 213c is also a value calculated based on the value of the unique code memory 203 which is a unique value for each pachinko machine 10. Such an illegal substrate is difficult to manufacture and contributes to prevention of illegal acts using the illegal substrate.

  The internal startup process is a process executed by the internal program 212a1. As described above, since the contents controlled by the internal program 212a1 are virtually impossible to recognize by anyone other than those who can inevitably know the contents, it is illegal to determine which value is set as the initial value of the management password. It is difficult for an actor to recognize. For this reason, it is difficult to accurately create a fraudulent board that imitates the first management password, which contributes to prevention of fraudulent acts using the fraudulent board.

  If the RAM erase switch 122 is pressed when the power to the pachinko machine 10 is turned on, the value of the unique code memory 207a that is the first management password is set to the third management password by the processing of S1703. It is stored as a backup value in the PW memory 213c. On the other hand, when the RAM erase switch 122 is not pressed when the power to the pachinko machine 10 is turned on, the value held (backed up) before the power is turned off is directly stored in the third management PW memory 213c. It will be held as the first management password.

  FIG. 26 is a flowchart showing the second management password process executed by the internal program 212a1. The second management password process is performed by (1) writing a management password by the process of S1402 in the management password reception process (see FIG. 23) or (2) management by the process of S1422 in the management password output process (see FIG. 24). It is a process that starts when one of the passwords is read.

  As shown in FIG. 26, in the second management password process, first, it is confirmed whether the management PW reception flag 213f is on (S1501). If the management PW reception flag 213f is turned on as a result of checking in the processing of S1501 (S1501: Yes), the management passwords stored in the first management PW memory 213a and the second management PW memory 213b are collated, respectively. A second verification process for determining whether or not there is an abnormality in the control device 110 or the payout control device 111 is executed (S1502), an operation is performed on the management password stored in the first management PW memory 213a, and a new The process proceeds to the second calculation process (S1503) for updating to a new management password. Note that specific processes executed in the second matching process (S1502) and the second calculation process (S1503) will be described later with reference to FIGS. 27 and 28, respectively.

  On the other hand, if the management PW reception flag 213f is off (S1501: No) as a result of the confirmation in the process of S1501, there is no need to collate the management password, so the second collation process (S1502) is skipped. The process proceeds to 2 arithmetic processing (S1503).

  After the execution of the second calculation process (S1503), it is confirmed whether the management PW reception flag 213f is on (S1504). If it is on (S1504: Yes), it is stored in the first management PW memory 213a at that time. Since the management password is the management password to be output to the main controller 110, the management PW output request flag 213e is turned on (S1505), the management PW reception flag 213f is turned off (S1506), and this second management is performed. Finish password processing.

  On the other hand, if the management PW reception flag 213f is turned on as a result of the confirmation in the process of S1504 (S1504: No), the management password stored in the first management PW memory 213a at that time is sent to the main control device 110. Since it is not the management password to be output, the processing of S1505 and S1506 is skipped, and the second management password processing is terminated.

  Therefore, according to the second management password process, when the management PW reception flag 213f is on, that is, the management password reception process executed when the management password is received from the main controller 110 (see FIG. 23). Is started as a result of the process of S1402, the management password updated by the calculation by the second calculation process (S1503) after the management password is verified by the second verification process (S1502) is the main control. It is output to the device 110.

  On the other hand, when the management PW reception flag 213f is off, that is, when activated as a result of the process of S1422 in the management password output process (see FIG. 24), the calculation by the second calculation process (S1503) The updated management password is not output to the main controller 110. The management password that is not output to the main control device 110 after the calculation by the second calculation processing (S1503) is used for collation with the management password received next from the main control device 110.

  Next, the second collation process (S1502) will be described with reference to FIG. FIG. 27 is a flowchart showing the second verification process (S1502) executed in the second management password process (see FIG. 26).

  As shown in FIG. 27, in the second verification process (S1502), first, the management password stored in the first management PW memory 213a and the management password stored in the second management PW memory 213b are verified. Then, it is confirmed whether or not both are equal (S1601).

  At the time of executing this second verification process (S1502), the second management PW memory 213b stores the nth management password (where n is an odd number equal to or greater than 1) received from the main control device 110. On the other hand, the first management PW memory 213a also has an nth management password (where n is an odd number of 1 or more) obtained as a result of execution of a second calculation process (see FIG. 27) described later. It is remembered.

  That is, in S1601, the initial value of the management password (first management password) in each of the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111, or the management password updated the same number of times after power-on is compared. Here, as described above, in the pachinko machine 10 according to the present embodiment, the initial value (first management password) of the management password in each of the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 is the specific code memory 207a. Or the values stored in the third management PW memories 203c and 213c when the power is turned on. Although details will be described later, in the present embodiment, since the values stored in the third management PW memories 203c and 213c at the time of power-on are the same, the management password of each of the main controller 110 and the payout controller 111 is the same. The initial value (first management password) is configured to have the same value. The main controller 110 and the payout controller 111 are configured to perform the same calculation as the nth calculation. Therefore, in this embodiment, if both the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 are regular, the management password obtained as a result of the nth calculation in the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 are displayed. The management password obtained as a result of the nth calculation in is configured to have the same value.

  Therefore, if the management password stored in the first management PW memory 213a is equal to the management password stored in the second management PW memory 213b as a result of the confirmation in the process of S1601 (S1601: Yes), the main control is performed. In this case, a timer clear command is transmitted to the main control device 110 (S1602), indicating that neither the device 110 nor the payout control device 111 has been confirmed to have an abnormality due to fraud. The process (S1502) ends.

  Here, when the timer clear command is output to the main control device 110 by the processing of S1602, the main control device 110 that has received the timer clear command performs the processing of S1003 in the fraud monitoring timer update processing (see FIG. 11). An initial value is set in the fraud monitoring timer 208.

  That is, when it is confirmed that there is no fraud in the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 by the processing of S1601, as a result, the time of the grace time by the fraud monitoring timer 208 is again set to the initial value. (30 seconds in this embodiment).

  On the other hand, as a result of checking in the process of S1602, the management password stored in the first management PW memory 213a is not equal to the management password stored in the second management PW memory 213b (S1601: No). Since at least one of the control device 110 and the payout control device 111 is suspected of being abnormal due to fraud or the like, in this case, the process of S1602 is skipped and the second collation process (S1502) is terminated. .

  Therefore, if it is suspected that at least one of the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 is abnormal due to fraud or the like by the processing of S1601, the value of the fraud monitoring timer 208 is not changed, and the remaining time of the grace time Will be consumed further. However, as described above, until the value of the fraud monitoring timer 208 indicates 0, there is a case where it is suspected that there is an abnormality due to fraud in at least one of the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 by the processing of S1601. Even if it exists, since the determination is postponed, it can prevent that the legitimate control devices 110 and 111 are erroneously determined to be illegal due to erroneous determination due to temporary factors such as noise.

  Next, the second calculation process (S1503) will be described with reference to FIG. FIG. 28 is a flowchart showing the first calculation process (S1503) executed in the second management password process (see FIG. 26).

  As shown in FIG. 28, in the second calculation process (S1503), first, the management password stored in the first management PW memory 203a is read (S1621), and the value of the calculation counter 213d is confirmed (S1622).

  If the value of the operation counter 213d is 0 (S1622: 0) as a result of checking in the process of S1622, the management password read out in the process of S1621 is shifted to the right by 1 bit (S1623), and the process proceeds to S1624.

  On the other hand, if the value of the operation counter 213d is 2 (S1622: 2) as a result of checking in the processing of S1622, the management password read out in the processing of S1621 is shifted to the right by 3 bits (S1627), and the processing proceeds to S1624. Transition.

  If the value of the operation counter 213d is 1 or 3 as a result of checking in S1622, the management password read out in S1621 is reversed (S1328), and the process proceeds to S1624. To do.

  Since the calculation counter 213d is updated in the order of 0 → 1 → 2 → 3 → 0 → 1 →... Every time the calculation is performed, the value of the management password is obtained as a result of the processing in S1622, S1623, S1627, and S1628. , (1) 1 bit shift to the right → (2) inversion → (3) 3 bit shift to the right → (4) inversion → (1) 1 bit shift to the right →... Since these calculation formulas and calculation order are the same as those of the main control apparatus 110, the payout control apparatus 111 updates the management password with the same update pattern as that of the main control apparatus 110.

  Therefore, the main code device 207a and the payout control device 111 both use the value stored in the unique code memory 207a or the value backed up in the third management PW memory 203c, 213c as the operation value of the first operation. In the pachinko machine 10 according to the embodiment, if both the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 are valid, the nth management password in the main control device 110 and the nth admin password in the payout control device 111 are used. The administrative password is the same value.

