EP1039422A2 - Vorrichtung zur Prüfung der Echtheit eines tragbaren Datenträgers - Google Patents
Vorrichtung zur Prüfung der Echtheit eines tragbaren Datenträgers Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP1039422A2 EP1039422A2 EP00104583A EP00104583A EP1039422A2 EP 1039422 A2 EP1039422 A2 EP 1039422A2 EP 00104583 A EP00104583 A EP 00104583A EP 00104583 A EP00104583 A EP 00104583A EP 1039422 A2 EP1039422 A2 EP 1039422A2
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- intermediate unit
- data carrier
- test module
- portable data
- authenticity
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/12—Card verification
Definitions
- the invention relates to a device for checking the authenticity of a portable Data carrier according to the genus of the main claim.
- Such is known e.g. from DE-A-44 19 805.
- a portable Disk equipped with a hardware feature that is preferred has the form of a logic circuit and the defined generation of a Response data record from an input data record allowed.
- the response record generation takes place at such a high speed that a rapid replication of the changes made by a Program, i.e. not possible in software form.
- a Data carrier in a given time window a defined data change can therefore determine whether the data carrier is genuine.
- the testing unit has an on the Hardware feature coordinated evaluation circuit and is via a separate, fast data transmission channel with the hardware feature connected.
- the well-known concept significantly improves the security of Disks by simply duplicating the hardware structure effectively suppressed. However, it does require the provision of a Test circuit and a sufficiently fast data transmission channel to the data carrier hardware feature. The concept is suitable therefore generally not for existing ones accessing a data carrier Orders that do not have these requirements.
- the invention has for its object the concept of authentication of portable media so that it can be easily can also be used when accessing a portable data carrier Device does not have a test module and sufficient fast data channel.
- the test module and the fast data transmission channel are in an intermediate unit realized, which in the manner of an adapter between the portable data carrier and the device accessing it is.
- the intermediate unit has a first interface for data exchange with the portable data carrier and a second interface to Establishing a connection to the one accessing the data carrier Contraption.
- the second interface is mechanically designed so that it is without Need to make further adjustments to the device can be connected. This enables in an advantageous manner, even originally equip devices not intended for this purpose with authenticity checking devices.
- the execution of the authentication device as an independent Unit advantageously allows simple adaptation a device to newly introduced security features through replacement the entire authenticity test facility. Existing can also be created at any time Authenticity checking facilities through updated, e.g. with additional functions replace provided equipment.
- a preferred application for the concept according to the invention form chip cards and accessing them Devices, for example in the form of terminals. It is particularly advantageous the second interface of the intermediate in turn itself like a chip card designed so that the intermediate to an existing conventional smart card reader a terminal can be connected.
- FIG. 1 shows a portable data carrier 10 in a block structure, which has an intermediate 20 to prove its authenticity with a Device 30 is connected to a function realized in the data carrier 10 accesses.
- the following is an embodiment for a portable Data carrier 10 is based on a chip card, which, for example, a Provides exchange function.
- the main functional component of the chip card 10 is a microprocessor circuit 11. It realizes a useful function set up on the chip card 10, e.g. a stock exchange function. There is also a chip card 10 on Hardware element 12 in the form of a fast, performing a defined operation logic circuit.
- the intermediate unit 20 has a counterpart to the hardware element 12 Check module 24, which is designed to ensure the authenticity of the hardware element 12 to be verified.
- Test module 24 and hardware element 12 are for this purpose connected to one another via a high-speed data channel 13.
- the high-speed data channel 13 is expediently physical as an independent one, specially tailored to the proof of authenticity Structure trained.
- Another component of the intermediate unit 20 is a controllable data bus 22 with an interface for connecting the chip card 10 and an interface to the terminal 30.
- the data bus 22 is also via a data connection 25 connected to the test module 24.
- processor circuit 11 of chip card 10 and intermediate unit 20 is further parallel to the high speed data channel 13 Usual serial or parallel data transmission path 21 formed the to the processor circuit 11 on the one hand and to the data bus 22 on the other is led.
- the intermediate unit 20 is connected to the terminal 30. Together with the data transmission path 21 and the bus 22 forms the data transmission path 23 a data transmission path between the terminal 30 and the portable data carrier 10.
