EP1864935B1 - Elevator apparatus - Google Patents
Elevator apparatus Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP1864935B1 EP1864935B1 EP05727358.3A EP05727358A EP1864935B1 EP 1864935 B1 EP1864935 B1 EP 1864935B1 EP 05727358 A EP05727358 A EP 05727358A EP 1864935 B1 EP1864935 B1 EP 1864935B1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- car
- elevator
- safety controller
- electronic safety
- control portion
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Not-in-force
Links
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims description 33
- 230000005856 abnormality Effects 0.000 claims description 30
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 claims description 28
- 230000002159 abnormal effect Effects 0.000 claims description 4
- 238000009877 rendering Methods 0.000 claims 2
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 18
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 10
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 8
- 239000000872 buffer Substances 0.000 description 6
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 description 6
- 239000000758 substrate Substances 0.000 description 3
- 238000012790 confirmation Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000009977 dual effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012423 maintenance Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000007423 decrease Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000002452 interceptive effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000003068 static effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B66—HOISTING; LIFTING; HAULING
- B66B—ELEVATORS; ESCALATORS OR MOVING WALKWAYS
- B66B1/00—Control systems of elevators in general
- B66B1/24—Control systems with regulation, i.e. with retroactive action, for influencing travelling speed, acceleration, or deceleration
- B66B1/28—Control systems with regulation, i.e. with retroactive action, for influencing travelling speed, acceleration, or deceleration electrical
- B66B1/30—Control systems with regulation, i.e. with retroactive action, for influencing travelling speed, acceleration, or deceleration electrical effective on driving gear, e.g. acting on power electronics, on inverter or rectifier controlled motor
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B66—HOISTING; LIFTING; HAULING
- B66B—ELEVATORS; ESCALATORS OR MOVING WALKWAYS
- B66B5/00—Applications of checking, fault-correcting, or safety devices in elevators
- B66B5/02—Applications of checking, fault-correcting, or safety devices in elevators responsive to abnormal operating conditions
- B66B5/04—Applications of checking, fault-correcting, or safety devices in elevators responsive to abnormal operating conditions for detecting excessive speed
- B66B5/06—Applications of checking, fault-correcting, or safety devices in elevators responsive to abnormal operating conditions for detecting excessive speed electrical
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B66—HOISTING; LIFTING; HAULING
- B66B—ELEVATORS; ESCALATORS OR MOVING WALKWAYS
- B66B1/00—Control systems of elevators in general
- B66B1/24—Control systems with regulation, i.e. with retroactive action, for influencing travelling speed, acceleration, or deceleration
- B66B1/28—Control systems with regulation, i.e. with retroactive action, for influencing travelling speed, acceleration, or deceleration electrical
- B66B1/285—Control systems with regulation, i.e. with retroactive action, for influencing travelling speed, acceleration, or deceleration electrical with the use of a speed pattern generator
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B66—HOISTING; LIFTING; HAULING
- B66B—ELEVATORS; ESCALATORS OR MOVING WALKWAYS
- B66B1/00—Control systems of elevators in general
- B66B1/34—Details, e.g. call counting devices, data transmission from car to control system, devices giving information to the control system
- B66B1/3415—Control system configuration and the data transmission or communication within the control system
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B66—HOISTING; LIFTING; HAULING
- B66B—ELEVATORS; ESCALATORS OR MOVING WALKWAYS
- B66B3/00—Applications of devices for indicating or signalling operating conditions of elevators
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B66—HOISTING; LIFTING; HAULING
- B66B—ELEVATORS; ESCALATORS OR MOVING WALKWAYS
- B66B5/00—Applications of checking, fault-correcting, or safety devices in elevators
- B66B5/0006—Monitoring devices or performance analysers
- B66B5/0018—Devices monitoring the operating condition of the elevator system
- B66B5/0031—Devices monitoring the operating condition of the elevator system for safety reasons
Definitions
- the present invention relates to an elevator apparatus which employs an electronic safety controller for detecting abnormality of an elevator based on a detection signal from a sensor.
- an elevator control device and an electronic safety controller are respectively provided with CPU's that are independent of each other.
- a communication system of the elevator apparatus employs double redundancy configuration. When a communication error is detected by the electronic safety controller, operation of the elevator is prohibited (e.g. , see Patent Document 1).
- Patent Document 1 JP 2002-538061 A
- a car of the elevator may be operated without a safety monitoring of the electronic safety controller in cases where the electronic safety controller is substantially absent, when, for example, a substrate of the electronic safety controller has been removed for maintenance reasons and the like, when the electronic safety controller does not function at all, or when an inappropriate electronic safety controller is connected.
- a conventional elevator apparatus of this type is described in US 6,173,814 .
- the present invention has been made to solve the problem as discussed above, and it is therefore an object of the invention to obtain an elevator apparatus allowing detection of a substantially absent state of an electronic safety controller and thus enhancement of reliability.
- An elevator apparatus includes: an elevator control portion for controlling operation of a car; and an electronic safety controller for detecting abnormality in an elevator based on a detection signal from a sensor for detecting a state of the elevator and outputting a command signal for shifting the elevator to a safe state, and in the elevator apparatus, the elevator control portion is capable of communicating with the electronic safety controller and is capable of confirming a state of communication with the electronic safety controller at predetermined timings.
- Fig. 1 is a structural diagram of an elevator apparatus according to Embodiment 1 of the invention.
- a hoistway 1 includes a pair of car guide rails (not shown) and a pair of counterweight guide rails (not shown).
- a car 3 is raised and lowered in the hoistway 1 while being guided by the car guide rails.
- a counterweight 4 is raised and lowered in the hoistway 1 while being guided by the counterweight guide rails.
- the safety device 5 is provided in a lower part of the car 3 that engages with the car guide rails to stop the car 3 in an emergency.
- the safety device 5 has a pair of braking pieces that performs braking operation due to mechanical operation to be pushed against the car guide rails.
- a driving apparatus (hoisting machine) 7 that raises and lowers the car 3 and the counterweight 4 via a main rope 6 is provided.
- the driving apparatus 7 has: a drive sheave 8; a motor portion that rotates the drive sheave 8; a brake portion 10 that brakes the rotation of the drive sheave 8; and a motor encoder 11 that generates a detection signal according to the rotation of the drive sheave 8.
- the brake portion 10 is, for example, an electromagnetic brake apparatus.
