EP1486028B1 - Procede et dispositif permettant de creer des documents infalsifiables verifiables - Google Patents

Procede et dispositif permettant de creer des documents infalsifiables verifiables Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1486028B1
EP1486028B1 EP03722214A EP03722214A EP1486028B1 EP 1486028 B1 EP1486028 B1 EP 1486028B1 EP 03722214 A EP03722214 A EP 03722214A EP 03722214 A EP03722214 A EP 03722214A EP 1486028 B1 EP1486028 B1 EP 1486028B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
information
document
cryptographic module
encrypted
station
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP03722214A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP1486028A1 (fr
Inventor
Bernd Meyer
Jürgen Lang
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Deutsche Post AG
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Deutsche Post AG
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Priority to SI200330135T priority Critical patent/SI1486028T1/sl
Publication of EP1486028A1 publication Critical patent/EP1486028A1/fr
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Publication of EP1486028B1 publication Critical patent/EP1486028B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00741—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system using specific cryptographic algorithms or functions
    • G07B2017/00758—Asymmetric, public-key algorithms, e.g. RSA, Elgamal
    • G07B2017/00766—Digital signature, e.g. DSA, DSS, ECDSA, ESIGN
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00959—Cryptographic modules, e.g. a PC encryption board

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for creating forgery-proof Documents or records, with a key information generated and an encrypted check information from the key information and a transaction indicator is formed.
  • the invention further relates to a value transfer center with an interface for loading value amounts.
  • cryptographic module is distinguished by having electronic data inside involve or process data that does not go unnoticed from the outside can be viewed or manipulated.
  • a cryptographic module can act as a secure, sealed entity be considered in the security-related processes that are not manipulated from the outside can.
  • a globally recognized standard for such cryptographic Modules is that of the US National Authority for standardization NIST published standard for cryptographic modules called FIPS Pub 140th
  • modules are usually one or more asymmetric Keypairs deposited, which are characterized by that encryption with the so-called private Keys are generated only with the associated public Keys can be reversed and that Encryptions generated with the public key are undone, only with the associated private key can be made. According to their designation are public Key to the publication and any Distribution, whereas private keys are not issued may be used and when used together with cryptographic modules do not leave these modules at any time allowed to.
  • Algorithms such as for checksum formation or, in the example of digital signature, for creating a so-called digital Fingerprint or "hash value" that distinguishes that he has any data content to one usually quantitatively represents significantly shortened information in such a way that the result is irreversible and unique and that for different data contents with which the algorithm fed will result in different results.
  • the examination of such a digital signature is usually done as follows: The recipient receives the document and the encrypted check value. The receiver still needs and this is what the later described invention aims at, the public Key of the document manufacturer and used to decrypt the test value given by the document manufacturer with his private key inside the encrypted cryptographic module. After decryption the receiver thus has the unencrypted Test value. Furthermore, the receiver turns in the next step the same algorithm for creating a check value the received document. Finally, in the third step the receiver compares the self-generated test value with the decrypted test value of the document manufacturer. Both agree Check values, the document was not falsified and the authenticity of the document is proven beyond doubt. Usually, in known digital signatures also checked the authenticity of the document manufacturer.
  • CA certification authority
  • the recipient of the document takes the public key in this case
  • the document manufacturer is not just given as a given, but also checks this for affiliation with the document manufacturer, by giving the digital signature of the public Key in the manner described above.
  • this problem can be illustrated by an example describe in such a way that it is necessary to test the authenticity of a usual digitally signed document is required the public key or the key certificate of the Document manufacturer or his cryptographic module to have the exam available. If at a test center, As usual, documents from various document manufacturers are checked so it is necessary there all public Keys or all key certificates of all document manufacturers to have available.
  • Attaching the key or the key certificate is then detrimental if the scope of the document minimized must be held and an attached key to printing, to be transferred or processed record would increase excessively.