  Furthermore, as described above, the value of the unique code memory 207a is a unique value for each pachinko machine 10. Similarly, the backup value stored in the third management PW memories 203c and 213c is also a value calculated based on the value of the unique code memory 203 which is a unique value for each pachinko machine 10. Therefore, even if the number of updates by calculation is the same, the value is unique for each pachinko machine 10. Therefore, in the pachinko machine 10 according to the present embodiment, the operation value of the first calculation performed in both the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 is a unique value for each pachinko machine 10, In order to perform fraud, there is a need for a fraudulent board that can set the calculated value of the first calculation performed in both the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 to a different value for each pachinko machine 10. Become. However, since it is difficult to manufacture such a fraudulent board, it contributes to prevention of fraud using the fraudulent board.

  In the process of S1624, the new management password updated by the calculations performed in S1623, S1627, and S1628 is written to the first management PW memory 203a by overwriting (S1624). After the processing of S1624, the new management password updated by the calculations performed in S1623, S1627, and S1628 is written to the third management PW memory 213c (S1625), and the calculation counter 213d is updated (S1626). The calculation process (S1503) is terminated.

  Since the contents of the RAM 213 are held by the backup voltage supplied from the power supply device 115 even when the power of the pachinko machine 10 is cut off, the contents of the RAM 213 are stored in the third management PW memory 213c as a result of the processing of S1625. The value is retained even after the pachinko machine 10 is powered off. Therefore, when the power is turned on again without pressing the RAM erase switch 122 after the power of the pachinko machine 10 is turned off, the value held in the third management PW memory 213c is executed last before the power is turned off. This is the management password obtained by the operation.

  On the other hand, as described above, the value held in the third management PW memory 203c of the main controller 110 when the power is turned on again without pressing the RAM erase switch 122 after the power of the pachinko machine 10 is shut down is also This is the management password obtained by the last operation executed before the power is turned off.

  Therefore, the value stored in the third management PW memory 203c of the main controller 110 and the value of the payout controller 111 when the power is turned on again without pressing the RAM erase switch 122 after the power of the pachinko machine 10 is shut off. The values stored in the 3 management PW memory 213c are values corresponding to each other. In the present embodiment, when the RAM erase switch 122 is pressed when the pachinko machine 10 is turned on, the value of the unique code memory 207a is changed to the first value in both the main controller 110 and the payout controller 111. Since it is set as the first management password, the values stored in the third management PW memories 203c and 213c are the same when the power is turned on again without pressing the RAM erase switch 122 after the power of the pachinko machine 10 is turned off. It is the value of.

  As described above, in the pachinko machine 10 according to the first embodiment, the first calculation process (see FIG. 20) and the second calculation process (see FIG. 28) for updating the management password by calculation are controlled respectively. It is configured to be performed by internal programs 202a1 and 212a1 that are substantially impossible to recognize or modify except for those who can inevitably know the contents. Therefore, it is difficult to produce an illegal board that imitates and outputs the management information that is sequentially updated by the first arithmetic process (see FIG. 20) and the second arithmetic process (see FIG. 28). It is possible to reliably prevent cheating.

  In particular, in the pachinko machine 10 according to the first embodiment, between the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111, the nth management password in the other control device is the same as the nth management password in itself. By checking, it is determined whether or not there is an abnormality caused by fraud in the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111, so that it is possible to reliably prevent fraudulent acts related to payout of game balls, Loss of amusement hall can be reliably suppressed.

  Note that the management password is input / output (transmission / reception) between the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 via a communication path (command line) for various commands, not a dedicated communication path. It is possible to reliably prevent an illegal act relating to a payout of a game ball such as illegally gaining profit by illegally generating a command instructing the payout of a ball.

  In the first embodiment, management password input / output (transmission / reception) between the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 is performed not by the internal programs 202a1 and 212a1 but by control by the user programs 202b1 and 212b1. It is configured as follows. Therefore, it is possible to use an existing development tool such as an assembler at the time of design and development, and the design and development efficiency is good.

  In the pachinko machine 10 according to the first embodiment, the main control device 110 performs the nth operation after the power is turned on, and the payout control device 111 performs the nth operation after the power is turned on. Therefore, the transition pattern of the management password that is changed by the calculation is the same transition pattern in both the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111. Therefore, since it is easy to determine whether or not there is an abnormality due to fraud in the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 by checking both management passwords, considering this similar transition pattern, Easy to develop and design.

  In particular, in the pachinko machine 10 according to the first embodiment, in both the main controller 110 and the payout controller 111, the management password used in the first calculation is the same value, that is, in the unique code memory 207a. Since it is a value or a value that has been backed up (held) in the third management PW memories 203c and 213c, the nth calculation performed by the first calculation process (see FIG. 20) and the second calculation process (see FIG. 28). The (n + 1) th management password obtained as a result of this is the same value in both the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111. Therefore, it can be easily determined whether or not the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 has an abnormality due to fraud or the like depending on whether or not the nth management passwords are equal.

  Further, according to the pachinko machine 10 of the first embodiment, the value set as the first management password in the main control apparatus 110 in the main control apparatus 110 is set when the power to the pachinko machine 10 is turned on. When the RAM erase switch 122 is pressed, the value is stored in the unique code memory 207a. On the other hand, when the RAM erase switch 122 is not pressed, the power stored in the third management PW memory 213c is shut off. This is the value of the admin password that was last updated before being entered. Therefore, regardless of whether or not the RAM erase switch 122 is operated, the main controller 110 and the payout controller 111 are fixed as a combination corresponding to 1: 1 by turning on the power to the pachinko machine 10. Therefore, in order to perform fraud, an illegal board corresponding to a regular combination is required. However, it is difficult to manufacture such an illegal board, and an illegal act using the illegal board can be prevented.

  In particular, in the first embodiment, since the value of the unique code memory 203 that is a unique value for each pachinko machine 10 is used as the first management password, each pachinko machine 10 is used for fraud. An illegal board capable of setting a different first management password is required. However, since it is difficult to manufacture such a fraudulent board, it contributes to prevention of fraud using the fraudulent board. Similarly, the backup value stored in the third management PW memory 213c is also a value calculated based on the value of the unique code memory 203 which is a unique value for each pachinko machine 10. Such an illegal substrate is difficult to manufacture and contributes to prevention of illegal acts using the illegal substrate.

  In the first embodiment, the backup voltage is supplied from the power supply device 115 to both the third management PW memory 203c (RAM 203) of the main control device 110 and the third management PW memory 213c (RAM 213c) of the payout control device 111. Is done. Therefore, even if the regular main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 may be replaced with an illegal board outside the business hours, the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 is removed when the replacement is performed. Since the values held (backed up) in the management PW memories 203c and 213c are erased, the power of the installed island is turned on once, and the initial values of the third management PW memory 203c (RAM 203) and the third management PW memory 213c (RAM 213) Unless abnormality (RAM clear) is performed, if there is an abnormality in the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 in the first verification process (see FIG. 19) or the second verification process (see FIG. 27) Suspicious judgment will be made. Similarly, even if the ROM 202 in the main controller 110 and the ROM 212 in the payout controller 111 may be replaced with ROMs that store unauthorized control contents, the ROM 202 and the ROM 212 are removed at the time of replacement. Since the values held (backed up) in the management PW memories 203c and 213c are erased, the main controller in the first collation process (see FIG. 19) or the second collation process (see FIG. 27) only by replacement. 110 or the payout control device 111 is determined to be suspected of being abnormal due to fraud. Therefore, it becomes difficult to use a fraudulent board or a storage medium such as a ROM that stores fraudulent control contents, so that fraud can be prevented more reliably.

  In the pachinko machine 10 according to the first embodiment, when the fraud monitoring timer 208 indicates that it is within the grace period, in the first verification process (see FIG. 19) or the second verification process (see FIG. 27). Even if it is determined that the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 is suspected of being abnormal due to fraud or the like, the determination indicating the abnormality is postponed.

  Therefore, even if it is determined that the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 is suspected of having an abnormality due to fraud due to an accidental factor such as noise, the cause may be corrected within the grace period. For example, the previous determination indicating the presence of the abnormality is ignored as being temporary. Therefore, by measuring the predetermined grace period using the fraud monitoring timer 208, it is possible to prevent erroneous determination that the normal control devices 110 and 111 are fraudulent due to an accidental factor.

  Here, according to the pachinko machine 10 of the first embodiment, when the main control device 110 receives the nth management information from the payout control device 111, the first calculation is performed using the received management password. Since the calculation (the nth calculation) by the process (S1203) is performed, as long as the received management password is correct, the incorrect management information generated by the accidental factor as described above should be the correct value. Can be corrected. Therefore, for example, as a result of the change of the management password value due to accidental factors such as noise, in the first verification process (see FIG. 19) or the second verification process (see FIG. 27), an abnormality caused by fraud is suspected. If the management password is modified as described above during the grace period counted by the fraud monitoring timer 208, the previous determination indicating the presence of an abnormality is temporary. It will be ignored as it exists. Accordingly, it is possible to prevent an erroneous determination that the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 are both illegal even though they are legitimate.

