ES2987293T3 - Vehicle control method and vehicle control system - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention relates to a method of vehicle control in which a wayside device (RBC) initially identifies the vehicle position (ePold) of a vehicle as unreliable when said vehicle (T) starts moving (SoM). In order to improve cost efficiency, according to the invention the wayside device (RBC) identifies a new vehicle position (ePnew), determined from a new position report (PRnew) of the vehicle, as unreliable in a configuration mode (CM) under each of the following two conditions (i, ii) and only if one of said two conditions (i, ii) is met: (i) if a new data point identifier (NID_LRBGnew), determined from the new position report (PRnew), differs from a previous data point identifier (NID_LRBGold) determined from a previous position report (PRold); (ii) if the new data point identifier (NID_LRBGnew) does not differ from the previous data point identifier (NID_LRBGold), if in addition a new address information element (Q_DLRBGnew) determined on the basis of the new position report (PRnew) differs from a previous address information element (Q_DLRBGold) determined on the basis of the previous position report (PRold), and if in addition a new position confidence interval (P-CInew) determined on the basis of the new position report (PRnew) is smaller than a previous position confidence interval (P-CIold) determined on the basis of the previous position report. The invention also relates to a vehicle control system (S). (Automatic translation with Google Translate, without legal value)

Description

DESCRIPTION

Vehicle control method and vehicle control system

The invention relates to a method of vehicle control in which a device located on the road initially indicates that the position of the vehicle is not reliable when a vehicle starts to move.

The invention also relates to a vehicle control system in which a roadside device is configured to initially classify a vehicle position as unreliable when a vehicle starts to move and to respond to a request for a driving license from the vehicle with an authorization to drive under personal responsibility.

A generic vehicle control method and a generic vehicle control system are known from the article "The ERTMS/ETCS signalling system", www.railwaysignaging.eu © 2013-2014.

The European Train Control System, abbreviated ETCS, is a component of a unified European rail traffic control system developed under the abbreviation ERTMS, where the abbreviation ERTMS stands for "European Rail Traffic Management System" and where the abbreviation ETCS stands for "European Train Control System". The second technical component of this digital railway technology is the railway mobile communications system developed under the abbreviation GSM-R, where the abbreviation GSM-R stands for "Global System for Mobile Communication-Railway". ETCS is intended to replace the large number of train control systems in use in countries, to be used in high-speed transport in the medium term and, in the long term, to be implemented throughout European rail transport.

The concepts and ideas of the railway mobile radio system and its interaction with an ETCS route centre are introduced in the article "EuroRadio and the RBC", JOHN HARMER ET AL, IRSE (INSTITUTE OF RAILWAY SIGNAL ENGINEERS) PROCEEDINGS 2002/2003.

An ETCS vehicle device consists of several components. The essential component is an on-board device in the form of an ETCS on-board unit or ETCS vehicle device (ETCS Onboard Unit, abbreviated ETCS OBU) with an on-board computer system in the form of a safe ETCS vehicle computer (European Vital Computer, abbreviated EVC).

Depending on the intended purpose, a vehicle equipped with ETCS may contain the following additional components as part of the ETCS vehicle equipment:

- an interface for the vehicle's traction and braking components (in English: “Train Interface Unit”, abbreviated TIU),

- a communication device for communicating with Eurobalise (Balise Transmission Module, abbreviated BTM),

- a communication device for communication with Euroloops (in English: “Loop Transmission Module”, abbreviated LTM),

- a GSM-R transmission facility (including Euroradio),

- an interface for the vehicle driver (including the driver's cab display) (in English: “Driver Machine Interface’’, abbreviated DMI)

- an odometer, i.e. a device for measuring speed and distance. These are mainly wheel tachometers, although in practice radar is often used to increase the accuracy of the location.

Outside the ETCS specification, interfaces exist between national train control systems and the EVC in the form of special transmission modules (STM). When using a special transmission module, no separate information processing unit for the respective national train control system is necessary.

There are different equipment levels for the European train control system ETCS. ETCS can be implemented at several levels:

- Level 0, where the vehicle is equipped with ETCS, but the track is not;

- STM Level, which as of the specification version “SRS Baseline 3” is no longer called STM Level, but NTC Level (“National Train Control”);

- Level 1 FS(“Full Supervision” = Full Supervision);

- Level 1 LS(“Limited Supervision”=guided by signals);

- Level 2 (with and without signs);

- Level 3.

