EP2920608A1 - Procede d'estimation du niveau d'erreur de mesures de geolocalisation par satellites et de controle de la fiabilite de ces estimations et dispositif associe - Google Patents
Procede d'estimation du niveau d'erreur de mesures de geolocalisation par satellites et de controle de la fiabilite de ces estimations et dispositif associeInfo
- Publication number
- EP2920608A1 EP2920608A1 EP13821453.1A EP13821453A EP2920608A1 EP 2920608 A1 EP2920608 A1 EP 2920608A1 EP 13821453 A EP13821453 A EP 13821453A EP 2920608 A1 EP2920608 A1 EP 2920608A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- error
- errors
- geolocation
- calculating
- satellite
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/24—Acquisition or tracking or demodulation of signals transmitted by the system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/22—Multipath-related issues
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/20—Integrity monitoring, fault detection or fault isolation of space segment
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of satellite geolocation.
- the present invention more particularly relates to a method for estimating the level of error of measurements of satellite geopositioning and checking the reliability of these estimates and a geolocation device implementing this method.
- the satellite geolocation (or geolocation) devices known as the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Global Positioning and Timing System (GNSS) calculate the position of the receiving terminal by measuring the propagation time. signals emitted by the positioning satellites between the satellites and the receiving terminal. The terminal then deduces the distances between the different satellites and the terminal.
- GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
- GNSS Global Positioning and Timing System
- the position estimated by the terminal is not always accurate. It is known to enter the corrections in the calculation system so as to take account of these disturbances but the models used are complicated to define. In addition, these models do not take into account the environment of the reception terminal, for example multipath phenomena.
- the present invention aims to overcome at least some disadvantages of the prior art by proposing in particular a method for quantifying the level of measurement error induced by the environment and to monitor the reliability of these estimates.
- the subject of the invention is a method for estimating the error level of satellite geolocation measurements and for checking the reliability of these estimations implemented by a geolocation device in which local errors are detected. by said device Geolocation and satellite errors are detected by a ground segment.
- the method comprises:
- the process step Etp1 comprises:
- the process step Etp2 comprises:
- the process step Etp3 comprises:
- the integrity parameters are calculated by defining a protection radius to be less than a predetermined threshold value. According to an implementation variant, the integrity parameters are determined by directly calculating the risk of being greater than alert values.
- the estimation of local errors are validated with a robust estimation algorithm.
- a second object of the invention is to propose a satellite tracking device.
- the invention also relates to a geolocation device capable of implementing the location method described above.
- FIG. 1 represents an exemplary flow diagram of the method according to the invention.
- the subject of the present invention is a method for estimating and controlling the integrity parameters of satellite geolocation measurements and for checking the reliability of these estimates.
- the process according to the invention will be presented according to a particular non-limiting application related to aviation.
- the principle of the invention consists in detecting local errors at the level of the geolocation device and in detecting satellite errors at a ground segment.
- the method according to the invention mainly comprises a first step Etp1 for estimating local errors, a step Etp2 for building the error report, a step Etp3 for monitoring the estimated error, and a step calculation of integrity parameters.
- the first step consists in estimating the error on the local measurements specific to the environment of the receiving terminal of the satellite geolocation device at a time t.
- the receiver may be subject to electromagnetic interference. For example, if the receiver is close to a radar, noise related to the emissions of this radar will be added to the signals received and therefore the measurements will be noisy at random. The measurements can also be disturbed by the thermal noise related to the receiver. Thereafter, the term "thermal noise" will include all the electromagnetic disturbances of the receiver environment and the thermal noise specific to the receiver. The error due to the thermal noise can be determined according to the technology implemented in the reception terminal of the geopositioning device. It will depend on the signal-to-noise ratio C / No.
- the error dispersion due to the thermal noise a n0 i Se for the receiving terminal can be estimated at time t, during a step Etp1 1, by a standard formula such as for example:
- T is the period and B n is the noise band.
- the error due to the thermal noise can be estimated according to the uncorrelated part of the measurement fluctuations. For this purpose, an average of the square of the measurement differences between two consecutive measurements divided by ⁇ can be made to isolate the uncorrelated noise.