  Moreover, according to the pachinko machine 10 of the first embodiment, the management password received from the payout control device 110 is used for the main control device 110 that performs control related to the occurrence of a special gaming state (big hit) that is advantageous to the player. The first calculation process (S1203) is performed (the nth calculation). That is, the management password updated by the calculation performed in the main control device 110 depends on the management password obtained as a result of the calculation performed in the payout control device 111. Therefore, it is detected more sensitively than an illegal act against the payout control device 111. In general, since the main control device 110 related to the occurrence of jackpot is often replaced by a fraudulent person, the fraud can be effectively prevented by detecting the replacement of the main control device 110 more sensitively. .

  Next, the pachinko machine 10 according to the second embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS. 29 to 32. In the pachinko machine 10 of the first embodiment described above, the fraud monitoring timer 208 is provided only in the main controller 110. However, in the pachinko machine 10 of the second embodiment, not only the main controller 110 but also the payout The control device 111 is also provided with a fraud monitoring timer 218 (see FIG. 29) similar to the fraud monitoring timer 208. In the second embodiment, the same parts as those in the first embodiment are denoted by the same reference numerals, and the description thereof is omitted.

  FIG. 29 is a block diagram showing an electrical configuration of the pachinko machine 10 according to the second embodiment. As shown in FIG. 29, the payout control device 111 of the pachinko machine 10 according to the second embodiment includes a ROM 212, a RAM 213, and a fraud monitoring timer 218.

  The fraud monitoring timer 218 corresponds to the fraud monitoring timer 208 provided in the main control device 110. As a result of collation between the management password on the main control device 110 side and the management password on the payout control device 111 side, When it is determined that an abnormality exists in the control device 110 or the payout control device 111, it is a timer for measuring a period (a grace period) during which the determination (determination indicating an abnormality) is suspended.

  The fraud monitoring timer 218 provided in the payout control device 111 is the main control device 110 or payout control when the pachinko machine 10 is turned on, or as a result of verification of the management password by the second verification processing (see FIG. 31). When it is confirmed that there is no abnormality in the device 111, a grace period (30 sec in the present embodiment) for suspending determination indicating abnormality due to fraud or the like is set as an initial value. . Then, after the initial value is set, the value is subtracted by a fraud monitoring timer update process (see FIG. 32) executed every predetermined time (in this embodiment, every 4 ms).

  FIG. 30 is a flowchart showing an internal startup process that is started up in the payout control device 111 when the power is turned on. This internal startup process is a process executed by the internal program 212a1 in the same manner as the internal startup process (see FIG. 25) in the first embodiment.

  As shown in FIG. 30, in the internal startup processing in the second embodiment, after executing the processing of S1701 to S1705, an initial value is set in the fraud monitoring timer 218 (S1706), and this internal startup processing is executed. finish. As described above, the fraud monitoring timer 218 in the present embodiment is configured to be sequentially subtracted by the fraud monitoring timer update process (see FIG. 32) executed every 4 ms. The initial value is a value converted into a value corresponding to timekeeping by subtraction every 4 ms. In other words, since the grace period is set to 30 seconds in this embodiment, 7500 is set as the initial value in the fraud monitoring timer 218.

  FIG. 31 is a flowchart showing the second matching process (S1502) in the second embodiment. The second verification process (S1502) in the second embodiment is replaced with the second verification process (see FIG. 27) in the first embodiment in the second management password process (see FIG. 26). This process is executed and executed by the internal program 212a1.

  As shown in FIG. 31, in the second collation process (S1502) in the second embodiment, as a result of confirmation in the process of S1601, the management password stored in the first management PW memory 213a and the second management PW memory If the management password stored in 213b is equal (S1601: Yes), it indicates that neither the main control device 110 nor the payout control device 111 has been confirmed to have an abnormality due to fraud or the like. Then, an initial value (7500 corresponding to 30 sec in this embodiment) is set in the fraud monitoring timer 218 of the payout control device 218 (S2602), and this second collation process (S1502) is terminated.

  That is, if it is confirmed that there is no abnormality due to fraud in the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 by the processing of S1601, as a result, the grace time is counted by the fraud monitoring timer 218. Again, it starts from the initial value (30 sec in this embodiment).

  On the other hand, if the management password stored in the first management PW memory 203a is not equal to the management password stored in the second management PW memory 203b as a result of the confirmation in the process of S1601 (S1601: No), Since it is suspected that the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 has an abnormality due to fraud or the like, in this case, it is confirmed whether the value of the fraud monitoring timer 218 is 0 (S2603).

  As a result of checking in the processing of S2603, if the value of the fraud monitoring timer 218 is not 0 (S2603: No), even if the determination result in the processing of S1601 indicates the presence of an abnormality due to fraud etc. In this case, the second collation process (S1502) is terminated without performing anything.

  On the other hand, if the value of the fraud monitoring timer 218 is 0 (S2603: Yes) as a result of the confirmation in the processing of S2603 (S2603: Yes), since the grace period is exceeded, the determination result by the processing of S1601 is fixed, that is, the main control It is determined that an abnormality caused by fraud or the like exists in the device 110 or the payout control device 111. In this case, an anti-fraud processing process for stopping the operation of the payout control device 111 is executed (S2604), and this second verification The process (S1502) ends.

  Therefore, if it is suspected that at least one of the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 is abnormal due to fraud by the process of S1601, the value of the fraud monitoring timer 218 is not changed and the remaining time of the grace time Will be consumed further. However, as described above, until the value of the fraud monitoring timer 218 indicates 0, there is a case where the existence of an abnormality due to fraud is suspected in at least one of the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 by the processing of S1601. Even if it exists, since the determination is postponed, it can prevent that the legitimate control devices 110 and 111 are erroneously determined to be illegal due to erroneous determination due to temporary factors such as noise.

  If the fraud monitoring timer 218 indicates 0 and it is determined that fraudulent acts have been performed on the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111, the payout control device is executed by executing the fraud countermeasure processing (S2604). Since the operation of 111 stops, it is possible to prevent the game ball from being paid out illegally.

  FIG. 32 is a flowchart showing a fraud monitoring timer update process executed by the MPU 211 in the payout control apparatus. This fraud monitoring timer update process is an interrupt process that is started every predetermined time (in this embodiment, every 4 ms) by the user program 212b1. As shown in FIG. 32, the fraud monitoring timer update process is started, and after the fraud monitoring timer 218 is subtracted by 1 (S2001), the process ends. By executing this fraud monitoring timer update process, the value of the fraud monitoring timer 218 is decremented by 1 every 4 ms.

  In the present embodiment, in the second verification process (S1502), as a result of confirmation in the process of S1601, it is confirmed that neither the main control apparatus 110 nor the payout control apparatus 111 has an abnormality due to fraud or the like. Is configured to set an initial value in the fraud monitoring timer 218, and output of the timer clear command used in the first embodiment is unnecessary. Therefore, the fraud monitoring timer update process executed by the main controller 110 in the second embodiment is the same as the processes of S1001 and S1003 in the fraud monitoring timer update process (see FIG. 11) in the first embodiment. Is no longer necessary.

  That is, the fraud monitoring timer update process (S207) in the second embodiment is started after the execution of the second symbol control process (S206) in the main process (see FIG. 8), and after the fraud monitoring timer 208 is decremented by 1 ( S1002), the process ends. Then, the process proceeds to the management password output setting process (S208).

  As described above, the pachinko machine 10 according to the second embodiment includes not only the main control device 110 but also the payout control device 111 including the fraud monitoring timer 218 similar to the fraud monitoring timer 208. The fraud monitoring timer 208 of the device 110 is initialized according to the result of the first collation process (see FIG. 19) executed by the main control device 110, and the fraud monitoring timer 218 of the payout control device 111 is initialized by the payout control device 111. It is initialized according to the result of the second collation process (see FIG. 31) executed in step (b). Therefore, unlike the first embodiment, the initial value is not set in the fraud monitoring timer 208 by the timer clear command output from the payout control device 111. Therefore, the timer clear command can be illegally input, thereby preventing illegal acts including illegal acts that extend the grace period indefinitely.

  As described above, the present invention has been described based on each embodiment, but the present invention is not limited to the above-described embodiment, and various modifications can be easily made without departing from the gist of the present invention. Can be inferred.

  For example, in the first embodiment described above, the basic operations of the MPUs 201 and 211 and the control of the flowcharts shown in FIGS. 17 to 20 and FIGS. 25 to 28 are stored in the user unusable areas 202a and 212a of the ROMs 202 and 212. The internal program 202a1 and 212a1 are software-based, but may be hardware-controlled.

  In the first embodiment described above, in the control of the flowcharts shown in FIGS. 17 to 20 and FIGS. 25 to 28 executed by the internal programs 202a1 and 212a1, the management password is updated by calculation. Processes other than the first calculation process (see FIG. 20) and the second calculation process (see FIG. 28) may be executed by the user programs 202b1 and 212b1.

