EP1509828A2 - Dispositif et procede pour produire des donnees codees, pour decoder des donnees codees et pour produire des donnees avec une nouvelle signature - Google Patents

Dispositif et procede pour produire des donnees codees, pour decoder des donnees codees et pour produire des donnees avec une nouvelle signature

Info

Publication number
EP1509828A2
EP1509828A2 EP03725156A EP03725156A EP1509828A2 EP 1509828 A2 EP1509828 A2 EP 1509828A2 EP 03725156 A EP03725156 A EP 03725156A EP 03725156 A EP03725156 A EP 03725156A EP 1509828 A2 EP1509828 A2 EP 1509828A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
encrypted
media information
data
information
key
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
EP03725156A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Karlheinz Brandenburg
Christian Neubauer
Ralph Kulessa
Frank Siebenhaar
Wolfgang Spinnler
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Fraunhofer Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Angewandten Forschung eV
Original Assignee
Fraunhofer Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Angewandten Forschung eV
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Fraunhofer Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Angewandten Forschung eV filed Critical Fraunhofer Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Angewandten Forschung eV
Publication of EP1509828A2 publication Critical patent/EP1509828A2/fr
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F15/00—Digital computers in general; Data processing equipment in general
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
    • G06F21/16—Program or content traceability, e.g. by watermarking
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
    • H04L2209/606—Traitor tracing

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to media distribution and, in particular, to a distribution of media which permits free distribution in a moderate scope, at least makes it difficult to distribute on a large scale and makes it comprehensible in any case.
  • the digital signal display for media content has made it possible to copy media content as often as required without loss of quality. This has resulted in unauthorized copying i.e. the "piracy" has increased dramatically compared to previous times, causing financial loss to the owners of the rights to the media content. Compared to previous times when analog signaling was predominant and where quality was motivation, For example, buying a record and not just owning a pirated copy has led to the possibility of digital media reproduction, which means that the financial losses of the rights owners are increasing.
  • DRM Digital Rights Management
  • the object of the present invention is to provide a rights management concept that has a better chance of being accepted by the market.
  • a device for generating encrypted data according to claim 1 a method for generating encrypted data according to claim 16, a device for decrypting encrypted data according to claim 17, a method for decrypting encrypted data according to claim 24, a device for generating re-signed data according to claim 25, a method for generating re-signed data according to claim 40 or a computer program according to claim 41.
  • the present invention is based on the knowledge that only a rights management concept will be enforceable on the market, which not only takes into account the interests of the music industry, but also the existing property rights or interests of the operators, who will ultimately be responsible for enforcement on the market , considered.
  • the concept of media distribution according to the invention provides a compromise between the interests of media providers and media consumers.
  • the present invention is based on the fact that, once purchased, content is in principle made available to everyone. However, an identification of the first buyer or the person who passes on the media content is included in the passed on data. In the event of misuse, for example if an enormous large number of copies are made at once, the offender can be prosecuted and the offense punished because the Malefactors can be identified on the basis of the massly distributed copies.
  • encrypted data generated according to the invention are distinguished by the fact that they are encrypted, but that they contain decryption information and that they also contain identification information of the person who generated the encrypted data.
  • the encrypted data thus include, in addition to the encrypted media information, additional information which is designed such that identification of the producer of the encrypted data and decryption of the encrypted media information can be carried out on the basis of the additional information.
  • the publisher of media content must digitally sign the content before publishing it.
  • An essential aspect of the concept according to the invention is also the fact that it is based on encryption, i.e. the media content or information is encrypted. Removal of encryption is an illegal act under the relevant United States law known as the Millennium Act. In this context, it should be noted that the copying of non-encrypted files, such as MP3 files, according to this law is not punishable in the United States, but the unauthorized removal of encryption is.
  • an asymmetrical encryption method is used. In particular, an operator has an associated pair of a public key and a private key. The private key is used by an operator to encrypt a symmetric key to decrypt the media information to obtain an encrypted symmetric key. The operator then adds this encrypted symmetric key and his public key to the encrypted media information.
