EP3493170B1 - Dispositif d'inviolabilité sans fil - Google Patents

Dispositif d'inviolabilité sans fil Download PDF

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Publication number
EP3493170B1
EP3493170B1 EP18204984.1A EP18204984A EP3493170B1 EP 3493170 B1 EP3493170 B1 EP 3493170B1 EP 18204984 A EP18204984 A EP 18204984A EP 3493170 B1 EP3493170 B1 EP 3493170B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
wtd
tamper
layer probe
antenna
tamper state
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EP18204984.1A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP3493170A3 (fr
EP3493170A2 (fr
Inventor
Wade Price
Bruce Olsen
Raymond Roeder
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Boeing Co
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Boeing Co
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Publication date
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Publication of EP3493170A2 publication Critical patent/EP3493170A2/fr
Publication of EP3493170A3 publication Critical patent/EP3493170A3/fr
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
    • G08B13/02—Mechanical actuation
    • G08B13/08—Mechanical actuation by opening, e.g. of door, of window, of drawer, of shutter, of curtain, of blind
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G09—EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09F—DISPLAYING; ADVERTISING; SIGNS; LABELS OR NAME-PLATES; SEALS
    • G09F3/00—Labels, tag tickets, or similar identification or indication means; Seals; Postage or like stamps
    • G09F3/02—Forms or constructions
    • G09F3/03—Forms or constructions of security seals
    • G09F3/0305—Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used
    • G09F3/0329—Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used having electronic sealing means
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G09—EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09F—DISPLAYING; ADVERTISING; SIGNS; LABELS OR NAME-PLATES; SEALS
    • G09F3/00—Labels, tag tickets, or similar identification or indication means; Seals; Postage or like stamps
    • G09F3/02—Forms or constructions
    • G09F3/03—Forms or constructions of security seals
    • G09F3/0305—Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used
    • G09F3/0341—Forms or constructions of security seals characterised by the type of seal used having label sealing means

Definitions

  • the present disclosure is related to sensors, and in particular, to sensors that detect tampering.
  • the bins above passengers, washrooms, and galleys in a commercial airliner train or bus may need to be easily accessible at one point or another while traveling.
  • the washrooms in a vehicle may need to be inspected, secured, and closed prior to passengers boarding the vehicle for security purposes.
  • crew related items may need to be stored in an overhead bin or closet that also needs to be closed and secured.
  • storage compartments in a galley may also need to be inspected, closed, and secured.
  • the approach to securing these areas is generally limited to inspecting, closing, and placing a device at the access of the area that may be a door or flap.
  • the device may include multiple devices or items that provide visual evidence of tamper, such as, for example, a zip tie, an adhesive seal or tape, and a plastic padlock that are permanently altered or broken by a tamper event.
  • FIG. 1 a system block diagram of an example of an implementation of a known security seal 100 is shown attached to an overhead bin door 102 of an overhead bin 104.
  • the overhead bin 104 may be located within an aircraft, bus, train, or other passenger vehicle.
  • the security seal 100 is located on both the overhead bin body 106 and the overhead bin door 102 in a straddling fashion that bridges the gap 108 between the overhead bin body 106 and the overhead bin door 102.
  • FIG. 2 a system block diagram of an example of another implementation of a known security device 200 is shown attached to a secure box 202.
  • the secure box 202 may be located within an aircraft, bus, train, or other passenger vehicle.
  • the security device 200 may be a padlock type device, zip tie, adhesive seal or tap, or other similar device.
  • the security box 202 may be a storage location having a lid 204 that is utilized to store secure items that include, for example, crew items and/or emergency equipment, life vest(s), fire extinguisher, automated external defibrillator ("AED”), etc.
  • AED automated external defibrillator
  • the security device 200 may be a padlock type device that attaches to an attachment device 206 that is located on both the lid 204 and a front wall 208 of the security box 202 in a straddling fashion that bridges a gap 210 between the front wall 208 and the lid 204.
  • the security seals are a type of tape or device that are usually known as, for example, tamper seals, security seals, tamper evident security seals, security tapes, tamper evident tapes, plastic zip ties, or padlocks, which for the purpose of simplicity are herein referred to as "security seals" or "security devices.”
  • these security seals or devices are designed to be visually inspected and easily recognized if tampered with or broken.
  • security seals or devices are utilized in commercial aircraft to help ensure that any items placed onto the aircraft have been cleared by the relevant security personnel, and once cleared, those items are sealed to make sure that they cannot be tampered with before, during and post flight.
  • US9697711B2 in accordance with its abstract states a system for tamper detection that includes a security device and a data device.
  • the security device has a first portion disposable on a first side of a separation boundary of a separable object, and a second portion disposable on a second side of the separation boundary.
  • the security device further includes a first Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) circuit configured to provide a first return signal.
  • RFID Radio Frequency Identification
  • the data device includes a microprocessor and system memory, an RFID reader and a radio antenna. The data device is configured to send and receive radio frequency signals with the first RFID circuit, and to recognize the first return signal as indicating an untampered condition of the separable object.
  • US2017/316679A1 in accordance with its abstract states a portable alarm system.
  • the portable alarm system includes a portable base station, which has an outer housing that encloses a power supply and a secondary protective housing.
  • the secondary protective housing encloses at least a controller and a cellular modem that are electrically connected to each other.
  • An energy storage device such as a super capacitor, is configured to maintain a store of energy and is electrically connected to the controller and the cellular modem to provide an alternative power source thereto.
  • EP2590154A1 in accordance with its abstract states a secure sealing device comprising a radiofrequency transceiver with a first antenna, a closure element, a second antenna with a higher gain than the first antenna at a transmission frequency of the radiofrequency transceiver.
  • the closure element presents an electrically conductive path for connecting the radiofrequency transceiver to the second antenna in a closed state of the secure sealing device.
  • a secure sealing method wherein access to a sealed content is prevented by the closure element, so that breaking said closure element to gain access to the sealed content will disconnect the radiofrequency transceiver from the second antenna, substantially reducing the range of the radiofrequency transceiver.
  • the WTD includes a transmitter, multi-layer probe having predetermined electrical characteristics, wherein the multi-layer prove is an antenna having an antenna length that is approximately equal to a fractional length of an operating frequency of the transmitter, processing device, and power supply.
  • the processing device is in signal communication with the multi-layer probe and the power supply is in signal communication with the transmitter and processing device.
  • the processing device includes a processor and a computer-readable medium (“CRM").
