JP2007179509A - Job execution device and job execution processing program - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a job execution device and a job execution processing program, in which even when an image forming device of a remote place out of an intranet is used, authentication information of a user can be rapidly acquired, and secret leak or the like can be effectively prevented by surely protecting a secret key. <P>SOLUTION: This device comprises first reading means 4, 40 reading authentication information except a secret key of authentication information including the secret key stored in portable storage media at the time of log-in of a user owning portable storage media MA and MB; second reading means 5 and 40 for reading, only when the authenticated user selects a secret key-requiring job, the secret key from the portable storage media; a memory means 6 capable of storing the authentication information including the secret key read by the first and second reading means; and a job execution means 15 executing the secret key-requiring job selected by the user by use of the read secret key. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2007,JPO&INPIT

Description

  The present invention relates to a job execution apparatus applied to an image forming apparatus such as an MFP (Multi Function Peripherals) which is a multifunction digital image forming apparatus, and a job execution processing program for causing a computer of the job execution apparatus to execute a job. .

  In companies and offices, multiple users can share an MFP by connecting a remote MFP to the user's terminal via a network or an intranet that combines the Internet and a local area network. Systems that can be used are widespread.

  Each time the user logs in to the MFP, authentication information is transferred from the server at the user's site to the MFP via the intranet.

  However, if the user's base is outside the intranet, the authentication response takes time and the user is stressed.

Therefore, conventionally, a technique has been known in which an electronic signature, a secret key, a public key, and the like are stored in a memory medium connected to the interface of the MFP, and an electronic signature related to image file data is decrypted using the public key. (For example, refer to Patent Document 1).
JP 2001-184186 A

  However, according to the conventional publicly-known technology described above, it is not necessary to acquire user authentication information via an intranet or the like by using a memory medium storing an electronic signature, a secret key, a public key, etc. Although the image file data can be easily decrypted using the public key of the medium, if the secret key is used, the secret key remains unconditionally in the memory in the MFP, and the secret key is not authorized. There was a risk of secret leakage due to copying.

  The present invention has been made in view of the above circumstances, and even when using a remote image forming apparatus outside the intranet, the authentication information of the user can be quickly acquired, and the secret key can be reliably protected. It is an object of the present invention to provide a job execution apparatus capable of effectively preventing confidential information leakage and the like, and a job execution processing program for causing a computer to execute processing of the job execution apparatus.

  The above problem is solved by the following means.

  (1) a first reading unit that reads authentication information excluding a secret key among authentication information including a secret key stored in the portable recording medium when a user who owns the portable recording medium logs in; Only when the authenticated user selects a job that requires a secret key, the second reading means for reading the secret key from the portable recording medium, and the reading by the first and second reading means. Memory means capable of storing authentication information including the secret key received, and job execution means for executing a job requiring the secret key selected by the user using the read secret key. A job execution device.

  (2) The first reading means is a non-contact type reading means for reading authentication information from a portable recording medium in a non-contact manner, and the second reading means is more than the reading range of the first reading means. 2. The job execution apparatus according to item 1, which is a non-contact type reading unit having a large reading range.

  (3) Equipped with erasure means for erasing authentication information including the secret key stored in the memory means when the non-contact type portable recording medium goes out of the reading range of the second reading means. 3. The job execution device according to item 2 above.

  (4) The first and second reading means comprise one common reading means, and the reading means stores authentication information stored in the recording medium when the user who owns the portable recording medium logs in. 2. The job execution device according to item 1, wherein the secret key is read from the portable recording medium when a job requiring a secret key is selected.

  (5) The first and second reading means are a common contact type reading means for reading information in a state where the portable recording medium is mounted, and the portable recording medium can be read by the reading means. 2. The job execution apparatus according to claim 1, further comprising an erasing unit for erasing authentication information including a secret key stored in the memory unit when a state of being attached is released.

  (6) The job execution apparatus according to item (1), further comprising an erasing unit that erases the secret key stored in the memory unit after the execution of the job requiring the secret key is completed.