  • a deposit of a public key at the test center is particularly disadvantageous if access to Keys deposited at the test center from practical or time considerations is not possible, for example a very high number of reserved keys to which would need to be accessed in a very short time.
  • German Patent DE 100 20 563 C2 of the applicant known in a generic method in a security module a mystery to generate the secret along with information, provide information about the identity of the security module, encrypted to a certification office to pass that To decipher the secret in the certification center, thereby identify the identity of the backup module, then the secret along with identity information to encrypt the document manufacturer in such a way that only a verifier can do a decryption in order to then submit the secret to a document maker.
  • the document manufacturer gives his own data in the security module, the security module the even data provided by the document manufacturer with the Secret irreversibly linked and where no conclusions to the mystery are possible.
  • This known method is characterized in that the Result of the irreversible linkage of the document manufacturer introduced data with the secret of the Document manufacturer self-added data as well as the encrypted Information of the certifying body the document submitted to the Examination Office.
  • stamps are made by customers of a postal company using a personal cryptographic Module generated and as a machine-readable barcode on the Broadcast applied.
  • the machine-readable barcode has only one very limited scope of data and thus does not allow to contribute the public key of the customer.
  • digital Stamps can be read and checked in no time, resulting in the ability to split-second on a database of potentially many millions of public keys also not applicable.
  • a method of providing postage with postage indicia goes from the German publication DE 100 20 402 A1 of the Applicant.
  • Information needed to create a franking mark encrypted from a loading point to a crypto module a customer system that is used to generate digital Franking marks are used.
  • the franking mark contains a hash value that is derived from the shipment data and the transferred and information cached in the crypto module is formed as well as one contained in this information encrypted "crypto-string" that is only available in a letter center, be decrypted during the inspection of the franking can, is provided with a digital signature.
  • German patent application DE 100 20 566 A1 of the applicant describes a method of the same kind in which customers Can load amounts from a value transfer center, consumed for printing digital indicia can be. Of a customer system is doing in particular transmit a random number to the value transfer center, that of this with a symmetric key encrypted and sent back to the customer system.
  • the invention is based, a creation of to enable counterfeit-proof documents that are independent from an immediate communication between the cryptographically trusted contact point and the document manufacturer can be carried out.
  • this object is also achieved by a value transfer center solved according to claim 23.
  • the invention provides in particular that the preparation of the random key information and the formation of the encrypted Check information from the key information and the Transaction indicator in a cryptographically trusted Contact point that the cryptographically trusted Contact point encrypts the key information, and that the encrypted check information and the encrypted Key information from the cryptographically trusted Contact point to an intermediate body be that the intermediate the encrypted Key information and the encrypted check information cached and at a later time from the transfer between the cryptographically trusted Contact point and the intermediate point decoupled to a cryptographic Module submitted by a document manufacturer.
  • the invention thus provides that the cryptographic module even with a feed via an intermediate point, for example over untrustworthy in the cryptographic sense Communication partner is supplied with two types of data, on the one hand remain in the cryptographic module and the to others are attached to the document, with the ones in the cryptographic Module remaining information can be used to secure the document information via a check value and wherein the information incorporated into the document thereto serve as part of an examination of the authenticity of the document in a test center the security of the document to prove the cryptographic module.
  • the invention includes a number of advantages. It allows a generation of forgery-proof documents in one Variety of applications, especially in such cases, where no direct connection between the document maker and the trusted contact point. For example, this makes it possible forgery-proof Documents without the use of computers and / or a data connection to the trusted contact point to create.
  • the key information is created by chance, though the invention with a predetermined set of key information can be carried out.
  • the respective random Generation of the key information is therefore special advantageous, since such a storage of a variety of Key information is avoided.
  • a decryption of the key information by the Cryptographic module includes several advantages. hereby is it possible for a user of the cryptographic module to especially a document manufacturer, a confirmation receives information from the trusted contact point, especially created by the trusted contact point Received monetary value information. Furthermore this makes it possible that the cryptographic module the contained key information for subsequent encryption starts.