- a spring force of a braking spring is used to push a brake shoe against a braking surface to brake the rotation of the drive sheave 8 and an electromagnetic magnet is excited to separate the brake shoe from the braking surface to cancel the braking.
- An elevator control portion (control panel) 12 is disposed in, for example, the lower part or the like in the hoistway 1.
- the elevator control portion 12 is provided with an operation control portion for controlling the operation of the drive device 7.
- a detection signal from the motor encoder 11 is input to the operation controlportion. Based on the detection signal from the motor encoder 11, the operation control portion calculates a position and a speed of the car 3 and controls the drive device 7.
- the elevator control portion 12 has a function of detecting an abnormal speed of the car 3 through a comparison between the calculated speed of the car and an operation command value.
- the elevator control portion 12 is connected to a safety circuit (relay circuit) 30 for suddenly stopping the car 3 when the elevator is in an abnormal state.
- a safety circuit relay circuit
- an electric current to the motor portion 9 of the driving apparatus 7 is blocked and an electric current to the electromagnetic magnet of the brake portion 10 is also blocked, whereby the drive sheave 8 is braked.
- a speed governor (mechanical speed governor) 14 is provided in the upper part of the hoistway 1.
- the speed governor 14 includes: a speed governor sheave, an overspeed detection switch, a rope catch, and a speed governor encoder 15 serving as a sensor.
- the speed governor rope 16 is wound at a speed governor sheave. Both ends of the speed governor rope 16 are connected to the operational mechanism of the safety device 5.
- the lower end of the speed governor rope 16 is wound around a tightening pulley 17 provided in the lower part of the hoistway 1.
- the speed governor rope 16 When the car 3 is raised or lowered, the speed governor rope 16 is moved in circulation and the speed governor sheave is rotated at a rotation speed corresponding to a traveling speed of the car 3.
- the speed governor 14 mechanically detects that the traveling speed of the car 3 reaches an overspeed.
- Set as overspeeds to be detected are a first overspeed (OS speed) that is higher than a rated speed and a second overspeed (Trip speed) that is higher than the first overspeed.
- the overspeed detection switch When the traveling speed of the car 3 reaches the first overspeed, the overspeed detection switch is operated. When the overspeed detection switch is operated, the relay circuit of the safety circuit 13 is opened. When the traveling speed of the car 3 reaches the second overspeed, the rope catch grips the speed governor rope 16 to stop the circulation of the speed governor rope 16. When the circulation of the speed governor rope 16 is stopped, the safety device 5 provides a braking operation.
- the speed governor encoder 15 generates a detection signal according to the rotation of the speed governor sheave.
- the speed governor encoder 15 employs a dual sense type encoder that simultaneously outputs two types of detection signals, i.e., a first detection signal and a second detection signal.
- the first detection signal and the second detection signal from the speed governor encoder 15 are input to an ETS circuit portion 22 of an Emergency Terminal Slowdown apparatus (ETS apparatus) provided at an electronic safety controller 21.
- the ETS circuit portion 22 detects, based on a detection signal from the speed governor encoder 15, abnormality of an elevator and outputs a command signal for shifting the elevator to a safe state. More specifically, the ETS circuit portion 22 calculates, independently from the elevator control portion 12, a traveling speed and a position of the car 3 based on the signal from the speed governor encoder 15, and monitors whether the traveling speed of the car 3 in the vicinity of a terminal landing reaches an ETS monitoring overspeed.
- the ETS circuit portion 22 also converts the signal from the speed governor encoder 15 to a digital signal to perform a digital calculation processing and determine whether the traveling speed of the car 3 reaches an ETS monitoring overspeed. When the ETS circuit portion 22 determines that the traveling speed of the car 3 has reached the ETS monitoring overspeed, the relay circuit of safety circuit 13 is opened.
- the electronic safety controller 21 can also detect abnormality of the electronic safety controller 21 itself and abnormality of the speed governor encoder 15. When the electronic safety controller 21 detects abnormality of the electronic safety controller 21 itself or abnormality of the speed governor encoder 15, a nearest floor stop command signal is output from the electronic safety controller 21 to the operation control portion 12 as a command signal for shifting the elevator to a safe state. Interactive communication is also possible between the electronic safety controller 21 and the operation control portion 12.
- a first reference location sensor 23 and a second reference location sensor 24 for detecting that the car 3 is located at a reference position in the hoistway.
- Top and bottom terminal landing switches can be used for the reference location sensors 23 and 24.
- Detection signals from the reference location sensors 23 and 24 are input to the electronic safety controller 21. Based on the detection signals from the reference location sensors 23 and 24, the electronic safety controller 21 corrects the information for the position of the car 3 calculated in the ETS circuit portion 22.
- a car buffer 27 and a counterweight buffer 28 are provided in the lower part of the hoistway 1.
- the car buffer 27 and the counterweight buffer 28 reduce an impact caused when the car 3 and the counterweight 4 collides with a bottom part of the hoistway 1.
- These buffers 27 and 28 may be, for example, an oil-filled-type or spring-type buffer.
- a pair of car suspending pulleys 41a and 41b are provided in a lower part of the car 3.
- a counterweight suspending pulley 42 is provided in an upper part of the counterweight 4.
- Car-side return pulleys 43a and 43b and a counterweight-side return pulley 44 are disposed in the upper part of the hoistway 1.
- the main rope 6 has a first end 6a and a second end 6b, which are connected to a top portion of the hoistway 1 via rope stop portions.
- the main rope 6 is wound, sequentially from the first end 6a side, around the car suspending pulleys 41a and 41b, the car-side return pulleys 43a and 43b, the drive sheave 8, the counterweight-side return pulley 44, and the counterweight suspending pulley 42. That is, in this example, the car 3 and the counterweight 4 are suspended within the hoistway 1 according to a 2:1 roping method.
- Fig. 2 is a graph of overspeed patterns set in the speed governor 14 and the ETS circuit portion 22 of Fig. 1 .
- the car 3 travels at a normal speed (rated speed) from a bottom terminal landing to a top terminal landing, the car 3 draws a normal speed pattern V0.
- a first second overspeed patterns V1 and a second overspeed pattern V2 are set in the speed governor 14 by a mechanical position adjustment.
- An ETS monitoring overspeed pattern VE is set in the ETS circuit portion.
- the ETS monitoring overspeed pattern VE is set to be higher than the normal speed pattern V0.
- the ETS monitoring overspeed pattern VE is also set to have about equal intervals from the normal speed pattern V0 in the entire raising/lowering process.
