ES2249334T3 - Train safety procedure. - Google PatentsTrain safety procedure.
- Publication number
- ES2249334T3 ES2249334T3 ES01103405T ES01103405T ES2249334T3 ES 2249334 T3 ES2249334 T3 ES 2249334T3 ES 01103405 T ES01103405 T ES 01103405T ES 01103405 T ES01103405 T ES 01103405T ES 2249334 T3 ES2249334 T3 ES 2249334T3
- Prior art keywords
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- 238000000034 methods Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 35
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- 201000001845 syndromic X-linked intellectual disability Snyder type Diseases 0.000 description 1
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L3/00—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. to release brake, to operate a warning signal
- B61L3/02—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. to release brake, to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control
- B61L3/08—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. to release brake, to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically
- B61L3/12—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. to release brake, to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves
- B61L3/121—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. to release brake, to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves using magnetic induction
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central traffic control systems ; Track-side control or specific communication systems
- B61L27/0038—Track-side control of safe travel of vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. braking curve calculation
- B61L2027/0044—Track-side control of safe travel of vehicle or vehicle train, e.g. braking curve calculation using European Train Control System [ETCS]
Procedure for train safety.
The present invention relates to a train safety procedure, performed according to the preamble of claim 1.
Under names such as "SIGNUM", "ZUB 121", "INDUSI" and "TPWS" (Train Protection and Warning System), the intermittent automatic control systems of train running are known, covering automatic control devices of the progress of trains mounted in a fixed place and devices mounted on vehicles. The fixed devices are usually arranged in a signal or before a dangerous place, and transmit indications of a signal and partly also speed specifications, to a locomotive or in the push locomotives to a pilot car. The indications of a signal contain for example the meaning "START", "DANGER", or "STOP", while the speed specifications, most of the time, contain directly in min./sec. or in km / h, a maximum speed to the place that concerns or for the next section of
In EP 1069021 A2 a system is revealed intermittent automatic control of the running of trains, which in addition to the signal indications and specifications of Speed mentioned above, allows for each type of train, other than regulation trains, transmit the values of difference at the expected speeds and if necessary the values of difference to the destination distances. So you can transfer different profiles of different train types from driving, without a high flow rate being required for transmission of data.
Because of the traffic density, which is increasing, as well as unfortunately also due to accidents, an improvement of the automatic control systems of train travel is required. Particularly, also the intrusion in the administration of the countries and in the railway administration of the trains that do not require a locomotive change, is coupled with the aforementioned systems. These systems will be successively replaced by a standardized "European Train Control System" - hereafter designated as ETCS -. The ETCS offers considerably higher functionality compared to the old systems with respect to the automatic control of train travel and significantly improves safety. An overview of the existing automatic train travel control system, as well as the separation strategies through the ETCS, appears in the ETR document 11/2000 under the title "Zugbeeinflussungssyteme europäischer Bahnen" pages 725 to 733, by Professor Dr. Jörn Pachl. The technical specification of the ETCS, in the mentioned document is contained in the UNISIG (for example UNISIG SRS, SUBSET-026, Version 2.0.
In Britain the railway administration introduced a security system on TPWS trains (Train Protection and Warning System), whereby using devices transmission mounted in pairs at intervals of 0 to about 22 m, signal indicators such as "DANGER", "EXCESS RISK SPEED "or" STOP ", in a lower frequency field of ten KHz, they can be transmitted from these devices to moving vehicle. The system is, however, in such a way designed, that a train, before a dangerous point, is not sure to stop The speed control takes place through the control chronometric between a pair of signals received from two devices of transmission. Which means that, on the one hand, all trains with the same maximum speed will be controlled, and by another On the other hand, the distance will be determined over the distance to that group. Therefore, the modifications require a new assembly on the track. An adaptation to the European ETCS system requires some Expenses so high that it cannot be done in one step.
The present invention is therefore intended to propose a procedure for train safety, which can be installed and put into operation in an easy manner, so that trains at a dangerous point will be able to stop easily and in a later phase, in a simple way, the system can be installed
This objective is solved by means of measures proposed in claim 1.
