Classifications

• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
  • H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B61—RAILWAYS
  • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
  • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
  • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
  • B61L15/0036—Conductor-based, e.g. using CAN-Bus, train-line or optical fibres
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B61—RAILWAYS
  • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
  • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
  • B61L15/0072—On-board train data handling
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B61—RAILWAYS
  • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
  • B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
  • B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
  • B61L25/028—Determination of vehicle position and orientation within a train consist, e.g. serialisation
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
  • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
  • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
  • H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
  • H04W4/42—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for mass transport vehicles, e.g. buses, trains or aircraft

Definitions

• the invention relates to the coupling of train parts, where ne ben electrical and mechanical coupling continue train part buses are coupled so that data exchange can take place.
• the coupling of several train parts leads to the compilation ⁇ ment of a train.
• a train operator can flexibly put together a train or train, be standing out of several train parts or trains, where sections of this can be adapted to the intensity of use of the routes traveled.
• control buses of the trains can also be directly connected to each other, so that the data, for example control messages for lighting, brake, drive or drive signal display, can be exchanged.
• partially Ethernet or IP-based rail ⁇ vehicle control buses can be coupled together.
• a vehicle control network or an operator network for video surveillance or for passenger information between coupled train parts may also be connected.
• a so-called train bus is already common today to transfer data between train parts.
• the electrical connection between two tension members can in principle also be produced by a plugged cable. This connection connects u. U. also the train bus of gekop ⁇ pelt train parts.
• a plug according to a specific standard (UIC 568) can be used.
• IP communication is used in trains.
• the problem of addressing occurs especially when coupling trains.
• the coupling of a train bus with a vehicle bus is realized via a network coupler / gateway or an interface.
• a so-called Buchtau ⁇ fe know subsequently all vehicles logy the Glastopo-. This contains the type and version of other Fahrzeu ⁇ ge and their respective number.
• the numbers of the coupled vehicles are assigned in a coupling process so that the vehicles are consecutively numbered.
• a tensile member for example, holding a plurality of networks or buses ⁇ ent, for example a passenger network, a vehicle control network, an operator network, a Switzerland Schmatsnetz or the like have. These can be connected between coupled train parts directly or via a train bus.
• a network access control / NAC / Network Access Control wherein the configuration of the connecting device is checked.
• it is determined at ⁇ play whether a current virus scanner is installed or whether so-called patches are installed. Only if the specifications for the configuration are fulfilled is access granted by the access switch. If access is not granted, the subscriber may be rejected or have limited access to a non-critical network.
• US 2006/0180709 for example, a method and a system for IP cable entry are known.
• the train launch or train launch is carried out in an IP-based train control network. In this case, the train topology, insbesonde ⁇ re determined a traction vehicle. Depending on this, the IP address conversion is configured.
• a car is detected on the train by applying a recognition protocol.
• the network and configura ⁇ tion information are telt übermit- to other units in the train.
• the invention has for its object to prevent a risk ei ⁇ ner control function of a tensile member in a coupling with another tensile member. The solution of this task is done by the corresponding feature combination of independently formulated claims.
• the invention is based on the finding that, for example, in the coupling of train parts or individual cars to trains or in the coupling of entire trains to a train or train network such as the ICE / Inter-City Express, the safety of control functions optimizes who can ⁇ . This not only affects the actual operational safety, but also the operational security for a secure operation.
• this additional pulling part is identified.
• a filtering of the permissible data communication is carried out, which can run via a control network of the first train part with a control network of the coupled further train part.
• Control network of a train part is, for example, the train control, a vehicle control, an operator function such as passenger information system or the like. So that the filtering defined subnets, each gekop ⁇ pelt and the allowable data communication between each of these subnetworks runs it from.
• data communication between coupled sections of a train network for example an Ethernet Train Bus / ETB, can be made possible, whereas, on the other hand, operator networks or
• Vehicle control networks are not coupled or can be coupled only limited understood, ie gefil ⁇ tert. Filtering is understood to be the evaluation of administration data such as headers and / or user data of a control data packet. It is checked whether this is permissible at all and / or whether values are plausible with respect to the local operating data.
• the filtering relates to data messages such as control commands, status messages, measured values, etc.
• data messages such as control commands, status messages, measured values, etc.
• the air conditioning, the lighting, the door function, brake and drive control can be operated via the train control.
• an automatic train safety function is operated via a train protection.
• a passenger information system provides necessary and comfortable information. So-called operator functions can administer energy consumption measurements , operate passenger counts or video surveillance.
