EP1314140A1 - Systeme de securite - Google Patents

Systeme de securite

Info

Publication number
EP1314140A1
EP1314140A1 EP01953875A EP01953875A EP1314140A1 EP 1314140 A1 EP1314140 A1 EP 1314140A1 EP 01953875 A EP01953875 A EP 01953875A EP 01953875 A EP01953875 A EP 01953875A EP 1314140 A1 EP1314140 A1 EP 1314140A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
period
security system
data
base station
communication method
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP01953875A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP1314140B1 (fr
Inventor
Peter Crowhurst
Frank Pavatich
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Robert Bosch GmbH
Original Assignee
Robert Bosch GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Robert Bosch GmbH filed Critical Robert Bosch GmbH
Publication of EP1314140A1 publication Critical patent/EP1314140A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1314140B1 publication Critical patent/EP1314140B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00182—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00555—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00793—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by Hertzian waves
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
    • G07C2209/60—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00174 - G07C9/00944
    • G07C2209/61—Signal comprising different frequencies, e.g. frequency hopping

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a safety system, in particular a passive safety system for vehicles.
  • Vehicle start-ups use remote electronic keys that include a transmitter that transmits authentication data to a vehicle's receiver when a key's transponder is energized when the key is within a predetermined range of the receiver.
  • the communication protocol activated between the transmitter and the receiver uses a radio frequency interface to carry the transmitted data and all the data that are sent from the vehicle to the key.
  • the radio frequency (RF) interface has a limited area to ensure that the communication link is broken when a key-held person moves away from the immediate vicinity of the vehicle.
  • the device is used to excite the key, to receive the transmissions transmitted by the key and to transmit the transmissions to the vehicle.
  • the intercept device often referred to as a relay station, nonnerally includes a receiver and an amplifier within the range of the key to transmit the intercepted signal to a receiver and an amplifier near the vehicle for access to the vehicle .
  • the relay location can be discovered using a two-tone test as described in the two two-tone security system specifications.
  • a relay point uses devices that do not involve a broadband amplifier, but instead use separate receivers, filters and amplifiers for each transmission channel.
  • the relay point can have separate transmitter / receiver stations, each of which is equipped with a receiver and transmitter that is dedicated to each radio frequency channel in the frequency band in which the passive safety system is operated. The relay would then not need to scan the security system frequency band to locate the channels, both of which are used for spectral authentication of the data and transponder. In this scenario, the two-tone test cannot be applied to the detection by the intercepting broadband amplifier when mixing the
  • the present invention provides a security system including an electronic key having a transmitter and a secured object having a base station having a receiver, the transmitter and the receiver being designed to communicate with each other to exchange authentication data, characterized in that the key which transmits the data in a message comprises parts with respectively predetermined periods with transmission signal variations; and that the base station detects distortions of the transmission signal variations by a relay point.
  • the present invention also provides a communication method performed by a security system, including an electronic key having a transmitter and a secured object with a base station having a receiver, the method of transmitting authentication data from the transmitter includes the recipient, characterized by
  • Transmission of the data in a message which comprises parts with respectively predetermined periods with transmission signal variations;
  • Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a preferred implementation of a security system with a relay point