- the ETS monitoring overspeed pattern VE changes according to a car position. More specifically, the ETS monitoring overspeed pattern VE is set to be held constant in the vicinity of an intermediate floor and is set to continuously and smoothly decline, in the vicinity of a terminal landing, as ends (upper end and lower end) of the hoistway become closer. In this manner, the ETS circuit portion 22 monitors the traveling speed of the car 3 not only in the vicinity of a terminal landing but also in the vicinity of an intermediate floor (a fixed speed traveling zone in the normal speed pattern V0). However, the ETS circuit portion 22 does not always have to monitor the traveling speed of the car 3 in the vicinity of the intermediate floor.
- the first overspeed pattern V1 is set to be higher than the ETS monitoring overspeed pattern VE.
- the second overspeed pattern V2 is set to be further higher than the first overspeed pattern V1.
- the first overspeed patterns V1 and the second overspeed pattern V2 are fixed at all heights in the hoistway 1.
- Fig. 3 is a block diagram showing an essential part of Fig. 1 .
- the elevator control portion 12 has a first computer having a first CPU (a calculation processing portion) 31, a storage portion (a ROM, a RAM, a hard disk, and the like), and signal input/output portions .
- a function of the elevator control portion 12 is realized by the first computer.
- a control program for realizing the function of the elevator control portion 12 is stored in the storage portion of the first computer.
- the first CPU 31 performs a calculation processing regarding the function of the elevator control portion 12 based on the control program.
- the elevator control portion 12 is also provided with a motor drive portion 32 (an inverter or the like) for driving the motor portion 9.
- the elevator control portion 12 is provided with a first safety relay 33 for opening the safety circuit 13.
- a motor contactor 34 is opened to shut off the supply of electric power to the motor portion 9, and a brake contactor 35 is opened to shut off the supply of electric power to the electromagnet of the brake portion 10.
- the electronic safety controller 21 has a second computer having second and third CPU's (a calculation processing portion) 36 and 37, a storage portion (a ROM, a RAM, a hard disk, and the like), and signal input/output portions.
- a function of the electronic safety controller 21 is realized by the second computer.
- a safety program for realizing the function of the electronic safety controller 21 is stored in the storage portion of the second computer.
- the second and third CPU's 36 and 37 perform a calculation processing regarding the function of the electronic safety controller 21 based on the safety program.
- the electronic safety controller 21 is provided with a second safety relay 38 and a third safety relay 39 for opening the safety circuit 13.
- the second CPU 36 and the third CPU 37 correspond to the second safety relay 38 and the third safety relay 39 on a one-to-one basis.
- emergency stop commands forcible slowdown commands
- the safety circuit 13 is opened.
- the safety program includes a first safety program and a second safety program of the same contents.
- the second CPU 36 performs the calculation processing based on the first safety program.
- the third CPU 37 performs the calculation processing based on the second safety program.
- the second and third CPU's 36 and 37 can have mutual communication via an interprocessor bus and a dual port RAM.
- the second and third CPU's 36 and 37 can also check the soundness of the second and third CPU's 36 and 37 themselves by mutually comparing the results of the calculation processing. In other words, the soundness of the second and third CPU's 36 and 37 is checked by causing the second and third CPU's 36 and 37 to perform an identical processing and the processing results are communicated and compared.
- the electronic safety controller 21 can also detect abnormality in the electronic safety controller 21 other than abnormalities in the CPU' s 36 and 37 themselves, through the calculation processing.
- Fig. 4 is an explanatory diagram showing a method of performing the calculation processings by means of the second CPU 36 and the third CPU 37 of Fig. 3 .
- the second CPU 36 and the third CPU 37 repeatedly perform the calculation processings according to the program stored in the ROM, on a predetermined calculation cycle (e.g., 50 milliseconds) based on a signal from a fixed cycle timer in the second computer.
- a predetermined calculation cycle e.g. 50 milliseconds
- a program executed in one cycle includes a safety program for detecting abnormality of an elevator and a failure/abnormality check program for detecting the failure/abnormality of the electronic safety controller 21 itself and various sensors.
- the failure/abnormality check program may be executed only when predetermined states are satisfied.
- failure/abnormality check program for example, detection of clock abnormality, detection of abnormality in a stack region of the RAM, detection of abnormality in a sequence of calculation processings, detection of abnormality in a relay contact, detection of abnormality in power supply voltage, and the like are sequentially carried out.
- Fig. 5 is an explanatory diagram showing a method of performing the calculation processings by means of the first CPU 31 of Fig. 3 .
- the first CPU 31 repeatedly perform the calculation processings according to the program stored in the ROM, on a predetermined calculation cycle based on a signal from a fixed cycle timer in the first computer.
- a program executed in one cycle includes a control program for controlling operation of an elevator and a communication check program for checking the communication with the electronic safety controller 21.
- the communication check program may be executed only when predetermined states are satisfied.
- the elevator control portion 12 communicates with the electronic safety controller 21 on a predetermined cycle for the purpose of checking on a state of communication therewith.
- the elevator control portion 12 stops the car 3 safely (nearest floor stop command) if the car 3 is running, and renders normal automatic operation impossible if the car 3 is stopped.
- the elevator control portion 12 may permit at least only one of manual operation and low-speed automatic operation.
- the elevator control portion 12 When a communication error is detected, the elevator control portion 12 outputs an abnormality detection signal to an elevator administrative room or the like. In other words, when a communication error is detected, the elevator control portion 12 generates a signal for informing an elevator administrator of abnormality.
- the elevator control portion 12 can communicate with the electronic safety controller 21, and can confirm a state of communication with the electronic safety controller 21 at predetermined timings. As a result, it is possible to detect a substantially absent state of the electronic safety controller 21 and thus achieve enhancement of reliability.
- the elevator control portion 12 When abnormality is detected in a state of communication with the electronic safety controller 21, the elevator control portion 12 renders normal automatic operation of the car 3 impossible. Therefore, the car 3 can be prevented from being operated with a passenger being present therein while the electronic safety controller 21 is substantially absent.
- the car 3 does not become completely immovable in, for example, replacing the substrate for the reason of maintenance.
- a communication state confirmation signal is repeatedly output from the elevator control portion 12, it is appropriate to judge that a communication error has occurred once a normal response is not returned from the electronic safety controller 21.
- Information such as the speed of the car which has been calculated by the elevator control portion 12 may be included in the communication state confirmation signal.