• Vehicle network internally consists of several subnets such as train control, passenger network, operator network. These subnets can be individually coupled between train parts. Filtering can also affect the coupling of these subnetworks with each other, ie a coupling across multiple gears can be allowed or blocked. A data communication is thus allowed or blocked depending on the Filte ⁇ tion or directed to a so-called proxy server.
• a rule / policy for filtering data communication on a train may either be fixed or configurable or may be supplied by a server become.
• the train network is very flexible when coupling other train parts in the filtering of newly coupled train parts and their own subnets. Since most rail vehicles, ie more or less each train part, have their own data bus, a coupling with other train parts usually also mean a coupling of the data buses of the individual train parts. For data communication, it is thus expedient, at least one network coupler / gateway GW between train bus and the individual
• Insert subnetworks of a tensile component proceeds according to a fixed or configurable filter rule / policy, and at the network gateway GW, the data communication is classified as permitted or blocked.
• the network coupler / gateway GW It is advantageous to equip the network coupler / gateway GW with at least one Ethernet interface and with one interface for each subnetwork. If a pulling element is coupled on both sides with other draft parts, it is advantageous to equip the physical coupler with Minim ⁇ least two Ethernet interfaces.
• Ethernet interface is understood as a technology that specifies software, for example protocol and hardware, for example, distributors or network cards for wired data networks. Originally, these local Since ⁇ tennetze for data exchange in the form of data packets between a local area network (LAN) connected devices intended.
• LAN local area network
• a data transmission can be carried out by means of radio transmission between individual tension parts.
• Figure 2 is an illustration corresponding to Figure 1 with the variation that only a physical coupler / gateway GW is pre see ⁇ which is connected to the electric couplings EK simultaneously,
• FIG 3 shows a further variant in which the electrical
• Couplings EK are directly connected on both sides of the first tension member 1 and the access to a subnetwork 7 of the first tension member 1 takes place via a single network coupler / gateway GW,
• FIG. 4 shows the basic sequence of the identification and the filtering dependent thereon in accordance with a filter rule
• Figure 5 shows a variant in which the coupled further
• subnets 72, 73, 74 can be realized via separate physical lines. However, the subnets can also be coupled via a common line by tunneling the data. Achieve this, for example ⁇ over VLAN, L2TP. In each case a data packet, so ge ⁇ -called frame, share in the transmission between the two tensile with a mark provided that allows the receiver allocation to the respective sub network.
• the operator network of a first train part 1 can be connected to the operator network of the coupled further train part 2, ie data packets are forwarded between the coupled operator networks.
• the passenger network or the train-control network in each case, that it be coupled between the data packets or draft parts
• the operator network can only be connected if the coupled train parts belong to the same operator.
• the train control / Switzerland tenunetz can also be done between train parts that are assigned to different operators.
• the filtering can be done logically by discarding the data packets that are not allowed according to the filter rules, that is, they are not forwarded between the coupled train parts.
• the filtering can also be done by a controllable electrical contact, such as a relay, which only switches an electrical connection between connectable subnetworks, insofar as it is permissible according to the filter rules, depending on the coupled train part.
• a controllable electrical contact such as a relay
• a basic functionality of sub ⁇ networks or enhanced functionality is only necessary and above ⁇ handen which is available at a pull coupling.
• further functionalities can be used if it is ge ⁇ fahrlos possible, eg between coupled draft parts of the same operator. This is possible as soon as this is permitted according to a defined filter rule / policy.
• Figure 1 shows two physical coupler for filtering the data traffic coupled with a further tensile member 2. It will be connected to each other in the coupling train buses or vehicle buses through a specific coupling electrical ⁇ EK.
• the data communication with the further train part 2 is conducted via a train coupling gateway GW.
• GW train coupling gateway
• FIG. 2 shows a variant of the view corresponding to Fi gur ⁇ 1, is provided in which only a single physical coupler / gateway GW. This network coupler is connected to the electrical coupling EK on both sides of the train at the same time. In FIG. 2, there is no direct connection of the train buses 5, which originate from both train couplings EK.
• FIG. 3 shows a further variant in which the electrical couplings EK are connected to one another directly on the train bus 5 on both sides of the pulling part.
• the network coupler GW is interposed between train bus 5 and one or more subnets 7.
• the network coupler / gateway can not distinguish whether the data communication via the left or the right electrical coupling EK takes place. It can be done here an identification of both the left and the right coupled train part. Depending on this, a filter rule / policy is determined by the gateway.
• the directly coupled train part is identified.
• more distant train parts are identified. This means that Dieje ⁇ Nigen train parts that are indirectly coupled via a directly coupled pulling part, are also identified.
• the applied filter rule / policy can then be determined or adjusted depending on these further identified train parts.
• the identification of the coupled additional train part 2 can in particular be cryptographically protected by authentication.
• the coupled further tensile part 2 can be reliably identified. This can for example by means of a digital certificate, for example, X.509 ⁇ SUC gene, wherein the digital certificate associated with the further coupled tensile member. 2