  (7) Among the authentication information including the encrypted secret key and the secret key decryption key stored in the portable recording medium when the user who owns the portable recording medium logs in, the secret key The first reading means for reading the authentication information excluding the decryption key and the secret key decryption from the portable recording medium only when the authenticated user selects a job that requires the secret key Second reading and reading means for reading the key, memory means capable of storing authentication information read by the first and second reading means, including a secret key and a secret key decryption key, and the use A job execution device comprising: job execution means for executing a job that requires a secret key selected by a person using the read secret key and a secret key decryption key.

  (8) At the time of login of the user who owns the portable recording medium, the step of reading the authentication information excluding the secret key out of the authentication information including the secret key stored in the portable recording medium and receiving the authentication Only when the user selects a job that requires a secret key, the step of reading the secret key from the portable recording medium and the authentication information including the secret key read by each reading step are stored in the memory means. A job execution processing program for causing a computer to execute a step and a step of executing a job that requires a secret key selected by the user using the read secret key.

  (9) Among the authentication information including the encrypted secret key and the secret key decryption key stored in the portable recording medium when the user who owns the portable recording medium logs in, the secret key Reading the authentication information excluding the decryption key and reading the secret key decryption key from the portable recording medium only when the authenticated user selects a job that requires the secret key A step of storing authentication information including a secret key and a secret key decryption key read by the first and second reading means in a memory means; and a secret key selected by the user is required A job execution processing program for causing a computer to execute a job to be executed using the read secret key and a secret key decryption key.

  According to the invention described in (1) above, only when authentication information excluding the secret key stored in the portable recording medium is read and a job that requires the secret key is selected at the time of login. Since the private key is read from the portable recording medium, the private key is not read for jobs that do not require the private key. Compared to the case where the private key is read unconditionally, the private key is the job execution device. The risk of remaining in the memory means can be reduced. Accordingly, the opportunity for copying and secretly using the secret key can be reduced, and security can be improved.

  Of course, since authentication information is read from a portable recording medium, it is not necessary to read the authentication information from the server at the user's site, even when using an image forming apparatus in a remote location outside the intranet. Information can be acquired and authentication information is not transferred through a public line or the like, so that the risk of leakage of authentication information can be reduced.

  According to the invention described in (2) above, the first reading means is a non-contact type reading means for reading authentication information from a non-contact type portable recording medium, and the second reading means is the first reading means. Since it is a non-contact type reading unit having a reading range larger than the reading range of one reading unit, when the user approaches the job execution device, recognition is performed by removing the user's secret key from the non-contact type portable recording medium When the information is read and the user selects a job that requires a secret key, the user can immediately read the secret key and execute the job.

  According to the invention described in (3) above, when the non-contact type portable recording medium is out of the reading range of the second reading means, the secret key and the authentication information stored in the memory means Therefore, it is possible to reliably prevent the risk that the authentication information remains in the memory means even after use of the job execution apparatus and is copied.

  According to the invention described in item (4) above, the reading of the authentication information excluding the secret key at the time of login and the reading of the secret key when a job that requires the secret key is selected by one reading means. Can do.

  According to the invention described in (5) above, when the readable mounting state of the portable recording medium with respect to the contact-type reading unit is released, the authentication information including the secret key stored in the memory unit is erased. Therefore, it is possible to reliably prevent the risk that the authentication information remains in the memory means even after use of the job execution apparatus and is copied.

  According to the invention described in item (6) above, since the secret key is deleted when the job execution that requires the secret key is completed, the secret key remains in the memory means after the job execution that requires the secret key is completed. Therefore, it is possible to reliably prevent the risk of copying and the like.

  According to the invention described in the preceding item (7), at the time of login, the authentication information excluding the secret key decryption key stored in the portable recording medium is read, and the job requiring the secret key is selected. Only when the private key decryption key is read from the portable recording medium, the secret key decryption key is not read for jobs that do not require the private key. Compared with the case where the key and its decryption key are read unconditionally, the risk of remaining in the memory means of the job execution apparatus in a state where the secret key can be copied can be reduced.