  • Figure 2 is a block diagram of a security system
  • Figure 3 is a timing diagram for signals conveyed by the security system
  • Figure 4 is a diagram of a corrupted data signal
  • Figure 5 is a diagram of a frequency spectrum for two-tone transmission of the system; and Figure 6 is a diagram of a frequency spectrum for data transmission of the system.
  • a passive security system as shown in Figures 1 and 2, comprises an electronic key 4 with a transmitter 6 and a transmitting antenna 7, a base station 8 with a receiver 10 and receiving antenna 12.
  • the base station 8 is housed in a secure location, such as a Vehicle, and controls access to the secured location and / or to start the vehicle. If the key 4 is moved within a certain range of the antenna 12 of the receiver 10, the receiver 10 excites the transponder of the key 4, thereby causing the transmitter 6 to begin the transmission to the receiver 10. Data are transmitted using RF signals, which establish a communication link between the key 4 and the base station 8.
  • the data communicated between the key 4 and the base station 8 are determined by a communication protocol, which the key 4 and the base station 8 follow, and which includes the transmission of authentication data from the key 4 to the receiver 10. Access to the secured area and or for starting the vehicle is only permitted by the base station 8 if the medium-range means
  • Authentication data match the authentication data stored by the base station 8.
  • the key 4 and the base station 8 comprise a number of security features, e.g. those described in the two-tone security system specifications.
  • the components of the key 4 and base station 8 are the same as described in the two-tone security system specifications, except that the transmitter 6 of the key 4 and the receiver 10 of the base station 8 include additional filters with larger bandwidths as described below or programmable filters whose bandwidths can be adjusted.
  • the control software in the key 4 and the base station 8 is also adjusted so that the communication protocol, as described below with reference to FIG. 3, is carried out.
  • the key 4 includes a microcontroller 35 which includes control software for controlling the key components as part of the communication protocol.
  • the microcontroller 35 controls the transmitter 6, which includes a first oscillator 30 for generating the first fundamental 60 and a second oscillator 32 for generating the second fundamental 62.
  • the frequency signals generated are combined by a combiner (antenna switch) or summing amplifier 34 for transmission on the UHF transmission antenna 7.
  • the microcontroller 35 is also connected to control the oscillators 30 and 32 so that it a frequency offset or a frequency deviation, based on the data to be transmitted, as described below.
  • the microcontroller 35 is also capable of receiving control data from the base station 8 via a low-frequency receiver 9 and antenna 31.
  • the key 4 includes transponder circuitry (not shown) to energize or trigger the key 4 when it is within a predetermined range of the base station 8. Within this range, an excitation signal can be generated by the vehicle when a certain event occurs, such as lifting the door handle or the like. As soon as the key 4 is excited or activated, the communication protocol 4 for the access authorization of the vehicle is started.
  • the base station 8 comprises a microcontroller 40 which has control software and which controls the operation of the components of the base station 8. These parts include a UHF receiver 36 connected to the receiving antenna 12 to provide an output of the data received for the microcontroller 40.
  • An analog / digital converter 38 is used to convert analog output signals of the receiver 36 into digital form for the microcontroller 40. These signals include an RSSI (input signal strength indicator) output, which provides spectral signature data for the microcontroller 40.
  • RSSI input signal strength indicator
  • Intermediate frequency signals generated by the receiver 36 are passed to filter 43 for filtering and then passed back to the receiver 36 to hide the data carried by the signals.
  • the filters 43 are switched intermediate frequency filters with bandwidths that are set by the microcontroller 40 in accordance with the protocol.
  • the base station 8 also has a low-frequency transmitter 37 and antenna 39 for transmitting data from the microcontroller 40 to the key 4.