- the electronic safety controller 21 compares the information calculated by itself with information calculated by the elevator control portion 12. When the information calculated by the electronic safety controller 21 does not match the information calculated by the elevator control portion 12, the electronic safety controller 21 may refrain from making a response (refrain from permitting normal operation). Thus, the car 3 can be prevented from being operated with the wrong electronic safety controller 21 installed.
- At least one of the elevator control portion 12 and the electronic safety controller 21 may monitor movements of the car 3 based on information that has been obtained after actuation of a brake, every time the car is stopped.
- at least one of the elevator control portion 12 and the electronic safety controller 21 may have a function of confirming whether or not the car 3 has been suitably held static after actuation of the brake.
- a timing for performing an operation of confirming the slowdown torque as described above should not be limited to a timing corresponding to each stoppage of the car. This operation may also be performed, for example, when the car 3 is stopped at a floor designated in advance, when the car 3 is stopped a preset number of times, or when the car 3 is first stopped within a preset cycle time (e.g., one day, one hour, or 10 minutes).
- a preset cycle time e.g., one day, one hour, or 10 minutes.
- a detection switch that is mechanically operated when the substrate of the electronic safety controller 21 is removed, so that the elevator control portion 12 confirms an open/closed state of the detection switch on a regular basis to check whether or not the electronic safety controller 21 is substantially absent.
- the elevator control portion 12 and the electronic safety controller 21 may communicate with each other either through cable communication using a communication cable or through radio communication using a local area wireless network or the like.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Maintenance And Inspection Apparatuses For Elevators (AREA)
- Indicating And Signalling Devices For Elevators (AREA)
Description
- The present invention relates to an elevator apparatus which employs an electronic safety controller for detecting abnormality of an elevator based on a detection signal from a sensor.
- In conventional elevator apparatuses, an elevator control device and an electronic safety controller are respectively provided with CPU's that are independent of each other. In order to enhance reliability of communication between the elevator control device and the electronic safety controller, a communication system of the elevator apparatus employs double redundancy configuration. When a communication error is detected by the electronic safety controller, operation of the elevator is prohibited (e.g. , see Patent Document 1).
- Patent Document 1:
JP 2002-538061 A - In a conventional elevator apparatus, however, only the electronic safety controller checks on whether or not there is a communication error. Therefore, a car of the elevator may be operated without a safety monitoring of the electronic safety controller in cases where the electronic safety controller is substantially absent, when, for example, a substrate of the electronic safety controller has been removed for maintenance reasons and the like, when the electronic safety controller does not function at all, or when an inappropriate electronic safety controller is connected. A conventional elevator apparatus of this type is described in
US 6,173,814 . - The present invention has been made to solve the problem as discussed above, and it is therefore an object of the invention to obtain an elevator apparatus allowing detection of a substantially absent state of an electronic safety controller and thus enhancement of reliability.
- An elevator apparatus according to the present invention includes: an elevator control portion for controlling operation of a car; and an electronic safety controller for detecting abnormality in an elevator based on a detection signal from a sensor for detecting a state of the elevator and outputting a command signal for shifting the elevator to a safe state, and in the elevator apparatus, the elevator control portion is capable of communicating with the electronic safety controller and is capable of confirming a state of communication with the electronic safety controller at predetermined timings.
-
- [
Fig. 1 ] A structural diagram of an elevator apparatus according toEmbodiment 1 of the present invention. - [
Fig. 2 ] A graph of patterns of overspeed set in speed governor and an ETS circuit portion of an electronic safety controller ofFig. 1 . - [
Fig. 3 ] A block diagram showing an essential part ofFig. 1 . - [
Fig. 4 ] An explanatory diagram showing a method of performing calculation processings by means of a second CPU and a third CPU ofFig. 3 . - [
Fig. 5 ] An explanatory diagram showing a method of performing a calculation processing by means of a first CPU ofFig. 3 . Best Mode for carrying out the Invention - Preferred embodiments of the present invention will be hereinafter described with reference to the drawings.
-
Fig. 1 is a structural diagram of an elevator apparatus according toEmbodiment 1 of the invention. In the drawing, ahoistway 1 includes a pair of car guide rails (not shown) and a pair of counterweight guide rails (not shown). Acar 3 is raised and lowered in thehoistway 1 while being guided by the car guide rails. Acounterweight 4 is raised and lowered in thehoistway 1 while being guided by the counterweight guide rails. - Provided in a lower part of the
car 3 is asafety device 5 that engages with the car guide rails to stop thecar 3 in an emergency. Thesafety device 5 has a pair of braking pieces that performs braking operation due to mechanical operation to be pushed against the car guide rails. - In the lower part of the
hoistway 1, a driving apparatus (hoisting machine) 7 that raises and lowers thecar 3 and thecounterweight 4 via amain rope 6 is provided. Thedriving apparatus 7 has: adrive sheave 8; a motor portion that rotates thedrive sheave 8; abrake portion 10 that brakes the rotation of thedrive sheave 8; and amotor encoder 11 that generates a detection signal according to the rotation of thedrive sheave 8. - The
brake portion 10 is, for example, an electromagnetic brake apparatus. In the electromagnetic brake apparatus, a spring force of a braking spring is used to push a brake shoe against a braking surface to brake the rotation of thedrive sheave 8 and an electromagnetic magnet is excited to separate the brake shoe from the braking surface to cancel the braking. - An elevator control portion (control panel) 12 is disposed in, for example, the lower part or the like in the
hoistway 1. Theelevator control portion 12 is provided with an operation control portion for controlling the operation of thedrive device 7. A detection signal from themotor encoder 11 is input to the operation controlportion. Based on the detection signal from themotor encoder 11, the operation control portion calculates a position and a speed of thecar 3 and controls thedrive device 7. Theelevator control portion 12 has a function of detecting an abnormal speed of thecar 3 through a comparison between the calculated speed of the car and an operation command value. - The
elevator control portion 12 is connected to a safety circuit (relay circuit) 30 for suddenly stopping thecar 3 when the elevator is in an abnormal state. When the relay circuit of thesafety circuit 13 is opened, an electric current to themotor portion 9 of thedriving apparatus 7 is blocked and an electric current to the electromagnetic magnet of thebrake portion 10 is also blocked, whereby thedrive sheave 8 is braked. - In the upper part of the
hoistway 1, a speed governor (mechanical speed governor) 14 is provided. The speed governor 14 includes: a speed governor sheave, an overspeed detection switch, a rope catch, and aspeed governor encoder 15 serving as a sensor. Thespeed governor rope 16 is wound at a speed governor sheave. Both ends of thespeed governor rope 16 are connected to the operational mechanism of thesafety device 5. The lower end of thespeed governor rope 16 is wound around a tighteningpulley 17 provided in the lower part of thehoistway 1. - When the