  • the CRM has encoded thereon computer-executable instructions to cause the processor to initiating a tamper state to untampered, detect a physical trigger on the multi-layer probe, and set the tamper state to tampered in response to detecting the physical trigger wherein the physical trigger is a breaking of the multi-layer probe that reduces the antenna length, thus causing the antenna to operate at a shifted operating frequency.
  • the WTD performs a method that includes initiating a tamper state to untampered, detecting a physical trigger, and setting the tamper state to tampered in response to detecting the physical trigger wherein the physical trigger is a breaking of the multi-layer probe that reduces the antenna length, thus causing the antenna to operate at a shifted operating frequency.
  • the WTD includes a transmitter, multi-layer probe having predetermined electrical characteristics, processing device, and power supply.
  • the processing device is in signal communication with the multi-layer probe and the power supply is in signal communication with the transmitter and processing device.
  • the processing device includes a processor and a computer-readable medium (“CRM").
  • the CRM has encoded thereon computer-executable instructions to cause the processor to initiate a tamper state to untampered, detect a physical trigger on the multi-layer probe, and set the tamper state to tampered in response to detecting the physical trigger.
  • the WTD performs a method that includes initiating a tamper state to untampered, detecting a physical trigger, and setting the tamper state to tampered in response to detecting the physical trigger.
  • the WTD 300 includes a transmitter 302, multi-layer probe 304, processing device 306, and a power supply 308.
  • the WTD 300 may also include an antenna 310, receiver 312, optional sensor 314, and optional accelerometer 315 (or other solid-state electronic sensor capable of measuring movement and/or vibration).
  • the processing device 306 is in signal communication with the transmitter 302, receiver 312, power supply 308, optional sensor 314, and the optional accelerometer 315 via signal paths 316, 318, 320, 322, and 323, respectively.
  • the power supply 308 is in signal communication with the transmitter 302, receiver 312, and the optional sensor 314 via signal paths 324, 326, and 328, respectively.
  • the antenna 310 is in signal communication with the transmitter 302 and receiver 312 via signal paths 330 and 332, respectively.
  • the multi-layer probe 304 is in signal communication with the optional sensor 314 via signal path 334 and the processing device 306 via the optional sensor 314 and signal paths 334 and 322.
  • the WTD 300 may optionally also include an optional trigger switch 336 in signal communication with the processing device 306 via signal path 338.
  • the optional accelerometer 315 may be in signal communication with the multi-layer probe 304 via signal path 339.
  • the processing device 306 may include a processor 340 and a computer-readable medium (“CRM”) 342.
  • the CRM 342 has encoded thereon computer-executable instructions to cause the processor 340 to perform different functions in the operation of the WTD 300.
  • the processor 340 may be any microprocessor or similar device, such as, for example, a central processing unit (“CPU"), digital signal processing (“DSP”) device, application specific integrated circuit (“ASIC”), or a field programmable-gate array (“FPGA”).
  • the CRM 342 may be software or firmware and the computer-executable instructions stored on the CRM 342 may include, for example, an operating system, software, and other modules, programs, or applications that are loadable and executable by processor 340.
  • the computer-executable instructions may include hardware logic (i.e., machine instructions) that controls the operation of the processor 340.
  • the CRM 342 may be in signal communication with the processor 340 via a signal path that includes a bus.
  • the power supply 308 may be a battery configured to power the WTD 300 for an extended period of time. It is appreciated by those of ordinary skill in the art that the transmitter 302 and receiver 312 may be independent devices or combined together to form part of a transceiver.
  • the multi-layer probe 304 may be any type of multi-layer device capable of detecting a physical force (i.e., a physical trigger) associated with a tampering activity where the physical trigger may include physically damaging or breaking the multi-layer probe 304. Examples of the multi-layer probe 304 include multiple layers of material that may include a wire, electrical substrate, or other electrically conductive material.
  • the multi-layer probe 304 may include two or more layers of material placed together that cause the multi-layer probe 304 to have predetermined electrical characteristics that may include, for example, a predetermined impedance, capacitance, inductance, dielectric properties, breakdown voltage, etc.
  • predetermined electrical characteristics may include, for example, a predetermined impedance, capacitance, inductance, dielectric properties, breakdown voltage, etc.
  • the multi-layer probe 304 is physically modified or damaged such that the layers of material within the multi-layer probe 304 partially or fully move or separate from each other in a way that substantially alters and changes the electrical characteristics of the multi-layer probe 304 from the original predetermined electrical characteristics.
  • the multi-layer probe 304 is an electrical implementation of a security device similar to, for example, a security tape (also known as security label) that is a type of adhesive tape used to detect tampering.
  • security tape is a pressure sensitive tape or label with special tamper resistant or tamper evident features. These special tamper resistant or tamper evident features may include intentionally weak or frangible components that easily fracture or tear, printing which, when cut or torn, cannot easily be realigned, layers that easily delaminate to show entry or tampering, hidden print layers which indicated an opening or tampering, etc.
  • the multi-layer probe 304 may also include special tamper resistant or tamper evident features that allow the WTD 300 to indicate that the WTD 300 has been tampered with.
  • the multi-layer probe 304 may include multiple layers of material that are sandwiched together to form the multi-layer probe 304. As an example, some of these layers may be electrically conductive and some may be isolative that act as a dielectrics between the electrically conductive layers. In an example of operation, a current may be induced to flow between the electrically conductive layers and through the dielectric layers between the electrically conductive layers.
  • the multi-layer probe 304 may have predetermined electrical characteristics that lets the multi-layer probe 304 allow a certain amount of current to flow through the multi-layer probe 304 with a corresponding predetermined voltage drop across the inputs to the multi-layer probe 304. Moreover, in this example, the multi-layer probe 304 may have a predetermined impedance value corresponding to combination of resistive, capacitive, and inductive properties of the multi-layer probe 304.
  • this tamper will cause a physical variation or deformation of the layers within the multi-layer probe 304 that may change the distance, orientation, or both, between the electrically conductive layers and deformation or damage to the dielectric layers.
  • this tamper may introduce cracks, breaks, and air gaps within layered structure of the multi-layer probe 304.
  • the WTD 300 may utilize these changed electrical characteristics to identify a triggering event corresponding to a tampering event as experienced by the multi-layer probe 304.
  • the multi-layer probe 304 may include multiple layers within the multi-layer probe 304 where one or more layers may include one or more electrical probes such as conductive strips or wires.