- the terminal 30 has a central for its intended operation Processor unit 31. In addition to terminal operating functions, it realizes in particular Functions which can only be carried out with the involvement of chip card 10 are, e.g. Booking processes, and physically changing one in Integrated circuit 11 of the chip card 10 existing memory content have as a consequence.
- the terminal 30 is for reading and writing one Chip card 10 formed.
- the authenticity of a chip card 10 is verified via the high-speed data channel 13.
- the test module 24 sends test information to the hardware element 12 located in the chip card 10, which derives a response signal from it at high speed and without delay sends back to the test module 24.
- This first checks the timely receipt of the response signal in a predetermined time window, then its accuracy. For the authenticity check is used that for the generation and return of the reply signal
- the total time required is shorter than that for a replica same process by software shortest possible time.
- the chip card 10 takes place as genuine via the data transmission paths 21, 22, 23 expediently further, software-based security checks between chip card 10 and terminal 30, e.g. an authorization check by checking a PIN.
- the test module 24 causes a corresponding one to be canceled Error signals to Terminal 30. It also blocks the controllable data bus 22, so that data exchange between terminal 30 and portable Disk 10 is not possible. Furthermore, it can be provided that the Terminal 30 makes an irreversible change in the chip card, which is also recognized by other terminals.
- FIG. 2 illustrates an implementation form of the one shown in FIG. 1 Functional structure.
- the intermediate unit 20 has for receiving one Chip card 10 has a receiving slot 201, in which there are connections for production of the high-speed data channel 13 and the regular data transmission path 21 are located.
- the receiving shaft 201 is one Chip card 10 used so that both high-speed data channel 13 how regular data transmission path 21 are set up.
- the intermediate unit 20 is in turn formed in a terminal 30 Receiving slot 301 used, such that the data transmission path 23 to the central processor unit 31 of the terminal 30.
- Receiving slot 301 used, such that the data transmission path 23 to the central processor unit 31 of the terminal 30.
- insertion section 203 used, such that the data transmission path 23 to the central processor unit 31 of the terminal 30.
- head part 204 lies outside the structure of the Terminals 30
- the receiving shaft 201 of the intermediate unit 20 is expediently Recording of the chip card 10 and the implementation of the regular data transmission route 21 and the high-speed data channel 13 after kind of a conventional card reading unit for writing / reading a chip card educated.
- the receiving shaft is used to implement the interfaces 201 corresponding to the intermediate unit 20 as a conventional chip card read / write unit executed, which depending on the type of chip card 10 a contactless and / or a contact-related data connection to corresponding ones Establishes contact means on the chip card 10.
- Via a data line 205 the read / write unit 201 is connected to the test module 24. This is also expedient in the head part 204 of the intermediate unit 20 arranged on or in the read / write unit 201.
- the head part 204 can by appropriate design of the head part 204 provide sufficient space in a simple manner.
- Via another data line 208 is furthermore the read / write unit 201 on contact means 206 guided, which are formed on the insertion section 203 and to Production of the data transmission path 23 to the terminal 30 serve.
- the data transmission link 23 is also expedient between Terminal 30 and intermediate unit 20 are formed in chip card technology.
- receiving slot 301 of terminal 30 is in the manner of a conventional card reading unit executed.
- the insertion section 203 of the intermediate unit 20 accordingly has a flat, the geometry of a chip card Shape in which contact means 206 for contacting and / or a coil are designed for contactless data transmission. Matched to it there is a read / write unit 302 in the terminal 30 for reading or Describe smart cards. With the contact means 206, it forms the data transmission path 23. Via a data line 303 Read / write unit 302 connected to the central processor unit 31.
- the terminal 30 can, as indicated in FIG. 2, take the form of a conventional one Have payment terminals.
- additional functional elements 207 are sensors for detection, for example biometric characteristics of a user in order to thereby authorize their use to consider.
- Fingerprint sensors are equally suitable, Face recognition sensors and / or voice recognition sensors.
- the signals supplied by such sensors are evaluated expediently directly in the intermediate unit 20.
- the facility a user dialog by means of an on the intermediate unit 20 trained display / input device may be provided.