  Of course, since authentication information is read from a portable recording medium, it is not necessary to read the authentication information from the server at the user's site, even when using an image forming apparatus in a remote location outside the intranet. Information can be acquired and authentication information is not transferred through a public line or the like, so that the risk of leakage of authentication information can be reduced.

  According to the invention described in (8) above, only when the authentication information excluding the secret key stored in the portable recording medium is read at the time of login and the job that requires the secret key is selected, the portable type is selected. A process for reading the secret key from the recording medium can be executed by the computer.

  According to the invention described in item (9) above, when logging in, the authentication information excluding the secret key decryption key stored in the portable recording medium is read, and a job requiring the secret key is selected. In addition, the computer can execute the process of reading the secret key decryption key from the portable recording medium.

  Hereinafter, an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.

  FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing an MFP, which is a multifunction digital image forming apparatus, to which a job execution apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention is applied.

  In FIG. 1, the MFP 1 is connected to a user terminal or the like via a communication line 10 (FIG. 2) such as a public line.

  The MFP 1 includes an apparatus main body 2 having an operation panel unit 11, an ADF (automatic document feeder) 12, a paper feed cassette 13, and the like, and a paper discharge unit 3 for printing on paper and discharging it outside the apparatus. ing.

  The apparatus main body 2 has a card-like recording medium as a portable recording medium storing authentication information including a user's private key, for example, a non-contact (wireless) known IC card (FIG. 2). A first card reader 4 as a card reading unit corresponding to the MA is provided, for example, on the side of the operation panel unit 11. Similarly, a second card reader 5 as a reading unit corresponding to the IC card MA is provided, for example, below the operation panel unit 11.

  The first card reader 4 is a wireless card reader using short waves, and is a proximity type whose reading range with respect to the IC card MA is within about 10 mm, and the wireless IC card MA is approached by the user. , And the authentication information excluding the secret key stored in the IC card MA is read out and stored in the volatile memory unit (FIG. 2) 6.

  The second card reader 5 is a wireless card reader using a short wave having the same wavelength as that of the first card reader 4, and the reading range for the IC card MA is wider than that of the first card reader 4, for example, about It is several tens of centimeters and is a neighborhood shape.

  The second card reader 5 reads the secret key stored in the IC card MA and stores it in the volatile memory unit 6 (FIG. 2) only when the user selects a job that requires the secret key. It is designed to be stored.

  The apparatus main body 2 is also provided with a contact card reader 40 for an insertion contact type card-like recording medium, for example, an IC card MB.

  FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the electrical configuration of the MFP.

  2, the MFP 1 includes an operation unit 21 and a display unit 22 in the operation panel unit 11 in addition to the wireless first and second card readers 4 and 5 and the contact card reader 40. The scanner unit 14, the printer unit 15, the control unit 23, the image processing unit 24, the volatile memory unit 6, the nonvolatile memory unit 7, and the communication control unit 25 are provided.

  After the authentication information read via the first card reader 4 is stored in the volatile memory 6, the second card reader 5 selects a job for which the authenticated user needs a secret key Only in some cases, in order to execute the job, the secret key is read from the wireless IC card MA and stored in the volatile memory 6.

  The contact-type card reader 40 can also be used only when the authenticated user selects a job that requires a secret key after the authentication information read from the inserted IC card MB is stored in the volatile memory unit 6. In order to execute the job, the secret key is read from the contact IC card MB and stored in the volatile memory unit 6.

  The operation unit 21 includes a keyboard and a touch panel unit, and is used by the user to input data and select a job.

  The display unit 22 includes a touch panel type liquid crystal panel and the like, and is used to display a message for a user, a touch input screen, and the like.

  The scanner unit 14 reads an image of a document and converts it into image data.

  The printer unit 15 prints image data read by the scanner unit 14 or print data transmitted from an external device on a sheet.

  The control unit 23 includes a CPU 23a and a ROM 23b in which a program for operating the CPU 23a is recorded. For example, the first card reader 4 and the contact card reader 40 receive authentication information from the IC card MA (MB). When the program is read and downloaded, the overall operation is comprehensively controlled, such as authenticating the user as an authentication means.