  • the one or more electrical probes may include just one electrical wire or strip within the multi-layer probe 304 that is electrically connected to other devices of the WTD 300 and completes a circuit that passes a predetermined amount of current and has predetermined electrical characteristics.
  • two or more electrical wires or strips may be utilized where the two or more electrical wires or strips interact with each other, e.g., one electrical wire or strip may act as an input to the multi-layer probe 304 while another electrical wire or strip may act as an output to the multi-layer probe 304.
  • the first electrical wire or strip may be in signal communication with the second electrical wire or strip through the other dielectric layers of the multi-layer probe 304.
  • this tamper will cause a physical variation or deformation of the layers within the multi-layer probe 304 that may change the distance, orientation, or both, between the electrically wires or strips and deformation or damage to the dielectric layers.
  • the tamper may also damage or break one or more of the electrical wires or strips. As described earlier, this tamper may introduce cracks, breaks, and air gaps within layered structure of the multi-layer probe 304.
  • the WTD 300 may utilize these changed electrical characteristics to identify a triggering event corresponding to a tampering event as experienced by the multi-layer probe 304.
  • the antenna 310 is the multi-layer probe 304.
  • the antenna 310 and multi-layer probe 304 is the same element (i.e., device, component, module, or circuit) where the antenna 310 has an antenna length that is approximately equal to a fractional length (such as, for example, a half-wavelength) of an operating frequency of operation of the transmitter 302 and receiver 312.
  • the physical trigger is a damaging or breaking of the antenna 310 that results in the reduction of the antenna length.
  • changing the antenna length of the antenna 310 will alter the electrical properties of the antenna 310 that include, for example, causing the antenna 310 to operate at a new shifted frequency (i.e., it will result in a new operating frequency that is equal to the new reduced antenna length of the antenna 310 after the breakage or damage of the antenna 310 by the tampering activity), be less efficient at receiving and transmitting signals at the original frequency of operation of the transmitter 302 and receiver 312 (i.e., the quality of reception and transmission will be degraded), and changing the input impedance of the antenna 310.
  • the WTD 300 may not have an optional sensor 314 and the multi-layer probe 304 will be in direct signal communication (i.e., directly connected) to the processing device 306, where the processing device 306 will include a module or logic capable of sensing the physical trigger associated with the tampering activity.
  • the WTD 300 may optionally include the optional sensor 314 or not because the multi-layer probe 304 may be in direct signal communication with processing device 306.
  • the optional sensor 314 may be a device, component, module, or circuit configured to sense the physical trigger on the multi-layer probe 304.
  • the optional trigger switch 336 may be a user activated switch that arms the WTD 300 to detect the physical trigger on the multi-layer probe 304 by initiating a tamper state of the WTD 300 to "untampered.”
  • the WTD may also optionally include the optional accelerometer 315.
  • An accelerometer is a device that measures the proper acceleration of the device, which is a rate of change of velocity of the device in its own instantaneous rest frame (i.e., measures movements or vibrations of the device). If present in the WTD 300, the optional accelerometer 315 detects any movement or vibration (which is a very small movement that is an oscillating, reciprocating, or other periodic type of motion) as the physical trigger.
  • the entire WTD 300 may be partially or completely enclosed by an encapsulation material 344 that may include, for example, paper, cloth, elastomer, nitrile, fluorosilicone, fluoroelastomer, neoprene, silicone, ethylene propylene diene monomer ("EPDM”) rubber, fabric, polymeric material, ceramic, thin metal, or other material.
  • the encapsulation material 344 may be referred to as a sensor external substrate.
  • circuits, components, modules, and/or devices of, or associated with, the WTD 300 are described as being in signal communication with each other, where signal communication refers to any type of communication and/or connection between the circuits, components, modules, and/or devices that allows a circuit, component, module, and/or device to pass and/or receive signals and/or information from another circuit, component, module, and/or device.
  • the communication and/or connection may be along any signal path between the circuits, components, modules, and/or devices that allows signals and/or information to pass from one circuit, component, module, and/or device to another and includes wireless or wired signal paths.
  • the signal paths may be physical, such as, for example, conductive wires, electromagnetic wave guides, cables, attached and/or electromagnetic or mechanically coupled terminals, semi-conductive or dielectric materials or devices, or other similar physical connections or couplings. Additionally, signal paths may be non-physical such as free-space (in the case of electromagnetic propagation) or information paths through digital components where communication information is passed from one circuit, component, module, and/or device to another in varying digital formats without passing through a direct electromagnetic connection.
  • the computer-executable instructions of the CRM 342 will cause the processor 340 to initiate a tamper state to untampered, detect a physical trigger on the multi-layer probe 304, and set the tamper state to tampered in response to detecting the physical trigger.
  • the computer-executable instructions of the CRM 342 may initiate the tamper state to untampered either by a user arming the WTD 300 via the optional trigger switch 336 or by receiving a "wake" command from an external device in signal communication with the WTD 300.
  • the external device may be a server, user portable device, or other wireless device capable of interfacing with the WTD 300.
  • the term “arming" or "armed” is utilized to designate that the WTD 300 is placed in a state that detects any tampering on the WTD 300 by either moving or damaging the WTD 300.
  • the computer-executable instructions of the CRM 342 will cause the processor 340 to receive the wake command from the external device and then authenticate the wake command. It is appreciated by those of ordinary skill in the art that the wake command may be authenticated by a process that includes determining that the external device is an "authenticated interrogator" by utilizing a series of predetermined security protocols. Once the wake command is authenticated, the computer-executable instructions of the CRM 342 then causes the processor 340 to initiate the tamper state to untampered.
  • the tamper state of the WTD 300 is in a state that is not “untampered” but may not be in a state that is "tampered;” however, it is also appreciated that the state of the WTD 300 may vary based on the design of the WTD 300.
  • the wake command may include instructions to set the tamper state to untampered, or, other instructions.
  • receiving the wake command may be for initial setup only where the WTD 300 may initially be running in a lower power scheme where the WTD 300 is in a dormant state for several seconds, powers up the processor device 306 for a short time (for example, a few milliseconds) to listen to the receiver 312 for an authenticated command signal that may be an independent signal from the initial wake command.
  • the wake command may only cause the processing device 306 to query the receiver 312 for a wake package of information for what operation is being requested, which may include to set the state to untampered, or to query the WTD 300 state and then send a report, or possibly other encoded functionality at the processing device 306.