Depending on the respective ETCS level, route information is transmitted directly to the vehicle via beacons (LS Level 1) or between the vehicle and an ETCS centre (RBC) via the GSM-R mobile radio system (Level 2 and Level 3).

In particular, in Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3, data points in the form of beacons or groups of beacons are used in a known manner.

At level 1, ETCS has full train control functionality with discontinuous transmission and continuous tracking. Information is transmitted via beacons (Eurobalises) and can be supplemented by infill elements (infill balises or radio infills). A report of vacant tracks on the track (in the infrastructure) is still required. Thanks to the functionality of the DMI, fixed signals can be dispensed with. In addition to so-called fixed data beacons, so-called transparent data beacons are used at level 1, by means of which the corresponding driving authority (in English: "Movement Authority") is transferred to the passing vehicle. They are arranged at least at the virtual locations of the main and remote signals.

Level 2 involves train control with continuous transmission and tracking. This enables data to be transferred from the vehicle to the infrastructure. Vehicle localisation is achieved using fixed data beacons and odometry. The central interface between the respective vehicle and a signal box is a trackside installation in the form of an ETCS route centre (RBC). The signal box remains responsible for securing the route and transmits information about the route to the respective ETCS route centre, which in turn generates the respective driving licence. At ETCS level 2, continuous communication between the vehicle and the route is achieved using GSM-R. On-shore clearance notification is required.

ETCS Level 3 works analogously to Level 2, but it is not necessary to report track vacancies on the track. The RBC also takes over the function of reporting track vacancies. The integrity of the train must be monitored by the ETCS on-board equipment. ETCS Level 3 also makes a "moving block" possible, so that in some cases a further increase in capacity can be achieved. The route does not have to be divided into fixed block distances.

Beacons or groups of beacons are used as data points. In practice, beacons are arranged in groups of 1 to 8 beacons and thus form a beacon group. At least two beacons are required for address recognition; more are used when a larger amount of information is to be transmitted or a particularly high level of availability is required, which is achieved by redundant telegrams.

On-board vehicle localization is achieved using fixed data beacons, which are measured with high precision and reflect the relocated location. The respective vehicle is located between these beacons by extrapolating the distance traveled, which is measured by odometry. Since extrapolation is subject to errors, this must be taken into account when calculating the vehicle position. For this purpose, a confidence interval is generated that increases linearly with increasing distance from the last position beacon, i.e. the last relevant beacon group (LRBG).

The different ETCS versions on the infrastructure side (SRS “Baseline”) have, among other things, an influence on which vehicles are to be ordered. For this reason, it is always important for railway companies to know which route-specific requirements apply.

For a track with a signalling system compliant with ERMTS/ETCS Level 2 or 3 standards, a method for initialising the full monitoring mode for the movement of a train on the track is known from EP publication 3235706 A1.

In addition to ETCS levels, ETCS modes are also defined. Modes describe the states in which the EVC can be found. Among others, the following modes exist:

- FS mode (‘Full Supervision’): The railway vehicle is fully controlled by ETCS. A prerequisite for this mode is that an MA has been given from the track.

- LS mode (“Limited Supervision”): As the name suggests, only a limited supervision function is active. The driver receives his driving licence via stationary signals; the display in the passenger compartment does not show any reference variables. Only an emergency braking curve is monitored.

- OS (“On Sight”) mode: the railway vehicle is monitored by ETCS, but the driver drives visually.

- SH mode (“Shunting”): manoeuvring mode; the permitted range can be specified by ETCS; in many countries they are only allowed a maximum speed of 30 km/h.

- SR mode (“Staff Responsible”): The driver is responsible for securing the vehicle, although in many countries only a maximum speed of 30 km/h or 40 km/h is permitted, which is still monitored by ETCS. This mode is adopted when there is no MA.

- SN (“National System”) mode where tracking is performed by a national system using ETCS vehicle components such as odometry or DMI.

- RV(“Reversing Mode”): This mode is used for reversing to evacuate, especially from tunnels. - TR(“Trip”) mode: If the ETCS activates emergency braking, this mode automatically switches to this mode. The mode is maintained until the vehicle stops.

- PT Mode (“Post Trip”): After stopping in Trip mode and with confirmation from the driver, it is only possible to switch to this mode

- SL (“Sleeping”) mode. The ETCS automatically adopts this mode when no cabin is occupied and the vehicle control recognises that the vehicle is being driven by another vehicle. Typical applications are towing operation and multiple traction.

- NL (“Non Leading”) mode. The “Non Leading” driving mode must be selected manually by the driver if he has to drive a locomotive on the vehicle (i.e. unlike SL, the driver's cab is occupied), but this locomotive is not located in front of the vehicle.