- the signal emitted by the geolocation satellite may also have been reflected on obstacles at ground level such as buildings.
- the receiver will therefore receive on its receiving antenna replicas of signals that may have been reflected one or more times on the environment. These signals will have traveled longer than a direct route and will disrupt measures.
- the error due to the multipath phenomenon can be evaluated for example according to the carrier-code difference.
- a first measurement can be performed by measuring the time that the code on which the data is encrypted is propagated, the propagation speed being the group speed of the electromagnetic signal. Another measure may be to calculate the time it takes for the carrier to spread. For that we measure the Doppler effect. As the carrier propagates at the phase speed of the electromagnetic signal, the distance between the receiving terminal and the satellite can be deduced. To perform these measurements, two different techniques are used and different measurement qualities will be obtained. The codes being repeated over long periods of time, the code phase is inambal but noisy. Conversely, the phase of the carrier has a shorter length and therefore will be ambiguous but not very noisy.
- one way to estimate multipath noise during a certain filtering time may be to calculate the standard deviation of the difference between the distance of the code measure. and carrier measurement error due to the multipath phenomenon can thus be evaluated in a stage Etp 12 for example by the following formula: L 2 î î L ⁇
- L is the filter time, typically a few tens of seconds, and cp f (p f resp.) Is the carrier phase (resp code.)
- L is of the order of magnitude of the time that the receiver converges on the estimation of phase ambiguity using the code.
- the estimation of the local error can be carried out during a step Etp13 by means of the formula: In the case of reception terminals using several reception frequencies, the estimate is to be calculated for each frequency / ' separately.
- the previous formula becomes:
- the second step Etp2 of the method consists in completing these estimates by taking into account the other contributors in order to build the error report.
- errors are essentially two-fold, atmospheric errors (ionospheric and tropospheric errors) and orbital and clock errors
- a substep Etp 21 consists of taking into account the ionospheric error ⁇ / ⁇ .
- a second solution is to use the fact that the delay that takes an electromagnetic signal in this layer of the atmosphere depends on its frequency. The idea is to receive the signal on at least two different frequencies so the receiving terminal can calculate its own ionospheric corrections by multifrequency combination. In this case, the contribution to the error report is twofold. A first contribution OHOI corresponds to the higher order errors of the ionosphere. The second contribution is a multiplicative factor that amplifies local errors. In the case of a bi-frequency reception terminal, the measurement of the pseudo distance taking into account the delay due to the ionosphere can be given by the formula: 3 ⁇ 4 ⁇ - ⁇ ⁇
- pi and p 2 represent the measurements of the pseudo-distances for the pulsations ⁇ and ⁇ 2
- this error can be estimated by the formula:
- An estimate of the tropospheric errors is evaluated during a step Etp 22.
- a measurement of the delay due to the path of the electromagnetic signal through this layer of the atmosphere is quite complicated.
- there is generally not enough data at the user's receiving terminal to estimate this delay so the tropospheric error of Tro po needs to be modeled.
- An estimate of this error can be given for example by a model available in the state of the art.
- the orbit and clock errors kX sa n are then taken into account during a step Etp 23. These errors are transmitted by the augmentation system SBAS in the form of variance. In the case of an augmentation system following the MOPS-D standard they may be available through the transmitted quantity UDRE for User Differential Range Error.
- a step Etp24 consists in establishing the error report.
- the variance of the total pseudorange error is obtained by summing the variances of the different errors.
- the variance of the total error can be given by a formula:
- the variance of the total error can be given by a formula:
- This error report gives the total error for a particular measure of pseudorange (line of sight). This is the total error calculated from the information collected from a given satellite as seen by the receiving terminal. This variance can be estimated for each measuring pseudorange n for determining the position of the receiving terminal and is denoted 2 its t, n thereafter.
- Etp3 of the method consists of monitoring the estimated error.
- the position of the reception terminal of the geolocation device is calculated.
- This position is estimated by weighting the pseudosdistances measurements of the terminal using the covariances of the errors calculated in the previous steps.