car 3 is raised or lowered, thespeed governor rope 16 is moved in circulation and the speed governor sheave is rotated at a rotation speed corresponding to a traveling speed of thecar 3. Thespeed governor 14 mechanically detects that the traveling speed of thecar 3 reaches an overspeed. Set as overspeeds to be detected are a first overspeed (OS speed) that is higher than a rated speed and a second overspeed (Trip speed) that is higher than the first overspeed. - When the traveling speed of the
car 3 reaches the first overspeed, the overspeed detection switch is operated. When the overspeed detection switch is operated, the relay circuit of thesafety circuit 13 is opened. When the traveling speed of thecar 3 reaches the second overspeed, the rope catch grips the speed governor rope 16 to stop the circulation of thespeed governor rope 16. When the circulation of thespeed governor rope 16 is stopped, thesafety device 5 provides a braking operation. - The
speed governor encoder 15 generates a detection signal according to the rotation of the speed governor sheave. Thespeed governor encoder 15 employs a dual sense type encoder that simultaneously outputs two types of detection signals, i.e., a first detection signal and a second detection signal. - The first detection signal and the second detection signal from the
speed governor encoder 15 are input to an ETS circuit portion 22 of an Emergency Terminal Slowdown apparatus (ETS apparatus) provided at anelectronic safety controller 21. The ETS circuit portion 22 detects, based on a detection signal from thespeed governor encoder 15, abnormality of an elevator and outputs a command signal for shifting the elevator to a safe state. More specifically, the ETS circuit portion 22 calculates, independently from theelevator control portion 12, a traveling speed and a position of thecar 3 based on the signal from thespeed governor encoder 15, and monitors whether the traveling speed of thecar 3 in the vicinity of a terminal landing reaches an ETS monitoring overspeed. - The ETS circuit portion 22 also converts the signal from the
speed governor encoder 15 to a digital signal to perform a digital calculation processing and determine whether the traveling speed of thecar 3 reaches an ETS monitoring overspeed. When the ETS circuit portion 22 determines that the traveling speed of thecar 3 has reached the ETS monitoring overspeed, the relay circuit ofsafety circuit 13 is opened. - The
electronic safety controller 21 can also detect abnormality of theelectronic safety controller 21 itself and abnormality of thespeed governor encoder 15. When theelectronic safety controller 21 detects abnormality of theelectronic safety controller 21 itself or abnormality of thespeed governor encoder 15, a nearest floor stop command signal is output from theelectronic safety controller 21 to theoperation control portion 12 as a command signal for shifting the elevator to a safe state. Interactive communication is also possible between theelectronic safety controller 21 and theoperation control portion 12. - In predetermined positions in the
hoistway 1, there are provided a firstreference location sensor 23 and a secondreference location sensor 24 for detecting that thecar 3 is located at a reference position in the hoistway. Top and bottom terminal landing switches can be used for thereference location sensors reference location sensors electronic safety controller 21. Based on the detection signals from thereference location sensors electronic safety controller 21 corrects the information for the position of thecar 3 calculated in the ETS circuit portion 22. - In the lower part of the
hoistway 1, acar buffer 27 and acounterweight buffer 28 are provided. Thecar buffer 27 and thecounterweight buffer 28 reduce an impact caused when thecar 3 and thecounterweight 4 collides with a bottom part of thehoistway 1. Thesebuffers - A pair of
car suspending pulleys car 3. Acounterweight suspending pulley 42 is provided in an upper part of thecounterweight 4. Car-side return pulleys 43a and 43b and a counterweight-side return pulley 44 are disposed in the upper part of thehoistway 1. Themain rope 6 has afirst end 6a and asecond end 6b, which are connected to a top portion of thehoistway 1 via rope stop portions. - The
main rope 6 is wound, sequentially from thefirst end 6a side, around thecar suspending pulleys drive sheave 8, the counterweight-side return pulley 44, and thecounterweight suspending pulley 42. That is, in this example, thecar 3 and thecounterweight 4 are suspended within thehoistway 1 according to a 2:1 roping method. -
Fig. 2 is a graph of overspeed patterns set in thespeed governor 14 and the ETS circuit portion 22 ofFig. 1 . In the drawing, when thecar 3 travels at a normal speed (rated speed) from a bottom terminal landing to a top terminal landing, thecar 3 draws a normal speed pattern V0. A first second overspeed patterns V1 and a second overspeed pattern V2 are set in thespeed governor 14 by a mechanical position adjustment. An ETS monitoring overspeed pattern VE is set in the ETS circuit portion. - The ETS monitoring overspeed pattern VE is set to be higher than the normal speed pattern V0. The ETS monitoring overspeed pattern VE is also set to have about equal intervals from the normal speed pattern V0 in the entire raising/lowering process. In other words, the ETS monitoring overspeed pattern VE changes according to a car position. More specifically, the ETS monitoring overspeed pattern VE is set to be held constant in the vicinity of an intermediate floor and is set to continuously and smoothly decline, in the vicinity of a terminal landing, as ends (upper end and lower end) of the hoistway become closer. In this manner, the ETS circuit portion 22 monitors the traveling speed of the
car 3 not only in the vicinity of a terminal landing but also in the vicinity of an intermediate floor (a fixed speed traveling zone in the normal speed pattern V0). However, the ETS circuit portion 22 does not always have to monitor the traveling speed of thecar 3 in the vicinity of the intermediate floor. - The first overspeed pattern V1 is set to be higher than the ETS monitoring overspeed pattern VE. The second overspeed pattern V2 is set to be further higher than the first overspeed pattern V1. The first overspeed patterns V1 and the second overspeed pattern V2 are fixed at all heights in the
hoistway 1. -
Fig. 3 is a block diagram showing an essential part ofFig. 1 . Theelevator control portion 12 has a first computer having a first CPU (a calculation processing portion) 31, a storage portion (a ROM, a RAM, a hard disk, and the like), and signal input/output portions . A function of theelevator control portion 12 is realized by the first computer. In other words, a control program for realizing the function of theelevator control portion 12 is stored in the storage portion of the first computer. Thefirst CPU 31 performs a calculation processing regarding the function of theelevator control portion 12 based on the control program. - The
elevator control portion 12 is also provided with a motor drive portion 32 (an inverter or the like) for driving themotor portion 9. In addition, theelevator control portion 12 is provided with afirst safety relay 33 for opening thesafety circuit 13. When an emergency stop command is output from thefirst CPU 31 to thefirst safety relay 33, thesafety circuit 13 is opened. When thesafety circuit 13 is opened, amotor contactor 34 is opened to shut off the supply of electric power to themotor portion 9, and abrake contactor 35 is opened to shut off the supply of electric power to the electromagnet of thebrake portion 10. - The
electronic safety controller 21 has a second computer having second and third CPU's (a calculation processing portion) 36 and 37, a storage portion (a ROM, a RAM, a hard disk, and the like), and signal input/output portions. A function of theelectronic safety controller 21 is realized by the second computer. In other words, a safety program for realizing the function of theelectronic safety controller 21 is stored in the storage portion of the second computer. The second and third CPU's 36 and 37 perform a calculation processing regarding the function of theelectronic safety controller 21 based on the safety program. - The