During the start of mission (SoM), an ETCS device on board a track-guided vehicle reports whether its stored position is "valid" or "invalid". From the point of view of the ETCS device, a "valid" reported position is also the actual position of the vehicle. This is due to the ETCS definition, according to which the vehicle only has a linear view of the path travelled. Route deviations via detours are not known to the vehicle and are not included in its position determination.

In practice, however, it is possible that the vehicle has been diverted to another track by means of bypasses or by reading new balise groups. Then, the position information of the ETCS vehicle device is actually ambiguous.

An RBC (the ETCS centre) must be able to take this potential ambiguity into account and eliminate it before issuing and sending a driving licence for the FS operating mode or, where applicable, the OS operating mode of the vehicle concerned.

Therefore, at the start of the trip, an RBC must check the vehicle position report to see if the position has become invalid due to vehicle movements, for example, at STM level, level 0, or at SH(“Shunting”), SL(“Sleeping”), or NL(“Non Leading”).

In particular, it should be noted that position information reached by the RBC based on position reports sent by the vehicle may indicate an apparent overtaking of a beacon group by changing the steering information, even if a beacon group itself was not read.

Until now this problem has been solved by defining so-called “Trusted Areas” with appropriate beacon equipment.

The concept of safe sections or safe areas was defined by Deutsche Bahn.

Defines secured sections as sections of a route where the route centre can rely on a valid position transmitted by an ETCS component of the railway vehicle to be correct. The route centre can thus, for example, issue a driving licence for this railway vehicle in OS mode or in FS mode.

It is known to provide the following types of beacons for secured sections:

- beacons at the edge of the secured section (also called TAB beacons; TAB: “Trusted Area Border”);- beacons outside the secure area (also called TAO beacons; TAO: “Trusted Area Outside”);

- beacons inside the secure section (also called TAI-Balisen; TAI: “TrustedArea Inside”).

Publication DE 102013226728 A1 shows in Figure 5 an exemplary arrangement of a railway track with a secured section.

Therefore, a solution with trusted areas requires a large number of beacon groups. This is a high cost factor for each client project.

The aforementioned document DE 102013226728 A1 provides a solution with which some of the beacons can be saved, while at the same time implementing the concept of secured sections while respecting the necessary safety measures.

A large number of beacon groups are also required for this solution.

The aim of the invention is to provide an even more cost-effective solution.

This task is solved according to the features of the independent claims. Preferred embodiments are found especially in the dependent claims.

In order to solve the task in a generic vehicle control method in which a track device initially declares its vehicle position to be unreliable when a vehicle starts to move, it is provided according to the invention that the track device is in a configuration mode under each of the following two conditions (i, ii) and only if one of these two conditions (i, ii) is met, a new vehicle position determined on the basis of a new vehicle position report is considered reliable:

(i) if a new data point identifier determined from the new position report differs from a previous data point identifier determined from a previous position report;

(ii) if the new data point identifier does not differ from the previous data point identifier, if, in addition, the new directional information determined based on the new position report differs from the previous directional information determined based on the previous position report and if, in addition, a confidence interval of the new position determined based on the new position report is less than a confidence interval of the previous position determined based on the previous position report.

Similarly, to solve the problem, in a generic vehicle control system in which a roadside device is configured to initially declare a vehicle position as unreliable when a vehicle starts to move, it is provided according to the invention that the ground device is in a configuration mode under each of the following two conditions (i, ii) and only if one of these two conditions (i, ii) is met, a new vehicle position is determined based on a new vehicle position report. considered reliable:

(i) if a new data point identifier determined from the new position report differs from a previous data point identifier determined from a previous position report;

(ii) if the new data point identifier does not differ from the previous data point identifier, if, in addition, the new directional information determined based on the new position report differs from the previous directional information determined based on the previous position report and if, in addition, a confidence interval of the new position determined based on the new position report is less than a confidence interval of the previous position determined based on the previous position report.

With respect to the vehicle control method according to the invention, it is considered advantageous if the track device is in an additional configuration mode under each of the following three conditions (i, ii, iii) and only if one of these three conditions (i, ii, iii), the new vehicle position determined on the basis of the new vehicle position report is considered reliable:

(i) if the new data point identifier is different from the previous data point identifier;

(ii) if the new data point identifier does not differ from the previous data point identifier, if in addition the new address information differs from the previous address information and in addition the new confidence interval of the position is less than the confidence interval of the previous position;

(iii) if the new data point identifier does not differ from the previous data point identifier, if the new address information also differs from the previous address information and if, in addition, the new confidence interval does not differ from the previous confidence interval, but is less than a predetermined limit value.