  • Low-frequency transmitter 37, antennas 31 and 39 and receiver 9 of the key 4 are designed so that a low-frequency communication connection is only established if the key 4 and the base station 8 are housed together within the secure area, for example inside the vehicle.
  • the transmitting antenna 39 may be in the form of a coil housed in the ignition barrel 39 so that a connection is only made to the antenna 31 when the key 4 is inserted into the ignition switch of the ignition system.
  • the low frequency channel connection is used to send synchronization control data from the base station to key 4 for use when the key 4 is next energized.
  • the synchronization control data is used to set the times TO, TI, T2, T3 and T4 for the different parts or components of the messages sent in the access authorization protocol.
  • the protocol shown in FIG. 3, starting at stages (a) and (b), contains the two fundamental tones mediated by the key 4 with a spacing of 100 kHz, first at low power and then at high power, and carrying out the two-tone test, as in the two-tone - Security system specifications described.
  • An example of the frequency spectrum of the signals received by the receiver 10 during two sound transmissions is shown in FIG. For example, if fundamental oscillators 30 and 32 are set to transmit 433.9 MHz and 434.1 MHz, respectively, then all
  • Third order intermodulation distortion products appear at frequencies 433.7 MHz and 434.3 MHz, 64 and 66, respectively.
  • the microcontroller 40 adjusts the filters 43 so that corresponding bandwidth filters of 100 kHz width are provided for each of the frequencies 60, 62, 64 and 66.
  • the spectral information within these bands is converted into a spectral signature for the microcontroller 40 and stored with it
  • the ability to detect a relay location using the two-tone test is maximized by the synchronized switching of the low power and high power transmission parts (a) and (b) of the relayed message.
  • the distortion products introduced into the internal modulation bands by a relay station 16 are used three times for each individual power increase.
  • a relay point 16 would have to provide its amplifiers with significant power gain or gain in order to increase the distance between the key 4 and to bridge the base station 8 of the vehicle.
  • the relay point 16 is unable and will immediately compensate for the gain in power of its amplifiers transmit an exaggerated signal to the receiver 10.
  • the authentication data to be transmitted between the base station and the key are sent in a first part. However, they are sent using frequency shift keying and applying one
  • Frequency deviation eg 200 kHz
  • a low signal 70 is sent with a +200 kHz deviation
  • a higher signal 72 is sent with a -200 kHz deviation.
  • the frequency spectrum of the signals received by the receiver 10 during the fsk data transmission is shown in FIG. Since the filters 43 of the receiver 10 have previously been set to a bandwidth of 100 kHz, they have to be adjusted in order to avoid data corruption. Accordingly, during an initial transmission, such as before or during the two-tone test, the key is instructed by the base station to transmit a certain number of bits with a frequency deviation set according to stages (a) and (b).
  • the filter circuit 43 in the receiver 10 is changed in order to be able to serve the required new bandwidth of 400 kHz at the right time.
  • the number of bits to be transmitted and frequency deviations can be sent to the key using an initial message which is triggered by the recognition and validation of the key by the base station. This initial message is encrypted and sent using the low frequency connection.
  • the timing of the Communication is designed so that the relay point is unable to adjust or change filters at the right time. Therefore, if the data is sent with the wider frequency deviation, interception by a relay station using narrow bandwidth filters 100 kHz to bypass the two-tone test can be detected at base station 8, since using the narrow bandwidth filters can result in data corruption, as in FIG Figure 4 shown would import.
  • the corruption shown in FIG. 4 is introduced through a 150 kHz bandwidth filter if a frequency deviation of +/- 150 kHz is applied to the transmitted data.
  • the two basic tones are again transmitted with a channel spacing of 100 kHz.