  • the attached public key represents the operator identification, since the operator can be clearly identified on the basis of this public key.
  • a recipient of the encrypted data will then extract the public key from the encrypted data, decrypt the enclosed encrypted symmetric key with this public key and then finally decrypt and play the encrypted media information using the decrypted symmetric key. If the public key (public key) of the producer of the encrypted data is removed without authorization, it is no longer possible to decrypt the symmetric key and ultimately to decrypt the encrypted media information.
  • the operator identification information signature is the cause of whether the encrypted data is still usable or not.
  • a watermark to the media information as a second line of defense in addition to the operator identification present in plain text, which also enables operator identification. If an attacker succeeds in falsifying or removing the operator identification and still providing an intact data stream, it can still be identified using the watermark. In particular, in the event that an attacker succeeds in generating plain text data from the encrypted data, but this is made more difficult by technical precautions, identification can nevertheless be determined using the watermark. Should he be able to generate plaintext data without his watermark is added to the media information, but a watermark which will be included in the media information that has the encrypted data provided ⁇ the offender. In this way, at least its identity can be determined.
  • the concept according to the invention is thus distinguished by the fact that it contains the media information in encrypted form and that the key for decoding and playing back is contained in the encrypted data, although there is no legal possibility of writing a file with plain text data.
  • the encrypted data contains the operator identity as a digital certificate or user signature in a secure manner. This signature is preferably issued and registered by a certification body, so that in the event of a punishment an operator identification can also be used in court. It is also preferred as a second line of defense to also write the operator identity as a watermark in the media data.
  • the concept according to the invention is advantageous for the operators or consumers of the media information in that a transparent system is provided which is simple to use and is free to copy for private use (e.g. for friends), that is to say to a limited extent allowed. Simple operators who have previously been in a state of semi-legality and who have no illegal interests will be brought into a legal state - provided the laws and regulations of the media providers are in an appropriate position. Furthermore, it is preferred to compress the media information prior to encryption for data rate compression. If MPEG-4 is used as the compression method, the operator gets even better audio quality and higher compression than MP3, for example, and is motivated to switch from the MP3 format, which can be copied in any way, to MPEG-4 is an encrypted method by the inventive concept.
  • the operator receives additional media tracks, especially since MPEG-4 is not only an audio compression process, but is also intended for video, text, etc. Overall, it is assumed that illegal copying can be reduced with the concept according to the invention, so that, for example, the prices for music and video works are reduced due to the lower illegal use.
  • the concept according to the invention is also advantageous in that it does not represent a deterioration compared to the times of analog music distribution, but it does provide a means of preventing the widespread piracy in the MP3 age.
  • the system provides media manufacturers with an entry into an age in which media content is no longer distributed freely, but encrypted.
  • the concept according to the invention is advantageous for the music industry in that it leads the operators to estimate the value of media information based on the fact that it is encrypted.
  • the concept according to the invention will result in operators being more responsible with media content, since if the media is passed on, they have to expect that their identity will ultimately be contained in a pirated copy which is widespread, which can cause difficulties. Operator acceptance is unlikely to suffer, however, since the transfer is raised to a limited extent from the state of semi-legality to a legal state.
  • the concept according to the invention also solves several problems of previous DRM systems in that the decoding key is included, so that no complex and logistically expensive key management is necessary.
  • the concept according to the invention is self-contained, which in other words means that the encrypted data contains the information required for playback at all times, so that encrypted data generated according to the invention are future-proof.
  • the encryption methods used such as RSA as an example for an asymmetrical encryption method and Rijndal as an example for a symmetric encryption method, are also public.
  • the method according to the invention allows any copying and playback in the area of responsibility of the operator, that is, also the transfer to friends in the private area, that is to say in a limited circle.
  • the concept according to the invention does not provide the normal operator with an incentive to "crack" since the access is free anyway.
  • the operator's responsibility will limit the mass distribution, not a cryptographic method.
  • a watermark is optionally included, which to a certain extent identifies the signatory as an optional additional line of defense.