  When the wireless IC card MA goes out of the reading range of the second card reader 5, the control unit 23 further moves the contact IC card MB from the contact card reader 40. In addition to erasing all authentication information stored in the volatile memory unit 6 when removed, the secret key stored in the volatile memory unit 6 is erased when the execution of the job requiring the secret key is completed. Or a signature or certificate is created using a private key, and the created signature or certificate is attached to the image data scanned by the scanner unit 14.

  The image processing unit 24 processes received image data.

  The volatile memory unit 6 is composed of, for example, a RAM, and stores authentication information including a secret key read from the IC card MA (MB) by the card readers 4, 5, and 40.

  The non-volatile memory unit 7 is a hard disk, for example, and stores user job data and the like.

  The communication control unit 25 serves as an input / output interface unit that controls transmission / reception of data to / from a user terminal or other external device (not shown) connected via the communication line 10. It is.

  Here, an outline of a case where the user who owns the wireless IC card MA logs in to the MFP 1 with the first and second card readers 4 and 5 will be described.

  When the user brings the wireless IC card MA close to or touches the first card reader 4, the user is permitted to log in to the MFP 1, and authentication information other than the secret key is read from the IC card MA. Stored in the volatile memory unit 6. Thereby, the MFP 1 becomes an authentication server for this user.

  Information is passed between the IC card MA and the card reader 4 after being encrypted.

  In addition, if there is a biometric authentication such as a password, fingerprint, or iris at the time of login, safety can be further enhanced.

  Thereafter, the user cancels the proximity state of the IC card MA to the first card reader 4 and performs a job selection operation. At this time, if a job other than a job that requires the user's private key (for example, reception of encrypted data or encrypted print output) is selected, the job may be immediately executed. it can.

  When a job requiring a secret key is selected, the secret key is read from the IC card MA by the second card reader 5 and stored in the volatile memory unit 6. When the execution of the job that requires the secret key is completed, the secret key stored in the volatile memory unit 6 is deleted.

  As described above, when the user who owns the IC card MA logs in, the first card reader 4 reads the authentication information excluding the secret key, and the authentication information is stored in the volatile memory unit 6. Even if the user is in a remote location outside the intranet, it is no longer necessary to read the authentication information from the server at the user's site, and the user's authentication information can be obtained quickly, and the user feels stressed due to the authentication response time, etc. Nor. Further, since authentication information is not transferred through a public line or the like, the risk of leakage of authentication information can be reduced.

  In particular, since the secret key is read from the IC card MA only when the authenticated user selects a job that requires the secret key, the secret key is not read unconditionally and stored. Therefore, it is possible to reliably reduce the chance of copying a secret key by a third party.

  Further, after the execution of the job requiring the secret key is completed, the secret key stored in the volatile memory unit 6 is deleted. Therefore, it is possible to reliably prevent the danger that the secret key remains in the MFP 1 for a long time even after the job ends and is illegally used.

  When the user logs off on the operation panel unit 11 after the job ends, or when the IC card MA held by the user leaves the reading range of the second card reader 5 of the proximity type, the volatile memory. The authentication information stored in the unit 6 is completely erased.

  If the IC card MA is left in the MFP 1, the authentication information stored in the volatile memory unit 6 is completely erased after notifying the user by e-mail or the like when the MFP 1 auto-clears or the sleep setting time elapses. To do.

  Examples of processing that requires a secret key include reception processing such as encrypted printing (confidential printing), encrypted facsimile, and encrypted mail, and processing that gives a certificate to scanned image data and document data. is there.

  Further, when the IC card MA approaches the reading range of the second card reader 5 during sleep, if there is print data, a function for canceling sleep may be added.

  Next, the flow of processing when logging in with the first and second card readers 4 and 5 will be described with reference to the flowcharts shown in FIGS. This process is performed by the CPU 23a of the control unit 23 executing it according to a program recorded in the ROM 23b.

  First, in FIG. 3, in step S101, it is determined whether or not the user touches the first card reader 4 with the IC card MA. When the first card reader 4 is touched (YES in step S101), in step S102, it is determined whether or not the IC card MA is confirmed. If the first card reader 4 is not touched (NO in step S101). ), The determination of whether or not it has been touched is repeated.