  • a preferred use of the key information serves to an encryption of own data of the document manufacturer.
  • the document manufacturer transfers his own Data in a possibly automated procedure the cryptographic Module.
  • a particularly preferred embodiment of the invention is characterized by the fact that the cryptographic module the Data provided by the document manufacturer with the key information linked irreversibly.
  • the result of the irreversible Linking the introduced by the document manufacturer Data with the decrypted key information form a document and / or a dataset attached to a Test center is transmitted.
  • the remaining in the cryptographic module Information is encrypted in such a way that it is in the cryptographic module can be decrypted and that it is the information remaining in the cryptographic module is a value that is difficult or impossible is predictable.
  • Also of particular advantage is that the supply of Cryptographic module over cryptographically untrusted Communication partner is made such that the handover the information to the cryptographic module is temporally decoupled.
  • the method is carried out such that the created forgery-proof documents or datasets contain monetary information.
  • the monetary information cryptographically connected to the document or record in such a way is that by comparing the monetary information and the document or record a check value can be formed.
  • Another advantage is that the one payment of a postage amount showing monetary information with identification information of the document manufacturer are linked.
  • a very important field of application of the invention is the production of postage stamps.
  • Different intermediate points can be used become.
  • a value transfer center of a Franking machine manufacturer can be used as an intermediate point.
  • Another object of the invention is a value transfer center with an interface for loading value amounts.
  • the value transfer center advantageously functions as an interface for receiving encrypted information a cryptographically trusted contact point and for caching the received encrypted ones Information.
  • a cryptographic module for generating Tamper-proof documents with means for output encrypted check information and a check value.
  • An advantageous embodiment provides that the cryptographic Module at least one means for receiving and for Decryption of key information and at least one Means for receiving a document or a record contains, and that the cryptographic module over at least a means of creating a check value for the document or the record has.
  • Fig. 1 is in the cryptographic module of the document manufacturer a random number is generated and stored (1) together with the identity or identification number of the document manufacturer or the cryptographic module is encrypted (2) is sent to a trusted authority (3).
  • This trusted site decrypts the random number and the identification number (4), checks the Legality of the request (5) and then encrypted the random number and a newly formed transaction indicator in such a way that only the test center is able to to undo this encryption (6).
  • the like encrypted random number and the transaction indicator. will be returned to the document manufacturer (7).
  • the document manufacturer now the document to be backed up in the cryptographic Module (8). There is using the document plaintext and the still stored random number a test value is formed (9).
  • a method for generating digital Documents and records created without a direct Contact between a cryptographically trusted contact point and the cryptographic module, respectively a document manufacturer using the cryptographic module can be done.
  • key information m key for use in the machine and, on the other hand so-called test information VS.
  • the key information m key is encrypted by the Postage Point of the postal company, which serves as a trusted communication point, so that a decryption is possible only in the tamper-proof area of the Digital franking machine (cryptographic module).
  • the already encrypted check information VS can be transmitted to the franking machine or the cryptographic module without further transport encryption. By encrypting the key information m key decryption is possible only in the cryptographic module of the franking machine, but not on the untrusted communication path.
  • the invention is suitable for the generation of any documents. However, it is particularly advantageous for the invention a generation of digital documents of a relatively small Amount of data in the order of a few bits up to Documents with a total size including inspection information to use about 60 bytes.
  • Particularly preferred documents within the meaning of the invention are Validity marks for a variety of applications. It is particularly advantageous the invention for a review to use digital postage indicia for postal items, because they are a particularly fast and easy generation the franking marks. A bet for others Territories as proof of payment of funds - digital tokens - or as other carrier A monetary value information is also possible.
  • the invention is particularly suitable for all applications, in which except the document creator at least one Auditor an interest in the authenticity of the document to have.
  • the invention is thus suitable for a wide Areas of application, in particular for the creation of digital Tokens for a variety of applications, such as as airline tickets, train tickets, theater or movie tickets.