  • the reason is to run the two-tone test again to see if the relay site has now expanded the bandwidth of any intermediate frequency filter (IF) used at the relay site. If, for example, the bandwidth has now been increased to 400 kHz, the two-tone test used at this stage will be able to detect the presence of the wider bandwidth filter, since this will result in a mixture of the tones and the recognizable intenodulation , The duration 73 of the tones sent during this message is in turn communicated to the key 4 during the initial message. This, in turn, will prevent the relay station from adjusting the filters at the right time during the communication protocol.
  • IF intermediate frequency filter
  • the second part of the authentication data is transferred with a frequency deviation of +/- 200 kHz. This in turn was previously communicated to the key by the base station so that the security system filters can be adjusted or switched accordingly.
  • the timings for each of the parts of the message transmitted by the key 4, T0, TI, T2, T3 and T4, and possibly the frequency deviations used to transmit the data in the data parts (c) and (e) are determined by the base station after each valid one Key 4 detection changed.
  • These timing or synchronization data are supplied to the key 4 with the initial message; Parts of the initial message can be, like described above, during the transmission of parts of the message by the key, but are preferably transmitted if the key 4 and the base station 8 are housed together within the secured area, for example after the vehicle has been started.
  • the new synchronization times and deviations are then used for the next communication via the RF interface.
  • the frequency deviations for the transmission of the high and low bits of the data can be varied in accordance with the capabilities of the transmitter 6 and receiver 10 used. For example, the deviation can be as small as +/- 25 kHz. The range of that
  • the filter 10 used by the receiver 10 and the deviation used simply need to be changed during the transmission of the key message in order to recognize the presence of filters used by a relay point 16. If the frequency deviation during the transmission of the data parts exceeds the bandwidth of the filter of a relay point 16, then the data are falsified by the relay point 16 and recognized by the base station 8. If the filters of the relay station are wide enough that the data are not corrupted, then the two tones are passed through by the filters and the recognizable Intennodulationsprodu te are generated. Even if the relay point is sufficiently designed to switch intermediate frequency filters to compensate for the change in bandwidth, the relay point 16 is unable to determine when the filter bandwidth should be changed. In order to be successful, the relay station would have to change the filter bandwidths at exactly the right time, otherwise the two-tone test will reveal their presence or the data will be falsified.
  • the protocol can be varied depending on the security requirements for the secure area. For example, the performance variation between parts (a) and (b) can be dispensed with and simply a two-tone test of uniform performance can be used. It may also be decided that it is not necessary to divide the authentication data into two parts and that all data in the period will be sent after the first two-tone tests, eliminating the need for Part (d) unnecessary. If the data is combined into one part, it can be sent with the low performance and high performance two-tone test parts or the two-tone test of the single uniform performance.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
  • Radio Relay Systems (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un système de sécurité (4, 8) comprenant une clé électronique (4), qui présente un émetteur (6), ainsi qu'un objet sécurisé avec une station de base (8), qui présente un récepteur (10). L'émetteur (6) et le récepteur (10) sont conçus pour communiquer entre eux, afin d'échanger des données d'authentification. La clé (4) transmet les données dans un message qui comprend des parties avec des périodes prédéfinies (T0,...T4) présentant des variations de signal de transmission. La station de base (8) reconnaît des distorsions dans les variations de signal de transmission au moyen d'un relais.
EP01953875A 2000-08-25 2001-07-07 Systeme de securite Expired - Lifetime EP1314140B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AUPQ9682A AUPQ968200A0 (en) 2000-08-25 2000-08-25 A security system
AUPQ968200 2000-08-25
PCT/DE2001/002534 WO2002017238A1 (fr) 2000-08-25 2001-07-07 Systeme de securite