electronic safety controller 21 is provided with a second safety relay 38 and athird safety relay 39 for opening thesafety circuit 13. Thesecond CPU 36 and thethird CPU 37 correspond to the second safety relay 38 and thethird safety relay 39 on a one-to-one basis. When emergency stop commands (forcible slowdown commands) are output from thesecond CPU 36 and thethird CPU 37 to the second and third safety relays 38 and 39 respectively, thesafety circuit 13 is opened. - The safety program includes a first safety program and a second safety program of the same contents. The
second CPU 36 performs the calculation processing based on the first safety program. Thethird CPU 37 performs the calculation processing based on the second safety program. - The second and third CPU's 36 and 37 can have mutual communication via an interprocessor bus and a dual port RAM. The second and third CPU's 36 and 37 can also check the soundness of the second and third CPU's 36 and 37 themselves by mutually comparing the results of the calculation processing. In other words, the soundness of the second and third CPU's 36 and 37 is checked by causing the second and third CPU's 36 and 37 to perform an identical processing and the processing results are communicated and compared.
- The
electronic safety controller 21 can also detect abnormality in theelectronic safety controller 21 other than abnormalities in the CPU's -
Fig. 4 is an explanatory diagram showing a method of performing the calculation processings by means of thesecond CPU 36 and thethird CPU 37 ofFig. 3 . Thesecond CPU 36 and thethird CPU 37 repeatedly perform the calculation processings according to the program stored in the ROM, on a predetermined calculation cycle (e.g., 50 milliseconds) based on a signal from a fixed cycle timer in the second computer. - A program executed in one cycle includes a safety program for detecting abnormality of an elevator and a failure/abnormality check program for detecting the failure/abnormality of the
electronic safety controller 21 itself and various sensors. The failure/abnormality check program may be executed only when predetermined states are satisfied. - In the failure/abnormality check program, for example, detection of clock abnormality, detection of abnormality in a stack region of the RAM, detection of abnormality in a sequence of calculation processings, detection of abnormality in a relay contact, detection of abnormality in power supply voltage, and the like are sequentially carried out.
-
Fig. 5 is an explanatory diagram showing a method of performing the calculation processings by means of thefirst CPU 31 ofFig. 3 . Thefirst CPU 31 repeatedly perform the calculation processings according to the program stored in the ROM, on a predetermined calculation cycle based on a signal from a fixed cycle timer in the first computer. - A program executed in one cycle includes a control program for controlling operation of an elevator and a communication check program for checking the communication with the
electronic safety controller 21. The communication check program may be executed only when predetermined states are satisfied. - As described above, the
elevator control portion 12 communicates with theelectronic safety controller 21 on a predetermined cycle for the purpose of checking on a state of communication therewith. When a normal response is not returned from the electronic safety controller 21 (when a communication error is detected), theelevator control portion 12 stops thecar 3 safely (nearest floor stop command) if thecar 3 is running, and renders normal automatic operation impossible if thecar 3 is stopped. When normal automatic operation is rendered impossible, theelevator control portion 12 may permit at least only one of manual operation and low-speed automatic operation. - When a communication error is detected, the
elevator control portion 12 outputs an abnormality detection signal to an elevator administrative room or the like. In other words, when a communication error is detected, theelevator control portion 12 generates a signal for informing an elevator administrator of abnormality. - In the elevator apparatus constructed as described above, the
elevator control portion 12 can communicate with theelectronic safety controller 21, and can confirm a state of communication with theelectronic safety controller 21 at predetermined timings. As a result, it is possible to detect a substantially absent state of theelectronic safety controller 21 and thus achieve enhancement of reliability. - When abnormality is detected in a state of communication with the
electronic safety controller 21, theelevator control portion 12 renders normal automatic operation of thecar 3 impossible. Therefore, thecar 3 can be prevented from being operated with a passenger being present therein while theelectronic safety controller 21 is substantially absent. - Moreover, even when normal automatic operation is rendered impossible, at least one of manual operation and low-speed automatic operation is permitted. Therefore, the
car 3 does not become completely immovable in, for example, replacing the substrate for the reason of maintenance. - Although a communication state confirmation signal is repeatedly output from the
elevator control portion 12, it is appropriate to judge that a communication error has occurred once a normal response is not returned from theelectronic safety controller 21. Alternatively, with a view to preventing erroneous detection of a communication error, it may also be appropriate to judge that a communication error has occurred when a normal response is not consecutively returned from the electronic safety controller 21 a preset number of times. - Information such as the speed of the car which has been calculated by the
elevator control portion 12 may be included in the communication state confirmation signal. In this case, theelectronic safety controller 21 compares the information calculated by itself with information calculated by theelevator control portion 12. When the information calculated by theelectronic safety controller 21 does not match the information calculated by theelevator control portion 12, theelectronic safety controller 21 may refrain from making a response (refrain from permitting normal operation). Thus, thecar 3 can be prevented from being operated with the wrongelectronic safety controller 21 installed. - Furthermore, at least one of the
elevator control portion 12 and theelectronic safety controller 21 may monitor movements of thecar 3 based on information that has been obtained after actuation of a brake, every time the car is stopped. In other words, at least one of theelevator control portion 12 and theelectronic safety controller 21 may have a function of confirming whether or not thecar 3 has been suitably held static after actuation of the brake. Thus, it is possible to confirm whether or not thebrake portion 10 ensures a required slowdown torque. - A timing for performing an operation of confirming the slowdown torque as described above should not be limited to a timing corresponding to each stoppage of the car. This operation may also be performed, for example, when the
car 3 is stopped at a floor designated in advance, when thecar 3 is stopped a preset number of times, or when thecar 3 is first stopped within a preset cycle time (e.g., one day, one hour, or 10 minutes). - Still further, it may also be appropriate to provide a detection switch that is mechanically operated when the substrate of the
electronic safety controller 21 is removed, so that theelevator control portion 12 confirms an open/closed state of the detection switch on a regular basis to check whether or not theelectronic safety controller 21 is substantially absent. - The
elevator control portion 12 and theelectronic safety controller 21 may communicate with each other either through cable communication using a communication cable or through radio communication using a local area wireless network or the like.