  • the processing device 306 may further execute instructions that may set the initial state of the WTD 300 to untampered, to read the sensor current state, read the power level remaining, generate a report, instruct to transmit, or other instructions.
  • the wake command may also act as a "reset" function to place the WTD 300 into the untampered state.
  • the WTD 300 may include an "off' state prior to being deployed and initiating the tamper state to untampered may include changing the off state to the untampered state by arming the WTD 300 either with the optional trigger switch 336 or the wake command from the external device.
  • the WTD 300 may only include two states (i.e., untampered and tampered) and initiating the tamper state to untampered may include powering up the components of the WTD 300 once the wake command is received and authenticated or the user arms the WTD 300 via the optional trigger switch 336.
  • the WTD 300 is armed by a user directly (via the optional trigger switch 336) or a user wirelessly (via a wireless connection with the external device).
  • the WTD 300 may be a resettable device capable of being reutilized after first use.
  • the WTD 300 may have been first utilized in a situation that detected that the WTD 300 was tampered with by a physical trigger.
  • the WTD 300 includes the optional accelerometer 315 and the WTD 300 is utilized to monitor tampering of a door where the WTD 300 is placed on the door and armed.
  • the door is subsequently moved causing the computer-executable instructions to cause the processor 340 to first detect the physical trigger (i.e., the movement of the door) on the multi-layer probe 304, which may be in signal communication with the optional accelerometer 315, and then set the tamper state to tampered in response to detecting the physical trigger.
  • the physical trigger i.e., the movement of the door
  • the WTD 300 may be reset and utilized again either on the same door or in another application that needs to detect movement.
  • the WTD 300 may not include the optional sensor 314 (because the sensor for movement is the optional accelerometer 315) nor a separate multi-layer probe 304 that is independent from the optional accelerometer 315 because the multi-layer probe 304 may be part of the optional accelerometer 315 or an extension of it such as, for example, a mechanical filter (i.e., a vibration filter).
  • the WTD 300 may receive a reset signal from the external device or the user may again activate the optional trigger switch 336 that causes the computer-executable instructions to cause the processor 340 to reset the state of the WTD 300 back to untampered and the WTD 300 may again monitor the door for another physical trigger.
  • the WTD 300 may, for example, transmit a tamper state signal in response to detecting the physical trigger, wait to receive a status command from the external device, or do nothing.
  • the computer-executable instructions cause the processor 340 to set the tamper state to tampered in response to detecting the physical trigger.
  • the computer-executable instructions then cause the processor 340 to transmit a tamper state signal in response to detecting the physical trigger, where the tamper state signal indicates that the tamper state is tampered.
  • the transmitter 302 may transmit the tamper state signal as a beacon or other repetitive transmission to the external device.
  • the antenna 310 may be a distinct element from the multi-layer probe 304 and the multi-layer probe 304 may have been broken or damaged.
  • the optional accelerometer 315 may be a combination of the optional sensor 314 and multi-layer probe 304 and the transmitter 302 transmits the tamper state signal via the antenna 310.
  • the multi-layer probe 304 is the antenna 310 and in an alternative the transmitter 302 transmits the tamper state signal via the antenna 310 that has been damaged or broken, which reduced the antenna length of the antenna 310.
  • the antenna 310 receives the tamper state signal from the transmitter 302 and transmits it at an altered frequency (as compared to the original operation frequency of the transmitter 302) because of the reduction of antenna length caused by the physically trigger. In all of these situations, the WTD 300 transmits the tamper state signal automatically after detecting the physical trigger.
  • the WTD 300 does not automatically transmit the tamper state signal when a physical trigger is detected. Instead, the WTD 300 waits to be queried by the external device as to its tamper status.
  • the computer-executable instructions cause the processor 340 to receive the status command from the external device and transmit the tamper state signal in response to receiving the status command.
  • the antenna 310 may be a distinct element from the multi-layer probe 304 and the multi-layer probe 304 may have been broken or damaged.
  • the optional accelerometer 315 may be a combination of the optional sensor 314 and multi-layer probe 304 and the transmitter 302 transmits the tamper state signal via the antenna 310.
  • the multi-layer probe 304 is the antenna 310 and in an alternative the transmitter 302 transmits the tamper state signal via the antenna 310 that has been damaged or broken reducing the antenna length of the antenna 310.
  • the antenna 310 receives the tamper state signal from the transmitter 302 and transmits it at a shifted frequency because of the reduction of antenna length caused by the physically trigger. In all of these situations, the WTD 300 transmits the tamper state signal only after detecting the physical trigger and receiving the status command from the external device.
  • the WTD 300 does nothing if a physical trigger is detected.
  • the computer-executable instructions may cause the processor 340 to set the tamper state to tampered in response to detecting the physical trigger or do nothing.
  • the WTD 300 may be automatically placed in an untampered tamper state (i.e., the WTD 300 is armed and ready to detect a physical trigger).
  • the WTD 300 may either automatically transmit a tamper state signal as a beacon or other repetitive transmission to the external device or wait for a query from the external device before answering the query (i.e., the status command) with the tamper state signal.
  • the WTD 300 may be in a sleep state, which will not check the tamper state until receiving an authenticated request for status, at which time the processing device 306 queries directly to the optional sensor 314 to determine the state as tampered or untampered, after which WTD 300 immediately reports the state status to the external device.
  • the WTD 300 may continue to transmit the tamper state signal either automatically or when queried or "go silent" and not transmit any tamper state signal.
  • the antenna 310 is the multi-layer probe 304 and it suffers damage from the physical trigger that either breaks or damages the antenna 310 but the antenna 310 is still functioning and able to transmit a signal.
  • the WTD 300 continues to transmit the same tamper state signal without changing the tamper state of the signal in the processor 340.
  • the antenna 310 will alter the frequency of transmission of the tamper state signal because of the reduction of the antenna length. If the external device is configured to detect the change in transmitted frequency by the antenna 310, then there is no need to have the processor 340 change the tamper state of the WTD 300 since the tampering activity itself has caused an effective "change in state" since the resulting transmission of the tamper state signal will automatically shift in frequency based on the damage caused to the antenna 310 and the external device may be configured to detect that frequency shift and flag it as indicating that the WTD 300 has been tampered. As such, in these situations the WTD 300 does not need to do anything different once armed since the physical trigger has caused damage to the antenna 310 that causes a frequency shift that is detectable by the external device as a flag indicating that the WTD 300 has been tampered.
  • the damage to the multi-layer probe 304 may be so great that the WTD 300 is not be able to transmit a tamper state signal thus indicating that the WTD 300 has been tampered.