  • the concept according to the invention is independent of the source coding format used. Any existing compression method, such as MP3, etc., can be integrated, although it is preferred to use the new MPEG-4 method as the source coding method in order to give operators an additional incentive since MPEG-4 has higher Contains data rate compressions and better audio / video qualities and other improved properties.
  • MPEG-4 coders / decoders are no longer made freely available, but are only issued in connection with the DRM system, free of charge or at a low price, so as not to endanger the market launch.
  • FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of the concept according to the invention for generating encrypted data
  • FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of the concept according to the invention for decrypting / reproducing encrypted and signed data
  • FIG. 3 shows a block diagram of the concept according to the invention for the re-signing of encrypted data in order to enable it to be passed on to other - trustworthy - persons;
  • Fig. 4 is a schematic representation of the format of NEN encrypted and signed Ruleinformatio ⁇
  • FIG. 6 shows a block diagram of a simple device for reproducing encrypted and signed media information
  • FIG. 7 shows a block diagram of a device according to the invention for generating an operator-specific local archive as a “trial version”
  • FIG. 8 shows a block diagram of a device according to the invention for reproducing, generating and re-signing according to a preferred exemplary embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 9 shows an extension of the device from FIG. 8 in order to publish media information specifically supplied by a media provider in encrypted and signed format
  • FIG. 10 shows an extension of the device from FIG. 9 in order to enable not only the free encrypted / signed option but also a point-to-point option in which it is not possible to pass on content to other people.
  • the media information which can be in plain text or which can be data rate compressed according to a method, such as MPEG-4, is fed to an input 10 of the device according to the invention.
  • the media information is sent to a device 12 for encryption, the device 12 being supplied with a key by a device 14 for providing additional information, which includes operator identification on the one hand and key information on the other hand.
  • the device 14 for providing which can be designed as a memory, supplies this additional information, which An operator identification on the one hand and a decryption of the encrypted media information output at the output of the device 12, on the other hand, allow to a device 16 for adding the additional information to the encrypted media information, in order to provide the encrypted information at an output 18 and by an operator of that shown in FIG Device to deliver signed data.
  • the data supplied at the output 18 can be either encrypted files or continuous stream data.
  • the plain text media information can be, for example, PCM data that an operator has read from or “ripped” from a CD or DVD in his possession.
  • the media information can also be compressed source information, such as encoded PCM data, using a coding algorithm known coding algorithm can be used, such as MPEG-4, MP3, etc.
  • any media information can be processed with the concept according to the invention, such as e.g. Audio information, video information, text information, graphics, special music information, e.g. WAV files, MIDI files, music score files, etc.
  • Any encryption method can be used as the encryption method that is carried out by the device 12 for encryption, such as, for example, symmetrical encryption method (for example Rijndal) or asymmetrical encryption method (for example RSA), although a combination of both concepts is preferred for reasons of computing time.
  • the added public key also provides the operator identification.
  • the additional information should be designed such that both identification of the operator and decryption of the encrypted media information can be carried out by the additional information.
  • the additional information such that at least some of the additional information, such as the public key in the example above, simultaneously represents the operator identification, so that manipulation of the operator identification results in the encrypted data at the output 18 of the 1 in the sense that decryption based on the information contained in the encrypted data itself is no longer possible.
  • the device 2 shows a device according to the invention for decrypting encrypted data.
  • the encrypted and signed data supplied at the output 18 of the device shown in FIG. 1 are provided and fed to a device 22 for key extraction and a device 24 for decoding.
  • the device 22 for extracting is designed to extract decryption information from the encrypted data, which is then fed to the device 24 which, using the decryption information from the device 22, decrypts the encrypted media information contained in the encrypted data and a device 26 for Representation or playback leads.
  • the device 26 for playback will be a loudspeaker (audio information), a monitor (video information), a special device for voice or music output etc.
  • the entire system in which the ⁇ in Fig. 2 shown Vorrich processing is included, such as a PC of an operator, not is able to output the decrypted media information at the output of the device 24 as digital data or, in other words, to generate a plain text file.