  If IC card MA is not verified (NO in step S102), the process returns to step S101 to repeat the determination of whether or not the touch has been made. When IC card MA is confirmed (YES in step S102), login is accepted in step S103.

  In step S104, the usage conditions of the MFP 1 are downloaded from the IC card MA. In step S105, authentication information other than the secret key is downloaded from the IC card MA.

  In step S106, it is searched whether or not the user has sent print data. In step S107, the home server is inquired whether there is transfer data (email, FAX, etc.) to the user, and then in step S108. It is determined whether there is print data or transfer data.

  If there is print data or transfer data (YES in step S108), the arrival data is displayed on the display unit 22 in step S109, and the process proceeds to step S110. If there is no print data or transfer data (NO in step S108), the process proceeds to step S117 (FIG. 4).

  In step S110, it is determined whether a print job has been selected. If a print job has been selected (YES in step S110), the process proceeds to step S111. If no print job has been selected (NO in step S110), the process proceeds to step S117 (FIG. 4).

  In step S111, it is determined whether or not the print data is encrypted in the selected print job. If the print data is not encrypted (NO in step S111), printing is performed in step S116, and then step S116 is performed. The process proceeds to S117 (FIG. 4).

  If the print data is encrypted (YES in step S111), the secret key is read from the IC card MA by the second card reader 5 and stored in the volatile memory unit 6 in step S112.

  In step S113, the print data is decrypted using the secret key, and in step S114, printing is executed. Thereafter, in step S115, the secret key in the volatile memory unit 6 is deleted, and then the process proceeds to step S117 (FIG. 4). This prevents the secret key from remaining in the memory unit 6 for a long time even after the job requiring the secret key is completed.

  In FIG. 4, in step S117, a job selection screen is displayed on the display unit 22, and then the process proceeds to step S118.

  In step S118, it is determined whether or not a scan job has been selected. If a scan job has been selected (YES in step S118), the scan is executed in step S119, and then the process proceeds to step S120.

  If no scan job has been selected (NO in step S118), it is determined in step S124 whether or not another job has been selected. If no other job has been selected (YES in step S124), step S125 is determined. In step S117, the job is executed. If no other job is selected (NO in step S124), the process proceeds to step S126.

  In step S120, it is determined whether or not a signature is to be pasted. If the signature is not to be pasted (NO in step S120), the process returns to step S117.

  If the signature is to be attached (YES in step S120), the secret key is read from the IC card M by the second card reader 5 and stored in the volatile memory unit 6 in step S121.

  In step S122, a signature and a certificate are created and pasted on the scan data. In step S123, the secret key in the volatile memory unit 6 is erased, and the process returns to step S117.

  In step S126, it is determined whether or not logoff is selected. If logoff is selected (YES in step S126), the process proceeds to step S128. If logoff is not selected (NO in step S126), step S127 is performed. Proceed to

  In step S127, it is determined whether or not a predetermined time has elapsed. If the predetermined time has not elapsed (NO in step S127), the process returns to step S118, and if the predetermined time has elapsed (YES in step S127), step S127 is performed. In step S128, logoff is executed. In step S129, the authentication information is deleted and the process ends.

  When the MFP 1 includes only the first card reader 4 and does not include the second card reader 5, when executing a job that requires a secret key, the MFP 1 When requesting retouching, or when storing a secret key in a second IC card different from the IC card MA storing login information and authentication information, and executing a job that requires the secret key The touch of the second IC card may be requested.

  Processing for logging in to the MFP 1 will be described with reference to the flowcharts of FIGS. This process is performed by the CPU 23a of the control unit 23 executing it according to a program recorded in the ROM 23b.

  First, in FIG. 5, in step S201, it is determined whether or not the user has touched the card reader 4 with the IC card MA. When the card reader 4 is touched (YES in step S201), in step S202, it is determined whether or not the IC card MA is confirmed. If the card reader 4 is not touched (NO in step S201), whether or not the card is touched is determined. Is repeated.

