EP2133257A2 - Système de commande de traction destiné à l'augmentation de la sécurité dans la zone de sources de danger le long d'une voie ferrée - Google Patents

Système de commande de traction destiné à l'augmentation de la sécurité dans la zone de sources de danger le long d'une voie ferrée Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2133257A2
EP2133257A2 EP09405094A EP09405094A EP2133257A2 EP 2133257 A2 EP2133257 A2 EP 2133257A2 EP 09405094 A EP09405094 A EP 09405094A EP 09405094 A EP09405094 A EP 09405094A EP 2133257 A2 EP2133257 A2 EP 2133257A2
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
train
train control
control system
danger
security system
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP09405094A
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German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP2133257A3 (fr
Inventor
Jakob Schiesser
Karim Badr
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Ingenium AG
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Ingenium AG
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Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Ingenium AG filed Critical Ingenium AG
Publication of EP2133257A2 publication Critical patent/EP2133257A2/fr
Publication of EP2133257A3 publication Critical patent/EP2133257A3/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L29/00—Safety means for rail/road crossing traffic
    • B61L29/08—Operation of gates; Combined operation of gates and signals
    • B61L29/18—Operation by approaching rail vehicle or train
    • B61L29/22—Operation by approaching rail vehicle or train electrically
    • B61L29/226—Operation by approaching rail vehicle or train electrically using track-circuits, closed or short-circuited by train or using isolated rail-sections
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L11/00—Operation of points from the vehicle or by the passage of the vehicle
    • B61L11/08—Operation of points from the vehicle or by the passage of the vehicle using electrical or magnetic interaction between vehicle and track
    • B61L2011/086—German radio based operations, called "Funkfahrbetrieb" [FFB]