- these estimates are made using a robust estimation algorithm such as, for example, and without limitation, an Huber algorithm, able to detect significant deviations from the estimated errors.
- the position is estimated by calculating the coordinates (longitude, latitude and altitude) by a least squares method.
- This method uses an algorithm that is very sensitive disturbances.
- the algorithm works correctly and the calculated positions are correct.
- the calculated positions deviate from the real position proportionally to the measurement errors.
- an aberrant measurement can cause an extremely large position error.
- the method according to the invention does not use an algorithm based on the least squares but a robust estimation algorithm.
- the advantage of such an algorithm is to detect aberrant measurements and eliminate them from the calculation or to assign them a very low weight.
- the weight assigned will be even lower than the measurement error will be important.
- the monitoring of the error report is ensured as follows.
- the pseudorange residues ⁇ are estimated during a step Etp32. These pseudodistance residues are defined as the difference between the measurement on the one hand, and the distance between the measured position sat , n and the estimated position is .
- This threshold value represents a parameter that controls the confidence level of the error a sat , n , ie the probability of underestimating a sat, n which would lead to a potentially misleading position estimate.
- the method according to the invention makes it possible to combine the quasi-real time estimate of the error balance ⁇ 2 33 ⁇ , ⁇ with the monitoring of its adequacy to reality by means of an estimation algorithm of the position of the robust receiving terminal and to analyze how these error reports correspond to observed residual errors.
- the integrity parameters are then calculated using the errors estimated and validated in the previous steps. Integrity parameters are calculated using for example the usual methods, the standard least squares solution.
- the variance of the vertical and horizontal position error is calculated by projecting the variances of the estimated error on the local vertical axis and the horizontal plane.
- X is a 1 x 4 vector representing the position of the receiver / clock offset, North, East, vertical frame
- Y represents the vector of V pseudorange measures
- the vertical (respectively horizontal) errors ie the difference between the real positions and the estimated positions, must not exceed the limit VAL (respectively HAL) with a probability greater than or equal to a value P which is specified by the needs of the application.
- VAL vertical (respectively horizontal) errors
- P the value of P is often equal to 1 - 2 x 10-7 .
- the dispersion of horizontal errors can be given by Once the dispersion of errors has been calculated, we assume that we are dealing with a Gaussian standard deviation, since the non-Gaussian sources of error have been eliminated beforehand. From the error report on each line of sight of each validated satellite that was used to calculate the different positions, we calculate the size of a cylindrical box inside which the user is sure to be with a probability higher than that imposed by the civil aviation authorities.
- the receiving terminal will consider that the position is not reliable enough and will broadcast an error message. Otherwise the calculated position will be considered reliable.
- Integrity parameters can be determined using two methods.
- a first way to do this is to use the described method in the SBAS MOPS standard by defining a protection radius that must be smaller than fixed alert values. These alert values can for example be set by, for example, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in the case of an aeronautical application.
- a Horizontal Protection Level (HPL) and a Vertical Protection Level (VPL) is calculated as the maximum horizontal (vertical) distance between the estimated position and the actual position with probability P. these levels of protection can be given by the formulas:
- VPL K P , v ⁇ v
- the calculated position will be considered safe if the HPL and VPL protection levels are strictly lower than the HAL and VAL warning values.
- a second possible implementation is to directly calculate the risk of being beyond alert values. This method corresponds to the G ALI LEO standard.
- the integrity risk can be defined as the probability that the position estimation error is greater than an X value.
- ⁇ ⁇ x represents the centered Gaussian distribution of standard deviation ⁇ and ⁇ 2
- ⁇ (x) represents the distribution ⁇ 2 with 2 degrees of freedom and parameter ⁇ .
- the calculated position will be considered safe if
- the method of the present invention has been described through an application to aviation. This example is in no way limiting and the method can be applied to any type of transport means such as, for example, shipping or the railroad. This method can also find an application for a pedestrian to have a precise position for example for emergency services.