  • Such documents can be obtained by means of the invention be printed by the document manufacturer itself, where it is possible that the document manufacturer exists for this Credit - or loan amounts - exploits and in this way Receives a reliable proof of payment.
  • the generation of these documents can, for example, via a conventional personal computer or a cryptographic unsecured printer.
  • a special advantage The invention is that the creation of documents without a connection between the generation of documents without direct Connection between the document maker, he and the trusted Contact can be made.
  • the document production is thus also at interposition of one or several intermediate points, or in a communication cryptographically difficult or impossible to secure Data paths possible.
  • the cryptographically trusted contact point and / or the verifier will receive funds to ensure that no unauthorized documents were generated, or that no documents were falsified. This is it on one particularly simple and reliable way possible, testable generate secure digital documents and these documents reliable check.
  • Such an examination can be carried out in various ways, the said cryptographic method steps being simple and can be reliably applied.
  • This is a use of the invention outside the most preferred Checking the authenticity of digital postage paid mail, for example, by checking the authenticity digital tickets, air tickets ect. by a controller, or at an admission control, possible.
  • compositions and method steps according to the invention can also be applied to documents before or during the creation of the counterfeit security in the sense
  • This invention also be encrypted.
  • the method is preferably not unencrypted Plain text but applied an encrypted text, however, the methods of this invention do not differ.
  • the encryption is also in the cryptographic Module takes place and thus as shown in FIG. 3 an intermediate step of encryption between here described steps ten and eleven would take place.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Inspection Of Paper Currency And Valuable Securities (AREA)
  • Devices For Checking Fares Or Tickets At Control Points (AREA)
  • Cleaning In Electrography (AREA)
  • Image Processing (AREA)
  • Document Processing Apparatus (AREA)

Claims (24)

  1. Procédé de fabrication de documents ou de jeux de données infalsifiables, dans lequel une information de clé est générée et dans lequel une information chiffrée de vérification est obtenue à partir de l'information de clé et d'un indicateur de transaction,
    caractérisé en ce que la génération de l'information de clé aléatoire et l'obtention de l'information chiffrée de vérification à partir de l'information de clé et de l'indicateur de transaction se font dans un point de contact dans lequel on a confiance pour la cryptographie, que le point de contact dans lequel on a confiance pour la cryptographie chiffre l'information de clé, et que l'information chiffrée de vérification et l'information chiffrée de clé sont transmises à un point intermédiaire par le point de contact dans lequel on a confiance pour la cryptographie, que le point intermédiaire fait un enregistrement intermédiaire de l'information chiffrée de clé et de l'information chiffrée de vérification et les transmet à un module de cryptographie d'un fabricant de documents à un moment tardif non lié temporellement avec la transmission entre le point de contact dans lequel on a confiance pour la cryptographie et le point intermédiaire.
  2. Procédé selon la revendication 1,
    caractérisé en ce que l'information de clé est fabriquée de telle manière que l'information de clé est obtenue aléatoirement.
  3. Procédé selon une ou plusieurs des revendications précédentes,
    caractérisé en ce que l'information chiffrée et/ou l'information chiffrée de vérification sont constituées de manière à ce qu'elles ne peuvent pas être déchiffrées au niveau du point intermédiaire.
  4. Procédé selon une ou plusieurs des revendications précédentes,
    caractérisé en ce
    le module de cryptographie procède de préférence à un déchiffrement de l'information de clé avec une clé contenue dans le module de cryptographie.
  5. Procédé selon une ou plusieurs des revendications précédentes,
    caractérisé en ce que le fabricant de documents transmet des données qui lui sont propres au module de cryptographie.
  6. Procédé selon une ou plusieurs des revendications précédentes,
    caractérisé en ce que le module de cryptographie combine de manière irréversible les données apportées par le fabricant de documents avec l'information de clé.
  7. Procédé selon la revendication 6,
    caractérisé en ce que la combinaison irréversible entre les données apportées par le fabricant de documents et l'information déchiffrée de clé se fait par l'obtention d'une valeur de vérification pour le document en utilisant l'information de clé.