Definitions

  • the invention is in the field of railway safety technology and relates to a train control system for increasing safety in the area of sources of danger along a railway line, in particular at level crossings on secondary lines.
  • the invention further relates to a system for increasing the safety in the area of sources of danger along a railway line, which has such a train control system moved along with the train, as well as further stationary components.
  • the invention relates to a corresponding method.
  • the movement of railways is controlled by train control systems depending on the permissible speed and / or the condition of stationary safety systems, eg level crossings.
  • train control systems In a punctiform train control information on securing the train ride to the control system of the railcar are transmitted at defined points of action, depending on the position of ahead signals.
  • the train control system initiates emergency braking to a standstill.
  • the action points are defined for example by track magnets, with a Oscillating circuit interact within the railcar, wherein the resonance drop in the transmitting coil is registered and processed by the train control.
  • the "unsafe" activation of the security system 7 is in connection with Fig. 1
  • An approaching train 1 actuates a sensor 2 at a corresponding distance from the source of danger to be secured.
  • a corresponding signal is transmitted via a line to the security system 7, which then causes the necessary measures to secure the source of danger, here the closure of the barriers at a railroad crossing. Only after all measures have been implemented, takes place via the optical signal 3 and a controllable active element 5 a release for the onward journey of the train.
  • the senor 2 must be arranged at a distance from the security system 7, which allows a reaction of the source of danger (fuse distance T1) and the train in the event of failure of the fuse still in braking distance T2 can give a corresponding stop signal (each calculated for the fastest train).
  • a passive active element 4 usually an electromagnetic circuit or a permanent magnet, switches on the train control in the locomotive. Without countermeasure, this automatically initiates emergency braking. To prevent this depending on the state of the security system and to allow the train to continue, is the information of the passive active element 4 with the help of an example of the security system controllable active active element 5 "neutralized".
  • the "safe" activation is related to Fig. 2 described:
  • the basic function of the controller is sufficient to obtain the drive release by the signal 3 and the active element 5 in Bremswegdistanz T2.
  • the security system constantly checks its condition; as long as there is no error message, it is assumed that the security system functions. With this variant, the blocking times (only the backup time T1) can be significantly reduced.
  • ETCS centrally controlled train control via radio.
  • the ETCS system works via radio with position balises and secure computer systems in the train composition.
  • the problem with this system lies in the high cost of the central control center and the GSMR coverage.
  • the locomotive computers are also elaborate because they need to calculate the position and a variety of parameters. For secondary lines, such a system is too costly.
  • a level crossing in radio mode receives the registration of a locomotive via radio.
  • the locomotive will automatically send you to an appropriate route position.
  • the security system turns on and sends an acknowledgment back to the locomotive. If this acknowledgment fails, the locomotive initiates emergency braking at a certain position in front of the level crossing.
  • the US 5,098,044 describes a system for controlling safety systems at level crossings via a secure radio link.
  • the train control system recognizes an active element, here a transponder, which is arranged at the distance at a greater distance than the braking distance that a railroad crossing is imminent. Then a secure radio connection between the train control and the security system is established. An emergency braking is initiated if the secure radio connection does not exist when the braking distance is reached or if exchanged messages in the respective controls of the train or the security system are faulty.
  • a disadvantage of this system is the relatively large infrastructure costs;
  • the transponders must be designed so that they transmit information about the distance of the railroad crossing and the time available until the initiation of emergency braking time to the train control.
  • no mixed operation with conventionally secured transitions ie those with cable-based signaling, is possible, which requires the simultaneous conversion of entire routes and is therefore disadvantageous, at least in the transition phase.
  • the invention is therefore based on the object to increase the safety of sources of danger, especially level crossings on secondary lines, while avoiding the problems of the prior art.
  • a system and method is to be made available, which already uses existing components for train control and also permits mixed operation with conventionally secured sources of danger.
  • the object is achieved by a train control system having the features of claim 1, a safety system having the features of claim 5 and a method for increasing the safety of hazards with the features of claim 9.
  • the train control system according to claim 1 relates to the equipment of the trains;
  • the safety system according to claim 5 comprises both fixed components and the train equipment.
  • the invention is preferably used to increase the safety of level crossings on secondary lines where a costly upgrade according to ETCS standard or the like is not profitable.
  • the train control system assumes that a train control system (train protection) moving along with the train is present, as is known per se. This is set into a standby mode by interaction with at least one active element, in particular a passive active element such as a permanent magnet, which is fixedly arranged along the railway track at a distance from the source of danger.
  • a train control system is in the standby mode and does not receive a control signal within a predetermined period of time, a Forced braking initiated.
  • a control signal may be a signal triggered by the train driver, eg an acknowledgment signal or a warning signal.
  • the invention further assumes that a controllable security system is arranged in the area of the danger source, which is able to communicate by radio, in particular by the control having a stationary radio module.
  • the train control system comprises a co-moving radio module in addition to the components already mentioned.
  • the controller is set up in such a way that it establishes a secure radio connection to the controllable security system-preferably independently of active elements on the route-and maintains it, for example, at least until the danger source has passed.
  • the controller notifies the security system in at least one first message with the start of the standby mode, ie the passing of the active element.
  • the active element can serve any active element, which is also used in conventional systems, for example, the usual track magnets, but also balises and the like.