  • Vorrich processing such as a PC of an operator
  • a watermark in the plain text data which could be “stolen” at the exit of the encryption device 24, as the second line of defense , is included.
  • the device for re-signing comprises a device 32 for providing an identification of the operator of the re-signing device shown in FIG. 3 and a device 34 for adding the re-signing operator identification to encrypted media information which is derived from the unencrypted media information by encryption - Tet to deliver the re-signed encrypted data at an output 38.
  • the re-signed encrypted data at the output 38 now in any case contain an identification of the operator of the device shown in FIG. 3 and preferably also the signature of the last producer, that is to say the data stream provided at the input 30, this feature making it possible to walk the entire route to track the media information.
  • the device shown in FIG. 3 only has to add a new re-signing identification. This is possible if the key information contained in the encrypted data present at input 30 is independent of the operator information. However, if there is a dependency between the operator data and the decryption information, that is to say the additional information in the encrypted data, the device shown in FIG. 3 further comprises a key extraction device 35, which, like the key extraction device 22 in FIG.
  • a decryption device 36 which can again be designed like the device 24 of FIG. 2 and furthermore an encryption device 37, which in principle can be designed like the device 12 of FIG. 1.
  • the one signed by a previous producer Data stream at the input 30 is first decrypted by the device 36 using the decryption information provided by the key extraction device 35 and using the new resigning identification which is provided by the device 32 using the identification of the operator the re-signing device is encrypted again.
  • a dashed line 39 will not exist in FIG. 3.
  • a preferred embodiment of a file format for the encrypted and signed data is discussed below with reference to FIG. 4.
  • the file contains a header with a format specification (40).
  • a certificate of the operator or a public key assigned to this operator can follow this header (42).
  • the entry 42 in the file thus ensures the generator identification.
  • the area 42 can be followed by an area 44, which contains a symmetrical key encrypted with the public key in the area 42, which is used to log into a to decrypt encrypted media information standing in area 46.
  • the areas 42 and 44 thus represent the additional information which is designed such that both identification of the operator (by the area 42) and decryption of the encrypted media information (by the areas 42 and 44) can be carried out.
  • FIG. 5 is designated in FIG. 5 with DRM system 50 and, in a preferred form, contains all the devices and further features shown in FIGS. 1-3.
  • plain text media information or compressed media information can be fed to the DRM system (51a).
  • the DRM system 50 is designed to receive the signed and encrypted data as input signal (51b), which for example correspond to the data present at the output 18 of FIG. 1.
  • the DRM system 50 is designed to receive local archive data as input (51c) which, as will be explained later, is “hard” encrypted using a machine-dependent key are such that the local archive data contains no decryption information and no operator signature.
  • the DRM system 50 shown in FIG. 5 can also be provided with a data format with signed and additionally “hard” -encrypted data, this data format also being referred to as an “AtoB” format (51d).
  • the "AtoB" format is characterized in that the content has been generated by user A so that it only ent of B can be ⁇ encrypted.
  • the DRM system 50 according to the invention can also be provided with a file with secure media information by a media provider 52, which file can be provided by the media provider 52, which can be an owner of the rights to the media information or a licensed publisher, for example. are typically not signed.
  • the media information transmitted from the media provider 52 to the DRM system 50 is cryptographically secured media information. This enables the DRM system to operate in a publish mode in order to support or execute media distribution by the media provider 52. This is also known as super distribution.
  • the DRM system 50 is able to reproduce (54a) data formats obtained via the inputs 51a-51d, generate a signed data format (54b), and generate a local data format (54c) in order to build up a local archive or to generate signed and hard-encrypted data at an output (54d), ie to write an AtoB format.
  • the format specification that is to say whether the format which is supplied to the DRM system 50 is plain text data or compressed data (51a), whether it is signed and encrypted data (51b), whether local data is present (51c ), whether there is an AtoB format (51d) or whether there is a publish format (51e) is contained in the header of FIG. 4.