  In the above embodiment, the value of the unique code memory 207a is described as 8-byte data. However, the data size is not limited to 8 bytes, and data of 8 bytes or more (for example, 16-byte data), 8 It may be data of 1 byte or less (for example, 1 byte, 2 bytes, 4 bytes of data, or 1 byte or less of bit unit data).

  In the above embodiment, the backup voltage is supplied from the power supply device 115 to both the third management PW memory 203c (RAM 203) of the main control device 110 and the third management PW memory 213c (RAM 213c) of the payout control device 111. However, the third management PW memory 203c (RAM 203) of the main control device 110 and the third management of the payout control device 111 are provided from a dedicated power source for backup (such as a backup capacitor) separate from the power supply device 115. The backup voltage may be supplied to both the PW memory 213c (RAM 213c).

  A backup voltage is supplied from the power supply device 115 to one of the third management PW memory 203c (RAM 203) of the main control device 110 or the third management PW memory 213c (RAM 213c) of the payout control device 111. May be configured to provide a dedicated backup capacitor.

  Alternatively, the main controller 110 may be provided with a backup capacitor dedicated to the RAM 203, and the payout controller 111 may be provided with a backup capacitor dedicated to the RAM 213. When a dedicated backup capacitor is provided in the main controller 110 and / or the payout controller 111, the backup capacitor is provided outside the board boxes 100, 102 even if it is provided inside the board boxes 100, 102. It may be done.

  In the above-described embodiment, the third management PW memories 203c and 213c for storing the management password for backup are provided in the RAMs 203 and 213, respectively, but are stored in a writable nonvolatile storage medium such as an EEPROM. It is good also as composition to do.

  In the above embodiment, the unique code memory 207a is provided in the main control device 110. However, the payout control device 111 may have a unique code memory that stores unique information in place of the main control device 110. . In this case, when the power is turned on while pressing the RAM erase switch 122, the value (unique information) of the unique code memory of the payout control device 111 is read, and the read value is output to the main control device 110, The second management PW memory 203b of the main control device 110 and the third management PW memory 203c for backup may be stored.

  Alternatively, the main control device 110 may have the unique code memory 207 and the payout control device 111 may also have a unique code memory. In this case, at a predetermined timing, the main control device 110 sets the value of the unique code memory 207a as the first management password in the main control device 110, while the payout control device 111 sets the payout control. The value of the unique code memory in the device 111 can be set as the first management password in the payout control device 111.

  Further, in the above embodiment, after the value stored in the third management PW memory 213c is written in the first management PW memory 213a as the first management password by the process of S1705, the first management PW memory The value stored in 213a and the first management password received from the main control device 110 are collated, but the first management password received from the main control device 110 and the third management PW It is good also as a structure which collates directly with the value memorize | stored in the memory 213c.

  In the above embodiment, when the main controller 110 is turned on while the RAM erase switch 122 is pressed, the value of the unique code memory 207a is stored in the third management PW memory 203c by the process of S1104. Although it is configured, it may be configured to omit this. Similarly, in the above embodiment, when the payout control device 111 receives the value of the unique code memory 207a from the main control device 110, the received value is stored in the third management PW memory 213c. It is good also as a structure which omits this.

  In the pachinko machine 10 according to the above embodiment, the management password used in the first calculation is the same value, that is, the value of the unique code memory 207a in both the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111. Alternatively, it is configured to be the value of the third management PW memory 203c, 213c, which is a value derived from the value of the unique code memory 207a, but the management password used in the first calculation in the main controller 110, The management password used in the first calculation in the payout control device 111 may be a non-identical value. In this case, values (calculated values) used in the first calculation are mutually output to the counterpart control device, or values used in the first calculation in the counterpart control device are stored in advance. By configuring such that the initial values of the control devices on the other side can be recognized with respect to each other, similar fraud prevention can be achieved.

  Further, in the above embodiment, when the RAM erase switch 122 is pressed when the power to the pachinko machine 10 is turned on, the initial values of the management passwords of both the main controller 110 and the payout controller 111 ( The first management password) is configured to be a specified value (constant), that is, the value of the unique code memory 207a. However, a value that can be variably obtained each time may be used as an initial value. Good.

  Moreover, in the said embodiment, although comprised so that the nth calculation performed by both the main control apparatus 110 and the payout control apparatus 111 may be the same, it differs in the main control apparatus 110 and the payout control apparatus 111. The structure which performs this may be sufficient. In this case, for example, the internal programs 202a1 and 212a1 are in a state in which computations performed by both control units are possible, and the configuration is predicted by performing the computation results performed by the counterpart control device. It is possible to prevent fraud.

  In the above-described embodiment, the payout control device 111 performs the (n + 1) th calculation using the nth calculation result obtained in the second calculation process (see FIG. 28), The main control device 110 is configured to perform the (n + 1) th calculation using the received management password when the nth management password is received from the payout control device 110.

  Instead, the main controller 110 performs the (n + 1) -th calculation using the n-th calculation result obtained in the first calculation process (see FIG. 20). In 111, when the nth management password is received from the main control device 111, the received management password may be used to perform the (n + 1) th calculation.

  In the above embodiment, in both the first calculation process (see FIG. 20) and the second calculation process (see FIG. 28), the value of the management password is (1) shifted 1 bit to the right → (2) inverted. → (3) 3-bit shift to the right → (4) inversion → (1) 1-bit shift to the right →... Is calculated and updated in this order. A combination of a plurality of operations such as “bit shift and inversion” may be employed.

  In the above-described embodiment, the management password is transmitted once for two calculations. However, the management password is transmitted once for one calculation. The configuration may be such that one management password is transmitted for two or more (for example, four) calculations.

  Further, S1326 in the above embodiment is a process of writing the new management password updated by the calculations performed in S1324, S1329, and S1330 to the third management PW memory 203c, but the second management PW is performed by the process of S1325. It may be a process of writing the value stored in the memory 203b to the third management PW memory 203c. Similarly, in the processing of S1625 in the above embodiment, instead of writing the new management password updated by the operations performed in S1623, S1627, and S1628 in the third management PW memory 213c, the processing of S1624 is performed. The value stored in the first management PW memory 213a may be written into the third management PW memory 213c.

  Further, in the first collation process (see FIG. 19) in the above embodiment, as a result of the process of S1303, the presence of an abnormality due to fraud or the like is determined for the main control apparatus 110 or the payout control apparatus 111. Is configured so that a fraud detection command is output to the sound lamp control device 113, but in addition to the fraud detection command output or in place of the fraud detection command output, another command is output to the payout control 111. As a result, the payout control device 111 may be configured such that the payout of the game ball is prohibited or the operation of the payout control device 111 itself is stopped.

  Alternatively, an output device (for example, the first symbol display device 37 or the like) controlled by the main control device 110 when the presence of an abnormality due to fraud or the like is determined for the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 is used. Thus, the existence of fraud may be notified to the outside. In addition, a dedicated lamp is provided on the main control board 110 and the payout control board 111, and the lamp is turned on when the controller 110 and the payout control apparatus 111 are determined to have an abnormality due to fraud. May be. Further, when it is determined that an illegal act has been made with respect to the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111, the main control device 110 is turned off to forcibly stop the execution of the game. May be.

  In the second embodiment, the fraud countermeasure process (S2604) in the second verification process (see FIG. 31) is a process for stopping the operation of the payout control device 111. However, in the payout control device 111, a game ball You may stop only paying out. Alternatively, a dedicated lamp may be provided on the payout control board 111, and the lamp may be turned on by fraud countermeasure processing (S2604).

  Alternatively, in the fraud countermeasure processing (S2604), a command is output to the main control device 110, the power supply of the main control device 110 is shut off to forcibly stop the execution of the game, or an output device (controlled by the control device 110) For example, the configuration may be such that the presence of an illegal act is notified to the outside using the first symbol display device 37 or the like, or a dedicated lamp is provided on the main control board 110 to light the lamp.

  Alternatively, in the fraud countermeasure processing (S2604), a command is output to the sound lamp control device 113, and as a result, output using the sound output device 226, the lamp display device 227, or the third symbol display device 81 (auditory output) Or a visual display), the presence of an illegal act may be notified to the outside.

  In the above embodiment, the fraud prevention is performed using the management password between the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111. However, this is replaced with the payout control device 111 and other sub-controls. It is good also as a structure performed between apparatuses (audio | voice lamp control apparatus 113 etc.) and the main control apparatus 110. FIG.

  Alternatively, the management password is used not only between the main control device 110 and the payout control device 111 but also between the main control device 110 and the sub control device (such as the sound lamp control device 113) as in the above embodiment. It may be configured to prevent fraud. The more sub-control devices that collate the management password with the main control device 110, the more fraudulent boards must be produced in all of those control devices in order to carry out fraud, and the execution and success of fraud is more It becomes difficult.

  In the first embodiment, the fraud monitoring timer 208 is provided only in the main control device 110. However, instead of providing the fraud monitoring timer 208 in the main control device 111, the payout control device 111 is supported. A timer may be provided.

