EP1282882A1 - Procede et systeme de production d'un ensemble de donnees de cle - Google Patents

Procede et systeme de production d'un ensemble de donnees de cle

Info

Publication number
EP1282882A1
EP1282882A1 EP01951481A EP01951481A EP1282882A1 EP 1282882 A1 EP1282882 A1 EP 1282882A1 EP 01951481 A EP01951481 A EP 01951481A EP 01951481 A EP01951481 A EP 01951481A EP 1282882 A1 EP1282882 A1 EP 1282882A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
data
biometric
data record
characteristic
key data
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
EP01951481A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Albert MÖDL
Elmar Stephan
Robert Müller
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Giesecke and Devrient GmbH
Original Assignee
Giesecke and Devrient GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Giesecke and Devrient GmbH filed Critical Giesecke and Devrient GmbH
Publication of EP1282882A1 publication Critical patent/EP1282882A1/fr
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06V—IMAGE OR VIDEO RECOGNITION OR UNDERSTANDING
    • G06V40/00—Recognition of biometric, human-related or animal-related patterns in image or video data
    • G06V40/10—Human or animal bodies, e.g. vehicle occupants or pedestrians; Body parts, e.g. hands
    • G06V40/12—Fingerprints or palmprints
    • G06V40/1347—Preprocessing; Feature extraction

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for authenticating a person using biometric data, and in particular to a method for generating a key data record for a verification process from the biometric data of this person.
  • the invention further relates to a system for generating the key data record and a system for authenticating the person using biometric data.
  • a key which is assigned to this person and which comprises a discrete data record This can be, for example, a personal identification number (PIN).
  • PIN personal identification number
  • the PIN is stored as a reference key either directly in the access-protected system or in a separate data carrier that serves as identification for the access-protected system.
  • the data carrier can itself represent an access-protected system, for example a credit card, cash card or the like.
  • PIN-based systems A disadvantage of PIN-based systems is that the PIN is easily forgotten and is therefore often written down, which reduces system security.
  • PINs are not personal, but only personal. This means that the PIN can be passed on or spied on to other people, which increases the authorized user group in an uncontrollable manner. Entering the PIN with or without presenting a user card is therefore no proof of the presence of the legitimate user.
  • a disadvantage of the biometric user verification is that the comparison between the stored biometric data and the respectively presented sensor-acquired biometric data is only a comparison of similarities, in which only a statement can be made as to the probability with which they are to be compared Data match.
  • the sensor systems currently available are not suitable for deriving the same biometric data from a presented biometric feature with completely exact reproducibility.
  • a set of biometric data which is stored as a reference data set, for example in a chip card, is only checked for a necessary degree of compliance with a newly recorded biometric data set.
  • complex biometric software with complex biometric algorithms runs in the background during the verification phase. The verification using biometric algorithms is accordingly relatively complex.
  • biometric user verification is fundamentally more reliable than a simple PIN comparison.
  • it cannot be transferred to conventional security systems with a PIN comparison without having to make complex changes to the file systems, chip card applications and transaction sequences.
  • the introduction of biometric verification would often involve the exchange of all cards in circulation would have to, since card application and file system change. Interventions in the transaction process would also be necessary, so that the online check of the PIN would have to be replaced by an offline check, for example of an Irish pattern.
  • the object of the present invention is to overcome the disadvantages associated with biometric user verification without losing the advantages achieved with biometric user verification compared to PIN verification.
  • the invention makes use of the fact that a biometric feature can never be sensed completely in the form of clearly reproducible raw data for generating a reference data or verification data record, but that the raw data recorded in each case have enough common ground to make the descent from the same feature carrier statistically plausible to be able to prove. Therefore, according to the invention, instead of the complete biometric reference or verification data, only a comparatively small number of particularly characteristic data is obtained from the biometric raw data in order to generate a discrete data set as a reference key or verification key data set from this characteristic raw data set, which is always clearly reproducible , This discrete key data record is then used either directly as a PIN replacement or to generate a unique PIN ("biometrically generated PIN").
  • the biometrically generated PIN is generated in the terminal in which the sensor unit is installed and transferred to the system as a PIN, possibly cryptographically secured. As with the conventional PIN, it can happen that several people from the user group are assigned the same P ⁇ N.
  • the biometrically generated PIN By generating and using the biometrically generated PIN, there is no need to store a complex biometric reference data record on the data carrier card, e.g. B. a chip card or magnetic card, and / or in the system. Rather, the biometrically generated PIN is saved and used like a conventional PIN. Interventions in the process structure and data management of the applications are unnecessary, so that the biometry can be integrated into existing, PIN-based systems and card applications without any particular organizational effort. The PIN comparison can remain unchanged in the background system or on the card. To the extent that today's systems provide that users are allowed to define their PINs themselves, cards in circulation can continue to be used unchanged with a new, biometrically generated PIN.
  • the data carrier card e.g. B. a chip card or magnetic card
  • the biometric PIN generation can optionally be provided for entering the PIN until all systems are equipped with sensors for recording the characteristic biometric raw data.
  • the optimal use of both PIN systems will still make sense in the future for users with temporarily or permanently poor quality of the corn. If necessary, such users can use the classic PIN entry and use the same interface as the biometric users.
  • the biometric PIN generation is an unambiguous mapping, that is, the presented and sensed raw biometric data of a person are always mapped to the same PIN.
  • the biometrically generated PIN thus combines the advantages of conventional PINs with the Biometry and at the same time overcomes the disadvantages of conventional PIN and biometric systems.
  • a fingerprint or the iris structure or any other biometric feature for example a characteristic behavior pattern of the person, can be used as the biometric feature.
  • a dynamic signature ie the conditions that occur when signing, for example, pressure and / or speed are evaluated.
  • the figure shows a direction vector image 1 to the papillary strips of a fingerprint, the center of which lies approximately in the middle of the direction vector image.
  • the direction vector image 1 is divided into districts 2 with a similar overall orientation, the weighted centroids of which form 3 connection points for a graph 4 derived from the fingerprint.
  • this graph is "fault-tolerant", since its structure is only slightly influenced by the quality of the measurement sensors used for recording the raw fingerprint data. That is, the characteristic data derived from the fingerprint or the derived graph 4 differs from others, Characteristic data derived from the same fingerprint only marginally, regardless of the raw data actually determined by sensor _ _!
  • the derived graph 4 is then compared in a comparison algorithm 6 with comparison graphs 4 'stored in a graph database 5, a multiple-digit number being assigned to each comparison graph 4 1 .
  • a biometrically generated PIN (“BioPIN”) 7 is assigned to the recorded fingerprint and thus the person to be identified, corresponding to the multi-digit number associated with the closest comparison graph 4 ′.
  • the rough orientation of the papillary strips of the fingerprint is used as characteristic data of the fingerprint, in order to use this rough orientation to classify the fingerprint to a specific fingerprint type.
  • the standard FBI classification system does not evaluate orientations, but rather relative positions of the centers or delta points. (A delta point is a point around which the lines form a triangle).
  • the types can include, for example, "left loop", “right loop”, “whorl”, “regular arch”, “tented arch”, “double loop”.
  • the FBI classification system with only six classes is too unspecific for the intended purposes and must therefore be expanded to at least 1,000, preferably 10,000 or even more, with each class standing for a special PIN code.
  • minutiae are the characteristic points of a fingerprint, namely line ends and line branches in the fingerprint image. In most fingerprint verification algorithms, these points are used for comparison purposes; for the present invention is direct use
  • the minutiae is unsuitable, however, because individual minutiae may no longer be present in the currently captured image depending on the sensor, lighting conditions, local injuries and other factors, may be slightly shifted or may have been added.
  • the minutiae are statistically evaluated, since a statistical evaluation is fault-tolerant towards specific minutiae. This means that even with slightly different statistical evaluation results, the evaluation results are so close together that they lie within an error tolerance limit, so that each evaluation leads to a clear result and thus to a clear key data record.
  • the minutiae can be statistically evaluated in different ways.
  • a template of concentric circles or segments of circles can be placed around the center of the fingerprint and the average number of minutiae in the predefined concentric circles or -
  • the average number of minutiae which have a predefined orientation can be determined, the predefined orientation being, for example, the direction of a connecting line between centers
  • An average line density of the fingerprint image can also be determined on the basis of the biometric raw data, for example by Fast Fourier transformation of the image, a key data record or a PIN code being generated directly on the basis of the determined average line density.
  • the local density or the average distance between the welding pores on the papillary strips can be used as characteristic data from the biometric raw data in order to generate the key data set.