  • the DRM system 50 according to the invention shown in FIG. 5, that is to say a header check is carried out in order to perform certain actions depending on the data format.
  • the data format will not be processed anyway.
  • the preferred DRM system shown in Fig. 5 has no output for plain text data or compressed data in digital form. It can be seen from this that the DRM concept according to the invention, as has already been explained, will lead to the fact that, apart from CDs or other sound carriers that contain plain text data (PCM data) cannot be created or made available at any point.
  • the DRM system according to the invention also contains a data compression module which, because of its high data rate compression, enables digital storage in the usual framework anyway.
  • this compression format delivers high data compression factors on the one hand and delivers good quality on the other hand and is also distributed free of charge or for only small fees, whereby the actual costs for the new data format, such as MPEG 4, can be easily redeemed by curbing illegal piracy.
  • plain text data can be encoded or uncoded in the sense of the present document, while encrypted data are generated from the plain text data by a cryptographic algorithm.
  • Level-1-DRM system shown 6 comprising as the main ⁇ functionality playback of the signed format and comprises, in addition, as an addition to the operator a clear text input, or an input for encoded Rulein ⁇ formations (51a) that alternatively are coded for the signed and encrypted data at the input (51b).
  • Age- natively encoded data is provided to an alternate decoder 60 to be decoded prior to being displayed / reproduced (26). If plain text data is fed in at the input (51a), * the alternative decoder is bypassed (62).
  • the media information is compressed media information and is preferably compressed by MPEG-4.
  • the decoder 64 can either be part of the DRM system or can be connected as an external module.
  • the SAC 66 is an external interface for the DRM system which ensures that only special decoders 64 are operated, namely decoders which are certified to not allow plain text output as a digital file etc.
  • PCM data or MP3-coded data can be fed in as plain text or alternatively coded input data, in which case the alternative decoder is an MP3 decoder.
  • FIG. 7 shows a level 2 DRM system which, in addition to the DRM system shown in FIG. 6, generates a local archive (54c) on the one hand and feeds in local archive data (51c ) enables.
  • the ge in Fig. 7 showed ⁇ Level 2 DRM system thus results in the local format that serves that an operator MPEG-4 files can testify locally ER and can also play out only locally.
  • plain text data is encoded at the input (51b) with an MPEG-4 encoder 70, which may be integrated again or 72 interfaced gekop ⁇ may be pelt over a SAC.
  • the encoded data are then subjected to Ver thoughlungsein ⁇ direction supplied 74 which encrypts the encoded data using a local key 76 and a Local archive output (54c) feeds.
  • the locally encrypted data does not include decryption information.
  • the local archive data is therefore fed to the decryption device 24, which, however, does not attempt to extract key information, but rather, when a local format is recognized (40 from FIG. 4), decryption device 24 to the local key 76 switches.
  • the Level 2 DRM system is intended for an operator who wants to look at the new system and in particular the new encoder / decoder (70/74), but has not (yet) registered for encrypted and signed data to generate (Fig. 1) or to re-sign (Fig. 3).
  • the operator of the Level 2 DRM system can thus not yet generate encrypted and signed data or pass it on legally, but he can already examine the functionality of the new coding / decoding concept and may then opt for a full version. However, the operator can play works already received from acquaintances or distributors in the signed format, since the level 1 DRM system of FIG. 6 is contained in the level 2 DRM system of FIG. 7.
  • the operator can also generate a local archive (54c) of his own music data, that is to say a digital archive of his own CDs, for example, but this can only be played on his own device, for example his PC, using the local key 76.
  • the level 2 DRM system becomes a level 3 DRM system after registration by the operator, so that encrypted and signed data can also be generated, regardless of whether the input data are plain text data or encrypted but not signed local data.
  • the local key 76 for example, as will be explained later, is derived from a machine-dependent identification, such as the serial number of a PC, etc.
  • the level 3 DRM system is described below with reference to FIG. 3 which, in addition to the functionalities of the DRM systems of FIGS.