Similarly, with respect to the vehicle control system according to the invention, it is considered advantageous if the trackside device is configured in an additional configuration mode under each of the following three conditions (i, ii, iii) and only if one of these three conditions (i, ii, iii) is met, the new vehicle position determined on the basis of the new vehicle position report will be considered reliable:

(i) if the new data point identifier is different from the previous data point identifier;

(ii) if the new data point identifier does not differ from the previous data point identifier, if the new address information also differs from the previous address information and if, in addition, the new confidence interval of the position is less than the confidence interval of the previous position

(iii) if the new data point identifier does not differ from the previous data point identifier, if the new address information also differs from the previous address information and if, in addition, the new confidence interval does not differ from the previous confidence interval, but is less than a predetermined limit value.

Furthermore, it is considered advantageous if in the vehicle control method according to the invention the trackside device, after initially declaring that the position of the vehicle is unreliable, responds to a request for a driving licence of the vehicle with an authorisation to drive under personal responsibility, or if in the vehicle control system according to the invention the trackside installation is configured, after initially declaring that the position of the vehicle is unreliable to respond to a request for a driving licence of the vehicle with authorisation to drive under personal responsibility.

Furthermore, it is considered advantageous if, in the vehicle control method according to the invention, the track device only issues a driving permit for driving in route guidance mode after having established the new position of the vehicle as reliable, or if the track device is configured in the vehicle control system according to the invention to issue a driving permit for driving in route guidance mode only after having determined that the new position of the vehicle is reliable.

Furthermore, it is considered advantageous if in the vehicle control method according to the invention a computer system of the ground-based device receives the position reports at a ground interface with a communication path and uses these position reports to determine data point identifiers, address information and confidence intervals, or if in the vehicle control system according to the invention a ground-based computer system of the ground-based facility is configured to receive the position reports at a ground interface with a communication path and to use these position reports to determine data point identifiers, address information and confidence intervals.

It is also considered advantageous that in the vehicle control method according to the invention an on-board computer system of the vehicle generates the position reports based on data provided on the track by data points and data provided in the vehicle and provides them at an on-board interface to the communication path, or if in the case of the vehicle control system of the invention, an on-board computer system of the vehicle is configured to generate the position reports based on data provided on the track by data points and data provided in the vehicle and to provide them at an on-board interface of the vehicle to the communication path.

The invention also relates to an on-line computer program with program instructions which, when the computer program is executed by an on-line computer system, cause it to carry out the method steps according to one of claims 1 to 6.

Furthermore, the invention relates to an on-line delivery device for the on-line computer program according to claim 7, wherein the on-line delivery device stores and/or provides the computer program.

The invention also relates to an on-board vehicle computer program with program commands that, when the on-board vehicle computer program is executed by an on-board vehicle computer system, causes it to perform the steps recited in claim 6 of generating the position reports and providing position reports on the on-board vehicle interface.

Furthermore, the invention relates to an on-board vehicle provisioning device for the on-board vehicle computer program according to claim 9, wherein the on-board vehicle provisioning device stores and/or provides the on-board vehicle computer program.

The vehicle is, for example, a track-guided vehicle, in particular a rail vehicle.

The track device is, for example, an ETCS track centre, the track computer system being formed by at least one RBC secure computer.

The on-board vehicle device is, for example, an ETCS vehicle device, the on-board vehicle computer system being formed by at least one secure vehicle computer.

The communication path consists, for example, of at least one GSM-R digital radio channel.

The solution to the problem according to the invention lies in the evaluation of the position reports sent by the vehicle in connection with driving on a group of beacons.

This takes into account that a UNISIG-compatible vehicle, when passing over a group of beacons, resets the confidence interval contained in the position report (evaluation of distance measurement errors) to at least a defined predetermined value. A confidence interval that was previously larger due to the distance travelled becomes smaller.

Furthermore, it is noted that the reported confidence interval is only due to short distances travelled which may remain the same, but not exceed a total value of around 30 m. The value of 30 m is an empirically determined value.

Within each SoM procedure, the RBC assumes each reported position as “untrusted” (RBC definition is “not credible”), regardless of the reported Q_STATUS (valid, invalid, unknown) of the SoM-PR. If the driver presses the “Start-Button”, the vehicle sends an “MA-request”, which is always answered by the RBC with an SR (“Staff Responsible”) authorization.

