EP3136273A1 - Einbruchsicherheitsvorrichtung mit sms-basierter benachrichtigung und steuerung - Google Patents

Einbruchsicherheitsvorrichtung mit sms-basierter benachrichtigung und steuerung Download PDF

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Publication number
EP3136273A1
EP3136273A1 EP16185955.8A EP16185955A EP3136273A1 EP 3136273 A1 EP3136273 A1 EP 3136273A1 EP 16185955 A EP16185955 A EP 16185955A EP 3136273 A1 EP3136273 A1 EP 3136273A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
access code
mobile device
screen
code screen
recited
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP16185955.8A
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English (en)
French (fr)
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EP3136273B1 (de
Inventor
Anantha KRISHNAN
Michael RAMOUTAR
Prakash BODLA
Sunilkumar NECKARAJE
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Carrier Corp
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Carrier Corp
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Publication of EP3136273A1 publication Critical patent/EP3136273A1/de
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Publication of EP3136273B1 publication Critical patent/EP3136273B1/de
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B25/00—Alarm systems in which the location of the alarm condition is signalled to a central station, e.g. fire or police telegraphic systems
    • G08B25/14—Central alarm receiver or annunciator arrangements
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/34—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards
    • G06F21/35—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards communicating wirelessly
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/42—User authentication using separate channels for security data
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/21—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass having a variable access code
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/22—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder
    • G07C9/23—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder by means of a password
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/27—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass with central registration
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/2803—Home automation networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0861—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using biometrical features, e.g. fingerprint, retina-scan
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/107—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources wherein the security policies are location-dependent, e.g. entities privileges depend on current location or allowing specific operations only from locally connected terminals
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1491—Countermeasures against malicious traffic using deception as countermeasure, e.g. honeypots, honeynets, decoys or entrapment
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/18—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/63—Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent
    • H04W12/64—Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent using geofenced areas
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2127—Bluffing
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B25/00—Alarm systems in which the location of the alarm condition is signalled to a central station, e.g. fire or police telegraphic systems
    • G08B25/008—Alarm setting and unsetting, i.e. arming or disarming of the security system
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/082—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying multi-factor authentication