  8. Procédé selon une ou les deux des revendications 6 ou 7,
    caractérisé en ce que le résultat de la combinaison irréversible des données apportées par le fabricant de documents avec l'information déchiffrée de clé forme un document ou un jeu de données qui est transmis à un point de vérification.
  9. Procédé selon la revendication 8,
    caractérisé en ce que le document transmis au point de vérification contient au moins partiellement dans le texte en clair les données apportées par le fabricant de documents et qui lui sont propres.
  10. Procédé selon une ou les deux des revendications 8 ou 9,
    caractérisé en ce que l'information chiffrée de vérification est insérée dans le document transmis au point de vérification.
  11. procédé selon une ou plusieurs des revendications précédentes,
    caractérisé en ce que des informations qui sont chiffrées de manière à pouvoir être déchiffrées dans le module de cryptographie restent dans le module de cryptographie.
  12. Procédé selon une ou plusieurs des revendications précédentes,
    caractérisé en ce que la fourniture des informations au module de cryptographie même dans le cas d'un approvisionnement par un partenaire de communication dans lequel on n'a pas confiance dans le sens de la cryptographie se fait aussi par le biais d'un point dans lequel on a confiance pour la cryptographie et pour lequel le point de vérification peut faire confiance aux informations qui en proviennent.
  13. Procédé selon la revendication 12,
    caractérisé en ce
    des chiffrements cryptographiques que le point de vérification peut annuler sont appliqués par un point dans le lequel on peut faire confiance pour la préparation d'informations dans lesquelles on peut faire confiance pour le module cryptographique.
  14. Procédé selon une ou plusieurs des revendications précédentes,
    caractérisé en ce que la fourniture au module de cryptographie par le biais de partenaires de communication dans lesquels on n'a pas confiance dans le sens de la cryptographie se fait de telle manière que la transmission des informations au module de cryptographie n'est pas liée temporellement.
  15. Procédé selon une ou plusieurs des revendications 1 à 14,
    caractérisé en ce que la fourniture au module de cryptographie par le biais de partenaires de communication dans lesquels on n'a pas confiance dans le sens de la cryptographie se fait de telle manière qu'un échange d'informations dans un dialogue n'est pas requis.
  16. Procédé selon une ou plusieurs des revendications 1 à 14,
    caractérisé en ce que les deux genres de données sont liés entre eux d'un point de vue cryptographique mais ne peuvent pas être dévoilés par le biais de l'analyse cryptographique.
  17. Procédé selon la revendication 16,
    caractérisé en ce que le lien du point de vue cryptographique des deux genres de données est fait de telle manière que des parties non linéaires sont ajoutées, qui ne sont connues que par le point de contact dans lequel on a confiance et le point de vérification.
  18. Procédé selon une ou plusieurs de revendications précédentes,
    caractérisée en ce que les documents ou jeux de données infalsifiables fabriqués contiennent des informations de valeurs d'argent.
  19. Procédé selon 18
    caractérisé en ce
    l'information de valeurs d'argent est liée d'un point de vue cryptographique avec le document ou le jeu de données de telle manière qu'une comparaison entre l'information de valeurs d'argent et le document ou le jeu de données permet d'obtenir une valeur de vérification.
  20. Procédé selon une ou les deux des revendications 18 ou 19,
    caractérisé en ce que les informations de valeurs d'argent contiennent une preuve de paiement des frais de port.
  21. Procédé selon la revendication 20,
    caractérisé en ce que les informations de valeurs d'argent prouvant le paiement des frais de port sont liées avec des renseignements d'identification du fabricant de documents.
  22. Procédé selon une ou les deux des revendications 20 ou 21,
    caractérisé en ce que les informations de valeurs d'argent sont liées avec une indication d'adresse.