  • the active element which conventionally serves for activating the train control, thus has the (alternative or additional) task of generating a position signal which is transmitted to the control of the safety system and from which position information can be derived.
  • the conventional position sensors (reference numeral 2 in FIG Fig. 1 ) are therefore expendable or can with the Active element are combined to form a common unit, can be dispensed with a cable connection to the security system.
  • the train control system When a secure radio connection is in place, the train control system receives and evaluates a second message about the state of the safety device. Depending on the contents of the second message, the train control system outputs a control signal for suppressing the emergency braking to the train control system.
  • the suppression of forced braking is omitted, i. the emergency braking takes place when there is no (more) radio connection or the train control has been informed by the safety device about an error.
  • the functions of the active element for the train control and the train detection sensors are realized by a single module, which manages without a cable connection. Electrotechnically, this module is passive and has no power supply. If a secure radio link ensures the exchange of information between the train and the security system, the conventional active element serves both to activate the train control as well as the switch-on point and location information for the activation of the security system. As soon as the security system is activated, the train is informed and the otherwise automatically initiated emergency braking is prevented.
  • the invention advantageously allows a mixed operation with conventional (signal transmission via cable) and radio-controlled security systems.
  • the control signal for deactivating the ready state for the emergency braking is generated, for example, in a known manner by the active active element.
  • the train control can distinguish based on the active elements, whether it is a conventionally secured or secured by radio railroad crossing.
  • stationary active elements are present, which interact differently with the receiving components of the train control.
  • two conventional active elements e.g. two permanent magnets, arranged in quick succession, so that the train control registers two pulses.
  • the distinction can also be made by the transmission of information stored in the active element.
  • the secure radio link is preferably established to all security systems that are "visible" to the train control.
  • all transitions and other danger points are in the actual order, e.g. deposited as a table.
  • Mobile hazards construction sites
  • the train control exchanges the mentioned messages only with those backup system which is the next in the stored sequence.
  • the train control in the present case requires no differentiated information about the level crossings, since the control of the train is taken from the control of the security system and thus only a stop or drive signal must be transmitted. This results in a significant simplification of the operation and maintenance, since only the controller of the security system needs to know the exact nature (position) of the location detectors and in the case of change no time-consuming and error-prone updates of the data stored in the locomotive must be made.
  • train control can specifically request the control of the security system to keep open the transition, even if the train has already passed the active element. This is important, for example, for shortening the closing times, if a regular stop is still carried out shortly before the level crossing concerned, e.g. at a train station.
  • Another side effect of such an attachment system is that a train that does not have the radio equipment is automatically forced to an emergency stop.
  • Fig. 3 shows a block diagram of the inventive train control system 10. It comprises a train control system 11, which functionally comprises a receiving unit 12 for interacting with stationary active elements 4, 5 and an emergency stop system 13. By interaction with an active element 4, the emergency stop system 13 is placed in the standby mode, which is shown here purely symbolically by the closure of a switch 14. Standby mode means that emergency braking is automatically initiated without countermeasures.
  • the first active element 4 can be neutralized in conventional operation by a second active element 5, or the second active element 5 can trigger a signal in the receiving unit 12, which ends the standby mode.
  • a radio module 15 is additionally provided with which the controller 10 establishes a secure radio connection to the security system.
  • the controller 10 intervenes in the train control system 11 by terminating the standby mode (symbolized by opening the switch 14).
  • the control of the security system thus indirectly takes control of the train, whereby the reverse case is possible, for example, keeping open a transition the Train. If the state of the security system changes again at a later point in time, intervention can again be made in the train control system 11 in order to initiate the emergency braking. As a result, the consequences of a malfunction of the security system can at least be mitigated.
  • the system is based on the construction of a secure radio link.
  • the operation of a secure radio link is already state of the art and must meet defined (normalized) criteria, e.g. Identification of subscribers, timestamps etc.
  • the radio link is considered here as a "black box system" and can be realized in various suitable ways.
  • Fig. 4 shows a first and at the same time very simple embodiment of the stationary components of the overall system according to the invention, which according to the conventional system Fig. 1 based.
  • the function of the train detection element 2 and the first active element 4 are integrated into a common assembly, hereinafter also referred to as locating elements 2/4.
  • the conventional in the prior art train detection element 2, which is connected via a cable connection with the security system, is not necessary in the present case, because the triggered by the active element 4 in the controller 10 signal is used as information that the train has passed the active element 4, and thus as a location signal.
  • This is transmitted to the security system 7 by radio, for which purpose it has a radio module 6.
  • the distance between the locating elements 2/4 and security system 7 corresponds to the backup time T1 (multiplied by the train speed) plus the braking distance T2, respectively for the fastest train.
  • This version corresponds to the usual in Switzerland usual insecure activation (see above Fig. 1 ).
  • FIG. 2 Another embodiment according to the "safe" activation according to Fig. 2 can be realized with an extended arrangement of components and is in Fig. 5 shown.
  • a first position message (module 2 '/ 4') can be used for readiness indication and a further position message (module 2 "/ 4") lead to the effective securing of the transition 7.