  In the above embodiment, the grace period is measured by the fraud monitoring timers 208 and 218, and the determination indicating the presence of the abnormality made in the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 is graced within the grace period. However, when it is determined that there is an abnormality in the main control device 110 or the payout control device 111 without providing such a grace period, the determination may be immediately confirmed.

  In each of the above embodiments, each command is transmitted from the main control device 110 to the sound lamp control device 113, and the sound lamp control device 113 issues a display instruction to the display control device 114. However, the command may be directly transmitted from the main control device 110 to the display control device 114. Further, an audio lamp control device may be connected to the display control device, and a command instructing the output of each sound and the lighting of the lamp may be transmitted from the display control device to the audio lamp control device. Furthermore, the sound lamp control device and the display control device may be configured as one control device.

  Moreover, in the said embodiment, although it was comprised so that the winning to the 1st entrance 64 and the passage of the 2nd entrance 67 might be held up to 4 times, respectively, the maximum number of times of holding was 4 times. It is not limited and may be set to 3 times or less, or 5 times or more (for example, 8 times). In addition, the number of times the variable display is held based on the winning at the first entrance 64 is different for the part of the third symbol display device 81 by a number or by dividing the number of four divided areas by the number of times of the hold. It may be displayed in a mode (for example, color or lighting pattern), and a light emitting member such as a lamp is provided separately from the first symbol display device 37, and the number of holding times is notified by the light emitting member. You may do it.

  Further, as shown in the above embodiment, the variable display, which is a kind of dynamic display, is not limited to the one that scrolls the symbol as identification information in the vertical direction on the display screen of the third symbol display device 81, It may be performed by moving and displaying symbols along a predetermined route such as a horizontal direction or an L shape. In addition, the dynamic display of the identification information is not limited to the display of variation of the symbol. The effect display etc. which are displayed are also included. In this case, one or more characters are used as the third symbol.

  You may implement this invention in the pachinko machine etc. of a type different from the said embodiment. For example, the present invention may be applied to a so-called second type pachinko gaming machine having a winning device having a special area such as a V zone. Further, in addition to the pachinko machine, the game machine may be implemented as another game machine such as an alepacchi or a sparrow ball.

  You may implement this invention in the pachinko machine etc. of a type different from the said embodiment. For example, once a big hit, a pachinko machine (commonly known as a two-time right, a three-time right, etc.) that increases the expected value of the big hit until a big hit state occurs (for example, twice or three times). May also be implemented. Further, after the jackpot symbol is displayed, it may be implemented as a pachinko machine that generates a special game that gives a player a predetermined game value on the condition that a ball is won in a predetermined area. Further, the present invention may be implemented in a pachinko machine that has a special area such as a V-zone and has a special gaming state as a necessary condition for winning a ball in the special area. Further, in addition to the pachinko machine, the game machine may be implemented as various game machines such as an alepatchi, a sparrow ball, a slot machine, a game machine in which a so-called pachinko machine and a slot machine are integrated.

  In the slot machine, for example, a symbol is changed by operating a control lever in a state where a symbol effective line is determined by inserting coins, and a symbol is stopped and confirmed by operating a stop button. Is. Accordingly, the basic concept of the slot machine is that it is provided with a display device for confirming and displaying the identification information after variably displaying the identification information string composed of a plurality of identification information, and resulting from the operation of the starting operation means (for example, the operation lever). The variation display of the identification information is started, and the variation display of the identification information is stopped and fixedly displayed due to the operation of the operation means for stop (for example, the stop button) or when a predetermined time elapses. It is a slot machine that generates a special game that gives a player a predetermined game value on the condition that the combination of identification information at the time is a specific condition. In this case, the game medium is typically a coin, medal, etc. Take as an example.

  In addition, as a specific example of a gaming machine in which a pachinko machine and a slot machine are fused, a display device is provided that displays a symbol after a symbol string composed of a plurality of symbols is variably displayed, and has a handle for launching a ball. What is not. In this case, after throwing a predetermined amount of spheres based on a predetermined operation (button operation), for example, the change of the symbol is started due to the operation of the operation lever, for example, due to the operation of the stop button, or With the passage of time, the variation of the symbol is stopped, and a special game that gives a predetermined game value to the player is generated on the condition that the determined symbol at the time of stoppage is a so-called jackpot symbol. In this case, a large amount of balls are paid out to the lower tray.

  Below, the gaming machine and the modification of the present invention are shown. The basic operation is controlled in software or hardware, and the user is executed by executing an internal control means that cannot substantially recognize or modify the control content and a user program arbitrarily stored in a predetermined storage area. User program control means for controlling operations specific to each program, the main control means for performing main control relating to the game by the control by the internal control means and the user action control means, and the basic action software Specific to each user program by executing internal control means that can be controlled in a manual or hardware manner, and the control contents are substantially impossible to recognize or modify, and a user program arbitrarily stored in a predetermined storage area User program control means for controlling the operation of the internal control means, and by the control by the user action control means When a command is received from the main control means, in the gaming machine comprising peripheral control means for performing peripheral control related to the game according to the received command, both the main control means and the peripheral control means are management information , The management information storage means for storing, the first initial value storage means for storing the value to be stored as the first management information in the management information storage means, and when the power to the gaming machine is turned on, First initial value setting means for writing a value stored in the first initial value storage means as first management information in the management information storage means, and stored in the management information storage means at every predetermined timing. The nth (n is an integer greater than or equal to 1) management information is calculated, and the calculation means for obtaining the (n + 1) th management information and the calculation by the calculation means Management information holding means for storing the management information as a value to be stored in the first initial value storage means as first management information in the management information storage means, and stored in the management information storage means Management information that is updated to management information obtained by calculation by the calculation means, management information output means that outputs the management information updated by the update means to the other-side control means, When the nth management information is received from the counterpart control means, the received nth management information and the nth management information stored in the management information storage means are collated, Determining means for determining whether or not there is an abnormality in the control means or the peripheral control means, and the calculations performed by the calculation means of the main control means and the peripheral control means respectively correspond to each other. The first initial value storage means is configured so that the stored contents are retained even when the power of the gaming machine is cut off. A gaming machine 1 characterized.

  According to the gaming machine 1, main control related to the game is performed by the main control means based on the control by the internal control means and the user operation control means of the main control means, and the peripheral control means allows the command from the main control means. Is received based on the control by the internal control means and user operation control means of the peripheral control means according to the received command. Note that both the user operation control means of the main control means and the user operation control means of the peripheral control means control specific operations for each user program by executing a user program arbitrarily stored in a predetermined storage area. Is.

  On the other hand, the internal control means of the main control means and the internal control means of the peripheral control means both control the basic operation in software or hardware. It is virtually impossible.

  Here, the first management information is stored in the management information storage means corresponding to the value stored in the corresponding first initial value storage means by the first initial value setting means in response to power-on of the gaming machine. Written as That is, when the power to the gaming machine is turned on, the value stored in the initial value storage means of the main control means is stored in the management information storage means of the main control means by the first initial value setting means of the main control means. It is stored as the first management information. On the other hand, the value stored in the initial value storage means of the main control means is stored in the management information storage means of the peripheral control means by the first initial value setting means of the peripheral control means when the power to the gaming machine is turned on. It is stored as the first management information. Therefore, in both the main control means and the peripheral control means, the value of the first initial value storage means is stored as the first management information in the management information storage means.

  Further, calculation is performed at predetermined timings by the calculation means of the main control means and the peripheral control means, and the nth (n is an integer of 1 or more) management information is the (n + 1) th management by calculation. Updated with information. That is, the management information is sequentially updated at predetermined timings by the calculation means of the main control means and the peripheral control means. The “every predetermined timing” includes every execution timing of a specific operation (for example, a write operation or a read operation) or every elapse of a predetermined time.

  The management information stored in the management information storage means is updated by the update means to the management information obtained by the calculation by the calculation means. That is, the management information stored in the management information storage means of the main control means is updated to the management information obtained by the calculation by the calculation means of the main control means by the update means of the main control means. On the other hand, the management information stored in the management information storage unit of the peripheral control unit is updated to the management information obtained by the calculation by the calculation unit of the peripheral control unit by the update unit of the peripheral control unit. As a result, the management information storage unit of each control unit is sequentially updated to the management information obtained by the calculation every time the calculation unit performs the calculation.

  The management information updated by the updating means is output to the counterpart control means by the corresponding management information output means. The “other party control means” is the peripheral control means in the case of the main control means, and is the main control means in the case of the peripheral control means. That is, the management information stored in the management information of the main control means is output by the management information output means of the main control means to the peripheral control means that is the counterpart control means. On the other hand, the management information stored in the management information of the peripheral control means is output to the main control means by the management information output means of the peripheral control means.