Switching to SR mode allows the driver to begin driving.

RBC retains information on the "not credible" position.

The position of a vehicle travelling in the SR only becomes a "credible" position in the CM configuration mode with one of the events (i) and (ii) described below.

In the CM* additional configuration mode, the vehicle position only becomes a "credible" position with one of the events (i), (ii) and (iii).

In other words, an RBC according to the solution according to the invention recognizes that a beacon group has been crossed by evaluating the position reports in the CM configuration mode through the following events:

(i) The vehicle reports a changed beacon group compared to the last position report; therefore, the vehicle reports its position with a new LRBG, i.e. with a different BG than the SoM-PR or changes its position from unknown to known, which can only happen when a new BG is read.

EITHER

(ii) The vehicle sends a position report regarding the same beacon group with direction change information Q_DLRBG and at the same time a smaller confidence interval (L_DOUBTOVERnew L_DOUBTUNDERnew) < (L_DOUBTOVERold L_DOUBTUNDERold). Therefore, the vehicle reports the current LRBG with direction change and the collapsed confidence interval within a single position report. The RBC is based on the fact that a cyclically sent position report cannot have a collapsed confidence interval according to SRS(“Subset”026,3.6.4).

The following test determines whether the confidence interval has collapsed:

(L_DOUBTOVERnew L_DOUBTUNDERnew) < (L_DOUBTOVER0,d L_DOUBTUNDERold)

(L_DOUBTOVERnew L_DOUB TUNDE Rnew) < (L_DOUBTOVERold

L_D0UBTUNDERoid)

The values of the new position release (the new position report) are marked with the index “new”. The index “old” indicates the values of the last position report that was received before the new position release.

Thus, if a vehicle passes over a beacon group and “reads” the information from this beacon group, it sends a position report (PR) with exactly this just-passed beacon group as a location reference (LRBG – “last relevant balise group”). So, if a different LRBG was reported in the previous PR or the position was sent as “unknown”, then reporting a “new” LRBG is an indication that the vehicle has just passed this LRBG. This means that RBC can rely on this reported position – the position becomes “reliable” (“credible”).

On the other hand, if a vehicle starts off again after turning around (e.g. the vehicle has entered a terminal station such as Leipzig or Stuttgart and now has to leave in the opposite direction), it sends a SoM-PR in which the position of the vehicle is indicated in relation to an LRBG that is located in front of the front of the "turned" vehicle. If the vehicle starts off now, it will again drive over the LRBG it last drove over, but now in the opposite direction to the one it had before entering the station. This means that the LRBG always remains the same in the sent PRs, but the directional information related to this LRBG changes. In addition, when the crossing of the beacon group is recognized again, the distance measurement error is reset on board the vehicle, resulting in a collapsed confidence interval. The combination of a simultaneous change in directional information and a reduced confidence interval is considered a reliable indication that the vehicle actually drove over and read the LRBG.

In the CM* additional configuration mode, an RBC according to the solution according to the invention recognizes that a group of beacons has been passed by evaluating the position reports through the following events:

(i) The vehicle reports a beacon group that has changed compared to the last position report OR

(ii) The vehicle sends a position report on the same beacon group with modified direction information Q_DLRBG and at the same time a reduced confidence interval (L_DOUBTOVERnew L_DOUBTUNDERnew) < (L_DOUBTOVERold L_DOUBTUNDERold)

EITHER

(iii) The vehicle sends a position communication with respect to the same beacon group with modified direction information Q_DLRBG and an unchanged confidence interval, whereby the total size of the confidence interval does not exceed a defined size.

(L_DOUBTOVERnew L_DOUBTUNDERnew) = (L_DOUBTOVERold L_DOUBTUNDERold)

(L_DOUBTOVERnew L_DOUBTUNDERnew) <= value set for an unchanged confidence interval.

The following test is used to determine whether the confidence interval does not change:

The CM* additional configuration mode is a function that can be configured using design data and can also be activated or deactivated.

It should be noted that due to the definition of the UNISIG specification, a vehicle sends or may send direction change information even if, after turning, it reaches the position of the last beacon group read according to its trajectory measurement, but has not read the beacon group.