- the present invention also relates to a satellite geolocation device capable of implementing the previously described method. This terminal has at least one reception unit capable of receiving at least one electromagnetic signal emitted by the geolocation satellites and the SBAS augmentation system stations and at least one calculation module.
- the method of the present invention makes it possible to couple three elements.
- augmentation station data for example EGNOS
- ARAIM aspect augmentation station data
- An advantage of the present invention is to allow a reduction in the cost of the ground segments by deferring some of the responsibilities at the level of the GNSS receivers.
- the basic principle of the invention consists in allocating between local phenomena (multitrajet phenomena, thermal noise, electromagnetic interference, tropospheric error,) and global phenomena (ionospheric error, orbit error / satellite clock). Monitoring of local phenomena is ensured by the reception terminal and the monitoring of global phenomena is ensured by the system.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
- Radio Relay Systems (AREA)
- Monitoring And Testing Of Transmission In General (AREA)
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR1203073A FR2998378B1 (fr) | 2012-11-16 | 2012-11-16 | Procede d'estimation du niveau d'erreur de mesures de geolocalisation par satellites et de controle de la fiabilite de ces estimations et dispositif associe |
PCT/EP2013/073983 WO2014076254A1 (fr) | 2012-11-16 | 2013-11-15 | Procede d'estimation du niveau d'erreur de mesures de geolocalisation par satellites et de controle de la fiabilite de ces estimations et dispositif associe |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2920608A1 true EP2920608A1 (fr) | 2015-09-23 |
Family
ID=48236997
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP13821453.1A Ceased EP2920608A1 (fr) | 2012-11-16 | 2013-11-15 | Procede d'estimation du niveau d'erreur de mesures de geolocalisation par satellites et de controle de la fiabilite de ces estimations et dispositif associe |
Country Status (10)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US10012737B2 (ja) |
EP (1) | EP2920608A1 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP6262248B2 (ja) |
KR (1) | KR102205329B1 (ja) |
CN (1) | CN104813191A (ja) |
AU (1) | AU2013346734B2 (ja) |
BR (1) | BR112015011292B1 (ja) |
CA (1) | CA2891363C (ja) |
FR (1) | FR2998378B1 (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2014076254A1 (ja) |
Families Citing this family (10)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN107703525B (zh) * | 2016-08-08 | 2019-12-06 | 华为技术有限公司 | 用于网络rtk基准站网更新的方法和装置 |
US10613233B2 (en) * | 2016-09-21 | 2020-04-07 | Honeywell International Inc. | ARAIM clustering distribution improvement |
FR3065083A1 (fr) * | 2017-04-05 | 2018-10-12 | Thales | Procede de determination de niveaux de protection de solutions de navigation, produit programme d'ordinateur et recepteur associes |
KR101882482B1 (ko) * | 2017-12-20 | 2018-07-27 | 엘아이지넥스원 주식회사 | 표적 인식 장치 및 방법 |
ES2914250T3 (es) * | 2017-12-28 | 2022-06-08 | Centre Nat Etd Spatiales | Gestión de multitrayecto para sistemas globales de navegación por satélite |
US11143765B2 (en) * | 2019-04-25 | 2021-10-12 | Honeywell International Inc. | Reducing bias impact on GNSS integrity |
CN111077545B (zh) * | 2019-12-23 | 2022-02-25 | 深圳市力合微电子股份有限公司 | 一种北斗和gps卫星信号接收的正直性监测和判决方法 |
US11709819B2 (en) | 2020-09-30 | 2023-07-25 | International Business Machines Corporation | Validating test results using a blockchain network |
US20240027630A1 (en) * | 2022-07-22 | 2024-01-25 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Real-time ppe base station measurement uncertainty modeling for protection level computation |
CN115951378B (zh) * | 2023-03-08 | 2023-05-16 | 北京大学 | 一种基于北斗星基增强信息的自适应信息融合定位方法 |