  On the other hand, when the nth management information is received from the counterpart control means as a result of the output of the nth management information by the management information output means or the initial value output means in the counterpart control means. In this case, the determination means of the control means on the receiving side compares the nth management information stored in the management information storage means of the control means on the receiving side with the received nth management information. Based on the comparison, the determination unit determines whether or not there is an abnormality in the main control unit or the peripheral control unit. In other words, when the main control means receives the nth management information from the peripheral control means that is the counterpart control means, the main control means determines the management of the main control means (reception side control means). The nth management information stored in the information storage means is compared with the nth management information received from the peripheral control means, and as a result, there is an abnormality in the main control means or the peripheral control means. A determination is made as to whether or not. On the other hand, when the peripheral control means receives the nth management information from the main control means, it is stored in the management information storage means of the peripheral control means (reception-side control means) by the determination means of the peripheral control means. The n-th management information and the n-th management information received from the main control means are collated, and as a result, whether or not there is an abnormality in the main control means or the peripheral control means is determined. Is made. Therefore, when a malfunction occurs due to an illegal act such as attachment of an unauthorized board to the main control means or the peripheral control means, the malfunction is determined by the determination means as an abnormality.

  Here, the calculations performed by the calculation means of the main control means and the peripheral control means are respectively defined by the internal control means of the corresponding control means. That is, the calculation performed by the calculation means of the main control means is defined by the internal control means of the main control means, while the calculation performed by the calculation means of the peripheral control means is defined by the internal control means of the peripheral control means. The

  As described above, both the main control means and the peripheral control means are configured such that the control content of the internal control means is substantially impossible to recognize or modify. Accordingly, the calculation contents of the calculation means executed by the internal control means are naturally difficult to recognize or modify.

  Therefore, it becomes difficult to produce an illegal board that imitates and outputs the management information that is sequentially updated by the arithmetic means, and as a result, illegal acts using the illegal board can be reliably prevented.

  On the other hand, when new management information is obtained by computation by the computation means, the newly obtained management information is stored in the first initial value storage means in the management information holding means. Here, the contents stored in the first initial value storage means are retained even when the gaming machine is powered off. Therefore, when the gaming machine is turned on again after the gaming machine is turned off, the management information obtained by the computation by the computing means executed last before the power is turned off is the first information described above. The initial value setting means stores the first management information in the management information storage means. That is, when the power is turned on again after the power is turned off, the main control means and the peripheral control means are set to 1: by the management information obtained by the calculation performed by the calculation means last executed before the power is turned off. The combination corresponding to 1 is fixed. Therefore, in order to perform fraud, a fraudulent board corresponding to a regular combination is required, but as described above, it is difficult to sequentially imitate values obtained by computation by the computation means executed by the internal control means. Therefore, it is difficult to manufacture such an illegal board, and an illegal act using the illegal board can be prevented.

  In the gaming machine 1, the first storage member that stores the main control means inside, the second storage member that stores the peripheral control means inside, and the main control means when the power of the gaming machine is cut off A first memory holding power supply means for holding the contents stored in the first initial value storage means, and a memory in the first initial value storage means in the peripheral control means when the power of the gaming machine is cut off Second memory holding power supply means for holding the stored contents, wherein at least one of the first memory holding power supply means and the second memory holding power supply means is the first storage member or the second storage power supply means. 1. A gaming machine 2 configured to be positioned outside a storage member.

  According to the gaming machine 2, when the power of the gaming machine is cut off, the first memory holding power supply means supplies the memory holding voltage (backup voltage) to the first initial value storage means in the main control means. On the other hand, a voltage for storing and holding (backup voltage) is supplied to the first initial value storing means in the peripheral control means by the second storing and holding power supply means. As a result, the contents stored in the first initial value storage means in the main control means and the first initial value storage means in the peripheral control means are held.

  Here, at least one of the first memory holding power supply means and the second memory holding power supply means is a first storage member that stores the main control means inside, or a second storage member that stores the peripheral control means inside. It is comprised so that it may be located outside.

  Therefore, the regular board (the board including the main control means and the board including the peripheral control means) is replaced with an illegal board together with the storage member (the first storage member or the second storage member) storing the board outside the business hours. Even if there is, the memory holding power supply means (the first memory holding power supply means or the second memory holding power supply means) outside the replaced storage member (first storage member or second storage member) When the storage member is arranged, the storage holding voltage (backup voltage) supplied from the storage holding power supply means is cut off with the removal of the storage member (first storage member or second storage member). Then, the value stored in the first initial value storage means is erased by the management information holding means. Therefore, unless the power of the installation island is turned on and the first initial value storage means is initialized (RAM clear), the determination means determines that an abnormality exists.

  Similarly, a storage medium (eg, ROM) that stores the control contents of the main control board or the peripheral control means or the user program control means may be replaced with a storage medium that stores illegal control contents. Even if the storage holding power supply means for supplying the storage holding voltage to the substrate having the replaced storage medium, the storage member (first storage member or second storage member) for storing the substrate is used. In the case of being located outside, the storage holding voltage supplied from the storage holding power supply means is cut off with the removal of the storage medium, so that it is stored in the first initial value storage means by the management information holding means. Will be erased. Therefore, unless the power of the installation island is turned on and the first initial value storage means is initialized (RAM clear), the determination means determines that an abnormality exists. .

  Therefore, it becomes difficult to use an unauthorized substrate and a storage medium (for example, ROM) that stores unauthorized control contents, so that it is possible to prevent unauthorized acts more reliably.

  In the gaming machine 2, the first memory holding power supply means and the second memory holding power supply means may be configured as separate power supply means or as integrated power supply means. .

  The gaming machine 1 includes storage holding power supply means for holding the contents stored in the first initial value storage means when the gaming machine power is cut off, and the storage holding power supply means includes the main holding power supply means. A gaming machine configured to supply a memory holding voltage in common to the first initial value storage means in the control means and the first initial value storage means in the peripheral control means 3

  According to the gaming machine 3, when the power of the gaming machine is cut off, the memory holding power supply means shares the first initial value storage means in the main control means and the first initial value storage means in the peripheral control means. Then, a memory holding voltage (backup voltage) is supplied, and the contents stored in these first initial value storage means are held.

  Therefore, even if the regular board (the board including the main control means and the board including the peripheral control means) is replaced with an unauthorized board outside the business hours, the management information is removed by removing the regular board when replacing the board. Since the value stored in the first initial value storage means is erased by the holding means, the determination means unless the power of the installed island is turned on and the first initial value storage means is initialized (RAM clear). Therefore, it is determined that an abnormality exists.

  Similarly, a storage medium (eg, ROM) that stores the control contents of the main control board or the peripheral control means or the user program control means may be replaced with a storage medium that stores illegal control contents. However, when the storage medium is removed at the time of replacement, the value stored in the first initial value storage unit is erased by the management information holding unit. Will be.

  Therefore, it becomes difficult to use an unauthorized substrate and a storage medium (for example, ROM) that stores unauthorized control contents, so that it is possible to prevent unauthorized acts more reliably.

  The gaming machine 3 includes a first storage member that stores the main control means inside, and a second storage member that stores the peripheral control means inside, wherein the memory holding power supply means is the first storage member The gaming machine 4 is configured to be positioned outside the second storage member and outside the second storage member.

  According to the gaming machine 4, the memory holding power supply means is located outside the first storage member that stores the main control means inside, and outside the second storage member that stores the peripheral control means inside. By the removal of the first storage member or the second storage member, the memory holding voltage (backup voltage) supplied from the memory holding power supply means to the main control means or the peripheral control means is cut off. Therefore, the regular board (the board including the main control means and the board including the peripheral control means) is replaced with an illegal board together with the storage member (the first storage member or the second storage member) storing the board outside the business hours. Even if this happens, the storage holding voltage (backup voltage) supplied from the storage holding power supply means is cut off with the removal of the storage member (the first storage member or the second storage member), and the management information is held. The value stored in the first initial value storage means is erased by the means. Similarly, a storage medium (eg, ROM) that stores the control contents of the main control board or the peripheral control means or the user program control means may be replaced with a storage medium that stores illegal control contents. However, since the storage holding voltage supplied from the storage holding power supply means is cut off with the removal of the storage medium, the value stored in the first initial value storage means is erased by the management information holding means. The As a result, it becomes difficult to use an unauthorized substrate and a storage medium (for example, ROM) that stores unauthorized control contents, so that unauthorized actions can be prevented more reliably.

  In any one of the gaming machines 1 to 4, one of the main control means or the peripheral control means is turned on in a manner involving a second initial value storage means for storing a predetermined value and an initialization of the gaming machine. A second initial value setting means for writing the value stored in the second initial value storage means as the first management information in the management information storage means, and the power supply in a mode involving initialization of the gaming machine. And an initial value output means for outputting the value stored in the second initial value storage means to the counterpart control means when it is input, and receiving the value output by the initial value output means When the control unit on the receiving side receives the value output by the initial value output unit in the control unit on the other side, the third initial write unit writes the received value as the first management information in the management information storage unit Equipped with value setting means Gaming machine 5, characterized in that there.