- for one point of the track (L0, L1, ..) that in at least one of the telegrams (TEL) transmitted, contain the distance at data transfer units (F1, T1) that form a group, and for the confirmed reception moments of at least two Telegrams in an evaluation unit (8), the speed is calculated of the vehicle on rails;
- in al minus one of the transmitted telegrams (TEL) contains the maximum authorized speed for the points of the road in question (L0, L1, ..);
- that speed calculated in the phase of procedure A, is compared with the maximum permitted speed transmitted in the phase of procedure B, and in case of exceeding the maximum speed allowed, an alarm signal or automatic shutdown will occur of the train;
can be made possible for points of the route chosen individually, an effective protection of the train and regardless of the slip effect, it is determined and controls the current speed of a vehicle over lanes
Other advantageous embodiments of the invention They are included in other claims.
In addition, the following may be produced advantages:
- Dice that
- the telegrams transmitted sent by the data transmission units (F1, T1; F11, F12) are based on the European Train Control System ETCS system and is received on the corresponding beacon antennas (6) conforming to the ETCS System;
- for the respective railway administration may the system for the train protection, at a later stage, easily, to through an addition to the data unit, the system be applied I integrate ETCS Level 1 System (claim 2).
- Dice that
- in the phase of procedure A additionally a rule of braking, which contains that the speed reduction takes place between two groups and that in the phase of procedure C additionally it will be compared if the speed reduction is truly effected and if it is found that the reduction of the speed effected is insufficient an alarm signal or a stop is triggered automatic train; you can also monitor trains, which do not exceeding the maximum allowed speed, where however it has to be accepted, a locomotive driver because of a indisposition or distraction, do not react more correct to the signals marked in the indications of signals (claim 3).
- Given the
- in the phase of procedure A, in addition to a signal mounted along the track, the corresponding signal indicator is transmitted and on this depends that a warning signal or an automatic stop of the train; different signal indications can be transmitted, which In addition to controlling speed, avoid crossing a point dangerous (claim 4)
- Dice that
- in the phase procedure A additionally at least one is transmitted train class and the corresponding maximum speed is transmitted allowed to a train class and that in the procedure phase C the comparison is made for each train class of the corresponding maximum allowed speed, to which the rail vehicle; the different types of trains as per example express trains, freight trains and trains of the construction service, etc. can be observed in a way different in regards to the maximum allowed speed and enables for each type of valid train, a minimum duration of route (claim 6).
The following explains in more detail the invention by way of example by means of the attached drawings, in those shown:
Figure 1 Distribution and detailed representation of the coupling of the groups of beacons mounted at the points of the tracks before a stop light;
Figure 2 Distribution and coupling of a group of beacons mounted at a point on the track on a section of the caution signal - stop traffic light;
Figure 3 equipment inside the vehicle.
Figure 1 shows the basic distribution of a group of beacons L0, L1, L2 of the ETCS / Eurobalise system mounted at a point on the track before a stop light 3. With the reference sign R, the direction of travel is indicated. train. A group of beacons - hereafter referred to as a group - contains at least two beacons. A group can cover up to eight beacons mounted one after another. The beacons can be constructed at the same time, as telegrams emitted with fixed data beacons or as maneuverable transparent beacons - with a telegram, the content of which depends on a signal indication. The smaller distribution of groups of beacons two by two is necessary so that in the event that it passes over it can be recognized in a telegram, by means of a firm identification signal, the direction of travel R of the train that passes over. Up to eight beacons can be arranged per group. The group L0 according to figure 1 comprises a transparent beacon T0 and a fixed data beacon F0. In another interval (not drawn to scale) of the stop light 3, two groups with two beacons are placed in two other points of the track L1 and L2. These other intervals are established due to business requirements and can be found in the dimension of 50 m ... 2500 m. Groups L1 contain two fixed data beacons F11 and F12, which, over a distance d1, are mounted on the crossbars of railway tracks. Groups L2 consist, like groups L0, of a transparent beacon T2 and a fixed data beacon F2, which are mounted at a distance d2 side by side. The distances d1 and d2 typically have the dimension 2.5 m ... 6 m. The selection unit 1 contains an adapter 2 - also called Lineside Electronic Unit LEU - which is arranged for the selection of transparent beacons T0 and T2. The signal indications - also called driving indicators - supplied by a control station of the selection unit 1, on the one hand they are transmitted to the signal 3 and on the other hand they are supplied to the adapter 2 and registered in the telegram, which on the connection line 10 or 12, the transparent beacons T0 or T2, for their transmission, are transmitted to an antenna located in a
Figure 2 shows, for the intended direction of the train R travel, before the stop light 3 a signal of Caution 4, whose indication of a signal is supplied on a adapter (not shown) of a transparent beacon of the group L4 Groups L3 and L1 are formed through two data beacons fixed, while groups L2 and L0 contain both a beacon of fixed data and a transparent beacon. In figure 2 it is not represented the connection of the caution signal 4 and the traffic light Stop 3 with a maneuvering station.