  • the device 14 for providing a certified key is essential to the device shown in FIG. 8, on the one hand to generate encrypted (and thus signed) data or to re-sign data signed by a first operator.
  • the certified key is preferably provided by the registration entity 56 (FIG. 5), which represents a neutral entity, by means of which the identity of the operator of the device shown in FIG. 8 can be ascertained on the basis of the certified key.
  • the public key entered in block 42 in FIG. 4 thus represents the operator identification information.
  • the watermark embedding therefore takes place using a PCM watermark embedder 80 or a bitstream watermark embedder 82.
  • PCM watermark embedders are shown, for example, in German patent DE 196 40 814 Cl. Like a bitstream watermark embedder, a PCM watermark embedder is based on applying a spreading sequence to a payload, such as an operator ID or user ID in this case, in order then to weight the spread payload signal such that it when it is combined with the audio data that are to be provided with egg ⁇ nem watermark is inaudible, that is energetically below the psychoacoustic see masking threshold lies.
  • a payload such as an operator ID or user ID in this case
  • This - optional - watermark embedding can, as has been carried out, take place either at the temporal level (block 80) or at the bitstream level (block 82), whereby only a partial unpacking of the encoded data and not a complete decoding is required is.
  • the output signal of the decoder 64 is fed into the PCM watermark embedder 80 via a transmission line 84.
  • bitstream watermarking is carried out, the input signal into decoder 64, that is to say the coded source information at the output of decoding device 24, 36, is fed into the bitstream watermark embedder via another transmission line 86.
  • the bitstream watermark embedder 82 already provides the media information to be encrypted, so that in the case of bitstream watermarking the encoder 70 is not required.
  • the watermark is not evaluated in normal use. However, should the protection mechanism of the concept according to the invention be circumvented illegally and the raw data should be used further, then the invisible watermark or, for video data, the invisible watermark or, for text data, the watermark entered for text data with steganographic methods can be evaluated for forensic purposes in order to draw a conclusion to get to the illegal disseminator.
  • the watermark itself, so the payload information that either the user ID match or if the user ID is too long or the direct transfer ⁇ transmission of the user identification for reasons of Schut- of privacy not zes desired is, for example, is derived by means of ei ⁇ ner hashing of the user ID, or with a process known as "Random key" in Figure 8 is thus key to embed another -.. encrypted - Pseudorandom sequence used for spreading. This has the advantage that less or no payload interference occurs compared to encryption of the payload by encryption of the spreading sequence.
  • This concept corresponds to the known CDMA method, in which several message channels are contained in a frequency channel, each of which uses the same frequency band, but which can be separated from one another by means of a correlator in a watermark extractor. Furthermore, a modification of the watermark improves the anonymity of the legal operator, but enables the illegal operator to be raised from anonymity and punished if necessary.
  • the first method for generating these watermark keys uses a further random key with a variable length, which can be adapted to the decoding times as technology advances. This ensures that when testing all possible keys for watermark extraction for forensic purposes, a certain amount of effort has to be carried out and thus the watermark ID is practically secure and anonymous, since it can only be read with considerable effort since the key is not known to anyone.
  • the decoding for forensic purposes is done by trying all possible keys. This is not a problem since there is sufficient time for decoding for forensic purposes, since the number of illegal distributors will typically be adapted to the current computer technology.
  • the alternative method for generating watermark keys is that a set of different keys exist, which are derived from the operator ID in a known manner, and that one of these possible watermark keys is used in the watermark encryption. This means that proof of identification can only be provided for an operator to be checked with moderate effort.
  • the level 3 DRM system comprises all functionalities, that is to say to play signed data, local data and plain text data, to generate signed data from plain text data and to generate re-signed data from signed data ,
  • the functionality is further preferred that when an operator feeds local data on the input side in order to reproduce it, a conversion into the encrypted and signed format can be carried out. This is possible because the operator of the system shown in FIG. 8 has already registered since he is in possession of the certified key 14.