  • the damage to the antenna 310 may be so great that the antenna 310 is not function and thus not capable of transmitting the tamper state signal. Since the external device is expecting a response from the WTD 300 (in response to the status command), the external device will flag the WTD 300 as tampered because no signal was received by the external device.
  • the WTD 300 may be configured to always respond to a status command queried by the external device when in the untampered tamper state but once tampered (i.e., once the physical trigger is detected), the WTD 300 may simply stop transmitting any reply to the status command. Again, in this situation, since the external device is expecting a response from the WTD 300 (in response to the status command), the external device will flag the WTD 300 as tampered.
  • the WTD 300 may be designed such that when the computer-executable instructions cause the processor 340 to initiate the tamper state to untampered, the computer-executable instructions are simply arming the WTD 300 for operation in detecting a physical trigger that will eventual move the optional accelerometer 315 or damage the multi-layer probe 304 (which may be the antenna 310). This may include simply turning the power on for the components (i.e., the transmitter 302, receiver 312, accelerometer 315, processing device 306, optional sensor 314, and multi-layer probe 304) of the WTD 300 so as to be able to detect the physical trigger.
  • the components i.e., the transmitter 302, receiver 312, accelerometer 315, processing device 306, optional sensor 314, and multi-layer probe 304
  • the WTD 300 is placed in a tampered tamper state automatically when the physical trigger happens because the physical trigger actually physically effects the WTD 300 (i.e., it moves or damages the WTD 300) in such a way that when the computer-executable instructions cause the processor 340 to set the tamper state to tampered in response to detecting the physical trigger, the computer-executable instructions are simply preparing the WTD 300 to transmit the tamper state signal either automatically or in response to receiving the status command.
  • the method 400 starts 402 by receiving an arming command 404.
  • the arming command may be a command produced by a user activating the optional trigger switch 336 or by receiving a wake command from the external device. If the arming command is the wake command from the external device, the arming command is then authenticated 406. The arming command then causes the WTD 300 to initiate the tamper state to untampered 408 as described earlier. The WTD 300 is then armed and ready to detect a physical trigger. If no physical trigger is detected, the WTD 300 remains in the armed state and ready to detect the physical trigger.
  • the WTD 300 may then enter into a passive state that does not transmit anything until the WTD 300 receives an authenticated request for state status. Once the physical trigger is detected 410, the WTD 300 sets the tamper state to tampered 412 (as described earlier) in a fashion that may be the automatic result of the physical condition of the WTD 300 (as described earlier). The WTD 300 may then either transmit a tamper state signal 414 or wait for a status command (as described earlier) and then, in response, transmit the tamper state signal 414.
  • the WTD 300 may skip step 412 and optionally transmit a tamper state 414 of "untampered.” Alternatively, the WTD 300 may not transmit any signal as described earlier.
  • the method 400 may then end 416. If the WTD 300 is resettable (i.e., the WTD 300 was not damaged and reusable as described earlier), the method 400 may return to step 404, if the WTD 300 is reset, and wait for another arming command that may include a reset signal from the external device. If the WTD 300 is not reset, the method 400 then ends 416.
  • the WTD 300 utilizes energy to check for state of the WTD 300 and revise the state of the WTD 300 independent of the external query but in alternative example, the WTD 300 may only check for state once an authenticated status report command is received. Additionally, the WTD 300 may not transmit (i.e., send a state report) unless it receives an authenticated request to report the tamper state. Otherwise, the WTD 300 may cycle between dormant and listen-on-radio (i.e., monitor the receiver 312).
  • FIG. 5A a top-view is shown of an example of an implementation of the WTD 500 as a security tape or security label type of device (i.e., a "Band-Aid" type of device) in accordance with the present disclosure.
  • the encapsulation material 502 may be in the shape of tape or label including part, or all, of the multi-layer probe 504 within the encapsulation material 502.
  • the multi-layer probe 504 may be a multi-layered device that includes a plurality of material layers (i.e., multiple layers of material) within the multi-layer prober 504 that may include a wire, electrical substrate, or other electrically conductive material.
  • the multi-layer probe 504 may include two or more layers of material placed together that cause the multi-layer probe 504 to have predetermined electrical characteristics that may include, for example, a predetermined impedance, capacitance, inductance, dielectric properties, breakdown voltage, etc.
  • the WTD 500 may utilize these changed electrical characteristics to identify a triggering event corresponding to a tampering event as experienced by the multi-layer probe 504.
  • the multi-layer probe 504 may also include multiple layers within the multi-layer probe 504 where one or more layers may include one or more electrical probes such as conductive strips or wires.
  • the encapsulation material 502 that may include, for example, paper, cloth, elastomer, nitrile, fluorosilicone, fluoroelastomer, neoprene, silicone, EPDM rubber, fabric, polymeric material, ceramic, thin metal, or other material.
  • the encapsulation material 502 may be referred to as a sensor external substrate.
  • the encapsulation material 502 includes an electronic portion 506 of the WTD 500 that includes the transmitter 302, receiver 312, antenna 310, processing device 306, power supply, and part of the multi-layer probe 504.
  • the encapsulation material 502 may also include the optional sensor 314 and optional trigger switch 336.
  • the electronic portion 514 includes the power supply 308 and a system on a chip ("SOC"), ASIC, FPGA, or a substrate or printed circuit board (“PCB”) having the transmitter 302, receiver 312, antenna 310, and processing device 306.
  • the WTD 500 detects tampering (i.e., a physical trigger) via deformation, damage, or break of the multi-layer probe 504.
  • the multi-layer probe 504 is shown to have five (5) layers of material 504a, 504b, 504c, 504d, and 504e.
  • This number of layers of material is for illustration purposes only and it is appreciated by those of ordinary skill in the art that they number of layers can vary based on the design from a minimum of two (2) to any number determined by the design.
  • the lower layer 504e may be support layer that supports the electronic portion 506 and the remaining layers of the multi-layer probe 504.
  • the lower layer 504e may include an attachment surface 508 at the bottom of the WTD 500 that attaches to the surface to be monitored.
  • the attachment surface 508 may include any attachment means that will properly attach the attachment surface 508 to the surface to be monitored and may include an adhesive.
  • FIG. 5B a side-view is shown of an example of the implementation of the WTD 500 in accordance with the present disclosure. It is appreciated by those of ordinary skill in the art that the WTD 500 illustrated in FIGs. 5A and 5B are not so scale and for illustration purpose only. As such, the relative size and dimensions of the multi-layer probe 504, electronic portion 506, and encapsulation material 502 may vary based on the design of the WTD 500.