- the dialogue to be carried out can be controlled by the intermediate unit alone 20, or also with the involvement of the central processor unit 31 of the Terminals 30 take place.
- the intermediate unit 20 is advantageously equipped with means which have a Support fixed connection to Terminal 30. As indicated in Fig. 2, can do this on the contact surface between the head part 204 of the intermediate unit 20 and the top 304 of the terminal 30 an adhesive layer 34 be arranged.
- Such is inexpensive and allows convenient Handling, e.g. is covered with silicone paper that immediately before inserting the intermediate unit 20 into the terminal 30 becomes.
- the intermediate unit 20 shown in FIG. 2 is under in structure and design Maintaining its basic functionality can be designed in a wide range. So there is a possible design variant to increase the mechanical Stability of the transition between the head part 204 and the insertion section 203 in that the receiving shaft 201 completely within the Put headboard 204 so that the portable data carrier 10 in the inserted end position lies outside the terminal building.
- the test module 24 can also be covered with a protective layer, which in the event of attempted manipulation of the test module Destruction of security-relevant data in the test module 24, on the chip card 10 and / or in terminal 30.
- the design of the in the terminal receiving shaft is also not mandatory 301 engaging insertion section 203 in the form of a chip card.
- 3 illustrates an embodiment variant in which the intermediate unit 20 almost completely in a correspondingly large size Receiving shaft 301 of the terminal 30 is located. Outside the terminal building is only a more widespread end surface as the head part 204, which for Fixation of the intermediate unit 20 is used and any existing additional functional elements 207 such as sensors for biometric feature detection wearing.
- Read / write unit 201 and test module 24 are in the insertion section 203, i.e. they are within the operational end position of the receiving shaft 301.
- the variant shown in FIG. 3 facilitated by the larger available space Realization of the data transmission link 23 between the intermediate unit 20 and read / write unit 302 of the terminal 30. However, it requires that the terminal 30 with a special design for the intermediate unit 20 adapted receiving slot 301 is provided.
- Fig. 4 shows a further embodiment of the intermediate unit 20.
- Sie in contrast to the variants shown in FIGS. 2 and 3, none own slot 201 for receiving a chip card 10.
- terminal 30 has a large recess 40 in the intermediate unit 20 and chip card 10 are placed together so that the between unit-side read / write unit 201 the contact means of Chip card 10 is opposite and data transmission links 21 and High-speed data channel 13 are set up.
- Shape together Intermediate unit 20 and the recess 40 of the terminal 30 a receiving shaft 401, three sides of which are part of terminal 30, the fourth is defined by the intermediate unit 20.
- For the chip card 10 forms the Receiving shaft 401 with inserted intermediate unit 20 in turn usual reader.
- the rest of the design of the intermediate unit 20 is appropriately based on the embodiment variant Fig.
- the headboard 204 is designed as a widespread end surface on which there may be existing ones additional functional elements 207 are located, the test module 24 arranged in the insertion section 203.
- the design variant allows a lot small-sized intermediate units 20, but in turn requires that the terminal 30 is specially designed for receiving the intermediate unit 20.
Landscapes
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
- Inspection Of Paper Currency And Valuable Securities (AREA)
- Fittings On The Vehicle Exterior For Carrying Loads, And Devices For Holding Or Mounting Articles (AREA)
- Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)
Abstract
Description
- Fig. 1
- das der vorgeschlagenen Anordnung zugrundeliegende Sicherheitskonzept,
- Fig. 2
- ein Terminal mit einer Zwischenheit in Seitenansicht,
- Fig. 3
- ein Terminal mit einer ersten abgewandelten Zwischeneinheit, und
- Fig. 4
- ein Terminal mit einer zweiten abgewandelten Zwischeneinheit.
Claims (13)
- Vorrichtung zur Prüfung der Echtheit eines tragbaren Datenträgers, welcher über eine Datenübertragungsstrecke mit der Vorrichtung verbindbar ist, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Datenübertragungsstrecke (24, 22, 23) über eine Zwischeneinheit (20) realisiert ist welche ein Prüfmodul (24) trägt, das selbständig eine Kommunikation mit dem tragbaren Datenträger (10) durchführt.