  • Fig. 7 Establishing a connection: If a permissible (eg with the correct level crossing) safe radio connection 3 between locomotive 1 and the radio module 6 of the security system 7 is established, the train protection detection in the locomotive can be switched over and serves the system as a location detector. This means that the next active element 4 does not initiate emergency braking on the route, but rather causes a position signal to be emitted to the safety system 7 via the secure radio link. The locomotive still has an undefined distance from the transition when the radio link 3 is established. The position of the locomotive is known for the security system 7 until the element 4 is detected.
  • a permissible (eg with the correct level crossing) safe radio connection 3 between locomotive 1 and the radio module 6 of the security system 7 is established, the train protection detection in the locomotive can be switched over and serves the system as a location detector. This means that the next active element 4 does not initiate emergency braking on the route, but rather causes a position signal to be emitted to the safety system 7 via the secure radio link.
  • the locomotive still has an undefined distance from
  • the driver can be controlled by means of a control device in the driver's cab, e.g. However, there is no need to do anything about a lamp that informs about the established radio connection.
  • Fig. 8 Locating the locomotive: The radio link 3 between the locomotive 1 and the radio module 6 of the security system 7 is maintained. If the first locating detector 2 is run over, a timer T ZS , for example with a duration of approximately 1 s, starts in the control device for the expected second locating element 4. If this is also detected, this is a safety device 7 with radio transmission. If no second element is detected, if it is a conventional security system or one of the two locating elements 2, 4 is defective, and an emergency stop must be initiated.
  • T ZS for example with a duration of approximately 1 s
  • the position of the locomotive is defined with the second detection process.
  • Fig. 9 Triggering the backup process: The locomotive 1 sends via the secure radio link 3 a backup command to the backup system 7 and thus triggers the backup process.
  • the security system responds with a trip enable or a hold command as needed by the section to be secured.
  • the safety time T1 of the level crossing begins, after this time, the transition must be secured. Due to the existing communication, the control of the security system 7 can bring the train to emergency stop at any time by sending a corresponding command to the train control. Until then, the locomotive is still farther away from the transition than the braking distance distance T2.
  • Driving clearance for the locomotive The ride clearance can be displayed in the cab via the control device with a green light, for example. This procedure must take place before the expiry of the backup time T1. The locomotive now penetrates into the "dangerous" zone because the braking distance distance T2 is traversed. However, the transition is already secured here. Thanks to the radio connection, the However, train still be informed about irregularities of the system and if necessary be forced to an emergency stop.
  • the level crossing is released again with conventional train detection after the train has cleared the transition.
  • the release is also communicated via radio to the control device in the cab, and this can connect to the next security system connection.
  • the alternative release with the help of another locating block has already been mentioned above in connection with the safety device (local train detection).
  • the invention is based on a bidirectional communication with a secure locating of the train (positioning of the two locating elements).
  • a faulty behavior of the security system can be communicated to the locomotive. Different errors can lead to disturbances:
  • Fig. 11 Secure radio transmission not established: Radio connection 3 has not been established (no status exchange possible). The first locating element is thus "read" as an active element of a conventional train protection, and the locomotive initiates an emergency stop via the train control system.
  • Fig. 12 Loss of secure radio transmission: In the case of an interrupted radio connection 3 (eg no status change is possible, as defined by a radio interruption in the case of secure radio links), localization by both locating elements has already taken place here, and the level crossing can be secured. However, the control unit of the locomotive initiates an emergency stop regardless of the safety status of the system.
  • an interrupted radio connection 3 eg no status change is possible, as defined by a radio interruption in the case of secure radio links
  • Fig. 13 not (completely) secured level crossing: The backup process will not be completed within the backup time T1. Since the braking distance distance T2 is still complied with, the locomotive is not granted any travel release via the control unit and an emergency stop is initiated
  • Fig. 14 Not upright securing the level crossing: In contrast to existing security systems even an emergency stop can be enforced, even if the locating elements have already been passed. That does not mean that there is no accident, but the speed is reduced after all. In the present case, the radio link is still present, but a partial defect in the security system 7 has occurred after a successful backup, ie only after expiration of T1 and the regular drive release. Securing the transition is no longer complete and there is a potential risk of collision. However, the control unit of the locomotive can still initiate an emergency stop and make any other safety measures such as warning light and acoustic signaling automatically.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
EP09405094A 2008-06-09 2009-06-05 Système de commande de traction destiné à l'augmentation de la sécurité dans la zone de sources de danger le long d'une voie ferrée Withdrawn EP2133257A3 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CH8712008 2008-06-09

Publications (2)

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EP2133257A2 true EP2133257A2 (fr) 2009-12-16
EP2133257A3 EP2133257A3 (fr) 2010-08-25

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EP09405094A Withdrawn EP2133257A3 (fr) 2008-06-09 2009-06-05 Système de commande de traction destiné à l'augmentation de la sécurité dans la zone de sources de danger le long d'une voie ferrée

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Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN114194251A (zh) * 2021-12-30 2022-03-18 交控科技股份有限公司 列车可碰撞连挂方法、系统、电子设备和存储介质

Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5098044A (en) 1989-12-22 1992-03-24 General Railway Signal Corporation Highway crossing control system for railroads utilizing a communications link between the train locomotive and the crossing protection equipment

Family Cites Families (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE19900696A1 (de) * 1999-01-06 2000-07-13 Siemens Ag Verfahren zur Optimierung der Sperrzeiten von Bahnübergängen

Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5098044A (en) 1989-12-22 1992-03-24 General Railway Signal Corporation Highway crossing control system for railroads utilizing a communications link between the train locomotive and the crossing protection equipment

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN114194251A (zh) * 2021-12-30 2022-03-18 交控科技股份有限公司 列车可碰撞连挂方法、系统、电子设备和存储介质

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