• the tensile member of the gekop--coupled 2 digital certificate is checked by the first pulling part 1 in the Au ⁇ thentmaschine further tensile member. 2
• the certificate contains the public key of the coupled further train part 2, as well as further the further train part 2 associated Attributes such as manufacturer, model, serial number, operator, train number and so on. Also, a temporal validity information may be included.
• the coupled further train part 2 has a static Gebteil identification and a separate operator train identification, the first is manufacturer-related and the second operator-related executed, and the latter assigns the Glas ⁇ part of a particular use in an operator. It can then be determined, for example, whether two coupled train parts are actually assigned to the same train number.
• information is stored on a first pulling part 1, which further pulling parts 2 are coupled or are to be coupled.
• this information is when coupling from an external server via a data communication, for example via radio, such as
• a feature may be used in the prior art to provide further information about the certificate or certificate Subject for which the certificate is issued.
• a specific name or an IP address can be encoded. This specifies the e-mail address or server address of an SSL TLS server for which the certificate is to be considered valid. This information be ⁇ draws to the subject, ie those who authenticated by this certificate.
• a digital certificate or a digital train certificate can be used to encode a train identification in it.
• a certificate can be used to authenticate a train part against a coupled train part. It can be an authentication example for manufacturers, series, serial number, etc. or operator information such as train number of the operator according to the timetable of the route or the home station of the train part are encoded. It is also possible to provide separate certificates for the train part information and the operator information associated therewith. This information may be in a field, for example
• tensile member authentication is to be noted that the identity can be carried fication of a tensile member coupled by means of differing ⁇ cher standards and protocols.
• ⁇ cher standards and protocols.
• an SSL, TLS, IKE or EAP protocol can be used.
• Figure 4 shows the basic structure for a coupled tensile member 2, which activates identified and depending entspre ⁇ accordingly a filter rule / filter policy to a data communica ⁇ cation, that is allowed.
• the data communication can also be blocked during filtering depending on the filter rule.
• a filter rule is valid as long as the train remains coupled. When decoupling or re-coupling another filter rule is determined and activated again.
• the individual steps according to FIG. 4 mean:
• Figure 5 shows a variant in which the coupled tension member 2 is identified by means of a so-called challenge-response authentication using a digital certificate. It is exemplified that only the ge ⁇ coupled further pulling part is first identified. May in common all-the tensile member further coupled the corresponding steps also perform, ie, the tensile member identi fied ⁇ also the selected at this further coupled tensile member 2 and a corresponding filter rule and a k ⁇ tivated. This can be done in particular a mutual authentication of the two other train parts.
• the filtering of traffic can take into account the following criteria in particular:
• Protocol e.g., ARP, IP, ICMP, DHCP, UDP, TCP
• Sender / address (e.g., MAC address, IP address)
• - send address (e.g., MAC address, IP address)
• Port numbers e.g., UDP port number, TCP port number, ICMP service
• Data contents eg contents of a control instruction, measured value: In particular, it may be a validation of the data depending on the vehicle identification and / or local own data such as speed or temperature;
• WTBshiei ⁇ properties such as length and weight.
• This data can be validated depending on the vehicle identification.
• the reference data may for example be contained in the digital certificate of the vehicle or they may be determined by the vehicle identification contained therein from a database.
• Corresponding WTB messages are only forwarded if these data are consistent with extended data.
• FIGS. 4 and 5 show, by way of example, the sequence of train identification or train authentication.
• Figure 5 is a digital certificate is ⁇ asks which is sent back in the form of the certificate 19 CERT in the Ant ⁇ word information.
• This certificate CERT is checked for its validity and authenticity, that it is checked whether it is a valid, ei ⁇ ner trusted certification authority (Certifica- tion Authority) issued certificate.
• a challenge-response authentication is performed in order to authenticate the coupled further train part 2.
• filtering rules are selected and activated, the permitted transferable with the oppel ⁇ th further pulling part control data de ⁇ finishing. Control data is transferred to or from the coupled other tensile member as far as they are allowed according to the chosen from ⁇ and activated filter rules.

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• Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
• Signal Processing (AREA)
• Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
• Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
• Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
• Computing Systems (AREA)
• General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Aviation & Aerospace Engineering (AREA)
• Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
• Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)

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• 2011
  • 2011-04-18 DE DE102011007588A patent/DE102011007588A1/de not_active Ceased
• 2012
  • 2012-04-10 RU RU2013151051/11A patent/RU2561885C2/ru not_active IP Right Cessation
  • 2012-04-10 CA CA2833292A patent/CA2833292A1/fr not_active Abandoned
  • 2012-04-10 US US14/112,598 patent/US20140041011A1/en not_active Abandoned
  • 2012-04-10 BR BR112013026697A patent/BR112013026697A2/pt not_active IP Right Cessation
  • 2012-04-10 AU AU2012244402A patent/AU2012244402A1/en not_active Abandoned
  • 2012-04-10 EP EP12714670.2A patent/EP2670649A1/fr not_active Withdrawn
  • 2012-04-10 CN CN2012800190541A patent/CN103476662A/zh active Pending
  • 2012-04-10 WO PCT/EP2012/056443 patent/WO2012143260A1/fr active Application Filing

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