Claims (8)
- An elevator apparatus, comprising:an elevator control portion (12) for controlling operation of a car (3); andan electronic safety controller (21) for detecting abnormality of an elevator based on a detection signal from a sensor (15, 23, 24) for detecting a state of the elevator and outputting a command signal for shifting the elevator to a safe state,the electronic safety controller (21) calculates, independently from the elevator control portion (12), the speed of the car (3), characterized in that the elevator control portion (12) calculates a speed of the car(3), andthe elevator control portion (12) is capable of communicating with the electronic safety controller (21) and is capable of confirming a state of communication with the electronic safety controller (21) at predetermined timings.
- The elevator apparatus according to Claim 1, wherein the elevator control portion (12) renders normal automatic operation of the car (3) impossible when abnormality is detected in the state of communication with the electronic safety controller (21).
- The elevator apparatus according to Claim 1, wherein the elevator control portion (12) permits manual operation of the car (3) while rendering normal automatic operation of the car impossible when abnormality is detected in the state of communication with the electronic safety controller (21).
- The elevator apparatus according to Claim 1, wherein the elevator control portion (12) permits low-speed operation of the car (3) while rendering normal automatic operation of the car (3) impossible when abnormality is detected in the state of communication with the electronic safety controller (21).
- The elevator apparatus according to Claim 1, wherein the elevator control portion (12) stops the car (3) when abnormality is detected in the state of communication with the electronic safety controller (21) while the car (3) is running.
- The elevator apparatus according to Claim 1, wherein the elevator control portion (12) generates a signal for informing an elevator administrator of abnormality when the abnormality is detected in the state of communication with the electronic safety controller (21).
- The elevator apparatus according to Claim 1, wherein the elevator control portion (12) outputs to the electronic safety controller (21) a signal for confirming the state of communication therewith on a predetermined cycle, and determines presence/absence of abnormality in the state of communication depending on whether or not a normal response is returned from the electronic safety controller (21).
- The elevator apparatus according to Claim 7, wherein the elevator control portion (12) determines that the state of communication is abnormal when a preset number of abnormal responses are returned consecutively from the electronic safety controller (21).
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/JP2005/006292 WO2006106575A1 (en) | 2005-03-31 | 2005-03-31 | Elevator apparatus |
Publications (3)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1864935A1 EP1864935A1 (en) | 2007-12-12 |
EP1864935A4 EP1864935A4 (en) | 2012-10-24 |
EP1864935B1 true EP1864935B1 (en) | 2018-11-28 |
Family
ID=37073143
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP05727358.3A Not-in-force EP1864935B1 (en) | 2005-03-31 | 2005-03-31 | Elevator apparatus |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1864935B1 (en) |
JP (1) | JPWO2006106575A1 (en) |
KR (1) | KR101014917B1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN1953926B (en) |
WO (1) | WO2006106575A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (30)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN101068741B (en) * | 2005-08-31 | 2012-01-11 | 三菱电机株式会社 | Control system for elevator |
JP5111502B2 (en) * | 2007-05-24 | 2013-01-09 | 三菱電機株式会社 | Elevator equipment |
EP2246285B1 (en) | 2008-02-28 | 2018-06-20 | Mitsubishi Electric Corporation | Elevator system |
CN102036898B (en) * | 2008-06-27 | 2013-05-01 | 三菱电机株式会社 | Elevator apparatus and operating method thereof |
JP5523455B2 (en) * | 2009-06-23 | 2014-06-18 | 三菱電機株式会社 | Elevator equipment |
WO2011001829A1 (en) * | 2009-06-29 | 2011-01-06 | 三菱電機株式会社 | Elevator device |
WO2011001197A1 (en) * | 2009-07-02 | 2011-01-06 | Otis Elevator Company | Elevator rescue system |
DE102009037347A1 (en) * | 2009-08-14 | 2011-02-17 | K.A. Schmersal Holding Gmbh & Co. Kg | Electronic security system for a lift |
DE102009058571A1 (en) * | 2009-12-17 | 2011-06-22 | Elektro-Anlagen-Ernst GmbH, 07552 | Device for controlling the travel of a single- or double-struck conveyor system and method for executing the cruise control |
JP5876881B2 (en) * | 2010-09-13 | 2016-03-02 | オーチス エレベータ カンパニーOtis Elevator Company | Elevator safety system and method |
JP5492732B2 (en) * | 2010-10-21 | 2014-05-14 | 株式会社日立製作所 | Electronic safety elevator |
EP2452907A1 (en) | 2010-11-11 | 2012-05-16 | Inventio AG | Elevator Safety Circuit |
WO2012137279A1 (en) | 2011-04-01 | 2012-10-11 | 三菱電機株式会社 | Elevator device |
CN102424313A (en) * | 2011-08-19 | 2012-04-25 | 上海新时达电气股份有限公司 | Elevator system |
JP5773893B2 (en) * | 2012-01-10 | 2015-09-02 | 東芝エレベータ株式会社 | Passenger conveyor safety device and safety system |
FI123507B (en) * | 2012-08-07 | 2013-06-14 | Kone Corp | Safety circuit and lift system |
JP6190171B2 (en) * | 2013-06-10 | 2017-08-30 | 株式会社日立製作所 | elevator |
WO2015085527A1 (en) * | 2013-12-12 | 2015-06-18 | Otis Elevator Company | Safety system for use in a drive system |
CN106232514B (en) * | 2013-12-17 | 2018-07-17 | 株式会社日立制作所 | The control device and its control method of elevator |
WO2016203513A1 (en) * | 2015-06-15 | 2016-12-22 | 三菱電機株式会社 | Elevator safety system |
JP6062009B2 (en) * | 2015-09-18 | 2017-01-18 | 三菱電機株式会社 | Elevator equipment |
EP3246281B1 (en) * | 2016-05-20 | 2021-04-21 | KONE Corporation | Elevator communication arrangement |
CN106241535B (en) * | 2016-08-03 | 2018-10-23 | 陕西小溪机电科技有限公司 | A kind of control system and method for safe towed elevator |
CN111788139B (en) * | 2018-02-26 | 2021-09-14 | 三菱电机株式会社 | Elevator safety control device |
JP7086906B2 (en) * | 2019-09-13 | 2022-06-20 | 株式会社東芝 | Work support equipment, work support methods, and work support programs |
JP2021117854A (en) * | 2020-01-29 | 2021-08-10 | 株式会社日立製作所 | System to control moving object |