Family Cites Families (17)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5600329A (en) * | 1995-06-30 | 1997-02-04 | Honeywell Inc. | Differential satellite positioning system ground station with integrity monitoring |
US6151551A (en) * | 1997-03-03 | 2000-11-21 | Motorola, Inc. | Method and apparatus for generating an indication of loss of positioning integrity in emergency call systems |
JP3662098B2 (ja) * | 1997-09-03 | 2005-06-22 | 日本無線株式会社 | Gps受信機 |
US6711478B2 (en) * | 2000-12-15 | 2004-03-23 | Garmin At, Inc. | Receiver-autonomous vertical integrity monitoring |
US7089452B2 (en) * | 2002-09-25 | 2006-08-08 | Raytheon Company | Methods and apparatus for evaluating operational integrity of a data processing system using moment bounding |
US6847893B1 (en) * | 2003-01-22 | 2005-01-25 | Trimble Navigation, Ltd | Horizontal/vertical exclusion level determination scheme for RAIM fault detection and exclusion implementation |
US8131463B2 (en) * | 2003-12-02 | 2012-03-06 | Gmv Aerospace And Defence, S.A. | GNSS navigation solution integrity in non-controlled environments |
US20060047413A1 (en) * | 2003-12-02 | 2006-03-02 | Lopez Nestor Z | GNSS navigation solution integrity in non-controlled environments |
US7095369B1 (en) * | 2004-06-15 | 2006-08-22 | Lockheed Martin Corporation | Phase step alert signal for GPS integrity monitoring |
EP1637899A1 (en) | 2004-09-20 | 2006-03-22 | EADS Astrium GmbH | Method and apparatus for providing integrity information for users of global navigation system |
JP4656969B2 (ja) * | 2005-03-02 | 2011-03-23 | 日本無線株式会社 | 衛星信号受信システム |
DE102007050034A1 (de) * | 2007-10-17 | 2009-04-23 | Astrium Gmbh | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Integritätsüberwachung von Satellitennavigationssignalen |
DE102009016337A1 (de) * | 2009-04-06 | 2010-10-07 | Astrium Gmbh | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Abschätzung des Integritätsrisikos in einem Satellitennavigationssystem |
FR2947342B1 (fr) * | 2009-06-30 | 2012-05-25 | Thales Sa | Procede de determination de la position d'un mobile a un instant donne et de surveillance de l'integrite de la position dudit mobile |
US8334804B2 (en) * | 2009-09-04 | 2012-12-18 | Hemisphere Gps Llc | Multi-frequency GNSS receiver baseband DSP |
EP2418515A1 (en) * | 2010-07-21 | 2012-02-15 | Astrium GmbH | Integrity method for differential corrections |
EP2461182B1 (en) * | 2010-12-01 | 2014-06-04 | European Space Agency | Method and apparatus for determining an integrity indicating parameter indicating the integrity of positioning information determined in a global positioning system |
-
2012
- 2012-11-16 FR FR1203073A patent/FR2998378B1/fr active Active
-
2013
- 2013-11-15 CN CN201380059838.1A patent/CN104813191A/zh active Pending
- 2013-11-15 BR BR112015011292-7A patent/BR112015011292B1/pt active IP Right Grant
- 2013-11-15 CA CA2891363A patent/CA2891363C/en active Active
- 2013-11-15 WO PCT/EP2013/073983 patent/WO2014076254A1/fr active Application Filing
- 2013-11-15 US US14/443,324 patent/US10012737B2/en active Active
- 2013-11-15 JP JP2015542278A patent/JP6262248B2/ja active Active
- 2013-11-15 AU AU2013346734A patent/AU2013346734B2/en active Active
- 2013-11-15 EP EP13821453.1A patent/EP2920608A1/fr not_active Ceased
- 2013-11-15 KR KR1020157012817A patent/KR102205329B1/ko active IP Right Grant
Non-Patent Citations (2)
Title |
---|
None * |
See also references of WO2014076254A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CA2891363A1 (en) | 2014-05-22 |
WO2014076254A1 (fr) | 2014-05-22 |
KR20150084857A (ko) | 2015-07-22 |
AU2013346734B2 (en) | 2017-11-02 |
JP2016501365A (ja) | 2016-01-18 |
FR2998378B1 (fr) | 2016-01-29 |
JP6262248B2 (ja) | 2018-01-17 |
CA2891363C (en) | 2020-09-22 |
BR112015011292B1 (pt) | 2022-05-03 |
US10012737B2 (en) | 2018-07-03 |
US20150355339A1 (en) | 2015-12-10 |
CN104813191A (zh) | 2015-07-29 |