  • FIG. 5C a prospective-view is shown of the WTD 500 where a trigger event (i.e., a tamper) has occurred in accordance with the present disclosure.
  • a trigger event i.e., a tamper
  • the first layer of material 504a of the multi-layer probe 504 has been substantially altered (i.e., damaged) to the point of being peeled off from the second layer of material 504b in a peeling direction 510.
  • the physical trigger is a separating of the layers of the material within the multi-layer probe 504.
  • any deformation or damage of the multi-layer probe 504 is also applicable in this example and large separation of the first layer of material 504a from the second layer of material 504b (as an example of break or extensive damage of the multi-layer probe 504) is shown for purposes of ease of illustration. Moreover, the separation, deformation, or damage may be between any of the layers of material 504a, 504b, 504c, 504d, or 504e.
  • FIG. 5D a side-view is shown of the WTD 500 where the trigger event has occurred in accordance with the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 6A a block system diagram is shown of an example of an implementation of the WTD 600 as a flat rectangular Band-Aid type of device (i.e., a security tape or security label type of device) in accordance with the present disclosure.
  • This example is similar to the one described in FIGs. 5A through 5D , with the addition of having conductive wire or strip within the multi-layer probe 602 that may be part of any of the multiple layers of material 504a, 504b, 504c, 504d, or 504e shown in FIGs. 5A through 5D .
  • the encapsulation material 604 is in the shape of a large rectangular flat Band-Aid.
  • the multi-layer probe 602 extends throughout the encapsulation material 604 in a turning fashion that fills a multi-layer probe area 606 along a first portion of the encapsulated material 604.
  • the multi-layer probe 602 may (as discussed earlier) include multiple layers of material and an electrical wire or strip 603 (or other electrically conductive material with the proper performance properties of current, resistance, capacitance, voltage, etc.) that is of sufficient thickness to detect any tampering along the multi-layer probe area 606.
  • the multi-layer probe 602 extends outward from a first end 608 of an electronic portion 610 to a second end 612 of the electronic portion 610 via the electrical wire or strip 603 or other conductive material layers within the multi-layer probe 602.
  • the multi-layer probe 602 may include the continuous electrical wire or strip 603 that forms a closed circuit within the WTD 600 such that a current 614 flows from and to the electronic portion 610 when the multi-layer probe 602 is untampered.
  • the electronic portion 610 is part of the encapsulation material 604 and includes the transmitter 302, receiver 312, antenna 310, processing device 306, power supply, and part, or all, of the multi-layer probe 602.
  • the electronic portion 610 may also include the optional sensor 314 and optional trigger switch 336.
  • the electronic portion 610 includes the power supply 308 and a SOC, ASIC, FPGA, or a substrate or PCB having the transmitter 302, receiver 312, antenna 310, and processing device 306.
  • the WTD 600 detects tampering (i.e., a physical trigger) via a deformation, damage, or break in the multi-layer probe 602 along the multi-layer probe area 606 within the multi-layer probe 602.
  • the deformation, damage, or break in the multi-layer probe 602 may include a break in the electrical wire or strip 603.
  • the multi-layer probe 602 Prior to any tampering activity, the multi-layer probe 602 is continuous and undamaged.
  • the WTD 600 is attached to a surface (or across multiple surfaces) and detects when there has been physical separation from the attaching surface or surfaces that causes deformation, damage, or a break of the multi-layer probe 602.
  • the WTD 600 can attach to a flat surface (e.g., utilizing the attachment surface 508), it is appreciated that in this example the electronic portion 610 is at one end of the WTD 600 such that the WTD 600 can be utilized for a corner application.
  • the WTD 600 receives wake command from an external device that is authenticated as an authenticated interrogator by the WTD 600 performing a series of predetermined security protocols. As described earlier, in another example, the wake command may not cause the WTD 600 to set the tampered state to untampered.
  • the WTD 600 transmits a tamper state back to the interrogator (i.e., the external device). More specifically, the WTD 600 may first authenticate, then check the current state of the tamper, write and/or compile a report, and transmit the tamper state to the interrogator.
  • the WTD 600 may either send back a tamper state signal indicating that the tamper state of the WTD 600 is "tampered," or the WTD 600 will not send back the tamper state signal at all.
  • the multi-layer probe 602 and antenna 310 is be the same element and as such when the multi-layer probe 602 is broken the antenna 310 will be broken and have a shorted antenna length causing the WTD 600 to send back and altered (i.e., frequency shifted) tamper state signal.
  • the damage to the multi-layer probe 602 may be such that the WTD 600 is incapable of transmitting the tamper state signal.
  • the multi-layer probe 602 and antenna 310 are the same an too damaged to transmit the tamper state signal or the multi-layer probe 602 is separate from the antenna 310 but once the multi-layer probe 602 is broken the current 614 flow within the WTD 600 is interrupted and the disables the operation of the WTD 600.
  • the WTD 600 is simply designed to transmit the tamper state signal to the external device only when the WTD 600 is untampered but once tampered, the WTD 600 stops transmitting the tamper state signal.
  • the WTD 600 provides both a wireless and visual indication of tamper evidence.
  • FIG. 6B a block system diagram is shown of the WTD 600 after being tampered in accordance with the present disclosure.
  • the physical trigger 616 is shown as a fissure along the multi-layer probe 602 via the electrical wire or strip 603.
  • the electrical wire or strip 603 is utilized to detect the tamper; however, alternatively the multi-layer probe 602 may not include an electrical wire or strip 603 an may utilize at least one conductive layer within the multi-layer probe 602 that conducts the current 614 along the at least one conductive layer from the first end 608 of an electronic portion 610 to the second end 612 of the electronic portion 610.
  • the physical trigger 616 may be a deformation, damage, or break (i.e., a fissure) along the multi-layer probe 602 that has multiple layers of material without the electrical wire or strip 603.
  • any tampering would result in the deformation, damaging, or breaking of the at least one conductive layer, the other non-conductive dielectric layers, or both that would change the electrical characteristics of the multi-layer probe 602 from the original predetermined electrical characteristics.
  • This change in electrical characteristics may be detected by the electronic portion 610 of the WTD 600 and flagged as a tampering event indicative of the physical trigger 616.
  • the physical trigger 616 may be a peeled off type of damage similar to the one described with regards to FIGs. 5C and 5D .