  According to the gaming machine 5, when the power is turned on in a mode involving initialization of the gaming machine, the value stored in one of the second initial value storage means of the main control means or the peripheral control means is the second value. The initial value setting means writes the first management information in the management information storage means. Further, the value stored in the second initial value storage means is output to the counterpart control means by the initial value output means.

  On the other hand, when the control means on the side receiving the value output by the initial value output means receives the value, the third initial value setting means stores the first management information in the management information storage means. Written. The “control means on the side of receiving the first management information output by the initial value output means” is a peripheral control means when a value is output by the initial value output means of the main control means. When the value is output by the initial value output means of the peripheral control means, it is the main control means.

  Therefore, when the power is turned on in a mode involving initialization of the gaming machine, the first management information in the main control means and the first management information in the peripheral control means have the same value, that is, the second It is set to the value of the initial value storage means. As a result, the main control means and the peripheral control means are fixed as a combination corresponding to 1: 1 when the power is turned on in a mode involving initialization of the gaming machine. Therefore, in order to perform fraud, an illegal board corresponding to a regular combination is required. However, it is difficult to manufacture such an illegal board, and an illegal act using the illegal board can be prevented.

  In the gaming machine 5, the value stored in the second initial value setting means is unique information that is different for each gaming machine.

  According to the gaming machine 6, the value stored in the second initial value storage means stores unique information that is different for each gaming machine. Therefore, when the assembled gaming machine is first turned on In addition, the value for associating both control means (main control means and peripheral control means) with 1: 1 is set to different unique information for each gaming machine. Therefore, in order to perform fraud, a fraud board that can use the first management information that is different for each gaming machine is required. However, it is difficult to manufacture such a fraudulent board, and illegal acts using the fraudulent board can be reliably prevented.

  The unique information in the gaming machine 6 is, for example, information stored as binary data in unique information storage means (for example, ROM, EEPROM, etc.). Specifically, for example, a serial number (ID) set so as not to be duplicated for each gaming machine manufacturer, each gaming machine model, or each gaming machine component (for example, a control device typified by MPU). No.) for specifying the production time and production lot.

  In any of the gaming machines 1 to 6, when the determination means of the main control means or the peripheral control means determines that the main control means or the peripheral control means is abnormal, the fact is notified to the outside. A gaming machine comprising an informing means.

  According to the gaming machine 7, when it is determined by the determining means of the main control means or the peripheral control means that the main control means or the peripheral control means is abnormal, the notification means notifies the outside. Therefore, it is possible to clearly distinguish whether or not there is an abnormality (eg, a malfunction of the main control means or the peripheral control means based on an illegal act such as the use of an illegal substrate) depending on whether or not notification is performed by the notification means. In addition, it is possible to notify the store clerk of the game hall of the presence of the main control means or the peripheral control means having an abnormality by the notification.

  In any one of the gaming machines 1 to 7, the calculation performed by the calculation means of the main control means for the nth time after the power is turned on, and the calculation performed by the calculation means of the peripheral control means for the nth time after the power is turned on. The gaming machine 8 is configured to have the same calculation.

  According to the gaming machine 8, the calculation performed by the arithmetic means of the main control means for the nth time after the power is turned on is the same as the calculation performed by the arithmetic means of the peripheral control means for the nth time after the power is turned on. Therefore, the transition pattern of the management information that is changed by the calculation is the same transition pattern in both the main control unit and the peripheral control unit. Therefore, since it is easy to determine whether or not there is an abnormality in the main control means or the payout control means by collating both management information in the determination means, considering this similar transition pattern, the development of the internal control means and Design becomes easy.

  In the gaming machine 8, the calculation performed by the calculation means of the main control means and the calculation performed by the calculation means of the peripheral control means are both calculated with a pattern of calculations performed multiple times as one cycle. A gaming machine 9 which is performed by repeating a cycle.

  According to the gaming machine 9, the calculation performed by the calculation means of the main control means and the calculation performed by the calculation means of the peripheral control means are all performed with a pattern of calculations performed multiple times as one cycle. Since it is performed by repeating the cycle, it becomes difficult to manufacture an illegal substrate by imitating an operation pattern of one cycle, and as a result, an illegal act using the illegal substrate can be surely prevented.

  In the gaming machine 8 or 9, the value used in the first calculation after the power is turned on by the calculation means of the main control means and the first time after the power is turned on by the calculation means of the peripheral control means. The gaming machine 10 is configured to have the same value as that used in the calculation performed in the above.

  According to the gaming machine 10, the value used in the first calculation after the power is turned on by the calculation means of the main control means and the first time after the power is turned on by the calculation means of the peripheral control means. As a result, the (n + 1) th management information obtained as a result of the nth calculation by the calculation means in each of the main control means and the peripheral control means is the same. It becomes the value of. Therefore, both the main control means and the determination means of the peripheral control means have an abnormality in the main control means or the peripheral control means depending on whether or not the nth ((n + 1) th) management information to be compared is the same. It can be easily determined whether or not there is.

  In any one of the gaming machines 1 to 10, the writing of the value to the management information storage means performed by the first initial value setting means is defined by the internal control means of the corresponding control means. Game machine 11.

  According to the gaming machine 11, the first initial value setting means is configured to write a value as the first management information in the management information storage means by the internal control means of the corresponding control means. As described above, since the control contents of the internal control means of the main control means and the peripheral control means are both configured to be substantially impossible to recognize or modify, the internal control thereof. By the first initial value setting means executed by the means, it is difficult to recognize or change which value is used as the first management information by the fraudster. Therefore, it becomes difficult to manufacture a fraudulent board that imitates the first management information accurately. As a result, fraudulent acts using the fraudulent board can be reliably prevented.

  In any of the gaming machines 1 to 11, when the arithmetic means in at least one of the main control means or the peripheral control means receives the nth management information from the counterpart control means, The n-th calculation is performed on the received n-th management information. Otherwise, the n-th management information obtained as a calculation result by the calculation unit of the same control unit is n-th. A gaming machine 12 characterized by performing a second calculation.

  According to the gaming machine 12, at least one of the main control means and the peripheral control means has received the nth management information from the counterpart control means (for example, the main control means in the case of the peripheral control means). In this case, the n-th calculation is performed by the calculation means on the received n-th management information. On the other hand, in other cases, that is, when the nth management information is not received from the counterpart control means, the calculation result by the same control means (for example, the peripheral control means in the case of the peripheral control means). The n-th calculation is performed by the calculation means on the n-th management information obtained as follows.

  In one control means (for example, peripheral control means), when management information obtained by computation by the computation means is used and further updated by computation by the computation means, the management information is accidental such as noise. Once it is disturbed by an incorrect value due to a factor, after that, it does not return to the correct management information as it should be, and as a result, it is erroneously determined to be abnormal by the determination means collating with the management information in the counterpart control means. It will be.

  However, according to the gaming machine 12, when the nth management information is received from the counterpart control means, the calculation means (the nth calculation) is performed by using the received management information. Therefore, as long as the received management information is correct, the erroneous management information generated by the accidental factor as described above is corrected to a correct value that should originally be. Therefore, for example, even if it is determined to be abnormal by comparing the management information with the control means on the other side by the determination means, it may be due to an accidental factor rather than an artificial factor such as fraud For example, by suspending the determination during the predetermined period, it is possible to prevent the correct control means from being erroneously determined to be illegal by being corrected with the correct management information received from the other-side control means.

  In any one of the gaming machines 1 to 12, when the arithmetic means in the main control means receives the nth management information from the peripheral control means, the arithmetic means in the main control means A game characterized in that the n-th computation is performed, and otherwise, the n-th computation is performed on the n-th management information obtained as a computation result by the computation means of the main control means. Machine 13.

  According to the gaming machine 13, when the main control means receives the nth management information from the peripheral control means, the main control means performs the nth calculation by the calculation means on the received nth management information. Done. On the other hand, in other cases, that is, when the nth management information has not been received from the peripheral control means, the calculation means for the nth management information obtained as a result of calculation by the main control means. Thus, the nth calculation is performed.

  Therefore, the management information obtained by the calculation by the calculation means of the main control means depends on the management information obtained as a result of the calculation by the calculation means of the peripheral control means. It will be detected more sensitively than cheating on the means. In general, since the main control means for performing control related to the occurrence of jackpots are often replaced by fraudsters, it is possible to effectively prevent fraud by detecting the replacement of the main control means more sensitively. Can do.

  In addition, when management information obtained by calculation by the calculation means is used in one main control means, and the calculation is further updated by calculation by the calculation means, the management information is once erroneously caused by accidental factors such as noise. If the value is disturbed, the correct management information is not restored after that, and as a result, it is erroneously determined that there is an abnormality by comparing the determination information with the management information in the peripheral control means.

  However, according to the gaming machine 13, when the nth management information is received from the peripheral control means, the calculation by the calculation means (the nth calculation) is performed using the received management information. As long as the received management information is correct, the erroneous management information caused by the accidental factor as described above is corrected to a correct value as it should be. Therefore, even if the presence of an abnormality is determined by the determination means of the main control means, if the abnormality is due to an accidental factor rather than an artificial factor such as fraudulent activity, the By delaying the determination, it is corrected by the correct management information received from the peripheral control means during that time, and it can be prevented that the regular main control means is erroneously determined to be illegal.