FR2998378A1 (fr) | 2014-05-23 |
BR112015011292A2 (pt) | 2017-07-11 |
KR102205329B1 (ko) | 2021-01-19 |
AU2013346734A1 (en) | 2015-06-04 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
WO2014076254A1 (fr) | Procede d'estimation du niveau d'erreur de mesures de geolocalisation par satellites et de controle de la fiabilite de ces estimations et dispositif associe | |
EP3505968B1 (fr) | Procede de controle de l'integrite de l'estimation de la position d'un porteur mobile dans un systeme de mesure de positionnement par satellite | |
EP1839070B1 (fr) | Recepteur de positionnement par satellite a integrite et continuite ameliorees | |
EP3306272B1 (fr) | Procédé de localisation ponctuelle d'un véhicule évoluant sur une trajectoire contrainte et système associé | |
US10942281B2 (en) | GNSS receiver using a combination of velocity integration and precise point positioning | |
EP2339377A1 (fr) | Récepteur de positionnement par satellites | |
EP2987036B1 (fr) | Procede de controle d'integrite et dispositif de fusion-consolidation comprenant une pluralite de modules de traitement | |
WO2020249874A1 (fr) | Procede et systeme de localisation ponctuelle d'un vehicule a l'arret sur une voie de garage a l'aide de balises virtuelles | |
EP2333582B1 (fr) | Procédé de détection de fraude sur la transmission d'informations de position par un dispositif mobile | |
WO2015165908A1 (fr) | Procédé et dispositif de contrôle d'intégrité à double niveau de consolidation | |
FR2942325A1 (fr) | Procede de lever d'ambiguite, procede de localisation d'un recepteur par radionavigation comprenant une etape de lever d'ambiguite et recepteur de localisation | |
EP2743729A1 (fr) | Procédé et système de détection d'anomalie sur des signaux de navigation par satellites et système d'hybridation comportant un tel système de détection | |
FR2918524A1 (fr) | Procede et systeme de controle d'integrite des mesures dans un systeme de navigation | |
FR3066611A1 (fr) | Systeme d'augmentation d'un systeme de positionnement par satellites et recepteur a surveillance d'integrite autonome augmentee par un reseau | |
FR2957425A1 (fr) | Procede et systeme de calcul pour l'evaluation de la performance en precision d'un systeme de navigation par satellite | |
WO2009040381A1 (fr) | Procede et systeme de gestion et detection des multitrajets dans un systeme de navigation | |
FR3100066A1 (fr) | Detection d'une operation de leurrage d'un recepteur de signaux satellitaires | |
Charbonnieras | Exploitation of the GNSS signals for integrity measurement. | |
EP4307010A1 (fr) | Methode mac de monitoring, avec compensation de biais commun, de l'integrite d'un procede de positionnement ponctuel par balises virtuelles | |
FR3137973A1 (fr) | Méthode MAC de monitoring, avec compensation de biais commun, de l’intégrité d’un procédé de positionnement ponctuel par balises virtuelles | |
EP4283324A1 (fr) | Procede et systeme de localisation d'un noeud mobile par mesures radio utilisant une carte de visibilite | |
Dion | Reconfigurable navigation receiver for space applications |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
PUAI | Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012 |
|
17P | Request for examination filed |
Effective date: 20150525 |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR |
|
AX | Request for extension of the european patent |
Extension state: BA ME |
|
DAX | Request for extension of the european patent (deleted) | ||
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: EXAMINATION IS IN PROGRESS |
|
17Q | First examination report despatched |
Effective date: 20181008 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: EXAMINATION IS IN PROGRESS |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: R003 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: THE APPLICATION HAS BEEN REFUSED |
|
18R | Application refused |
Effective date: 20211031 |