Therefore, changing the direction information alone is not sufficient to ensure that a beacon group was actually hardly read. But: If the vehicle has only travelled a very short distance since the last reading of a beacon group (see again the example of a turn at the terminal station, the LRBG is only a few metres in front of the front of the vehicle), then there is no change in the route due to the measurement error of the short distance travelled, since no distance measurement error has yet occurred. If this situation were not allowed, then this position evaluation procedure would be very disruptive to operations (see again the example of a vehicle turning at the terminal station, this vehicle would not be able to receive a driving licence from the <r>B<c> and would have to drive very slowly for a long time). For this reason, position reports with a direction change of the LRBG and a confidence interval between ±12 m and ±15 m should also be possible. The ±12m is the initial or default value of the UNISIG specification for a confidence interval when reading a group of beacons. The ±15m is derived from empirical experience. Therefore, the GW limit value for the confidence interval can be configured; a GW limit value other than 30m is preferably provided.

As already mentioned, the functional part (iii) can be activated or deactivated by projection.

In the solution according to the invention, fewer beacon devices are required to determine the position of the vehicles. This results in less planning effort in the respective application project, which ultimately leads to lower project costs.

Position reports sent by vehicles are also used. Only a few groups of beacons are needed, which are normally needed for other functions.

However, the RBC only issues an MA if the vehicle's position is at least "credible". However, there are additional framework conditions for the granting of an MA:

- The front of the vehicle notified as the new minimum safe front end must approach a sign in the direction of travel.

AND

- upon receipt of the "credible" PRnew, the signal must display a free travel term.

Based on this, it is possible to issue an MA driving licence using the 'passing-by procedure'. For this case, a special definition of a shorter MA window is not required.

After reaching a "credible" position, the MA window can be used to output an MA on each subsequent signal.

List of reference symbols

S Vehicle control system

SoM Launch, also departure (in English: “Start of Mission”)

T Vehicle in the form of a rail-guided vehicle, especially a railway vehicle

OBU Vehicle-side device in the form of an ETCS onboard device or ETCS vehicle device (ETCS “onboard unit”)

EVC On-board computer system in the form of a safe vehicle computer ETCS (European Vital Computer)

RBC Track side installation in the form of a trackside ETCS (English:“Radio Block Centre”)

RBC-C Trackside computing system in the form of a secure RBC computer (English:“RBC Core”)

CP<r b c -c>Computer program executed by the lateral computer system on the track

CP<e v c>Additional computer program executed by the on-board computer system

CC<g s m -r>Communication path in the form of at least one GSM-R radio channel (in English:“GSM-R Radio Channel”)

I<r b c -c>Ground interface with the communication channel

I<e v c>Onboard interface with the communication channel

MA-R Application for a Driver's Permit (abbreviated “MA Request”)SR-A Authorization to Travel Under the Responsibility of Staff (abbreviated “SR Authority”)

CM Configuration Mode

CM* Further Configuration Mode

cV predefined limit value, or configured value ePold approximate previous vehicle position, in particular approximate previous positions of the front end of the vehicle

eP<new>new estimated vehicle position

PR<oid>previous position report (in English:“previous Position Report or old Position Report“)

PR<new>new position report

NID_LRBG<old>previous data point identifier determined based on previous position report in the form of an identity number or identity of a new last relevant balise group, abbreviated LRBG<old>(in English:“Identity of previous Last Relevant Balise Group’’)

NID_LRBG<new>new data point identifier determined based on the new position report in the form of an identity number or identity of a new last relevant balise group, LRBG<new>for short

Q_DLRBG<old>Previous directional information determined based on the previous position report in the form of a qualifier, indicating on which side of the previous LRGB<old>the previous approximate position of the head of the vehicle (nose of the train) is located

Q_DLRBG<new>New directional information determined based on the new position report in the form of a qualifier, indicating on which side of the LRGB<new>new the new approximate position of the vehicle head (nose of the train) is located

L_DOUBTOVER<old>previous distance determined based on the previous position report between a previous minimum safe front end of the vehicle (previous min safe front end) and the approximate previous position of the front of the vehicle (nose of the train)

L_DOUBTUNDER<old>previous distance determined based on the previous position report between a previous maximum safe front end of the vehicle (previous max safe front end) and the approximate previous position of the front of the vehicle (nose end)

L_DOUBTOVER<new>new distance determined based on the new position report between a new minimum safe front end of the vehicle (“newmin safe front end”) and the new approximate position of the front of the vehicle (nose of the train)

L_DOUBTUNDER<new>new distance determined based on the new position report between a new endpoint

maximum safe front end of the vehicle (“new max safe front end”) and the new approximate position of the front of the vehicle (nose of the train)

P-CI<old>=L_DOUBTOVER<old>+L_DOUBTUNDER<old>previous position confidence interval or position confidence interval (in English:“previous Position Confidence Intervall”)