Figure 3 shows the equipment inside the automotive train A motor train 5 shows on its lower side a antenna 6, to be called here beacon antenna, which Telegrams received by the antenna are supplied for preparation, to a BMT transmission module (Balisen Transmission Module) The received telegrams are supplied for others evaluations to an evaluation unit 8, which is connected to a display (or visual representation box) 9. The display (or visual representation box) 9 serves to display the information analyzed in the evaluation unit 8. With L4 is indicated a point of the track, which is assigned to a group with a fixed data beacon F4 and a transparent beacon T4.
For the distribution explained in detail in Figures 1 to 3, the method recommended in the invention It is exemplified in the following three cases:
- The Caution Sign 4 shows the "DANGER" signal indication and the stop light corresponds to the signal indication "STOP"; the locomotive engineer reacts only in part to the signal indications and the train continues circulating
- The Caution Sign 4 shows the "DANGER" signal indication and the stop light corresponds to the signal indication "STOP"; the locomotive engineer does not react to the signal indication, the train continues to run steadily but gently below the allowed speed.
- The Caution signal 4 shows the signal indication "DANGER", the locomotive driver reacts to that signal indication and when it continues to circulate, the stop light changes to the "CIRCULAR" signal indication.
A train with the maximum speed allowed, passes with the direction of travel R, the point of track L4 and receives from the transparent beacon of the group assigned at that point on track L4 a telegram with a TEL packet, which contain a data structure according to the following table 1. Hereinafter to simplify the telegram package will be called with the shortest term of "telegram".
The other indications - partly techniques of transmission - such as those for the recognition of sense of the train's progress and for the recognition of each beacon, are not represented in the data structure according to table 1. In the REF_BALISEN field the beacons are exposed within the group to which the reference distance refers. At field DIST_BALISEN is exposed the distance to the beacon of Reference within a group.
In the case of passing over the group at the point of via L4, through the two beacons that form the group, a telegram each of the aforementioned type, in which Only one of the telegrams contains a TEL telegram package, with the corresponding direction of travel. In the module transmission 7 the time difference of the moments is determined of reception of the two aforementioned telegrams, these are supplied to the evaluation unit and there the current speed of the trains. In the evaluation unit 8 the others are analyzed fields of the received telegrams and an alarm information to cause of the received signal indications are transferred to Locomotive engineer by the display (or box of visual representation) 9. By comparison of the current and maximum proposed permitted speed in evaluation unit 8, no it happens, because of the entry of the mentioned requirements, No other reaction.
The locomotive engineer starts first place a braking and the train passes with decrease, but still with the maximum allowed speed, the point of the L3 track, at which it is assembled a group with two fixed data beacons. Here they communicate again two TEL telegrams, of the corresponding structure defined HRD + APP to the locomotive, in the following table 2 are exclusively represented fields that are different from those represented in figure 1.