- Vorrichtung nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß das auf der Zwischeneinheit(20) angeordnete Prüfmodul (24) eine Prüfung zum Nachweis der Echtheit des tragbaren Datenträgers (10) durchführt.
- Vorrichtung nach Anspruch 2, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß das Prüfmodul (24) eine Eigenschaft eines auf dem tragbaren Datenträger (10) ausgebildeten Echtheitsmerkmals prüft.
- Vorrichtung nach Anspruch 3, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß das Echtheitsmerkmal ein Hardware-Element ist.
- Vorrichtung nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß zwischen tragbarem Datenträger (10) und Zwischeneinheit (20) eine gesonderte Datenübertragungsstrecke (13) besteht über die das Prüfmodul (24) mit dem tragbaren Datenträfger (10) kommuniziert.
- Vorrichtung nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Zwischeneinheit (20) einen steuerbaren Datenbus (22) aufweist, der Teil der Datenübertragungsstrecke zwischen Terminal (30) und tragbarem Datenträger (10) ist.
- Vorrichtung nach Anspruch 6, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der steuerbare Datenbus (22) mit dem Prüfmodul (24) verbunden ist.
- Vorrichtung nach Anspruch 2, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß das Prüfmodul (24) die Echtheit nachweist indem es ein Prüfsignal absetzt und darauf den zeitgerechten Eingang eines vorbestimmten Antwortsignales überwacht.
- Vorrichtung nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Datenübertragungsstrecke (21) zwischen dem tragbaren Datenträger (10) und der Zwischeneinheit (20) baulich wie eine Einrichtung zur Kontaktierung einer Chipkarte ausgeführt ist.
- Vorrichtung nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Zwischeneinheit (20) in Gestalt einer lösbar mit der Vorrichtung (30) verbindbaren Adaptereinrichtung (20) ausgeführt ist.
- Vorrichtung nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Datenübertragungsstrecke (23) zwischen der Vorrichtung (30) und der Zwischeneinheit (20) baulich wie eine Einrichtung zur Kontaktierung einer Chipkarte ausgeführt ist.
- Zwischeneinheit zur Verwendung in Verbindung mit einer Vorrichtung gemäß Anspruch 1, gekennzeichnet durch Mittel zur Herstellung einer Datenübertragungsstrecke (21, 22, 23) zwischen einem Terminal (30) und einem tragbaren Datenträger (10) sowie ein Prüfmodul (24), welches zur Durchführung einer selbständigen Kommunikation mit dem tragbaren Datenträger (10) ausgebildet ist.
- Zwischeneinheit nach Anspruch 12, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß das Prüfmodul (24) mit einer Schutzschicht überzogen ist die im Falle eines Manipulationsversuches eine Zerstörung sicherheitsrelevanter Daten auslöst.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE19913326A DE19913326A1 (de) | 1999-03-24 | 1999-03-24 | Vorrichtung zur Prüfung der Echtheit eines tragbaren Datenträgers |
DE19913326 | 1999-03-24 |
Publications (3)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1039422A2 true EP1039422A2 (de) | 2000-09-27 |
EP1039422A3 EP1039422A3 (de) | 2002-07-17 |
EP1039422B1 EP1039422B1 (de) | 2008-06-25 |
Family
ID=7902234
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP00104583A Expired - Lifetime EP1039422B1 (de) | 1999-03-24 | 2000-03-14 | Prüfung der Echtheit eines tragbaren Datenträgers |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1039422B1 (de) |
AT (1) | ATE399355T1 (de) |
DE (2) | DE19913326A1 (de) |
Families Citing this family (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE10041669A1 (de) * | 2000-08-10 | 2002-02-21 | Deutsche Telekom Ag | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Prüfen der Echtheit einer Chipkarte |
DE20117644U1 (de) | 2001-10-31 | 2002-12-05 | Siemens AG, 80333 München | Lesegerät für elektronische Datenträger mit Zugangsberechtigung |