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates to a security system and, more particularly, to a security system that pairs an intrusion security device with a mobile device to facilitate SMS based notification and control.
  • Intrusion security panels are electronic control devices that are primarily used to supervise residence and, office premises to report access events to a user and/or monitoring stations. These control panels are usually governed by relatively "simple to use" 4-10 digit access codes. The authorized user can thus readily enter the access code to disarm the system and disables all the sensors that report to the security panel.
  • a security system can include a security device with at least two factors of authentication.
  • a further embodiment of the present disclosure may include, wherein at least one factor of authentication includes proximity between the security device and an authorized mobile device.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include, wherein at least one factor of authentication includes a communication between the security device and an authorized mobile device.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include, wherein the communication between the security device and the authorized mobile device includes a fingerprint to the authorized mobile device.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include, wherein the communication between the security device and the authorized mobile device includes a voiceprint to the authorized mobile device.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include, wherein at least one factor of authentication includes a SMS between the security device and an authorized mobile device.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include, wherein at least one factor of authentication includes display of a the pseudo code screen prior to display of an actual access code screen.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include, wherein the pseudo code screen is identical to the actual access code screen.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include, wherein the pseudo code screen requires entry of a pseudo code for display of the actual access code screen.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include, wherein the pseudo code has a different digit count compared to the access code.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include, wherein the entry of the access code to the actual access code screen is required to disarm the security system.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include a security panel including an input device, the input device in communication with the security device.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include, wherein the pseudo code screen is identical to the actual access code screen.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include displaying the actual access code screen in response to an authorized mobile device being within a predefined proximity to a security device.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include displaying the actual access code screen in response to a SMS from an authorized mobile device.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include, wherein the pseudo code has a different digit number compared to the access code.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include communicating with an authorized mobile device or central monitoring station in response to a predetermined number of incorrect entries into the pseudo code screen.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include communicating with the authorized mobile device or central monitoring station via SMS.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include communicating a temporary access code to the authorized mobile device.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include disabling the security device in response to an incorrect entry to the secret question screen.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include displaying the actual access code screen in response to an authorized mobile device being within a predefined proximity to a security device, the predefined proximity determined by GPS.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include displaying the actual access code screen in response to an authorized mobile device being within a predefined proximity to a security device, the predefined proximity determined by triangulation.
  • a further embodiment of any of the embodiments of the present disclosure may include displaying the actual access code screen in response to an authorized mobile device being within a predefined proximity to a security device, then displaying the actual access code screen in response to a xml-based communication from the mobile device.
  • FIG. 1 schematically illustrates a security system 20.
  • the security system 20 generally includes a security device 22 and one or more mobile devices 24, e.g. a smartphone, in communication with the security device 22 such as via Short Message Service (SMS).
  • SMS Short Message Service
  • the security device 22 may be a security panel or form a potion thereof.
  • SMS is a text messaging service component for phone, Web, or mobile communication systems that facilitates exchange of short text messages.
  • the communication may be conveyed to one or more networks.
  • the communication may be transmitted to the Internet and/or a cellular network.
  • the network(s) may include infrastructure that may be organized to facilitate cloud computing.
  • cloud computing may include one or more servers, such as a primary message server, a backup message server, etc.
  • the servers may be configured to process communications from the mobile device 24. As part of the processing, the servers may validate or authenticate the mobile device 24 and/or a user, potentially based on an identifier associated with the authorized user or the mobile device 24. The validation may alternatively or additionally be based on a location of the authorized user or the mobile device 24. The location may be determined based on one or more location-based services or techniques, such as triangulation, global positioning system (GPS), etc.
  • GPS global positioning system
  • the security device 22 generally includes a control module 40 with a processor 42, a memory 44, and an interface 46.
  • the processor 42 may be any type of microprocessor having desired performance characteristics.
  • the memory 44 may include any type of computer readable medium that stores the data and executable instructions 48 described herein below.
  • the executable instructions may be stored or organized in any manner and at any level of abstraction, such as in connection with one or more applications, processes, routines, procedures, methods, etc.
  • the memory 44 may also store data 50 that, for example, includes an access code validation engine 52, a device identifier, or any other type of data.
  • the access code validation engine 52 is the authorization code that disables sensors 30 reporting to the security device 22 to disarm the security system 20.
  • the processor 42 may execute the instructions stored in the memory 44 that are operative on the data 50.
  • the processor 42 may be coupled to the interface 46 that may include one or more of a keyboard or keypad, a touchscreen or touch panel, a display screen, a microphone, a speaker, etc.
  • the interface 46 may also support a graphical user interface (GUI) and/or voice-to-text capabilities.
  • GUI graphical user interface
  • the interface 46 and/or the mobile device 24 is operable to display a pseudo access code screen 60 ( Figure 3 ) that is identical to an actual access code screen 62 ( Figure 4 ) but is not in communication with the security device 22 access code validation engine 52. That is, the security device 22 and/or the mobile device 24 may display the pseudo access code screen 60 and the actual access code screen 62 to receive an access code for further interaction with the security system 20.
  • the pseudo access code screen 60 When the pseudo access code screen 60 is displayed, a user may not be able to distinguish the pseudo access code screen 60 from the actual access code screen 62 and any correct/incorrect access code entered on the pseudo access code screen 60 will result in a failure.
  • the pseudo access code screen 60 will be seen as the access code screen and any of a brute force attack, a correct access code which was shoulder tapped, and/or an access code crack will not permit the intruder to break into the security control panel 22.
  • the authorized user can access the actual access code screen 62 via proximity between the security device 22 and the one or more authorized mobile devices 24, via SMS communication between the security device 22 and the one or more authorized mobile devices 24, specific Bluetooth/NFC based authentication token, and/or other such authentication factor.
  • a method 100 for operation of the security system 20 is disclosed in terms of functional block diagrams. It should be appreciated that these functions may be enacted in either dedicated hardware circuitry or programmed software routines capable of execution in various microprocessor based electronics control embodiments.
  • the pseudo access code screen 60 is displayed (step 102) until the one or more authorized mobile devices 24 are within proximity to the security device 22 (step 104). That is, proximity to the security device 22 may be predefined as a threshold distance directly adjacent to the security device 22. Predefined proximity to the security device 22 can be further determined by GPS, Triangulation, or from a Periodic poll from the smartphone application from authorized user mobile. Once the mobile device is in proximity, the smartphone/mobile app live/installed in the authorized user mobile can send an xml-based communication (different from SMS communication) to the security panel to get access to the actual access code screen.
  • xml-based communication different from SMS communication
  • the security device 22 detects the authorized mobile device 24 (step 104)
  • the actual access code screen 62 is displayed (step 106) such that the authorized user may enter the access code to disarm the system 20 (step 108). That is, detection of the authorized mobile device 24 is the first authentication factor, and entry of the access code to disarm the system 20 is a second authentication factor.
  • a third authentication factor may be utilized (step 110).
  • the authorized user can send an SMS from the authorized mobile device 24 to the security device 22 while proximate the security device 22 to access the actual access code screen 62.
  • the third authentication factor may beneficially utilize security features built in to the mobile device 24 such as a fingerprint scan, voice print, etc. Such a third authentication factor obviates the use of a stolen mobile device 24, as even with the stolen mobile device 24, the intruder cannot enter the proper third authentication factor, e.g., fingerprint scan, voice print, etc.
  • a method 200 for operation of the security system 20 displays the pseudo code screen 60 (step 202) and requires the entry of a pseudo code, which is different from the access code utilized for the actual access code screen 62 (step 204).
  • the authorized user has to enter the pseudo code in the pseudo access code screen 60 to reveal the actual access code screen 62.
  • the pseudo access code screen 60 may be identical to the actual access code screen 62, so the intruder will be unable to recognize the difference between the pseudo access code screen 60 and actual access code screen 62. Since the authorized user has enabled this setting, the authorized user is aware that the pseudo access code screen 60 is displayed, but for the intruder it will look like the actual access code screen.
  • the actual access code screen 62 is displayed (step 206) such that the authorized user may enter the access code to disarm the system 20 (step 208). It should be appreciated that the third authentication factor might also be utilized in this embodiment.
  • the security device 22 may just display a message, for example, "Invalid Access Code, Please Try Again.” Since the pseudo access code screen 60 is displaced, whatever the intruder enters - even the correct access code - results in the same message. The intruder will thus be unable to break into the security system 20 with any number of attempts. Further, after a predefined number of wrong attempts (step 210), the authorized user will be notified with SMS to the one or more authorized mobile devices 24 (step 212) to alert the authorized user and/or central monitoring station that an unauthorized access has been attempted. The authorized user or central monitoring station may then access the security device 22 remotely via SMS to, for example, lock the security device 22, alert authorities, trigger an alarm, etc. ( Figure 7 ). Alternatively, the security device 22 may be locked, alert authorities, trigger an alarm, etc., in response to a predetermined number of incorrect attempts.
  • the authorized user may selectively enable and disable the pseudo code setting, for example, when the authorized user is traveling out of town, while on normal days, the pseudo code setting can be disabled to avoid the necessity of always entering the two codes.
  • the pseudo access code may be a relatively simple derivative of the actual access code, for example, if the access code is "1234," then the pseudo code can be "123" or "12345,” or other code which can be configured by the authorized user.
  • the pseudo code will have a different digit count than the actual access code and thus be different than the actual access code, to avoid accidental access should the intruder try the 4 digit "1234" on the pseudo code screen 60 and then enter the actual access code screen 62 such that if the intruder enters "1234" believing the first entry failed, the intruder has then disabled the system, that is, inadvertently bypassed the pseudo code screen 60.
  • the authorized user forgets that the pseudo code setting is enabled, and fails to enter the proper pseudo code (step 302).
  • the authorized user fails to enter the proper pseudo code into the pseudo code screen 60 a multiple of times, for example, twice (step 304).
  • the security device 22 sends an SMS to the authorized device 24 to provide information such as a status of the security device 22 which may, for example, remind the authorized user that the pseudo code setting is enabled (step 306).
  • This SMS may contain information to facilitate entry of the proper pseudo code (step 308) by the authorized user.
  • step 304 Should the authorized user fail to enter the proper pseudo code into the pseudo code screen 60 a multiple of times (step 304) then again fails to enter the proper pseudo code in response to the SMS reminder (step 308), the system 20 sends an SMS to the authorized device 24 with a temporary access code (step 310).
  • a secret question screen is displayed (step 314).
  • the secret question may, for example, be mother's maiden name, city of birth, etc., that was previously set by the authorized user (step 316).
  • Proper entry of the answer to the secret question by the authorized user (step 318), displays the access code screen 62 (step 320) for entry of the access code (step 322) to then disarm the system (step 324). Should an intruder who has stolen the mobile device 24 reach this step, the secret question prevents intruder access and can then lock the security device for a desired time period ( Figure 9 ).
  • the real-time SMS notification facilitates increased security at no extra cost and readily handles brute force attack and access code cracking.
  • the real-time SMS notification to the authorized user and the pseudo code facilitates more timely control via SMS based communication with the control panel 22 ( Figure 10 ). Further, installer back end support is eliminated via SMS based communication for access code recovery to result in cost savings and an efficient method of administering user access code in an essentially self-contained manner.