The current indication of a signal, according to the caution signal 4 or stop light 3, is not transmissible since in position L3 there are only fixed data beacons; these are communicated in the TPWS_FUNCTION field of the unit evaluation 8. Individually transmitted to the track point L3 among others the distance, as well as the contents of the fields VEL_MAX, BREAK_RULE, TRAIN_CLASS_CNT, VEL_MAX_CLASS, BREAK_RULE_CLASS. When mounting the fixed data beacon, for the point of the route in question, the contents of the fields These have to be programmed in a fixed way, for that You can use a portable programmer. In the motor vehicle they are the indications of a signal transmitted in the point of the L4 pathway and correspondingly, the data contained in table 2 by evaluation unit 8: Of the distance of both fixed data beacons F31, F32 (in figure 2 not represented) and the time between receipt of the two Telegrams, the current speed is calculated. Speed contained in the field VEL_MAX_CLASS in the respective position L3, it is compared with the calculated speed and interpreted as in order. In the evaluation unit it is usually stored the type of train and according to that you can check the speed maximum for that type of train. If no type of train, the maximum allowed speed of the VEL_MAX field is deducted. In If you exceed the maximum speed allowed, you can trigger an automatic train stop, which the driver of The locomotive cannot cancel. The aforementioned inspection of the maximum speed, according to the content of the fields VEL_MAX_CLASS and / or VEL_MAX, is basically possible in each group of beacon. Depending on the telegram configuration, the fields can TRAIN_CLASS_CNT and VEL_MAX_CLASS appear several times to be can transmit the maximum speed in each case to more types of trains
The locomotive engineer will now reduce from speed again and the train will pass with the speed allowed on point of track L2, in which a group with a transparent beacon and one with a fixed data beacon. For other part a TEL telegram of the aforementioned type is transmitted, with the current indication of a TPWS_FUNCT signal according to the indication of a signal registered at stop light 3. As at the point of track L3 the current speed of the train, with the procedure recommended in the invention and compared with the transmission of the maximum speed according to the content of the VEL_MAX_CLASS or VEL_MAX fields. Because of the premise mentioned at the beginning, that comparison does not cause any technical signal reaction by the evaluation unit 5 existing in the motor vehicle, a particular signaling to the Locomotive machinist, where you are told that the system beacons works correctly and that true speed is compliant with the maximum speed allowed.
It is accepted that the train from the point of via L2 with constant speed continue the march, which crosses the route point L1 and receive a TEL telegram from both transparent beacons according to the type of table 2. In this place you check now, through evaluation unit 8, that you have exceeded the maximum allowed speed and accordingly triggers an automatic train stop, which the train behind the traffic light stop at the place of danger, stay paralyzed. Alternatively it is accepted that the train, at the point of track L1 pass with the allowed speed and continue the march. In in that case an automatic train stop occurs upon receipt of a telegram according to table 1, which is sent from the group located at the point of track L0. In the TPWS-FUNCT field you contains the "STOP" signal indication, which immediately e regardless of the result of the speed controls, triggers an automatic train stop.
A train with a speed clearly below of the maximum speed, passes in the direction of march R, the point on track L4 and receive a TEL telegram, from the beacon transparent of the group that at that point of the L4 track is assigned according to the structure in table 1. For the calculated speed and the comparison with the current speed, through the unit of evaluation 8, no other reaction happens, only the indications of a communicated signal, can be transmitted particularly for the display (or visual representation box) 9 to the engine operator of the locomotive.
The train continues to drive now with a constant speed and pass the point of the L3 track. This is supposed, that the calculated (and actual) train speed is also for the track point L3 below the maximum speed. For the telegrams transmitted through the groups located at the point of track L3, it is not checked in evaluation unit 8, none speed transgression. The BREAK_RULE field indicates some braking rules, so when in that field there is a speed reduction, which of a group must be respected by the next group, that if not, automatic braking is caused of the train. In this case the braking rules are broken, that the Train shows both the same speed in L4 and L3. That does that an automatic train braking is triggered caused by the evaluation unit 8.
This compliance test takes place, of Obviously, also for the processes explained in case A, in case A it was assumed that the transmitted braking rules They were not infringed.
A train with the maximum speed allowed, passes in the direction of march R the point of track L4 and receives from the transparent beacon of the group assigned to the point of track L4 a TEL telegram, according to the structure of table 1. Because of the calculated speed and the comparison with the current speed not takes place through the evaluation unit 8 none reaction, only the indication of a communicated signal can be transmitted by the display (or visual representation box) 9 particularly the locomotive engineer. The machinist of the Locomotive starts braking now.