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1314140A1 true EP1314140A1 (fr) 2003-05-28
EP1314140B1 EP1314140B1 (fr) 2011-10-05

Family

ID=3823736

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP01953875A Expired - Lifetime EP1314140B1 (fr) 2000-08-25 2001-07-07 Systeme de securite

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US20040137877A1 (fr)
EP (1) EP1314140B1 (fr)
JP (1) JP2004506824A (fr)
AU (1) AUPQ968200A0 (fr)
WO (1) WO2002017238A1 (fr)

Families Citing this family (26)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP1378864A1 (fr) * 2002-07-05 2004-01-07 EM Microelectronic-Marin SA Procédé de controle d'accès d'un objet portable personnalisé à un espace déterminé, et objet portable pour la mise en oeuvre du procédé
EP1378865B1 (fr) * 2002-07-05 2008-04-30 EM Microelectronic-Marin SA Procédé de contrôle d'accès d'un objet portable personnalisé à un espace déterminé, et objet portable pour la mise en oeuvre du procédé
US20050232179A1 (en) * 2003-05-08 2005-10-20 Dacosta Francis Multiple-radio mission critical wireless mesh networks
US11368537B2 (en) 2002-10-28 2022-06-21 Dynamic Mesh Networks, Inc. High performance wireless network
US8520691B2 (en) * 2003-05-08 2013-08-27 Mesh Dynamics, Inc. Persistent mesh for isolated mobile and temporal networking
US10785316B2 (en) 2008-11-24 2020-09-22 MeshDynamics Evolutionary wireless networks
US7489720B2 (en) * 2002-11-04 2009-02-10 Texas Instruments Incorporated Method for transmit pulse design for ultra-wideband communications
GB0228032D0 (en) * 2002-11-30 2003-01-08 Koninkl Philips Electronics Nv Wireless activation system, method and device
DE10301146B4 (de) * 2003-01-14 2014-07-10 Robert Bosch Gmbh Ein Sicherheitssystem
US7251473B2 (en) * 2005-08-19 2007-07-31 Gm Global Technology Operations, Inc. System and method for controlling access to mobile devices
US20070043489A1 (en) * 2005-08-19 2007-02-22 Alrabady Ansaf I System and method for controlling access to mobile devices
US20070080779A1 (en) * 2005-10-12 2007-04-12 Lear Corporation System and method for remotely controlling a function
US8266312B2 (en) * 2007-07-20 2012-09-11 International Business Machines Corporation Method of streaming size-constrained valid XML
JP2013115613A (ja) * 2011-11-29 2013-06-10 Nippon Telegr & Teleph Corp <Ntt> 無線端末特定方法及び無線端末特定装置
EP3037306B1 (fr) * 2013-08-23 2018-09-26 Seoyon Electronics Co., Ltd Procédé destiné à éviter l'attaque de relais sur un système de clé intelligente de véhicule
US9340155B2 (en) 2013-09-17 2016-05-17 Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. Interactive vehicle window display system with user identification
US9400564B2 (en) 2013-09-17 2016-07-26 Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc. Interactive vehicle window display system with a safe driving reminder system
US9760698B2 (en) * 2013-09-17 2017-09-12 Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. Integrated wearable article for interactive vehicle control system
US9902266B2 (en) 2013-09-17 2018-02-27 Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc. Interactive vehicle window display system with personal convenience reminders
US9387824B2 (en) 2013-09-17 2016-07-12 Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc. Interactive vehicle window display system with user identification and image recording
US9807196B2 (en) 2013-09-17 2017-10-31 Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. Automated social network interaction system for a vehicle
JP6308936B2 (ja) * 2014-12-18 2018-04-11 アルプス電気株式会社 キーレスエントリー装置
FR3054510B1 (fr) * 2016-07-29 2019-04-19 Continental Automotive France Procede de defense contre une action de relais attaque sur une activation a distance d'une fonction presente dans un vehicule automobile
CN111226478A (zh) * 2018-01-12 2020-06-02 Oppo广东移动通信有限公司 数据发送方法、装置及系统
CN114128336B (zh) * 2019-05-13 2024-04-26 拉姆达4发展有限公司 无线电授权系统、方法、使用方法和访问限制系统
EP4256833A1 (fr) 2022-02-28 2023-10-11 Lambda: 4 Entwicklungen GmbH Détection d'attaques sur des systèmes d'autorisation radio

Family Cites Families (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5680134A (en) * 1994-07-05 1997-10-21 Tsui; Philip Y. W. Remote transmitter-receiver controller system
US5604462A (en) * 1995-11-17 1997-02-18 Lucent Technologies Inc. Intermodulation distortion detection in a power shared amplifier network
AU743933B2 (en) 1998-07-20 2002-02-07 Robert Bosch Gmbh An entry system
AU4241999A (en) 1998-08-27 2000-03-09 Robert Bosch Gmbh A security system
DE59906447D1 (de) 1998-09-01 2003-09-04 Kostal Leopold Gmbh & Co Kg Verfahren zum durchführen einer schlüssellosen zugangsberechtigungskontrolle sowie schlüssellose zugangsberechtigungskontrolleinrichtung
DE19850792A1 (de) 1998-11-04 2000-05-11 Opel Adam Ag Benutzeridentifikationsvorrichtung

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
See references of WO0217238A1 *

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO2002017238A1 (fr) 2002-02-28
US20040137877A1 (en) 2004-07-15
JP2004506824A (ja) 2004-03-04
EP1314140B1 (fr) 2011-10-05
AUPQ968200A0 (en) 2000-09-21