  In any of the gaming machines 1 to 13, if the time measuring means for measuring a predetermined period and the time measured by the time measuring means are within the predetermined period, the main control means or the determination means of the peripheral control means Even if it is a case where determination is made, the game machine 14 provided with the determination grace part which graces the determination.

  According to the gaming machine 14, if the time measured by the time measuring means is within a predetermined period, even if it is determined that the abnormality is determined by the determination grace means by the determination means of the main control means or the peripheral control means, the determination Will be suspended.

  Therefore, even if it is determined that there is an abnormality in the main control means or the peripheral control means due to accidental factors such as noise, if the cause is corrected within the grace period, the presence of the abnormality The indicated determination is ignored as it is temporary. As a result, it is possible to prevent an erroneous determination due to an accidental factor.

  In any of the gaming machines 1 to 14, the main control means has a winning detection means for detecting a winning in the game, and a number corresponding to the detected winning when the winning detection means detects the winning. A payout instruction means for outputting a command for instructing payout of game media to the peripheral control means, wherein the peripheral control means receives a command for instructing payout of a game medium by the payout instruction means. A gaming machine 15 comprising payout execution means for paying out a number of game media according to the instruction.

  According to the gaming machine 15, when a winning is detected by the winning detection means of the main control means, a command for instructing the payout of the number of game media corresponding to the detected winning is output to the peripheral control means by the payout instructing means. Is done. On the other hand, when the peripheral control means receives a command for supporting the payout of the game medium, the number of game media indicated by the command is paid out by the payout executing means in the peripheral control means.

  As described above, the peripheral control unit performs the payout control of the game medium. Whether or not an abnormality exists by using the management information between the peripheral control unit performing the payout control and the main control unit. Therefore, it is possible to determine fraudulent behavior regarding the payout of the game medium, and it is possible to reliably suppress the loss of the game hall.

  In the gaming machine 15, the communication path for transmitting and receiving the management information between the main control means and the peripheral control means is a communication for outputting a command instructing the payout of the game medium by the payout instructing means of the main control means. A gaming machine 16 that is the same communication path as the road.

  According to the gaming machine 16, the communication path for transmitting and receiving management information between the main control means and the peripheral control means is the same as the communication path for outputting a command for instructing the payout of game media by the payout instruction means of the main control means. Since it is a communication channel, it is possible to reliably determine an illegal act related to the payout of a game medium, that is, an illegal action that gains an illegal profit by illegally generating a command instructing the payout of a game medium, As a result, such illegal acts can be prevented.

  In any one of the gaming machines 1 to 16, the management information is input / output between the main control means and the peripheral control means under the control of the user program control means of each control means. A gaming machine 17 characterized by being.

  According to the gaming machine 17, the management information is input / output between the main control means and the peripheral control means under the control of the user program control means of each control means. In this case, an existing development tool such as an assembler can be used, and the design and development efficiency is good.

  The gaming machine 18 according to any one of the gaming machines 1 to 17, wherein the gaming machine is a pachinko gaming machine. Above all, the basic configuration of a pachinko gaming machine is provided with an operation handle, and a ball is launched into a predetermined game area according to the operation of the operation handle, and the ball is placed in an operation port disposed at a predetermined position in the game area. As a necessary condition for winning a prize (or passing through the operating port), the identification information dynamically displayed on the display device is confirmed and stopped after a predetermined time. In addition, when a special gaming state occurs, a variable winning device (specific winning opening) disposed at a predetermined position in the gaming area is opened in a predetermined manner so that a ball can be won, and a value corresponding to the number of winnings is obtained. Examples include those to which values (including data written on magnetic cards as well as premium balls) are given.

  A gaming machine 19 according to any one of the gaming machines 1 to 17, wherein the gaming machine is a slot machine. Above all, the basic configuration of the slot machine is “equipped with variable display means for confirming and displaying the identification information after dynamically displaying an identification information string composed of a plurality of identification information, and for operating the starting operation means (for example, an operation lever). As a result, the dynamic display of the identification information is started, and the dynamic display of the identification information is stopped due to the operation of the stop operation means (stop button) or after a predetermined time has elapsed. The game machine is provided with special game state generating means for generating a special game state advantageous to the player on the condition that the confirmed identification information is specific identification information. In this case, examples of the game media include coins and medals.

  The gaming machine 20 according to any one of the gaming machines 1 to 17, wherein the gaming machine is a combination of a pachinko gaming machine and a slot machine. Among them, the basic configuration of the merged gaming machine includes “a variable display means for confirming and displaying the identification information after dynamically displaying an identification information string composed of a plurality of identification information, and a starting operation means (for example, an operation lever). Due to the operation of the identification information, the change of the identification information is started, and the dynamic display of the identification information is stopped due to the operation of the operation means for stop (for example, the stop button) or when a predetermined time elapses. Special game state generating means for generating a special game state advantageous to the player on the condition that the fixed identification information at the time of stoppage is specific identification information, and using a ball as a game medium, and the identification information The game machine is configured such that a predetermined number of balls are required at the start of the dynamic display, and a large number of balls are paid out when the special gaming state occurs.

  The first initial value setting means according to claim 1 corresponds to the processing of S1105 and S1707, and the arithmetic means according to claim 1 corresponds to the processing of S1324, S1329, S1330, S1623, S1627, and S1628. The management information holding means according to claim 1 corresponds to the processing of S1326 and S1625, and the updating means according to claim 1 corresponds to the processing of S1325 and S1624, and outputs the management information according to claim 1. As the means, the processes of S1023, S201, and S1423 correspond, and as the determination means according to claim 1, the processes of S1301 and S1601 correspond. Further, the second initial value setting means according to claim 4 corresponds to the processing of S1103 to S1105, and the initial value output means according to claim 4 corresponds to the processing of S1023 to S201. The third initial value setting means corresponds to the processing of S1703 to S1705.

  Further, the notification unit according to claim 6 corresponds to the processing of S1304. Further, as the determination delay means according to claim 10, the branch process of No in S1303 corresponds. The winning detection means according to claim 11 corresponds to the process of S501, the payout instruction means according to claim 11 corresponds to the process of S201, and the payout execution means according to claim 11 corresponds to S909. This process is applicable.

10 Pachinko machines (game machines)
100 Substrate box (first storage member)
102 Substrate box (second storage member)
115 Power supply device (first memory holding power supply means, second memory holding power supply means, memory holding power supply means)
201 MPU (main control means)
202a1 internal program (part of internal control means)
202b1 user program (part of user program control means)
211 MPU (peripheral control means)
203a First management PW memory (management information storage means)
203b Second management PW memory (management information storage means)
203c Third management PW memory (first initial value storage means)
207a Unique code memory (second initial value storage means)
208 Fraud monitoring timer (time keeping means)
212a1 Internal program (part of internal control means)
212b1 User program (part of user program control means)
213a First management PW memory (management information storage means)
213b Second management PW memory (management information storage means)
213c Third management PW memory (first initial value storage means)

Claims (1)

The basic operation is controlled in software or hardware, and the user is executed by executing an internal control means that cannot substantially recognize or modify the control content and a user program arbitrarily stored in a predetermined storage area. User program control means for controlling operations specific to each program, main control means for performing main control relating to games by the internal control means and control by the user action control means,
The basic operation is controlled in software or hardware, and the user is executed by executing an internal control means that cannot substantially recognize or modify the control content and a user program arbitrarily stored in a predetermined storage area. User program control means for controlling operations specific to each program, and when receiving a command from the main control means by the internal control means and control by the user action control means, according to the received command In a gaming machine comprising peripheral control means for performing peripheral control related to the game,
The main control means and the peripheral control means are both
Management information storage means for storing management information;
First initial value storage means for storing a value to be stored as first management information in the management information storage means;
A first initial value setting means for writing the value stored in the first initial value storage means as the first management information in the management information storage means, triggered by turning on the power to the gaming machine;
Arithmetic means for calculating n-th (n is an integer equal to or greater than 1) management information stored in the management information storage means to obtain (n + 1) -th management information at a predetermined timing. When,
Management information holding means for storing management information obtained by calculation by the calculation means as a value to be stored in the first initial value storage means as first management information in the management information storage means;
Updating means for updating the management information stored in the management information storage means to management information obtained by calculation by the calculation means;
Management information output means for outputting the management information updated by the updating means to the other-side control means,
When the nth management information is received from the counterpart control means, the received nth management information and the nth management information stored in the management information storage means are collated, Determining means for determining whether there is an abnormality in the control means or the peripheral control means,
The calculations performed by the calculation means of the main control means and the peripheral control means are respectively defined by the internal control means of the corresponding control means,
The gaming machine is characterized in that the first initial value storage means is configured so that the stored contents are retained even when the power of the gaming machine is cut off.

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