  • the local data format for generating an encrypted local archive is advantageous in that a taster version for a new coding method 70 or decoding method 64 is provided to a certain extent becomes.
  • a free-keeping device 88 in the level 3 DRM system shown in FIG. 8, which enables a signed data format to be output if the operator receives the certified key 14 from the registration authority 56 in FIG. 5, for example had received. If the operator has not yet received the certified key, the free-keeping device 88 is active in order to only allow local data to be output, but not signed data. It is thus possible if the operator has registered and has a certified 7, the functionality shown in FIG.
  • an operator of a DRM system contains media information that is secured but not signed by the media provider 52 via an input (51e).
  • a further decryption device 90 is provided, which is to be provided with a key 92, which is typically transmitted to the operator of the DRM system via a secure channel.
  • asymmetrical encryption method in combination with a symmetrical encryption method is preferred.
  • the secured media information (51e) provided by the provider 52 is also encrypted with a symmetric key, which is not contained in the secured media information in one embodiment of the present invention. This key is provided externally (92).
  • an asymmetrical encryption method can advantageously be used.
  • the operator of the device shown in FIG. 9 supplies his public key to the media provider 52, who then encrypts the symmetrical key for decrypting the media information with this public key and this encrypted symmetrical key to the measurement key. service information included.
  • the operator of the device shown in FIG. 9 can then use his private key (92) to decrypt the encrypted symmetric key contained in the data stream, in order to then receive the unsigned information received from the media provider through the device 90 decrypt.
  • the decrypted media information if it is encoded data, is fed to the decoder 64 and then output by the display device 26 in the form shown, but not as a file.
  • the output data of the decryption device are processed as before.
  • the level-4 DRM system shown in FIG. 9 thus enables super distribution or distribution via non-personalized media such as e.g. CDs.
  • the DRM system shown in FIG. 9 also has the functionality, if an operator of the same still has local data, to convert the data automatically or not automatically into signed data, depending on the embodiment.
  • FIG. 10 A further embodiment of the concept according to the invention, which is referred to as a Level 5 DRM system for the sake of simplicity, is shown below with reference to FIG. 10.
  • the system shown in FIG. 10 is able to additionally encrypt with a personal key and transmit it to the recipient person.
  • This point-to-point format is also known as the AtoB format. If the system shown in FIG. 10 is receiver B, the system receives an AtoB data stream (51d) on the input side, which is encrypted with the public key of system B.
  • a further decryption device 100 is provided, which is the private one Key (B) is supplied from B to decrypt the AtoB format and then further process as shown in the other figures. If the device shown in FIG. 10 is a producer of the AtoB format, a further encryption device 102 is provided for this after the addition device 16, 34, in order to use a public key contained by a recipient to transmit from the recipient B the to re-encrypt the signed and encrypted data stream to output a data stream in AtoB format.
  • B the private one Key
  • an asymmetrical encryption method does not necessarily have to be used for the encryption or decryption in the devices 102 and 100. However, this is preferred for reasons of economy.
  • the device shown in FIG. 10 is designed to prevent conversion of the hard-encrypted AtoB format into a free, encrypted and signed format. The device shown in FIG. 10 only allows the media information to be displayed, but not converted into a signed / encrypted format.
  • the AtoB format is a way to share signed files with people you don't trust 100%. These recipients can then no longer pass on the content in the sense of conventional restrictive DRM systems.
  • An exception to playing back into a file is if it was signed for B for distribution purposes and sent to B. If the signer and recipient are identical, the signed format can be written as a file.
  • a private key is required on each player to play the AtoB format. This private key must be supplied to the decryption device 100. In order to prevent circumvention of the AtoB format, it is preferred to darken the area shown in FIG. area of the DRM system (104) to be executed in hardware.
  • this key is encrypted and transferred to the corresponding player of the recipient, so that the AtoB format can be converted into a signed format for playback, which can then be played back without any storage option.
  • club keys which are valid for a limited period, for example annually, on the private device so that content relating to the club can be played in AtoB format .