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
EP1314140B1 (fr) Systeme de securite
DE102007039599B4 (de) Fahrzeugsteuersystem
DE102014010668B4 (de) Passives schlüsselloses Ferneintrittssystem mit einer niveau-basierten Anti-Diebstahl-Eigenschaft
DE10301146B4 (de) Ein Sicherheitssystem
DE102014200417B4 (de) Kommunikationssystem und Kommunikationsvorrichtung
DE102009020404B4 (de) Verfahren zur Initialisierung einer sicheren drahtlosen Kommunikation
DE102005054215A1 (de) Tragbare Kommunikationsvorrichtung
DE102007046995A1 (de) Fahrzeugsteuersystem
DE10224284A1 (de) Nutzungsberechtigungskontrollverfahren
DE102019120207A1 (de) Passives schlüsselloses Zugangssystem
DE112014003366T5 (de) Frequenzspringen mit amplitudenpegelsteuerung nutzendes schlüsselloses anti-diebstahl-fernbedienungszugangssystem
DE19926748A1 (de) Funktionskontrollsystem, insbesondere Zugangskontrollsystem, und Verfahren zur Funktionssteuerung
EP1099204B1 (fr) Systeme d&#39;acces pour vehicules
EP1082712A2 (fr) Systeme et procede de transmission de messages
EP1108102B1 (fr) Systeme de securite
US7050587B1 (en) Security device for guarding a vehicle
EP3580938B1 (fr) Procédé de détermination de la position relative d&#39;un dispositif ble par rapport à un véhicule
DE60102616T2 (de) Handfreies Zugangs- und/oder Startsystem für Kraftfahrzeuge
DE69916461T2 (de) Sicherheitssystem
DE19839695C1 (de) Verfahren zum Durchführen einer schlüssellosen Zugangsberechtigungskontrolle sowie schlüssellose Zugangsberechtigungskontrolleinrichtung
WO1999066650A1 (fr) Procede et dispositif a diversite en frequence porteuse destines a la transmission d&#39;informations par un procede a sauts de frequence
EP1287221B1 (fr) Procede et dispositif pour controler l&#39;acces a un lieu protege, notamment une automobile
DE102008007842B3 (de) Synchronisation der Kommunikation zwischen Identifikationsgeber und Fahrzeugstation einer Zugangsvorrichtung
DE10027380A1 (de) Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Betreiben eines Berechtigungssystems
EP1254042A1 (fr) Procede permettant de faire fonctionner un systeme antivol pour vehicule et systeme antivol associe

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PUAI Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012

17P Request for examination filed

Effective date: 20030325

AK Designated contracting states

Designated state(s): AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LI LU MC NL PT SE TR

17Q First examination report despatched

Effective date: 20040322

RBV Designated contracting states (corrected)

Designated state(s): DE FR GB IT SE

17Q First examination report despatched

Effective date: 20040322

GRAP Despatch of communication of intention to grant a patent

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR1

GRAS Grant fee paid

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR3

GRAA (expected) grant

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009210

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: B1

Designated state(s): DE FR GB IT SE

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: GB

Ref legal event code: FG4D

Free format text: NOT ENGLISH

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R096

Ref document number: 50115973

Country of ref document: DE

Effective date: 20111201

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: SE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20111005

PLBE No opposition filed within time limit

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009261

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: NO OPPOSITION FILED WITHIN TIME LIMIT

26N No opposition filed

Effective date: 20120706

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R097

Ref document number: 50115973

Country of ref document: DE

Effective date: 20120706

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: FR

Ref legal event code: PLFP

Year of fee payment: 16

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: FR

Ref legal event code: PLFP

Year of fee payment: 17

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: FR

Ref legal event code: PLFP

Year of fee payment: 18

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: DE

Payment date: 20190924

Year of fee payment: 19

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: FR

Payment date: 20200727

Year of fee payment: 20

Ref country code: GB

Payment date: 20200724

Year of fee payment: 20

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: IT

Payment date: 20200731

Year of fee payment: 20

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R119

Ref document number: 50115973

Country of ref document: DE

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: DE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20210202

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: GB

Ref legal event code: PE20

Expiry date: 20210706

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: GB

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF EXPIRATION OF PROTECTION

Effective date: 20210706