  23. Centre de transmission de valeurs avec une interface pour le chargement de montants de valeurs,
    caractérisé en ce que le centre de transmission de valeurs contient une interface pour la réception d'informations chiffrées d'un point de contact dans lequel on a confiance pour le cryptographie et pour l'enregistrement intermédiaire des informations chiffrées reçues, et des moyens pour une réception de requêtes de transmissions de valeurs par au moins un module de cryptographie et pour la transmission non liée temporellement de l'information chiffrée reçue vers le module de cryptographie.
  24. Centre de transmission de valeurs selon la revendication 23,
    caractérisé en ce que les informations sont chiffrées de telle manière qu'elles ne peuvent pas être déchiffrées dans le centre de transmission de valeurs.
EP03722214A 2002-03-13 2003-03-10 Procede et dispositif permettant de creer des documents infalsifiables verifiables Expired - Lifetime EP1486028B1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
SI200330135T SI1486028T1 (sl) 2002-03-13 2003-03-10 Postopek in priprava za tvorjenje preverljivo pred ponaredbo varnih dokumentov

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE10211265A DE10211265A1 (de) 2002-03-13 2002-03-13 Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Erstellung prüfbar fälschungssicherer Dokumente
DE10211265 2002-03-13
PCT/DE2003/000760 WO2003079609A1 (fr) 2002-03-13 2003-03-10 Procede et dispositif permettant de creer des documents infalsifiables verifiables

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1486028A1 EP1486028A1 (fr) 2004-12-15
EP1486028B1 true EP1486028B1 (fr) 2005-09-28

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US (2) US7409062B2 (fr)
EP (1) EP1486028B1 (fr)
JP (1) JP4286150B2 (fr)
CN (1) CN100473004C (fr)
AT (1) ATE305684T1 (fr)
AU (1) AU2003229491B8 (fr)
CA (1) CA2479144A1 (fr)
DE (2) DE10211265A1 (fr)
DK (1) DK1486028T3 (fr)
ES (1) ES2250889T3 (fr)
HK (1) HK1071488A1 (fr)
NO (1) NO20044277L (fr)
NZ (1) NZ535247A (fr)
PL (1) PL373765A1 (fr)
RU (1) RU2323531C2 (fr)
WO (1) WO2003079609A1 (fr)
ZA (1) ZA200407274B (fr)

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US6438530B1 (en) * 1999-12-29 2002-08-20 Pitney Bowes Inc. Software based stamp dispenser
DE10020402C2 (de) * 2000-04-27 2002-03-14 Deutsche Post Ag Verfahren zum Versehen von Postsendungen mit Freimachungsvermerken
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US7251728B2 (en) * 2000-07-07 2007-07-31 Message Secure Corporation Secure and reliable document delivery using routing lists
DE10056599C2 (de) * 2000-11-15 2002-12-12 Deutsche Post Ag Verfahren zum Versehen von Postsendungen mit Freimachungsvermerken

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NZ535247A (en) 2006-02-24
DE10211265A1 (de) 2003-10-09
AU2003229491A1 (en) 2003-09-29
AU2003229491B2 (en) 2008-04-10
CN100473004C (zh) 2009-03-25
JP4286150B2 (ja) 2009-06-24
EP1486028A1 (fr) 2004-12-15
WO2003079609A1 (fr) 2003-09-25
NO20044277L (no) 2004-10-08
ZA200407274B (en) 2006-02-22
ES2250889T3 (es) 2006-04-16
AU2003229491B8 (en) 2008-08-28
JP2005528015A (ja) 2005-09-15
RU2004126947A (ru) 2005-06-27
RU2323531C2 (ru) 2008-04-27
HK1071488A1 (en) 2005-07-15
DK1486028T3 (da) 2006-02-06
DE50301269D1 (de) 2006-02-09
US20050226422A1 (en) 2005-10-13
ATE305684T1 (de) 2005-10-15
PL373765A1 (en) 2005-09-19
US7409062B2 (en) 2008-08-05
US20080109359A1 (en) 2008-05-08
CN1647447A (zh) 2005-07-27

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