  If the IC card MA is not confirmed (NO in step S202), the process returns to step S201 to repeat the determination of whether or not the IC card MA has been touched. When IC card MA is confirmed (YES in step S202), login is accepted in step S203.

  In step S204, the usage conditions of the MFP 1 are downloaded from the IC card MA. In step S205, authentication information other than the secret key is downloaded from the IC card MA.

  In step S206, it is searched whether the user has sent print data. In step S207, the home server is inquired whether there is transfer data (e.g., mail, FAX) to the user, and then in step S208. It is determined whether there is print data or transfer data.

  If there is print data or transfer data (YES in step S208), the arrival data is displayed on the display unit 22 in step S209, and the process proceeds to step S210. If there is no print data or transfer data (NO in step S208), the process proceeds to step S219 (FIG. 6).

  In step S210, it is determined whether a print job has been selected. If a print job has been selected (YES in step S210), the process proceeds to step S211. If no print job has been selected (NO in step S210), the process proceeds to step S219 (FIG. 6).

  In step S211, it is determined whether or not the print data is encrypted in the selected print job. If the print data is not encrypted (NO in step S211), printing is performed in step S218, and then step S218 is performed. The process proceeds to S219 (FIG. 6).

  If the print data is encrypted (YES in step S211), in step S212, “Please touch the card” is displayed on the display unit 22, and then whether or not the card reader 4 is touched in step S213. to decide. If not touched (NO in step S213), the touch is waited.

  If touched (YES in step S213), the secret key is read from the IC card MA and stored in the volatile memory unit 6 in step S214.

  In step S215, the print data is decrypted using the secret key, and in step S216, printing is executed. Thereafter, in step S217, the secret key in the volatile memory unit 6 is deleted, and the process proceeds to step S219 (FIG. 6). This prevents the secret key from remaining in the memory unit 6 for a long time even after the job requiring the secret key is completed.

  In FIG. 6, in step S219, a job selection screen is displayed on the display unit 22, and then the process proceeds to step S220.

  In step S220, it is determined whether or not a scan job has been selected. If a scan job has been selected (YES in step S220), scanning is performed in step S221, and then the process proceeds to step S222.

  If no scan job has been selected (NO in step S220), it is determined in step S228 whether or not another job has been selected. If no other job has been selected (YES in step S228), step S229 is performed. In step S219, the job is executed. If no other job is selected (NO in step S228), the process proceeds to step S230.

  In step S222, it is determined whether or not a signature is to be pasted. If no signature is to be pasted (NO in step S222), the process returns to step S219.

  If the signature is to be affixed (YES in step S222), in step S223, the message “Please touch the card” is displayed on the display unit 22, and then it is determined whether or not the card reader 4 is touched in step S224. . If not touched (NO in step S224), the touch is waited.

  When touched (YES in step S224), the card reader 4 reads the secret key from the IC card M and stores it in the volatile memory unit 6.

  In step S226, a signature and a certificate are created and pasted on the scan data. In step S227, the secret key in the volatile memory unit 6 is deleted, and the process returns to step S219.

  In step S230, it is determined whether or not logoff is selected. If logoff is selected (YES in step S230), the process proceeds to step S232. If logoff is not selected (NO in step S230), step S231 is performed. Proceed to

  In step S231, it is determined whether or not a predetermined time has elapsed. If the predetermined time has not elapsed (NO in step S231), the process returns to step S220, and if the predetermined time has elapsed (YES in step S231), step S231 is performed. In step S232, logoff is executed, and in step S233, the authentication information is deleted and the process ends.

  FIGS. 7 and 8 are flowcharts showing processing when a user having a contact type IC card MB inserts into the connection type card reader 40 and logs in. This process is also executed by the CPU 23a of the control unit 23 according to a program recorded in the ROM 23b.

  First, in FIG. 7, in step S <b> 301, it is determined whether the user has inserted the IC card MB into the card reader 40. When the user inserts the IC card MB into the card reader 40 (YES in step S301), in step S302, it is determined whether or not the IC card MB has been confirmed. If the IC card MB is not inserted into the card reader 40 (in step S301). NO), the determination of whether or not it has been inserted is repeated.