The train now passes the point of track L3 and L2, sometimes with the maximum speed allowed and under the compliance with the braking rules indicated in the field BREAK_RULE
Immediately, when passing the point of the L2 track, the signal indicator is changed at the stop light "STOP" by "START" and visibility conditions They allow the driver to be able to realize that change. But still now, the group of the track point L1, which only has fixed data beacons, to pass, the locomotive machinist cannot accelerate the train, but must reduce the speed to the permitted speed, according to the braking rules of the point of track L1 and may after passing the point of track L1, again accelerate the train
The case explained above is in itself and for Yes, disadvantageous. Such a case can be eliminated by proper placement and proper group ordering with just fixed data beacons and transparent beacons. The distribution moderate distance of both groups mentioned above, it determined according to the type and distance to the danger point, behind of stop light 3, the visibility conditions of the path and terrain topography as well as according to the capacity of braking of each type of train; particularly they can also be taking into account the ups and downs that have an influence Direct over braking distance.
For particularly critical paths, you can also provide that all groups show a beacon transparent, so that the aforementioned disadvantage can be eliminated
In the procedure written above, accepted that evaluation unit 8 be placed in a vehicle at engine coupled at the tip of the train in the direction of travel. In particular for block passenger train compositions, the evaluation unit 8, can be placed somewhere in the composition, however as a rule the beacon antennas 6, contemplating in each case according to the direction of the march, this actively connected in the first vehicle.
The method recommended in the invention with beacon groups, which exclusively display data beacons fixed, it is used especially there, where the section of the track is monitored, for example before curves, that for all trains It can only be traveled with a controlled speed. In the countryside TPWS-FUNCT can be provided for this, a indication of a special signal, ie "SPEED NOTICE", that in the vehicle can be evaluated, regardless of a previous transmission and with a signal corresponding to a indication of a signal.
The fields indicated in table 1, can be completed through other fields, for example, you can facilitate on a crossing with a defined deep speed a "stop" indicated by a stop light for vehicles of the construction service. The different contents of the different fields in a telegram, can be combined arbitrarily as regards the valuation in the unit of evaluation 8 and are not in any way limited to the example of execution described above.
- Selection unit
- LEU Lineside Electronic Unit adapter
- Stop light
- Caution sign
- Motor vehicle
- Beacon antenna
- BTM Transmission Module (Balise Transmission Module)
- Evaluation unit
- Display or representation box visual
- LEU connection with the beacon group at the traffic light stop 3
- LEU connection with the beacon group at the point of the L2 track
- Position of a group of beacons at a traffic light of stop
- L1, L2, Lx
- Point of the way in which groups are ordered beacons, in which x = 1,2,3, ..,
- F0, Fx
- Fixed data beacon at a point on the L0 or Lx; in which x = 0, 1, and a transparent beacon in the corresponding track point is also turn available
- F11, F12; Fy1, Fy2
- Fixed data beacon at the point of the L1 or Ly path, in which y = 0, 1, in which the data beacons Fixed are only available at the Ly track point
- T0, Tx
- Transparent beacon at the point of track L0 or Lx
- Distance of a group of beacons at the point of the via L1
- Distance of a group of beacons at the point of the via L2
- Direction of the march of a train
- for one point of the track (L0, L1, ..) at least one of the telegrams (TEL) transmitted contains the distance to the transmission unit of data (F1, T1) that form a group, and for the time being reception of at least two telegrams, the speed of a vehicle on rails, in an evaluation unit (8);
- in al minus one of the transmitted telegrams (TEL) contains the maximum speed allowed for the track point in question;
- the speed calculated in the phase of procedure A, is compared with the maximum speed transmitted in the phase of procedure B and of exceed the maximum allowed speed, a signal is triggered alarm or automatic train stop.