WO2021176547A1 (en) * | 2020-03-03 | 2021-09-10 | 株式会社日立製作所 | Elevator safety control system and elevator using same |
JP7526057B2 (en) * | 2020-09-03 | 2024-07-31 | 株式会社日立製作所 | Mobile radio control system and mobile radio control method |
KR102271465B1 (en) | 2021-03-12 | 2021-07-01 | 대한민국 | Sample collection device |
EP4074641A1 (en) * | 2021-04-14 | 2022-10-19 | Otis Elevator Company | Safety control device and method |
Family Cites Families (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US3792759A (en) * | 1972-12-22 | 1974-02-19 | Westinghouse Electric Corp | Elevator system |
JP3045790B2 (en) * | 1991-01-28 | 2000-05-29 | 三菱電機株式会社 | Elevator signal transmission equipment |
JP3529291B2 (en) * | 1998-12-16 | 2004-05-24 | 東芝エレベータ株式会社 | Elevator transmission control device |
US6173814B1 (en) * | 1999-03-04 | 2001-01-16 | Otis Elevator Company | Electronic safety system for elevators having a dual redundant safety bus |
JP3681602B2 (en) * | 2000-02-07 | 2005-08-10 | 株式会社日立ビルシステム | Elevator confinement remote rescue device |
JP4204299B2 (en) * | 2002-10-18 | 2009-01-07 | 東芝エレベータ株式会社 | Elevator control device |
-
2005
- 2005-03-31 JP JP2007512379A patent/JPWO2006106575A1/en active Pending
- 2005-03-31 CN CN2005800154032A patent/CN1953926B/en active Active
- 2005-03-31 KR KR1020097007617A patent/KR101014917B1/en active IP Right Grant
- 2005-03-31 WO PCT/JP2005/006292 patent/WO2006106575A1/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2005-03-31 EP EP05727358.3A patent/EP1864935B1/en not_active Not-in-force
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
None * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN1953926B (en) | 2010-05-05 |
CN1953926A (en) | 2007-04-25 |
EP1864935A1 (en) | 2007-12-12 |
WO2006106575A1 (en) | 2006-10-12 |
KR101014917B1 (en) | 2011-02-15 |
JPWO2006106575A1 (en) | 2008-09-11 |
KR20090055031A (en) | 2009-06-01 |
EP1864935A4 (en) | 2012-10-24 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
EP1864935B1 (en) | Elevator apparatus | |
US8807285B2 (en) | Elevator device and method of inspecting same | |
EP2289832B1 (en) | Elevator apparatus and operating method thereof | |
EP2682360B1 (en) | Elevator system | |
EP2163502B1 (en) | Elevator with a semiconductor switch for brake control | |
EP1864934B1 (en) | Elevator apparatus | |
EP1719729B1 (en) | Safety device of elevator | |
EP1880967B1 (en) | Elevator apparatus | |
EP2380841A1 (en) | Elevator device | |
CN109789993B (en) | Elevator safety supervision entity with two units with selection of e.g. autonomous evacuation of passengers | |
US8887873B2 (en) | Elevator device | |
EP2130792A1 (en) | Elevator control system | |
KR100898205B1 (en) | Elevator apparatus | |
KR100891234B1 (en) | Elevator apparatus | |
KR100727198B1 (en) | Elevator apparatus | |
KR20080110689A (en) | Elevator apparatus | |
KR100745928B1 (en) | Control device of elevator | |
KR100775182B1 (en) | Elevator controller | |
KR20080078083A (en) | Elevator apparatus |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
PUAI | Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012 |
|
17P | Request for examination filed |
Effective date: 20061130 |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): DE ES FR NL PT |
|
DAX | Request for extension of the european patent (deleted) | ||
RBV | Designated contracting states (corrected) |
Designated state(s): DE ES FR NL PT |
|
A4 | Supplementary search report drawn up and despatched |
Effective date: 20120926 |
|
RIC1 | Information provided on ipc code assigned before grant |
Ipc: B66B 1/34 20060101ALI20120920BHEP Ipc: B66B 5/00 20060101ALI20120920BHEP Ipc: B66B 5/02 20060101AFI20120920BHEP Ipc: B66B 3/00 20060101ALI20120920BHEP Ipc: B66B 1/30 20060101ALI20120920BHEP |
|
17Q | First examination report despatched |
Effective date: 20121109 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: R079 Ref document number: 602005055058 Country of ref document: DE Free format text: PREVIOUS MAIN CLASS: B66B0005020000 Ipc: B66B0001280000 |
|
RIC1 | Information provided on ipc code assigned before grant |
Ipc: B66B 1/30 20060101ALI20180419BHEP Ipc: B66B 1/28 20060101AFI20180419BHEP Ipc: B66B 1/34 20060101ALI20180419BHEP Ipc: B66B 5/00 20060101ALI20180419BHEP |
|
GRAP | Despatch of communication of intention to grant a patent |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR1 |
|
INTG | Intention to grant announced |
Effective date: 20180621 |
|
GRAS | Grant fee paid |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR3 |
|
GRAA | (expected) grant |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009210 |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: B1 Designated state(s): DE ES FR NL PT |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: R096 Ref document number: 602005055058 Country of ref document: DE |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: NL Ref legal event code: MP Effective date: 20181128 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: ES Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20181128 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: PT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20190328 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: NL Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20181128 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: R097 Ref document number: 602005055058 Country of ref document: DE |
|
PLBE | No opposition filed within time limit |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009261 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: NO OPPOSITION FILED WITHIN TIME LIMIT |
|
26N | No opposition filed |
Effective date: 20190829 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: FR Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20190331 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: DE Payment date: 20210316 Year of fee payment: 17 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: R084 Ref document number: 602005055058 Country of ref document: DE |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: R119 Ref document number: 602005055058 Country of ref document: DE |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: DE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20221001 |