P-CI<new>=L_DOUBTOVER<new>+L_DOUBTUNDER<new>new position confidence interval or position confidence interval (in English:“new Position Confidence Intervall”)

Claims (18)

1. Vehicle control method, in which an en-route facility (RBC), during an initial ride (SoM) of a vehicle (T), initially stipulates that the vehicle's position (eP<old>) is unreliable, characterized in that The route-based (RBC) facility, in configuration mode (CM), stipulates that a new vehicle position (eP<new>) determined on the basis of a new vehicle position report (PR<new>) (T) is reliable under each of the following two conditions (i, ii), and only if one of these two conditions (i, ii) is met: (i) if a new data point identifier (NID_LRBG<new>) based on the new position report (PR<new>) is determined to differ from a previous data point identifier (NID_LRBG<old>) determined based on a previous position report (PR<old>); (ii) if the new data point identifier (NID_LRBG<new>) does not differ from the previous data point identifier (NID_LRBG<old>), if a new address information (Q_DLRBG<new>) determined on the basis of the new position report (PR<new>) also differs from a previous address information item (Q_DLRBG<old>) determined on the basis of the previous position report (PR<old>) and if in addition a new position confidence interval (P-CI<new>) determined on the basis of the new position report (PR<new>) is less than a previous position confidence interval (P-CI<old>) determined on the basis of the previous position report. 2. Vehicle control method according to claim 1, characterized because the route device (RBC), in another configuration mode (CM*), stipulates (specifies) that the new vehicle position (eP<new>) determined on the basis of the new position report (PR<new>) of the vehicle (T) is reliable under each of the following three conditions (i, ii, iii), and only if one of these three conditions (i, ii, iii) is met: (i) if the new data point identifier (NID_LRBG<new>) differs from the old data point identifier (NID_LRBG<old>); (ii) if the new data point identifier (NID_LRBG<new>) does not differ from the previous data point identifier (NID_LRBG<old>), if the new address information element (Q_DLRBG<new>) also differs from the previous address information element (Q_DLRBG<old>) and if in addition the new position confidence interval (P-CI<new>) is less than the previous position confidence interval (P-CI<old>); (iii) if the new data point identifier (NID_LRBG<new>) does not differ from the previous data point identifier (NID_LRBG<old>), if the new address data (Q_DLRBG<new>) also differs from the previous address data (Q_DLRBG<old>) and if in addition the new confidence interval (P-CI<new>), despite not differing from the previous confidence interval (P -CI<old>), is less than a predefined limit value (cV). 3. Vehicle control method according to one of claims 1 or 2, characterized because The en route facility (RBC), having initially stipulated that the vehicle's position (eP<old>) is unreliable, responds to a request for circulation authority (MA-R) from the vehicle (F) with authorization to travel with personnel responsibility (SR-A). 4. Vehicle control method according to one of claims 1 to 3, characterized because The en-route facility (RBC) only issues a movement authorization (MA) to travel in a guided mode on the route once it has stipulated that the new position of the vehicle (eP<new>) is reliable. 5. Vehicle control method according to one of claims 1 to 4, characterized because A route computer system (RBC-C) at the route facility (RBC) receives the position reports (PR<old>, (PR<new>) at an on-board interface (I<r b c>) to a communication path (CC<g s m -r>) and, based on these position reports, determines data point identifiers (NID_LRBG<old>, NID_LRBG<new>), direction information (Q_DLRBG<old>, Q DLR-BG<new>) and confidence intervals (P-CI<old>, P-CI<new>). 6. Vehicle control method according to one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that An on-board computer (EVC) system in the vehicle generates position reports (PR<old>, (PR<new>) based on data provided en route by the data points and data provided on board the vehicle, and provides such position reports on an on-board interface (IEVC) to the communication path (CC<g s m -r>). 7. On-board computer program (CP) with program commands which, after execution of the computer program (CP) by an on-board computer (RBC-C), causes said computer system to carry out the steps of the method according to one of claims 1 to 6. 8. Route delivery facility (M<r b c>) for the route computer program (CP<r b c>) according to claim 7, wherein the route delivery apparatus stores and/or provides the computer program (M<r b c>). 9. An in-vehicle computer program (CP) with program commands such that, when the vehicle computer program (CP) is executed by an in-vehicle computer system (EVC), said computer system rapidly performs the steps recited in claim 6 to generate the position reports (PR, (PR) and provide the position reports (PR, (PR) at the vehicle interface (IEVC). 