Citations (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE4419805A1 (de) | 1994-06-06 | 1995-12-07 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Verfahren zur Echtheitsprüfung eines Datenträgers |
Family Cites Families (19)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE3736882C2 (de) * | 1987-10-30 | 1997-04-30 | Gao Ges Automation Org | Verfahren zur Echtheitsprüfung eines Datenträgers mit integriertem Schaltkreis |
FR2650097B1 (fr) * | 1989-07-19 | 1992-12-31 | Pailles Jean Claude | Carte a microcircuit cable et procede de transaction entre une carte a microcircuit cable correspondante et un terminal |
DE69022976T2 (de) * | 1990-02-06 | 1996-05-30 | Bell Telephone Mfg | Elektronischer Betrugsdetektor. |
CZ287295B6 (cs) * | 1992-03-17 | 2000-10-11 | Ip-Tpg Holdco S.A.R.L. | Zařízení pro zjišťování pokusů podvodů na čtecím a popisovacím zařízení čipové karty |
DE4219739A1 (de) * | 1992-06-17 | 1993-12-23 | Philips Patentverwaltung | Verfahren und Schaltungsanordnung zum Prüfen einer Wertkarte |
FR2696032B1 (fr) * | 1992-09-21 | 1994-12-23 | Oberthur Ckd | Dispositif pour effectuer des transactions avec cartes à microprocesseur, et procédé pour effectuer une transaction avec un tel dispositif. |
DE4242579C2 (de) * | 1992-12-16 | 1997-08-21 | Siemens Ag | Verfahren zur Echtheitserkennung von Datenträgern |
DE4407173A1 (de) * | 1994-03-04 | 1995-09-14 | Arnulf Jost | Adapterkarte für Funktelefone |
US5500517A (en) * | 1994-09-02 | 1996-03-19 | Gemplus Card International | Apparatus and method for data transfer between stand alone integrated circuit smart card terminal and remote computer of system operator |
US5599231A (en) * | 1994-10-31 | 1997-02-04 | Nintendo Co., Ltd. | Security systems and methods for a videographics and authentication game/program fabricating device |
DE19541290A1 (de) * | 1995-11-06 | 1997-05-07 | Orga Kartensysteme Gmbh | Chipkartentelefon |
AT405337B (de) * | 1995-11-08 | 1999-07-26 | Siemens Ag Oesterreich | Einrichtung zum überprüfen von sicherheitsrelevanten daten einer chipkarte |
EP0867015B1 (de) * | 1995-12-14 | 1999-08-04 | Landis & Gyr Technology Innovation AG | Zusatzsicherheitsmerkmal für chipkarten |
DE29602609U1 (de) * | 1996-02-15 | 1997-06-12 | Robert Bosch Gmbh, 70469 Stuttgart | Erweiterte elektronische Chipkarteneinrichtung |
JP2000509532A (ja) * | 1996-04-30 | 2000-07-25 | エレクトロワット テクノロジイ イノベイション アクチェンゲゼルシャフト | チップカードに第2のチップを、チップカードリーダにより認識されないように取り付けることを防止する装置 |
US5861662A (en) * | 1997-02-24 | 1999-01-19 | General Instrument Corporation | Anti-tamper bond wire shield for an integrated circuit |
DE19810817A1 (de) * | 1997-03-14 | 1998-10-01 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | System zur Prüfung der Zugangsbrechtigung |
DE19734507C2 (de) * | 1997-08-08 | 2000-04-27 | Siemens Ag | Verfahren zur Echtheitsprüfung eines Datenträgers |
DE19739448A1 (de) * | 1997-09-09 | 1999-03-11 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Verfahren zur Echtheitsprüfung eines Datenträgers |
-
1999
- 1999-03-24 DE DE19913326A patent/DE19913326A1/de not_active Ceased
-
2000
- 2000-03-14 AT AT00104583T patent/ATE399355T1/de not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2000-03-14 DE DE50015221T patent/DE50015221D1/de not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2000-03-14 EP EP00104583A patent/EP1039422B1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
Patent Citations (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE4419805A1 (de) | 1994-06-06 | 1995-12-07 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Verfahren zur Echtheitsprüfung eines Datenträgers |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
DE50015221D1 (de) | 2008-08-07 |
ATE399355T1 (de) | 2008-07-15 |
DE19913326A1 (de) | 2000-10-05 |
EP1039422B1 (de) | 2008-06-25 |
EP1039422A3 (de) | 2002-07-17 |
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