Priority Applications (1)
|Application Number||Priority Date||Filing Date||Title|
|EP20010103405 EP1232926B1 (en)||2001-02-14||2001-02-14||Train safety system|
|Publication Number||Publication Date|
|ES2249334T3 true ES2249334T3 (en)||2006-04-01|
Family Applications (1)
|Application Number||Title||Priority Date||Filing Date|
|ES01103405T Active ES2249334T3 (en)||2001-02-14||2001-02-14||Train safety procedure.|
Country Status (5)
|EP (1)||EP1232926B1 (en)|
|AT (1)||AT310662T (en)|
|DE (1)||DE50108160D1 (en)|
|DK (1)||DK1232926T3 (en)|
|ES (1)||ES2249334T3 (en)|
Families Citing this family (15)
|Publication number||Priority date||Publication date||Assignee||Title|
|DE502004000771D1 (en) *||2004-04-30||2006-07-27||Cit Alcatel||Method for determining the distance of a balise from a presignal|
|DE102005042218B4 (en) *||2005-09-05||2012-07-26||Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V.||Railway collision warning device|
|FR2916719B1 (en) *||2007-05-31||2009-08-21||Alstom Transport Sa||Communication beacon and associated configuration device|
|DE102007037603B4 (en) *||2007-08-07||2009-09-03||Siemens Ag||Method of operating ETCS route equipment|
|DE102008020700A1 (en)||2008-04-24||2009-11-05||Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V.||Train collision warning device for warning of collision danger between rail-bound vehicle and e.g. construction crews, has mobile unit determining collision danger between vehicle and person based on travel information in radio signals|
|FR2949412B1 (en) *||2009-09-02||2011-10-21||Alstom Transport Sa||Rail safety installation and associated method|
|ITRM20120107A1 (en) *||2012-03-21||2013-09-22||Ecm S P A||Mobile device railway signaling and mobile signaling system including said device|
|DE102012215574A1 (en)||2012-09-03||2014-03-06||Siemens Aktiengesellschaft||Operation of a rail vehicle|
|DE102012217777A1 (en) *||2012-09-28||2014-04-03||Siemens Aktiengesellschaft||Control of a rail vehicle|
|DE102013226728A1 (en) *||2013-12-19||2015-06-25||Siemens Aktiengesellschaft||Control of a rail vehicle|
|DE102013226718A1 (en) *||2013-12-19||2015-06-25||Siemens Aktiengesellschaft||ETCS wayside equipment|
|EP2905196A1 (en) *||2014-02-11||2015-08-12||Siemens Aktiengesellschaft||Receiving arrangement for speed control and related method|
|DE102015210550A1 (en) *||2015-06-09||2016-12-15||Siemens Aktiengesellschaft||Method and arrangement for ensuring edge protection for trains|
|FR3078310A1 (en) *||2018-02-27||2019-08-30||Alstom Transport Technologies||Method for controlling railway vehicles, device and system thereof|
|EP3569468A1 (en) *||2018-05-14||2019-11-20||Bombardier Transportation GmbH||Method of and arrangement for determining a vehicle speed recommendation for operating a railway vehicle|
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|Publication number||Priority date||Publication date||Assignee||Title|
|US3787679A (en) *||1972-01-26||1974-01-22||British Railways Board||Train communication system|
|DE2550444C3 (en) *||1975-11-10||1984-01-12||Siemens Ag, 1000 Berlin Und 8000 Muenchen, De|
|DE2633089A1 (en) *||1976-07-22||1978-01-26||Siemens Ag||Automatic selective speed control system for locomotives - has train identification transponders with respective speed encoding and resonant circuits to identify class of locomotive|
|DE3118421C2 (en) *||1981-05-09||1990-09-06||Standard Elektrik Lorenz Ag, 7000 Stuttgart, De|
|DE9200582U1 (en) *||1992-01-16||1992-03-12||Siemens Ag, 8000 Muenchen, De|
|BE1009635A4 (en) *||1995-09-29||1997-06-03||Gec Alsthom Acec Transport Sa||Device for enabling off and / or brake of a moving vehicle on track.|
- 2001-02-14 DE DE2001508160 patent/DE50108160D1/en active Active
- 2001-02-14 DK DK01103405T patent/DK1232926T3/en active
- 2001-02-14 ES ES01103405T patent/ES2249334T3/en active Active
- 2001-02-14 EP EP20010103405 patent/EP1232926B1/en not_active Not-in-force
- 2001-02-14 AT AT01103405T patent/AT310662T/en unknown
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