10. Vehicle supply facility (M<e v c>) for the vehicle computer program (CP<e v c>) according to claim 9, wherein the vehicle supply apparatus (M<e v c>) stores and/or provides the external en-route computer program (CP<e v c>). 11. Vehicle control system (S), in which an en-route facility (RBC) is configured, during an initial journey (SoM) of a vehicle (T), to initially stipulate that a vehicle position (eP<old>) is not reliable, characterized because The route-based facility (RBC) is configured, in a configuration mode (CM), to stipulate that a new vehicle position (eP<new>) determined on the basis of a new vehicle position report (PR<new>) (T) is reliable under each of the following two conditions (i, ii), and only if one of these two conditions (i, ii) is met: (i) if a new data point identifier (NID_LRBG<new>) determined on the basis of the new position report (PR<new>) differs from a previous data point identifier (NID_LRBG<old>) determined on the basis of a previous position report (PR<old>); (ii) if the new data point identifier (NID_LRBG<new>) does not differ from the previous data point identifier (NID_LRBG<old>), if a new address information (Q_DLRBG<new>) determined on the basis of the new position report (PR<new>) also differs from a previous address information (Q_DLRBG<old>) determined on the basis of the previous position report (PR<old>) and if in addition a new position confidence interval (P-CI<new>) determined on the basis of the new position report (PR<new>) is less than a previous position interval confidence (P-CI<old>) determined on the basis of the previous position report. 12. Vehicle control system (S) according to claim 11, characterized because The route-based facility (RBC) is configured, in an additional configuration mode (CM*), to stipulate (specify) that the new vehicle position (eP<new>) determined on the basis of the new vehicle position report (PR<new>) (T) is reliable under each of the following three conditions (i, ii, iii), and only if one of these three conditions (i, ii, iii) is met: (i) if the new data point identifier (NID_LRBG<new>) differs from the old data point identifier (NID_LRBG<old>); (ii) if the new data point identifier (NID_LRBG<new>) does not differ from the previous data point identifier (NID_LRBG<old>), if the new address information element (Q_DLRBG<new>) also differs from the previous address information element (Q_DLRBG<old>) and if in addition the confidence interval of the new position (P-CI<new>) is less than the confidence interval of the previous position (P-CI<old>); (iii) if the new data point identifier (NID_LRBGn<ew>) does not differ from the previous data point identifier (NID_LRBG<old>), if the new address information element (Q_DLRBG<new>) also differs from the previous address information element (Q_DLRBG<old>) and if in addition the new confidence interval (P-CI<new>), despite not differing from the previous confidence interval (P-CI<old>), is less than a predefined limit value (cV). 13. Vehicle control system (S) according to one of claims 11 or 12, characterized because The en route device (RBC) is configured, once the vehicle's position (eP<old>) has been initially determined to be unreliable, to respond to a vehicle (F) movement authority request (MA-R) with an authorization to travel with personnel responsibility (SR-A). 14. Vehicle control system (S) according to one of claims 11 to 13, characterized because The en-route facility (RBC) is configured to only issue a movement authorization (MA) for travel in an exteriorly guided mode en route once the new vehicle position (eP<new>) has been stipulated to be reliable. 15. Vehicle control system (S) according to one of claims 11 to 14, characterized because a route computing system (RBC-C) at the route facility (RBC) is configured to receive position reports (PR<old>, (PR<new>) at a path-side interface to a communication path (CC<g s m -r>) and, on the basis of these position reports (PR<old>, (PR<new>), to determine data point identifiers (NID_LRBG<old>, NID_LRBG<new>), direction information (Q_DLRBG<old>, Q DLRBG<new>), and confidence intervals (P-CI<old>, P-CI<new>). 16. Vehicle control system (S) according to one of claims 11 to 15, characterized in that an on-board computer system (EVC) of the vehicle (T) is configured to generate the position reports (PRold, (PRnew) based on the data provided on the path side by data points (LRBGold, LRBGnew) and the data provided on the vehicle side, and to provide said position reports on an on-board interface with the communication path (CC<g s m -r>). 17. Vehicle control system (S) according to one of claims 11 to 16, characterized because The vehicle (T) is a rail-guided vehicle, in particular a rail-guided vehicle. 18. Vehicle control system (S) according to one of claims 11 to 17, characterized because The route facility (RBC) is an ETCS route control centre, where the route side computer system (RBC-C) consists of at least one secure RBC computer, On-board installation (OBU) is an ETCS vehicle device, where the on-board computer system (EVC) consists of at least one safe vehicle computer, and The communication path (CCGSM-R) consists of at least one <g>S<m>-R digital radio channel.