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
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  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
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  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
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  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
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EP16185955.8A 2015-08-27 2016-08-26 Einbruchsicherheitsvorrichtung mit sms-basierter benachrichtigung und steuerung Active EP3136273B1 (de)

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WO2019128375A1 (zh) * 2017-12-29 2019-07-04 深圳市欧瑞博科技有限公司 一种基于智能门锁的胁迫报警方法及装置
WO2019192127A1 (zh) * 2018-04-02 2019-10-10 深圳春沐源控股有限公司 物业管理方法、服务器及存储介质
CN110995710A (zh) * 2019-12-05 2020-04-10 江苏恒宝智能系统技术有限公司 一种基于eUICC的智能家居认证方法
WO2020242958A1 (en) 2019-05-24 2020-12-03 Ademco Inc. Systems and methods of a doorbell device initiating a state change of an access control device and/or a control panel responsive to two-factor authentication
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US10785210B2 (en) * 2016-01-23 2020-09-22 Verizon Patent And Licensing Inc. User-enabled, two-factor authentication service
US20180032722A1 (en) * 2016-07-29 2018-02-01 Carneros Bay Capital, Llc Visual access alert system
CN111465020A (zh) * 2019-01-18 2020-07-28 中兴通讯股份有限公司 一种防伪基站方法及装置、计算机可读存储介质
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