  If the IC card MB is not confirmed (NO in step S302), the process returns to step S301 to repeat the determination of whether or not it has been inserted. If the IC card MB is confirmed (YES in step S302), login is accepted in step S303.

  In step S304, the usage conditions of the MFP 1 are downloaded from the IC card MB. In step S305, authentication information other than the secret key is downloaded from the IC card MB.

  In step S306, it is searched whether or not the user has sent print data. In step S307, the home server is inquired whether there is transfer data (email, FAX, etc.) to the user, and then in step S308. It is determined whether there is print data or transfer data.

  If there is print data or transfer data (YES in step S308), in step S309, the arrival data is displayed on the display unit 22, and the process proceeds to step S310. If there is no print data or transfer data (NO in step S308), the process proceeds to step S317 (FIG. 8).

  In step S310, it is determined whether or not a print job has been selected. If a print job has been selected (YES in step S310), the process proceeds to step S311. If no print job has been selected (NO in step S310), the process proceeds to step S317 (FIG. 4).

  In step S311, it is determined whether or not the print data is encrypted in the selected print job. If the print data is not encrypted (NO in step S311), printing is performed in step S316, and then step S311 is performed. The process proceeds to S317 (FIG. 8).

  If the print data is encrypted (YES in step S311), the secret key is read from the IC card MB by the card reader 40 and stored in the volatile memory unit 6 in step S312.

  In step S313, the print data is decrypted using the secret key, and in step S314, printing is executed. Thereafter, in step S315, the secret key in the volatile memory unit 6 is deleted, and then the process proceeds to step S317 (FIG. 8). This prevents the secret key from remaining in the memory unit 6 for a long time even after the job requiring the secret key is completed.

  In FIG. 8, in step S317, a job selection screen is displayed on the display unit 22, and then the process proceeds to step S318.

  In step S318, it is determined whether or not a scan job has been selected. If a scan job has been selected (YES in step S318), the scan is executed in step S319 and then the process proceeds to step S320.

  If no scan job is selected (NO in step S318), it is determined in step S324 whether another job is selected. If no other job is selected (YES in step S324), step S325 is performed. In step S317, the job is executed. If no other job is selected (NO in step S324), the process proceeds to step S326.

  In step S320, it is determined whether or not a signature is to be pasted. If no signature is to be pasted (NO in step S320), the process returns to step S317.

  If the signature is to be attached (YES in step S320), the secret key is read from the IC card M by the card reader 40 and stored in the volatile memory unit 6 in step S321.

  In step S322, a signature and a certificate are created and pasted on the scan data. In step S323, the secret key in the volatile memory unit 6 is erased, and the process returns to step S317.

  In step S326, it is determined whether or not logoff is selected. If logoff is selected (YES in step S326), the process proceeds to step S328. If logoff is not selected (NO in step S326), step S327 is performed. Proceed to

  In step S327, it is determined whether or not a predetermined time has elapsed. If the predetermined time has not elapsed (NO in step S327), the process returns to step S318, and if the predetermined time has elapsed (YES in step S327), step S327 is performed. In step S328, logoff is executed, and in step S329, the authentication information is deleted and the process ends.

  If the user forgets to remove the IC card MB, when the auto-clear or sleeve setting time has elapsed, the user is notified of the misplacement by e-mail or the like, and then the authentication information in the volatile memory unit 6 is completely erased. You may make it do.

  By the way, in addition to the authentication information, the IC card MA stores an encrypted secret key, and further a key for decrypting the secret key. When the user logs in, the IC card MA (MB) authenticates. The IC card is read in order to execute the job only when the information and the encrypted secret key are read and stored in the volatile memory unit 6 and the authenticated user selects a job that requires the secret key. It is also possible to read a secret key decryption key from the MA (MB), store it in the volatile memory unit 6, and execute the job using the read secret key decryption key and secret key. It is.