  • the method according to the invention outlined in FIGS. 1 to 3 and in particular in FIGS. 6 to 10 can be implemented in hardware or in software. be implemented.
  • the implementation can take place on a digital storage medium, in particular a floppy disk or CD with electronically readable control signals, which can interact with a * programmable computer system in such a way that the corresponding method is carried out.
  • the invention thus also consists in a computer program product with program code stored on a machine-readable carrier for carrying out the method according to the invention when the computer program product runs on a computer.
  • the present invention thus relates to a computer program with a program code for carrying out the method when the computer program runs on a computer.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Technology Law (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Signal Processing For Digital Recording And Reproducing (AREA)
  • Reverberation, Karaoke And Other Acoustics (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne des dispositifs et des procédés pour produire des données codées, pour restituer des données codées et pour modifier la signature de données initialement signées, se basant sur le fait que les données codées comprennent en plus des informations média codées les informations nécessaires au décodage des données et en supplément une signature de celui qui a produit les données codées. Ceci permet de tracer l'origine des données codées. Ceci permet en particulier une transmission des données codées de façon limitée par la personne à l'origine des données codées, par exemple à des amis ou des connaissances, alors que seule une reproduction à grande échelle des données codées est considérée comme piratage. Le pirate peut cependant être détecté grâce à la signature, celle-ci étant éventuellement sécurisée par une signature à filigrane noyée. A partir du moment où il s'agit d'un concept pour lequel au cours de l'utilisation légale seules des données codées interviennent, la suppression non autorisée du décodage est un délit. Le concept de l'invention permet de détecter l'auteur du délit et prend en considération simultanément les états de possession des utilisateurs vis-à-vis d'une transmission limitée d'informations média et a de ce fait le potentiel d'être accepté par le marché.
EP03725156A 2002-05-10 2003-05-06 Dispositif et procede pour produire des donnees codees, pour decoder des donnees codees et pour produire des donnees avec une nouvelle signature Ceased EP1509828A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE10220925A DE10220925B4 (de) 2002-05-10 2002-05-10 Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Erzeugen von verschlüsselten Daten, zum Entschlüsseln von verschlüsselten Daten und zum Erzeugen von umsignierten Daten
DE10220925 2002-05-10
PCT/EP2003/004735 WO2003096336A2 (fr) 2002-05-10 2003-05-06 Dispositif et procede pour produire des donnees codees, pour decoder des donnees codees et pour produire des donnees avec une nouvelle signature

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EP1509828A2 true EP1509828A2 (fr) 2005-03-02

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EP03725156A Ceased EP1509828A2 (fr) 2002-05-10 2003-05-06 Dispositif et procede pour produire des donnees codees, pour decoder des donnees codees et pour produire des donnees avec une nouvelle signature

Country Status (6)

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EP (1) EP1509828A2 (fr)
KR (1) KR100848369B1 (fr)
CN (1) CN100514252C (fr)
AU (1) AU2003227723A1 (fr)
DE (1) DE10220925B4 (fr)
WO (1) WO2003096336A2 (fr)

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KR102124575B1 (ko) * 2013-05-02 2020-06-18 삼성전자주식회사 사용자 프라이버시 보호를 위한 전자 장치 및 그 제어 방법
TWI791963B (zh) 2020-03-19 2023-02-11 瑞昱半導體股份有限公司 資料解密系統及資料解密方法
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CN111178010B (zh) * 2019-12-20 2024-02-09 国久大数据有限公司 显示数字签名的方法及系统、数据编辑方法及终端

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
AU2003227723A1 (en) 2003-11-11
WO2003096336A3 (fr) 2004-05-27
DE10220925B4 (de) 2005-03-31
AU2003227723A8 (en) 2003-11-11
DE10220925A1 (de) 2003-11-27
CN1774684A (zh) 2006-05-17
KR20050010795A (ko) 2005-01-28
WO2003096336A2 (fr) 2003-11-20
CN100514252C (zh) 2009-07-15
KR100848369B1 (ko) 2008-07-24

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