  • FIG. 7A a block system diagram is shown of an example of an implementation of the WTD 700 as a hybrid type of device in accordance with the present disclosure.
  • the encapsulation material 702 may be in the shape of a flat sheet that has a first axis 704 and a second axis 706 that divide up the flat sheet into a first quadrant 708, second quadrant 710, third quadrant 712, and fourth quadrant 714.
  • the power supply 308 and other electronics reside in one quadrant (i.e., the first quadrant 708) of the WTD 700 to provide corner or cross surface applications for the WTD 700.
  • the encapsulation material 702 includes the multi-layer probe 716 that is in portions of all four quadrants 708, 710, 712, and 714 and an electronics portion 718 of the WTD 700 that includes the transmitter 302, receiver 312, antenna 310, processing device 306, power supply 308, and part of the multi-layer probe 716.
  • the portions of all four quadrants 708, 710, 712, and 714 that include the multi-layer probe 716 are shown as a multi-layer probe area 719 that extends out of the electronics portion 718.
  • the electronics portion 718 may also include the optional sensor 314 and optional trigger switch 336.
  • the electronics portion 718 includes the power supply 308 and a SOC, ASIC, FPGA, or a substrate or PCB having the transmitter 302, receiver 312, antenna 310, and processing device 306.
  • the multi-layer probe 716 may include an electrical wire or strip 717 (or other electrically conductive material with the proper performance properties of current, resistance, capacitance, voltage, etc.) that is of sufficient thickness to detect any tampering along a multi-layer probe area 719 and is part of all four quadrants 708, 710, 712, and 714.
  • the multi-layer probe 716 is shown to extend outward from a first end 720 of the electronics portion 718 to a second end 722 of the electronics portion 718.
  • the multi-layer probe 716 may include the continuous electrical wire or strip 717 that forms a closed circuit within the WTD 700 such that a current 724 flows from and to the WTD 700 when the multi-layer probe 716 is untampered.
  • the multi-layer probe 716 and antenna 310 may be the same element.
  • the WTD 700 detects tampering (i.e., a physical trigger) via deformation, damage, or a break 726 (i.e., a fissure) in the multi-layer probe 716 along the multi-layer probe area 719, which is a break or rip 728 in the encapsulation material 702 and a break 726 in the multi-layer probe 716 (that may include a break in the electrical wire or strip 717) along one of the axis 704 and 706.
  • the break 726 may be a peeled off type of damage similar to the one described with regards to FIGs. 5C and 5D .
  • the WTD 700 may or may not include the electrical wire or strip 717 shown.
  • the multi-layer probe 716 may include multiple layers of material that include at least one conductive layer that is in contact with the first end 720 of the electronics portion 718 to a second end 722 of the electronics portion 718 and electronics portion 718 is configured to detect a tampering event along the multi-layer probe 716.
  • the WTD 700 receives wake command from an external device that is authenticated as an authenticated interrogator by the WTD 700 performing a series of predetermined security protocols. As described earlier, in another example, the wake command may not cause the WTD 700 to set the tampered state to untampered.
  • the WTD 700 transmits a tamper state back to the interrogator (i.e., the external device). More specifically, the WTD 700 may first authenticate, then check the current state of the tamper, write and/or compile a report, and transmit the tamper state to the interrogator.
  • the WTD 700 may either send back a tamper state signal indicating that the tamper state of the WTD 700 is "tampered," or the WTD 700 will not send back the tamper state signal at all.
  • the multi-layer probe 716 and antenna 310 may be the same element and as such when the multi-layer probe 716 is broken the antenna 310 will be broken and have a shorted antenna length causing the WTD 700 to send back an altered (i.e., frequency shifted) tamper state signal.
  • the damage to the multi-layer probe 716 may be such that the WTD 700 is incapable of transmitting the tamper state signal.
  • the multi-layer probe 716 and antenna 310 are the same an too damaged to transmit the tamper state signal or the multi-layer probe 716 is separate from the antenna 310 but once the multi-layer probe 716 is broken the current 724 flow within the WTD 700 is interrupted and the disables the operation of the WTD 700.
  • the WTD 700 is simply designed to transmit the tamper state signal to the external device only when the WTD 700 is untampered but once tampered, the WTD 700 stops transmitting the tamper state signal.
  • the WTD 700 provides both a wireless and visual indication of tamper evidence.
  • FIG. 7B a block system diagram is shown of the WTD 700 after being tampered in accordance with the present disclosure.
  • the physical trigger 726 is shown as a fissure along the multi-layer probe 716 along a rip 728 in the encapsulation material 702.
  • the encapsulation material 802 may be in the shape of a flat rectangular sheet that includes part of the antenna 804 within an antenna area 806 of the encapsulation material 802.
  • the antenna 804 extends through the antenna area 806 in a manner that fills the antenna area 806.
  • an electronics portion 808 that includes the power supply 308 and a SOC, ASIC, FPGA, or a substrate or PCB having the transmitter 302, receiver 312, accelerometer 315, and the processing device 306.
  • the electronics portion 808 may also include the optional trigger switch 336.
  • the antenna 804 is shown extending outward from a first end 810 of the electronics portion 808 to an optional second end 812 of the electronics portion 808.
  • the antenna 804 may be a wire, foil, or electro-deposited metal.
  • the antenna 804 may be an electrical wire, strip, or a conductive layer of material within a multi-layer probe 814.
  • the WTD 800 detects tampering (i.e., a physical trigger) via the accelerometer 315.
  • the accelerometer 315 is designed to detect a physical trigger based on movements or vibrations on the WTD 800. Because the internal and external components of the WTD 800 are not altered after a physical trigger (i.e., the WTD 800 is not broken or damaged), the WTD 800 is resettable and can detect multiple physical triggers (i.e., tamper events) throughout its design life.
  • the WTD 800 receives wake command from an external device that is authenticated as an authenticated interrogator by the WTD 800 performing a series of predetermined security protocols. As described earlier, in another example, the wake command may not cause the WTD 800 to set the tampered state to untampered.
  • the WTD 800 transmits a tamper state back to the interrogator (i.e., the external device). More specifically, the WTD 800 may first authenticate, then check the current state of the tamper, write and/or compile a report, and transmit the tamper state to the interrogator.