  This process replaces the process of “downloading authentication information other than the secret key” in step S105 of FIG. 3, step S205 of FIG. 5, and step S305 of FIG. 7, in order to decrypt the encrypted secret key. The process of downloading authentication information including an encrypted private key other than that of the key ”is performed, and the processes of steps S112 and S121 in FIG. 3, steps S214 and S225 in FIG. 5, steps S312 and S321 in FIG. Instead, a process of “reading a key for decrypting the encrypted secret key and downloading it to the volatile memory” may be performed.

1 is a schematic configuration diagram illustrating an MFP to which a job execution device according to an embodiment of the present invention is applied. 2 is a block diagram showing an electrical configuration of the MFP. FIG. It is a flowchart which shows the process at the time of logging in with a wireless 1st and 2nd card reader. It is a flowchart which shows the process following FIG. It is a flowchart which shows the process at the time of logging in with one wireless card reader. It is a flowchart which shows the process following FIG. It is a flowchart which shows the process at the time of logging in with one contact type card reader. It is a flowchart which shows the process following FIG.

Explanation of symbols

1 MFP (Job Execution Device)
4 First Card Reader 5 Second Card Reader 6 Nonvolatile Memory Unit 15 Printer Unit 23 Control Unit 40 Contact Card Reader MB Wireless IC Card MB Contact IC Card

Claims (9)

A first reading means for reading authentication information excluding the secret key among the authentication information including the secret key stored in the portable recording medium when the user who owns the portable recording medium logs in;
A second reading means for reading the secret key from the portable recording medium only when the authenticated user selects a job that requires the secret key;
Memory means capable of storing authentication information including a secret key read by the first and second reading means;
Job execution means for executing a job that requires the secret key selected by the user using the read secret key;
A job execution apparatus comprising:   The first reading means is a non-contact type reading means for reading authentication information from a portable recording medium in a non-contact manner, and the second reading means is a reading range larger than the reading range of the first reading means. The job execution apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the job execution apparatus is a non-contact type reading unit including   The erasure unit for erasing authentication information including a secret key stored in the memory unit when the portable recording medium is out of a reading range of the second reading unit. Job execution device.   The first and second reading means comprise one common reading means, and this reading means reads authentication information stored in the recording medium when a user who owns the portable recording medium logs in, 2. The job execution apparatus according to claim 1, wherein when a job that requires a secret key is selected, the secret key is read from the portable recording medium.   The first and second reading means are one common contact type reading means for reading information in a state where a portable recording medium is attached, and the portable recording medium can be read in the reading means. The job execution apparatus according to claim 1, further comprising: an erasing unit that erases authentication information including a secret key stored in the memory unit when the is released.   The job execution apparatus according to claim 1, further comprising: an erasing unit that erases the secret key stored in the memory unit after the execution of the job requiring the secret key is completed. Among the authentication information stored in the portable recording medium, including the encrypted secret key and the key for decrypting the secret key, when the user who owns the portable recording medium logs in, for decrypting the secret key First reading means for reading the authentication information excluding the key;
Second reading means for reading a secret key decryption key from the portable recording medium only when an authenticated user selects a job that requires a secret key;
Memory means capable of storing authentication information read by the first and second reading means and including a secret key and a secret key decryption key;
Job execution means for executing a job requiring the secret key selected by the user by using the read secret key and a secret key decryption key;
A job execution apparatus comprising: Reading the authentication information excluding the secret key out of the authentication information including the secret key stored in the portable recording medium when the user who owns the portable recording medium logs in;
Reading the secret key from the portable recording medium only when the authenticated user selects a job that requires the secret key;
Storing authentication information including a secret key read in each reading step in a memory means;
Executing a job that requires a secret key selected by the user using the read secret key;
Execution processing program for causing a computer to execute Among the authentication information stored in the portable recording medium, including the encrypted secret key and the key for decrypting the secret key, when the user who owns the portable recording medium logs in, for decrypting the secret key Reading authentication information excluding the key of
Reading a secret key decryption key from the portable recording medium only when an authenticated user selects a job that requires a secret key;
Storing the authentication information read by the first and second reading means and including the secret key and the secret key decryption key in the memory means;
Executing a job requiring a secret key selected by the user using the read secret key and a secret key decryption key;
Execution processing program for causing a computer to execute

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