Abstract

Selon l'invention, on se propose de mettre en commun les avantages de systèmes de sécurité fonctionnant avec NIP et les avantages de systèmes de sécurité à base biométrique, et d'éliminer les inconvénients inhérents aux systèmes respectifs, par production biométrique univoque du NIP. A cet effet, on dérive à partir des données brutes biométriques déterminées, des données caractéristiques pouvant être reproduites de manière univoque. Ensuite, on produit un ensemble de données de clé à partir de ces données caractéristiques pouvant être reproduites de manière univoque, ledit ensemble de données représentant le code NIP, ou pouvant être produit à partir du code NIP. Ainsi, le code NIP peut toujours être reproduit de manière univoque à partir des données biométriques. L'utilisateur n'est plus contraint de mémoriser le code NIP, et le code NIP ne peut pas être transmis à un tiers.
EP01951481A 2000-05-09 2001-05-07 Procede et systeme de production d'un ensemble de donnees de cle Ceased EP1282882A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE10022570 2000-05-09
DE10022570A DE10022570A1 (de) 2000-05-09 2000-05-09 Verfahren und System zur Generierung eines Schlüsseldatensatzes
PCT/EP2001/005154 WO2001086584A1 (fr) 2000-05-09 2001-05-07 Procede et systeme de production d'un ensemble de donnees de cle

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1282882A1 true EP1282882A1 (fr) 2003-02-12

Family

ID=7641311

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP01951481A Ceased EP1282882A1 (fr) 2000-05-09 2001-05-07 Procede et systeme de production d'un ensemble de donnees de cle

Country Status (8)

Country Link
US (1) US6782120B2 (fr)
EP (1) EP1282882A1 (fr)
JP (1) JP2003533784A (fr)
CN (1) CN100474330C (fr)
AU (1) AU2001272396A1 (fr)
DE (1) DE10022570A1 (fr)
RU (1) RU2267159C2 (fr)
WO (1) WO2001086584A1 (fr)

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
RU2267159C2 (ru) 2005-12-27
CN100474330C (zh) 2009-04-01
US6782120B2 (en) 2004-08-24
DE10022570A1 (de) 2001-11-15
JP2003533784A (ja) 2003-11-11
US20030156011A1 (en) 2003-08-21
AU2001272396A1 (en) 2001-11-20
CN1429377A (zh) 2003-07-09
WO2001086584A1 (fr) 2001-11-15

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