  • the WTD 800 may either send back a tamper state signal indicating that the tamper state of the WTD 800 is "tampered," or the WTD 800 will not send back the tamper state signal at all. In the case of not sending back the tamper state signal, the WTD 800 may simply be designed to transmit the tamper state signal to the external device only when the WTD 800 is untampered but once tampered, the WTD 800 stops transmitting the tamper state signal.
  • the WTD 800 Since the WTD 800 is not damaged by detecting the physical trigger, after the physical trigger has been detected, the WTD 800 may be reset to an untampered state for reuse in detecting another physical trigger.
  • the WTD 800 may be reset by receiving a reset signal from the external device after the WTD 800 was placed in a tampered state; the WTD 800 may then be reutilized.
  • the WTD 800 may also be reset by a user again activating the optional trigger switch 336.
  • each block in the flowchart or block diagrams may represent a module, a segment, a function, a portion of an operation or step, some combination thereof.
  • the function or functions noted in the blocks may occur out of the order noted in the figures.
  • two blocks shown in succession may be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks may sometimes be performed in the reverse order, depending upon the functionality involved.
  • other blocks may be added in addition to the illustrated blocks in a flowchart or block diagram.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)
  • Arrangements For Transmission Of Measured Signals (AREA)

Claims (14)

  1. Dispositif d'inviolabilité sans fil (DISF) (300) comprenant :
    un émetteur (302),
    une sonde multicouche (304) dotée de caractéristiques électriques prédéterminées, ladite sonde multicouche étant une antenne présentant une longueur d'antenne à peu près égale à une longueur fractionnaire d'une fréquence de service de l'émetteur (302),
    un dispositif de traitement (306) en communication par signaux avec la sonde multicouche, et
    une alimentation (308) en communication par signaux avec l'émetteur et le dispositif de traitement ;
    ledit dispositif de traitement comportant :
    un processeur (340), et
    un support lisible par ordinateur (CRM, computer-readable médium) (342) sur lequel sont codées des instructions exécutables par ordinateur et amenant le processeur à :
    initialiser un état d'inviolabilité sur « non forcé »,
    détecter un déclencheur physique sur la sonde multicouche, et
    régler l'état d'inviolabilité sur « forcé » en réaction à la détection du déclencheur physique ;
    ledit déclencheur physique étant une rupture de la sonde multicouche qui réduit la longueur d'antenne, amenant ainsi l'antenne à fonctionner avec un décalage de fréquence de service.
  2. DISF selon la revendication 1, comprenant en outre une matière d'encapsulation (344) enveloppant au moins une partie du DISF.
  3. DISF selon la revendication 1 ou 2, comprenant en outre :
    un commutateur de déclenchement (336),
    et dans lequel l'initialisation de l'état d'inviolabilité comprend l'initialisation de l'état d'inviolabilité sur « non forcé » une fois que le commutateur de déclenchement a été activé.
  4. DISF selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 3, comprenant en outre un détecteur (314) en communication par signaux avec le dispositif de traitement, ledit détecteur détectant le déclencheur physique sur la sonde multicouche.
  5. DISF selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 4, comprenant en outre :
    un récepteur (312),
    lesdites instructions exécutables par ordinateur amenant en outre le processeur à :
    recevoir une commande de réveil en provenance d'un appareil externe, et
    authentifier la commande de réveil ;
    l'initialisation de l'état d'inviolabilité comprenant l'initialisation de l'état d'inviolabilité sur « non forcé » une fois que la commande de réveil reçue a été authentifiée.
  6. DISF selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 5, comprenant en outre :
    un accéléromètre (315),
    ladite détection du déclencheur physique comprenant la détection du déclencheur physique soit sous forme de mouvement, soit sous forme de vibrations, à l'aide de l'accéléromètre.
  7. DISF selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 5,
    dans lequel le dispositif de traitement est un réseau prédiffusé programmable par l'utilisateur (FPGA, field programmable-gate array), et
    dans lequel le CRM est un micrologiciel.
  8. Procédé de détection du forçage sur un dispositif d'inviolabilité sans fil (DISF), le procédé comprenant :
    l'initialisation d'un état d'inviolabilité sur « non forcé »,
    la détection d'un déclencheur physique sur une sonde multicouche, et
    le réglage de l'état d'inviolabilité sur « forcé » en réaction à la détection du déclencheur physique,
    ladite sonde multicouche étant une antenne présentant une longueur d'antenne à peu près égale à une longueur fractionnaire d'une fréquence de service de l'émetteur, et
    ledit déclencheur physique étant une rupture de la sonde multicouche qui réduit la longueur d'antenne, amenant ainsi l'antenne à fonctionner avec un décalage de fréquence de service.
  9. Procédé selon la revendication 8, comprenant en outre :
    la réception d'une commande de réveil en provenance d'un appareil externe, et
    l'authentification de la commande de réveil ;
    ladite initialisation de l'état d'inviolabilité comprenant l'initialisation de l'état d'inviolabilité sur « non forcé » une fois que la commande de réveil reçue a été authentifiée.
  10. Procédé selon la revendication 9, comprenant en outre :
    l'émission d'un signal d'état d'inviolabilité en réaction à la détection du déclencheur physique, avec ledit décalage de fréquence de service ;
    ledit signal d'état d'inviolabilité indiquant que l'état d'inviolabilité est « forcé ».
  11. Procédé selon la revendication 9 ou 10, comprenant en outre :
    la réception d'une commande de statut en provenance de l'appareil externe,
    l'authentification de la commande de statut, et
    l'émission d'un signal d'état d'inviolabilité en réaction à la réception de la commande de statut ;
    ledit signal d'état d'inviolabilité indiquant que l'état d'inviolabilité est « forcé », ladite détection du déclencheur physique sur la sonde multicouche comprenant de préférence la détermination du fait que la sonde a de nouvelles caractéristiques électriques en conséquence du déclencheur physique.
  12. Procédé selon la revendication 10 ou 11, dans lequel le déclencheur physique est une séparation d'une couche de matière au sein de la sonde multicouche.
  13. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 8 à 12, dans lequel la détection du déclencheur physique comprend la détection du déclencheur physique soit sous forme de mouvement, soit sous forme de vibrations, à l'aide de l'accéléromètre.
  14. Procédé selon la revendication 13, comprenant en outre :
    la réception d'un signal de réinitialisation en provenance de l'appareil externe, et
    la réinitialisation de l'état d'inviolabilité sur « non forcé ».
EP18204984.1A 2017-12-02 2018-11-07 Dispositif d'inviolabilité sans fil Active EP3493170B1 (fr)

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